THE HOMOGENEOUS EVOLUTION OF CATHOLIC DOGMA

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GENERAL INTRODUCTION

A SYNTHETIC VIEW

Among many other errors, Modernism maintained that Catholic dogma *does not always preserve the same meaning.* The content of dogmas is subject, not to the immutability of data objectively revealed by God, but rather to the contingency of human psychological and religious factors. Dogmas are as contingent and changeable as the subjective conditions of the human beings who believe in them. Since these conditions evolve and suffer frequent changes, without there being any substantive and homogeneous continuity throughout the whole process, it follows that dogmas can undergo a change of substantive content, and that dogmatic formulae can in the course of time come to have different, even contrary, meanings.

These Modernistic tenets were condemned by Pius X in the Encyclical *Pascendi dominici gregis* of 8 September, 1907.[1] And in the *Oath against Modernism* prescribed by the same Pius X we find the following: "I sincerely receive the doctrine of Faith transmitted *always in the same sense and the same teaching* from the Apostles through the orthodox Fathers down to our own times; hence I reject altogether the heretical figment of the *evolution of dogmas that change from one meaning to another.*"[2]

What the Pope condemned was the *evolution* of dogmas *from one meaning to another.* However, as was to be expected, the backlash of reaction rendered suspect the term *evolution* itself. Pius X never denied that dogmas evolved; what he denied was that they evolved in such a manner as to lose the revealed meaning they possessed at the beginning; in other words, that dogma is subject to *transformistic* evolution. Nonetheless, people readily identified these two terms *evolution* and *transformism* since both science and theology

[1] *ACTA SANCTAE SEDIS,* 40 (1907), 593 ff.

[2] *Oath against Modernism,* AAS, 2 (1910), 669-672; Denz.-Schön. 3541.

had been employing them as synonyms – science, because it had been looking at evolution through Darwinian concepts; theology, because it had been looking at the same through Modernist notions.[3]

Understandably, then, theologians entertained serious misgivings about employing the term. It was in this context of the recent condemnation of Modernism, when the very term *evolution* was suspect, that Fr. Marín-Sola began his series of articles in *La Ciencia Tomista* on *The Homogeneity of the Catholic Doctrine.*[4] Considering the times, the term *homogeneity* was bound to be particularly gratifying to theologians; very much less so the term evolution, which the author of the articles considered consistent with the immutability of revealed dogma.

Despite early misgivings, the articles succeeded in making headway. People began to see that dogma could evolve with no danger of *transforming* itself or of *changing its meaning;* that evolution is inherent in every living and growing thing; that it ought to exist in the revealed deposit unless one was prepared to accept that the deposit was itself inert and lifeless; and that, as a matter of fact, both the history of dogmas and traditional theology were unanimous in affirming the existence of dogmatic evolution. All these points were amply substantiated by Fr. Marín in his articles. Eventually he gathered them together and published them as a closely knit whole which is the present masterpiece THE HOMOGENEOUS EVOLUTION OF CATHOLIC DOGMA. Other writers had already employed the controversial term, and new authors had begun to use it again. On this point they concurred with Fr. Marín, but there was a divergence of views with respect to the extension and scope attributed to the evolving vitality of the revealed doctrine.

The articles in *La Ciencia Tomista* definitively established their author in theological circles. Up to then he had had a name only in the small ambit of Manila, Ávila, and Rosaryville. Now his name was made throughout the world. It did not take long to recognize that here was an exceptional personality – exceptional in the clear vision of the problems, the profound grasp of theology, the lucidity of exposition, the unassailability of the logic, and the innovative thrust with which, whilst keeping faith with traditional guidelines, the most pressing problems of theology were approached and solved.

[3] "It is quite possible for some of our readers, who are more pious than knowledgeable, to be bothered by the title we have chosen for our book, *The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma.* Ever since Darwin employed the term *The Evolution of the Species* to signify the transformation of one species into another, and particularly after the extrapolation of the transformistic theory to Catholic dogma effected by the heresy of modernism, the very name of evolution has been, and continues to be, suspect in the eyes of some overly timorous theologians, as if all evolution were necessarily transformistic and no homogeneous evolution were possible, or as if all evolution, including that which is homogeneous, were incompatible with the divine origin and substantial immutability of Catholic dogma." (MARÍN-SOLA, O.P., *The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma,* Introduction, no. 1).

[4] *La homogeneidad de la doctrina católica* (The Homogeneity of the Catholic Teaching), a series of articles begun by Fr. MARÍN-SOLA, in "La Ciencia Tomista", no. 9 (July-August, 1911) and concluded in no. 77 (September-October, 1922).

THE HOMOGENEOUS EVOLUTION OF CATHOLIC DOGMA was received in Spain as a veritable masterpiece worthy of the great theologians of Spain's golden age.[5] There were readers who felt that one had to go back to Melchor Cano's immortal *De Locis Theologicis* in the XVI century in order to find a comparable work.[6] Someone went even further and declared that only two books on the subject of dogmatic development were truly invaluable – that of St. Vincent de Lérins in the V century and Fr. Marín's.[7]

Foreign critics were no less unsparing in their praise of both the work and its author. Further on we will quote the reviews made by eminent theologians and statements by high ecclesiastical authorities.

Presently we will be sketching the portrait of Fr. Marín as a scholar and calling attention to the timeliness of his teaching. He had the knack of being *opportune.* Truth, indeed, is *eternal* and of all times. Nonetheless, it cannot be gainsaid that some *truths* seem to lose their edge at certain periods of history. Some philosophers and theologians have been accused of *living too much in the past.* There is a grain of truth in the charge, not in the sense that the truths they expound are passé – since the fundamental truths of philosophy and dogma are truths for *all times* – but in the sense that they are unable or do not know how to project on contemporary *actual* problems the light of truths and teachings which, being eternal, are also *of today.*

Fr. Marín-Sola had this gift of *timeliness,* the knack of infusing vitality and actuality into theological questions. At times this was the result of the light he focused on existing problems, as in the case of THE HOMOGENEOUS EVOLUTION OF CATHOLIC DOGMA. At other times it was due to the intellectual vigour of a mind capable of restating a problem in such

[5] Cf., for instance, the appraisal made by Don Celedonio León Herranz, professor of Dogma at the seminary of Madrid, in *Revista Eclesiástica,* July-September, 1932, pg.415.

[6] Many of those who have read the book have expressed this judgment, for instance, the book reviewer for *El Correo de Tortosa* (April 5, 1924) and the reviewer for *Boletín Oficial del Arzobispado de Valencia* (March, 1924).

[7] The illustrious professor of theology at the Colegio Máximo of Oña, Fr. Alfonso Ma. Eloriaga, wrote Fr. Marín-Sola in April, 1929, in these terms; "On the subject of the evolution of dogma I know of only two works of incomparable value for the theologian: that of Lirinensis and that of Your Reverence; and in point of scientific and theological merit, I consider the book written by Your Reverence unique and without equal." Thus the professor of Oña, despite the fact that in matters of detail, he held views that differed from those of Fr. Marín, as can be seen in several articles in *Estudios Eclesiásticos.*

terms that its mere restatement was sufficient to give it vital actuality, as happened in the case of the series of articles in *La Ciencia Tomista* on *The Thomist System concerning the Divine Motion.*[8] Fr. Marín was never out-of-step but always in-step with his time, either because he grappled with and solved the problems posed by the world to theology, or because he was able to get the theologians involved in the questions he himself proposed.

The publication of THE HOMOGENEOUS EVOLUTION OF CATHOLIC DOGMA could not have been more timely. *Evolution* was a term practically monopolized by the Modernists who used and abused it at their pleasure to tear down the dogma of the immutability of the Catholic faith. Fr. Marín saw that the term could be well employed to stress the progressive character of dogma without prejudice to its immutability, and he set himself to the task of wresting from Modernism and placing at the service of truth a term that, then as well as now, was enormously suggestive.[9]

But he was concerned not simply with terms and words but rather with the concepts and the realities expressed by the concepts. The Church was faced with the problem posed by the immutability and the development of dogma, Modernism solved the problem in a heterodox fashion; modern theology in an orthodox but insufficient manner. Fr. Marín confronted the problem squarely in the light of traditional philosophical and theological principles. As he saw them, these principles possessed sufficient power to channel along orthodox tracks the *progressive* and *vitalist* tendencies of the times – real and legitimate tendencies, indeed, but which Modernism had derailed onto completely unorthodox grooves.

In Fr. Marín's view, the authentic theological conclusion is that which is contained in the principles of theology in a *virtually inclusive way.* Inasmuch as the principles of theology are *revealed* principles, any authentically theological conclusion is likewise revealed and, consequently, capable of becoming a dogma. Thus dogma is capable of development and evolution. Now, since the containment is *inclusive,* the contained truth–, i.e., the truth which we gather or *deduce* when we draw the theological *conclusion,* and which is the same truth that the Pope can make into a dogma by his definition – is *homogeneous* to the revealed datum or principle from which it is drawn. There is, in consequence, development and evolution but neither transformation nor change.

[8] *El sistema tomista sobre la moción divina,* "La Ciencia Tomista" (July-August, 1925). *Respuesta a algunas objeciones acerca del sistema tomista sobre la moción divina* (January-February, 1926). *Nuevas observaciones acerca del sistema tomista sobre la moción divina* (May-June, 1926).

[9] "In the case of words, or of ideas, that contain a substratum of truth and can be useful for the defense and exposition of the revealed deposit, the best policy, we believe, is that counseled and practiced by St. Augustine, viz., to wrest such words, or ideas, from the hands of the enemy and, after having purged them from all false understanding, to place them at the service of the integral truth of the Catholic faith." (MARÍN-SOLA, *op. cit.,* no. 1)

Such is the conclusion Fr. Marín reaches in this work, which furnishes evidence of the extent of his sensitivity to the preoccupations of his times, and of his concern with setting them into legitimate and orthodox channels. New data support this view: Modernism wielded the *history of dogmas* in support of its transforming explanations. The author of the HOMOGENEOUS EVOLUTION appeals to the same history and establishes the fact that dogma has developed and grown by way of *virtual containment* and, hence, dogmatic evolution is homogeneous and in no way changes the meaning of the revealed principles.[10]

Modernism stressed the *psychological* or *vitalist* character of dogmatic development. This psychological character, together with the history of dogmas, lays the basis for its contention that dogmas change their meaning. Fr. Marín similarly appeals to the psychological or vital character of our knowledge of supernatural truths and to the role it plays in the development of dogmatic truths, and masterfully shows that, at the divine impulse of the theological virtues and of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, this development, if legitimate, leads of necessity to conclusions that are homogeneous to the vital, or divine, or supernatural principle from which it originates.[11]

He had, we repeat, the gift of timeliness: in the choice of a problem posed by Modernism to theology and the Church; in turning the very weapons (history, psychology, life) being wielded against orthodoxy to the latter's advantage by showing that they are precisely the same arguments which *traditionally led always* to orthodox solutions; and, finally, in wresting from the enemy the highly suggestive term *evolution,* and showing that it was capable of being employed in a legitimate and traditional sense. Fr. Marín thus put to excellent use St. Augustine's advice, which he himself recalls, to the effect that "if they who are called philosophers, particularly the Platonists, have said things that are *true and in harmony with our faith,* not only are these not to be feared, but they should be wrested from them as from unjust possessors and turned to our benefit."[12] Fr. Marín wrested from the Mo-

[10] In sections 2 and 3 of chapter 4, the author analyzes *ten dogmas* to the definition of which the Church arrived by an authentic process of *virtual implicit inclusion.*

[11] Chapter 4 of the present work contains a special study of the *affective way* and of its value for the development of dogma. In the original Spanish edition, section 5 of chapter 4 is entirely devoted to the affective way. In the French edition, the author added a whole new section (section 6) to its study.

[12] *De Doctrina Christiana,* 1. 2, c. 40; PL 54, 65. Fr. Marín recalls this counsel of St. Augustine on the very first page of his work. Indeed, the whole book may be viewed as a sustained effort at putting the Saint's counsel into practice.

dernists a term charged with strong suggestive power, which they were employing unduly and misleadingly; he likewise wrested from them the weapons of history and psychological religious experience with which they attempted to shore up their wrong conclusions, whereas in truth they serve to confirm and buttress the development of Catholic doctrine understood in an orthodox sense.

The work which is now published in an English translation has not lost its actuality despite the lapse of so many years since the first of its three previous editions. Modernism is dead. But the problem of the development of dogma is still vigorously alive today, it is still very much with us today. There are theologians who do not accept the principles of traditional theology and do not even bother to hide their antipathy towards Scholasticism. The solution proferred by these theologians is not the solution given by Modernism; but neither is it a solution that satisfies the demands of the immutability of the rational principles of philosophy and of dogmatic truths on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the demands of the developmental capacity of the same rational principles and dogmatic truths. The so-called *new theology*[13] poses the problem of *how to adapt* dogma to the *changing* mentality of men. This is, fundamentally, the point under debate today. Towards its resolution the Holy See has furnished theologians with firm and clear orientations. On several occasions Pius XII alluded to this problem,[14] and has published an encyclical in which, apart from restating substantially the guidelines he had previously given, he concretely identifies and names certain excesses that have been incurred and which need correction.[15]

Whatever solution is given to the problem must safeguard the immutability of the truths of faith. "No one must disturb and stir what is immutable. Many things have been aired, yet without sufficient examination, about the *new theology* which, inasmuch as it keeps changing in step with a universe of changing things, is a theology that is perpetually going without ever arriving

[13] The term *new theology* has acquired a pejorative sense. For this reason, some of its practitioners feel uneasy at the tag *new* appended to the theology to which they subscribe. Nonetheless, it is a fact that they have used and abused of such expressions as these: scholastic theology has *outlived* its usefulness today, the theology of St. Thomas is *outdated*, etc. Now, that which has outlived its usefulness, that which is outdated should be replaced by the new, the actual, the up-to-date which they represent. The Pope has several times alluded to the *new theology* and has cautioned against the dangerous deviations it contains. His words are quoted in the text, and we shall consider them at greater length in the third part of this introduction.

[14] Address to the 20th General Congregation of the Society of Jesus on 17th September, 1946; AAS, 38 (1946), 381-385.

Address to the General Chapter of the Order of Preachers, on 22nd September, 1946; AAS, 38 (1946), 385-389.

[15] Encyclical *Humani generis;* AAS, 42 (1950), 561-578.

anywhere. If such a position were to be accepted, what is to become of the immutability of Catholic dogmas? What is to become of the unity and stability of the faith? "[16] The solution must likewise safeguard the capacity of rational philosophy to account for the development of dogma without jeopardy to its immutability. "The very foundations of both perennial philosophy and theology are now called into question, those foundations which are acknowledged and revered by any body of knowledge and discipline worthy of being judged Christian in truth and in name . . . The truths revealed by God are called into question, that is to say, whether the mind is *capable of penetrating them and of drawing further truths out of them.* Briefly, the question is asked whether what St. Thomas has constructed *beyond and above any particular time by putting together and closely integrating all the elements furnished by the Christian sages of all times* is built upon solid rock, endowed with perpetual vigour and validity, capable even today of safeguarding the Catholic faith efficaciously and of *providing sure assistance and directive criteria to the new developments of theology and philosophy. The Church, indeed, affirms that such is the case.*"[17]

The problem today is none other than the problem of harmonizing the immutability of the truths of faith with their progress. Such a harmony is possible by means of the firm and solid notions of the perennial or traditional philosophy. Any solution that jeopardizes the immutability of dogma eventually ends in a transformistic development of the same and is absolutely inacceptable to the Church.

This contemporary problem, so clearly and nakedly stated by His Holiness, is in essence the problem examined and solved by Fr. Marín in this work. The passage just quoted from Pius XII on the immutability of the Catholic doctrine, on the employment of philosophical concepts in its development, and on the requirement that the immutability of dogma suffer no prejudice from its development by means of philosophical concepts; or, in other words, the problem of the *new theology* with its insistence on utilizing the new philosophies in the task of developing the dogmas of faith – all these things come to mind on reading the following passage from the Introduction to the present work, written by Fr. Marín in 1923:

"Any man who undertakes to study without preconceptions the history of the Catholic Church and of her teachings is confronted by two evident facts.

"The first is the fact that Catholic teaching, even in its strictly dogmatic part, has grown or developed, in a rather large scale, from the days of the

[16] Address, 17th September, 1946; AAS, 38 (1946), 384-385.

[17] Address, 22nd September, 1946: AAS, 38 (1946), 387.

Apostles to our own times. To become aware of this, one needs only to compare, on any given doctrinal point, the plain biblical statements with the complex definitions of the last ecumenical councils; compare the primitive Creed of the Apostles with the so-called Creed of St. Athanasius or with the profession of faith of Pius IV; compare any document of the early popes with the *Syllabus* of Pius IX or with Pius X's Encyclical *Pascendi;* or compare an catechesis or any number of catecheses of the Fathers of the Church with one of today's catechisms. The evidence of the fact of growth is immediately obvious.

"The second is the obvious fact that in the aforementioned growth various human philosophies and civilizations have played a large role and exercised a great influence, particularly Greek philosophy in the age of the Fathers, and Scholastic philosophy in the Middle and Modern ages. This influence is noticeable in the writings of the Fathers who developed the primitive doctrine, in the conciliar disputes and disquisitions that preceded the definition of each dogma, and even in the dogmatic formulae themselves which clearly exhibit the mark of the various epochs in which the propositions were defined.

"These two facts can be explained in very different ways, but can in no way be denied. Together they pose the following very serious problem: *Is the progress or growth of Catholic doctrine just mentioned homogeneous or heterogeneous? Is it simply a homogeneous evolution of what was already contained implicitly in the revealed datum, or is it an extrinsic or heterogenous addition, a truly transformistic evolution?* "[18]

It is obvious that these two interrogatives, coming right after the verification of the two facts mentioned, reflect the problem of the *new theology,* viz., the problem of adapting the truths of dogma to the mentality or philosophy of contemporary men, and the danger that the adaptation might be prejudicial to the immutability of dogma itself. It is likewise clear that they also pose the problem described by Pius XII in the passage earlier quoted, a problem whose solution is to be effected, as the Pope clearly enjoins, without jeopardy to the immutability of dogmatic truth.

These considerations amply justify the decision taken by the Royal and Pontifical University of Santo Tomás (Manila) to publish this 4th edition – the first in English – of the masterwork of a man who easily stands out among her most illustrious alumni and her most distinguished professors of dogmatic theology – Fr. Francisco Marín-Sola, O.P.

The introduction requested of us will have the following parts:

I. Fr. Marín and his work.

[18] MARÍN-SOLA, *The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma,* Introduction, nos. 5-6.

II. "The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma."
III. The "New Theology" and "The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma."
IV. The Second Vatican Council and "The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma."

FR. MARÍN-SOLA: THE MAN AND HIS LIFE-WORK[19]

Fr. Francisco Marín-Sola spent his whole lifetime – 59 years – in study, teaching and writing. However, his was not to be a tranquil and serene pursuit of these tasks. Paradoxically, his exceptional personal worth proved to be the greatest hindrance to an unruffled scholarly existence. It explains the numerous demands made on him for the solution of urgent and peremptory difficulties. Thus, in the course of more than thirty years of teaching, we find him being frequently transferred from one place to another. His longest tour of duty saw him teaching in Fribourg, Switzerland, for eight consecutive years.

This biographical sketch of Fr. Marín-Sola will have four sections:

1. Biographical data.
2. The scholar.
3. Literary output.
4. Moral personality.

1. Biographical Data

Fr. Marín-Sola was born in Carcar, a town of the province of Navarre and of the diocese of Pamplona. At the age of 13 he came to Ocaña (Toledo), soliciting admission to the Novitiate of the Dominican Fathers of the Province of the Most Holy Rosary of the Philippines. For lack of the requisite canonical age he was unable to take the habit. However, since he had a preco-

[19] This biographical information has been culled from the following sources:

(a) *Actas del Capítulo Provincial de la Provincia del Ssmo. Rosario de Filipinas, celebrado en Manila el año 1934.* (Proceedings of the Provincial Chapter of the Province of the Most Holy Rosary, held in Manila in 1934).

(b) *Ensayo de biografía de los religiosos de la Provincia del Ssmo. Rosario de Filipinas.* (Biographical Essays on the Religious of the Province of the Most Holy Rosary of the Philippines). A ms. in six volumes preserved in the provincial archives of the said Province.

Thanks are due to Fr. Jesús Gayo for furnishing us with a copy of every reference to Fr. Marín contained in this ms. We shall in every case indicate the page of the copy furnished us by Fr. Gayo.

(c) Biographical data in manuscript sent us by Fr. Gregorio Arnáiz, a contemporary of Fr. Marín since the novitiate.

cious intelligence, he was admitted meanwhile to the first year of philosophy together with those who had already made their religious profession.

Upon completing 15 years of age, he took the Dominican habit in the same priory of Ocaña on 9 December, 1888, and his simple religious vows on 10 December of the following year. After his religious profession he gave himself entirely to the study of philosophy. Although he had successfully completed the first year of philosophy, prior to taking the habit, he repeated it of his own volition and at his own request. Even at that young age he realized the importance of a solid primitive grounding in the philosophical sciences.

Upon completion of the philosophical courses, he was transferred to the Priory of Santo Tomás in Ávila. Here he took his solemn vows on 10 December, 1892, and began his theological studies. A serious illness forced him to leave Ávila and go to the Priory of Padrón (Galicia). There he regained his health and returned to Avila to complete his study of theology.

In 1897, being only a deacon, he was assigned to Manila. The Dominican Province of the Most Holy Rosary of the Philippines has for its field of activity in the Far East: China, Japan, Tonking, the Philippines. Thither went Fr. Marín-Sola after barely completing his ecclesiastical studies. He was ordained to the priesthood in September, 1897. Unfortunately, no sooner had he set foot in Manila than his health gave way. On the advice of his doctors, he left Manila for the province of Cagayán in the early days of 1898. The Philippine Revolution surprised him in the town of Amulung. He sought refuge in the town of Enrile and there fell into the hands of the revolutionists, and remained their prisoner for sixteen months. On 1 January, 1900, he was set free and returned to Manila.

His teaching career, uninterrupted until his death, began at this point. In 1900 he taught mathematics, algebra, and geometry at the secondary school of San Juan de Letrán (Manila). The following year he brilliantly passed the examinations for the degree of Lector in Sacred Theology at the University of Santo Tomás (Manila). Meanwhile he continued teaching in Letrán, and in 1902 he joined the staff of the daily *Libertas* and began to publish various articles, some of which attracted a great deal of attention, as we shall presently see.

In 1904 he was taken from Letrán and assigned to teach philosophy at the University of Santo Tomás. But his exceptional qualities as a teacher persuaded his superiors that they would be better employed in the formation of the Dominicans who were being trained in Spain for service in the Orient, than in teaching the natives studying in the University in Manila.

Thus, in 1906 Fr. Marín-Sola returned to Spain to teach the Sacred Scriptures and the Loci Theologici at the Dominican Studium Generale in Ávila. Those were the peak days of Modernism, during which Fr. Marín-

Sola was engrossed in the study of the Loci Theologici. It would not be farfetched to say that it was even then that the monumental work he was to publish several years later began dimly to take shape in his mind. In tracing the genesis of THE HOMOGENEOUS EVOLUTION no one should lose sight of these two factors: on the one hand, Modernism on the attack, and on the other hand, Melchor Cano's work which provides the means of defense.

Fr. Marín stayed in Ávila only two years. In 1908 he was back in Manila. His ecclesiastical formation was now complete and had began to bear fruit, but one requisite formality was still wanting. The Dominican Order had made him a Lector of theology, but Fr. Marín was destined to teach in universities of world renown, hence it was convenient that he should obtain academic degrees in sacred theology. For this purpose he returned to Manila where he obtained both the licentiate and the doctorate in theology. Upon his arrival he was appointed editor of *Libertas*, of which he had previously been a staff-member.

Two years later, in 1910, we find him back in Ávila holding the chair of theology in the same Studium Generale where he had taught Scripture and the Loci Theologici.

The Dominican Province in the Philippines felt the need of a command of English the better to carry out its apostolic labours in the East. In consequence, the Studium Generale at Ávila was transferred to Rosaryville in the United States. Thither, too, went Fr. Marín. However, prior to teaching theology at Rosaryville, he spent two years at the University of Notre Dame learning English and teaching philosophy.

At Rosaryville he taught theology from 1913 to 1918. The archbishop of New Orleans named him adviser to the archbishopric. Soon he came to be known in all North America on account of the solidity and soundness of the reports and other documents forwarded by the archbishopric of New Orleans to the Apostolic Delegation in Washington and to the Holy See itself. Fr. Marín was also appointed secretary of the Commission organized in the ecclesiastical province of New Orleans to examine the draft of the new Code of Canon Law. Of his contributions to the work of the Commission we shall speak later on.

About this same time the University of Notre Dame conferred on Fr. Marín the Doctorate in Civil Law *honoris causa*. The Rector, Fr. Cavanaugh, wrote him to say that the honor was conferred in view of the imperishable memory left by his teaching in the University and of his own great personal worth.

The year 1919 initiated a new period in Fr. Marín's life. He was named to the chair of theology at the University of Fribourg (Switzerland) left vacant by the death of Fr. Norberto del Prado. Of his teaching there and the

universal esteem in which he was held we shall speak presently in the following section. At Fribourg Fr. Marín continued his series of articles on *The Evolution of Dogma,* which he collected, recast, and published in 1923 in the book whose 4th edition (1st in English) the reader holds in his hands. Also at Fribourg Fr. Marín began a new series of papers on *The Thomist System concerning the Divine Motion,* published in *La Ciencia Tomista.* On the same subject he left an unedited manuscript entitled *Concordia tomista entre la moción divina y la libertad creada* (Thomist Conciliation between the Divine Motion and Created Liberty).

Fr. Marín spent eight years, 1919-1927, in Fribourg. Failing health forced his retirement to the priory at Ocaña where he had taken the habit as a lad. Having recovered somewhat, he returned to Manila in 1929 to end his life teaching theology at the same University that had reaped the first fruits of his youth.

He died on 5 June, 1932, at the age of 59. Death overtook him fully engaged in work, immersed in the twin activities that sum up his whole life teaching and writing. Teaching dogma and writing his *Thomist Conciliation between the Divine Motion and Created Liberty.*

2. The Scholar

Fr. Marín-Sola was an outstanding multi-faceted scholar. He was a great *thinker,* and thus a great *investigator.* He was never satisfied merely with hearing and reading. Things heard and read are of no use unless and until they are assimilated. Fr. Marín said and wrote nothing that he had not *previously comprehended* in the exact sense of this term. Which is to say that his knowledge always proceeded from a previous work of reduction to the fundamental principles of theology and philosophy, and of comparison with other truths with which it could have a connexion, or from which it could receive new light or added corroboration. He investigated the truth both in its principles and in its derivations. It is in this sense that we say that since he was a thinker he was also an investigator.

At the same time he was an outstanding *expositor* and an excellent *pedagogue.* For him no obstacles seemed to exist between the thought and the word. He perceived the problems with utmost clarity and endeavoured to bring the same clarity to his exposition. This obsession with communicating to others the clarity of his own perception led him to an insistent repetition of concepts with the hope that what might perhaps have been overlooked the first time, would be noticed and grasped the second or third time.

Lastly, he was a great *polemicist.* By temperament he was always eager to test his ideas. Since he never made them public until he had exhaustively comprehended them, it pleased him to be contradicted, for generally he had

anticipated the objections of his opponents, and the positions which the latter deemed weak had been well covered and buttressed in advance.

He shunned the *short* view of things, the *short* solution of problems, the *short* reply to difficulties. Being a robust theologian and philosopher, he preferred to investigate the truth by the light of the superior causes rather than by the light of the inferior and immediate causes. In one word, he truly was a *wise* man, if by wisdom is meant "the knowledge by the supreme reasons".

A. The Thinker and the Investigator

There are two kinds of investigation and thus two sorts of investigators. One kind of investigation aims at uncovering the *datum;* the other, at discovering the *truth.* The investigators of the one and the other kind are searching for the truth which is their object, but the former are looking for the truth in preceding testimonies, whereas the latter are looking for the truth in other preceding truths. The former are engaged in *positive* investigation; the latter in *rational* investigation.

Fr. Marín belongs to the second group. We have already said that he was a *thinker.* So say those who were his students. So say we who had the privilege of knowing him and talking to him. So can well say those who have read him. He was a *profound* theologian and philosopher who strove to unearth the deepest roots of any problem. His solutions are not based usually on immediate and superficial reasons but on ultimate reasons. This, of course, requires the penetration, the comprehension of the virtuality of the principles of theology and philosophy. In this comprehension of the *fundamental* truths Fr. Marín *finds* the solution to the problems studied in his writings. His is a labour of *investigation* of the highest caliber.

He was well equipped for it by a synthesizing mind that enabled him to grasp a lot of things in a few ideas. To him philosophy and theology were not disciplines in which truths are *added* to truths, but sciences in which truths are *joined, connected,* and mutually *explicated* by being deduced the one from the other.

But all this should not be taken to deny that Fr. Marín was an investigator in the first sense of the term, to mean that he overlooked the *positive* character of theology. His writings evidence a theological erudition that is simply overwhelming. Relative to the subjects studied by Fr. Marín, it can be asserted, without risk of being forced to recant, that no theologian exists with a vaster or more universal erudition. The present work provides ample evidence. In it Fr. Marín shows that he is acquainted with an astonishing number of theologians of every school. Chapter 7 is definitively conclusive on this point.

The reader is apt to be dazzled by this twin phenomenon verifiable in the writings of Fr. Marín-Sola. On the one hand, the mental power both to penetrate and analyze the truth, and to resolve and synthesize it, which places him in the ranks of *investigators-thinkers;* and on the other hand, his astonishing theological erudition, which classifies him among the *positive investigators.* In our opinion, he was foremost and fundamentally a thinker, and amassed his erudition from sheer necessity. On a certain occasion he artlessly confessed that he understood perfectly whatever he happened to study.[20] It is a fact that God had given him a capacity to understand, assimilate, and synthesize quite out of the ordinary. The works of St. Thomas constituted his fundamental sources, which he assimilated with his powerful intellect. But then he found that many theologians, especially the moderns, including even Thomists, did not agree with what he had seen in St. Thomas. So he began to investigate in the theological tradition the same problems whose solution he had already discovered in St. Thomas himself.

He would immerse himself in the study of countless theologians, and in the process unearth the fact that the line of Thomist thought had indeed suffered a deviation. And thus we have the amazing phenomenon of an speculative theologian, as Fr. Marín was, lecturing to the specialists on positive theology and the history of theology. It happened in the case of the *revealed virtual,* of the historical development of which he makes a very detailed study in the present work, and in the case of the so-called *ecclesiastical faith,* of which he makes a likewise perfectly finished positive study, in addition to a strictly doctrinal one, in chapter 5. Similarly, on the question of the conciliation between the divine motion and created liberty, Fr. Marín has amassed more than 15,000 notes in the four volumes of the unedited manuscript. It is the most astounding work of scholarly erudition on the subject. Here, too, his positive researches uncovered the deviation undergone by the pure and genuine thought of St. Thomas, even within the Thomist tradition – a deviation that obscured and notably complicated the problem.

Fr. Marín was, we repeat, an authentic investigator of the truth in both of the two modes of investigation: an speculative investigator of the truth of problems in their principles, and a positive investigator of the truth in the data of theological tradition.

The foregoing should make clear the *renovating* character of his theology. Any problem in the hands of Fr. Marín ended up by being a *renovated* problem. He was an authentic revolutionist – in the best sense of the term – in theology. He was not a man who passively accepted a ready-made theology; he actively made theology himself. But in making theology he took for sure guides the teachings of the Church, the teachings of St. Thomas, the

[20] Declaration by Fr. Gregorio Arnáiz.

teachings of the *classical Thomist* school. He *renovated* or *revolutionized* without *innovating.* Innovations in theological science are dangerous. Theology has to be studied with a profoundly traditional spirit. Fr. Marín's renovation implied the return to the ideas of traditional theology whenever they had suffered a deviation or come to a dead stop, and the updating of the same.

The reader can find for himself instances of what we are saying in the present work, he can also find them in his other writings. We will mention one: the problem of the physical causality of the sacraments in the case of their reviviscence. The reviviscence of the sacraments poses a grave and serious difficulty to their physical causality, to which the answers were neither suitable nor efficacious. Fr. Marín begins with the principles, incontrovertible in Thomism, that the baptismal character is a passive potency in which the other sacraments are received. He develops this principle, up to now insufficiently exploited, to propose a new solution[21] that does away with all the inconveniences of the solutions currently offered.

Fr. Marín possessed an extraordinary power of assimilation. His was a philosophical and theological temper, but his achievements were not restricted to these two fields. He possessed a finished formation in the humanities and was well acquainted with mathematics which he taught at the college of Letrán. He had an extraordinary facility for languages. Six months in Cagayán were enough for him to grasp thoroughly the morphology and structure of the Ibanag dialect, and, as those who lived with him testify, to dialogue fluently with the Filipino natives.[22]

In the preceding section we mentioned his having taught Canon Law, his having been an adviser to the archbishopric of New Orleans and secretary of the Commission set up in the same ecclesiastical province to review the draft of the new Code of Canon Law, and his having been conferred the Doctorate in Civil Law *honoris causa* by the University of Notre Dame. Some additional data will confirm his capacity and competence in the field of law.

Dr. Blenk, archbishop of New Orleans, made frequent use of Fr. Marín's services. Father's reports were read with great interest at the Apostolic Delegation in Washington. Msgr. Bonzano, the Apostolic Delegate at the time and Cardinal later on, wrote the archbishop saying: "Since this Apostolic Delegation was established in Washington we have received no reports as profound, methodical, and logically structured as those that Your Excellency has gra-

[21] *Proponitur nova solutio ad conciliandam causalitatem physicam sacramentorum cum eorum reviviscentia.* (A new solution with a view to reconciling the physical causality of the sacraments with their reviviscence) An article by Fr. Marín published in *Divus Thomas,* Fribourg, January, 1925.

[22] Fr. M. VELASCO, *Biographical Essays,* pg. 2 of the copy in our hands.

ciously remitted to this Apostolic Delegation."[23] The archbishop disclosed that the reports were authored by Fr. Marín.

When the Commission set up by Pius X for the codification of Canon Law finished the draft of the new Code, it was sent to all the bishops so that the latter might submit to Rome the opportune observations. For this purpose a Commission was organized in the ecclesiastical province of New Orleans. Fr. Marín was named its secretary. He personally submitted seventy nine amendments to the Code. Sixty-three of these amendments were subsequently incorporated literally in the definitive text of the Code. Undoubtedly, Fr. Marín's amendments coincided with those proposed by others elsewhere, but the fact remains that they appear today in the Code Canon Law just as he proposed them.

Obviously, then, his intellectual powers were not circumscribed to one sole discipline. His exceptional talents were evident in all fields of intellectual endeavour, although, as a matter of fact, they shone with particular radiance in the fields of philosophy and theology.

B. **The Expositor and Teacher**

There are very knowledgeable men – profound thinkers, great investigators, individuals of outstanding personal worth – who, for all their vast learning, are wanting in the qualities necessary to communicate what they know to others, or to induce them into taking part in their investigations. Understanding and explaining are two very different abilities. The former requires intellectual capacity; the latter requires furthermore the ability to translate what one knows into speech and writings not only with the clarity with which the truth exists in one's own mind, but also with the clarity needed by the person to whom the communication is addressed.

In Fr. Marín the clarity of exposition is almost unlimited. Once an idea is assimilated, he seems to find no trouble clothing it with the adequate expression that enables his listeners or readers likewise to grasp and penetrate it. The exact word, the suitable examples, the insistent repetitions . . . everything helps to make himself understood by all. Earlier we said that perhaps he sinned by too much insistence, too much repetition – by an excess of clarity, so to speak. The reader of this book will soon enough see for himself that we utter nothing but the truth.

Fr. Marín is blessed not only with the gift of communicating in a most intelligible manner the truths he perceives, but also of relating them with other clearer and more basic truths or matters in such a way that the reader or listener soon appreciates the accuracy of what he is told because he can see it for himself in the light of other truths with which he is well acquainted.

[23] Fr. M. VELASCO, *Ms.cit.*, pg.4.

One other characteristic, closely connected with his qualities as a teacher, deserves mention here. We refer to his ability to generate interest in the topics under discussion. The problems investigated by Fr. Marín were followed with increasing attention, either because of their inherent interest, or because he knew how to make them interesting. Problems or questions that provoke no interest or uneasiness will hardly cause any stir whether in the classroom or in a book. If they catch no attention, they can hardly be expected to gain wide readership, to say nothing of acceptance. Fr. Marín did not overlook any of this. Hence, for his writings he chose pressing or current problems, and if the subject was neither the one nor the other, he managed its presentation in such a way as to quicken the interest of his readers or listeners. In short, if the topic was not sufficiently interesting by itself, he made it so.

The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma provides an instance of the first case. We have already briefly touched on the actuality of the problem, the confusion created by modernism on the matter, the misguided use made by the modernists of the history of dogmas and of the psychological and affective character of religious truths. We have also mentioned that Fr. Marín took possession of the highly suggestive term, *evolution,* and of the two ill-employed weapons, the *history of dogmas* and *religious experience,* to brandish them in the service and for the benefit of orthodoxy as understood and expounded by traditional theology.

Another instance of the same kind is found in the series of articles published in the Manila daily *Libertas,* in the years 1902-1903, under the general title *Catholicism and Protestantism.* The series was made up of 22 articles.[24] The timing could not have been more opportune. Barely two years had elapsed since the Philippines had been acquired by the United States from Spain. The Protestants had begun to build chapels and churches in the islands. At this juncture the Catholic faithful stood in need of orientation. Fr. Marín supplied it with his long series of articles written in a journalistic and breezy style but without prejudice to the solidity of their content. We

[24] The titles of the articles are as follows: *Catolicismo y las sectas protestantes* (Catholicism and the Protestant sects), 3 articles; *Catolicismo y Protestantismo: la Iglesia luterana* (Catholicism and Protestantism: The Lutheran Church), 4 articles; *Catolicismo y Protestantismo: la Iglesia reformada* (Catholicism and Protestantism: The Reformed Church), 1 article; *Catolicismo y Protestantismo: Iglesia anglicana episcopal* (Catholicism and Protestantism: The Anglican Episcopal Church), 2 articles; *Catolicismo y Protestantismo: el movimiento de Oxford y su desenlace* (Catholicism and Protestantism: The Oxford Movement and its Outcome), 3 articles; *Catolicismo y Protestantismo: Puseísmo y Ritualismo* (Catholicism and Protestantism: Puseyism and Ritualism), 3 articles; *Catolicismo y Protestantismo: estado actual de la Iglesia anglicana* (Catholicism and Protestantism: The actual state of the Anglican Church); 4 articles; *Catolicismo y Protestantismo: el anglicanismo y la Iglesia Romana* (Catholicism and Protestantism: Anglicanism and the Roman Church), 2 articles.

shall perforce return to these articles further on when we sketch his profile as a polemicist since the reaction they evoked among the Protestants well deserves special mention.

However, there are also instances in which the interest cannot be ascribed to the circumstances but rather to Fr. Marín himself. Theology abounds in disputable questions that were once the focus of heated controversy. Today, with the heat turned off, such questions are discussed listlessly both in the classrooms and in books, perhaps because theological history seems to indicate that there appears to be no way of settling these issues in an entirely satisfactory manner. One such issue is that of reconciling the divine motion with created liberty. If there is any inherently crucial problem this is it, and yet it would be an anachronism to discuss it with any passion and heat. In the course of the controversies on the subject too much energy has been spent for the little light that has been made on this mysterious topic, with the result that no one investigating or writing on the matter can help being somewhat sceptical about the solutions to the problem, his own included. Which is why any heated discussions of the subject seems anachronistic.

And yet Fr. Marín succeeded in firing the enthusiasms of theologians on this very topic. He did it by *renewing* both the statement of the problem and its solution – renewing them in the genuine sense of the term because he pruned them of many accretions which, in his view, were accidental and mainly served only to obscure the issue, and thus restored them to the pristine simplicity they had in the mind and writings of St. Thomas. This procedure created shock waves everywhere, among Thomists and non-Thomists alike. The upshot: a problem that in its day had generated a great amount of heat but seemed to have burned itself out, recovered its old vigour and fire. If the articles published in *La Ciencia Tomista* under the general title *El Sistema tomista sobre la moción divina* (The Thomist System regarding the Divine Motion)[25] had achieved nothing else, they would have been thoroughly justified by the sole fact of having re-enkindled interest in a weighty theological problem that was tottering on the verge of extinction, and of having achieved this feat without straying outside the boundaries of either Catholic or Thomist theology.

A second instance is found in his work on the revival of the sacraments and their physical causality. Although lively and interesting in itself, this particular problem appeared fated to a limbo-like existence both in the classrooms and in the pages of theological handbooks. Fr. Marín revived it with a new treatment in an article on the subject published in *Divus Thomas*, in Fribourg.[26]

[25] *Ibid.* July-August, 1925; January-February, 1926; and May-June, 1926.

[26] *Ibid.* January, 1925.

The interest aroused by his writings provides us with a clue to the interest provoked by his oral teaching. There are many who still recall his marvelous expositions at Fribourg. The most sublime mysteries of theology and dogma acquired a stimulating and fascinating light in his elucidations. Fr. Marín exercised, so to speak, a bewitching influence on his students compounded of a lucid exposition, a vigorous eloquence, and personal charisma. His colleague and biographer, Fr. Velasco, wrote: "He was a leader of the Catholic student youth at the University of Fribourg. In his person the spirit of Francisco de Vitoria seemed to have returned to life."[27] The Fribourg paper *La Liberté* drew this sketch of him: "To a theological knowledge as vast as it was profound, Fr. Marín joined the qualities needed to make teaching attractive as well as effective, namely, clarity and logic in the exposition, originality and assurance in expression, knowledgeability, liveliness and eloquence in speech – all this topped by a broad and markedly open spirit to which nothing human and modern in the manifold manifestations of intellectual life was alien."[28]

C. The Polemicist

Fr. Marín was not a closed mind. It pleased him to test his ideas. Before sitting down to write a book, he would first publish the material by installments in various scientific journals in the form of monographic articles. In this way he could appreciate the reactions of the theologians to his views and have the opportunity to reply to their observations and difficulties. Thus, when the book finally made its appearance, it came out well argued and defended. This was the procedure followed by Fr. Marín in writing the present work, and his posthumous unedited book *The Thomist Conciliation of Divine Motion and Created Liberty*.

God had endowed him with the outstanding gifts of a polemicist. In the first place, he had a thorough grasp of the truth. We have already pointed out that he never began to set down his thoughts in writing until he was satisfied that he had thoroughly understood the matter and had reduced it to the incontrovertible principles of theology and Thomism and had traced its connexions to other theological and Thomist teachings. He was, thus, well prepared to do battle, since he had foreseen the possible attacks and had all the seemingly weak flanks well covered. This would not have been possible had he been satisfied with a non-comprehensive grasp of the subject matter, or been content with only an understanding of it based on immediate and superficial reasons, overlooking its connexions with the more universal principles and with other related questions.

[27] Fr. M. VELASCO, *Ms. cit.*, pg.6.

[28] *La Liberté* (Fribourg), 17 June, 1932.

Apart from this *dominion of his subject matter,* which is indispensable to every good polemicist, Fr. Marín possessed a second characteristic, viz., he quickly perceived the full scope of the objections hurled against him. We mentioned earlier the artless confession that he "understood anything that he studied." This included the objections of his critics. It was then an easy task to contrast his own teaching with the arguments brought against it. Generally, it was a case of difficulties *already solved* in the simple proposition and elucidation of his own views. We have already noted that he set nothing in writing until and unless he had reduced it to the incontrovertible principles of theology and Thomism and seen its connexions with other related truths. The objections usually stemmed from overlooking any of these reductions or connexions.

One other detail. The same preoccupation for comprehension that drove him to master any subject prior to speaking or writing about it and thoroughly to grasp the arguments raised against his views, likewise constrained him not to leave any loose ends whatsoever. Quite literally he analyzed to *shreds* his critics' terms and concepts.

The reader can verify what we have been saying by reading the whole of chapter 6 and the last two sections of chapter 7 of the present book. He will see for himself how Fr. Marín subjects to minute examination each and every one of the objections raised. He takes them apart, and calmly and firmly proceeds to answer each part whether it is relevant or not. The reader will also verify that the relevant part of the objections is refuted by calling attention to some principle or detail of the previous exposition, which the objector had either missed or overlooked.

We have just said that Fr. Marín was a polemicist by temperament. He was a fighter. Controversy delighted him. Far from avoiding it, he looked for it. Perhaps here, too, he sinned by excess just as he could also be faulted, as earlier mentioned, for an obsession with clarity which impelled him to excessive repetitions. We think that his fighting temperament occasioned no little harm. With more tranquility and peace he could have finished works which he left unfinished. His penchant for testing his ideas and for polemics robbed him of precious time and calm to bring to a successful conclusion the scientific projects he had in mind. A true Navarrese, this fighting spirit was part and parcel of his nature and he never managed to get himself rid of it.

Nonetheless, this fighting spirit was never tainted with harshness. Both nature and virtue combined to endow him with exquisite charity and elegance. Vigour was reserved for the doctrine – to defend what he believed true and to refute what he esteemed false. For the persons of his adversaries he reserved the most thoughtful consideration – not one harsh or strong word that might offend their sensibilities. The present work furnishes ample

proof of it. Further corroboration will be found in the section devoted to the sketch of his moral personality.

D. Three exceptional testimonies

The intellectual personality of Fr. Marín should soon be obvious to any of his readers, since it is clearly reflected in his writings, particularly in this book. Its perusal will justify every single statement made by us. However, we wish to make of the record here three testimonials culled from the many written about his person and his work. These three are particularly valuable because they come from the Master General of the Order of Preachers to which Fr. Marín belonged, from the Dominican Province of the Most Holy Rosary of the Philippines of which he was a son, and from the University of Fribourg where he held the chair of theology from 1919 to 1927.

The Most Reverend Fr. Theissling, Master General of the Dominicans, made a canonical visit to Fribourg in 1920. Fr. Marín had succeeded Fr. Norberto del Prado and had been teaching dogma for about a year. Fr. Norberto had achieved great renown and his theological production was numerous and classical. Having heard both the students and the faculty of the Faculty of Theology, the Fr. General made the following appraisal of Fr. Marín: "Quoad soliditatem doctrinae aequas P. Norbertum, et quoad modum docendi superas eum." (In solidity of doctrine you are Fr. Norberto's equal, in the manner of teaching you are superior to him).[29]

The chronicler of the Province of the Most Holy Rosary of the Philippines wrote the following encomium in the official chronicle: "Fr. Francisco Marín was a man of lofty intelligence and heart. His was a profound mind, an intuitive understanding both analytic and synthetic, an objective mental balance that struck admiration in all who sought his counsel and advice. He thoroughly understood anything he studied, and penetrated the problems he investigated down to their very roots and their derivations to other fundamental questions that had any bearing on them. Here lies the explanation of his sure grasp of the fundamental notions that provide the key to the matters he dealt with; his choice of the starting point capable of shedding light on the subject under study; the order, clarity and impeccable logic with which he proceeded in his investigations; the serenity and the argumentative cogency with which he captivated the minds of his students everywhere he taught – in the College of Letrán and the University of Santo Tomás in Manila, as well as in Spain, America, and Switzerland. His speech possessed an astounding power of suggestion that charmed those who listened to his teaching: such memory will live forever in his beloved students.

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[29] Fr. M. VELASCO, *Ms. cit.*, pg.7.

"Hence the enthusiasm, the fervent love, the intense affection he evoked in their hearts towards his person as a teacher, and his own loyal and inviolable reciprocal affection towards them. Thus the marvelous interaction between a great and expert teacher and students desirous of slaking their thirst in the admirable wisdom of the teacher which flowed purely and copiously in his lucid and enlightening lectures.

"His gifts as an organizer and eloquent speaker made him the acknowledged leader of the student youth at the University of Fribourg. In his person the spirit of Francisco de Vitoria seemed to have returned to this earth such was the new vitality he managed to infuse in all those who gathered round his professorial chair, the enthusiasm he aroused in them for philosophical and theological research and study, the renewal of the great problems that engrossed the attention of both ancient and modern thinkers and by him restated with refreshing originality and given brilliant solutions which cut the Gordian knot of difficulties to great theological questions."[30]

We conclude with this laudatory judgment from the University of Fribourg: "Fr. Marín-Sola was the professor of dogmatic theology in our university since the fall of 1918. This important chair had been brilliantly occupied by another Spaniard, his immediate predecessor, the unforgettable Fr. Norberto del Prado. Fr. Marín-Sola discharged his duties with a brilliancy and success that would be very difficult to surmount. His theological knowledge, as vast as it was profound, was enhanced by all the qualities that make for an effective and attractive teaching: clarity and logic in the exposition; originality and assurance of expression; power, fire and eloquence of speech; a markedly broad and open spirit to which nothing that is human and modern in the manifold manifestations of intellectual life was alien.

"His boldly personal mind renewed whatever problems it dealt with. His lectures were always attuned to the profoundly religious inspiration of his priestly soul. His classes constituted the delight of the listeners, who were drawn in ever greater numbers and with mounting enthusiasm to his chair of dogma. Thus, the news of his recall to Spain for imperative reasons understandably caused unanimous and profound regret in everyone.

"He had the temperament of a polemicist . . . and was, besides, a singularly powerful speaker."[31]

The coincidence of all appraisals is remarkably exact. Fr. Marín was an authentic intellectual: thinker, expositor, polemicist, an open and very human mind. A great theologian, a profound writer, he was a shaper of theologians and writers.

[30] *Ibid.*, pgs. 8-9.

[31] *La Liberté* (Fribourg), 17 June, 1932.

3. Literary Output

Fr. Marín-Sola's literary output is as varied as his professional activities. He gave himself wholly to teaching from 1900 to 1932 when he died. Of those 32 years, twenty two were devoted to teaching theology in Ávila, Manila, Rosaryville and Fribourg: three years in Ávila (1906-1908 and 1911), five in Manila (1908-1910, 1929-1932), six in Rosaryville (1913-1919), eight in Fribourg (1919-1927).

In Manila he was both a teacher and a journalist. In 1902-1906 he taught mathematics at the Colegio de San Juan de Letrán and philosophy at the University of Sto. Tomás and simultaneously was a staff writer of the daily newspaper *Libertas*. In 1908-1910 he was promoted to the editorship of the same paper and made a professor of theology at the aforesaid university.

These twenty two years devoted to the teaching of theology and six years of journalistic activities were greatly productive. We will mention here his more significant journalistic productions and all his theological writings.[32]

1. *Catholicism and the Protestant Sects.* – Three articles in *Libertas*, Manila, 1902.
2. *Catholicism and Protestantism. The Lutheran Church.* – Four articles, *ibid.*, 1902.
3. *Catholicism and Protestantism. The Reformed Church.* – One article; *ibid.*, 1902.
4. *Catholicism and Protestantism. The Anglican Episcopal Church.* – Two articles, *ibid.*, 1902.
5. *Catholicism and Protestantism. The Oxford Movement and its Outcome.* – Three articles, *ibid.*, 1902.
6. *Catholicism and Protestantism. Pusseyism and Ritualism.* – Three articles, *ibid.*, 1902.
7. *Catholicism and Protestantism. The Actual State of the Anglican Church.* – Four articles, *ibid.*, 1903.

[32] Besides the works listed in the text, Fr. Marín authored many others. They were mostly journalistic pieces written during his four years as a staffer, and two years as the editor of *Libertas*. He himself had gathered in twenty-two folders his articles published in *Libertas*. They comprise editorials, apologetical and polemical writings aimed at the Protestants, Aglipayans, and other sects.

He also wrote *Santo Domingo de Guzmán y las misiones de infieles* (St. Dominic de Guzman and the Missions among the Heathen), in *Misiones Dominicanas*, August, 1921.

Panegírico de Santo Tomás de Aquino Panegyric on St. Thomas Aquinas), delivered before the Faculty of the Central University of Madrid on 15 March, 1908, and published in Ávila that same year.

8. *Catholicism and Protestantism. The Anglican Church and the Roman Church.* – Two articles, *ibid.*, 1903.

9. *The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma.* – Original Spanish edition in 4°, one volume, 600 pages. Published by the Biblioteca the Tomistas Españoles, Valencia, 1923.

This work had been previously published as a series of monographic articles in the journals *La Ciencia Tomista* and *Revue Thomiste.*

10. *L'évolution homogene du dogme catholique.* – Two volumes in 4°, 535 and 375 pages respectively. Fribourg, Switzerland, 1924.

This edition is the French translation of the previous work, augmented by the author with new footnotes in almost all the sections, and with an entirely new section, the 6th section of chapter 4.

11. *Proponitur nova solutio ad conciliandam causalitatem physicam sacramentorum cum eorum reviviscentia* (A New Solution to Reconcile the Physical Causality of the Sacraments with their Revival). – In *Divus Thomas,* Jan. 1925, pgs. 49-63. Fribourg.

12. *El sistema tomista sobre la moción divina* (The Thomist System concerning the Divine Motion). – In *La Ciencia Tomista,* July-Aug. 1925, pgs. 5-55.

13. *Respuesta a algunas objeciones acerca del sistema tomista sobre la moción divina* (Replies to some Objections to the Thomist System concerning the Divine Motion). – In *La Ciencia Tomista,* Jan-Feb. 1926, pgs. 5-74.

14. *Nuevas objeciones acerca del sistema tomista sobre la moción divina* (New Objections to the Thomist System concerning the Divine Motion). – *La Ciencia Tomista,* May-June 1926, pgs. 321-397.

15. *Concordia tomista entre la moción divina y la libertad creada* (The Thomist Conciliation of the Divine Motion and Created Liberty). – Unedited typescript in 4 volumes fol. Volume 1 has 1039 pages of text and XLIX of indexes; vol. 2, 643 and XXI; vol. 3, 612 and LXXXI; vol. 4, 646 and LXXXV.

4. Fr. Marín's Moral Personality

Fr. Marín-Sola's moral personality possessed truly attractive and exemplary features as a religious and as a man. He endeared himself to God and to men.

A. Fr. Marín, the religious

Father's was a profound and solid religious spirit. We have time and again remarked that there was nothing superficial in him. This was also true of his piety. Occupied as he was in the study and consideration of dogmatic truths, he was not content with a merely *speculative* knowledge of the same. No one has expounded as well as he the affective and perfective value of Catholic dogmas. In this work he devotes two whole sections to explore this theme. His penetration of the dogmas made it easy for him to transform them into sources of spiritual and divine life.

Thence his solid piety – a truly *dogmatic* piety. He experienced no difficulty in translating his theological investigations into genuine dogmatic elevations of the purest mystical strain. Traces of it can be detected once in a while in his writings, and more frequently in his conversations. It can also be appreciated in some manifestations of his way of life. We are ourselves witnesses of some of these elevations done for our benefit when we were still students. We can likewise testify to the exactness with which he carried over into his exterior life the divine contemplation which filled him interiorly.

This profound and simple piety was accompanied by an equally profound and simple humility. We have earlier called attention to his renewing – not to say revolutionary – and polemical temperament on the intellectual level. This might lead one to surmise that, on the moral level, Fr. Marín was a restless and agitated spirit. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Father was an exemplar of humility as well as of simplicity.

That he should eagerly rise to the defense of his positions is understandable. He had spent many a wakeful night and a great deal of hard work to construct his doctrinal syntheses and to lay bare their traditional roots. For all their renewing and revolutionary features his teachings, as already noted earlier, always possessed a solid *doctrinal* and *positive* foundation. Right or wrong – that is beside the point just now – it is undeniable that Fr. Marín's writings evince a solid basis in doctrine and an equally solid grounding in tradition. Equally undeniable is the evidence that Father had read extensively and given much thought to the matter. Hence it is understandable that he should zealously defend what had cost him so dearly.

And yet Fr. Marín stood ready to give up all these many long vigils, all this intense labour of thought, a whole lifetime of investigation and study, all the fruits of dedicated effort – all of it – on the strength of a single passage in which St. Thomas clearly affirmed the contrary. Undeniably, the authority of St. Thomas ranks as one of the greatest. But equally great is the sacrifice implied in giving up the fruits of a lifetime of thinking, rethinking, and researching; in renouncing a scientific synthesis built in the course of long years of work; in setting aside *fifteen thousand* texts garnered from the

theological tradition for a single text of the Angelic Doctor. In *The Thomist Conciliation of Divine Motion and Created Liberty* Fr. Marín has collected fifteen thousand quotations for his position. Nonetheless, he writes: "Any theologian who disagrees with certain relatively new aspects which we expect to present in these articles, has at hand a very simple and easy way to convince us. He can dispense with long and complex counter arguments and instead show us one single text from St. Thomas that clearly says the contrary, and he can be certain of our recantation."[33]

Similar instances of humility and modesty abound in his life. As a student, Father once brilliantly argued against a certain professor in a public disputation. The professor found himself completely beset by the young student. Yet Father's classmates testify that he never, in his conversations, made any allusion to what had happened.[34] He passed the examinations for the degree of Lector of Sacred Theology with such flying colours that the Rector of the University of Santo Tomás (Manila), who presided over the exercises, proposed that he be conferred without further ado also the licentiate and the doctorate. Fr. Marín declined, not wishing to draw attention with such an unusual procedure. While teaching at Fribourg, he was proposed for the degree of *Magister* of Sacred Theology. Fr. Marín consented only on condition that the same degree be conferred on a colleague whose attainments were far inferior to his own. He thus gave to understand that he was accepting the degree not as a personal title but in order to add lustre to the chair.

[33]Fr. Marín's submission to the doctrinal authority of St. Thomas was anything but servile. It was neither a *blind* faith in the Angelic Doctor's authority nor a total abdication of personal thinking. At one time or another, we have heard him say that this faith and mental docility to the teachings of Aquinas were grounded *on his own experience.* He had repeatedly experienced the fact that the Saint's assertions were firmly grounded on the principles of reason and of revelation; and this led him to place more trust in what he read in Aquinas than in his own investigations.

Fr. Marín always evidenced his great faithfulness to the teachings of St. Thomas. In 1925-1926, the articles he published in *La Ciencia Tomista* under the title *El sistema tomista sobre la moción divina* (The Thomist System concerning the Divine Motion) caused a great commotion among theologians. About the same time he fell seriously ill in Fribourg. During his illness he wrote an oath of submission to the doctrines of the Angelic Doctor and a moving petition that God would please take him from this world if his interpretation should have deviated from the authentic thought of the Master. God was pleased not to take him at that time, and gave him sufficient time to complete the still unedited four volumes *in folio.*

Father's faithfulness is not to be taken to mean that he was content with the mere *reading* of Aquinas. He was never satisfied until he had thoroughly mastered what he read and researched – a mastery that normally was not long in forthcoming since he was gifted with a clear and profound mind.

[34]Declaration by his fellow-student, Fr. Gregorio Arnáiz.

The renovating spirit which he brought to the study and exposition of the theological conclusions expounded by him in the classroom and in his writings caused him no small amount of trials and unpleasantness. The reactions provoked by his articles in people of different persuasions can be easily understood. But Father Marín was a sensitive soul, and such reactions affected him a great deal. However, he was never heard to utter a recriminatory word. His intimate letters provide reliable proof of his humility and religious spirit. And the facts always coincided with the feelings expressed in his letters.

B. Fr. Marín, the man

Father, we have said, possessed a fighting temperament. Yet, he was not one to pick up his pen with a mind to provoke an argument, but to do constructive work. In *La Ciencia Tomista* he wrote: "Although our articles, so far as it depends on us, will have no polemical purposes . . ."[35] Still, he foresaw that the events would frustrate his intentions: "Despite our desire to avoid the faintest shadow of controversy, we anticipate no lack of Molinists, and particularly of Thomists, who will disagree with our ideas, who will attack them and force us to reply."[36]

His replies were always models of good breeding. Not a harsh word escaped his pen or his lips which could prejudice his critics. He was polite, mild and elegant. Section VII in toto of Chapter 7 of this book is devoted to answering the theologian who maintained the contrary view. The solution to the twenty seven objections raised by the latter take all of 48 pages.[37] Yet the critic's name is barely mentioned three times, and then always with expressions of regard.[38]

Father directed the reply to the doctrine. For the person he reserved an exquisite consideration. He strove "to keep objective discussions from degenerating into more or less personal differences of opinion, as is often the case with controversies carried on through journals."[39]

[35]*El sistema tomista sobre la moción divina; La Ciencia Tomista,* July-August, 1925, pg.8.

[36]*Ibid.*

[37]*La Evolución homogénea del dogma católico,* nos. 491, 519; Valencia, 1923, pgs. 524-571.

[38]No mention is made either of the names of his critics elsewhere in the same book. For instance, Section 1 of Chapter 4 is entirely motivated by the objection submitted by a theologian whom he quotes without naming. Chapter 6 is entirely given to the solution of difficulties without naming the persons who had raised them.

[39]*El sistema sobre la moción divina, La Ciencia Tomista,* July-August, 1925, pg.8.

Neither the harsh attacks hurled on certain occasions against his views nor the severe judgments to which they were at times subjected by some critics were sufficient to discourage him from holding on to his resolve never to climb down from the doctrinal and objective level to the subjective and personal. Fr. Marín never lost his composure and serenity; he always remained understanding and refined. A polemicist by temperament, he was, nonetheless, so far removed from the personal dimension of polemics and so intent only on the clarification of doctrine, that he expressed a wish for a return to the era in which controversies were carried on with no mention of the identities of those taking part. "To the remark added by our objector . . . we shall only make the following observations . . . Fourthly, if this controversy is to continue, it would be desirable that it should not be like the heated argument directed by Concina, in the decadent XVIII century, against Billuart by name, but that it should be conducted rather in the urbane style in which, in the classic XVI century, Ferrariensis took issue against Cardinal Cajetan on several questions, but without naming him; or even better still, in the truly saintly manner in which, in the Golden Age of Scholasticism, the two greatest disciples of St. Augustine – St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure maintained divergent interpretations of the common master without ever attacking one another and without jeopardizing in the least their mutual friendship."[40]

Father possessed a large measure of broadmindedness. He was unshakeable in his convictions, yet he never entertained the thought of imposing his views as definitively true. Indeed, he held them to be definitely true, but were they such in themselves? Broadmindedness was one thing he insisted upon in his articles. "From our adversaries, if there be any, we would ask only a little bit of patience and another little bit of broadmindedness. Of patience, so as not to let themselves be carried away by impressions caused by one or two articles and to allow us enough time to unfold our thought completely in suceeding articles . . . Of broadmindedness, so as to refrain from declaring false an assertion solely because it appears to be new or surprising, let alone qualifying it as anti-Thomistic because it is contrary to one, some, or several Thomists, when, as a matter of fact, other truly ranking Thomists support it."[41] "Of the Thomist school the same thing is true that is true of the Catholic doctrine, to wit: *unity* is to be preserved in *necessary* or evident things, but *liberty* is no less to be upheld in *doubtful* things, and, above all,

[40] *Nuevas observaciones acerca del sistema tomista sobre la moción divina* (New Observations about the Thomist System concerning the divine motion), *La Ciencia Tomista*, May-June, 1926, pgs. 396-397.

[41] *El sistema tomista sobre la moción divina, La Ciencia Tomista*, July-August, 1925, pg.8.

charity is to be maintained in *all* things. 'In necessariis, *unitas;* in dubiis, *libertas;* in omnibus, *charitas.*'"[42]

The mild, urbane, human character of his polemics was always in evidence both in debatable and non-debatable matters. His views on the evolution of dogma and on the conciliation of the divine motion with created liberty were debatable matters. He argued for his views as one thoroughly convinced of their truth; but he was also aware of the possibility of being in error, since no man is infallible. On the other hand, his points of view on the question of Catholic teaching as contrasted with Protestant teaching were not debatable matters, since these were dogmatic points of view, and thus infallible. Liberty was out of the question, but there was room for charity. This was clearly obvious in the articles published in Manila on the subject of Protestantism. Their objective, serene, and dispassionate tenor produced excellent results in the Protestants themselves.

The Episcopalian bishop in Manila wrote Fr. Marín a letter in the following terms: "Your articles on the Anglo-American Church are written in so urbane and correct a spirit that it was a pleasure for me to read them."[43] The bishop requested that *Libertas* publish the letter written by himself to the author of the articles on *Catholicism and Protestantism* so that the Catholic readers of that daily would come to know the pleasure with which the Protestants read what Fr. Marín was writing. Father, in turn, replied via the same daily that the mild tenor of his articles was an exigency of both social living and Christian brotherhood. He wrote: "Thank you, in the first place, for the kind words you have for our modest articles on Protestantism. The urbane and correct spirit which you so kindly attribute to us, produces in us the feeling of satisfaction that always attends the fulfillment of a duty. Indeed, nothing so becomes a Christian than a moderate and fair appraisal of the ideas of those who dissent from the convictions he holds dear, along with a gentlemanly consideration and respect owed to *persons of all kinds.*"[44] However, this *personal* urbanity shown to Protestants is not to be mistaken for weakness in upholding Catholic teaching, or for a certain interest in reaching a doctrinal compromise. "However", Fr. Marín went on to say, "in order to be utterly sincere, we have to make it clear that until the Episcopal Church returns to her ancient mother, the Roman Church, and acknowledges the Pope as the supreme Pastor and Head of the Universal Church, Catholics cannot consider Episcopalians as their correligionists nor

[42] *Nuevas observaciones acerca del sistema tomista sobre la moción divina, La Ciencia Tomista*, May-June, 1926, pg.397.

[43] Letter of the Rev. IRVING SPENCER, Episcopalian bishop of Manila to Fr. Marín, 1903.

[44] Fr. Marín's reply to the Episcopalian bishop of Manila.

believe that the means of salvation can be found in your Church, except in the case of a thoroughly invincible good faith."[45]

In addition to the traits of understanding, gentleness and urbanity, Fr. Marín possessed a youthful – at times, even a childlike – spirit. With the young he was in his element. He was as one of them, albeit simultaneously showing his superior maturity, age and knowledge. To the young he was at once a comrade, a teacher and a father. Therein, together with the clarity of his expositions and the interest he aroused in the problems under discussion, lies the key to the success he enjoyed in his dealings with the youth. To them he was an understanding friend, mentor and counsellor.

Earlier we have quoted incontrovertible testimonies from the chroniclers of the Philippine Province where he lived for so many years, and from the University of Fribourg where he taught for eight years – testimonies that speak of "the enthusiasm and fervent love he stirred up in the hearts of the young, and the intense affection he aroused towards his person"[46] and affirm that "nothing of what is human was alien to him".[47] Fr. Marín revived the classical age in which religious men exercised a decisive influence on the masses of university students – the age of Blessed John of Saxony who charmed and won the hearts of young students, the age of St. Thomas chatting with his students from the Sorbonne, by the banks of the Seine, showing himself as the best friend of those same youths who had earlier flocked to his classes to listen to him as their best teacher.

Those who have left us a written portrayal of his soul, and Father himself as well, give us to understand that the human virtues we have mentioned were not simply the fruits of his natural dispositions and education but also *manifestations of his supernatural virtues.* The eulogy made of him by the University of Fribourg at the time of his death recalls "the profoundly religious inspiration of his priestly soul."[48] Father Marín himself, in his reply to the Anglican bishop who had praised the gentle and fair tenor of his articles on Protestantism, wrote: "We, Catholics, are always ready to observe all the consideration demanded by society and Christian fraternity towards those whom we are precluded from sharing the sacred embrace of religious communion in the unity of faith."[49]

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[45] *Ibid.*

[46] Fr. M. VELASCO, *Biographical Essays,* pg.9.

[47] *La Liberté,* Fribourg, 17 June, 1932.

[48] *Ibid.*

[49] Fr. Marín's letter to the Episcopalian bishop of Manila.

THE HOMOGENEOUS EVOLUTION OF CATHOLIC DOGMA

The work being published in English in this volume is the most significant of Fr. Marín's published output. There is, indeed, another perhaps even more significant (in 4 vols.), which remains unpublished to this day; but it is this one which made his name in theological circles and definitively established him as a theologian of the first rank.

It was first published in 1911, as a series of articles in *La Ciencia Tomista* under the general title, *La Homogeneidad de la doctrina católica* (The Homogeneity of Catholic Teaching). The articles were later revised and given a better arrangement by the author, who also added some other material published in *Revue Thomiste* and wrote almost all the sections of chapters 6 and 7. Out of it all came the present work. Renamed *La evolución homogénea del dogma católico* (The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma), it was published in Valencia, in 1923, as the first title of the *Biblioteca de Tomistas Españoles* (Library of Spanish Thomists) founded by Fr. Luis Urbano.

The second edition, in French (2 vols., 4°), came out in Fribourg (Switzerland), in 1924. It constituted a notable improvement over the first since, apart from the further development of not a few concepts and the addition of more footnotes, it contained an entirely new section on the evolution of dogma through the affective way, the treatment of which is not as extensive in the Spanish as in the French edition.

To proceed in an orderly manner in the presentation of the work being offered to the public in a new edition, we shall touch on the following points:

I. The circumstances in which *The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma* first appeared.

II. Its content.

III. Its reception by theological opinion.

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH *THE HOMOGENEOUS EVOLUTION OF CATHOLIC DOGMA* FIRST APPEARED

The condemnation of modernism was still fresh when Fr. Marín began writing on homogeneity and the evolution of Catholic teaching. He was well aware that modernism had confronted a very real problem and given it an altogether heterodox solution. However, the condemnation of any heterodox solution left the problem unsolved, and the door open to the investigation of a real and pressing problem with a view to giving it a solution in conformity with the faith. It was necessary to find an acceptable solution to a problem which the modernists had solved in unacceptable ways. There were

two aspects to the problem: (1) the unfolding or evolution of Catholic dogma; (2) the influence of religious experience in its evolution. These were two aspects that modernism had ill considered; two aspects that Catholic theologians needed to recognize as real, to investigate, and correctly to explain. There were many who took it upon themselves to study the problem. They all safeguarded the dogmatic aspect of the question, but the proferred solutions were not always concordant. With the present work Fr. Marín enlisted himself in the enterprise.

Modernism was an *arational* conception of the Catholic doctrine its philosophy is fundamentally agnostic and the agnosticism is projected onto both the truths of religion and the dogmas. In consequence, faith is not an *intellectual assent* but a *blind sentiment*, the seat of which is not in the intellect since it proceeds rather from the heart under the pressure of the subconscious. "To begin with the philosophical part, modernists lay the foundations of religious philosophy in the doctrine known usually by the name of agnosticism."[50] "[Faith] which is the beginning and basis of any religion must be located in a certain intimate feeling which issues from the need of the divine. Now, this need of the divine . . . , in the first place, lies hidden beneath consciousness, or as they say, borrowing a term from modern philosophy, in the subconscious, where also its root lies hidden and ungrasped."[51]

The development of religious understanding (if that name can be given to what is but a *feeling* blindly issuing from the subconscious) is not brought about by the vitality inherent in the *objective truth itself* – which remains unapprehended, in the first place – but by imperatives properly belonging to the life of the subject who has the religious experience. Religious teachings, dogmas, evolve and develop at the behest of man's own psychology. We have here not an objective but rather a subjective development; not a rational or doctrinal but rather a blind and vital development, where the term "vital" does not refer to the developed truths or dogmas – which would be pure orthodoxy – but refers solely to the subject who feels them, man.

Thence flows one immediate consequence, namely, doctrinal and dogmatic evolution which is not subject to a homogeneous process. If such evolution proceeded from an *internal* pressure of the unfolding truth itself, from an explication of what is implicit in the truth, from a surfacing of what is virtually contained in it, one could be talking of a homogeneous evolution. The point arrived at in the developmental process would have been contained in the principle or point of departure. But this is not the case. As conceived by the modernists, the development is heterogeneous. The point arrived at, through one or more evolutional processes, might or might not coincide with

[50] Encycl. *Pascendi dominici gregis*, AAS, 40 (1907), 596.

[51] *Ibid.*, pg.598.

the primitive datum since the development and the evolution are not dictated by the internal fecundity of the truth which, as it unfolds, maintains a real identity with itself, but by the subjective dispositions of the religious person, dispositions that are extremely contingent and changeable. "That dogma not only does, but must needs evolve and *change*, is something that modernists themselves openly avow, and something that clearly follows from their teachings . . . The primitive formula needs to be accepted and sanctioned by the heart; the effort by means of which the secondary [formulae] come into existence must also be guided by the heart. If they are to be vital, these formulae must be and must ever remain accommodated to the faith as well as to the believer. If, for any reason whatsoever, this accommodation should cease, those primitive notions lose their worth and must needs be changed."[52]

Finally, modernists claim that the dogmatic development just described, namely, one that deviates from the meaning of the primitive data, is a fact attested to by the history of dogmas.

Light had to be shed on all of this. The Church condemned the errors we have mentioned. Yet, there are valid points contained in them. For instance, the fact that dogmas have developed; the fact that, although it comes down from God to us by revelation, dogma is not disconnected from the life of the person who believes in it; the fact that the connexion between dogma and Christian life has a bearing on the dogmatic development of the revealed truth.

These facts had to be harmonized with the two elements which no Catholic theologian can overlook, to wit, the *rational character of truth* denied by agnostic modernism, and the *homogeneous character of doctrinal evolution* likewise rejected by modernist doctrinal transformism.

In other words, there was a need to state in orthodox terms, and to solve by orthodox means and criteria and with orthodox results, a problem stated by the modernists in unacceptable terms, and by them solved by criteria and with results equally unacceptable to Catholicism. Such was the task to which Catholic theologians addressed themselves. It was also the task to which Fr. Marín applied himself, in the conviction that traditional theology possessed within itself sufficient elements satisfactorily to solve the nagging problem which the Church faced.

The Catholic solutions always safeguarded that which can in no way be renounced, they all upheld a faith that is rational and a process that is homogeneous. But there was not in all the same exhaustive fullness in the treatment of either the scope of the rationality of the faith and of the development of the dogmas vis-à-vis the affective influences bearing upon it, or of the scope itself of the development of dogmatic truths.

[52] *Ibid.*, pg.602.

The present work reflects those differences among Catholics. Beneath the author's mild and serene style, echoes can still be detected of the lively and spirited exchanges, of which he occasionally complains.

Without meaning to overlook the fact that faith is an intellectual virtue, some writers accounted for the unfolding of the truths of faith on the basis of a predominantly affective process. This should not be surprising given the fact that the two strains, the intellectualist and the mystic, have always existed among Catholic authors. The truth lies in the equilibrium between the intellect and the will. A correspondent wrote Fr. Marín in these terms: "Dogmatic development very, very rarely, or almost never, takes place through pure dialectics. Dialectics usually comes in at a later stage to justify the development made spontaneously or *intuitively* by way of Christian praxis or experience. Thus, St. Thomas's dictum is fulfilled: 'Life comes ahead of doctrine.' If such were not the case, you should find it easy to cite concrete, real instances of dialectical development, and you should not be satisfied with some hypothetical examples."[53] These words mirror the position of those who favour the affective and mystic factors in accounting for the development of dogma. Fr. Marín satisfied his correspondent's scruples. In the present work he cites a respectable number of historical instances that evidence the fact of dogmatic development by means of reasoning.

At the opposite end were those who accounted for the fact of dogmatic progress by an intellectual process that was insufficient both theoretically and historically. The reader will have discerned that we are reviewing only the tendencies dealt with by Fr. Marín in the writing of this book, namely, the heterodox or modernist, and, within Catholicism, the predominantly mystic and the insufficiently intellectual. We shall now consider the latter.

Fr. Marín offers an ample account of the traditional meaning of the revealed *implicit*. Everything that is implicit in the principles is homogeneous to the same. What is implicit in the revealed principles is likewise revealed, and if it is revealed, it can be defined as a dogma of faith. But what is the scope of true implicitness? Fr. Marín maintains that the traditional view places the *inclusive virtual* within the scope of metaphysical and theological implicitness. Hence, every truly theological conclusion is implicitly revealed and can be defined as a truth of faith. Consequently, the development of Catholic teaching can reach as far as turning all authentically theological conclusions into dogmas of divine faith by means of the definition of the Church.

Not everybody was – or is – of this opinion. And Fr. Marín experienced no want of objectors. Dogmatic development by way of reasoning stops short of the *virtual inclusive;* it extends only as far as the *formal implicit*. Nothing is definable as a dogma if it is not formally revealed. Such is not the case with the conclusions. Hence the conclusions can never be defined as dogmas of faith.

[53] *The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma,* ch.4, sec.1, no.190.

Herein lies the core of Fr. Marín's book. He proves that the *virtual,* understood in the traditional sense, entails real identity with the principles: it is contained in them, included in them. Theological conclusions are virtually included in the revealed principles; hence they, the conclusions, are revealed. Virtually and implicitly, true; but, in any case, revealed. If revealed, then definable. Once they are defined by the Church they are to be believed with divine faith.

But Fr. Marín did not arrive at this position solely through the reasoning just indicated. True enough, the concept of genuine metaphysical virtuality could not but bring him to it. Yet it is equally true that the history of dogmas furnished him with a battery of first rate arguments. There are not a few dogmas, already defined and believed with divine faith, that reached the stage of definition by a process of authentic reasoning. Fr. Marín amply documents these instances. Those who maintain that only formally implicit conclusions can be defined as dogmas of faith, and exclude from definition all virtually implicit conclusions, must explain how it has been possible for the Church to have defined certain dogmas[54] that do not seem to have been revealed in a formally implicit manner.

"It is a historical fact *beyond doubt",* writes Fr. Marín, that a number of dogmas have unfolded or developed by way of theological conclusions in the proper sense of the term. This historical fact was admitted by traditional theology up to the 17th century, and it should likewise be admitted by all modern theologians . . . Once the true concept of the revealed virtual is recaptured, it becomes easy to understand how an authentic and proper evolution – but one that is homogeneous – can, and does exist in Catholic dogma. Thus, the antinomy that seemingly existed between the teachings of Catholic theology and the facts of history[55] vanishes, and the objection

[54] The author examines ten dogmas that came to be defined through a previous process of investigation and study, a process clearly manifested in the very same conciliar or papal texts in which the definition is prepared or explained. These ten instances are found in ch.4, secs.2-3.

[55] This refers to theological teaching subsequent to the deviation that took place in the 17th century. Having reduced the theological conclusion to the connexive virtual, and taking into account the non-revealed character of the latter, theology was bound to affirm that theological conclusions cannot be defined as dogmas. On the other hand, history manifestly shows that truths known by way of genuine theological conclusions have been actually defined.

Certain modern theologians likewise affirm that only the *formally implicitly* revealed can be defined dogmatically. But the history of dogmas attests to instances in

raised by modernism concerning the transformation of dogmas collapses entirely."[56]

There were several reasons that led our author to challenge the notion of a dogmatic evolution restricted solely to conclusions of a formally implicit character. He considers such a notion too narrow. In the first place, it does not do away with the modernist contention that dogmas are subject to transformation. If the virtual is not homogeneous, then, since the Church has in fact defined many instances of the virtual, it follows that there are many dogmas that are not homogeneous to the revealed datum. In the second place, the metaphysical or theological virtual, as understood traditionally, is a virtual that is *included* in the principles, and therefore revealed. In the third place, this is the only sufficient explanation of the definitions by which the Church has officially sanctioned the development of certain dogmatic truths.

It is obvious that Fr. Marín had to contend not a little with certain orthodox ideas narrower than his own, and narrower even than ideas which he considered traditional. He fought against these narrow ideas for a fundamentally *dogmatic* reason: not for reasons of school affiliation (since, as he observes, *all the traditional theology is of one mind on this point),* but because of his desire to strike a blow, true and good, against the modernist error that upheld a transformistic evolution in Catholic teaching. The whole of chapter 6 and the last two sections of chapter 7 bear witness to these debates.

II. THE CONTENT OF THE PRESENT WORK

The contents of the book have already been somewhat outlined. We shall, nonetheless, proceed to give a more detailed account of it, a task made easy by the fact that Fr. Marín's writings – and this one in particular – are models of logical vigour and clarity, two qualities which immensely facilitate an over-all view.

There are seven chapters to the book, each one subdivided into several sections. Chapter 1 is fundamental. It explains the various kinds of doctrinal evolution; the various kinds of distinctions, those obtaining in things, and those obtaining between the principle which is the starting point of the evolu-

which virtually revealed truths have been defined. Thus, theology and history seemed to be at loggerheads.

Fr. Marín's researches on this point do away with these embarrassments and re-establish a perfect coincidence between theology and history.

[56] *The Homogeneous Evolution* . . ., Introduction no.11.

tion, and the term at which it arrives; the various kinds of reasoning by means of which doctrinal evolution is carried out; etc.

Doctrinal development or evolution takes place in three ways, according as it arrives either at formulae or expressions different from the primitive ones; or at different concepts; or at different realities. The merely nominal development or evolution of formulae, which maintains the same concept and the same reality in the first as well as in the final formula, is necessarily homogeneous. Homogeneous, likewise, is the development of one formula into another, when the latter contains a different concept which is, nonetheless, included in the same reality expressed by the meaning of the primitive formula or principle which is the starting point. But the same is not the case in the process of development at the term of which we find a formula, a concept, and a reality that differ from those of the starting point. This is a case of true transformation, a case of heterogeneous or transformistic evolution.

If it is to be truly homogeneous, the conceptual development must needs preserve the *same meaning* through all the changes of formulation. However, the identity of meaning is maintained not only in the case where the change is solely in the words, but also in the case where the concept is *explicated,* where the concept is *opened up* and thus discloses or makes manifest what was implicit or contained in itself. Development ceases to be homogeneous solely in the case in which the meaning of the derived formula is either different from or contrary to the meaning of the initially given one. "The better to understand when the meaning of a formula is, or is not, implicitly contained in the meaning of another formula, it will help to bear well in mind a threefold distinction of meanings or concepts taught by St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure, namely, (a) explicative concepts; (b) diverse concepts; (c) contrary concepts. Concepts are said to be *explicative* when they issue one from the other upon the one and only condition that our intellect penetrates their *whole* content."[57]

In this case, between the implicit and the explicit there is only a distinction of reason, not a real distinction. Not a merely nominal distinction either. It is not a case of nominal distinction or a distinction solely of words and formulae. Neither is it a case of real distinction or a distinction of objectivity and subject-matter. It is a case of a distinction of reasoned reason or a distinction of concepts *really contained the one in the other.*

In Chapter 2 the question concerning the nature of *true theological implicitness* is stated and solved. Authentic doctrinal development in theology is carried out by way of conceptual implicitness. Theological conclusions are explications of what is contained in the revealed principles.

[57] *Op.cit.,* ch.1, sec.1, no.20.

The starting point of dogmatic evolution is constituted by the revealed formulae handed down by the Apostles to the primitive Church. In these formulae there is a part of meaning *formally* contained, and a part of meaning *virtually implicit*. No theologian doubts that the formulae themselves, as handed down by the Apostles, are objects of divine revelation: they have been revealed. No theologian doubts either that the part of meaning formally contained has been revealed. But what of the part of meaning virtually implicit? Has it also been revealed? This is the point at issue. Its solution calls for the determination of the traditional understanding of the concept of the true theological virtuality.

Virtual is the counterpart of formal. The formal or immediate content is that which is known by itself *without the mediation of any other*. On the other hand, the virtual or mediate is not known by itself, but disclosed by *something new*.

There are two kinds of *virtual* or *mediate* content. There is a virtual or mediate that differs both really and conceptually from the formal; and there is a virtual or mediate that *differs conceptually* from the formal but is, nonetheless, *really and objectively identical to it*. The existence of these two kinds of virtual is traditionally admitted and forms the basis for two kinds of sciences: the metaphysical, and the physical sciences. Every science is a knowledge of the virtual or mediate, a knowledge of conclusions. Conclusions are nothing else but the virtuality of the principles made plain or explicated. The conclusions of the physical sciences contain meanings that differ from the meaning of the principles both conceptually and really. The conclusions of the metaphysical sciences contain meanings that are conceptually different from, and at the same time really identical to the meaning of the principles. The existence of these two kinds of sciences provides the clearest proof for the existence of these two kinds of virtuality.

Fr. Marín calls these two traditionally accepted virtuals the *virtual inclusive* and the *virtual connexive*. The former, which is *included* in the principles, really contained in them, is the metaphysical virtual. The latter, which is *connected* or joined to the principles but not included in them but rather distinct from them, is the physical virtual.

In a magnificent example of positive-doctrinal research, Fr. Marín discovers the origin of a change of nomenclature which eventually had enormous theoretical repercussions. The innovation is traced to Suárez who exhibits in these matters a spirit that is traditional in part and independent in part. This great Jesuit theologian admitted, contrary to Molina, that theological conclusions become truths of faith after their definition by the Church. "It must be said that the theological conclusion, after it has been defined by the Church, is of faith formally and most properly, not only mediately but immediately. This opinion seems to me certain and gathered from the common consent of theologians. Nor do I find any theologian who contradicts it."[58]

"Eminently traditional where common doctrines are concerned, Suárez is also one of the most eclectic spirits in matters where his predecessors are divided among themselves. Suárez seldom declares himself unconditionally for any of two opposed schools. More often than not, he introduces a distinction or observation of his own, no doubt with the praiseworthy intention of reducing the distance between the two adversaries."[59] And that is what he did in the present question. There were those who affirmed that the revealed virtual or theological conclusion is of divine faith by itself prior to the Church's definition. Among these, Suárez says, are Melchor Cano, Vázquez and Vega. Others, on the contrary, affirm that the theological virtual or theological conclusion can be defined by the Church as of divine faith, but, prior to such definition, it can be the object of only a theological assent. Such is the view of St. Thomas, Cajetan, Capreolus, etc.

To shorten the distance between these two positions, Suárez introduced two new terms: the *formal confused*, and the *proper virtual*. He designated as formal confused what had up to then been traditionally called virtual implicit, that is, the metaphysical or theological virtual. In other words, what had been traditionally considered a theological conclusion was now considered as an object of *formal* revelation, and thus could be said to be of faith prior to the Church's definition. On the other hand, the connexive or physical virtual was called a *proper* virtual. Since the theological conclusion refers to what is properly virtual, it followed that the properly theological conclusion differed really from the revealed principle, and was not of faith prior to its definition by the Church.

After shedding light on this confusion in nomenclature and making clear at once the doctrinal repercussions therefrom, Fr. Marín goes on to explain the nature of the truly theological virtual or truly theological conclusion. It is the virtual inclusive or the conclusion deduced by means of essential reasoning. The theological conclusion is a metaphysical conclusion; hence, objectively implicit in the revealed principles, which are the principles of theology. The minors of reason that play a part in theological reasonings are mere instruments with which we bring out what is contained in the revealed premises. They are not principles *from which* the conclusions are deduced, but *with which* the conclusions are deduced. The conclusions are included in the premises of faith.

Theological conclusions can be considered either prior to, or after, their definition by the Church. Prior to the definition, they are not of faith.

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[58] *Op.cit.*, ch.2, sec.2, no.69.

[59] *Ibid.*, no.70.

Although they contain a revealed truth, nonetheless, its revealed character is not perceived through the Church's proposition but through the light of one's own reason. Thus, one of the conditions for the assent of faith is wanting.

The Church can define theological conclusions because they are included in God's revelation, and the Church has the power and the assistance of the Holy Spirit in order to explicate infallibly what is implicit in the Word of God. No new revelation is required for this explication. Once they are defined, theological conclusions must be accepted and held with divine faith because they have now become dogmas of faith. As a matter of fact, the object attained by theological conclusions, or rather the truth expressed by such conclusions, has been revealed by God, since we are talking of the virtual *inclusive*. After the definition, this truth is accepted through the Church's infallible proposition, and not because the theologian or the believer perceives its inclusion by the light of his own reason. All the conditions for a dogmatic truth are, thus, fulfilled, to wit, divine revelation and infallible proposition by the Church assisted by the Holy Spirit. He assists her not only in order to propose what is revealed, but also to explicate or unfold it.

However, before proceeding, with the infallible assistance of the Holy Spirit, to the dogmatic definition of a theological conclusion, the Church employs various means *humanly* to assure herself that it is truly a case of authentically inclusive conclusions. Still, it must be well understood that neither the Church's infallible definition, nor, consequently, the evolution of the conclusions into dogmas, is grounded on such assurance or on the correct employment of the two available means. The sole foundation, Fr. Marín insists time and again, is the infallible divine assistance.

The classical ways, through which virtual inclusive revelation is explicated, are two. One is the way of the intellect, or of reasoning, or of study. The other is the way of the will, or of connaturalness, or of the experience of the divine.

The way of study or reasoning is the better known and, at the same time, the more certain. Better known, because the intellectual character of faith and theology are obvious. More certain, because reasoning and theoretical investigation are subject to a process ruled by necessary and immutable factors and laws such as those which preside over the life of the intellect. Better known, besides, inasmuch as it is objectively verified with ease precisely because it is ruled by necessary and immutable laws. It is relatively easy to perceive whether an intellectual process is correctly done or not, and hence to see whether or not the conclusion is included in the principles from which it is deduced.

The way of the will or of experience of the divine is another authentic way of doctrinal, theological or dogmatic, evolution. By this means we are

also able to attain truths derived from principles although, in this case, the medium by which we apprehend such derived truths is not an intellectual one, but rather an experimental medium or one of vital contact. As a matter of fact, the faithful possess within themselves a divine principle of life: grace. From it proceed not a few infused habits: the theological virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit. All of this confers on the person who possesses it a *divine mode of being*, which is in effect a principle of intuition or of appreciation of things divine. Just as the natural habits, in virtue of their being *in conformity with right reason*, impart a natural knack of estimating the *rational rectitude* of things, so also the divine habits impart the knack of appreciating the *divine character* of what is opposed, or proposed, to them. Any thing that is appreciated, or adumbrated, or felt by the sense of the divine that exists in us, is something divine, supernatural.

The way of the will is neither as firm or as certain as the way of the intellect. Not as firm, because the laws under which the will operates are much more contingent. Not as certain, because the very contingency of the will subjects it to the increased danger of deception. It is easy to mistake as proceeding from divine grace what in truth proceeds from a natural normal or abnormal psychic condition. Deception is much easier in the realm of the affections than in the realm of reason. A mistake in the latter is more easily detectable than a mistake in the realm of vital experience. Hence, doctrinal development by way of the will needs to be confirmed by theological reasoning.

Fr. Marín examines ten cases taken from the history of dogmas. The ten are instances of a dogmatic process effected by way of the intellect or reasoning. But some of them also reflect the influence of Christian piety, divine grace, and the infused virtues.

After an ample exposition and proof of the points just mentioned, Fr. Marín devotes a whole chapter to disprove the existence of the so-called *ecclesiastical faith*. Modern theology asserts that, once they are infallibly defined by the Church, theological conclusions are believed with ecclesiastical faith. This assertion is made in consequence of the view that theological conclusions have not been revealed since they are not *inclusive virtuals*, that is, included in the theological principles. They are only *connexive* virtuals connected, etc. Since they are not revealed, it is impossible for the Church to define them as revealed. Thus, when the Christian accepts them, his belief is not grounded on divine revelation, but solely on the Church's infallible proposition. Consequently, *it is an ecclesiastical faith.*

Fr. Marín holds that such a faith is non-existent. Having said that theological conclusions are *inclusive*, that the theological virtual is not physical but authentically *metaphysical*, it follows that, in his view, the *ecclesiastical faith is left without a reason for being.* When the Church defines a theological

conclusion, she defines a revealed truth, and the faith, with which revelation defined by the Church is accepted, is a *divine faith.*

Fr. Marín adduces eleven arguments to disprove the existence of ecclesiastical faith and to show that its presumed object is an object of divine faith. He then makes a special study of the so-called *dogmatic facts,* and another of the concrete dogmatic fact which is the canonization of saints.

The work is virtually complete. If the theological conclusion or theological virtual is *inclusive,* then it is revealed. If revealed, then it can become a dogma. To become a dogma, it is enough that it be infallibly proposed by the Church as revealed. If it becomes a dogma, then it must be believed with divine faith, and the ecclesiastical faith has no reason for being. Such is the path travelled by Fr. Marín in this book.

He adds two more chapters. Chapter 6 bears the title, Solution to the Objections against the Evolution of Dogma. And Chapter 7, The Evolution of Dogma and the Traditional View. In this last chapter Fr. Marín demonstrates a prodigious theological erudition. Up to the 17th century, traditional theology endorsed the view that theological conclusions are definable and, having been defined, are to be held with divine faith. In the same century is found the beginning of the disorientation in both nomenclature and theory. Some writers begin to understand the theological conclusion in the sense of a truth *connected* with revelation, instead of a truth *included* in revelation. In such a case, the theological conclusion is not a revealed truth and cannot be defined. It is necessary to return to the earlier and traditional concept of the theological virtual, namely, one that is revealed, definable, capable of increasing the number of dogmas through the intervention of the Church with her definition. Hence, dogmatic development or evolution exists.

III. THE RECEPTION ACCORDED TO THE PRESENT WORK BY THEOLOGICAL OPINION

We have mentioned that the present book was first published in the form of articles. Put together in due order and revised, they make up *The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma.* The articles began to appear in *La Ciencia Tomista,* in 1911. The book came out in 1923. Two years after the latter's publication and fourteen after the initial appearance of the articles, Fr. Marín, writing in 1925, describes the reaction provoked by his writings in these terms: "Upon the appearance of the first articles, there was a fairly considerable commotion among the theologians both in and outside Spain. Some were of the belief that we had extended too far the scope of dogmatic evolution. Others, on the contrary, felt that we severely restricted the infallibility of the Church. Finally, others thought that we had deviated, on certain points, from the traditional teachings of Thomism.

"Fortunately, as the series of articles continued, the qualms felt by our critics subsided, and when the articles came out collected and amplified in the large tome of the Spanish edition and later in the two volumes of the French edition, they earned warm praises from theologians of all nationalities and schools, especially from Thomists of the caliber of Fathers Gardeil, Pègues, and Ramírez."[60]

The author of *The Homogeneous Evolution* combined deeply rooted convictions with a profoundly liberal spirit. As any faithful Christian, he regarded *necessary* matters, the *principles of faith,* as beyond all dispute. Likewise, he regarded as unquestionable the principles of Thomism, from which he believed he had never deviated. He was a Thomist out of conviction; but he accepted the fact that within Thomism there were many shades of opinion, many applications that lacked the solidity of the principles. In holding this view, he had in mind *Thomists* rather than Thomism. On this premise he demanded for himself the same freedom of thought, within the boundaries of what in the faith and in Thomist orthodoxy is beyond question.[61]

The liberty, which he demanded for himself, he was always ready to respect in others. He never had any wish to impose his views on others. He hoped to convince them, of course, but he was ready to face the fact that they might not be convinced. Hence, he was not surprised to find that his teachings were contested, even among Thomists. Indeed, some of his theses encountered very stiff opposition. We shall briefly describe the reception accorded by theologians to *The Homogeneous Evolution.* He has just said that it was warmly received by theologians of all nationalities and schools. That is the plain truth. It should not be surprising, given the fact that the problem presented and solved in this book cannot be properly said to be a *wrangle between the schools,* since theologians have *traditionally* understood the theological virtual in the sense expounded by Fr. Marín. It was, therefore, perfectly feasible for him to garner the sympathy of the representatives of all schools.

"Numerous journals, French as well as foreign, have introduced to the public and expressed a high regard for this important work of Fr. Marín-Sola. Almost unanimously they express the belief that it provides the solution to

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[60] *El sistema tomista sobre la moción divina,* in *La Ciencia Tomista,* July-Aug. 1925, pg.5.

[61] "With regard to both the Thomist school and Catholic doctrine, *unity* is to be preserved in matters that are either *necessary* or evident, but liberty is no less to be maintained in matters that are doubtful, and above all, charity must be observed in all things. 'In necessariis, unitas; in dubiis, libertas; in omnibus, charitas'." (*Nuevas observaciones acerca del sistema tomista sobre la moción divina,* in *La Ciencia Tomista,* May-June 1926, pg.397)

the distressing problem of the evolution of dogma."[62] Such is the view expressed in a journal of French Franciscans. We would not dare to speak of *unanimity*, but we would certainly say that the work as a whole – that is, the identification of the theological conclusion with the revealed inclusive virtual; the consequent assertion that the theological conclusion is a revealed proposition; the ulterior step that it can be defined as a dogma of divine faith; that, therefore, dogma does evolve and the ecclesiastical faith is redundant, since the object assigned to it (theological conclusions) is an object of divine faith – all this logical ensemble of thought found widespread acceptance in theological circles. Let us cite some evidences of it culled from all theological schools and from independent authors.

The Dominicans, Fathers Ramírez, Pègues and Gardeil – the first a professor in Fribourg; the second, in Rome; and the third, the restorer and patriarch of Thomism in France – expressed complete and unreserved acceptance of Fr. Marín's doctrine in reviews they made of the book in various journals.

Fr. Ramírez, in *La Ciencia Tomista:* "We believe that Fr. Marín's book expresses the true mind of St. Thomas and of traditional theology. In this sense his work seems to us definitive and we have no hesitation in dubbing it classical. Any one who takes the trouble of reading it serenely and studying it thoroughly will be convinced that Fr. Marín is right."[63]

The author of the *Litteral Commentary to the Summa Theologica,* Fr. Pègues, in *Revue Thomiste:* "The book is so abundant, so closely knit, so logical that it disallows prescinding from any part without being marred and impaired in its demonstrative value . . . It can be asserted that the author proves his thesis with such an abundance of authorities and theological reasons that the mind is left dazzled, so to speak . . ."[64]

And Fr. Gardeil, in Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques: "One has to read all the parts [of the book] so ingeniously fashioned and convincing, in which the history of doctrines alternates unceasingly with doctrinal principles, that the mind, enlightened and satisfied, can hardly put down pages so engrossing . . . I believe that this beautiful synthesis solves all the difficulties raised by the history of the evolution of dogma, or, at the very least, furnishes the key to their solution."[65]

Well known is the commendation of the book made in *Estudios Eclesiásticos* by the Jesuit Fr. Alfonso Ma. de Elorriaga, renowned professor of

[62] *Etudes Franciscaines,* March-April 1925, pg.220.

[63] *La Ciencia Tomista,* Nov.-Dec. 1923, pg.396.

[64] *Revue Thomiste,* Jan.-Feb. 1924, pg.57 ff.

[65] *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques,* Oct. 1924, pg.582 ff.

theology in Salamanca, and later in the Colegio Máximo at Oña. Fr. Elorriaga published in *Estudios Eclesiásticos* several articles espousing a different view from that of Fr. Marín concerning the Church's divine authority in her doctrinal definitions and the proximate capacity of the inclusive virtual to be believed with divine faith before its definition by the Church. But he agreed with the central issue of Fr. Marín's work, namely, the determination of the authentic inclusive virtual and its definability and, consequently, the evolution of dogma by way of theological conclusions. "A theory", he writes, "admirably outlined and developed, and splendidly argued by the Rev. Fr. Marín Sola in his masterpiece *The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma* . . . Indeed, if there be any theological work that states and solves the problem of evolution – not theological evolution but dogmatic evolution, which is something altogether different; not of the immutability of dogma under its various and progressive formulae, not of the evolution of dogma in our knowledge and subjective appreciation of the mystery, but in its own objective nature by a growth that is not transformistic but homogeneous and *quasi* vital – this is it . . . No more objective, deeper and at once loftier conception of dogmatic progress is possible; nor will it be easy to produce a clearer, more delicate and conscientious study superior to the present one in subtle analysis, theological foundation, and abundance of proofs in support of its Thomistic and traditional theory on evolution . . . In such unhappy circumstances comes and appears before us, to our joy, Fr. Marín Sola's luminous work, *The Homogeneous Evolution,* as a powerful preservative or an efficacious curative, to furnish us with ready means, if we study and exploit it well, to save the homogeneity of dogmatic evolution and reconcile it with history."[66]

Fr. Elorriaga, in a letter to Fr. Marín, enlarged upon his own judgment in *Estudios Eclesiásticos* in these terms: "It is with no little joy that I take advantage of this opportunity [that of reviewing the book in the aforementioned journal] to express something of the extraordinary esteem, unique in its kind, in which I hold your work . . . Believe me, Father, within my modest erudition, I find only two works, on the evolution of dogma of incomparable value to the theologian: that of the Lirinensis and that of your Reverence. As a scientific and theological study, I find your own unique and without peer. Nor am I alone in holding this extraordinary concept of its worth in this same house where I am writing this."[67]

The view that the theological conclusion or the inclusive virtual is dogmatically definable is traditional in the Scotist school. Hence the praise and

[66] *Estudios Eclesiásticos,* Jan. 1929, pgs.42-44.

[67] Letter of Fr. ELORRIAGA to Fr. Marín, written from Oña on 25th April, 1929.

acceptance accorded by the Franciscans to Fr. Marín's work. Here are some tokens of it:

Etudes Franciscaines: "Numerous journals, French as well as foreign, have introduced to the public and expressed a high regard for this important work of Fr. Marín Sola. Almost unanimously they express the belief that it provides the solution to the distressing problem of the evolution of dogma."[68]

Estudis Franciscans: "This Library [of Spanish Thomists] sets out with a work [Fr. Marín's] which will undoubtedly be enshrined by fame . . . The doctrinal exposition of all the questions treated in it is solidly grounded on, and strengthened by, a truly Thomistic logic. A luminous clarity makes it engrossing reading. All throughout the author evinces a lofty mind and an extraordinarily serene and impartial judgment . . . This lofty mind manifests itself, in our opinion, not only in the exposition of the theories but also in the treatment accorded to the persons, particularly to the great masters of the different schools – a quality of behaviour that is some times wanting in modern philosophers and theologians . . . Fr. Marín's work will always be worthy of the highest praise."[69]

The adherence of the Franciscans to the doctrine of the definability of the inclusive virtual or to the thesis that dogma evolves by way of truly theological conclusions is apparent in the recent Assumptionist movement, in which they take the stand that the Blessed Virgin's Assumption is definable because it is virtually revealed.[70]

[68] *Etudes Franciscaines,* March-April 1925, pg.220.

[69] *Estudis Franciscans,* Feb. 1924, pgs.134-135.

[70] Many instances of this adherence could be cited. For example, in the proceedings of the Congresso Nazionale Mariano dei Frati Minori d'Italia celebrated in Rome in 1947, the following view is expressed on the definability of Our Lady's Assumption: "The Franciscan Marian Congress cannot give its unconditional acceptance to the opinion of those who maintain as a fixed principle the position that only truths formally revealed, if but implicitly, can be defined, and affirm that the Bl. Virgin's Assumption is thus contained in revelation . . . However, we add, it is in no way necessary for theologians to prove that this truth is included *formaliter implicite* in revelation, since the merely virtual inclusion of a truth in revelation suffices to enable the Church to proceed to define that it be held as revealed 'et propter auctoritatem Dei revelantis'." (*Atti del Congresso Nazionale Mariano dei Frati Minori d'Italia,* pgs. 694-695)

At the Marian Congress of Puy-en-Velay, Fr. BONNEFOY expressed himself in these terms: "Our choice was made after a long time . . . Under certain conditions, theological conclusions can be the object of a dogmatic definition. This is the only doctrine that can claim Tradition for itself. It is the only one capable of giving an account of indisputable dogmatic facts." (*L'Assomption de la Très Sainte Vierge,* Congrès Marial du Puy-en-Velay, Aug. 1949, pg. 333).

Fr. Bonnefoy also published an excellent study defending the same concept of the virtually revealed. Cf. *L'Assomption de la T.S.V. est-elle définissable comme révélée "formaliter implicite"?* , in *Marianum,* fasc. 2, 1950.

The Augustinian Fr. Juan Manuel López writes the following in *España y America:* "A considerable and complete work, a very solid cornerstone of the Library of Spanish Thomists, finely wrought by an intellect of great power and loftiness grounded on very solid philosophical principles and extremely wide theological erudition . . . It gives us pleasure to declare that everyone (particularly the clerly and professors of theology) should read and ponder attentively this exceptional work."[71]

R. Proost, a reviewer in *Revue Bénédictine:* "Fr. Marín-Sola, a professor at the University of Fribourg, is a thoroughbred Thomist, of the same vigorous mettle of Báñez and John of St. Thomas. The subject of his investigations – the evolution of dogma – is an actual, modern question, which he solves with the principles of the Thomist school without any of the expedients devised by modern theologians. We believe that the author has succeeded in making clear the traditional teaching on the essential issue of his thesis, and that the solution he offers is clear and victoriously resists the difficulties that can be raised against it . . . From the viewpoint of method, Fr. Marín is incomparable both in wealth of documentation and argumentation. Finally, let us mention that the book is written with admirable clarity."[72]

La Ilustración del Clero, journal of the Claretian Fathers: "The acquisition and study of this masterful work will be indispensable to any one dedicated to higher religious studies . . . There is need for this sort of propaedeutic, in which the study of philosophy, a presupposition of both theology and faith, will preserve us from the three great pseudotheological errors of our time, to wit, fideism, rationalism and radical agnosticism."[73]

The publications of the secular clerly did not lag behind in their enconiums. To cite a few examples:

Don Celedonio León, professor of dogma at the Seminary of Madrid, did not share all the views of Fr. Marín. Nonetheless, he wrote in *Revista Eclesiástica:* "The Rev. Fr. Marín-Sola, whose death in these past days is mourned by Catholic theology, has fought *pro aris et focis* for the definability as of faith of theological conclusions in his admirable work, which can worthily rank together with the masterpieces of the great Spanish theologians of the golden age."[74]

"This book", in the words of the reviewer in the *Boletín Oficial del Arzobispado de Valencia,* "is, on account of its doctrinal content, the best

[71] *España y América,* Feb. 1924, pg. 285 ff.

[72] *Revue Bénédictine,* Oct. 1924, pg. 355 ff.

[73] *La Ilustración del Clero,* Nov. 1925, 83.

[74] *Revista Eclesiástica,* July-Sept. 1932, pg. 415.

that has been published in Spain, and even in Europe, in recent years."[75]

Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses: "To our knowledge, no one has up to date investigated with such depth and such felicitous independence . . . in the face of positions already taken, the theological and traditional aspect of such a throbbing question as the evolution of dogma. For its solution, no one had as yet marshalled in such a comprehensive manner both the historical and theoretical methods."[76]

Divus Thomas of Fribourg: "Few works can be found that are capable of clearing away all the shadows and difficulties of the subject matter treated in them with a profound penetration and a scientific exactitude that cannot be faulted, and, at the same time, of pointing the way towards the truth with a clear vision and a sure hand. Fr. Marín-Sola's work is a true *opus aureum* and a monument *aere perennius*."[77]

Lastly, Battifol in *La Vie Catholique:* "We were pleasantly surprised to see a Spanish Dominican come up with the complement required by Newman's conception on the matter of the development of dogma. He accomplishes this task with the wealth of information and the doctrinal security which others have already praised . . . It is a doctrine very carefully researched and thoroughly matured, and I find it accepted by personalities not in the least mediocre."[78]

The journals and writers just cited are not the only ones that warmly welcomed Fr. Marín's work. We have transcribed only some of the many favourable comments made upon the publication of the book. Fr. Marín also received a good number of congratulatory messages, some from ecclesiastical authorities, others from eminent theologians. Among the former are those from Cardinal Merry del Val and from the Master General of the Order of Preachers, which appear on the first pages of this edition. They were printed in the French edition, and it was thought opportune to reprint them also in this one. We deem it unnecessary to print the letters of Cardinals Laurenti, Van Rossum, and Boggiani. The quotations already transcribed suffice to show the atmosphere of calm and serenity, of admiration and acceptance, with which the present work was received in the various sectors of the theological world. Theologians saw in it an authentic return to tradition, not in order to remain immovably fixed in it, but in order to wield it as an efficacious weapon against modernism.

[75] *Boletín Oficial del Arzobispado de Valencia,* March 1924, pgs. 79-80.

[76] *Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses,* July 1924, pg. 403 ff.

[77] *Divus Thomas* (Fribourg), Dec. 1923, pg. 413 ff.

[78] *La Vie Catholique,* 5th June 1925.

At the beginning of this section, Fr. Marín himself attested to the fact that his articles in *La Ciencia Tomista* had, at first, been received with misgivings by many theologians. Those misgivings abated as the series of articles continued, but never vanished altogether. Truth to say, there were not only misgivings, there was honest to goodness opposition both during and after their publication. But it is no argument against the intrinsic worth of the book; it merely shows that its central theme is a debatable one.

However, the opposition proved impotent to prevent Fr. Marín's thesis from winning the acceptance of extensive sectors of the theological community and the support of numerous theologians of the first rank, as the doctrine that best explains the historical instances of the definition of certain dogmas without doing violence to, but rather preserving, the traditional notion of the inclusive virtual, and as the most efficacious solution to the serious problems which modernism had solved in a heterodox fashion.

The book itself offers glimpses of the opposition aroused by the views of Fr. Marín. The first two sections of chapter 6 documents the opposition to *dogmatic evolution in general.*[79] In them he solves twenty one objections aimed at showing that the theological conclusions or the revealed virtual can never become a dogma of divine faith, and that the conclusions that were so defined by the Church were simply instances of improper or formally implicit conclusions.

At other times, the opposition is directed *against a determinate or particular channel of evolution.* The first section of chapter 4 is devoted in its entirety to the defense of reasoning or discourse as a legitimate channel of evolution.[80] Without prejudice, however, to the affective channel or the experience of the divine, in favour of which, to the exclusion of all others, his opponent seemed to declare himself.

Opposition, too, against certain particular agruments advanced in support of evolution, as evidenced by section 4 of chapter 6.[81]

The opposition which surfaced as Fr. Marín was writing his articles persisted after the publication of the book, and persists to this day in certain sectors. It is principally embodied in the opinion that nothing is definable as a dogma of faith if it is not revealed in a *formal* implicit manner. In chapter 7, the author devotes two entire sections to refuting the latest observations levelled against his views on this particular point.[82] It is our opinion that any-

[79] *The Homogeneous Evolution* . . . , ch.6, sec.1-2, nos.299-321.

[80] *Op.cit.,* ch.4, sec.1, nos.186-200.

[81] *Op.cit.,* ch.6, sec.4, nos.340-351.

[82] *Op.cit.,* ch.7, sects. 6-7, nos. 465-523.

thing that has been, or can be, said against the definability of the *inclusive virtual* has already been disposed of, either *formally* or *virtually*, in Fr. Marín-Sola's masterpiece.

The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma is a monumental piece of work, a classic worthy of our golden age. Its author was himself truly a master theologian. If a book's worth were to be appraised by the number of people who accept the solutions offered therein, Fr. Marín's opus would rank as a first-rate winner. However number is not of prime importance in doctrinal matters.[83] What matters most is the solid grounding of the views expressed, the logical and systematic exposition of the doctrine presented; in a nutshell, the depth and the lucidity of thought. On this score, the book is of exceptional value; so, too, was its author.

But Fr. Marín's credit does not end here. It acquires added dimensions if one considers that, with this book, he has brilliantly spotlighted the traditional teaching on a most interesting theological issue: on the one hand, he clarified the anomaly that appeared to exist between certain facts, certain truths defined by the Church, and, on the other hand, the theological position of certain modern authors who limit the Church's defining power exclusively to truths that are formally, albeit in an implicit manner, revealed. Not to mention the fact that he provided the best corrective to modernism's wrong handling of historical facts in support of its heterodox explanation of the evolution of Catholic doctrine.

THE HOMOGENEOUS EVOLUTION OF CATHOLIC DOGMA AND THE NEW THEOLOGY

La *Ilustración del Clero,* reviewing Fr. Marín-Sola's present work, pointed out that *The Homogeneous Evolution* could well be the efficacious answer "to the three big pseudo theological errors of these times, namely, fideism, rationalism, and radical agnosticism."[84] Each of these errors comes under various aspects and guises, some of which persist even to this day. Thus,

[83] A Thomist theologian disagreed with the solution given by Fr. Marín, within the context of St. Thomas's principles, to the problem of divine motion vis-à-vis created liberty, adding that a number of theologians were of the same opinion (the objector's). Aside from an adequate doctrinal reply, Fr. Marín retorted with the following observation: "We consider it a debasement of both parties to introduce in these objective questions the consideration of persons and the taking into account the number and quality of votes either favourable or contrary, as if the point at issue were a matter of economics or a senatorial contest." (*La Ciencia Tomista,* May-June 1926, pg.397)

[84] *La Ilustración del Clero,* Nov. 1923, 83.

it should not be strange that Fr. Marín's book should possess relevance even today.

Certain contemporary theological trends would appear to be tainted by such or similar errors, as the Holy See has pointed out. The Pope has spoken of those who "all the more devalue human reason, the more firmly they adhere to the word of God."[85] He has also mentioned those who "pretend to dilute as much as possible the meaning of the dogmas and to set them free from the way of speaking hallowed by tradition in the Church and from the philosophical concepts employed by Catholic teachers, in order to return to the expressions employed by the Scriptures and the Holy Fathers in the exposition of the Catholic doctrine."[86] There is a clear tendency to agnosticism in the former, and to fideism in the latter.

Likewise, there exists today, as in the heyday of modernism, the tendency to a misguided interpretation of what might be termed the *vital* aspect of dogmatic truths. It is true that modern theologians defend the objectivity of dogma and the objectivity of theological truth. However, in the process of *subjectivizing* them in the theologian, of turning them into the theologian's spiritual life, they do not appear duly to safeguard the exigencies of a process that is *healthily rational.*

Hence, it is not strange to hear voices extolling the need of *thoroughly reforming the method of theology, nay, even theology itself.* There are theologians who seem bent on formulating a *new theology.* "There are some today who dare go to such lengths as seriously to question whether theology and its method, as found in schools approved by the Church, ought not only to be improved but also completely reformed."[87] The tendency to an *arational* theology is inconsistent with the concept of theology as a *science.* The tendency to a *vitalist* theology free from due intellectual supervision conflicts with the notion of a theology that is *affective,* yes, but also intelligent. Lastly, the tendency to a theology susceptible to radical reforms flatly contradicts the concept of a theology which is the development of what is virtually *implicit* in the revealed principles. Since they are revealed, the principles are immutable; and the virtuality, inasmuch as it is *inclusive,* is likewise necessary and immutable.

Fr. Marín-Sola's book, then, is as relevant today as when it was first published. The problems it confronted then, are identical to those we confront today. His teachings on the way of discourse and on the way of the affections duly supervised by the reason; on the immutability of revealed truth, whether revealed formally or revealed virtually; on the complete and

[85] *Humani generis,* AAS, 42 (1950), 563.
[86] *Ibid.,* pg. 565.
[87] *Ibid.,* pg. 564.

perfect homogeneity of Catholic doctrine from its initial starting point down to its ultimate point of arrival, which is the remotest possible theological conclusion – all these teachings should provide welcome relief to theologians ceaselessly subjected today to views of a totally different ilk.

Let us delve somewhat deeper into the matter thus summarily sketched, since it is an issue of great interest both in its own right and in respect to the book now being edited in English. We shall treat of the following points:

1. The new theology and the traditional theology.
2. Theology and faith.
3. Theology and philosophical systems.
4. The true solution to the problem.
5. The permanent and the changeable.
6. A bibliography on the *new theology*.

1. New Theology and Traditional Theology

In certain theological circles – concretely, in those that maintain the need for a *new theology* – the term *traditional theology* is employed in a *pejorative* sense. It is the theology of the past, a theology made up of categories which are either false, or if true, nonetheless inoperative and ineffectual for present day thinkers; a fossilized theology lurking in conventual and seminary cloisters and buried in dusty and moth-eaten parchments; a theology couched in language and in terms unintelligible to contemporary intellectuals. In short: concepts that are either false or inoperative and expressions that cannot be understood; concepts that say nothing to those that grasp them, and formulae that mean nothing to those who hear them.

It is true that the defenders of the new theology do not always speak so harshly of traditional theology; it is also true that at times they speak in an even harsher and cruder language. But what matters is not the language; it is the fact that the content attributed by them to traditional theology is outdated. Consequently, it is itself outdated; its expressions outdated; its method outdated.

Anyone, who seriously attempts to verify the exactness of these appraisals of traditional theology, will soon find himself confronted by three thoroughly certain facts. One, there are some theologians who are practitioners of a theology of that sort. Two, there are not a few theologians, eminently representative, who by their theological knowledge, by their openmindedness to all legitimate theological developments, and by their lucid expositions accessible to modern day thinkers, provide a convincing refutation of the charges just mentioned. Foremost among these are the great masters of the past and the present. Three, traditional or scholastic theology is by definition, by its very essence so to speak, eminently progressive.

It is easy to air charges without going to the trouble of previously ascertaining whether there is a solid basis for them. The invectives hurled against scholasticism, at times even against patrology and against the highest representatives of the one and the other, may imply great acquaintance with present day needs, but they also imply a not inconsiderable ignorance of what is so contemptuously dismissed, an ignorance which cannot serve as a serious foundation for the charge that the traditional teaching (which is not sufficiently known) serves no useful purpose today.

Traditional philosophy and theology are not doctrinal fossils. They are a complex of fundamental truths possessing such a large virtual content and such a great power of adaptation, that neither the development of their virtuality nor their adaptation to changed circumstances verge to the detriment of the truths thus developed and adapted. Traditional theology and philosophy are in possession of immutable foundations, but neither is satisfied with the study of these foundations, or with the development, expression and application of such foundations as were required in times past. They consider these fundamental truths to be open to *both the present and the future*. The traditional view and attitude conjugates the past with the present and with the future; it projects on the problems and issues raised by each epoch the light of everlasting principles and truths, unfolding them as required, completing them where necessary, but without ever denying what can never be set aside by the very fact that it is necessary and immutable.

Certain new theologians, thus, proceed to inveigh against traditional theology from a false conception. These theologians confuse *scholastic theology in itself*, the elements of which are open to legitimate development and legitimate application, and are operative and efficacious for every epoch, including the present one, but elements of which anyone who accuses scholastic theology of being ineffectual is apparently ignorant; these theologians, we repeat, confuse scholastic theology *in itself*, or even scholastic theology as embodied in its great representatives in every age, with the scholastic theology of *certain theologians* whose sense of the permanent and immutable is extensively developed, but whose sense of the transitory and changeable is very much less so. These critics ought to have their eyes open to much that is good and useful in traditional theology and traditional theologians today instead of adverting only to the fact that it is not being thus utilized by some theologians. In these circumstances the indictment of scholasticism cannot be a fair one.

We shall divide this section into three subsections, namely:

A. What is the new theology?
B. What is traditional theology?
C. The traditional content of *The Homogeneous Evolution* by Fr. Marín-Sola.

A. *What is the new theology?*

The term *new theology* is, in itself, perfectly acceptable. We shall later have occasion to dwell on the great capacity for renewal inherent in theology and to recall that great theologians have been great innovators. William de Tocco, St. Thomas's biographer, tells us that the Saint proposed *new* truths, followed a *new* method in elucidating them, proved his conclusions with *new* arguments, and that those who heard him teaching *new* things and clearing doubts away with *new* reasons, never doubted that he had been divinely given a *new* light with which to explain the *new* insights God had *newly* inspired into his mind.[88]

Nonetheless, the term *new theology* has nowadays acquired a pejorative connotation. A number of writers, who are being classified as *new theologians*, protest against being thus qualified and avow their adhesion to what is immutable in tradition. We want to make it clear that it is not our intention to refer to anyone in particular. We shall be speaking not of *theologians* but of *theology*, and we shall be speaking of theology not insofar as it is new in a healthy sense, but new in a *pejorative* sense. The contemporary theological problem boils down to an inexact concept of the renewal of theological science.

It should be observed that the *new theology* possesses no clearly defined contours. This makes it difficult to reduce it to precise categories. It is quite possible that some forms of the *new theology* will not exhibit the features we ascribe to it, but others certainly will. We believe that, taken as a whole, our observations have been substantiated in the theological tendencies that have surfaced in the last twenty years. Following the classical, theological and Christian example given by Fr. Marín himself (as already pointed out in the second part of this Introduction where we dealt with his personality as a polemicist), and the example of St. Thomas himself, we shall make no mention of any contemporary writer in our criticisms. But at the end of this study we shall annex a bibliography of modern studies on the nature of theology. In them the reader may verify for himself the truth of what we have to say. In the exposition of the modern currents of theological thought we shall make use of Pope Pius XII's *Humani Generis* and of his Allocutions on the 17th and the 22nd September, 1946.

[88] "For, in his lectures he introduced new articles, found new and clear ways of settling questions, and produced new reasons in determining them. No one who listened to him thus teaching new things and defining the doubtful with new reasons, doubted that God had shed a new light on him, who, from the start, at once displayed such a certitude of judgment, as to show no hesitation in teaching and committing to writing the new things that God had deigned to inspire in him." (*Vita Sancti Thomae Aquinatis:* "Fontes vitae Sancti Thomae Aquinatis, notis historicis et criticis illustrati," curis et labore D. PRÜMMER; pg. 81).

The new theology pretends to replace traditional theology on the ground that the latter is a rational, dialectical, intellectualist theology; whereas the knowledge of God should fundamentally be mystical, vital, arational. A distinction is in order between the divine reality and the divine teaching, between God in his mysteries and the propositions in which man embodies this mysterious divinity.

When the Church affirms that revelation was closed with the death of the Apostles,[89] this must not be understood in the sense that the content of revelation was ended then, but only in the sense that God brought to a close the manifestations or the propositions of the teaching. The revealed propositions, the revealed teaching came to an end with the death of St. John; but revelation, that is, the thing or reality revealed continues to grow in the Church without interruption. In the Church there are ceaselessly new revelations, there is a constant communication of the mysteries of the divine life.

Theology is embedded in the Church in such a way that it grows apace with the growth of the revealed reality in the Church. Theology is not a dialectical, but an experimental knowledge whereby we are given to know not only the formulae revealed by God in the Scripture and in the divine-apostolic Tradition, but also and above all the divine mysteries that manifest themselves day by day in the life of the Church, of which theology itself is a part.

In this conception of theological science three characteristics are clearly discernible. In the first place, its vitalist or mystical character. Theology is, indeed, formally a natural science; nonetheless, its vitalist or mystical[90] character may not be ignored since its foundation or starting point is to be found in the infused virtue of faith which is a virtue of the intellect with roots in the will, and thus with affective elements of great significance in its make-up. The defect, then, does not consist in affirming the vitalist character of theology but in stressing it exclusively by assuming that it is an arational knowledge. In the second place, Theology's starting point is not the revela-

[89] "For the Holy Spirit was promised to Peter's successors, not to enable them, by his revelation, to disclose new doctrine, but to enable them, through his assistance, inviolably to safeguard and faithfully to expound the revelation or deposit of faith handed on by the Apostles." (Dogmatic Const. *De Ecclesia Christi*, c.4. Denz.-Schön., 3070).

Among the condemned modernistic propositions we find this one: "Revelation, which is constitutive of the object of faith, was not completed with the Apostles." (Denz.-Schön., 3421).

[90] The term mystical is not to be taken here in the spiritual sense which corresponds to the predominance of the gifts of the Holy Spirit. We take it here in the sense of *affective, vital,* as opposed to the intellectual or rational.

tion that was brought to an end with the death of the Apostles, but the revelation that is constantly made in the Church; that is to say, not the kind of revelation that is formulated and proposed, but the kind that is communicated and lived, or rather, the revealed reality that is constantly being communicated in the Church. And, in the third place, the pointlessness of theological reasoning and of authentic theological conclusions arrived at through study and reasoning.

This mystical tendency is not always expounded in the same manner. At times it is made to appear compatible with rational or discursive theology as, for instance, when theological knowledge is described as follows. The starting point is the divine revelation made to the primitive Church. Today, the Church is not the recipient of new revelations that could be the object of divine knowledge and faith. Revelations that are the object of faith have all been made to the primitive Church before the death of the Apostles. Anything that we might subsequently attain in the order of divine knowledge must necessarily be a development of this primitive revelation. However, the primitive revelation was not effected so much by means of statements proposed to the intellect as by an obscure and *delicious* communication. The revealed proposition is something secondary. What is primary is the delicious savouring of the revealed reality.

This revealed datum, this obscure and delicious communication of divine reality has been grasped by means of notions, concepts, judgments, reasoning; yet this way of knowing the divine reality might be said to be occasional. It is there because man is imperfect and cannot intellectually perceive in an immediate fashion what is proposed to him as a delicious and experimental reality. Theology, then, reduces to a proposition of the revealed reality in a manner at variance from the manner of the revealed reality itself. The reality is something divine that is lived; theology, on the other hand, is an ensemble of notions, formulae, etc., that is known. The distance between the reality and the notion, between the thing itself and the formula, is the very same distance that intervenes between what theology ought to be and what it actually is.

All our existing theological apparatus is extrinsic to revelation. It is also inadequate and disproportioned. And this is especially true of the apparatus constructed with Aristotelian notions, since Aristotle's is a philosophy of essences, of universals, whereas the revealed reality is the reality of things divine that are singular, individual, historical.

In the *Humani generis* the Holy Father recalls the position of certain theologians who maintain the necessity of formulating the dogmas of faith with the categories of modern philosophy because, among other reasons, "the mysteries of faith can never be expressed with concepts that are completely

true, but only with concepts that are approximative and always subject to change."[91]

At other times the new theology presents itself as an intellectualist theology, not because it eschews its experimental character - which is impossible since it belongs to its very nature - but because it is a knowledge that must necessarily express itself through concepts. Correctly understood, this is to put oneself on the right path. Unfortunately, it is not understood as it ought to be.

To begin with, it is assumed that there are no absolute truths. Or, if this is not assumed, it is a conclusion that is quickly reached. The Pope solemnly made this point in an allocution, speaking precisely of the *new theology*: "If such a view were true [viz., that theological truth is always subject to change], what would become of the immutability of Catholic dogmas, what would become of the unity and stability of the faith?"[92] In the *Humani generis* he points out that also in philosophy itself there are immutable principles and truths. These principles and truths have been professed by traditional philosophy and utilized in the unfolding of divine revelation. "Human reason will be capable of aptly and securely discharging this function [that of achieving a profound understanding of the divine mysteries] only when it has been duly cultivated, that is, imbued with that sound philosophy which has been handed on as a patrimony inherited from preceding Christian generations, and thus also enjoys a superior kind of authority because its principles and chief assertions, gradually made clear and defined by men of great talent, have been tested in the balance of divine 'revelation' by the Church's Magisterium."[93]

Divine things are grasped by man only with approximative concepts which are always subject to change. Now, since these concepts can change not only into different, but even into opposite concepts, it is possible for two contradictory theological propositions to be true, provided that their formulation has taken place in times or circumstances in which the different or opposed concepts were taken as faithful expressions of reality. "The more daring affirm that this [viz., the formulation of Catholic dogmas with categories taken from modern philosophy, whether from *immanentism*, or *idealism*, or *existentialism*, or any other modern philosophical system] not only may but should be done for the following reason, to wit, that the mysteries of faith can, in their opinion, never be expressed by completely true, but only by approximative notions which are always subject to change, by means of which the truth is, indeed, somehow indicated but also necessarily distorted. Hence, they do not think it absurd, but altogether necessary, that theology

[91] *Humani generis*, AAS, 42 (1950), 566
[92] Address, Sept. 17, 1946. AAS, 38 (1946), 385.
[93] *Humani generis*, AAS, 42 (1950), 571-572.

should replace the old notions with new ones in accordance with the different philosophies which in the course of time serve it as its instruments, in order that by these different, or even in a certain sense opposed, but nonetheless in their view equivalent, ways the same divine truths may be humanly expressed."[94]

Such an account of the nature of theology should not surprise anyone who takes into consideration that it is based on the belief that the world is subject to an absolute and constant evolution, in the process of which the same reality is not brought continuously to perfection but changed into some other thing. And if things themselves change, then the concepts man has of them can and must likewise change. If things change, and this change finds support in nothing that is permanent and immutable, then there is nothing to hinder concepts from changing, even into their opposites, without prejudice to their being both true under certain circumstances. Indeed, the Pope mentions evolutionism in the number of modern errors that have influenced and continue to influence modern theology.[95]

Three tendencies in the new theology have been pointed out: that which might be called mystical; another which is a mixture of mysticism and reasoning but which attributes a merely extrinsic value to the cognitive elements (notions, concepts, formulae, etc.) employed by the theologian; and a third which is rational or discursive but changeable for want of consistency between the things and the concepts which represent them.

Theology, as will be explained in a later subsection, is the unfolding of the faith by means of the philosophical or human means available to man. Thus, the aforementioned conceptions of theology arise from certain philosophical conceptions, which we deem necessary to recall to mind. Prescinding now from details which give them very different shapes, such philosophical conceptions reduce to two: the *subjectivistic* and the *evolutionistic*. In them is to be found the root of the theological orientations just described. Subjectivism is the basis of a theology that is falsely mystical or vitalist; evolutionism, the basis of a theology that is falsely relative and changeable.

Contemporary philosophies are *many* and go by a multitude of names. True. But it is no less true that, in a more or less direct manner, they all boil down to the two we have mentioned. The common denominator that unites contemporary philosophies and philosophers, that are otherwise divided by numerous differences, is, in certain cases, *evolutionism* under such names as the relativism of truth, historicism, Marxism (by all these names it has been called); in other cases, it is *subjectivism*, which also shows up under such various guises as vitalism, existentialism, etc.

[94] *Ibid.*, pg. 566.

[95] *Ibid.*, pg. 562.

Anyone imbued with the evolutionistic spirit considers truth in function of actuality. The true is the actual; and the more actual, the truer it is. This equation is, indeed, susceptible of a correct interpretation; but when it is launched into a world saddled with evolutionistic ideas, it soon comes to mean an absolute relativism. To affirm that the criterion of truth is the actuality of what is known, is to take positions vis-à-vis the scholastic and traditional concept of truth, which is "that which corresponds to reality". Since what is actual is measured by the category of *time*, it follows that truth is temporal, by no means eternal. Thus the evolutionism and historicism of truth clash head-on with stable and timeless truth. The metaphysics of phenomena rises to confront the metaphysics of essences.

The evolutionistic spirit of many contemporary philosophies has infiltrated theology to the extent of proclaiming a theology subject to constant change and evolution, a theology that never succeeds in grasping truth firmly and permanently: a theology condemned to the torture of Tantalus, doomed to watch truth slipping away through its fingers at the very moment that it seemed to be apprehended, since the inexorable law of an actuality that *passes away*, of a "now" that vanishes, would have changed it into something entirely different from what it was. "Many things have been said, but without sufficient examination, about the 'new theology', which, since it evolves in step with the evolving universe, is forever going but never arriving anywhere."[96] With these very graphic terms the Pope describes the relativistic aspect of the new theology, which is a necessary consequence of the relativism of truth and of reality itself professed by evolutionistic philosophy.

To the evolutionism that pervades a large part of contemporary philosophy must be added subjectivism, which is no stranger to it. Subjectivism is a specific kind of evolutionism. It considers truth as a function of life. This rather vague expression might become clearer by saying that truth is measured by reference to the actuality it acquires in the subject who possesses it. Truth becomes truer, so to speak, the better it reflects the situation of the subject possessing it. The subjectivistic tendency, thus, shows vitalistic manifestations; its latest sprouts constitute the existentialist philosophy. Anyone who professes subjectivism takes positions opposite objective truth or the philosophy of extrasubjective reality.

The subjectivistic spirit has also infiltrated theology, especially under existentialist guises. Thus, attempts are being made to construct a theology with categories taken from the latter philosophy. "By reducing Catholic doctrine to this condition [viz., to the formulations found in the Holy

[96] Address, Sept. 17, 1946. AAS, 38 (1946), 385.

Scriptures and the Church Fathers, purged from every systematic element] they believe that the way is open whereby, in satisfying the needs of modern times, dogmas may be expressed with notions taken from modern philosophy, whether from 'immanentism', or 'idealism', or 'existentialism', or some such other system."[97]

The problems confronting man today, not excluding the theological, are to be solved by means of these two philosophical orientations, that is to say, by the principles and concepts of evolutionism and existentialism. The notions and principles that are operative today come from these two philosophies: on the one hand, the notions and principles stemming from the fundamental idea of absolute contingency or of the changeable actuality of things, which take no account of, or perhaps even deny, the permanency of the essential elements; and, on the other hand, the notions and principles stemming from the fundamental idea that man is, in the contingency of his own life or existence, the point of reference of every thing that happens or is known. Since theology is knowledge resulting from the principles of faith in conjunction with philosophical notions, it follows that contemporary theology will consist in the explication of the revealed truths by means of the notions of *truth-time* and *truth-subject*.

Traditional or scholastic theology is, thus, to be set aside either because, in the view of some, it is inoperative since it operates with altogether ineffectual categories; or, in the opinion of the more radical, as false since it employs false categories. Scholasticism operates on a level destitute of actuality, its categories serve no purpose today. The necessary and unchangeable truth of essences is unintelligible to a modern spirit attuned to the appreciation of the contingent and changeable truth of existences. Objective truth proposed from without is likewise unintelligible to anyone used to considering truth-as-subject or truth-as-life.

Scholasticism was never cognizant of the categories held in highest esteem by contemporary minds. The notions of progress, or evolution, or history, and of subjectivity are thoroughly alien to traditional philosophy. Yet, these are precisely the notions that need to be employed today. Hence, it follows that traditional theology is outdated, passé; it must be replaced by another that is up-to-date, by the new theology.

The *Humani generis* takes note of the contempt for the traditional notions of scholastic theology. To the charge that it is made up of notions that were useful in the past but of no use today, it replies in the following terms:

"The body of doctrine elaborated with common accord by Catholic teachers in the course of many centuries, in order to obtain some understand-

[97] *Humani generis*, AAS, 42 (1950), 566.

ing of the dogmas, is certainly not grounded on such frail foundations. They are grounded on principles and notions derived from a true knowledge of created things. In deriving such knowledge, divinely revealed truth shone like a star, through the Church, upon the human mind. Hence, it is not surprising to find some of these notions not only employed but also sanctioned by the Ecumenical Councils, so that it is unlawful to deviate from them . . . This contempt for the terms and notions which the scholastic theologians were wont to employ naturally leads to the weakening of speculative theology, which, inasmuch as it leans on theological reasoning, is in their opinion wanting in true certainty."[98]

The achievements attained in the past by scholastic theology with its own notions have not become obsolete. Furthermore, the conquests that can and ought to be achieved today by theology may not ignore those same notions. Which is to say that both the perennial philosophy and the traditional scholastic theology constructed with the aid of that philosophy, contain in themselves elements capable of achieving an authentic and effective doctrinal development appropriate to the present and to the future. "But human reason will be capable of discharging this function [that of obtaining some understanding of the revealed mysteries or of constructing theology] aptly and safely only when it has been duly cultivated, that is, imbued with that sound philosophy which has been handed on as a patrimony from previous Christian generations, and thus enjoys also a superior kind of authority because its principles and principal assertions, gradually made manifest and defined by men of great talent, have been weighed by the Church's Magisterium in the balance of divine revelation. That philosophy, acknowledged and accepted by the Church, defends the true and genuine value of human knowledge, the indisputable principles of metaphysics — viz., the principles of sufficient reason, causality and finality — and the attainment of certain and unchangeable truth."[99]

Since traditional philosophy contains firm notions and principles, it remains effective today and, therefore, it cannot be said to be useless and obsolete. It is an open philosophy, capable of progress, relevant and easily adaptable to modern minds without therefore having to eschew anything of what hitherto it had held as incontrovertible and necessary. "The question is this: whether what St. Thomas has constructed beyond and above any particular time, by combining and knitting together the elements contributed by the students of Christian wisdom throughout the ages, is founded on solid rock, endowed with perpetual vigour and validity, remains even today an efficacious defense and bulwark of the deposit of Catholic faith, and can be

[98] *Ibid.*, pgs. 566-567.
[99] *Ibid.*, pgs. 571-572.

employed safely to guide the new developments of theology and philosophy."[100]

The Holy Father takes up the validity for our modern times of what St. Thomas has constructed and all Christian philosophers have accepted, viz., the immutability of truth, the objective value of human knowledge, the value of the first principles and their efficaciousness to ground and safeguard the future progress of theology and philosophy. The Pope insists on all these points particularly in the encyclical *Humani generis*. "It is wholly to be deplored that the philosophy accepted and recognized by the Church should be held in contempt by some people, and impudently called antiquated in its form and rationalistic in its thinking processes. In their view, our philosophy mistakenly defends the possibility of an absolutely true metaphysics. They, on the contrary, maintain that reality, especially that which is transcendent, cannot be more aptly expressed except by disparate doctrines that are mutually complementary despite being in a sense inconsistent. Hence, the philosophy taught in our schools, with its lucid exposition and solution of problems, its accurate determination of concepts and clear distinctions, can indeed be a useful propaedeutics to scholastic theology, and was altogether adapted to the minds of men in the middle ages. But it does not offer a way of philosophizing responsive to the requirements of our culture today. The perennial philosophy, they add, is nothing but a philosophy of immutable essences, whereas the modern mind must look to the 'existence' of each and every one, and to life in a state of constant flux."[101]

In describing the orientations of the *new theology*, we have deliberately made use of texts from papal documents. These texts clearly indicate the tendencies of the *new theology:* at times arational; at times rational, albeit denying consistency and permanency to the truth; at times subjectivistic and vitalistic with fairly clear indications of the inadequacy and lack of correspondence between the concepts by which we know and the reality that is known. Since traditional theology employs a sanely rational philosophy, which accepts the objective value of human knowledge, the new theology has taken it upon itself to inveigh against traditional theology, repeating the trite and commonplace charge that scholasticism is a dated and obsolete philosophy and theology; the more radical claim that it is dead.

B. *What is Traditional Theology?*

We wish to make it clear that we do not pretend to present a complete exposition of theology according to any particular author, or even according to any particular school. It is common knowledge that the Schoolmen were divided on such issues as the object, the method, the scope of theological

[100]Address, Sept. 22, 1946 AAS, 38 (1946), 387.
[101]*Humani generis,* AAS; 42 (1950), 573.

science. In this work, Fr. Marín occasionally alludes to some of these differences, as for instance, the question whether theology is a formally supernatural habit, or a habit that is formally natural and only radically supernatural. A large part of this book deals *ex professo* with one of such differences, viz., the scope of theology, or in other words, the reach which true and genuine theological conclusions are capable of attaining. On this point the Schoolmen are far from being in accord.

By traditional theology we understand a theology characterized by features which are precisely the opposite of those already noted in the new theology. The new theology stands in opposition not only to theology as conceived by one or another school, but to theology as conceived by all of them. Traditional theology, then, possesses the characteristics in which they all coincide.

Theology is the understanding of the faith achieved, among other things, by the use of the rational notions made available by philosophy. These notions possess an analogical value which enables them to express divine truths. Such is the teaching of the First Vatican Council.[102] What are the characteristics of human knowledge, and on what conditions is it employed in theology?

1. We are dealing with *true* notions, that is, with notions that correspond to the reality they represent. Words, concepts, ideas are essentially relative, and the term of that relation is the reality represented. Traditional theology begins by accepting, at the very outset, the correspondence between all those elements and the reality represented in them. The Pope, in a passage already quoted, enumerates the conditions of the sound philosophy which the Church employs to glean an understanding of dogmatic truth, and one of them is "the true and genuine value of human knowledge."[103] This is not accepted by the new theology.

2. These notions correspond to the reality of things when they reflect truths of the natural order; they do not cease to correspond to objective reality when they reflect divine truths. The divine mysteries cannot be contained perfectly and exhaustively in human notions. Very true. Nonetheless, it is no less true that the divine mysteries are contained therein in a certain *proper* sense. This is made possible by the *analogical* value of the philosophical or rational notions. Analogy is by no means a medium of improper or metaphorical knowledge, let alone a medium of uncertain knowledge. By means of analogy, the analogates can be known properly and with certainty.

[102]The council speaks of the understanding of the faith which is "attained by means of the analogy of those things that are naturally known, as well as by means of the connexion of the mysteries among themselves." (Denz.-Schön., 3016)
[103]*Humani generis,* AAS, 42 (1950), 572.

Consequently, traditional theology does not accept that, by reason of the fact that human concepts are not perfectly adequate to the divinity, the knowledge of God achieved through rational theology is uncertain and improper. That is the position taken by the new theology; traditional theology rejects it.

3. Rational knowledge can, at times, be necessary and unchangeable. This happens when the object itself is necessary and unchangeable, and the knowledge of it is achieved through a process that provides evidence, that is, through a process of rigorous scientific deduction. Traditional theology accepts the immutability of essences and the unchangeability of the correct knowledge of such essences. Extrapolating this to the divine order, traditional theology admits the immutability of the truths revealed by God together with the necessity and the unchangeability of the theological conclusions that are necessarily included in the divinely revealed truth. Pius XII recalls to mind this characteristic of our theology when he censured the errors of the new theology in these terms: "Let no one disturb, let no one unsettle what is immutable . . . If such a view were to be accepted [viz., the view of a theological science subject to continual change], what would become of the immutability of Catholic dogmas, what would become of the unity and stability of the faith? "[104]

However, this is not to say that our knowledge of contingent things cannot undergo radical changes. Our knowledge must always render tribute to the things known, since truth is the adequation of the concept to the reality. Now, contingent things undergo change. If they change, the concept we have of them must also change. Otherwise, if the concept remains unchanged but the thing to which the concept refers has changed, then a false correspondence is established between the two; falsehood then emerges.

4. The immutability of knowledge is no hindrance to its progress and its adaptation to the needs and the preoccupations of each age. Dogmatic reality is unchangeable but it is not known exhaustively; it can, then, be unfolded unceasingly. Inasmuch as it is dogmatic or revealed, it is destined to all men and, thus, adaptable to each and every one: to those of the past, those of the present, and those of the future. The philosophical notions, by means of which this reality is known, inasmuch as they are necessary and permanent, are likewise valid for all men and for all times. These elements, then, precisely because of their necessity and permanence, can serve as the subject that gives *substance and content* to all legitimate development and change. Any change that begins by denying that which of its nature is unchangeable is, by the same token, illegitimate and deserving of condemnation. Traditional theology, thus, contains within itself elements open to progress, development, and perfection; it is not a static but a perfective or perfectible theology. However,

[104] Address, Sept. 17, 1946. AAS, 38, (1946), 384-385.

the development takes place along a continuous line: it does not deny today what it affirmed yesterday. Otherwise, the development would not be perfective but destructive.

The Holy Father underscores the capacity of traditional theology to satisfy the requirements of all legitimate progress in these terms: "The question is this: whether what St. Thomas has constructed beyond and above any particular time, by combining and knitting together the elements contributed by the students of Christian wisdom throughout the ages . . . remains even today an efficacious defense and bulwark of the deposit of Catholic faith, and can be employed safely to guide the new developments of theology and philosophy."[105]

In the rational order, these are what might be termed the essential elements of traditional theology vis-à-vis the new theology, viz.: the objectivity of our knowledge of things, inclusive of the things of God; correspondence, although not one that is comprehensive, between the analogical concepts we have of God and the divine reality; possession of unchangeable and necessary knowledge; capacity for progress in theological science.

But God is not perceived only through notions, He is perceived also through *contact*. There is knowledge obtained through study; there is, besides, knowledge available through experience. This is true in the natural order; it is no less true in the theological and the mystical orders. The dogmas of faith can be grasped also by way of experience, by a vital contact with the divine reality contained in them. But, according to traditional theology, this kind of knowledge is so far from being arational that, if it is to be safe and firm, theologically firm and safe, it needs the endorsement of rational guarantees, which are not identical in every case.

"Right judgment", says St. Thomas, "can be had in two ways. First, by means of the perfect use of reason; secondly, on account of a kind of connaturality with regard to the object on which judgment is to be passed. For instance, one who has acquired the science of morals judges rightly on matters of chastity through rational inquiry; whereas one who has the habit of chastity judges rightly on the same matters on account of a certain connaturality."[106] This is an undeniable fact. There are *natural* habits that function as instruments of knowledge, which is obtained by being in touch with the proper object of the habit concerned. A chaste person has a correct judgment on matters of chastity without the study of morals. The artist judges of a work of art, a musical composition, a painting, etc., armed perhaps with only a natural sense or feeling, without having learned the rules of the art in question. Knowledge is an act of the intellect: it is the intellect that

[105] Address, Sept. 22, 1946. AAS, 38 (1946), 387.
[106] *Summa Theologica*, 2-2. q. 45, a. 2.

judges; however, it may arrive at eliciting its judgment by different ways. One is the way of experience obtained by the contact of natural habits with their proper object; another is the way of study by evidences garnered through investigation or research.

What is true in the natural order is also true in the divine order. "Knowledge is of two kinds . . . The other is affective or experimental; it is had when one experiences in himself the taste of divine sweetness."[107] There exist in us supernatural habits which confer a *divine mode of being.* These habits provide us with a "sense of God"[108] or a "sense of Christ",[109] as St. Paul would say. Such habits are grace, the infused virtues, and the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

One of the infused virtues is faith, which is the starting point of theology. Catholic theology is a knowledge of the supernatural which begins with the acceptance of the revealed principles by faith. Without such acceptance there is no theology. The "theology" constructed by a heretic or a pagan is not identical to our theology, even in the case where it is deduced from the same principles as ours. The two differ essentially because of the essential differences between the acceptance given by them and that given by us to the same principles. The acceptance given by the Catholic is the assent of divine faith; the acceptance given by the heretic or the pagan is purely a humanly motivated assent.

Now, despite its being an intellectual virtue, faith nonetheless requires the formal intervention of the will as determining the assent given to the truths believed; which means that faith must also perfect and supernaturalize the will-power with regard to the perception of these truths. The perception which the will can achieve clearly lies along the paths of connaturality. This explains, among other things, the incontrovertible fact that the affection and piety of the Christian people, which obviously pertain to the will, have played and do play a not insignificant role in the development of theological principles. And when we speak of the affection and piety of the Christian faithful, we do not mean only those that are the outcome of the gifts of the Holy Spirit and belong to the mystical life, but those which can exist apart from the operation of the gifts. The piety and affection of the mass of Christians, with respect to the influence they have exercised in the development of Christian dogmas, can hardly be presumed to be mystical.

All of this is to say that Catholic theology is open to progress and development by way of connaturality and affection, apart from the way of investigation and study. By the infused habits we have a sense or feeling of

[107] *Summa Theologica,* 2-2, p. 97, a. 2 ad 2.
[108] *1 Cor.,* 11:16.
[109] *Ibid.*

the divine. Faith gives us an instinct for divine truth, an instinct by means of which we are able in certain circumstances to judge whether a proposition or statement is in conformity, or not, with the revealed truth which is the object of faith.

Now, knowledge obtained through experience of divine things must possess certain determinate characteristics:

In the *first* place, it has to be *objective* knowledge. Traditional theology is eminently objective. It does not manufacture the truth but acknowledges that truth is proposed to it by God. Hence, as in the speculative order the starting point is the *datum revealed by God,* so in the experiential order the starting point is the *datum infused by God.* In other words, the criterion determining whether a truth is divine or not, is an *objective* criterion. That criterion is not a natural, inborn habit; it is a supernatural, infused habit, something from the outside, coming from God. To take the experience rooted in natural habits as the criterion determining the legitimacy of dogmatic, or even of simply theological, truths would be to subscribe to an extremely dangerous religious immanentism, which has always been shunned by scholastic theology, adhering, as it does, to the solid firmness of objective criteria.

In the *second* place, it has to be knowledge of which the progress is homogeneous. The only legitimate religious experience is that in which the object experienced is divine, as also divine is the habit through which the experience is had. It can happen that what is only too human and is experienced in a human manner, is mistaken for something divine and experienced by means of divine habits. In this terrain, human psychology is liable to many and fatal mistakes. Furthermore, since between the habit and the object there exists a formal or, at the very least, a virtual coincidence; or, in other terms, an essential coincidence between the habit and its specifying object and the virtuality included in that object, it follows therefrom that the subsequent development of any legitimate experiential perception of divine things is homogeneous with its starting point.

In the *third* place, the allusion just made to *legitimate* religious experience brings us to the third characteristic of any knowledge obtained through experience of the divine, viz., the possession of sufficient guarantees that it is in fact divine. Such guarantees are not inherent in the knowledge itself they are to be looked for outside. The way of the affections is of itself arational, and thus needs to be sufficiently guaranteed. Since it is arational, it cannot provide itself the guarantees. Such guarantees are to be found outside itself in various different ways, some of which we will presently detail. The want of such guarantees renders the experiential knowledge truly suspect.

At times, the vital or arational knowledge obtained through a sense or an instinct or an intuition (it is designated by all these terms) is endorsed by the effects produced by this knowledge, *which is in them made manifest.* Here we already have a *rational* guarantee, to wit, the *visible* effects proceeding from that same knowledge. At other times, the intuition or sense of the theological truth asserted is not simply the experience of a lone individual, but the experience of the whole religious community, of the whole body of the faithful. Such a case would be an instance of a *common* sense, and common sense is a criterion of truth. The particular sense of each individual is liable to error; that of each and every one is not likely to be erroneous. The same thing is true in the divine order. Each one's feeling is liable to mistakes; each one may think he is being guided by God's Spirit when, in fact, he is guided by his own spirit, his temperament, etc. But the feeling of each and every one is not mistaken: it cannot be said that what proceeds from the spirit of the whole Christian community is a false inspiration. The spirit that animates the whole Church is the Holy Spirit. Finally, in the absence of the endorsement given by the resultant effects, in the absence of the warrant provided by the fact that the phenomenon is a common occurrence in the Church, it might be the case that what is perceived by the arational process of experience or feeling is, on the other hand, confirmed by investigation and research, by objective reasons that evidence the correctness of what has been attained through the subjective process.

Enough has been said to make it plain that traditional theology holds a conception of theological knowledge obtained by way of experience which is vastly different from that held by the modernistic and the new theologies. Modernistic theology holds that religious experience is active, it creates its own dogmas and the latter, consequently, change in step with the changes of the former. The new theology maintains that the experience of the divine presupposes the divine reality. However, the experience is destitute of sufficient rational guarantees. Such guarantees are rejected at the outset: either because rational structures are non-existent in theological knowledge; or because, if such structures do exist, they are alien to theology and inadequate to express the divine events taking place; or because the structures lack firmness, are subject to constant change, and, therefore, incapable of serving as criteria of certainty.

C. *The traditional character of THE HOMOGENEOUS EVOLUTION OF CATHOLIC DOGMA vis-à-vis the conceptions of the New Theology.*

Fr. Marín's work is imbued with a thoroughly traditional spirit, in the sense in which this spirit has been previously defined, to wit, not a mere acceptance of the past, but a projection, as well, of the past onto the present and the future; a projection, however, that does not change whatever is necessary and immutable in the starting point, and proclaims a constant

progress in the understanding of the revealed truth in a uniform and homogeneous sense.

The book contains much that is debatable, without, however, straying from the fundamental canons of traditional philosophy and theology already alluded to in the preceding subsection. Hence, it is not surprising to find scholastic theologians who question not a few of the author's assertions by the same right whereby the author, who is himself a scholastic theologian, questions the assertions of those who disagree with him. For instance, Fr. Marín teaches that dogmatic progress is achieved by way of genuine theological conclusions, while others hold that the theological conclusion is not definable as of divine faith and hence can never become a dogma; such conclusions are merely objects of the Church's infallibility, and, consequently, solely objects of ecclesiastical faith. Another debatable issue refers to the author's contention that theological conclusions are truly inclusive or metaphysical, and, hence, virtually revealed, etc.

We shall not touch on these points. In the preceding subsection traditional theology was defined in terms of characteristics which are opposed to the new theology. Thus, we shall here deal only with those features of the work at hand by which it confronts the modern notion of theology.

In the first place, *The Homogeneous Evolution* explains in a marvelous, exceptional, and we might even say, unique manner the *rational* or *discursive* character of theology with all the features already enumerated previously, viz.: the objectivity of knowledge and of what is known, the process and progressive development of the same, homogeneity in that doctrinal process between the starting point and the ending point.

Fr. Marín-Sola proceeds always within the presupposition of a genuine correspondence between our concepts and the things known. This presupposition, indisputable to the scholastic theologian that he was, is expressed by him in extremely lucid and expressive terms.

Divinely revealed formulae and concepts correspond to the objective reality of things. If there is any knowledge that corresponds to reality, it is surely God's knowledge, since the knowledge God has of things is the cause of the things themselves. The starting point of dogmatic evolution, according to Fr. Marín-Sola, is the revealed formula *insofar as it contains a divine meaning*, which is to say, insofar as it corresponds to the idea God has of the thing revealed, and this idea, in turn, necessarily corresponds to what He reveals. It would be more exact to say that the thing revealed corresponds to God's idea of it, since God's knowledge is eminently active. "For the existence of true revelation it is indispensable that God give some explicit meaning to the revealed formula."[110] This divine meaning, given by God

[110] *The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma*, ch. 2, no. 55.

to the revealed formula – which must necessarily correspond to the reality known by God or to the objective reality of what is revealed,[111] is the starting point of all theological knowledge and of all doctrinal evolution.

The divine meaning of revelation does not consist in an *indivisible*. God sees many more things in the formula which He reveals than are seen by the person who receives the revelation. God sees, and sees explicitly, everything that is included in the formula. Those who received the primitive revelation – concretely, the Apostles – also saw explicitly in the formula everything that the Church would discover in it in the course of time. However, the primitive Church that received the revealed formulae from the lips of the Apostles, did not perceive explicitly all the divine content infolded in them. The starting point of theological knowledge is the *divine meaning* of the revealed formulae as perceived by the primitive Church, that is to say, a meaning explicit with respect to something, but implicit with respect to much more. "The starting point of all dogmatic progress lies in the revealed formulae conveyed by the Apostles to the primitive Church. These formulae, as every other human formula, are made up partly of meaning formally expressed, and partly of meaning virtually implicit."[112] Both meanings, the formal and the virtual, are *divine* meanings, meanings *given by God*, and, thus, objective meanings or meanings that correspond to reality. They are not meanings fancied by man for himself, subjective, that do not correspond to the object. That they are divine, and therefore objective, is what Fr. Marín establishes at length throughout the second chapter of this book.

This knowledge, which is theology's starting point and which, in Fr. Marín's view, conforms to the objective reality of the object known, is *subject to progress*. Theology does not have for its starting point the divine meaning of the formulae as perceived by the divine mind. In God the meaning is perfect, exhaustively explicit. No progress is, thus, possible. God does not

[111] "Note ... that one of the premises *is of faith*. What does it mean *to be of faith?* In the teaching of St. Thomas it means, as it ought to mean in every Christian philosophy and theology, that in the major of faith we have divinely revealed not two mere names, nor two mere subjective concepts linked nominally by the verb *to be;* not two symbols of an agnostic reality, or of some subjective experience, or of some pragmatic attitude – all of that is kantian-bergsonian philosophy, the foundation and starting point of the various forms of modernism. For St. Thomas, the major of faith means that, in the terms placed as subject and predicate, we have divinely revealed two objective ideas, and that these two ideas are an authentic and faithful expression of the reality expressed by a verb that is real and transcendental to the human and the divine, the verb *to be.*" *(The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma,* ch. 2, no. 113).

[112] *Ibid.*, no. 59.

know more today than He knew yesterday, nor will He know tomorrow more than He knows today. Theology's starting point is the divine, real, objective meaning *grasped by the primitive Church* with the light given her by God. Fr. Marín has just said that that meaning is formal in part and virtually implicit in part. That part of it which is formal does not admit of progress, but that part of it which is virtually implicit, does. Therein precisely lies theological knowledge: theology advances from the principles or formal to the conclusions or the virtual.

The development of our knowledge of the divine meaning of the revealed formulae is homogeneous and, by the same token, *corresponds to the reality of what is revealed.* If it were heterogeneous, transformistic, there would be no correspondence. All traditional theologians are in accord on the issue of the homogeneity of the development. They disagree on the scope of that development, they are divided on the way of explaining its homogeneity, but they are unanimous in affirming both the development and its homogeneity. Some say that it is homogeneous because the dogmatically defined conclusions have been revealed formally albeit implicitly; and if they were formally revealed in the principles, it is obvious that they are homogeneous with those principles. Others explain the homogeneity on the basis that the dogmatically defined conclusions have been revealed in a virtual *implicit* manner; now if they were revealed in the principles, even if only virtually, they are homogeneous since that virtuality is intrinsic. Finally, others maintain the homogeneity of the development, despite the fact that the conclusions are not contained virtually inclusively in the principles. In this case, the doctrinal development and evolution of Catholic dogma should necessarily be *heterogeneous,* since *no real identity* exists between the conclusion and the principles. But these theologians skirt the difficulty by appealing to a divine supplemental action which is equivalent to a new revelation whereby the conclusions share in the divine meaning of the principles, not because they are included in the latter, but because God Himself so effects it through a new manifestation.[113]

Fr. Marín-Sola explains the homogeneity of dogmatic evolution by the second means. His theoretical exposition is buttressed by documentation showing that it is also the traditional way of explaining such homogeneity. Since doctrinal development is homogeneous, he rejects the explanation of dogmatic evolution by way of *assimilation.* Assimilation implies the transformation of *alien* matter into one's own substance: it is the process whereby living organisms evolve or develop themselves biologically. The intellectual process that takes place in the evolution of dogma, differs from the biological process. Nothing alien to the deposit of revelation, that is to say, nothing that has not been revealed, can ever be defined, can ever become a dogma. Dog-

[113] Fr. Marín devotes all of ch. 2 to this subject.

matic definition necessarily requires that the truth to be so defined should have been said by God, and thus contained in the principles of faith. Doctrinal evolution proceeds in one direction: from within to without; not from without to within.[114]

Enough has been said to establish the traditional character of Fr. Marín-Sola's book on the objectivity of theological knowledge and on the existence of a rational and homogeneous development which never ceases to correspond to the reality revealed by God. Consequently, in this book can be found the reasoned and demonstrated condemnation of the fundamental positions maintained by the *new theology* in the dialectical or rational order. The papal documents quoted earlier make it clear that the new theology takes the position that human concepts do not properly correspond to reality and that their meanings can be changed.

But the new theology exhibits now and then affective and mystical aspects. We have already observed that it manifests itself in many ways: mystically and arationally at times; at other times, rationally, although in this case it is blighted by the lack of correspondence between the concepts and the reality, and by the constant changes in meaning to which the concepts themselves are liable. On the other hand, with regard to the experiential side of theology, we have noted that, in contrast to modernism which owns that religious experience creates the dogmatic truth, the new theology admits the existence of a divine reality revealed by God. This is a point in its favour. However, the explanation given of the manner in which revelation is made and of the time when it was brought to a close is not altogether correct. Certain writers hold that notions and concepts are not needed for the evolution and development of dogma, nor for the progress in the perception of the same. In other words, the affective process is divorced from the rational process. Therein precisely lies one of its most serious defects.

The Homogeneous Evolution devotes two masterly sections to the study of theological and dogmatic development by way of experience or affection.[115] In these two sections, Fr. Marín-Sola explains the three features the presence of which is necessary to absolve the way of affection from all suspicion and to give it security and firmness, to wit, objectivity, homogeneity, and rationality. We stress once more that objectivity and homogeneity are positions which no genuine Catholic theology can dismiss.

The starting point for the way of affection is something *from without*, placed by God in us, viz., the infused habits, which in the experiential process play the same role that the revealed premises play in the rational process. The theologian who employs the affective process does not judge the truth by its

[114] Cf. ch. 4, sect. 4.
[115] Cf. ch. 4, sects. 5-6.

relationship to a mode of being that is *proper to himself* or *natural*, but by its relationship to habits that are not his but infused by God in him. Such habits, then, possess the same consistency and objectivity that mark anything coming from without. In like manner, anyone who employs the way of reasoning, does not judge the truth of the conclusion by reference to his own ideas, but by reference to the principles revealed by God. The starting point of either way comes from God; it is something real, objective, viz., the infused habits in the one case, and the revealed data in the other case. In either case, the starting point is something supernatural, divine.

By means of the elements of judgment consisting in the infused habits, a person may judge whether a truth is divine or not; whether or not it is included in the divine principles infused in himself. Whatever coincides with the divine reality existing in ourselves through the infused habits, is divine; whatever does not coincide, may be presumed not to be divine. Here we have a doctrinal advance or development that is authentically homogeneous and achieved by way of connaturality or experience. As Fr. Marín observes, "Catholic doctrine holds that grace, together with the virtues and gifts derived therefrom, is a real participation of the Divinity. More; through sanctifying grace, the Deity itself, in its Unity and Trinity of Persons, dwells in our soul, not merely by similitude or metaphor, but in an *objective and most real*,[116] albeit mysterious and ineffable manner. This indwelling of the Divinity itself within the most intimate recesses of our being is initiated by the supernatural faith possessed by every Christian, even if he be a sinner; it is formally consummated by sanctifying grace, together with the virtues and gifts with which every just man is endowed.

"Thus, he who possesses divine faith, and to a much greater degree, he who possesses sanctifying grace with its virtues and gifts, possesses and carries within himself, in the manner of a nature *the very same object*[117] from which all the statements of faith proceed, and with which they are all concerned; the object from which, and from which alone, all dogmatic progress ensues and can ensue, since nothing can ever be dogmatic or belong to divine faith if it is not a real expression of the divinity."[118]

To the objective value of the affective way and the homogeneous development of Catholic teaching possible through it, must be added the corroboration or endorsement by the way of reasoning. The affective process is blind, and hence liable to many mistakes and deceptions; whereas the

[116] Underscoring supplied. It is necessary to stress the importance of the objectivity of knowledge, particularly when the traditional teaching is compared with the philosophies employed by the *new theology*.
[117] Underscoring supplied.
[118] Ch. 4, no. 218.

reasoning process is done openly in the full light of day; albeit fallible if done by man alone, it is nonetheless much firmer and exhibits greater guarantees of being right. This is the view taken by traditional theology, and Fr. Marín alludes to it when he says, "Of course, no sooner does such a seemingly novel sentiment (the new truth embodied in a feeling) externally manifest and propagate itself, than it is seized by speculative theology and subjected to strict accounting by comparing it with the sources of revelation, viz., the divine Scriptures and Tradition, and with the authentic criteria represented by the Church Fathers, Councils, and Popes."[119] However, the endorsement of theological reasoning is not always needed. If the sentiment is one that is *common*, it possesses withal a sufficient guarantee of authenticity. If it is common, it certainly comes from the Holy Spirit dwelling in the Church. "Whether theology succeeds in demonstrating it or not, the *common* sentiment of the faithful is *of itself alone*, even without theological reasoning, a sufficient criterion."[120]

To conclude, *The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma* possesses, among the many things that could be listed in its favour, the merit of being a magnificent exponent of the traditional concept of theology in both its theoretical and experiential aspects; and, thus, also the merit of serving as a safe guide in the present state of disorientation brought about by the new theology.

2. Theology and Faith

A. *Kinds of knowledge of God.* – Human knowledge of God is of three kinds. They are mentioned by the [First] Vatican Council. They are distinguished from each other by the object and the light by which the object is known.

In the first place, the Council speaks of a knowledge obtained by means of the natural light of reason. This knowledge ends in the attainment of truths of the natural order about God, which reason can grasp by its own powers with the help of creatures. This is the philosophical knowledge obtained through reasoning which starts from things as effects of God, and terminates in God as the cause of things. It is knowledge that has for its object God as the Primary Being, the First Principle, the First Cause, etc.

There is, besides, another knowledge achieved by means of the supernatural light of revelation communicated to the person who first received it, and which is achieved today by means of the light of faith, which is similarly supernatural since its formal element is none other than divine revelation,

[119] *Ibid.*
[120] *Ibid.*

inasmuch as its *medium of knowing* (*medium cognitionis*) is the *authority of the revealing God.*

The difference between these two kinds of knowledge is essential. They agree neither in the object nor in the medium by which the object is attained. The object of the former belongs to the natural order, its light is the light inherent in human reason. The object of the latter belongs to the supernatural order, it is a mysterious and hidden object unattainable by reason left to itself, requiring for its attainment the supernatural light of revelation and faith.[121]

But the possibilities of knowing God are not yet exhausted. We said that the [First] Vatican mentioned three. The text we have been commenting on speaks of only two. But it immediately adds that human reason, enlightened by faith, can obtain a *certain understanding of the revealed mysteries,* employing for this purpose its natural knowledge, in which there is an *analogical value* that enables it also to represent the divine truths.[122] This kind of knowledge is the *theological* which lies midway between the other two.

There is, then, a natural knowledge of God, whose object is constituted by the divine truths attainable by human reason, and whose light is solely the light of human reason itself. There is, besides, a supernatural knowledge of God, the object of which is the supernatural mysteries beyond the reach of human reason, but which God has revealed either in the Scriptures or in Tradition, and which we grasp by the light, likewise supernatural, of revelation and faith. There is, finally, a third knowledge, that of theology, which is a combination of the natural and the supernatural. Of the supernatural, because its object is constituted by the divine mysteries, and its light by divine revelation and human reason employing philosophical notions and rational processes but always, of course, under the superior direction of faith.

B. *The knowledge of faith.* – In faith, the two formal elements are supernatural: both the object and the light. The object, viz., the divine

[121] "The perpetual consensus of the Catholic Church has held and holds that there are two orders of knowledge which are distinguished not only by their principles but also by their object: by their principles, indeed, since in the one we know by natural reason, in the other by faith; by their object, because, apart from those things which can be reached by natural reason, mysteries hidden in God, which cannot be attained except through divine revelation, are proposed to us for belief." (VATICAN I, *De Fide catholica*, ch. 4; Denz.-Schön., 3015).

[122] "Now, when through God's gift, reason enlightened by faith sedulously and soberly seeks some understanding of the mysteries, it achieves a very fruitful understanding (of the same) through the analogy of those things that are naturally known, as well as through the connexion of the mysteries among themselves." (*Ibid.*, Denz.-Schön., 3016).

mysteries; the light, which is divine revelation. Whatever is divine, if proposed infallibly, is not subject to debate or doubt. Neither is it accepted through a process of reasoning on the part of the believer. It is accepted without discussion because its divine character is of itself a guarantee of truth. Consequently, any divine truth, once it is guaranteed as divine through the Church's infallible definition, is incontrovertible; it thus has the nature of a *principle.* Faith is the starting point of theology; faith provides the principles of theology. The role of the articles of faith and of the other revealed and defined dogmas in the acquisition of theological knowledge is identical to that of the first principles of any science in the acquisition of scientific knowledge. The latter are held as indisputable by the science that employs them as principles. They may be questioned and subjected to proof by another superior science, in respect of which they will be conclusions, not principles. But they are unquestionable by any science of which they are principles.

However, the firmness of the principles is not the same in all the sciences. The principles of metaphysics and mathematics are absolutely necessary and immutable; this is not the case with the principles of the natural sciences, which are normally subject to exceptions in their application. The principles of faith possess the highest possible firmness since they have the greatest possible guarantee, the word of God. Metaphysical principles, although evident, are backed only by human guarantee and evidence; man accepts them because they are evident *to him.* On the other hand, the principles of faith are guaranteed by the word of God which is not subject either to deception or deceit.

Hence, theology proceeds from principles having the utmost consistency, principles utterly indisputable since they are altogether *necessary* inasmuch as theirs is a necessity grounded on the word of God who, in revealing them, has guaranteed their truth.

But this is not the sole function of faith. It is not just a grasp of supernatural truths accepted by means of a likewise supernatural light, and, thus, an assent the firmness of which is superior to any natural evidence. It exercises, besides, an influence on the natural truths that will be employed by man in the theological process that begins with the truths of faith, and on the reasoning process elaborated with the aid of those natural truths. Insofar as it is a *theological virtue,* faith is restricted to assenting with utmost certitude to the revealed truths on the authority of God who has revealed them; but insofar as it is theology's *starting point,* apart from the foregoing firm assent to revealed truths grounded on the authority of God, faith also functions to provide guidance in the rational appraisal of natural truths and in the rational use made of them for the purpose of drawing out the virtual content of the principles.

The truths of faith, as principles of theology, guide or shed light on the rational minor premises and on the reasoning process constructed with the latter and the former. This is a function of the highest importance. The Pope occasionally alludes to it in the *Humani generis* and grounds on it the superior value of traditional philosophy. "The body of doctrine elaborated with common accord by Catholic teachers in the course of many centuries is certainly not grounded on such frail foundations. They are grounded on principles and notions derived from a true knowledge of created things. In deriving this knowledge, *divinely revealed truth shone like a star,* through the Church, *upon the human mind.*"[123] "That sound philosophy handed down as a patrimony from previous Christian generations, enjoys a superior kind of authority because its principles and principal assertions, gradually made manifest and defined by men of great talent, have been weighed by the Church's Magisterium *in the balance of divine revelation.*"[124]

This is not the sole reason for the superior value of traditional philosophy, but it is a reason that no theologian may ignore, as the Holy Father bewails, it is in fact ignored by many modern theologians.

C. *Theological knowledge.* – Theology is the *science of revelation,* or the *understanding of the faith.*[125] This understanding of revelation or of the faith is a *wisdom,* a fact which endows theology with certain notable characteristics which we shall presently explain. Theology possesses characteristics which are proper to it as *science,* and characteristics which belong to it as an *ultimate* science or *wisdom.*

Theology is *wisdom* or an *ultimate science.* There is no superior science to which theology may entrust the defense of its own principles. Sciences are traditionally divided into subalternant and subalternate. The latter entrust to the former the elaboration of their principles. In other words, the principles of the subalternate sciences are conclusions of the subalternant. For instance, such sciences as have man for their object – medicine, anthropology, etc. – are subalternate to psychology, and psychology is their respective subalternant. The conclusions of psychology are principles of medicine. The physician must proceed from the presupposition that man is a substantial composite of matter and soul.

Now, then, our theology is exclusively a subalternant science. Not because there is no superior science to which it is subalternated, since it is in

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[123] AAS, 42 (1950), 566.

[124] *Humani generis,* AAS, 42 (190), 571-572.

[125] This definition is taken from Vatican I. Cf. Denz.-Schön. 3016. Pius XII recalls it in *Humani generis:* "It is common knowledge how great a store the Church sets by human reason . . . to achieve some understanding, one that is very fruitful, of the mysteries." (AAS, 42 (1950), 571).

fact subalternated to God's own divine knowledge and to the knowledge the blessed have in heaven, but because there is no other scientific knowledge *had by man* to which theology is subordinated. There is no human science which establishes as conclusions the principles of theology. Theological principles, we said, are principles of faith and *no principle of faith is a conclusion* deduced from any other piece of knowledge possessed by man on this earth.

Since no superior knowledge exists capable of working on the principles of theology, that function has to be assumed by theology itself. A parallel instance is found in the case of metaphysics. As the supreme science among those naturally acquired, it is likewise exclusively subalternant and in no way subalternate. Thus metaphysics goes to work on it own principles by an authentic reflexion on itself.

To reflect on itself is a proper function of the ultimate science. Such a science is a *wisdom*. Theology, as also metaphysics, is a genuine wisdom. Here lies the key to the correct understanding of the commonly accepted axiom that theology is a *science of authority*.

It is, in effect, a science of *authority*. What is meant by this? That is conclusions have to be established by proofs from authority? Or that the argument from authority is the *decisive* one? We believe that that is not the case. Theology does not need to prove its conclusions by arguments from authority; nor are such arguments the more efficacious and decisive.

The axiom means something else. Theology is said to be a science of authority because the argument from authority is decisive relative to its *starting point*, that is, relative to the acceptance of its *principles. Authority* is essential to its work as wisdom. As a wisdom, theology works on its own principles, and these principles are established *exclusively by means of authority*. The principles of theology are principles of faith, and truths of faith are accepted on the authority of God who reveals them and of the Church who proposes them, and of the Fathers and theologians, insofar as they are exponents of the faith proposed by the Church through her ordinary magisterium.

If the argument from authority were to be taken as *decisive* relative to the *conclusions* of theology, then the conclusions would *cease to be conclusions* and would become principles. If what is taken as a conclusion should be proven to be revealed by God and proposed by the Church, that is to say, if it should be established by a decisive argument of divine authority as explained and proposed by the Church, then whoever has succeeded in establishing the proof and judges it decisive, accepts that conclusion as a truth of faith and thus transfers it to the category of principles. Which is why we said that the argument from authority is decisive in theology relative to its sapiential function, that is, relative to the establishment of its principles which are

revealed by God and proposed by the Church, or truths grounded on the authority of God and of the Church.

The view we have been expounding on the theological argument from authority as relative specifically to the *principles* of theology is expressed by St. Thomas as follows: "To argue from authority is in the highest degree proper to this teaching [theology] inasmuch as its *principles* are had by revelation."[126]

But, apart from being a wisdom and carrying out the sapiential function of reflecting on its own principles and establishing them with decisive arguments from authority, theology is also a *science* charged with the performance of *scientific* functions, which perforce are concerned with the conclusions. And theology is no exception.

Now, how does theology draw the conclusions out of its principles? To draw them out is to *prove their inclusion therein, to make them known.* How is this done? In various manners and different ways. We have already mentioned that there are two ways of knowing: the way of connaturality or experience, and the way of investigation or research. We have also pointed out that the former is not of itself a *scientific* procedure since the experience had by means of the will is blind and therefore incapable of providing by itself any *certain* knowledge of what is experienced. Hence, the ever present need of having its assertions verified in one way or another by reasoning.

It follows that theology's specifically scientific work consists in the investigation and study of the principles, not for the purpose of establishing them – this is its sapiential function – but for the purpose of *unfolding* them, of drawing out the *conclusions contained in them,* which can be done in several ways, either *positively* or *speculatively*.

The *positive* way consists principally in proving the *conclusions* with arguments from authority. Obviously, such arguments exist, equally clear it is that authority possesses a value of its own because the scholars and theologians who preceded us were talented men who *knew* whereof they were speaking or writing. But are we to rest content on their authority? Would it not be better to examine the reasons that led them to the conclusions they reached? Relative to the theological conclusions, that is to say, relative to providing theology with *scientific* content, arguments from authority do not have the decisive value they have in proving theological principles, that is, relative to providing theology with *sapiential* content.

There is a positive theology which establishes its conclusions by quoting texts from the Fathers of the Church, Doctors, and theologians. True enough.

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[126] *Summa Theologica,* 1, q. 1, a. 8 ad 2.

But equally true it is that it is neither the only theology nor the most *scientific*. St. Thomas raises the question whether theology is an argumentative knowledge. His answer is affirmative. "This teaching does not argue for the purpose of proving its principles, viz., the articles of faith, but *from them it proceeds to prove something else*, as for instance, the Apostle argues from Christ's resurrection to prove the common resurrection."[127] To prove one truth by another, the conclusions by the principles, builds up a body of *scientific or speculative knowledge*. Theology does this. More: it is precisely by the discharge of this function that theology is *truly scientific*, that is, it provides authentic knowledge of the *content* of the principles. Positive theology does not provide this authentic knowledge of the principles since it does not penetrate them; it does not perceive the connexion of the conclusions with the truths from which they issue; it limits itself merely to asserting that, according to the authors quoted, the conclusion is a true conclusion. St. Thomas writes to the point: "There is an argumentation ordered to remove any doubt whether the case is so; and it is in theological argumentation of this sort that use is made principally of the authorities accepted by those of the contrary persuasion . . . But in the schools there exists another sort of argumentation, one that is magistral, not for the purpose of removing error, but of instructing the listeners and bringing them to an *understanding of the truth, which is what it seeks*. In this case it is necessary to insist on the reasons that probe into the roots of the truth, and make one know the truth of what is asserted. Otherwise, if the question is determined by the teacher through the use of mere authorities, the listener will indeed be certified that such is the case but *will acquire no knowledge or understanding and will go away empty*."[128] Speculative theology is necessary in order to obtain a truly scientific knowledge of the revealed truths, that is to say, in order to penetrate them and grasp their content, to see the conclusions concluded or included in them.

Speculative theology, then, is theological knowledge or science in the most authentic or genuine sense. Theology that is based decisively on *authority* is theology that investigates and establishes its own principles; it is not a science but a wisdom. Relative to the conclusions, the theology that establishes them by way of experience cannot be truly called a science since it is incapable of giving certainty by itself. The theology that establishes conclusions by arguments of authority is a science, but imperfectly, since it does not penetrate into the content of its principles. Hence, speculative theology alone is theological knowledge in the most authentic and genuine sense. Unfortunately, it is looked upon with disdain by not a few of the exponents of the new theology, and not unexpectedly characterized by them as *rational-*

[127] *Loc cit.*, body of the article.
[128] *Quodlibet.*, 4, a. 18.

istic, logical, dialectical, etc. In truth, it is nothing of the sort; it is simply theology as an authentic *science*. Anything short of penetration or insight into the revealed principles in order to perceive the conclusions contained therein, falls short of the true measure of theological *science*.

The [First] Vatican Council defines theology as the *understanding of revealed truths* obtained by means of the *analogy of things naturally known* and the *connexion that links truths with one another*. "Reason, indeed enlightened by faith . . . acquires some understanding of the mysteries . . . both through the analogy of the things which it naturally knows as well as through the connexion of the mysteries among themselves."[129] Pius XII alluded to the tendency to play down the role of speculative theology in these terms: "Concerning truths revealed by God, it is asked whether the mind is capable of penetrating them with the aid of *notions that are certain* and, thus, of *deducing further truths from them* . . . The Church affirms that such is the case."[130]

Theology as a scientific discipline, one employing philosophical notions to unfold the virtual content of the principles of faith, performs an extremely complex task. Theology would be impaired by ignoring the circumstances surrounding the formulation of the philosophical principles employed in the unfolding of the dogmas. Scientific or speculative theology requires a philosophical expertise conversant with the following:

(1) An exact information regarding the facts that have motivated the formulation of the teachings employed. Obviously, such facts shed enormous light on the sense of the teachings to the formulation of which they have greatly contributed.

(2) A similarly precise knowledge of the errors against which those teachings have been proposed as an antidote. By the law of contraries, it will be extremely useful, in order to appraise correctly the doctrinal content of certain philosophical propositions, to know what they were meant to correct or make good.

(3) The process whereby an already established and firm teaching was elaborated. Knowing such elaborative process makes it possible for one to appreciate the influence of a preceding stage on the subsequent; the corrections imposed by subsequent stages on those preceding it; the various aspects and shades of meaning that gradually became apparent to those who elaborated the teachings and systems. The interpretation of a teaching or system risks the taint of apriorism if, together with the details relative to the circumstances and errors, no account is taken of the details connected with the process followed in the elaboration of the given doctrine.

[129] Denz.-Schön., 3016.
[130] Address, Sept. 22, 1946. AAS, 38 (1946), 387.

(4) The emplacement of the teaching within the whole doctrinal conception or body of thought of the authors who hold it. In other words, knowledge of the teaching *from within.* Apart from the circumstances, the external motives, the occasions that influence the elaboration of doctrinal systems, the latter must, obviously, also exhibit an internal unity. The notions employed, the principles formulated, the theses upheld must certainly be interpreted in the light of those external elements, but, above all, in the light of the internal element, viz., its framing or emplacement within the mentality of the authors who have definitively built and formulated the body of teachings. That mentality shows up in the totality of the doctrinal whole.

Historical research is very much the "in" thing in scholarly circles today. It could be termed the extrinsic study of what has been taught or thought. Which is perfectly correct. But if that were all, then it would not be entirely correct. Notions, formulae, categories, principles possess an internal meaning, a meaning determined not solely by the precedents, circumstances, facts attendant to their formulation, but also by the intimate bonds whereby the whole is structured within an organic doctrinal conception. Which is to say that there is an inner meaning or truth which cannot be ignored, and which is the principal object of investigation and research.

The scientific or speculative theologian must perform all these tasks, and perform them well. Only then can he place the results of his research at the service of dogma in order to unfold it, to deduce the genuine conclusions included in the word of God. No less is required to build sterling theology.

D. *Theology and "The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma."* – The present book by Fr. Marín-Sola is a splendid example of everything we have just been saying. It expounds the theory on the nature of theology and at the same time puts the theory into practice.

All theological investigation takes the truths of faith for its starting point. Fr. Marín devotes a whole section to establish this point.[131] The principles of theology consist in the revealed truths, not insofar as they contain the divine meaning they have in God's mind, but insofar as they contain the meaning proposed to the primitive Church, a meaning undoubtedly divine, yet always lesser in scope than the scope they have in the divine mind. This is the realm of faith, which is an assent to what God has revealed and is proposed by the Church. Anything that theology may reach by deduction from the principles of faith is likewise revealed since theology is a science that is essentially inclusive or metaphysical in character.[132] Hence, the *formal element* of the truth deduced in the conclusion is exclusively reduced to the revealed notions and principles. Fr. Marín is particularly insistent on

[131] Cf. ch. 2, sect. 1.
[132] Cf. ch. 2, sects. 2-7.

this point because it is overlooked more than is convenient. "It has too often been forgotten that the starting point, the true principles, the *formal subject* of theology is . . . the majors of faith or revealed majors."[133] But theology is made up not only of revealed principles, but also of rational minor premises.

Concerning these minors of reason Fr. Marín has several things to say. ***First,*** he says that they are *mere instruments of deduction,* not formal principles from which the conclusion is deduced. "The confusion in this matter proceeds, we think, either from misunderstanding or overlooking the true role of the human sciences or minors of reason in the reasoning of the science of the revealed or sacred theology. Theology, indeed, utilizes all sorts of sciences or minors of reason, whether metaphysical, physical, or moral . . . The revealed majors are not instruments of the minors, nor do they enter into the constitution of theological reasoning *on a par* with the minors. On the contrary, the minors are *mere intellectual instruments* to unfold or explicate the objective virtuality which the revealed majors contain even if they do not express it."[134] "The solution proferred to these problems by St. Thomas and his school has always been that *in the theological reasoning the minors of reason are merely instruments of the majors of faith,* or mere helpers of our mind in the unfolding of *what already exists in a latent state in the majors of faith* . . ."[135] Thus, theology employs man's natural knowledge, particularly philosophy. It may and must do scientific work on the so-called minors of reason. But always in subordination to the majors of faith relative to which they serve as instruments to draw out what is contained in them.

In the second place, Fr. Marín teaches that, in spite of their rational character, the minors of reason do *have specific connections with revelation.* Hence, where a given philosophy is employed in theology, and particularly where that philosophy is already sanctioned by the use and the constant approval of the Church, it would take extreme superficiality to think that no special connections exist linking that philosophy and the divine revelation proposed in the major premises, inasmuch as the former cooperates in developing the virtuality of the latter. "The very serious problems related to the evolution of dogma – considered as new by many to the extent of almost accusing the great masters of scholasticism of being ignorant of them[136] – were examined and solved by these same masters, and above all by St. Thomas and his

[133] Cf. ch. 2, no. 96.
[134] *Ibid.*
[135] Cf. ch. 4, no. 214.
[136] Fr. Marín began work on this book early in this century. Then he evinced surprise at finding that the problems of doctrinal evolution were being presented as something *new,* such that the great masters of scholasticism *almost stood charged* with ignorance of the same. How would he react today at seeing them accused of being totally ignorant of the categories of evolution, historicity, and progress?

school, with a profundity and breadth that stand out in contrast to the superficiality with which they are studied not only in heterodox works, but even in many Catholic handbooks. What we call today the contact of revelation with the different philosophies and civilizations, the schoolmen called the contact of the majors of faith with the minors of reason."[137] As *instruments* of deduction, the minors of reason cannot be unrelated to the subject on which they work. As instruments to deduce what is revealed, they must needs have a certain aptitude to work on revelation. A natural aptitude is not enough: there is further need of their elevation by the *vis instrumentalis* (instrumental energy). The minors of reason employed by theology receive from the majors of faith, which are the principal cause of the conclusion, the divine *vis instrumentalis*, which is a special contact with revelation. It is common knowledge that the instrument receives the *vis instrumentalis* from the principal cause, which in this case is the *revealed* majors.

In the third place, the contact of the minors of reason or philosophical truths with the majors of faith or revealed truths in the theological enterprise of deducing theological conclusions from the premises of faith is explained by Fr. Marín as follows: the minor premises of reason are inclusive; consequently, the predicate signifies the same reality as the subject, although under a different concept. But the subject of the minor premise is the predicate of the major premise (otherwise, the reasoning would be incorrect). The predicate of the major is a *revealed* term. Now, the term found in both premises but not in the conclusion is the *middle term*. This term carries the whole burden of every authentic reasoning process, and in the instant case it is itself a *revealed* term since it is found in the major premise. It reappears in the minor premise where it has a philosophical meaning, but one in conformity with the revealed meaning in the major; otherwise, the argument would have four terms – the two of the major and the two of the minor, and none of the latter coinciding with any of the former – and thus wholly inconclusive. Says Fr. Marín: "The predicate of the premise of reason, (if it is inclusive, as it has to be in theology) is the self-same reality or object or thing as the subject: it is the essence itself of the subject . . . The subject of the minor is the very same predicate of the major, the very same predicate of the premise of faith, one of the two formally revealed ideas. The middle term in theology is formally revealed, illumined by the light of revelation: it is a term of faith . . . Anyone who understands the role of the middle term in the reasoning process, and anyone who understands the meaning of objective homogeneity, would need no further explanation."[138]

Enough has been said of the legitimate use of philosophy and its notions in theology, and on the guarantee given to the premises of reason by

[137] Cf. ch. 4, no. 214.
[138] Cf. ch. 2, no. 113.

their assumption as instruments in the development of the revealed truth to justify our repudiation of all the assertions of modern philosophers and theologians tending to minimize and cast aspersions on speculative or rational theology, by them described as rationalistic[139] or dialectical; and to vindicate our obligation to subscribe to these words of Pius XII: "Only then will human reason be capable of aptly and securely discharging this function [that of penetrating into the understanding of the faith or building a scientific theology] when it has been duly cultivated, that is, imbued with that sound philosophy which has been handed down as a patrimony from preceding Christian generations, and thus enjoys also a superior kind of authority because its principles and principal assertions gradually made clear and defined by men of great talent have been weighed by the Church's Magisterium in the balance of divine revelation."[140]

It is, thus, not surprising that the Church should herself have employed specifically philosophical notions and terms to express dogmatic truths, since those notions and terms imply a real, though not exhaustive, identity with the revealed reality. It must be understood that the notions and terms employed by the Church in her definitions, have the meaning they have in the philosophy from which they have been borrowed by the Church and utilized to draw out the defined conclusions. "In the aforementioned growth (of Catholic dogma) various human philosophies and civilizations have played a large role and exercised a great influence, particularly Greek philosophy in the age of the Fathers and scholastic philosophy in the Middle and Modern ages. This influence is noticeable in the writings of the Fathers who developed the primitive doctrine, in the conciliar disputes and disquisitions that preceded the definition of each dogma, and even in the dogmatic formulae themselves which clearly exhibit the mark of the various epochs in which the propositions were defined."[141]

Pius XII admonishes: "No one denies that the terms employed in the schools and in the teaching of the Church's Magisterium itself to express such notions, are capable of further perfection and polish. It is likewise clear that the Church has not always been constant in the use of the same terms. It is also obvious that the Church cannot be bound to any short-lived philosophy. But the body of doctrine elaborated with common accord by Catholic teachers in the course of many centuries is certainly not grounded on such frail foundations. They are grounded on principles and notions derived from a true knowledge of created things. In deriving this knowledge, divinely revealed truth shone like a star, through the Church, upon the human mind. Hence, it is not surprising that some of these notions have not only been

[139] *Humani generis*, AAS, 42 (1950), 573.
[140] *Ibid.*, pgs. 571-572.
[141] *The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma*, Introd. no. 5.

employed, but also sanctioned by the Ecumenical Councils, so that it is unlawful to deviate from them.

"Hence, to disregard, or reject, or devalue so many and so important things conceived, formulated and furnished through the multisecular endeavours of men of uncommon intelligence and holiness working to achieve an ever more accurate expression of the truths of faith under the illumination and guidance of the Holy Spirit and the Church's vigilant Magisterium, in order to make room for a new philosophy, whose conjectural notions and fluctuating and vague expressions are like flowers of the field in bloom today and withered tomorrow, is not only the height of imprudence but transforms dogma into a reed buffeted by the winds."[142]

3. Theology and Philosophical Systems

The preceding subsection has shown that theology is by definition the *understanding of the faith* or the *knowledge of the revealed truth;* thus it must be *rational* and, to borrow from the [First] Vatican Council, utilize the natural analogical notions of the human mind. Furthermore, these notions have passed on from theology to dogma, since the Church has not infrequently employed them in her dogmatic definitions. This raises a very serious problem, to wit, how is theology related, not precisely to philosophy in general, but to *the various philosophical systems* that so frequently come and go.

Not all philosophical systems are equally firm. Traditional philosophy possesses a very high degree of stability. As the Holy Father points out, it is not based on frail grounds, it is not an ephemeral philosophy. Nonetheless, there have been attempts to replace it. The *Humani generis* denounces those who pretend to liberate the dogmas from their traditional formulations and to reduce them to the scriptural expressions, thinking thereby to open the way to the possibility of expressing the dogmas of faith with the notions of the modern philosophies of immanentism, or idealism, or existentialism, etc., and so to satisfy the needs of the men of today.[143]

The problem is fraught with grave consequences. It arises from a very real and pressing need – the need to adapt the truths of faith, meant for all men, to modern minds. Nothing can be more appealing, more apostolic, more Christian than the desire to bring home to all human minds the truths of the Gospel. If theology is the understanding of the faith obtained, among other means, with the aid of notions made available by philosophy, then we are faced with an acute and vexing problem. The existence of many philosophies

[142] *Humani generis,* AAS, 42 (1950), 566-567.
[143] *Ibid.,* pg. 566.

is an undeniable fact. Equally undeniable is the fact of many, different incompatible, even opposed philosophical categories. The same category, formula, term takes on different, or even inconsistent senses in this and that philosophy. Are we, then, to admit the existence of several theologies scholastic, evolutionist, existentialist? Will it not be possible to construct a theology with the Gospel and Hegel or Marx? With the Bible and Kierkegaard? That is precisely the aim of the new theology.

In this subsection we shall consider the authenticity of the problem just stated, its foundations, and the mistaken solutions it has been given. The traditional solution, which the Church considers to be the true solution, will be dealt with in the next subsections.

A. *Theology should be suitable to all men and to all times.* – Nothing could be truer. Truth is the heritage of all men. Perhaps not truth in all its extension, but at least the truth *meant for men,* the truth tailored for the human mind. Such is the case with philosophical and religious truth. Hence all men can lay claim to the possession of such truths, even if not all men actually exercise it.

Philosophical truth knows no exclusivisms, it is the common heritage of all. Given a human intellect, it is vested with the natural right to know the truth that is proportionate to itself, and to know it in the manner that befits its nature, viz., through reasoning. An intellect not ordered to the truth, a reason not ordered to reasoning are as abnormal as eyes not ordered to light and a will not ordered to the good. It might happen that the mind should fail to grasp the truth, or should fall into error; but in no case will it not be ordered to the truth. Truth does not deny itself to any man. If it is not attained, it will be due to a defect in the man, not to a defect in the truth itself, or because the truth is not meant for him. Furthermore, every man, simply by being a man, has the natural right to know the truth *in a human manner,* not intuitively, but rationally or by way of argumentation. But to know the truth by way of argumentation is to philosophize. Therefore, philosophy is every man's heritage.

The case is the same for the truth of faith or the revealed truth. Every man has a natural and inalienable right to it. Lest we be misunderstood, let it be clear that by natural right we do not mean a right based on a man's being a man, but a right based on a positive and gratuitous divine determination. The supernatural order, to which man has been called, is in its entirety a divine-positive and wholly gratuitous order. But God has established it for all men, and, in virtue of this universal call, no man is excluded. Each and every man, because God has so willed it, has the right to the divine truths, grace, and salvation.

When we assert the existence in every man of a right to know the revealed truths, we do not mean a right grounded on the intrinsic demands of his cognitive power, since the object proportionate to the human mind is not the supernatural truth, which is unattainable, without the gratuitous elevation of human nature. However, if this gratuitous elevation is presupposed, then every man has a natural right, that is, a right corresponding to his elevated nature, to know the truth revealed by God. As a matter of fact, God has destined every man to a supernatural end, and consequently, "enlightens every man who comes into the world."[144] St. Thomas begins his *Summa Theologica* by expounding this elementary truth.[145]

The truths of faith are meant for all men. This is not to say that all men actually exercise their right to know such truths. Unfortunately, not all do and, as a matter of fact, the truths of faith remain unknown to a great many. But it must be understood that it is not on account of a defect in the truths themselves, or because they are not meant for some peole; but on account of a defect in men themselves who do not avail themselves of available God-given light.

The right of every man to the revealed truth is not limited to knowing it *by faith.* With faith alone a man can be saved, and no man needs to be a theologian in order to be saved. True. But, granted that theology is not a requisite for salvation, it is still true that theological knowledge is meant *for all.* For man has the right to know things *in his own manner,* the human manner, through reasoning or argumentation. Knowledge of the faith by way of reasoning is theological knowledge. Hence, all men may claim the right to a theological knowledge of the truth revealed by God. Hence, theology is meant for all men.

By this we mean to say that theology must be ***suitable*** or ***adaptable to all.*** Theology is meant not only for a particular era, but for all eras; not only for a particular mentality or culture, but for all the various mentalities and cultures. It should, of course, be obvious that we do not require an equal measure of theological achievement in each and everyone. The same science can be had on various levels, and the problem of adapting the subject matter to the different mental capacities of the learners is a matter of pedagogical skill.

Each epoch in history is beset with its own problems. The problems confronting the 20th century are not identical to those of the 13th century. The things that appealed to men in the past are not the same as those which preoccupy men today. The light of revelation and faith must be shed on the

[144] John 1:9.

[145] *Summa Theologica,* 1, q. 1, a. 1.

problems of today as on the problems of yesterday. In other words, we need a theology for the living problems and issues of the present.

Similarly, each era, each century has its own mentality; and theology begs to be adapted also to the mentality of the day. This is done not only by stating and solving the problems of the present in the light of divine revelation, but also by expounding the eternal or permanent problems in a manner accessible to the ways of contemporary men.

Finally, each epoch may also have its own mental categories, or philosophical system. Will it also be necessary to adapt the teachings of the faith to the new systems and categories in order to make the faith truly efficacious and suitable to modern men?

If theology is the knowledge of the faith obtained chiefly with the aid of philosophy, it would seem to follow that there will be as many theologies as there are philosophies. Otherwise, theology, which is intended for all men, will, as a matter of fact, not be suitable for a certain number of peoples or of generations. The inadmissibility of this conclusion seems to require the acceptance of various different theologies. Such is the conclusion reached, without qualms, by many today. To quote Pius XII in the *Humani generis:* "'(Certain modern writers) believe that the way is open whereby, in order to satisfy the needs of these days, dogmas may be expressed with notions taken from modern philosophy, whether from immanentism, or idealism, or existentialism, or some such other system."[146] If dogma, which is to say faith itself, is to be adapted to these philosophies, then, the case will apply with even greater force to theology.

B. *Contemporary problems and contemporary theology.* — Our problems today are, undeniably, not the problems of the 13th century. The methods of approach and of problem-solving employed today differ from the methods of yesterday; the criteria for solving present difficulties are not the criteria which prevailed in the past.

A modern spirit is used to living his own life, to breathing a reflexive and subjectivist atmosphere, to relating to problems from the point of view of the self. Consider, for instance, an existentialist. Must be he compelled to accept a theology burdened with Aristotelianism? A theology which considers the truths of faith with the category of *truth-object,* that is, a truth in correspondence with objective reality, the measure of which is to be found outside ourselves? Such a theology is of no use to him. The theology that will be of any use to him will be a theology of the *truth-subject,* the truth *in him,* the truth which is *lived* – not the truth which is *dictated.*

Likewise, a modern spirit has no use for a theology built with Aristotelian categories expressive of *immutable essences.* Truth beyond time is

[146] *Humani generis,* AAS, 42 (1950), 566.

inoperative for a mind used to looking at things through the categories of time, evolution, or history.

Pius XII recalls that, in the modern view, "the perennial philosophy is nothing but a philosophy of immutable essences, whereas the modern mind must look to the existence of each and everything and to life in a state of constant flux. While showing contempt for this philosophy, they simultaneously praise other philosophies, ancient or modern, and seem to insinuate that there is no philosophy or opinion which cannot be made compatible with Catholic dogma by making some corrections or additions as needed. The utter falsity of these pretensions no Catholic may call into doubt, particularly where such errors are involved as are known under the names of immanentism, or idealism, or materialism, whether historical or dialectical, or even existentialism, whether of the sort that professes atheism or of the sort that, to say the least, impugns the value of metaphysical reasoning."[147]

Let us repeat once more that theology is meant for all men and for all times. It follows that all men of all times can claim the right to achieve an understanding of the faith, a theological knowledge of the revealed truth. Consequently, we come up with the following dilemma: either theology is made to swim up river, to develop the problems of faith with outdated, ineffectual, useless criteria, thus effectively excluding from our apostolate and our sphere of attraction the men of today who have to live with the legitimate problems of subjectivism and evolution, as well as the men of tomorrow who will also have to live with the problems posed by the future; or we opt for achieving an understanding of the faith through modern categories and coping by their means with the problems of today. On this count, theology remains a reasoned faith; not, however, with the reason of the past but with the reason of the present. Such is the alternative for which many of the followers of the new theology have opted.

C. *Consequences of the solution given by the "New Theology".* – Opting for a theology constructed with the categories and principles of contemporary cultures is tantamount to admitting many non-coincident, divergent, and even inconsistent theologies. The immutability of the truth, and the homogeneity, of Catholic doctrinal development are thereby eliminated. Such are the fruits of the labour of the new theologians.

To justify the building of a theology with modern categories, reference is often made to what St. Thomas did in his time with Aristotle. The Angelic Doctor took the Stagirite and placed his philosophy at the service of revealed truth. Something of the sort must be done today with existentialism and evolutionism. No one denies St. Thomas the right to take possession of the Aristotelian philosophy of objective truth and immutable essences and to

[147] *Ibid.*, pgs. 573-574.

construct with it his theology. Modern theologians claim for themselves the same right to construct a new theology with the philosophy of subjective truth and of mutable truth. To achieve an understanding of the faith in the context of the apostolic needs of the 13th century what was done then had to be done. That endeavour is pointless today. To maintain those positions might even be prejudicial. The old positions should be abandoned and new ones occupied.

This line of reasoning is appealing and not without appearances of truth. But it leads to disastrous consequences. The fact is that it is shot through and through with equivocations. It is not a question of whether the truth should be adapted to the men of different times. That it should is so obvious as to be indisputable. The question is whether the truth is to be so adapted *at the cost of destroying the truth itself*, of changing its being, of forswearing its immutability. Divine truth is unchangeable; it can evolve, adapt itself, but always *preserving its identity*. The progress, evolution, adaptation must be *homogeneous*; only thus will the truth remain unimpaired.

Neither is it a question whether modern theologians may adapt contemporary philosophies to the service of the faith, as St. Thomas adapted Aristotle's philosophy in the 13th century. Rather, the question is whether the traditional philosophy contains *definitive conquests* that may not be disregarded, let alone denied, in the process of making the modern adaptations. Consequently, the question is whether the modern adaptation must take into account or must rather ignore such principles of modern philosophies as are inconsistent with those definitive conquests. Thus, the crux of the matter is not concerned with a certain behaviour that ought to be emulated – as it clearly ought to be – but with certain definitive achievements that ought to be respected. The task of adaptation to the modern mentality must be accomplished on the basis of not denying whatever theology judges to have been definitively achieved. "The question is whether what St. Thomas has constructed *beyond and above any particular time*, by combining and knitting together the elements contributed by the students of Christian wisdom throughout the ages, is founded on solid rock, endowed with perpetual vigour and validity, *remains even today an efficacious defense* and bulwark of the deposit of Catholic faith, and can *safely be employed to guide the new developments of theology and philosophy*. The Church affirms that such is the case."[148]

The question, then, is whether St. Thomas's adaptation of Aristotle is valid also today, that is, whether what he – and all of traditional theology with one accord – taught concerning the objectivity of human knowledge, the immutability of truth, etc., retains its value today and can lend itself to

[148] Address, Sept. 22, 1946. AAS, 38 (1946), 387.

the new developments and adaptations. That is the real point at issue, and not whether today, on the claim of doing just what he did, one can begin by demolishing what he built.

The endorsement of the enterprise of accommodating the faith to the mentality of modern times at the expense of scholasticism – either by belittling its usefulness or by denying its authority – has eventually led its detractors to hyperbolize some of its real shortcomings and to charge it, besides, with a litany of imagined defects, charges that can be made only by someone profoundly ignorant of this philosophy. For some quarters, scholasticism is a decrepit philosophy and theology, passé, ineffectual, ankylotic;[149] for others, it is dead. Scholasticism is completely unaware of the three totally indispensable categories that are operative today, viz., subjectivity, evolution, solidarity, without which nothing is intelligible to a modern spirit. Consequently, modern writers, who favour a change of theology, affirm that the revealed truth must no longer be investigated with the help of scholastic thinking, but rather with the aid of Marxist or Kierkegaardian thought. The Gospel together with Marx or Hegel will give us the exact idea of faith integrated with the categories of temporalness, evolution and solidarity; the Gospel and Kierkegaard, the idea of faith integrated with the categories of subjectivity, contingency, and existence.

4. The True Solution to the Problem

No good purpose would be served by ignoring the theological problem just mentioned. It exists and it is fraught with serious consequences. The truths of faith and the truths of philosophy are meant for all men; consequently, theology is also meant for all men. Philosophy, theology's instrument, changes; the mentality of the human beings in quest for a knowledge of God, changes. Will theology, then, become ankylotic, useless for want of change? Will it change to the extent of turning into something else? Or will it change and, withal, preserve its identity? Will it evolve heteregeneously or homogeneously?

There is a wide range of possible solutions. The true and traditional solution has already been outlined in the preceding pages. We will now proceed to fill it out in some detail. The reader will have guessed that Fr. Marín's book is here fully brought into play. Its very title contains a guarantee: *evolution,* progress exists; the real identity of the evolving reality is not impaired but preserved because the evolution is *homogeneous.*

A. *Starting presuppositions.* – A problem is not solved either because it is not correctly stated or because the presuppositions that give it body are ignored. The solution to the instant problem requires that we begin by ad-

[149] *Humani generis,* AAS, 42 (1950), 173.

mitting that theology is naturally subject to change for a number of reasons. However, the change must obey certain fixed and firm canons: it is not totally contingent but it is subject to laws that are, in part, necessary. Hence philosophers and theologians must have a mind that is *soundly open* to progress and at the same time firmly anchored in the foundations that provide homogeneity to the evolving subject, which must preserve its identity through all the stages of its evolution.

Theology is naturally subject to change for various reasons. We shall mention two, which we deem essential: the subject in which theological knowledge resides, and the very nature itself of theology.

The subject in possession of theology is *man.* Biologically as well as intellectually, man is subject to constant evolution and progress. Not endowed with the fullness of life from the beginning, he starts out as a germ meant to evolve, grow, progress. But it should never be forgotten that the identity of his human nature and personality is maintained all throughout his development, growth, and progress. No essential changes take place: the changes that occur are homogeneous.

It is not only biologically but also intellectually that man is subject to growth and progress. No man begins knowing everything he knows at the end. His is not an intuitive, but a reasoning intellect. His ideas are not innate but acquired. Man advances in knowledge either because he acquires more items of knowledge, or because he develops the knowledge he already has. Reasoning is by another name called discourse, which etymologically signifies a *running,* a progressing. A running forward, a running which perfects, an advance.

Endowed with a nature meant to develop itself both biologically and intellectually, it would be acting contrary to nature to cut a man off from the things that give meaning and content to his powers of development. Man changes. In order to change, he gets in touch with things changeable, existential, contingent.

The progressive character of theology, we said, is based not only on man's nature but also on the proper nature of theology itself. Theology is a *science;* as such it is discursive, it progresses or advances from the principles to the conclusions. Science is defined as "knowing one thing by another," that is, a passing from the knowing of one thing to the knowing of another thing, the latter finding its explanation in the former. Theology, then, as a science, is essentially progressive.

That advance is realized by the process of unfolding or explicitating the virtuality of the principles that constitute the starting point. Now, that virtuality varies according to the difference in the sciences. In the natural sciences it is a simply *connexive* virtuality; in the metaphysical sciences, an *inclusive* virtuality. Inclusive means that the conclusions are included in the

principles and refer to the same object or reality represented in the principles. This explains why the conclusions of the metaphysical sciences are homogeneous with the principles. Now, theology is a metaphysical science. If, as a science it is progressive, as metaphysical, its progress has to be homogeneous.

Consequently, to deny that theology progresses or advances, to think of it as ankylotic or petrified knowledge, to think that the clock that marked its development has come to a dead stop at some past century, to believe that theology need not be up-to-date implies denying that it is a science and, as such, capable of constant growth; implies denying its accommodation to man who is a subject of growth and development today as much as yesterday. All of this is to say that theology adapts itself to the minds of modern men as it adapted itself to the minds of the ancients; that it grows and advances in the present as it grew and advanced in the past.

But such growth must be without prejudice to *maintaining its identity*. The growth must be homogeneous. Today's advance must not begin by razing to the ground the achievements of the past; rather it must be grounded on them. And this brings us to the second presupposition to the true solution to the present theological problem. Theological growth and evolution are not *absolute;* not everything changes in theology. Some parts or elements are unchangeable and necessary, must remain always, and with their permanence provide the criterion for all genuine growth and progress to the extent of rejecting anything inconsistent with those necessary and unchangeable elements.

The problems of men change. Our problems today are not those of yesterday. The mentality of men changes. Philosophies change. Yet change as much as they will, no problem will affect men if it is not a *human* problem. Man's nature remains identical at all times, and if a problem is to affect him, it has to be a human problem, it has to relate to his humanity. Let circumstances change ever so much, let things be ever so contingent and changeable, they will never pose a problem for man unless they take on a human character.

Man's knowledge, too, possesses fixed and immutable elements, viz., the first principles and the primary notions. Principles and notions in which the essences of things are reflected. Essences are immutable, eternal; essences do not change. If knowledge is to be true, it has to be in conformity with them, and therefore remain identical, changeless. No evolution can exist without a *permanent* subject to provide a point of reference and give meaning to each stage of the process. No contingency can exist without a necessary foundation to support the contingent reality.

Evolution and progress come about from the interplay of the two elements just described: elements that are perfective, and elements that are

already perfect. Anyone who maintains that everything is contingent and subject to evolution places himself outside the pale of traditional thought, and so does anyone who affirms that everything in man and in science is perfect and accomplished leaving no room for advance and progress.

The theologian ought to keep all this in mind. Firmly rooted in the authentic achievements of the past, he must remain open to the achievements yet to be attained. It will not do merely to have his feet firmly planted in the eternal principles of the traditional philosophy and dogma; his eyes, too, must also be cast forward probing the range that can be effectively reached by those principles. The theologian and the philosopher should be able correctly to combine the unchangeable order of essences with the changeable order of existences, and to reflect on each and every stage of existence the eternal values of essence. They must be able to coordinate the necessary and the contingent so as to reflect on each change of contingent things that which is necessary and which never changes.

Thus, will contemporary problems and notions acquire substance and content, and be rescued from being left alone by themselves adrift and at the mercy of changing events. On the other hand, if they are given a sense of permanence, if on them should be reflected the value of what is stable and eternal, then authentic progress, one that is homogeneous, shall have been achieved. Pius XII bears repeating here: "The question is whether what St. Thomas has constructed beyond and above any particular time, by combining and knitting together the elements contributed by the students of Christian wisdom throughout the ages, is founded on solid rock, endowed with *perpetual vigour and validity,* remains even today an efficacious defence and bulwark of the deposit of Catholic faith, and can *safely be employed to guide the new developments of theology and philosophy."*[150] What St. Thomas and the common tradition of Christian thinkers have taught, is it valid today? Can it lend itself as a basis to further advances? The pope answers categorically: "The Church affirms that such is the case".

They stray far from the truth who think that traditional philosophy and theology are closed systems. This is not true either in principle or in practice. It is not true in principle because they are perfectly aware of the distinction between the essential and the existential, between the necessary and the contingent, and teach that the latter must be grounded on the former, the existential on the essential, the contingent on the necessary. It is not the case that everything is changeless, but that the changeless is to give meaning and content to the changing. Both elements combine to bring about progress and evolution. There is progress in the unfolding of the essential which is not grasped by us at one stroke. There is also progress in

[150] Address, Sept. 22, 1946. AAS, 38 (1946), 387.

knowledge when the human mind appreciates by stages what is necessary and immutable in its total reality.

It is not true in practice, either. As a matter of fact, the works of the great masters contain a great number of elements *unexploited* by modern theologians. Ignorance? Perhaps; but it has certainly not prevented them from censuring scholasticism as wanting in elements that can be exploited very usefully for the solution of the problems which they seek to solve with elements borrowed from other unrelated, or even contrary, philosophies, and thus burdened with either a dangerous or an erroneous content. Many instances could be cited. In a following subsection we will deal with two, *evolution* and *subjectivity,* the two most popular and fashionable categories today.

Elsewhere we recalled William de Tocco's observation calling attention to the *open mind* with which St. Thomas *renewed* the issues he dealt with.

B. *The solution to the Problem.* – It has been outlined in the preceding pages. But it will be worthwhile to develop it somewhat more.

To achieve genuine theological progress, to update theology and render it efficacious in our own times, there is no need to throw out any of the conquests already achieved. It might be necessary to sally forth to new positions. But before doing so, a careful study of traditional philosophy and theology ought to be undertaken to find out if they contain the elements that are needed today.

A careful study of scholasticism will undoubtedly bear out the truth of the statement just made. Scholasticism is richer than what we might think. We must know it. If we know it already, we must adapt it and bring it to bear on the needs of the day. Consider concretely the specific instances with which the new theologians seem preoccupied, viz., evolution and subjectivity. These two terms exercise the greatest appeal today. As we shall presently see in some detail, these two categories were not unknown to traditional philosophy and theology. Of course, one can hardly expect to find them identified by their modern names. But that is immaterial. What matters is that the concepts be utilized, as they were in fact utilized, under those or other equivalent terms.[151]

[151] In these matters, two equally defective extremes are to be avoided. One is represented by those who affirm that everything is to be found in scholasticism, without taking the trouble of verifying that it is, indeed, *up-to-date.* The other is represented by those who say that it is wanting in the things that are needed today, similarly without taking the trouble of studying it.

That the latter should be charged by those who are under no obligation to know it is no cause for surprise. But that the same charges should be made by those who ought to know it, is, indeed, surprising. Before making such accusations, Catholic theologians should thoroughly examine whether the indictment is solidly grounded. Instances exist where people who have not been formed in the traditional philosophy and theology, have, on making their acquaintance, been struck with admiration at the wealth contained therein, and have been instrumental in making known to those of the household what they ought to have known in order to refrain from making such charges.

It might occasionally happen that the needed elements are not formally contained in the traditional teaching. But we all know that much more is contained in philosophy and theology than what is formally expressed or taught. Philosophical and theological principles possess an immense virtuality capable of being stretched, applied, explicitated in new ways not explored up to the present, either because of unpropitious circumstances or because neither theologians nor philosophers were sufficiently interested in the undertaking. Can we say that the virtuality of the traditional teaching has been completely exhausted? By no means.

On the other hand, doctrinal situations could arise in which nothing contained, whether formally or virtually, in the traditional doctrine can be put to good use. We must, then, appeal to entirely new notions and to principles as yet unformulated. However, since traditional thinking contains much that is already *definitive,* no new notion, no new formulation can be accepted which is inconsistent with anything that is definitively established. Nothing new can be legitimate if it is inconsistent with immutable truth; it must be thrown out once the inconsistency is proven,[152] unless we are ready to admit change in what is unchangeable and to plunge headlong into a transformistic doctrinal evolution.

Pius XII admonishes: "When new or free questions are brought up for discussion, let the minds be always enlightened by the principles of Catholic teaching; let vigilant care be expended in appraising novelties in theological matters; let there be a segregation of what is certain and firm from whatever is brought into philosophy and theology by an unstable and not always praiseworthy fashion."[153] What in the Catholic teaching is immutable, be it dogmatic or philosophic, must be respected, and no novelties admitted that place it in jeopardy. The pope insists: "What is immutable let no one disturb, let no one unsettle."[154]

[152] "Whatever the human mind, through a sincere search, manages to discover of the truth, cannot be opposed to truth already achieved. For God, the supreme truth, created the human intellect and governs it, not so that it may daily oppose new things to those that have already been rightly achieved, but so that, after removing such errors as might have slipped in, it may build up the truth with the same order and structure wherewith nature itself, from which the truth is drawn, is constituted." (*Humani generis,* AAS, 42 (1950), 572).

[153] Address, Sept. 17, 1946; AAS, 38 (1946), 385.

[154] *Ibid.*, pgs. 384-385.

In our opinion, the so-called modern minds, modern philosophers and modern theologians who pontificate on the necessity of keeping an *open* mind, are themselves prime examples of *narrow-mindedness.* The notions and the framework employed by them in their thinking are severely restricted in terms of space and time: good, perhaps, for the here-and-now. Their philosophy, for instance, is the philosophy of today; and they criticize scholasticism for being *another philosophy,* the philosophy of yesterday. With such a circumscribed idea of philosophic knowledge, they find it difficult to rise to the level of thinking with general notions and frameworks and thus to appreciate *philosophy* which, as such, is not just for today but for always. They find it difficult to understand a perennial philosophy which is the philosophy for every day, and a perennial dogma which, likewise, is the dogma for every day.

People who are under no obligation to know the traditional philosophy and theology understandably dismiss them as passé. Often enough, though, on closer approach, these same people perk up at the discovery of unsuspected vistas in the traditional teaching, and find themselves in the odd situation of attempting to open up frontiers already well explored by the schoolmen. But that people who ought to be conversant with that teaching should be so unacquainted with it as to join the chorus of maligners who accuse it of stagnation and irrelevance – that, indeed, is amazing. They would do much better to employ their energies in getting to the bottom of what, in a more correct and orthodox sense, scholasticism formally teaches in terms more or less equivalent to those of modern philosophy, in unfolding the virtuality of the old notions and principles in those instances where a formal and explicit teaching is not had, or in incorporating into these permanent notions and principles the legitimate advances and situations of modern times.

This is to say that our philosophy and our theology have not reached the finish line nor have they exhausted their possibilities. But we will not draw nearer to the former nor will we exploit the latter by declaring them irrelevant, but by working at their development. It would be childish to maintain that the schoolmen, however extraordinary their genius, have said the last word. Ours is not simply to repeat what our teachers have said. A mere repetition of St. Thomas is not good enough. Our job is to amplify further what they have achieved. New discoveries are made about things, new aspects of the truths about things are uncovered: it is our task to broaden our principles and apply them to these new manifestations. If the virtuality of the principles does not extend thus far, ours is to find an explanation of the new facts and situations that is not inconsistent with our definitive positions. In one word, we have a twofold commitment: to develop our own heritage, and to integrate into it whatever things cannot be reached by what we already possess.

Elsewhere we mentioned the fact that modern theologians often cite St. Thomas's work on Aristotle to justify their own work with Hegel or Kierkegaard. But to state the problem in this way is to state it wrong. The point is not whether or not St. Thomas used Aristotle; the point is whether, in utilizing Aristotle, St. Thomas achieved a *definitive* philosophy. Obviously, not all of it is definitive, but some parts of it are. Modern philosophers may not be used in any way that is inconsistent with the definitive parts of traditional philosophy incorporated into speculative theology. It will be instructive to recall once more the words of Pius XII relative to the perpetual validity and the fruitfulness for the future of the common teaching of St. Thomas and all the schoolmen: "The question is whether what St. Thomas has constructed beyond and above any particular time, by combining and knitting together the elements contributed by students of Christian wisdom throughout the ages, is founded on solid rock, endowed with perpetual vigour and validity, remains even today an efficacious defense and bulwark of the deposit of Catholic faith, and can safely be employed to guide the new developments of theology and philosophy. The Church affirms that such is the case."[155] In the *Humani generis,* the pope concretely identifies the fundamental truths to be accepted as rationally firm and valid in the exposition and development of dogma: "That philosophy, recognized and accepted by the Church, defends the true and genuine value of human knowledge, the indisputable principles of metaphysics – viz., the principles of sufficient reason, causality and finality – and the attainment of certain and unchangeable truth."[156]

There is no need to insist at length on the great value of Fr. Marín-Sola's book relative to these matters. Its main theme is precisely the *virtuality of the revealed principles,* a virtuality the evolution of which *in no way changes* the primitive meaning but only unfolds it, maintaining always the real identity of the subject and the truth, as well as the presupposition that the evolving teaching corresponds to an objective and divine reality."[157]

In other words, *The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma* is a splendid exposition of the just quoted text from Pius XII on "the true and genuine value of human knowledge and the attainment of certain and unchangeable truth" combined with a legitimate doctrinal advance. The work bears two titles: *The Evolution of Dogma* and *The Homogeneity of Catholic Doctrine.* The latter gives us to understand that all throughout the author maintains the substantial and real immutability of Catholic doctrine;

[155] Address, Sept. 22, 1946; AAS. 38 (1946), 387.
[156] *Humani generis,* AAS, 42 (1950), 572.
[157] Cf. ch. 2, no. 113.

the former stresses the fact that we are dealing with a *living* and *progressive* doctrinal homogeneity achieved through the unfolding of an authentic metaphysical or inclusive virtuality.

Furthermore, the whole evolutive process corresponds to an extra-subjective and immutable reality, into the possession of which the human mind comes by degrees. Thus, Fr. Marín explains in this work the theology of these three things: the objectivity of the object known by theology; the immutability of that object and of the truth that manifests it; the homogeneous progress of the knowledge of that truth and of that object.

5. The Permanent and the Changeable

This section will be devoted to a further explanation of the solution we have given to the problem concerning the relationship between theology and the changing philosophical systems.

At the outset, we wish to make it clear that we shall be dealing only with those elements in philosophical systems that have *something to do with the revealed truth.* That is the only issue relevant to the present discussion. Those principles, notions, concepts that have to do with subjects unrelated to dogma might also possess a certain stability and be subject to some kind of evolution and progress. But they are immaterial to our present purposes. "Many things are, indeed, expounded in that philosophy [the traditional] which neither directly nor indirectly bear on matters of faith and morals, and which, therefore, the Church leaves to the free debate of the experts."[158]

"But no such liberty prevails with respect to many other things, especially those which concern the principles and principal assertions we have mentioned."[159] To wit: "the true and genuine value of human knowledge, the incontrovertible metaphysical principles of sufficient reason, causality and finality, and the attainment of certain and unchangeable truth."[160] On the basis of such principles the existence of an absolutely true metaphysics can and must be asserted. Hence, Pius XII censures the new theologians in these terms: "It is wholly to be deplored that the philosophy which is accepted and recognized by the Church should be held in contempt by some people, and impudently called antiquated in its form and rationalistic in its thinking processes. In their view, our philosophy mistakenly defends the possibility of an absolutely true metaphysics."[161]

[158] *Humani generis,* 42 (1950), 572.
[159] *Ibid.*
[160] *Ibid.*
[161] *Enc. and loc cit.,* pg. 573.

We will, therefore, touch only on something which in both philosophy and theology possesses an immutable character; concretely, on the value of knowledge and the correspondence that must prevail between concepts and the known realities.

A. *Knowledge and the elements that make it up.* — Knowledge is something relative; its point of reference is the object known. The possible relationships between knowledge and the things known can be reduced to two: a relationship of cause to effect, or a relationship of effect to cause. Either things depend on the knowledge one has of them, as in the case of God, whose knowledge is productive of the things known by Him; or knowledge depends on the things known, as in the case of our knowledge which takes place inasmuch as we receive some active influence from the objects we know.

Our knowledge is not the cause of what is known by us, nor is the reality of the object known by us dependent on the knowledge we have of it. On the contrary, our knowledge is produced, among other causes, by the very object that is known. The object plays a very important role in our knowing; it is sometimes likened to formal causes since, by means of its vicarious species, the object *informs* the knowing intellect; at other times it is compared to the father, insofar as the latter is the *active* principle of generation. St. Thomas writes to the point: "Our intellect is true insofar as it conforms to *its principle,* that is, to the things from which it draws knowledge."[162] "Now, that which is in the intellect . . . is in our ordinary language called the intellect's conception . . . But what the intellect grasps is formed in the intellect by the *intelligible object as agent* and by the intellect as patient."[163]

We come to know things when the latter make their influence felt in our intellects through their own representations. Truth or falsehood consists in the intellectual representation of the objects. If it conforms to what things are in reality, then the knowledge is true; if it does not, it is false. Truth is subordinate to reality, since it consists in reflecting reality as it is. Thus, the criterion of truth is in things, not in us. Here we have a philosophical statement that constitutes a definitive and highly interesting achievement. Consequently, whenever notions and formulae do not correspond to what things are, these notions and formulae are not true.

The factors that enter into the constitution of our knowledge of things are many and varied. To name a few:

1. The relationship between the representation of the object and the object itself. For knowledge to take place, the object known and the know-

[162] *Summa Theologica,* 1, q. 16, a. 5 ad 2.
[163] *Compendium Theologiae,* c. 38.

ing subject must be in touch. But there is no immediate contact between the two. The contact is effected by means of a representation or vicarious species of the object. No true knowledge is possible if that representation or species does not correspond to the reality represented. This *objective* relationship of the vicarious species or *verbum mentis* is *constitutive* of the truth. Truth exists when the species we form corresponds to the object known; there is no truth when it does not correspond. Such is the meaning of the classical definition, "Veritas est adequatio rei et intellectus" (Truth is the adequation of thing and intellect).

2. The relationship between the representation of the object and the subject that knows it (the object). We have just said that the role of the species is to establish contact between the object known and the knowing subject. Therefore, it must be related to the two terms joined by it, and, hence, proportionate to both. As we have just said, the proportion of the species to the object is *constitutive of the truth;* truth prevails only when the idea corresponds to the reality.

The adequation of the species to the subject – what may be called the *subjective* relationship of the species – is not constitutive, but *significative* of the truth. Its function is to manifest the truth, to make it intelligible to us.

3. The factor that puts the object known by us in contact with the outside. The truth known by us can be related to other men, or we can relate it to others. This requires communication, and the ordinary means of communication is language. In other words, it is possible to externalize the concepts we have in our minds, whether we do it for the benefit of others, or for our own benefit alone. That externalization is accomplished by means of *words* by the *verbum oris.*

This third factor is not constitutive of the truth either, but only *significative.* By its means we express externally to ourselves or to others the truth existing in our minds, viz., the concept we possess and which is correctly related to the object.

B. *The immutable element in knowledge.* – Are all these three factors immutable? In other words, for truth to remain unchanged, is it necessary that each and every one of the three elements indicated should remain unchanged? By no means. Only the first factor is constitutive of the truth. Therefore, it alone must remain unchanged, as long as the reality to which it corresponds remains unchanged. The other two factors are only *translations,* and there can be as many of these as may be required. The purpose of any translation is to make something intelligible to somebody; if one individual needs a translation different from that which is needed by another, there is no reason why a new one should not be made. Always on condition, obviously, that the truth is not adulterated in the translation,

that is, that the correspondence between the representation and the object represented remains unimpaired. With this safeguard, there can be any number of translations as good pedagogy may dictate.

From the fact that truth is constituted by the objective relationship, or by the correspondence between the *verbum mentis* and the object, it follows that the objective meaning of that *verbum* will remain always and eternally the same in the case of necessary and eternal objects, such as the essences of things, divine realities, or the content of revelation.

The objective representation can and must change in the case of contingent objects. What is contingent is subject to change If the thing changes but its representation does not, truth vanishes. Truth consists in the adequation between the *verbum mentis* and the object; if the latter changes and the former remains unchanged, the adequation ceases. In such a case, the objective change in the concept is not an exception to the general rule of the immutability of concepts; rather it is a concrete application of the rule. The general rule states that the concept must not change so as to remain in correspondence to the thing. In the present case, the concept must change precisely in order to maintain its correspondence to the thing which has changed. Thus, the statement stands that the concept must always conform to the object it represents. This assertion is immutable.

However, the fact that the objective concepts of the necessary things mentioned earlier are unchangeable, is not to be taken to mean that such concepts are absolutely static and admit of no progress at all. There is such a thing as homogeneous progress. A simple reality can encompass within its simplicity a virtual multiplicity, as in the case of God. Inasmuch as it is a property of an essentially simple reality, that multiplicity cannot impair its simplicity. In like manner, a doctrinal principle or statement can contain a number of inclusive conclusions, as in the case of principles with metaphysical virtuality. In such cases evolution is possible, an authentic doctrinal evolution with no impairment of the immutability of the truth. It is an evolution of the same objective reality progressively manifesting its multiple virtual content by means of different concepts. Each of these concepts corresponds to the same objective reality, yes, but insofar as it discloses itself in its varied and multiple virtual aspects. Of such an homogeneous evolution we have spoken several times. It not only crops up repeatedly throughout the whole of *The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma:* it is the central theme of the book.

The conceptual development which we have characterized as homogeneous does not destroy the conformity that must exist between the concept and the reality, since the latter, although unchangeable because it is simple and eternal, is nonetheless virtually multiple. Each concept corre-

sponds to one of these virtualities and these can be nothing less than homogeneous since they all belong to one and the same simple reality.

A case for an *objective* or transformistic evolution of the revealed truth might, perhaps, be built on the basis of the *analogy of truth.* Truth is analogous; knowledge of divine things is obtained by means of analogy; analogous forms exist in the analogates in *essentially* different ways.

Undoubtedly, modern theologians, in pursuit of a theology with the help of philosophies inconsistent with the traditional philosophy, appeal to the teaching on analogy or to the fact that analogous forms are predicated of the analogates in essentially different senses, to justify the possibility of *essentially different,* or even incompatible, theologies. Appeal is made to a true teaching for the solution of a false problem, with which that teaching has nothing to do. The fact of analogy is true, but the essential multiplicity of theology is false.

Truth is analogous and can have essentially different manifestations; as for instance, manifestations of one sort in creatures and manifestations of another sort in the Creator; or truth may disclose itself in one way in the case of substance, and in another way in the case of accidents. But all of that is immaterial to the point at issue. The point is whether a definitively attained truth, expressed in an objective concept if philosophic, or in a revealed formula if dogmatic, must *always retain the same meaning;* and whether other formulae or concepts, the implications of which are inconsistent with the former, can be admitted. The point is not whether one truth can be consistent with another different truth. Nobody doubts that; the point is not worth raising, let alone debating. The point is whether a truth already possessed, either one that is definitively achieved or one that is revealed, is subject to changes in tempo with our changing mental categories or philosophical systems. In the *Humani generis* the pope alluded to certain modern theologians in these terms: "They do not think it absurd, but altogether necessary, that theology should replace the old notions with new ones in accordance with the different philosophies which in the course of time serve it as instruments, in order that in these different, or even in a certain sense opposed, but nonetheless equivalent ways, so they say, the same divine truth may be humanly expressed."[164] Previously, he had said: "What is immutable let no one disturb, let no one unsettle. Many things are said, but without sufficient examination, about the *new theology* which, since it evolves in step with the evolving universe, is forever going and never arriving anywhere. If such a view were to be accepted, what would become of the immutability of Catholic dogmas? What would become of the unity and stability of the faith? "[165]

[164] *Humani generis,* AAS, 42 (1950), 566.
[165] Address, Sept. 17, 1946; AAS, 38 (1946), 385.

In a nutshell: the truth concerning necessary things can grow, but it cannot change unless following a change in the object itself; a clear impossibility since we are dealing with necessary objects. Neither can theological truth change unless a change takes place in the revelation in which it is contained, which, again, is impossible.

C. *What can be subject to change in knowledge.* – Two things should be clear by now: (1) what it is that is *not subject to change* in our knowledge of necessary truths, as is the case with revealed truths; (2) what is unchangeable can *grow.* We shall now consider *what can change.*

We have pointed out previously that the *verbum mentis* or mental representation of the object known is the subject of two relations: one is the relation to the object, a relation that is *constitutive* of the truth; the other is a relation to the subject, which is not constitutive but only *significative* or expressive of the truth. The former does not change: any change would imply an inconsistency in the truth itself. The latter can change.

Now, there are two kinds of expression. One is the internal expression effected by means of the *subjective* aspects of the concept, idea, notion, or category. The other is the external expression which comes about by means of words or the *verbum oris.* There is no objection to admitting the changeability of both these expressions even with reference to one and the same truth and to one and the same reality. Such a change in expressions does not necessarily entail a change in either the truth or the reality. It can even be advisable so as to make it easier to grasp the truth or to understand the reality. Only one condition is indispensable, viz., that there be no betrayal of that which is expressed. With this proviso, expressions may take a hundred forms.

Men of the same civilization and culture differ indefinitely in their mental capacity. No harm, then, is done but rather much good by expressing dogmatic and theological truth suitably to each one's capacity, provided that it is done conformably to the reality and the truth. Thus, we find scientific, catechetical and intermediary expositions of the Catholic faith. On the other hand, men of identical mental capacity may differ in terms of culture and mentality. Since the truths about God are meant for all, dogmatic and theological truth may be expressed in ways suitable to these various mentalities, always on condition that the various expressions remain faithful to the reality and the truth.

All this is elementary and undeniable by anyone with two bits of common sense. The pope himself advises that such adaptations be made either *internally* with the aid of notions whereby the truth is rendered more intelligible to the one receiving it, or externally by means of more accessible terms or words. "Even in the essential questions it is possible to

clothe philosophy with richer and more becoming garments, to reinforce it with more efficacious expressions, to set it free from certain less suitable academic aids, cautiously to enrich it with certain elements of progressive human thought."[166] "It should be obvious to all that the words used in the schools, and even by the Church's Magisterium to express those notions are capable of further refinement and polish."[167] "In addressing, whether by speech or writing, the men of their own times they ought to employ the kind of language that will make the message intelligible and well received. It follows that in the manner of presenting and stating the problems, in the way of developing the arguments, and also in the choice of a literary genre a wise accommodation should be made to the genius and bent of the times."[168] "Where the need occurs, there should be no objection, as shown by experience and practice, to translating into clear modern language and explaining by means of circumlocutions, for the benefit of laymen, certain so-called technical formulae, which ordinarily are obscure to the uninitiated."[169]

Nonetheless, this task must be carried out with prudence. Two things are always to be kept in mind. *First,* the conformity of the notions and of the expressive and significative terms to the objective reality must never be broken. If it were, the truth would not be made intelligible, the truth would not be expressed but destroyed.

Secondly, there are, so to speak, certain hallowed formulae, in the philosophic as well as theological and dogmatic orders. To change them would be presumptuous, even if it could be done with no impairment of the truth. Dogmatic formulae, including those expressed with philosophical notions and terms, must be respected. They could be replaced by other equivalent formulations, but insofar as they are hallowed by use and tradition, they are to be respected.

In the *Humani generis,* Pius XII spoke of the possibility of changes in the expression of the truth. Nonetheless, he pointed out that "the body of doctrine elaborated with common accord by Catholic teachers in the course of centuries, in order to obtain some understanding of the dogmas, is certainly not grounded on such frail foundations . . . Hence, it is not surprising to find some of these notions not only employed but also sanctioned by the Ecumenical Councils, so that it is not lawful to deviate from them. Hence, to disregard, or reject, or devalue so many and so important teachings conceived, formulated and furbished by the multi-

[166] *Humani generis,* AAS, 42 (1950), 572.
[167] *Enc. and Loc. cit.,* pg. 566.
[168] Address, Sept. 17, 1946; AAS, 38 (1946), 384.
[169] Address, Sept. 22, 196; AAS, 38 (1946), 388.

secular endeavour of men of uncommon intelligence and holiness, working to achieve an ever more accurate expression of the truths of faith, under the illumination and guidance of the Holy Spirit and of the Church's vigilant Magisterium, in order to make room for a new philosophy, whose conjectural notions and fluctuating and vague expressions are, like flowers of the field, in bloom today and withered tomorrow, is not only the height of imprudence, but transforms dogma into a reed buffeted by the winds."[170]

Consequently, the *scientific or philosophical, or theological* expression of the truth should not be subject to change; its common or ordinary expression, yes. "Truth does not change with time. Not all philosophical statements of truth change either; particularly those having to do with principles self-evident to the human mind, or having to do with such judgments as are based on the wisdom of the ages, or such as are in agreement with or guaranteed by divine revelation."[171]

D. *"Evolution" and "Subjectivity" traditional categories.* – We have frequently alluded to the claim made by some modern theologians to the effect that scholasticism is unaware of these two categories so immensely appealing to the modern mentality. Others borrow them from the contemporary philosophies of evolutionism, existentialism, immanentism, etc. In these philosophies the two categories are given totally unacceptable meanings. When later on they are brought into theology, the latter is transformed into a falsely evolutionist and falsely vitalist science.[172]

As a matter of fact, scholasticism was cognizant of these two categories under other equivalent terms, gave them a sound meaning and made correct use of them in theology. The result was a healthily progressive and a healthily vital theology.

Some words possess a high power of suggestion both for the masses and for the elite. Philosophers and theologians are not immune to the suggestive power of such small things as words. Evolution, history, vitality are very fortunate terms, in the sense of being able to express with greater vigour a truth already known, in fact, an elementary truth, a truth of which scholasticism was already in peaceful possession, although expressed by it in words of weaker suggestive power. In such cases, the censure of one who is in possession of the doctrine as if he were ignorant of it, simply because he does not express it in contemporary terms, is uncalled-for. What ought to and needs be done is to retrieve those terms and clothe with their suggestive power the truth already possessed. There is, besides, the added

[170] *Humani generis,* AAS, 42 (1950), 566-567.
[171] *Enc. and loc. cit.,* pg. 572.
[172] *Cf. Humani generis* passim.

bonus of giving an acceptable meaning to immensely appealing words that, as utilized by philosophies staking exclusive claim to them, are totally unacceptable.

Vitalism, evolution, as expressive of a philosophy at odds with the objectivity of truth and with the existence of something permanent which provides content to what evolves, are inadmissible. They have to be rehabilitated, and their rehabilitation is all the more urgent because there are traditional teachings capable of measuring up to their great suggestive power, but which up to now have been expressed in equivalent but clearly less powerful words. Fr. Marín-Sola rehabilitated one such word, evolution, and wrote it into the title of his book.

Traditional thought possesses the genuine content of the categories indicated by the terms *evolution, progress, historicity,* etc. By teaching that things are *perfectible* and that everything in this universe, with the sole exception of God, is composed of *potency and act,* traditional thought, by the same token, fully accepts an *evolving, progressive, historicist* view of things.

Indeed, St. Thomas left us splendid articles on the perfectibility of things and on the perfectibility of our teaching and of our knowledge of things, as well as, to speak concretely of the supernatural order, on the growth of grace,[173] and of charity,[174] and of the dogmas:[175] in other words, on the growth of the divine life and teaching.

On the contribution of time to the advancement of knowledge, the Angelic Doctor has written very meaningful texts: "It appears to be natural to human reason to advance gradually from the imperfect to the perfect. Hence, in the speculative sciences we find that the first philosophers left behind something imperfect, which was then improved upon by those who came afterwards."[176] *"Time seems to be, as it were, the discoverer and a good cooperator* of those factors that help to circumscribe or set something off; not because time per se effects something to that purpose, but on account of the things that are done in time. . ."[177] Scholasticism, it is said, is ignorant of history, or takes little account of it. That might have been true; it might still be true. Melchor Cano rightly complained of the fact that the schoolmen hardly ever mustered any arguments *from history.*[178] But it is one thing to be ignorant of the historical facts, and quite another

[173] *Summa Theologica,* 1-2, q. 114, a. 8.
[174] *Op. cit.,* 2-2, q. 24, aa. 4-10.
[175] *Op. cit.,* 2-2, q.1, a.7.
[176] *Op. cit.,* 1-2, q. 97, a. 1.
[177] *In I Ethic.,* lect. 2, no. 133, ed. Pirotta.
[178] *De Locis Theologicis,* lib. 12, ch. 3.

thing to be ignorant of the category of *historicity* or of the bearing that time has on the development of human thought, which is one of the charges levelled against scholasticism by some modern theologians.

The truth of the matter is that in scholastic thinking evolution and growth are not always heterogeneous; rather, evolution and growth in knowledge are not to be achieved by means of absolute changes in the concepts, if previously no changes equally absolute have occurred in the realities themselves. Otherwise, either the first or the second concept would not correctly represent the reality, and there would be, not growth, but the ruin of knowledge. Furthermore, in the case of necessary objects, our knowledge of them can grow only homogeneously, as already explained earlier.

Scholasticism, then, was well acquainted with the content of *evolution* as a mental category. It could, as in fact it did, apply that category to its own teaching as a whole, to the extent that a work, as fundamental as the present one, can rightly be entitled *The Homgeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma.*

Scholasticism is also accused of ignorance of the categories of *subjectivity, immanence,* and *vitality* as applicable to the truth. There is no substance to these charges. Scholasticism is perfectly aware of these categories. What happens is that they are expressed in other terms and are not given an absolutely subjective sense. In other words, scholasticism recognizes the subjectivity and vitality of the truth, but always dependent on the *objective reality to which they correspond.*

It would be dangerous to construct a philosophy and a theology based primarily and principally on the category *subject,* and relegating the category *object* to secondary importance. Traditional philosophy and theology link truth to life; they are conscious of the vitalism of truth. But the primacy of the *objectivity* of truth is always maintained because they understand that truth consists precisely in the conformity of the concept to the reality. Scholasticism begins by recognizing the value that is the object of our knowledge. To know is to grasp the real – the object – wherever it happens to be: within us or without. Knowledge depends on things. As long as this is accepted and safeguarded, there is no harm in introducing objective reality into the subject to vitalize it. The supernatural order consists exactly in the introduction of the object – grace – into the subject – man. On the other hand, the *fomes peccati* consists in the ruin of the harmony that ought to prevail among the various parts and powers of which the subject, man, is made up, a ruin resulting from sin. There is no need to appeal to a Kierkegaardian *angst* to explain original sin and the actual imbalance found in man. One needs only to peruse

[179] 1-2, qq. 81-85.

the pertinent Questions written by St. Thomas in the Summa Theologica, to appreciate sufficiently enough the tragedy into which mankind was plunged as a consequence of the First Fall – the subjective disharmony and sense of *angst* explained by an *objective* cause, and not by a merely existential or contingent criterion.

There is room in scholasticism for both subjectivism and vitalism. But the schoolmen refuse to accept the dependence of reality on the subject; truth depends on and obeys objective laws, laws that also demand our acquiescence. Once the objectivity of truth is admitted, no harm is done by admitting whatsoever influences it may have on the subject. Truth manifests its vitality in many ways. Here are three of particular interest:

1. Truth is the *cause of intellectual life.* It is not life that causes truth, but truth that causes life. Life is movement, and intellectual life is intellectual movement. Now then, objective truth provides the mind with an authentic knowledge of reality; it is the source of intellectual life. Objective truth, proposed to the mind as its object, is the food on which the mind feeds, a source of life for it.

2. Truth is the *indirect cause of the moral and of the affective life.* Truth is the intellect's object and food. Thus, truth immediately vitalizes the intellect. But the intellect influences the other powers and manifestations of life, as their guide and norm-giver. It follows that, through the intellect, truth extends its influence to a man's spiritual life in its moral and affective dimensions.

3. Truth can be a *direct cause of the moral and affective life.* Such is the case where truth is attained by way of connaturality or experience. In the natural order truth is so attained by means of the natural habits; in the supernatural order, by means of the infused virtues and gifts of the Holy Spirit. In these instances the contact between the habits and the object known is immediate, without any mediation by the intellect.

It is, thus, imperative to recognize the existence of a *live theology:* a theology containing the divine truth, which is the life of the intellect that knows it, the norm for man's other powers, and food for the infused habits. In the present work, Fr. Marín-Sola devotes two whole sections – the 5th and the 6th of chapter 4 – to a magnificent exposition of the vitalism of the science of God. But he points out that such vitalism is not to be understood in the sense that life creates the truth, but in the sense that truth creates life. For it is beyond dispute that theological truth is not created by us, it is dictated by God.

6. Bibliography on the "New Theology"

In the preceding pages we have done our best to make clear the orientations adopted by what is commonly referred to as the *new theology,* despite the disclaimers to the name by its practitioners. As a matter of fact, the name matters but little; what really matters is its content. Whether or not it deserves to be called *new,* it is certain that the orientations described above are to be found in some modern writings, and even more in unwritten manifestations.

We have refrained deliberately from mentioning any book or writer by name. For there hardly is anything as disagreeable as fingering for censure persons who might be perfectly honourable and capable of proferring an unexceptionable explanation for their writings. Therefore, we have not considered either persons or writings, but *what has been written,* that is, what has been written in the *Humani generis* and in the allocutions of Pope Pius XII in 1946. These documents from the Holy See contain express and formal references to certain theological orientations. The latter alone have been the object of our preceding observations: the orientations, not the persons of their authors.

These tendencies have not come about through spontaneous generation. Their headwaters are to be found much farther up. To make their origins clear a complete bibliography would be needed. Fortunately, such a bibliography exists. In Spain, two have been published not too long ago: one by Dr. Avelino Esteban,[180] another by Fr. Bartolome Xiberta, O.C.[181]

We will limit ourselves to listing here the works that deal specifically with the subject we have discussing in this *Introduction,* works that have been published in more recent years, thus completing with some new entries the two bibliographies already mentioned.[182]

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[180] *Revista Española de Teología,* 9 (1946), 531-546.

[181] *Introductio in Sacram Theologiam,* (Madrid, 1950), pgs. 35-58.

[182] This bibliography was written in November, 1950, some three months after the publication of the Encyclical *Humani generis.* Today, the bibliography on the subject has grown considerably on account of the commentaries to the said encyclical that have been published in most of the theological journals in Spain, Italy, France, Switzerland, Germany, the United States, and Argentina.

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VATICAN II AND *THE HOMOGENEOUS EVOLUTION OF CATHOLIC DOGMA*

There are words, formulae, statements that seem to have the power instantly to catch the public fancy and to command widespread acceptance. They are widely and frequently bandied about – for good, for evil; meaningfully, meaninglessly; to some purpose or to no purpose at all. They become commonplaces equally at the service of the thoughtful and of the empty-headed; fashionable utterances used left and right for almost everything – which, plainly, is a form of abuse. They persist until they are elbowed out by other terms and formulae fated to undergo the same vicissitudes.

The modern history of theology exhibits a phenomenon of that sort. Such is the case with the terms *evolution, relativism, aggiornamento.* To define the correct sense of evolution as applied to theology, Fr. Marín's work first appeared in the early years of this century. In the fifties, it was re-edited for the second time in Spanish to provide a counterbalance to relativism. The present English edition will serve to explain, in the light of the most often quoted conciliar guidelines or watchwords and of the work that is being presented anew to the public, the sense that *aggiornamento* ought to have in theology, if theology is to be what it is meant to be.

Evolution is a valid term applicable to many things and on many levels. Matter evolves; so does life biologically, culturally, intellectually, and emotionally. Evolution also occurs in the religious life, in the revealed doctrine, in Catholic dogma. At the turn of the century, modernism proclaimed that dogmatic evolution was the outcome of the subjective situations of the religious person. That entailed the denial of the divine origin of revelation and of the stability of revealed teachings, which were left at the mercy of the variously succeeding situations in the course of men's lives. Fr. Marín set out to meet the challenge of modernism with his monumental work, *The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma.* Its appearance was due to the circumstances of the times, to the modernistic error then in vogue. But the plain truth is that it goes over and beyond the circumstances in which it was written. It is a classic, as classic as the *Commonitorium* of St. Vincent de Lérins, as St. Thomas's treatise *De Fide,* as Melchor Cano's *De Locis Theologicis.*

Precisely because of its classic and fundamental character, the work has been of great help at another turn of theology about the middle of this century. Between the 40's and the 50's, another term began to catch the public mind: the *relativism* of truth became very much the fashion of the day. Grabbed by the so-called *New Theology* and applied by it to the revealed truths, it jeopardized the permanent value of the same. This prompted the second Spanish edition, prefaced by an introduction showing the value of Fr. Marín's teaching to counteract the new and dangerous theological orientation.

In this postconciliar era, the new magic word is *aggiornamento:* the updating of the Church, of her institutions, her practices, her doctrine. The updating of doctrine is liable to a great many risks, as well as to many fruitful achievements. In this part of our Introduction, we shall consider this contemporary problem: we will echo the Council's guidelines, strive to show how they could be properly employed, and how Fr. Marín-Sola deals with them in this book.

Vatican II intended to update the Church and her institutions, including the most sacred, as for instance, the liturgy,[183] pastoral care,[184] education.[185] With respect to the updating of doctrine, four policies or guidelines are mentioned in the speeches of Popes John XXIII and Paul VI, and in the Conciliar documents, to wit:

1. The return to the sources.
2. The search for formulae more intelligible to modern men.
3. The focus on the pastoral dimensions of the doctrine.
4. The attention to the signs of the times.

These policies have met with widespread approval. They have even been turned into slogans that synthesize the spirit of Vatican II. Their correct use will undoubtedly pave the way to great attainments; whereas incorrectly handled, they will lead to dangerous situations, not to say real errors. Only five years after Vatican II, Pope Paul VI was driven to complain of a series of deviations festering under the mantle of an ill-understood, and an even more incorrectly practiced, updating. "A great number of the faithful feel themselves unsettled in their faith by the accumulation of ambiguities, uncertainties, doubts in matters that are essential, as for instance, the dogmas concerning the Most Holy Trinity, Christ our Lord, the eucharistic mystery and the real presence, the Church as an institution of salvation, the priestly ministry in the midst of the People of God, the value of prayer and of the sacraments, the moral exigencies regarding the indissolubility of marriage and the respect for human life."[186]

In these postconciliar years, the Magisterium has frequently intervened to head off certain deviations and, in some cases, real errors in the faith. We might mention particularly: two encyclicals by Pope Paul VI, viz., the *Mysterium Fidei* (Sept. 3, 1965) on the Holy Eucharist, and *Humanae Vitae* (July 25, 1978) on human birth; the *Credo of the People of God* (June 30, 1968); and three forceful declarations from the Congregation on the Doctrine of Faith, viz., "On some errors about the mysteries of the Incarnation and the

[183] Cf. *Sacrosanctum Concilium*, no. 47.
[184] Cf. *Optatam totius*, no. 22.
[185] *Ibid.*, no. 17.
[186] Cf. *Quinque jam annis*, AAS, 63 (1971), 99.

Most Blessed Trinity" (Feb. 21, 1972), "On some errors about the Church" (June 24, 1973), and "On procured abortion." (Nov. 18, 1974).

If we are to avoid incurring errors in the faith, it is imperative that these policies or guidelines be given the true interpretation and substance that the Council and the two aforementioned popes meant them to have. This is what we shall attempt in the following pages, pointing out at the same time the recognition and interpretation given to them fifty years earlier by Fr. Marín in the present work.

1. The Return to the Sources

The understanding of what is meant by the return to the sources is given in detail by the Council itself in passages we shall presently quote from the dogmatic Constitutions *Verbum Dei* and *Lumen Gentium.* Then we shall see what *The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma* has to say on the subject.

A. Sources are of two kinds. The first comprises the constitutive or original sources, that is, Tradition and Scripture; the second, the explanatory sources, viz., the Magisterium whether solemn or ordinary.

With regard to the first kind of sources, the Council teaches that "Christ the Lord . . . commanded the apostles to preach the Gospel . . . This Gospel was to be the *source* of all saving truth and moral discipline. This was faithfully done: it was done by the apostles who handed on, by the spoken word of their preaching, by the example they gave, by the institutions they established, what they themselves had received – whether from the lips of Christ, from his way of life and his works, or whether they had learned it at the prompting of the Holy Spirit; it was done by those apostles and other men associated with the apostles who, under the inspiration of the same Holy Spirit, committed the message of salvation to writing. In order that the full and living Gospel might always be preserved in the Church the apostles left bishops as their successors. They gave them 'their own position of teaching authority.' This sacred *Tradition,* then, and the *Sacred Scripture* of both Testaments, are like a mirror, in which the Church, during the pilgrim journey here on earth, contemplates God, from whom she receives everything, until such time as she is brought to see Him face to face as He really is."[187]

This source, viz., the divine-apostolic tradition and the writings left us by the apostles and some of their contemporaries (the evangelists) was committed to the primitive Church. It *constitutes* the deposit of the revealed doctrine. However, there is another kind of source, an *explanatory* one. The revealed doctrine is extremely rich in content and needs to be explained and developed. Explanation and development – these are the proper tasks of the

[187] *Verbum Dei*, no. 7.

Magisterium, whether ordinary or solemn. "The Tradition that comes from the apostles makes progress in the Church, with the help of the Holy Spirit. There is a growth in *insight* into the realities and words that are passed on . . . This comes about in various ways. It comes through the contemplation and study of believers who ponder these things in their hearts. It comes from the intimate sense of spiritual realities which they experience. And it comes from the preaching of those who have received, along with their right of succession in the episcopate, the sure charism of truth."[188] This growth of doctrine achieved by an ever greater understanding of it as proclaimed by the bishops in common or by the Roman Pontiff, can attain the guarantee of infallibility thanks to the assistance of the Holy Spirit.[189]

The Constitution *Verbum Dei* itself indicates two ways of achieving the growth of truth through a greater understanding of it. One is the way of *study* or research; the other, the way of *vital experience of the revealed mysteries* and truths. Mention of these two ways can be found in the text just quoted.

To sum up: in order to know the revealed truth, *a return to three sources* is necessary: two are constitutive sources, Scripture and divine-apostolic Tradition; the third is explanatory, the definitive Magisterium of the Church. "It is clear, therefore, that, in the supremely wise arrangement of God, sacred Tradition, sacred Scripture and the Magisterium of the Church are so connected and associated that one of them cannot stand without the others. Working together, each in its own way under the action of the one Holy Spirit, they all contribute effectively to the salvation of souls."[190]

The growth in the understanding of the revealed truth is at times sanctioned by a dogmatic definition. The definition is not achieved without the assistance of the Holy Spirit which makes it infallible. In such a case, the defined truth is to be regarded as a revealed truth. It has the guarantee of the Holy Spirit. His assistance amounts to an assurance that the defined teaching is included in the revelation made to the apostles. "But the task of giving an authentic interpretation of the Word of God, whether in its written form or in the form of Tradition, has been entrusted to the living teaching office of the Church alone . . . At the divine command and with the help of the Holy Spirit, it listens to this (the Word of God) devotedly, guards it with dedication and expounds it faithfully. *All that it proposes for belief as being divinely revealed* is drawn from this single deposit of faith."[191]

[188] *Ibid.*, no. 8.
[189] Cf. *Lumen Gentium*, no. 25.
[190] *Verbum Dei*, no. 10.
[191] *Ibid.*, no. 10.

Clearly, then, returning *to the sources* means a return to the Scriptures and Tradition when it is a question of investigating the meaning of the constitutive sources, and a return to the meaning of the definitions when it is a question of investigating the meaning of the magisterial sources.

B. *The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma* reads like a commentary to the Council's teaching on the sources, written almost half-a-century before Vatican II and its Constitutions. A perusal of the book will bear out this assertion. Here we shall quote only some highly significant passages.

On the return to the constitutive sources: "The primitive Church received from the Apostles the whole deposit of Sacred Scripture and Divine Tradition, with no further expectancy or possibility of new revelation . . . The apostolic formulae, notwithstanding their divine and revealed origin, are couched in purely human language, and human formulae never succeed in expressing all the virtuality and meaning implicitly contained in them; much less when it is a case of expressing by their means sublime and fecund divine realities. Such formulae are like seeds bursting with life . . . that await only a favourable environment to unfold into branches, flowers and fruits the same virtuality and vitality already contained truly in them. Consequently, the true starting point of dogmatic progress is the apostolic formulae as they issued from the lips or the pen of the Apostles."[192]

On the return to the magisterial sources: "The primitive Church was in possession of two things: (1) a determinate number of revealed articles; (2) a determinate degree of divine explication of those same articles. Future Christian generations have been, are, and will be, till the end of time, in possession of something new, that is, of a third element acquired by them on account of the Church's dogmatic authority. They, or we, are in possession, not of two, but of three things: (1) the very same revealed articles; (2) the very same explication of these articles given by the Apostles. All these the Church has conserved, and will conserve, unchanged and unchangeable. It is to these two things that the first function corresponds, which is to conserve the deposit. But we have, besides, a third thing, viz., a new explication, which neither is in any way inconsistent with the previously given, nor comes from without, but is drawn out or deduced from within, and increases or unfolds the explication given by the Apostles without changing it . . .

"Of this dogmatic progress or development, human reason, in all its various endeavours: theological, exegetical, critical, historical, etc., etc., is only the human and fallible instrument; likewise, the Church, in her ordinary or solemn magisterium, is nothing more than an instrument, but a divinely

[192] *The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma*, ch. 2, no. 58.

assisted and infallible instrument; and the Holy Spirit, Who perpetually assists and guides the Church in her twin progressive functions of conserving and explicating the revealed truth, is the author or principal cause."[193]

The Constitution *Verbum Dei* mentions two ways of achieving the growth or greater understanding of the revealed truths: the study of the revealed mysteries, and the vital experience of them. Fr. Marín-Sola's work is devoted almost entirely to explaining the way of study, but two sections of the work – section 5 and 6 of chapter 4 – are devoted to explaining the affective way, or the way of connaturality or of vital contact with the divine mysteries.

2. The Search for Formulae More Intelligible to Modern Men

The late Pope John XXIII enunciated this guideline in his opening address to the Council. Textually reproduced subsequently in some Conciliar documents,[194] it has been frequently invoked with the most varied results, ranging from an authentic clarification of the truth to the adulteration of the same.

A. In that inaugural address Pope John XXIII said: "From the renewed, serene, and tranquil adherence to all the teaching of the Church in its entirety, transmitted with the precision of terms and concepts that constitutes the peculiar glory of the Tridentine and First Vatican Councils, the Christian, Catholic and Apostolic spirit expects of everyone a step forward . . . by the study of the same (teaching), putting it in conformity with the methods of investigation and the *literary expression* required by the methods prevailing today. One thing is the deposit itself of the faith, to wit, the truths of our venerated doctrine, and another thing is the manner in which it is expressed."[195]

This appeal by Pope John XXIII to new literary forms which should, however, express the same teaching in its entirety, has been invoked – and is still occasionally invoked – as a warrant either to set aside, as archaic and no longer useful, formulae that are precise both in expression and in content, or to put into circulation other formulae that deform the authentic content of dogmatic truth, or even to accept as good tender expressions that altogether change the revealed or defined truth. The pope's language, however, is clear and authorizes nothing but new *literary expressions* of the *same content.* An attempt has been made to present those words of John XXIII as corrective of

[193] *Op. cit.*, ch. 3, no. 172.
[194] Cf. *Unitatis redintegratio*, no. 11.
[195] AAS, 54 (1962), 792.

others of Pius XII in *Humani generis.* There is nothing of the sort. Paul VI was undoubtedly Pope John's best interpreter, and Pope Paul repeats, in his encyclical *Mysterium Fidei* on the Holy Eucharist, teachings identical to those of Pius XII.

Thus, the opening address to the Council must be situated between the teachings of John's predecessor and the teachings of his successor. In the *Humani generis,* Pius XII wrote as follows: "(The dogmatic formulae commonly employed in the Church) are grounded on principles and notions derived from a true knowledge of created things. In deriving such knowledge, divinely revealed truth shone like a star, through the Church, upon the human mind . . . Hence to disregard or reject or make of no value so many and so important teachings conceived, formulated, and furbished by the multisecular endeavours of men of uncommon intelligence and holiness, engaged in achieving an ever more accurate expression of the truths of faith under the illumination and guidance of the Holy Spirit and the Church's watchful Magisterium, in order to make room for the conjectural notions and the fluctuating and vague expressions of a new philosophy which, like flowers of the field, are in bloom today and withered tomorrow, is not only the height of imprudence, but transforms dogma into a reed buffeted by the winds."[196]

For his part, Paul VI, alluding to the new formulae put forward to explain Our Lord's presence in the Holy Eucharist, reasserted the same teaching in his encyclical *Mysterium fidei,* in these terms: "The norm of language established by the Church in the course of prolonged endeavours through the centuries . . . must be scrupulously observed, and no one should presume to change it at his own discretion or under pretext of new knowledge. Could any one ever tolerate that the dogmatic formulae employed by the ecumenical councils to express the mysteries of the Most Holy Trinity and of the Incarnation should be judged inadequate for the men of our times and injudiciously replaced by new ones? Similarly, no private person is to be allowed to attempt at his discretion against the formulae by means of which the Tridentine has proposed the belief in the Eucharistic Mystery. These formulae, as well as all the others used by the Church in proposing for belief the dogmas of faith express concepts that are not bound either to a certain form of culture, or to a certain stage of scientific progress, or to this or that theological school, but rather disclose what the human mind perceives of reality as contained in universal and necessary experience. They further express these concepts in adequate and determinate terms taken either from ordinary or from cultured speech. Hence, such formulae are suitable to men of all times and places."[197]

[196] AAS, 42 (1950), 566-567.
[197] AAS, 57 (1965), 758.

B. Section 2 of chapter 1 is devoted in its entirety to examining the change of the formulae that express the revealed truth. The formulae that serve as the starting point for the changes that are to take place are, in the first place, the revealed formulae handed on to the primitive Church and, therefore, contained in the Scriptures and in the divine-apostolic Tradition; and, in the second place, the formulae that have been defined by the Magisterium. Now, what are the changes that can be made in them? Three alternatives are possible. Two are valid, one is not. Fr. Marín-Sola examines all three.

The revealed formulae handed on to the primitive Church and the formulae already defined can be changed for others that express with different words the *same real content and the same degree of explicitation.* In this case there is only a nominal distinction between the first formula and the second. This is the sort of change to which Pope John XXIII alluded since he was only concerned with the *literary expression.* This kind of change is very useful especially for purposes of catechetical instruction. It is also very helpful in the case of superficial theological studies in which no deep penetration of the teaching is sought nor an explicitation of the content of revelation.

Revealed and dogmatically defined formulae can also be changed for others which under different terms express the *same reality together with a greater degree of explicitation* of that same reality. In this case, the change of formula entails an advance in the *comprehension* of the revealed or defined datum. There is a change in the words, but no change of reality, only a greater penetration of it. This is the sort of change defended and advocated by Fr. Marín-Sola throughout the present work, the change entailed in the growth or homogeneous evolution of dogma. This sort of change is helpful in the case of profound theological investigations.

But no revealed formula and no dogmatic formula can be changed for new literary expressions that entail a *change of the reality* contained in either the revealed or the dogmatic formula. The deposit of revelation was closed with the death of the last apostle. Since then no other doctrinal growth is possible except that which is intensive or homogeneous. To assert that a truth is revealed by God, when in fact it is *neither expressed in nor drawn out of* the initial formulae, is to play a game of equivocation and to lead the faithful into error.[198]

3. The Focus on the Pastoral Dimension of the Teaching

In his opening address to the Council, the Holy Father stressed the pastoral dimension of the revealed teaching. Fr. Marín-Sola's book can also be helpful in this regard.

[198] Cf. *The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma*, ch. 1, nos. 31-34.

A. Alluding to the task to be undertaken by the Council, the Pope expressed himself in the following terms: "One thing is the deposit of faith, that is, the truths contained in our venerated teaching, and another thing is the manner in which it is expressed. And this must be taken into consideration, with patience if necessary, everything being measured according to the norms and exigencies of a Magisterium which is predominantly pastoral in character."[199] Thus, two Constitutions were devoted to the Council's central theme, viz., the Church herself: one *dogmatic* or *doctrinal* (*Lumen Gentium*), the other *pastoral* (*Gaudium et Spes*). The General Secretariat recalled this same pastoral character in two responses: one to General Assembly 123 of November 16, 1964; the other to General Assembly 171 of November 15, 1965. The Council Fathers had inquired about the theological qualification to be given to the two doctrinal Constitutions. The General Secretariat replied: "Taking into account the conciliar praxis and the *pastoral purpose* of the present Council . . ."

The term *pastoral* can mean several things. Very often it is taken to mean the technical organization of the work of evangelization. Thus, the pastoral council in diocesan curias, common pastoral undertaking, etc. It is also taken to mean the *pasture* or healthy nourishment which the teaching is supposed to provide. In this sense, stress is laid on the vitalizing function of the doctrine. As a matter of fact, every true teaching is pastoral, that is, it nourishes and vitalizes that noble part of man which is his mind, since the mind feeds precisely on truth. And all theological truth is *pastoral, pasture* or food not only for the mind but likewise for the will. It supernaturally vitalizes the *whole man.*

Theological truth is able to do that because its foundation and starting point is faith, a virtue residing in the *practical* intellect, that is to say, in the intellect that is not moved by the light which it perceives in the truth, but by an impulsion from the will leading it to assent to what it does not see. Faith is a virtue that implies both the rectification of the intellect and the rectification of the will. "That to which the intellect gives its assent (viz., the truth) does not move the intellect to assent on account of the light it (the truth) possesses. The intellect is rather moved by the will's inclination. Hence, it follows that the good, which is the will's object, intervenes as a first mover in the act of faith."[200] Theological truth is nothing but the development of the truth of faith; hence, a development of the object of a virtue that vitalizes the whole man. A theology, then, that remains in the stage of speculation and fails supernaturally to vitalize the theologian is a theology that stops short in

[199] AAS, 54 (1962), 792.
[200] QQ. Disputatae *De Veritate*, q. 14, a. 2 ad 13.

the course of its normal functioning – an unfinished theology. And this happens when it fails to become a divine pasture for the theologian or for the believer: when it is not pastoral.

B. Quoting a passage from the Constitution *Verbum Dei,* we pointed out that the channels whereby an understanding of the revealed mysteries is attained are two, viz., study and living contact with the divine reality. Study is the channel whereby the truth is possessed as truth. Vital supernatural contact is the channel whereby the truth is attained as divine. The latter, obviously, is the channel that is best characterized as pastoral. To its study Fr. Marín-Sola devotes two entire sections in his book, sections 5 and 6 of chapter 4. They constitute the best commentary to number 12 of the Constitution *Lumen Gentium,* antedating it by almost fifty years. The reader will be well-advised to read in their entirety those two sections from which we excerpt the following significant passages:

"It is said that he who possesses a virtuous habit or natural disposition, possesses a *new sense.* Thus we commonly speak of a sense of art, a sense of modesty, a sense of humour, a sense or feeling of anything in any order whatsoever. Just as with our external senses we perceive the external objects through immediate contact, without any comparison or reasoning, through simple and genuine intuition, so he who possesses, e.g., the habit of chastity, spontaneously and intuitively perceives the purity or impurity of an action or of a doctrine related to such matters more speedily and keenly, and at times with even greater certainty than can be achieved with all the skills of reasoning by the theoretical moralist, if he is not chaste himself. Much of the same happens in art, education, religion, in all orders of life . . .

"What happens in the natural order, happens even more truly in the supernatural order . . . As a matter of fact, Catholic teaching holds that grace, together with the virtues and gifts derived therefrom, is a real participation of the Divinity. More: through sanctifying grace the Deity itself, in its Unity and Trinity of Persons, dwells in our souls, not merely by similitude or metaphor, but in an objective and most real, albeit mysterious and ineffable, manner. This indwelling of the Divinity itself within the innermost recesses of our being is virtually initiated with the *supernatural faith* possessed by every Christian, even if he be a sinner. It is formally consummated with sanctifying grace, together with the virtues and gifts, with which every just man is endowed.

"Now then, by history and experience we know that, on the natural level, the aesthetic sense, for example, or the moral sense have contributed to the appreciation and development of the arts or of ethics as much as, or perhaps more than, theoretical rules. Let us imagine what would be the case if, instead of being simply the patrimony of a few geniuses or of a few noble souls, artistic feeling or moral virtue were universally diffused, and the world were made up exclusively of brilliant artists, or of souls endowed with a high and exquisite moral sense.

"Now, what in the natural order is mere supposition, is a reality in the supernatural order. By the habit of faith, all Christians carry within themselves an inchoate, but nonetheless real, participation of the Divinity; an inestimable number of them possess sanctifying grace, and together with grace, charity, the virtues and the supernatural gifts, and through grace and charity, the Divinity itself and the divine life. Some – many more than we think – possess that life and those gifts in that heroic degree known as sanctity, in which the *life of God* becomes almost normal in them."[201]

The virtue of faith is the beginning of supernatural life, the initial nourishment of the divine life in man. It is also the starting point of theological knowledge. If in the exercise of his theological undertaking the theologian fails to elaborate this nourishment, or, in other words, fails to do pastoral theology, remaining content with doing only speculative theology, then he will be producing only a cold and aseptic theology. He will leave it unfinished, broken off in the middle of its normal course.

4. The Attention to the Signs of the Times

This is the most frequently quoted slogan in the postconciliar era. The assertion is often made that revelation must be taken together with the signs of the times.

A. "At all times the Church carries the responsibility of reading the signs of the times and of interpreting them in the light of the Gospel, if it is to carry out its task."[202] "An ever watchful attention to the signs of the times must be stimulated within the Church."[203] The Commission that drafted the *Gaudium et Spes* defined the *signs of the times* to mean "those phenomena that, by their widespread prevalence and their frequency, characterize an epoch and express the needs and aspirations of mankind today." Consequently, the term describes a complex of phenomena, cultural and historical in character. In the classical scale of the *loci theologici* they correspond to those enumerated in the last places. Traditionally, the *loci theologici* are listed in the following order: Holy Scripture, Tradition, the Magisterium, the Fathers of the Church, etc., and last, philosophy and history.

The appeal to the signs of the times is not always done correctly. At times they are placed on a par with divine revelation; at other times, divine revelation itself is subordinated to them, revelation being interpreted in the

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[201] *The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma,* ch. 4, nos. 217-218.
[202] *Gaudium et Spes,* no. 4.
[203] AAS, 56 (1964), 609 ff.

light of the signs of the times and not conversely. Now, the Council expressly declares that it is precisely the signs of the times that are to be illumined by the Gospel. "At all times the Church carries the responsibility of reading the signs of the times and of interpreting them in the light of the Gospel, if it is to carry out its task."[204] "And, indeed, as *reason, enlightened by faith,* sedulously and soberly searches . . ."[205] Historical as well as cultural phenomena are to be illumined by, and therefore subject to the judgment of, the Gospel and faith. St. Thomas made it clear that theology, as knowledge and understanding of revelation, utilizes all kinds of arguments, historical and cultural phenomena, as a means of penetrating into the content of revealed truth, but it utilizes them as subordinates, as servants, not as agents superior even to revelation itself.[206]

B. Everything pertaining to the signs of the times or to the contribution made by man – whether as facts, events, or ideas – Fr. Marín-Sola lumps together under the term, obviously borrowed from Aristotelian terminology, *minors of reason.* On the other hand, everything contributed by God, he calls *majors of faith.* "Theology, indeed, utilizes all sorts of sciences or minors of reason, whether metaphysical, or physical, or moral. But it is often overlooked that the starting point, the true principles, the formal subject of theology is not the human sciences or minors of reason, but the majors of faith or revealed majors. Theological reasoning, thus, does not have as its purpose to draw out or to deduce the virtuality contained in the minors of reason with the aid of the revealed majors; on the contrary, its purpose is to employ the minors of reason in order to draw out, or to deduce, or to explicate intellectually the virtuality contained in the principles or majors of faith."[207]

Some years ago, touching this very issue, we wrote the following: "Of the two elements that join hands in effecting theological knowledge, viz., the divine element consisting of the word of God and the human element consisting of the mental and cultural categories, only the former possesses substantive value. What is substantive in theology is the revealed element – it alone contains in itself the entire content of theology.

"In themselves and by themselves, the human factors are not objects of revelation. Theology employs them as instruments by means of which the theologian unfolds what is contained in the word of God. Notions and mental frameworks, the events that happen each day, the personal situations, the signs of the times in which the person lives – all these things would be

[204] *Gaudium et Spes,* no. 4.
[205] VATICAN I, Denz.-Schön. 3016.
[206] *Summa Theologica,* p. 1, q. 1, a. 8 ad 2.
[207] *The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma,* ch. 2, no. 96.

described in logic as the *minor propositions or premises of reason.* They prove helpful for working on what is similarly known as the *major propositions or premises of faith.* With those instruments or minor premises contributed by man three things can be done: (1) *explore* the source which is the revealed datum; (2) *explicitate* the content of the source; and (3) *apply* the God-given content by projecting it on the various turns taken by life and history. The minors of reason contributed by men are not sources of theological content. They are instruments or means for the exploration, explicitation, and application of the content of the sources.

"As instruments they are ruled by the canons regulating the activity of the instrumental causes. The instrument possesses, indeed, a proper power and efficaciousness. But that power is not activated except by the reception of the influence of the superior agent that utilizes it and which, in the very act of utilizing the instrument, makes the latter a participant in the former's own superior power. It is a commonplace that the major agent, or artificer, elevates and dignifies the minor agent, or instrument.

"As a science, theology consists in the logical play that combines the superior agent, or truth of faith, with the inferior agent, or the human contribution in the form of ideas, mental frameworks, events, phenomena prevalent in the times in which the person lives. In this logical play, in which theology consists, all that is ours or human is bathed in the light emanating from the superior agent, which is the revealed datum.

"It is the exact opposite of what happens when the so-called transcendental anthropology is employed as a method in theology. In such a method the human elements, the situations in which men find themselves, the phenomena characteristic of the historical period in which we play leading roles, these are taken as the supreme criteria by which the truths of faith are measured and evaluated."[208]

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[208] SAURAS, EMILIO, O.P., *El humanismo de la teología;* Valencia, 1974.

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The present book first appeared as a series of articles from 1811 to 1922 in *La Ciencia Tomista,* a philosophico-theological journal edited by the Dominican Fathers in Spain.

The original Spanish edition in book from appeared in 1923, as the first title of the *Library of Spanish Thomists* established in Valencia in honour of St. Thomas Aquinas on the 6th Centenary of his canonization.

A French translation of the work was immediately undertaken. This French edition was published in 1924 in Fribourg, Switzerland, where Fr. Marín was currently holding the chair in theology. The French edition incorporated new material both in the text and in the footnotes, especially in nos. 11, 44, 48, 80, 82, 106, 107, 165, 204, 209, 214, 220, 231, 247, 294, 312, 315, 317, 320, 331, 335, 336, 361, 365, 393, 417, 441, 443, 469, 506, 515 amd 516. The whole of section 6 in chapter 4 is entirely new: in it Fr. Marín expands his explanations on the homogeneity of doctrinal evolution via the affective or experiential way.

The 3rd edition in Spanish appeared in 1952 incorporating in a Spanish translation all the new material contained in the French edition.

The English translation offered to the public in this 4th edition under the auspices of the University of Santo Tomás in Manila, Philippines, is based on the foregoing 3rd edition in Spanish. This English edition reproduces the General Introduction written by Fr. Emilio Sauras, O.P., for the 3rd edition. Fr. Sauras has added new material to show that Fr. Marín's book retains its relevance in the post-Vatican II era.

In editing this English translation of Fr. Marin's classic work, the University wishes thereby to do honour to one of its most illustrious alumni and faculty members in the first decade of this century and to reassert the geniune and authentic nature of sacred theology and its subordination to the living Magisterium of the Church in the face of the confusion and distortions prevailing today when not a few Catholic theologians are wont to question the teaching authority of Peter's successor, when almost anything that contains a mention of God or of religion is labelled theology, and almost anybody who talks about God is called a theologian, no matter how bizarre the views he happens to hold.

A.T.P.

LETTER FROM HIS EMINENCE CARDINAL MERRY DEL VAL

Rome, 21st December, 1923

The Rev. Fr. F. Marín-Sola, O.P.

Very Reverend Father,

I have received the volume of your important work on The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma, which you have kindly sent me. Thank vou verv much for this token of your thoughtfulness.

Please accept my heartfelt congratulations for such a successful conclusion of your profound researches on the teaching of the illustrious and holy Doctor.

Let it all be for the glory of God and the growth of the true culture in the thick of the calamitous errors of our times, the disastrous consequences of which become more manifest day by day.

Keep me in your prayers and accept my best regards.

R. CARD. MERRY DEL VAL

LETTER FROM THE MOST REV. MASTER GENERAL OF THE ORDER OF PREACHERS

Rome, 29th October, 1923

The Very Reverent Father Magister
Francisco Marín-Sola, O.P.

It is with satisfaction that I have received the copy, which you have dedicated to me, of your work which bears the title The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma.

It gave me pleasure to observe that it is the fruit of persevering research in quoting the most appropriate texts on the subject and of attentive reflection and profound investigation of the foundations suitable for the solution of the problem. In this manner, you show yourself a peer of our great theologians of yore, who were not content to rest on what had already been explored, but proceeded to investigate with great sagacity and fruitfulness other truths not yet sufficiently explained.

You have likewise employed your lofty talent and your argumentation, unimpeachable in virtue of its logic, to resolve a question the transcendence of which is acknowledged by all, but which to this day remained controverted.

Let me, then congratulate you for your noble and well finished work. May the Lord bless it with copious light in the field of Sacred Theology.

In token of the particular esteem in which I hold you, Reverend Father, I call upon yourself, the blessing of our Father St. Dominic.

FR. LOUIS THEISSLING, O.P.
Master General

INTRODUCTION

1. THE TITLE OF OUR BOOK. – It is quite possible that some of our readers, who are more pious than knowledgeable, will be bothered by the title we have chosen for our book, THE HOMOGENEOUS EVOLUTION OF CATHOLIC DOGMA. Ever since Darwin employed the term *The Evolution of the Species* to signify the transformation of one species into another, and particularly after the extrapolation of the transformistic theory of Catholic dogma effected by the heresy of Modernism, the very name of evolution has been, and continues to be, suspect in the eyes of some overly timorous theologians, as if all evolution were necessarily transformistic and no homogeneous evolution were possible, or as if all evolution, including that which is homogeneous, were incompatible with the divine origin and substantial immutability of Catholic dogma.

We are aware that the term *evolution,* when applied to the dogmas of the faith, can in our days easily lead to a false understanding and to abuse. This notwithstanding, we believe that that is not reason enough to refrain from employing it, unless we mean to ban from the theological lexicon the more beautiful and more expressive terms of modern language, thus allowing them to be monopolized and abused by our adversaries for the purposes of error. In the case of words, or of ideas, that contain a substratum of truth and can be useful for the defense and exposition of the revealed deposit, the best policy, we believe, is that counseled and practiced by St. Augustine, namely, to wrest such words, or ideas, from the hands of the enemy and, after having purged them from all false understanding, to place them at the service of the integral truth of the Catholic faith.[1] And today there is every reason for so doing since the term *evolution* is now employed without scruples by eminent Catholic theologians whose knowledgeability and orthodoxy are recognized by all. Among many others that could be cited, let us briefly quote some passages from contemporary theologians belonging to different schools:

Cardinal Billot: "This law of *evolution,* which rules all living organisms, we see *verified also in the Church of Christ,* which while sedulously guarding the *dogmas* entrusted to her, detracts nothing [from them] . . . In treating faithfully and wisely the old doctrine, she pursues with all diligence this one endeavour: to determine and perfect that which previously was formless and

[1] "If they who are called philosophers, particularly the Platonists, have said things that are true and in conformity with our faith, not only are these not to be feared, but they should be wrested from them as from unjust possessors and turned to our advantage." (St. Augustine, *De Doctrina Christiana,* bk. 2, c. 40; Migne. PL 34, 63).

inchoate, to consolidate and firm up that which is already expressly stated and explained, to safeguard that which is already firmly established and defined.[2]

The Benedictine Fr. Janssens: "Be careful not to dismiss all *evolution* of Catholic doctrine. However, one must distinguish between *evolution* ab intrinseco, which is aptly signified by the parable of the mustard seed, and *evolution* ab extrinseco or ad extrinsecum, which is better called transformation. With due moderation the former *must be admitted,* whereas the latter must be absolutely rejected."[3]

The Servite Fr. Lepicier: "*It is quite obvious* that some kind of progress or some kind of *evolution* in *Catholic dogma* ought not to be totally rejected."[4]

The Franciscan Fr. Casanova: "The very notion of progress requires that there be something immutable, and something that advances, grows and increases. These two characteristics exist marvelously in the faith, the objective element of which remains constant while its explication or *evolution* takes place in many ways."[5]

Fr. Van Noort: "In the first place, it is certain that the increase, of which we have spoken, does not involve a change in the doctrine itself, but an organic unfolding or *evolution* of the same preaching, of the same faith. Just as the adult is not a different man from the child, in spite of the fact that his bodily members have grown considerably in size and strength, in like manner the preaching of the Church remains always the same in reality, even if with the passing of time it has *evolved* and become more developed."[6]

The Dominican Fr. Berthier: "Hence it is clear that for us the unfolding of the doctrine handed down is in no way a permutation but an *evolution* or progress of the same truth, not with regard to its substance but with regard to its explication."[7]

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[2] *De Ecclesia Christi,* th. 17, § 2, 3rd. ed. (Rome 1909 p. 398 Emphases added in this and all subsequent quotations throughout the book.

[3] *Tractatus de Deo Creatore,* prolog., p. 18, footnote 2; Friburgi Brisgoviae, 1905.
Ab intrinseco – from within, i.e. evolution powered by intrinsic energy.
Ab extrinseco – from without, i.e. evolution powered by outside energy.
Ad extrinsecum – to the without, i.e. evolution the term of which is something extrinsic or outside of the evolving thing. (*Transl.*)

[4] *De Stabilitate et Progressu Dogmatis,* Introd. p. 7; Rome, 1970.

[5] GABRIEL A. CASANOVA, O.F.M., *Theologia Fundamentalis,* n. 446.

[6] VAN NOORT, *De Fontibus Revelationis,* n. 234.

[7] *De Locis Theologicis,* n. 80

Another Dominican, Fr. de Groot: "An *evolution* of Christian teaching must be admitted. The character itself of the Church demands continuity and *evolution,* stability and movement. The causes that promote such an *evolution* are either direct or indirect; but they all are subject to one principal cause which is Christ, who promised the Holy Spirit to His Church . . . Now, we say that the *evolution* of a certain teaching comes to an end when the Church defines it . . . This is the *evolution and the life of the truth;* this is the sacred union of tradition and progress."[8]

One other renowned theologian, the Belgian Dominican Fr. Tuyaerts, Master of Sacred Theology and present Prior of the General Study at Louvain: "After about a century, probably nothing else has attracted more the attention of men of science than evolution. The Protestants pride themselves in being the pioneers in the study of the history of dogmas. However that may be, it is certain that many centuries before the advent of Protestanism, Catholic writers and teachers had drawn attention to, and studied the fact of the *evolution of dogmas.* Witness St. Vincent de Lérins who treats of it extensively enough in his celebrated *Commonitorium.* Witness the Angelic Doctor, St. Thomas Aquinas, who expounds the Catholic concept of it and establishes succinctly its foundations and laws. Hence, one keeps strictly within the bounds of Catholic theology in studying this phenomenon of the *evolution of dogmas.*"[9]

The extrapolation of the term *evolution* to dogma is so far from deserving censure that there are Catholic theologians who qualify as *anticatholic* the opinion that denies all dogmatic evolution. "Hence Mausbach notes *very well* that it is an *acatholic* position to maintain that no true progress or evolution is to be admitted in the Christian religion."[10]

We could go on quoting many other contemporary theologians, but we think that nine, of the stature of those we have just quoted, should suffice to dispel all scruples that might be entertained by even the most timorous reader concerning the title, THE HOMOGENEOUS EVOLUTION OF DOGMA, given to our book.

2. A POSSIBLE SUBTITLE. – To the title, THE EVOLUTION OF DOGMA, we could have appended the subtitle, *The Homogeneity of the Entire Body of Catholic Doctrine,* to signify that the aim we pursue is twofold. In the first place, we intend to demonstrate the possibility of true evolution – taken always in the sense of homogeneous evolution – in respect of dogma in the strict and rigorous sense of the term. In the second place, we

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[8] *Summa Apologetica.* q. 19, a.3, nn. 3-4; ed. 3.a, Ratisbonae 1906, p. 778.

[9] *L'évolution du Dogme,* introd., p. 5; Louvain 1919.

[10] REGINALDUS-MARIA SCHULTES, O.P., *Introductio in Historiam Dogmatum,* p. 163, footnote 7; Parisiis 1922.

intend to make it clear that this evolution is so ample that it covers all the degrees or levels of Catholic teaching, to such an extent that there is no truth, provided that it rigorously pertains to the Catholic doctrine, that cannot become a true dogma of faith maintaining the most perfect and substantial homogeneity with the divinely revealed deposit.

3. FOUR DEGREES OF CATHOLIC DOCTRINE. – The whole extent of Catholic doctrine can be distributed among four degrees: (a) the *revealed datum;* (b) *dogmas;* (c) *infallible truths;* (d) *theological conclusions.*

The *first degree* comprises all and only the truths or propositions expressly revealed or inspired by God to the Apostles and by them handed down to the Church. However, these truths or propositions are to be taken in the pristine form in which they issued from the pen or the lips of the Apostles or sacred writers; and, hence, prior to any work or speculation expended upon them by the Church or by human reason. It, therefore, embraces two kinds of propositions: first, all the propositions of the Holy Scripture, as they issued from the pen of the inspired writers; second, all the propositions of the Divine Tradition, as they came out of the lips of the Apostles. This first degree is commonly called the *revealed* datum or the *explicitly revealed.* It is the point of departure of the other three degrees, as well as of all progress whether dogmatic or theological.

The *second degree,* known as *dogmas* of faith, comprises all the propositions that have been defined by the Church as revealed, or as propositions of divine faith, or whose contradictories have been condemned with the censure of heresy.

The *third degree* includes all the propositions defined by the Church in an *infallible* manner, but are not defined expressly as revealed. It also includes all those propositions whose contradictories have been infallibly condemned but with a censure inferior to that of heresy.

Finally, to the *fourth degree* belong all the propositions that bear a necessary connexion with any of the other three degrees, and which commonly go by the name of theological conclusions. To these are reduced the so-called dogmatic facts.

4. IMPORTANCE OF THE FOURTH DEGREE. – These four degrees effectively comprise the whole body of Catholic doctrine. They are, of course, not of equal value. Nonetheless, all the four must be kept in mind by anyone who attempts the study of the homogeneity of the Catholic doctrine or the study of dogmatic evolution.

If anyone is surprised at the inclusion of the fourth degree, the theological conclusions, among the true degrees of Catholic doctrine, let him reflect on the following three facts. First, that a great part of the doctrine taught by the Church to the Christian faithful through the catechism or

through the channel of ordinary preaching belongs to this fourth degree. Second, that all the truths of the fourth degree can move up into the third, since there is no true theological conclusion that cannot be infallibly defined by the Church. Third and foremost, that in the opinion of theologians of the highest caliber – an opinion that seems corroborated by clear facts of the history of dogmas – a great part of the truths of the second degree have come from the fourth degree, that is, from theological conclusions.

Hence, without giving close attention to the nature of theological conclusions it is impossible to effect a good study of the nature of the infallible truths; likewise, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to investigate and understand the nature and the evolution of dogmatic truths.

5. TWO HISTORICAL FACTS. – Anyone who undertakes to study without preconceptions, the history of the Catholic Church and of its teaching is confronted by two evident facts.

The first is the fact that Catholic teaching, even in its strictly dogmatic part, has grown or developed, in a rather large scale, from the days of the Apostles to our own times. To become aware of this one need only compare, on any given doctrinal point, the plain biblical statements with the complex definitions of the last ecumenical councils; compare the primitive Creed of the Apostles with the so-called Creed of St. Athanasius or with the profession of faith of Pius IV; compare any document of the early popes with the *Syllabus* of Pius IX or with Pius X's Encyclical *Pascendi;* or compare any catechesis or any number of catecheses of the Fathers of the Church with one of today's catechisms. The evidence of the fact of growth is immediately obvious.

The second is the obvious fact that in the aforementioned growth various human philosophies and civilizations have played a large role and exercised a great influence, particularly Greek philosophy in the age of the Fathers and Scholastic philosophy in the Middle and the Modern ages. This influence is noticeable in the writings of the Fathers who developed the primitive doctrine, in the conciliar disputes and disquisitions that preceded the definition of each dogma, and even in the dogmatic formulae themselves which clearly exhibit the mark of the various epochs in which the propositions were defined.[11]

6. A PROBLEM. – These two facts can be explained in very different ways, but can in no way be denied. Together they pose the following most

[11] "Thus the definitions of the early Councils *smell of the Greek spirit,* both as to the thing defined and as to the mode of formulation; the teaching of St. Augustine reveals or shows the Latin mentality; the canons of Trent are full of *scholastic formulae;* similarly the Vatican Council evidences the *mentality of modern theology.*" (SCHULTES, *op. cit.* p. 278)

serious problem: Is the progress or growth of Catholic doctrine just mentioned homogeneous or heterogeneous? Is it simply a homogeneous evolution of what was already contained implicitly in the revealed datum, or is it an extrinsic or heterogeneous addition, a truly transformistic evolution? Are the last three degrees, which we call dogmas, infallible truths and theological conclusions, or, if we restrict ourselves to the second degree, are the dogmas of faith truths equally revealed and divine as those of the first degree, or are they human teachings added to the divine deposit?

7. THE MODERNIST SOLUTION. – Modernism solves the problem with the assertion that the present teachings of the Catholic Church are not a homogeneous evolution of the apostolic doctrine or primitive datum but an authentic transformism. It maintains that upon coming in contact with, and under the influence of, various philosophies and successive civilizations, the primitive doctrine has been mixed with, and substantially transformed by countless human and caducous elements, the result of which is an alloy and debasement of the primitive datum. That which we call dogmas, infallible truths and theological conclusions, is, in the view of modernism, not a mere evolution of the apostolic teachings, but a true transformation, or better still, a corruption thereof.[12]

8. THE SOLUTION OF SOME CATHOLIC THEOLOGIANS. – Some XVII century Catholic theologians, and a great many among modern theologians find no solution to this problem other than to draw a dividing line between the second, and the third and fourth degrees of Catholic doctrine. In the view of these theologians, the second degree, that is, the dogmas, is a homogeneous continuation of the revealed or apostolic doctrine. On the other hand, the third and fourth degrees are not a homogeneous evolution but an authentic transformation, a real mixture of revealed data and human knowledge. Hence, these theologians maintain that the primitive datum and the dogmas are revealed truths, authentically divine truths deserving of an assent of divine faith, whereas the so-called infallible truths and theological conclusions are human truths, which, even if the Church should define them, are undeserving and incapable of any assent other than that of human, or, at the utmost, of ecclesiastical faith.

9. A VERY SERIOUS DIFFICULTY. – This theory not only denies the substantial homogeneity of the Catholic doctrine in its third and fourth

[12] It is common knowledge that modernistic errors concerning the Catholic doctrine can be classified into two groups: (a) errors concerning the way in which the first degree of the Catholic doctrine, i.e. the revealed datum, was constituted; (b) errors concerning the manner in which the other three degrees unfolded from that first degree. In this book we take always for granted the Catholic teaching concerning the origin and constitution of the revealed datum; hence we will not concern ourselves with the first group of modernistic errors.

degrees, but is also liable to a very serious difficulty in the matter of defending the homogeneity of the second degree, that is, of the dogmas of faith themselves.

Indeed, these theologians deny the homogeneity of the third and fourth degrees because human reasoning, in the proper sense of the term, has taken part in their development; in other words, because of the second historical fact earlier mentioned, which is the influence of human reason in the elaboration of the primitive datum.

Now, then, history seems to bear clear witness to the fact that this influence of human reason on the unfolding of the revealed datum is to be found not only in the third and fourth degrees, but in the second degree as well. A cursory study of the history of dogmas seems to evidence the fact that certain dogmas have issued from the primitive datum through a proper reasoning process employing a revealed major and a minor of reason, that is to say, in exactly the same manner as the truths of the third and fourth degrees.

Consequently, if to use human reason and human knowledge in the third and fourth degrees destroys their homogeneity and effects an authentic transformism, as these theologians seem to think, then it would appear that modernism is quite correct in denying also the homogeneity of the second degree and admitting transformism in the whole body of Catholic doctrine.

10. FATHER GARDEIL. – Catholic theology owes this wise and renowned Dominican two of the best monographs on theological methodology.

In the first, entitled *La Crédibilité et l'Apologétique,*[13] he brought light to the chaos that enveloped the very concept of Apologetics by providing the exact demarcation of the proper object of this science, theology's auxiliary. In its fundamental lines this work can be regarded as definitive. It has been the point of departure of everything that has since been well written on the nature of Apologetics.

In the second work, *Le Donné révélé et la Théologie,*[14] the author set himself a no less important and fruitful, although more complicated and exacting goal, namely, to evince the fact that the revealed datum has developed untainted by transformism, in perfect objective continuity through all the other degrees.[15]

[13] *La Crédibilité et L'Apologétique,* Paris 1908.

[14] *Le Donné Révélé et la Théologie.* Paris 1910.

[15] Fr. Gardeil explains his overall plan in the following words: "To bring to a successful conclusion the program that I have outlined, two capital issues have to be elucidated. It is well known that theology has for its immediate starting point the truth

Fr. Gardeil's lucid mind immediately perceived that the whole problem hinged on two factors: on an historical fact and on a philosophico-theological principle.

Fr. Gardeil accepted the historical fact with neither reservations nor distinctions. That fact is the real and profound influence exerted by human reasoning in the development of Catholic doctrine, not only in its third and fourth degrees, but also in its second degree. It was obvious to Fr. Gardeil – and in our view, it should also be obvious to anyone who reads history without preconceived notions – that many dogmas have not been attained, nor could have been attained, by human reason except by way of a rigorous and proper theological conclusion deduced from a major of faith and a minor of reason.

With the acceptance of this historical fact, the problem of the homogeneity or transformism of Catholic dogma became wholly dependent on the following principle: whether the concurrence of minor premises of reason with major premises of faith in a reasoning process destroys dogmatic homogeneity or not. If, in the unfolding of the revealed datum, all and any intervention of human reasoning, understood properly, ends in transformism, then all endeavour to defend the objective homogeneity of the Catholic doctrine must be given up as hopeless. That homogeneity is obviously eliminated from the third and fourth, as well as from the second, degree unless one denies what seems an evident historical fact.

In any problem as serious as this, which concerns the evolution of dogma, innovations are exceedingly dangerous, and the most prudent course is to hew close to the line traditionally followed by Catholic theologians. Hence, Fr. Gardeil determined to obtain a good knowledge of the traditional thought on the matter. To this effect he read, as he tells us himself, all the best that had been written by theologians on the subject. His reading led him to the following conviction: "It seems clear that modern theologians

of faith, that is, the Catholic dogma. It is by means of dogma that theology is in contact with the Deposit of Revelation or revealed datum properly understood. Hence, it is in the form of dogma that the revealed datum especially influences the conclusions of theology. Now, in the twofold stretch of way that goes from the immediately revealed datum to the dogma, and from dogma to the theological conclusions, are we sure and certain that the proper value of the point of departure, that is, the authority of divine revelation, maintains all its vigour, all its purity? Are we certain that this double development is accomplished with perfect continuity and homogeneity? The question is debated these days with respect to either the first or the other stretch of the way. Resuming and systematizing all the old objections, Modernism – as the encyclical *Pascendi* unmincingly makes clear – has subjected to attack each and every one of the stages that mark the advance of the revealed truth, from the moment of its birth within the human spirit under the action of the charism of revelation, to the theological conclusions . . . This book has been planned with due regard to these difficulties and with the intention of confronting them." (Introduction, p. 13)

generally deny the possibility of homogeneity between a revealed principle and a conclusion deduced from it when that deduction has been made by a process of reasoning in the proper sense of the term."[16]

Although there are rather transparent indications that Fr. Gardeil was not pleased by this modern opinion, he did not dare to fight it head-on. So, to be able to continue defending homogeneity he resorted to an ingenious device, by bringing into the problem a new extrinsic factor, which he called the *social charism of the Christian sense.* With the approval of the conclusions by this common sense of the Church, such conclusions could achieve the value of homogeneity and continuity with the revealed datum, which they did not have of themselves.

As Fr. Gardeil himself admitted later on, such a factor, despite its usefulness in certain instances, does not solve the problem of homogeneity. This *sense* might well serve to discern homogeneity where homogeneity already exists. But no matter how powerful and efficacious we suppose this *sense* to be, it will never be able to create homogeneity, or supply it, where no homogeneity exists.

11. OUR ARTICLES IN *LA CIENCIA TOMISTA.* – This book of Fr. Gardeil inspired us to begin writing in 1911 a series of articles in *La Ciencia Tomista* on *The Homogeneity of the Catholic Doctrine.*[17] Since then, during

[16] "I have read all the best that has been written by theologians on this subject. It seems that they are chiefly concerned with safeguarding the dogmatic value of one part of theological conclusions, and relegate the rest to sheer theological discourse, which, as it provides nothing but an inference, never attains to an object of faith capable of being embodied in dogma. However, one discovers that 'the rest' is partly made up of truths virtually revealed that have in fact been defined by the Church. Whoever reads the Canons of the Council of Trent – so detailed and explicit – will, in my opinion, find there the clear proof. What, then, is left? [Fr. Gardeil then describes the conclusions of *as part in the whole,* etc., and goes on to say:] And this is about all. Undoubtedly these acquisitions are of very great value; but one is frightened by all the theological conclusions that lie outside these boundaries, but whose doctrine has, nonetheless, been defined . . . *This is my difficulty.*" (Op. cit. pg. 71)

[17] "Fr. Marín-Sola is publishing in *La Ciencia Tomista* a series of articles on the homogeneity of the Catholic doctrine . . . The series was motivated by a passage from my book, *Le Donné Révélé,* in which I manifested how little pleased I was by the solutions currently given to explain the homogeneity of revelation with certain truths defined by the Church, which seem to fit in the category of theological conclusions properly understood. Fr. Marín agrees with this, but he means to explain the obvious fact of the definition of theological conclusions in a manner different from that given by me. If we are to believe him, all modern theology is on this point the victim of a mistake made by Suárez, and shared by Lugo. The last great Thomists, the Salmanticenses and John of St. Thomas, are not completely untainted by it. It is, therefore, necessary to return to the mind of St. Thomas, who maintained that the revealed datum and a *genuine* theological conclusion are homogeneous because they *signify one single and identical reality* under its twofold aspect: the *revelatum* and the *revelabile* . . .

the past twelve years we have continued the series, studying the problem under a great variety of aspects and pointing out its relationships and harmony with the main questions of sacred theology. We believe we have succeeded in clarifying, among many others, the four following points:

1. It is a historical fact beyond doubt that a number of dogmas have unfolded or evolved by way of theological conclusions in the proper sense of the term. This historical fact was admitted by traditional theology up to the XVII century, and should likewise be admitted by all modern theologians.

2. It is a philosophically and theologically certain principle that reasoning in the proper and strict sense of the term, can intervene in the development or evolution of the revealed datum without impairing its perfect homogeneity.

3. The historical fact and the philosophico-theological principle just mentioned were admitted by *all* the theologians prior to the XVII century. The contrary persuasion, found today in some theologians, proceeds from a confusion introduced by Suárez regarding the nature of the true virtuality of the revealed deposit, a confusion continued by Lugo and undetected by the Salmanticenses and Billuart.

4. Once the true concept of the revealed virtual is re-established, it becomes easy to understand how an authentic and proper evolution – but one that is homogeneous – can, and does, exist in Catholic dogma. Thus, the antinomy which seemingly existed between the teachings of Catholic theology and the facts of history vanishes, and the objection raised by modernism concerning the transformism of dogmas collapses entirely.

These four points, and many others, such as the role of the Church in the evolution of dogma, the various paths of dogmatic evolution, the nature of the so-called ecclesiastical faith, etc., etc., constituted the substance of twenty-eight articles published throughout these twelve years, during which we have ceaselessly probed further and further into this problem of the evolution of dogma, a problem at once infinitely complex, in the view of Fr.

Upon reading this thesis of Fr. Marín-Sola, I perceived at once that he was within the authentic Thomist line. After having spent thirty years in the study of St. Thomas and of his commentator Cajetan, it is hardly possible not to acquire a certain *habitus* about these things. The genuine intrinsic and *a priori foundation* of the homogeneity of truly *theological conclusions*, according to St. Thomas, is to be found there and not elsewhere. *What I have called the Church's social sense guided by the Holy Spirit can very well be, in some cases, the criterion, and, consequently, the extrinsic proof. For no sense has been given the power to discern homogeneity where it does not exist.* Therefore, it is necessary to posit an intrinsic foundation for the homogeneity of the theological conclusions. And this foundation, according to St. Thomas, is their capacity to be deduced through formal reasoning by way of inclusion and identity." (GARDEIL, in *Revue de Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques*, Oct. 1912, pp. 825-27).

Grandmaison, as well as of supreme importance and "burning" actuality, in the words of Fr. Gardeil.[18] Those articles, recast and organized along the lines of a better knit and more concise plan, form the book, which we now offer to the public.[19]

12. DIVISION OF THIS BOOK. – To accomplish the aim of including in a few chapters the many questions related to the evolution of dogma, we found it convenient to divide this book into only seven chapters:

1. The nature of evolution in general, and the various species and degrees of doctrinal evolution.

2. Dogmatic evolution and the virtuality of the revealed datum.

3. The evolution of dogma and the authority of the Church.

4. The different paths of dogmatic evolution.

5. The extension of dogmatic evolution to the whole object of the so-called ecclesiastical faith.

6. Solution to the objections against the evolution of dogma.

7. The evolution of dogma and the traditional teaching.

We hope that these seven chapters – each subdivided into as many sections as the subject matter may require – will suffice to study the problem of dogmatic evolution, if not as extensively as it justly deserves, at least with sufficient clarity to point out the authentic foundations that will permit saving both the fact of evolution attested by history and the homogeneity of that same evolution, which our faith compels us to assert and which history also attests.

13. TWO METHODS. – There are two methods or approaches to the demonstration of the homogeneous evolution of Catholic dogma. The first is

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[18] "C'etait poser le probleme du developpement dogmatique . . . cette question *infiniment complexe*." (GRANDMAISON, *Revue Pratique d'Apologétique*, 1908, p. 521) "Ces questions *si importantes et combien brulantes*." (GARDEIL, *Revue des Sc. Phil. et Théolog.*, 1913, p. 704)

[19] In the process of recasting for this book the articles already published in *La Ciencia Tomista*, we have tried to eliminate the numerous repetitions inherent in a periodic publication. However, we do not flatter ourselves that we have succeeded in eliminating them all, and therefore beg the reader's indulgence. On the other hand, where it is a matter of uprooting widespread theories, which one thinks mistaken, it is impossible to keep from repeating time and time again certain fundamental concepts, the forgetfulness or the confusion of which has, in our opinion, given rise to error. Likewise, it is quite possible that mistakes might have occurred in quoting the chapter, question, or page of the many texts and passages we cite. But the reader can rest assured that the quoted text is authentic and exact, since not a single text is quoted that we have not verified personally in the sources.

the *theologico-speculative* method wherein both the possibility of such an evolution is shown and the manner it is carried out is indicated, without prejudice to the divine origin and the substantial immutability of dogma. The second is the *historical* method, which demonstrates that such evolution has existed in fact, and points out in which dogmas, and under what circumstances it has taken place.

14. OUR GUIDE IN THE PRESENT ENDEAVOUR. – It is commonly held today that the great fact of the evolution of dogma, which so engages the attention of modern theologians, was neither noticed nor investigated by the great masters of Scholasticism. The most that is nowadays granted is that they paid some attention to the dogmatic evolution of the Old Testament, but none whatsoever to that of the New Testament after the death of the Apostles.

Any study restricted exclusively to either method would necessarily be very incomplete. On the other hand, a study that included both methods and did them equal justice, would be perfect. However, the historical method applied to each particular dogma would both mean such an inordinate extension and require such an amount of historical, critical, and psychological information as to place it almost beyond the capabilities of an individual theologian.

Hence we have opted for a middle way. We have devoted the main part to the theologico-speculative approach, since we address ourselves first and foremost to theologians. But we have also added two historical studies: in the first we cite ten concrete instances of dogmatic evolution by way of reasoning; in the second we investigate the traditional view on the matter through the centuries. We believe that by so doing, our demonstration of the homogeneous evolution of dogma *oversteps the confines of theory and becomes sensible and tangible; as embodied in facts it takes on a concrete and practical shape.*[20]

[20] The first of these two historical studies, published in *La Ciencia Tomista, Progress* are particularly priceless for the understanding of the author's doctrine because they justify it by means of not less than ten historical instances of theological conclusions defined by the Church . . . Thus the central concept of this work ceases to be theory and becomes sensible and tangible, in becoming incarnate in facts, it takes on concrete and practical form." *(Revue des Sc. Phil. et Theolog.,* Oct. 1920, p. 662). We are now publishing for the first time the second historical study which takes up almost entirely chapter 7 of this book. We hope that this study will be of special delight to theologians because we trust that it makes clear with numerous citations that the doctrine of the evolution of dogma, held by many to be of modern vintage, is actually the common and current teaching of traditional theology. We also believe that a third historical study, that of ch. 5, sect. 1, pp. 226-237, about the origin of the modernly accepted ecclesiastical faith, will be read with greater interest by the historians of dogma than by theologians.

This is a great error. In the course of this book it will be made clear that all Scholastic theologians worthy of note dealt with this fact and endeavoured to explain it. In particular, we shall see that St. Thomas not only acknowledged the fact of dogmatic evolution in the New Testament and distinguished it perfectly from that of the Old Testament, but also traced its course and defined its laws with unerrring judgment, thus preserving intact both the fact of evolution and the principle of its homogeneity through all the degrees of Catholic teaching.

The Supreme Pontiffs have repeatedly asserted that the principles enunciated by the Angelic Doctor possess sufficient virtuality to provide a solution to all the great problems related to dogma that have arisen after him. We hope to make it clear that to solve this modern question of the evolution of dogma nothing more is required than faithfully to apply the great and fruitful principles laid down by the Angelic Doctor concerning faith, theology, human reason, and the Church. Our whole work makes no claims other than that of being a constant and faithful exposition of the teaching of the Holy Doctor as it was understood by all his classic commentators prior to the XVII century, that is to say, prior to the time when the confusion of terminology on the matter was introduced in the Schools together with the ensuing confusion about the authentic nature and extension of the *implicit virtuality* of the revealed datum.

15. PROTESTATION. – In any theological question, but especially in a question as momentous and critical as this which concerns the evolution of dogma, we submit ourselves unconditionally to the judgment of the Catholic Church, infallible arbiter in all matters related to the deposit of revelation.

Fribourg University (Switzerland), 1923

CHAPTER I

ON EVOLUTION IN GENERAL, AND THE DIFFERENT SPECIES AND DEGREES OF DOCTRINAL EVOLUTION

16. DIVISION. – A good understanding of the homogeneous evolution of the revealed deposit, which is a doctrinal deposit, presupposes the study of evolution in general – what it consists in – and of the different species and degrees of doctrinal evolution.

Hence, we divide this chapter into five sections:

I. Evolution in general.
II. The three degrees of doctrinal evolution.
III. Evolution in the various kinds of sciences.
IV. Evolution by reasoning from the essence to the properties.
V. Evolution by reasoning from the cause to the effect.

SECTION I
ON HOMOGENEOUS AND TRANSFORMISTIC EVOLUTION IN GENERAL

17. EVOLUTION IN GENERAL. – The term *evolution,* and its synonyms, such as, *development, unfolding, progress,* in general mean nothing but the *growth* or *increase* of anything whatsoever. Thus, the problem discussed today under the modern terms of the progress, or the development, or the evolution of dogma or of the faith, was debated by the earlier Schoolmen in terms of the increase or the growth of the faith: "Whether the articles of faith have *grown* in the course of time." "Whether with the running of time the faith has *increased.*"[1]

[1] ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theologica,* 2-2, q.1, a.7; *In 3 Sent.,* d.25, a.2, a.2.

18. HOMOGENEOUS EVOLUTION AND TRANSFORMISTIC EVOLUTION IN MATERIAL BEINGS – In any material being there are two things: its matter and its specific nature.

Hence the growth or evolution of a material being can happen in two ways: 1) Growth in matter, with no change in specific nature; 2) growth in matter together with a change of specific nature.

In the first case the growth is called homogeneous evolution; in the second, it is called transformistic evolution, because the change of specific nature involves not only a change in the matter but also a change of substantial form.

We have clear examples of material homogeneous evolution in the seedling that grows into a luxuriant tree, or in the child that develops into a mature man. There is here an increase or development of matter, but the specific nature remains the same.

Equally clear examples of transformistic evolution are the monkey which, in Darwin's theory, became a man; the mud which God converted into the body of our first father Adam; the tree into which is grafted a branch of another species; the living organism that dies. In each of these instances the change is not limited to the matter, but includes as well the specific nature or substantial form.

Thus, the preservation or the non-preservation of the same specific nature is that which distinguishes homogeneous evolution from transformistic evolution in material beings.

19. APPLICATION TO DOCTRINES. – In material beings there are two elements: matter, and specific nature. Likewise in doctrines there are two things: 1) the words or formulae, and 2) their meaning or signification. Words or formulae are to doctrines as matter is to material things, whereas meaning is to doctrines as the specific nature or substantial form to material things. Hence the aphorism that in doctrines, words or formulae are the material, and the meaning, the formal element.

Consequently, growth or evolution in doctrines can also happen in two ways: 1) growth or evolution of formulae, the meaning of which remains the same: 2) growth or evolution of formulae, the meaning of which does not remain the same.

In the first case the evolution is homogeneous; in the second, transformistic.

Hence, the preservation or the non-preservation of the same meaning is that which distinguishes homogeneous evolution from transformistic evolution in doctrines.

Whence the traditional formula describing the homogeneous evolution of Catholic dogma enunciated by St. Vincent de Lérins, and consecrated by

the Council of the Vatican [I]: *"Crescant* igitur . . . sed *in eodem sensu"*. Growth, yes; but in the same sense or meaning.

20. WHEN DOES THE MEANING REMAIN THE SAME? – The meaning of a doctrine remains the same throughout different formulations when the meaning of the subsequent formulae does not originate from without, but is already *implicitly contained* in the earlier formulae. Otherwise, the meaning does not remain the same. This occurs in those cases where the meaning of the subsequent formulae is not implicitly contained in, but is either *contrary* to, or at least, *different* from, the meaning of the earlier formulae.

To understand better when the meaning of a formula is, or is not, implicitly contained in the meaning of another formula, it will help to bear well in mind a threefold distinction of meanings or of concepts taught by St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure, viz.: a) explicative concepts; b) diverse concepts; c) contrary concepts.

Concepts are said to be *explicative* when they issue one from the other upon the one and only condition that our mind penetrates their *whole* content.

Diverse concepts are those that do not, and cannot, issue one from the other, no matter how deeply our mind penetrates into their content; however, they do not oppose or destroy one another.

Contrary concepts, not only do not issue one from the other, but also mutually destroy each other because they are incompatible among themselves.

Examples of *explicative* concepts – known also to the earlier writers by the Latin term *consonant* (*consonum*) – are those of absolute immutability and eternity, or those of spirituality and immortality. One needs only to penetrate well the concept of absolute immutability to find the concept of eternity. Similarly, one needs only to penetrate well the concept of spirituality to find the concept of immortality. They are simply partial aspects of one total concept.[2]

[2] For the same reason, although some of our readers might not find them equally clear, we could have given the following as examples of *explicative* concepts: *perfect man* and *man endowed with a human intellect and a human will;* or *true Son of God* and *consubstantial with the Father;* or *Trinity of Divine Persons* and *Trinity of opposed and subsistent relations;* or *Holy Spirit proceeding from the Father* and *Holy Spirit proceeding from the Son;* or *the Church, an indefectible foundation* and *infallible rule of faith and morals;* or *worthy Mother of God* and *immune from all stain of sin,* etc., etc. In all these instances, as we hope to make clear in the course of this book, the concepts are mutually implicit or explicative, since upon merely penetrating the whole content of one of the concepts the other comes to light.

Examples of *diverse* concepts are those of science and virtue, or quantity and quality, or colour and taste. The concept of virtue will not emerge from that of science, no matter how deeply one penetrates the latter; neither will the concept of quality emerge from the concept of quantity, nor the concept of taste from the concept of colour. Yet, although these concepts do not issue one from the other, which is why they are not explicative, still they are not opposed to each other, which is why they are not contrary but simply diverse.

Examples of *contrary* concepts are those of spiritual and material, or necessary and contingent, or white and black. These concepts not only do not issue one from the other, as diverse concepts do not, but, furthermore, they exclude one another from the same subject or from the same doctrinal formula.

It has taken us a few paragraphs to expound all this either because of its importance or because of our own lack of conciseness. St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure condensed the whole matter in just a few words. The problem discussed today, whether it is possible to have new dogmas, was debated by the Schoolmen in terms of whether it is possible to *add (apponere)* something to the revealed deposit. The objection and the answer follow:

"To the contrary: it is said in the Apocalypse, last chapter, 18: if anyone shall add to them, God will add unto him the plagues.

I answer: addition is twofold: either by adding that which is *contrary* or *diverse,* and this is erroneous; or by adding that which is implicitly contained by way of exposition, and this is praiseworthy."[3]

"There is an *addition* in which that which is added is *contrary;* there is another in which that which is added is *diverse;* and there is another in which that which is added is *consonant.* The first addition is one of error; the second, one of presumption; the third, one of faithful instruction, because it *explicates* what is implicit."[4]

21. EXPLICATIVE AND SUBSTANTIVE EVOLUTION. – Consequently, whenever the concepts of the succeeding formulae are neither contrary nor even diverse, but mutually implicit (*consona*) there is an evolution in the same sense or meaning, and therefore homogeneous. Otherwise, the evolution is transformistic.

Homogeneous doctrinal evolution – that which is characterized by the fact that the formulae are implicitly contained in one another – was denoted by earlier theologians with the name of *explicative* evolution (*quoad expli-*

[3] ST. THOMAS, *In I Sent.,* divisio textus Prologi cum eius expositione.

[4] ST. BONAVENTURE, *In I Sent.,* expositio in Prologum.

cationem); heterogeneous or transformistic evolution – that in which the formulae are not implicitly contained in one another – was by them called *substantive* evolution (*quoad substantiam*).

Hence, in matters of doctrine, the distinction between homogeneous or explicative evolution on the one hand, and transformistic or substantive evolution on the other, hinges on whether the meaning of the subsequent formulae is, or is not, implicitly contained in the meaning of the primitive formulae that make up the starting point.

SECTION II

THREE DEGREES OF DOCTRINAL EVOLUTION

22. EVOLUTION AND DISTINCTION. – As we have just seen, evolution or progress in general is simply the growth or increment of something that was already in existence. There can be no increment without the acquisition of something new. Nothing is new unless it is, in some measure, *distinct* from what was already existing. It follows that the degrees of evolution or progress are patterned after the degrees of distinction between the new that is acquired and the old that pre-existed.

23. THREE DEGREES OR KINDS OF DISTINCTION. – Any distinction either exists in the *object* itself prior to any operation of the subject, or does not exist in the object but is made by the *subject.* In the first case there is an objective or real distinction; in the second, a subjective distinction or a distinction of reason.

Likewise, the subject can make the distinction either with a basis in the object, or without it. In the former case the distinction is called a distinction of reasoned reason; in the latter, a distinction of reasoning reason.

Hence the *three* degrees of distinction that everybody knows: a) *real* or *objective* distinction; b) distinction of *reasoned reason* [*rationis ratiocinatae*], which is also called *virtual* or *conceptual* distinction; c) distinction of *reasoning reason* [*rationis ratiocinantis*], also known as *logical* or *nominal* distinction.

The first of these is a distinction of real *objectivity;* the second is merely a distinction of *partial concepts* or *aspects* within one and the same objectivity; the third is purely a distinction of *names* or of *formulae,* not only within one and the same objectivity, but also within one and the same concept or aspect of that objectivity.

The first distinction is purely *objective* and utterly independent of the subject. The second is *subjective,* but based or grounded on the object. The third is also *subjective,* but so purely *subjective* that it is a mere product of the subject bereft of any basis in the object.[5]

The third distinction is *improperly called* distinction since it is merely nominal and discloses nothing new about the object. The second and the first are *properly called* distinctions since both provide us with some new knowledge. The second offers us new aspects or partial concepts of the same object, whereas the first gives us a new objectivity or reality.

An example of nominal distinction is that which exists between the concepts *man* and *rational animal.* An example of virtual distinction is that

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[5] "Thus distinction is nothing but *lack of identity,* for those things are said to be distinct which are not the same.

"It is divided into *real* distinction and distinction of *reason.* Real distinction is the lack of identity obtaining *on the part of the thing independently of the intellect.* The distinction of reason is the lack of identity, but *only as conceived,* between things that in reality are not distinct but one and the same.

"The distinction of *reason* is also twofold. One is a distinction of *reasoning reason,* the other a distinction of *reasoned reason.* The former is that which is *without a foundation* in the thing, as when you distinguish between *Tullius* and *Cicero* . . . The latter *has a foundation in the thing,* as when you distinguish between justice and mercy in God . . .

"Two grounds can be given for this distinction [i.e. for the distinction of *reasoned* reason]. The first is the eminence of the thing . . . The second is the imperfection of our intellect which, not being capable of attaining to all these perfections simultaneously at once, conceives them by *distinct acts,* as if they were distinct, whence results a *distinction in the intellect.* The distinction, in so far as it is considered *in the intellect,* is called a distinction of *reasoned reason* with a foundation in the thing; in so far as it is considered *in the thing,* it is called *virtual.*" (BILLUART, *de Deo,* d. 2, a. 3)

"There is a distinction that arises *from the things,* and there is a distinction made by the *intention of the mind.* If one distinguishes things which *in themselves* are many, it is a *real* distinction; if one distinguishes through consideration things which *in themselves* are not distinct, it is called a distinction of *reason* . . . The *distinction of reason* is twofold. One is a distinction of reason *with a foundation in the thing* . . . The other is a *purely mental* distinction. From the foregoing it can be understood that the distinction of *reasoned reason,* that is with, a foundation in the thing, is accomplished through *inadequate concepts* of the same thing; whereas the distinction of reasoning reason, that is, that which is purely mental, is accomplished through a certain *reverting* to the same adequate concept of the same thing . . . The distinction of reasoned reason is also called *metaphysical* . . . Not infrequently it is also termed *virtual,* inasmuch as it is *not actual* on the part of the thing . . ." (PESCH, *Philosophia Lacensis, Logica,* lib. 1, n. 98)

Therefore, fundamentally there are *two, not three,* kinds of distinction: one, a distinction of the *object,* which is the real or objective distinction; the other, a distinction of the *subject,* which is the distinction of reason or subjective. The distinction called virtual, conceptual, or of reasoned reason, is not a third member divided on a par with the other two, but a member or subdivision of the distinction of reason or subjective distinction. Virtual distinction, consequently, is *formally subjective,* although with a foundation or basis in the object.

which exists between the concepts *immateriality* and *intellectuality*. An example of objective-real distinction is that which exists between the concepts *soul* and *body*, or *accident* and *actual inherence in a subject*.

In the case of *nominal* distinction the concepts or the propositions are *identical* not only really but also logically or formally. In the case of *real* distinction the concepts or the propositions differ not only logically or formally but also really. In the case of *virtual* distinction the concepts or the propositions are logically or formally *distinct*, but really or objectively *identical*.

We beg the reader's indulgence for taking up so much time in elucidating such elementary matters for on their correct understanding hinges to a great degree the grasp of the problem of the nature, whether homogeneous or transformistic, of all doctrinal evolution.

24. THREE KINDS OF CONCLUSIONS AND REASONINGS. – There being three kinds of distinction, it follows that there will also be three kinds of conclusions, to wit: a) nominal conclusions; b) conceptual conclusions; c) objective-real conclusions, depending on whether between the conclusion and the principle from which it is deduced, there respectively exists a nominal, or a conceptual or a real distinction.

Consequently, there will also be three kinds of reasonings, viz.: a) nominal reasonings; b) conceptual reasonings; c) real reasonings, depending on whether the conclusions deduced are respectively nominal, conceptual or real.

25. THREE KINDS OF VIRTUAL OR MEDIATE. – Since virtual or mediate is the same thing as conclusion, there will be three kinds of virtual or mediate corresponding exactly to the three kinds of conclusions, viz.: a) nominal virtual or mediate; b) conceptual virtual or mediate; c) objective-real virtual or mediate.

26. THREE KINDS OF PROGRESS OR EVOLUTION. – Correlative to these three kinds of distinction, of reasonings, of conclusions, or of virtuality, there are also three kinds of progress or evolution, to wit:

1. *Nominal* progress or evolution, such as exists in passing from one proposition to another nominally distinct, e.g. the passage from *N is a man* to *N is a rational animal*. This is a progress restricted to *mere formulae*, involving no passage to any new concept or aspect.

2. *Conceptual* progress or evolution, such as exists in passing from one proposition to another conceptually distinct, e.g. the passage from *N is spiritual* to *N is immortal*. This is more than a progress of mere formulae for it involves a passing on to virtually distinct concepts or aspects, which, however, are really and objectively identical to one another.

3. *Objective-real* progress or evolution, such as exists in passing from one proposition to another that is really distinct, e.g. from *N is an accident* to *N actually inheres in a subject*. This is a progress not simply of mere formulae nor simply of concepts, but also of objective reality; it is a progress in respect of the substance or real objectivity.

The first is a *merely subjective* progress, just as the nominal distinction on which it is based is merely subjective. The second is also *subjective* but based on the object, as is the conceptual distinction. The third is *purely objective*, as is also the real distinction. (23)

27. PROPER AND IMPROPER DISCOURSE. – Of the three kinds of reasonings mentioned above (24), the first, in which a merely nominal distinction is interposed between the conclusion and the premise, is said to be, and is, an *improper* reasoning. On the other hand, the second, in which there is a conceptual distinction, and the third, in which there is a real distinction, are said to be, and truly are, *proper* reasonings.

The reasoning based on nominal distinction is said to be an improper discourse because there is only *one concept* or idea, notwithstanding the variety of *names* or of formulae between the principle and the conclusion. Which is to say that in this kind of reasoning there are many *oral* acts, but only one *intellectual* act. Hence there is in it no true discourse, for discourse requires various intellectual acts.

On the other hand, the reasoning based on conceptual distinction, and the reasoning based on real distinction are discourse in the proper sense of the term because in these reasonings there is a multiplicity of realities, or at least, a multiplicity of concepts. Now, the human intellect, unlike that of the angels, is incapable of grasping with one single act diverse realities, or even diverse concepts. Hence, whenever either a conceptual or a real distinction intervenes between the conclusion and the principle, the discourse is proper.[6]

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[6] *Discourse*, as any other movement, presupposes a *point of departure*, which in this case is the propositions of the primitive datum. This discourse can be employed to pursue four ends: a) to find the formal meaning of the terms or words which make up the primitive datum: this is hermeneutics and exegesis; b) to explain, that is, to render more comprehensible, through analogies or comparisons, the meaning of the primitive propositions, since these are supernatural or suprasensible propositions: this is the *sapiential* function proper of the supreme sciences relative to their own proper principles; c) to defend it against those who deny it: this is *apologetics*, another sapiential function; d) to *deduce new propositions*, distinct from those comprised in the point of departure: this, and this alone, constitutes *science* as science. It is this fourth case that is relevant when the question of doctrinal progress or evolution is raised. The new propositions can be: a) nominally distinct from the propositions of the point of departure; b) conceptually or virtually distinct; c) really or objectively distinct. In the first case the discourse is improper; in the other two cases the discourse is proper. Thus, whenever mention is made of proper or improper discourses, we do not mean a discourse that is merely exegetical, or apologetical, or sapiential, we mean a discourse that is *scientific* or *deductive of new propositions*.

28. OBSERVATION. – It is, therefore, necessary to distinguish carefully not only the improper from the proper discourse but also, and with even greater care, the two species of proper discourse. To confuse the proper conceptual discourse with the real proper discourse is to confuse the subject with the object, and subjective evolution with objective evolution. Conceptual distinction, as we have already mentioned, notwithstanding its being grounded on the object, is nevertheless formally subjective, whereas real distinction is completely objective. On the other hand, conceptual distinction and nominal or logical distinction are both subjective, the only difference between them being that one has a basis in the object and the other has not.

Hence, when it is a question of determining whether this or that doctrinal evolution is objective or subjective, it is a more serious mistake to confuse the two species of proper discourse, in which one is objective and the other subjective, than to confuse the proper conceptual discourse with the improper discourse, both of which are subjective. And yet, while all modern authors speak of the distinction between proper and improper discourse, there is hardly any one who treats of the distinction between the two proper discourses.

29. PROPER AND IMPROPER VIRTUALITY. – There being one improper reasoning and two proper reasonings, there are correlatively one improper virtuality, the nominal, and two proper virtualities, the conceptual and the real.

We have just adverted to the need to distinguish carefully between the two species of proper reasoning. The same admonition holds equally for the need to distinguish sedulously between the two species of proper virtuality. The reasons are exactly the same for both cases.

30. THE SCALE OF DOCTRINAL PROGRESS. – The foregoing makes it easy to construct a true scale wherewith to measure and classify the different possible degrees of progress or evolution in the intellectual or doctrinal order. This scale comprises a point of departure and three perfectly delineated degrees in a sequence of progressive differentiation.

31. THE POINT OF DEPARTURE is made up of those truths held by our minds prior to its movement (*discurrere*) or reasoning. The mind holds these truths without the intervention of any reasoning whatsoever, either proper or improper, that is, it holds them either by simple intuition in the natural order, or by simple revelation in the supernatural order. In the natural order the starting point is made up of the first intuitive or *per se* evident principles; in the supernatural order it is made up of the revealed propositions in the form in which they issued from the mouth or from the pen of the Apostles and inspired writers.

The starting point for any subsequent progress is called either *immediate-explicit,* or *formal-explicit,* or simply *explicit,* period. It is given these names because no reasoning of any sort, no unfolding of any kind by human *reason* has touched it as yet. It is but the object of simple understanding or of simple revelation.

32. THE FIRST DEGREE of the scale is made up of all the new formulae derived from the point of departure, which differ from the primitive propositions with a merely *nominal distinction.* Such formulae are called: a) *immediate-implicit* or *formal-implicit;* b) *improper-virtual* or *improper-mediate.*

It is said to be, and truly is, improperly virtual or mediate – and, therefore, properly immediate or formal – because, as yet, there is no virtual, but only nominal distinction. It is said to be implicit, and not explicit, because there has already occurred some explication of the propositions constituting the point of departure.[7]

This first degree includes all the things contained in the point of departure in any of the four following ways: a) as the definition in the defined; b) as an essential part in the whole; c) as a particular in the unconditioned universal; d) as one correlative in the other correlative. It is obvious that, in any of these cases, in order to pass from one extreme to the other, nothing more is required than a simple explanation of the terms, that is to say, an improper reasoning, since each of the extremes is included in the *definition* of the other.

33. THE SECOND DEGREE of the scale includes all the new formulae derived from the primitive formulae of the point of departure, which differ from the latter not merely with a nominal but with a conceptual distinction. They are known by the names of: a) *implicit virtual* or *implicit mediate;* b) *identico-real virtual.*

It is properly called virtual or mediate since we now have, not merely a nominal distinction, which is improperly termed distinction, but also a conceptual distinction, which is a distinction in the proper sense of the term. It is called implicit or inclusive since, notwithstanding the passage from one concept to another, they both remain *within* the one and the same objectivity of the point of departure. It is described as *identico-real* because there exists no real distinction between this degree and the point of departure; there is only a

[7] If in the point of departure there should be something truly implicit, but with such a profound implicitude that the native power of our intellect is unequal to the task of explicating or bringing it to light, such a thing would be implicit *quoad se* but not *quoad nos.* An example would be the implicitude with which the Trinity of Persons is contained in the unity of the divine nature. Such implicitude requires divine revelation for its explication.

conceptual distinction, that is to say, different aspects within the same objective reality of the point of departure.

34. THE THIRD DEGREE of the scale comprises all the formulae derived from the primitive ones which differ from these not merely with a nominal or a conceptual distinction, but also with a *real distinction.* This degree is signified by the following names: a) *non-implicit virtual or non-implicit mediate;* b) *purely virtual,* or *purely mediate,* or *purely connexive (virtuale* tantum, *mediate* tantum, *connexive* tantum).

It is virtual or mediate because of the proper distinction that is present. It is non-implict or non-inclusive since, being really or objectively distinct from the point of departure, it is no longer within but outside of it; and thereby the conclusion denotes an objective reality added to the point of departure. It is merely virtual, merely mediate, or purely connexive because between the point of departure and the conclusion there exists no implicitude or inclusion, but only mere connexion.

35. OBSERVATION. – The reader will notice that the three degrees of this scale are perfectly characterized by the three degrees of distinction: nominal, conceptual, real. They have, besides, the added advantage of not being liable to confusion since they are of common knowledge and are universally accepted in the same sense by everybody.

Every philosopher or theologian is at liberty to designate these *three degrees* of progress by the *names* of his choice, provided that he does not confuse the content or the *meaning* of one degree with that of another. To confuse the first degree with the second necessarily involves confusing simple understanding with reasoning in the natural order, and consequently, faith with theology in the supernatural or revealed order. To confuse the second with the third degree is to confuse subjective progress with objective progress, since conceptual distinction is subjective and real distinction is objective distinction, and, as a consequence, to confuse homogeneous or explicative evolution with transformistic evolution.

SECTION III
DOCTRINAL EVOLUTION IN THE METAPHYSICAL AND MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES AND IN THE PHYSICAL AND MORAL SCIENCES

36. TWO GREAT GROUPS OF SCIENCES. – Bearing in mind this scale with its clear and perfectly defined degrees, it is easy to determine to which of those degrees the progress or evolution in each of the sciences belongs.

Of the three kinds of reasoning that make up the three degrees of the scale, the first does not produce any science strictly speaking. Nominal

reasoning is an improper reasoning, hence it remains within the scope of simple understanding or intuition, not within that of reason or science.

But the other two degrees, being made up of a proper reasoning and a proper virtuality and a proper and rigorous conclusion, comprise two groups of sciences, to wit: a) the metaphysical and the mathematical sciences; b) the physical and the moral sciences.[i]

These two groups of sciences differ essentially in three things: a) in certitude; b) in procedure; c) in homogeneity.

37. DIFFERENCE IN CERTITUDE. – The certitude of the metaphysical and mathematical sciences is absolute, unconditional and objectively infallible – a certitude that not even God Himself can cause to fail. The failure of any one single case of a truly metaphysical conclusion involves the ruin of the foundation of human reason, for it would mean the failure of the very *essence* of things, which is the formal object of our reason and of every intellect. Furthermore, it would mean the failure of God Himself, for the essences of things are not grounded on the free will of God but on the divine essence itself.

Hence, in any case where a metaphysical or a mathematical conclusion seems to fail, it is either because it is not a true metaphysical or mathematical conclusion, or because the reasoning is not done well. To say that a conclusion is truly metaphysical or mathematical and validly deduced, but at the same time false, is to utter a contradiction.

Very different, indeed essentially different, is the certitude of the physical sciences or of physical conclusions. In these the certitude is not absolute but conditional or relative; it is not grounded on the essence of things but on the regularity of the laws by which the universe is ruled; it does not depend on the essence, but on the free will of God. Hence, every physical conclusion presupposes, as understood, the condition *provided that the laws of nature do not fail.* Since those laws can fail, and actually fail, as often as it pleases God, every physical conclusion implies the understood condition *provided that God has not intervened miraculously.*

Thus, whereas metaphysical conclusions are absolutely necessary on all levels, in all places, at all times, in the supernatural as well as in the natural order; physical conclusions are not necessary except in the natural order, but they can, and often do, fail in the supernatural order.

Metaphysical conclusions – e.g., every contingent being is a created being, or every spiritual being is immortal, or that which is absolutely immutable is eternal – are equally necessary in the revealed order and in the

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i. The term *physical science* here means any natural science based on observation and/or experiment. The term *moral science* refers to the behavioural sciences. – *Transl.*

natural order, and there is no conceivable case in which they could be false. But the physical conclusion that every man is a human person is false in Jesus Christ. The physical conclusion that the woman who is a mother is not a virgin is false in the Virgin Mary. The physical conclusion that every accident has actual inherence in its subject is false in the Eucharist. The physical conclusion that all fire actually burns is false in the case of the furnace of Babylon. This failure which, in the case of physical conclusions occurs every-time it pleases God, can also occur in the conclusions of the so-called moral sciences every time it pleases the free-will of man.

38. DIFFERENCE IN PROCEDURE. – This difference in certitude arises precisely from the difference in procedure, that is to say, from the difference of the *minors* employed by the two groups of sciences in their reasonings.

In the metaphysical and mathematical sciences the minors are in every case essential or conceptual minors, the predicate of which is implicit in the essence of being as being (general metaphysics), or of the essence of this being (particular metaphysics); in other words, they are in every case of the essence. Likewise, mathematical minors are always either of the essence of quantity in general (pure mathematics), or of the essence of this species of quantity (applied mathematics), but in every case of the essence. Thus, to be constituted of act and potency, or to require a cause, is of the essence of contingent being; to be immortal is of the essence of spiritual being; and of the essence of the circumference is that its radii be equal.

On the other hand, in the physical and moral sciences the minors are not essential but accidental; the predicate of the minor is in no case essentially implicit in the subject, but in every case it lies outside of the subject's essence. To be a human person is not of the essence of man; not to be a virgin is not of the essence of motherhood; to have actual inherence is not of the essence of any accident; factual burning is not of the essence of fire; to love or not to love her offspring is not of the essence of a mother.

39. DIFFERENCE IN HOMOGENEITY. – This difference in procedure gives rise to the third difference in respect of the homogeneity of the conclusions or of the evolution. In the metaphysical sciences the progress is homogeneous, that is, a progress of analytic evolution. In the physical and moral sciences the progress is heterogeneous, that is, a progress by extrinsic addition.

The metaphysical or mathematical minor is always of the essence or *de intellectu* [of the understanding or notion] of the major.[ii] This being the case,

ii. *Minor* and *major* refer directly, not to the terms of the syllogism, but to the minor and major premises respectively. This should be clear from n. 38 where the author speaks of metaphysical and mathematical minors whose *predicate* is implicit in the essence of the *subject*. – *Transl.*

the conclusions do not go beyond the objectivity of the point of departure, but are simply different aspects that were already implicit or included in it. The whole science of metaphysics, in all its conclusions – provided that they are true and rigorous conclusions – is nothing more than an analytic and homogeneous development of the point of departure of metaphysics, namely, the intuitive apprehension of the notion of being as such. With this intuition alone to start with, and by means only of minors already implicit in the starting point, the metaphysician develops his science in all its entirety. If he had from the beginning enough intellectual power to penetrate well all that is implicit in the point of departure, he would have no need of any such minors. In the very point of departure he would intuitively see, as the angels do, all those conclusions which, because of our reason's feebleness, we, as a matter of fact, see successively with the aid of several minors, through reasoning. The role of the minors therefore is, not to *add* something that was not already implicit in the starting point, but merely to help our feeble reason to see part by part, or by successive aspects the very same thing that was already there, implicit from the very start. The imperfect photographic apparatus of our mind requires several exposures of the object from different angles because it is incapable of taking in in one single photograph, that is, in one single act of vision, all the wealth and fecundity of facets or aspects of the point of departure.

The opposite occurs in the poor physical and moral sciences, the fabric and texture of which is not essential but accidental, not analytic but synthetic. No physical minor is really implicit in the objectivity or essence of the majors; physical minors are without, not within the point of departure. A human personality is not truly implicit in the essence of man; actual inherence in a subject is not implicit in the essence of accidents; factual burning is not implicit in the essence of fire; nor is it implicit in the essence of a stone that it should factually fall or not. Since no thing can be seen in another if it be not truly implicit in the latter, not even God Himself is capable of seing with absolute certitude in the mere essence of a thing any physical or moral conclusion, any of its actual properties, any of its contingent effects.

Incidentally, this is why St. Thomas and his school require in God an act of the will, a free decree added to his intellect in order to see the contingent futures, that is to say, everything that is not of the essence of things. Through knowledge of simple understanding, independently of any decree of his will, God sees with absolute certitude everything that is essential, that is, all metaphysical and mathematical conclusions. If He had no other knowledge but that of simple understanding, not one single physical or moral conclusion could ever be known by God with absolute certitude.

40. APPLICATION OF THE SCALE. – Thus, the progress or evolution through metaphysical or mathematical minors belongs to the second degree of the scale, that is, to the *implicit virtual.*

It does not belong to the first degree of the formal-implicit or the immediate-implicit, because the first degree admits no reasoning other than the nominal or improper, whereas the metaphysical and mathematical sciences, in those cases where their conclusions differ conceptually from the principles, require for our reason a rigorous conceptual reasoning. Hence, relative to us they are not only truly and properly sciences but even the most exact and the most rigorous of sciences. Neither does it belong to the third degree of the virtual non-implicit or virtual purely connexive, because although the reasoning involved is proper and rigorous, it is analytic or inclusive, not synthetic or purely connexive.

On the other hand, the progress or evolution through physical minors belongs to the third degree of the scale, that of the virtual non-implicit. It belongs neither to the first nor to the second degree. Not to the first since the reasoning is not merely nominal. Not to the second because the reasoning is not one of analysis or of inclusion within the concepts or aspects of the same thing, but one of pure connexion or of transition from one thing to another that is really distinct from the former.

All of this had already been condensed by St. Thomas in a few words. To the objection that in all true science there must be a proper reasoning or passage *de uno in aliud* [from one to another], he answers: "In all *sciences* the mode of *reason* is preserved in so far as there should be a transition *from one to another according to reason,* but not that there should be a transition *from one thing to another thing,* this being proper of natural science."[8]

41. COROLLARY. – Consequently, the phrase *minors of reason,* that appears frequently in the discussion of the progress of dogma, is ambiguous. The term *reason* can stand for two things: a) the *power* or faculty called reason, whose proper act is reasoning; b) the *reasons*[iii] or minor premises that such a power employs when it reasons in the different sciences.

The power of *reason* is only one, and therefore the same in all the various sciences; however, its *reasons* or minors can be many and essentially diverse. There are minors of *metaphysical reason* and minors of *physical reason.* The former are minors already implicit in the majors that are the starting point of the reasoning, and they are nothing but instruments that our reason needs in order to explicate and develop, not to add or modify, the objectivity of the major. The latter are not implicit in the major, hence they do not merely explicate, but add to the objectivity of the starting point.

[8] *In Boet. de Trinitate,* q.6, a.1, ad primam quaestionem, ad 3.

iii. In the first of these two senses the author takes the term *reason subjectively;* in the second, he takes it *objectively.* Taken subjectively, *reason* is a word in current usage that signifies the *power* of intellectual cognition as well as its *characteristic act.* The characteristic act is *reasoning* or *discourse.* The power itself is denoted by various other names as, e.g. *understanding, intellect, mind.*

SECTION IV

THE EVOLUTION BY REASONING OR PASSING FROM THE ESSENCE TO ITS PROPERTIES

42. TRADITIONAL DEFINITION OF THE CONCLUSION. – The Aristotelian-Thomist philosophy defines the scientific conclusion in the proper sense, and therefore also the proper and rigorous theological conclusion, with the classical formula: *The deduction of the property from the essence or of the effect from the cause.*

The true or false notion of the nature of the evolution effected through scientific or theological conclusions depends on the true or false understanding of this definition.

In this section we will consider the nature of the transition from the essence to its properties, and in the next we will study the nature of the transition from the cause to its effects.

The objective sense of the term is not in current usage, although traces of it are to be found in such expressions as "There are good reasons for this theory", where *good reasons* means *objectively* valid reasons. However, in the tradition of the Schools, the corresponding Latin term *ratio* was, and is, indifferently employed either subjectively or objectively.

If subjectively *reason* denotes the power of understanding or conceiving intellectually, then objectively the term denotes either (a) that which is *understood,* or (b) that which is *conceived* by mind.

That which is understood is the *outside thing* or *object.* But nothing indeterminate can, as such, be understood. Wherefore, taken objectively, reason denotes in the first place that which is *determinate* in the object or outside thing, that is, its *essence, nature, kind,* or *species.* It also denotes that whereby the object is placed in a determinate kind or species, viz. its *form,* particularly its *substantial form.* (The modern surrogates for essence and form are constitution and structure respectively).

But that which is understood is not understood except through *that which the mind conceives* about the object. Hence, in the second place, reason objectively denotes the *concept, idea, notion,* or *definition* of a thing, as well as the *judgments* or *propositions* formed by the mind to express what it knows or conceives about the thing's nature or form.

When the Schoolmen say that to be rational is *of the reason* (de ratione) of man, the term is taken objectively, and means that to be rational is of the *essence* or *nature,* of the *understanding* or *concept* or *notion* or *definition* of man. Likewise, the whole proposition itself if *of the reason* of man, i.e. it is an *essential* proposition, or one that *describes the nature* of man, or one that *explicates the notion* of man.

It may be objected that concepts cannot be one of the objective denotations of *reason,* since concepts are subjective. The answer is that in the *psychological* order concepts are indeed subjective, inasmuch as they are accidental qualities inhering in the mind. But in the order of *knowing,* the concept is the *vicar* of, the *stand-in* for, the object. Thus, in the order of *intentionality* concepts are not subjective but *objective.* – *Transl.*

43. THREE SENSES OF THE TERM *ESSENCE.* – The essence of any thing can be taken in three very different senses, viz.: a) the mere essence, or the essence in the abstract; b) the *integral* essence, or the essence in its *connatural* state; c) the completely *perfect* essence.

The mere essence, or the essence taken in the abstract implies the *essential* predicates alone, and nothing else. The integral or connatural essence, in addition to the essential predicates, comprises furthermore the connatural predicates or the integral parts which the essence should have in accordance with the laws of nature. Finally, the completely perfect essence includes also all the accidental perfections of which the given essence is capable.

Thus, any thing that possesses the essential predicates of *animal* and *rational,* or those of *rational soul* and *body,* possesses the mere or true essence of man, and it makes no difference that he should lack this or that member or power, e.g. that he be lame, or armless, or deaf, or blind. Whoever possesses not only the essential predicates but also all the integral parts, possesses the integral or connatural essence, even if he should lack the accidental or acquirable perfections, e.g. if he be wanting in science or virtue. Whoever possesses all the perfections without exception, that is, the essential as well as the connatural and the acquirable, possesses the completely perfect essence.

We beg the reader never to lose sight of these three states of the essence if he wishes not to lose his bearings in the problem of the evolution of dogma. The three senses of the term essence are not only distinct but also perfectly ordered in rank or degree. The third sense *includes* the second, and the second *includes* the first. Hence the first is *implicit* in the second, and the second is *implicit* in the third. But the third is not implicit in the second nor is the second implicit in the first.

Consequently, when God reveals to us that "N is a man", He could have revealed it in three different senses, that is: a) man *essentially* or *truly;* b) man *integrally* or *connaturally;* c) man completely *perfect.* Since explicit divine revelation is the starting point of all conclusions or of all progress, the conclusions that can be deduced by way of implicitude, or in the same sense will be very different depending on which of the three senses is taken as the starting point; and consequently, too, the conclusions will vary as regards their homogeneity or heterogeneity with the starting point or revealed datum.

What we have just observed relative to the term *man* must also be said of any other predicate contained in divine revelation.

44. TWO SENSES OF THE TERM *PROPERTY.* – There are two kinds of properties that differ completely one from the other: a) *essential* properties, which are also called *metaphysical, aptitudinal, or radical;* b) *accidental* properties, also known as *physical, actual* or *formal.*

The former are really identical with the essence; hence the essence can never be without them, not even by God's power. The latter are really distinct from the essence, and the essence of a given thing can, absolutely speaking, be without them.

It should be easy to distinguish between these two kinds of properties. For instance, one thing is the aptitudinal inherence of the accident in its subject, which exists even in the eucharistic accidents, and quite another the actual inherence. One thing is the radical capacity for seeing, which exists even in the blind but not in a stone, and quite another the actual capacity which is wanting both in the blind and in the stone. One thing is the radical risibility, which is found even in the man whose facial muscles are all paralyzed, and quite another the actual risibility. One thing is radical peccability which is found in all mere creatures, and quite another actual peccability which did not exist in the Virgin Mary. One thing is the radical capacity to die, which existed even in the state of innocence and exists in Elias and Enoch, and quite another actual death. One thing is the exigency of burning, which existed in the very fire of the furnace of Babylon, and quite another the actual burning.

Examples like these could be multiplied to infinity. It is precisely the distinction between the radical or metaphysical properties and the actual or physical properties that grounds the possibility of miracles, or of the supernatural order *quoad efficientiam* [in the order of efficient causality]. God cannot suspend the metaphysical properties, for they are essential; but He can suspend the physical properties, because they are accidental.[9]

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[9] "It must be noted that there are *two kinds* of *properties:* one *physical* and real, the other logical and *attributive.* The physical and real property is a *real accident consequent* to the essence, as utmost heat is consequent to fire . . . The logical or attributive property is a notion that is *distinct from the essence by reason alone,* and consequent to the essence only through the manner of understanding; thus infinity is said to be a property of the divine essence, mortality a property of a living body, not to have contraries a property of substance, etc.; not that they are some thing distinct from the things of which they are said to be properties, but that they are certain secondary notions which our intellect distinguishes from the essence and attributes to the latter as its appendages." (GOUDIN, *Logica Major,* p.1, d.1, q.2, a.7) "*Radical* risibility belongs to man *essentially;* but the *formal* (or physical), accidentally." (JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *Cursus theologicus, de virtutibus,* d.17, a.3, n.14). "There appears no manifest contradiction that the proper passions, which are really distinct from the subject, be separated from it by God, e.g. that quantity, which is the proper passion of body, be separated from the subject . . . And thus those propositions that affirm the proper passions can be falsified as to the *actual conjoinment* but not as to the *radical* conjoinment and exigency." (JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *Cursus philosophicus,* p.3, q.2, a.2). "Although *aptitudinal* inherence is *of the essence of the accident, actual* inherence is its *proper passion* as something that

45. SIX TYPES OF REASONING OR PASSING FROM THE ESSENCE TO THE PROPERTY. – Since the term *essence* can be taken in three different senses, and the term *property* can be taken in two, there are six (3 x 2 = 6) possible combinations: three by combining the three senses of essence with the first sense of propety, and another three by combining the same three senses of essence with the second sense of property.

Thus, if as an example of essence we take the essence of man (man essentially or truly – man connaturally or integrally – perfect man), and as an example of property we take risibility (radical risibility – actual risibility), there are six types of reasoning from essence to property, as follows:

Type 1: reasoning from pure essence to radical property; e.g.: N is man (*truly* man); therefore he is radically risible.

Type 2: reasoning from connatural or integral essence to radical property; e.g. N is man (man *integrally*); therefore he is radically risible.

Type 3; reasoning from completely perfect essence to radical property; e.g. N is man (*perfect* man); therefore he is radically risible.

Type 4: reasoning from pure essence to actual property; e.g. N is man (*truly* man); therefore he is actually risible.

Type 5: reasoning from integral essence to actual property; e.g. N is man (man *integrally*); therefore he is actually risible.

Type 6: reasoning from perfect essence to actual property; e.g. N is man (*perfect* man); therefore he is actually risible.

It is obvious that there can be no other types of reasoning from essence to property aside from the six enumerated, and that any other type reduces to one of these.

46. APPLICATION OF THE SCALE. – Each of these six types of reasoning is a true passage from the essence to the property; therefore every one of them is a proper reasoning. Consequently none of them belongs to the first degree of the scale.

Every one of them, with the exception of the fourth, are reasonings by way of inclusion or implicitude; therefore they belong to the second degree, that is, to the virtual implicit. This is evident in the case of the first three, since they deal with essential properties, which is to say, *included* in the essence itself. It should be equally evident in the fifth and sixth cases. Although actual properties or accidental perfections are not included in the concept of mere essence, they are included in the concept of the integrity or

naturally and necessarily accompanies it if it be left to its nature, and yet *by the power of God* accidents are made to be without a subject in the Sacrament of the Altar." (FERRARIENSIS, *In 4 Contra Gentes*, c.65)

perfection of the essence. *"For a thing to be perfect, it is necessary that it possess both the form* [essence] *as well as those things that preexist to, and those that follow* [properties], *it."*[10]

On the other hand, the fourth type is clearly a reasoning of real distinction or of accidental connexion, and thus belongs to the third degree of the scale. This is the reasoning proper of the physical sciences.

In reality, all these six types of reasoning reduce to two: a) reasoning of real distinction or of pure connexion with no implicitude – the fourth type; – b) reasoning of real identity or of true implicitude – the other five types.

47. THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES. – That which in other things is called *properties*, and which the ancients also denominated *passions*, is in God known by the name of *attributes*. Now, the distinction between the divine essence and its attributes, or between the attributes themselves, is not real but only conceptual. Consequently, the fourth type of reasoning can find no place in the whole treatise *on God*. Thus all progress from the divine essence to its attributes, or from one attribute to another, belongs to the second degree, that is, to the virtual implicit.

48. ESSENTIAL AND ACCIDENTAL RELATIONS. – What has been said about the transition or progress from the essence to its properties is likewise applicable to the transition or progress from the essence to the *relations* that the essence, or the starting point, bears to other things, since in the instant case properties are equivalent to relations. "Whatever can be predicated of another is also called *passion*, whether it be negations or *relations* to other things. And many such can be proven of God both from naturally known principles and from the principles of faith."[11]

Consequently, the passage from the starting point to any of its essential or aptitudinal relations belongs to the second degree of the scale, or the virtual implicit. The passage to its accidental or actual relations belongs to the third degree, or the merely connexive virtual.

CONFIRMATION. – From the many texts that could be cited to corroborate what we have been explaining, we will quote the three that follow:

"Therefore, when that which constitutes the *reason* of a nature, whereby the nature is itself understood, has an *order to*, and *dependence on*, another, it is manifest that that nature *cannot be understood without it*. And this holds not only in the case when one is conjoined to the other with that conjunction wherewith the part is conjoined to the whole . . . or the form is united to matter . . . but also in the case where the one is in reality

[10] ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.1, q.5, a.5.

[11] ST. THOMAS, *In Boet. de Trinitate*, q.2, a.2, ad 3.

separated from the other, as the father *cannot be understood* without the understanding of the son, notwithstanding the fact that *these relations* are found in things that are distinct."[12]

"That *inclusion* is said to be identical and *essential,* when certain things are so related that one *includes* the other *essentially,* and vice versa, as is *manifest* in God, in Whom the divine essence *essentially includes* each and every attribute and conversely each attribute *includes* the divine essence itself; or when two things *essentially* coincide in a third one, as, e.g. the *passions and modes* in *being itself.*"[13]

"On the other hand, there are *relations,* not accidental but *essential,* which are *implicit* in a given essence or in one of its faculties. *The concept which expresses this essence expresses at the same time the relations which it contains.* Thus, *being* denotes that which bears relation to existence and this relation is *included* in the very *nature* of that which exists . . . What we say of being in general and of its properties can likewise be said of *all* the absolute analogous *perfections* which the common sense of men attributes to God, e.g. intelligence, wisdom, providence, free-will, love, mercy, justice."[14]

49. COROLLARY. – Hence, the definition usually given of the theological conclusion, as the deduction of a property from the essence, and the classical example of the same, *Christ is man, therefore He is risible,* are both ambiguous and capable of two radically different senses.

If by *man* is understood the mere human essence and by *risible* is understood actual risibility, then the conclusion is of the fourth type. It is not an implicit, but a purely connexive conclusion, one that belongs to the third degree of the scale.

But if by *risible* is understood radical risibility (types 1, 2, and 3); or, if taken to mean actual risibility, by *man* is understood either the integral or the perfect man (types 5 and 6), then the conclusion is implicit in its principle and thus belongs to the second degree of the scale.

Consequently, to grasp the true mind of a theologian, it is not enough to ascertain whether he uses, or not, the given definition and example. It is necessary to verify in which of those two senses he employs them.

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[12] ST. THOMAS, *In Boet. de Trinitate,* q.5, a.3.

[13] MAGISTER AQUARIUS, O.P., *Formalitates iuxta doctrinam Angelici Doctoris,* Neapoli 1605, c.1, p.7.

[14] GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, O.P., *Dieu, son existence et sa nature,* Paris 1915, pp. 542-545, n.56.

SECTION V

EVOLUTION BY REASONING OR PASSING FROM THE CAUSE TO ITS EFFECTS

50. TWO KINDS OF CAUSES. – There are two essentially different kinds of causes, viz.: a) causes that are really identical with, and differ only conceptually from, their effects; b) causes that are really distinct from their effects.

Instances of the first kind are absolute immutability relative to eternity, or immateriality relative to cognoscibility, or spirituality relative to immortality. Absolute immutability is said to be, and is, the cause of eternity because the latter *results* from the former, and the former is the *raison d'être* of the latter. Nonetheless, the two are not distinct realities but only two aspects of the same reality. The same can be said of the other two, and of many more, examples.

Instances of the second kind of causes are fire relative to the effect of burning, or a stone's gravity relative to its falling, or the debit which is the cause of original sin relative to the fact of contracting it. Between the fire and the burning, or between gravity and the stone's fall, or between the debit of original sin and the sin itself, there is not only virtual causality or *raison d'être* but also real distinction.

Causes of the first kind are called *metaphysical,* or *virtual,* or causes *in cognoscendo* [in the order of knowing]; causes of the second kind, *physical* or *real,* or causes in *essendo* [in the order of being].

A cause of the first kind really contains in itself not only the power to produce the effect, but also the effect itself. Thus in absolute immutability is contained not merely the power to produce eternity, but eternity itself. If we distinguish between immutability and eternity, or between immateriality and cognoscibility, or between spirituality and immortality, the distinction is not real or objective, it is a distinction that is *ours* or subjective, that is, a distinction between aspects or concepts but with a basis in the object itself.

A cause of the second kind really contains the power to produce the effect, but not the effect itself. Fire contains the power of burning but not the act of burning itself, which is a thing that really differs from and, absolutely speaking, is separable from the fire. It is a distinction that is not subjective or ours, but objective or of the object in itself.

51. APPLICATION OF THE SCALE. – The progress or reasoning from the virtual or metaphysical cause to its effects obviously pertains to the second degree of the scale, or to the virtual implicit. Not to the first because the intervening distinction is not merely nominal but conceptual. Not to the

third because between the metaphysical cause and its effects there is no real or objective, but only a subjective distinction, that is, a distinction of aspects.

On the other hand, the progress or passage from the physical or real cause to its effects obviously pertains to the third degree of the scale for the exactly opposite reason. It is a purely connexive virtual, with no inclusion or objective implicitude.

52. COROLLARY. – What has been said of the definition *deduction of the property from the essence* (49), must likewise be said of the definition *deduction of the effect from the cause.* It is an ambiguous definition. If cause, in the definition, be taken to mean the metaphysical, or virtual, or cause *in cognoscendo,* then the conclusion was already objectively implicit in the starting point. If by cause be understood the physical, or real, or cause *in essendo,* then the conclusion is not implicit, but purely connexive. The reason is that the physical cause contains the *power* to produce the effect, but not the *effect* itself; whereas the metaphysical cause contains the effect itself, not merely the power to produce it.

53. CORROBORATIVE TEXTS. – Although we think that the foregoing is sufficiently clear, we shall quote supporting authorities, principally in order to penetrate well the distinction between the physical and the metaphysical cause.

The Ferrariensis:[iv] "To make this evident, observe that there are *two ways* of considering the a priori demonstration [or *by cause*]: the *first* considers that whose middle is *truly and really the cause* of the passion's inherence in the subject of which it is demonstrated. The *second* considers that whose middle is *not truly and really the cause,* but only a *middle according to reason* . . . I say, then, first: that of *God* [theological science] there can be no demonstration at all of the first sort, since there is in God *no thing truly caused* . . . I say secondly: that, indeed, neither of *being* nor of the *supreme universal genera* [*metaphysical* sciences] is there any demonstration of this sort for the same reason . . . I say thirdly: that hence it does not follow that neither *metaphysics* nor *mathematics* are *sciences,* for although no thing can be demonstrated either of being or of the supreme universal genera by the *first* sort of demonstration, nevertheless some thing can be demonstrated of them by the *second sort* or demonstration."[15]

iv. SYLVESTER OF FERRARA, O.P., is commonly known in theological literature as the *Ferrariensis,* just as Aristotle is known as the *Stagyrite,* and Thomas de Vio, O.P. is better known as *Cardinal Cajetan,* or simply *Cajetan.* – *Transl.*

[15] *In Summam Contra Gentes,* lib. 1, c.25, n.13; in the ed. Leon. of the works of St. Thomas, t.13, pp. 80-81.

John of St. Thomas: "The answer is that it is not necessary that [a demonstration] should always proceed from a cause which is *formally* and *physically* a cause, but it is enough that it be a cause *virtually* and *metaphysically,* so that one is the *reason of the other,* even without causing it, as for instance immutability is the reason of eternity and perfection the reason of goodness."[16]

Cardinal Cajetan: "Hence, speaking *formally,* not uncommonly is immutability said to be the cause of eternity, and immateriality the cause of immortality, and so in other cases."[17]

[16] *Cursus Philosophicus, Logica,* p.2, q.25, a.1, ed.Vivès, t.1, p.683.

[17] *In Post. Analyt.,* c.2, Lugduni 1572, p.283.

CHAPTER II

THE EVOLUTION OF DOGMA AND THE IMPLICIT VIRTUALITY OF THE REVEALED DATUM

54. DIVISION. – Having considered the nature of intellectual evolution in general and the various degrees of virtuality that can contribute to it, we proceed now to the study of the different virtualities of the deposit revealed by God to the Apostles and by them conveyed to the Church, and the examination of the virtualities that are, or are not, capable of true dogmatic evolution.

To this effect we shall examine seven things:

I. The starting point of dogmatic, as well as theological, evolution.

II. The origin of the modern confusion concerning the true revealed virtuality.

III. Classification of the various Catholic theories on this subject.

IV. The physico-connexive virtuality is neither a true revealed, nor a true theological, virtuality.

V. The true theological virtuality is the implicit or metaphysico-inclusive virtuality.

VI. The metaphysico-inclusive virtuality is truly homogeneous with the revealed datum and objectively revealed.

VII. Two opposed concepts of the nature of sacred theology or revealed virtuality.

SECTION I

THE TRUE STARTING POINT OF ALL DOGMATIC OR THEOLOGICAL EVOLUTION

55. REVEALED FORMULAE AND REVEALED MEANING. – Two elements must be clearly distinguished in divine revelation: a) the revealed formulae, whether verbal or imaginary; b) the revealed meaning of the formulae. These two things are respectively denominated by St. Thomas as: a) the reception of a thing; b) the judgment on the things received.

Now, the divine revelation formally consists in the revealed meaning and not merely in the formulae. If God had restricted Himself to revealing to us new formulae without disclosing their meaning, that would not be a case of true revelation but a case of mere vision. Such a vision would be as useless for divine faith as the God-sent dreams of Pharaoh or the God-sent vision of the *Mane, Thecel, Phares* seen by Belshazzar, if God Himself had not subsequently disclosed their divine meaning through Joseph and Daniel.

For true revelation to exist, and not simply vision, it is not necessary that the prophet or the inspired author should grasp *all* the meaning that God intends to convey by means of the formulae, and is truly contained in them. Neither is it necessary that the prophet or the apostle, when promulgating either orally or in writing the revelation received, should explicitly express *all* the meaning that with the aid of divine light he sees in the divine formulae. Much less is it necessary that they who hear the prophet or apostle should from the beginning understand *all* the meaning really contained in the statements of the prophet or apostle.

However, for the existence of true revelation and true divine faith it is indispensable that God should have given *some* explicit meaning to the revealed formulae; likewise, it is indispensable that the prophet or apostle should have understood, at least *something* of that divine meaning; and, finally, it is indispensable that those who hear the prophet or apostle – that is, the primitive Church in the present case – should have understood from the beginning *some* meaning, that is, some *explicit* meaning, in the apostolic formulae. Whoever receives formulae from God without perceiving some meaning would not be a true prophet but a visionary or a dreamer, nor would those who subsequently receive such formulae from the prophet or apostle be capable of eliciting any act of divine faith. Thus, not the formulae, but the divine meaning is the formal element of both revelation and faith. To receive divine formulae without receiving some divine explicit meaning cannot be properly called divine revelation; progress of formulae without progress in meaning cannot be properly called dogmatic progress.

St. Thomas has this to say: "Prophecy [or divine revelation] is a supernatural *cognition.* Now, two things are required for cognition, viz. *reception* [formulae] and judgment [meaning] of the things received. At times, therefore, the cognition is supernatural only in respect of the reception; at other times in respect of the judgment alone; and at other times in respect of both. But if it be supernatural *only in respect of the reception* [revelation of formulae unaccompanied by a revelation of meaning], a man will not therefor be called a *Prophet,* as Pharaoh, who supernaturally received a sign of forthcoming fertility and barrenness under the symbols of the cows and ears of corn, is not to be called a Prophet. But if he should have the supernatural judgment [meaning], or both the judgment and the reception [meaning and formulae], he is therefor called a prophet."[1]

"For unless there be intellectual light to *understand* the sensible representations formed in the imagination, he to whom these representations are shown is not called a prophet, but rather a dreamer. At times he is called a prophet, but *improperly* and very farfetchedly."[2]

"It must be observed that there is a difference between *vision* and *revelation:* for revelation includes vision, but not conversely. For at times some things are seen, and then there is *vision alone;* as were the visions of Pharaoh and Nebuchadnezzar. But when together with the vision the *meaning* and the *understanding* of the things that are seen are also given, *then revelation exists.* Hence, in the cases of Pharaoh and Nebuchadnezzar, the vision of the wheat stalks and of the statue was merely vision: but in the cases of Joseph and Daniel, who were given the *meaning* of the things seen, it was revelation."[3]

"For faith cannot issue into act unless by *believing* something *determinately* and *expressly.*"[4]

"For man would not assent by giving faith to certain propositions unless he *understood them somehow.*"[5]

Thus Card. Billot has very well written: "The reception of revealed truth does not consist in the material possession of the dead *letter* but in the attainment of the *meaning* and of the *understanding* of the statements."[6]

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[1] *De Veritate,* q.12, a.7.

[2] *In 1 ad Corinth.,* c. 14, lect. 1.

[3] *In 2 ad Corinth.,* c. 12, lect. 1.

[4] *In 3 Sent.,* d. 25, q.1, sol. 1, ad 3.

[5] *2-2,* q.8, a.2, ad 2.

[6] *De Ecclesia Christi,* q.10, th.16, ed.3.a (Romae), p.356.

Consequently, the *starting point* of dogmatic progress has to be an *explicitly revealed meaning.* Without some explicit meaning there can be nothing implicit or virtual, nor can there consequently be any progress or evolution.

56. THE MEANING OF THE FORMULAE IN THE DIVINE MIND. – We have just seen that the divine meaning of the revealed formulae is the essential thing in both revelation and faith. But this meaning can be considered at three different stages before it reaches us: a) in the mind of God, who conceived it and revealed it to the Apostles; b) in the mind of the Apostles, who received it from God and conveyed it to the primitive Church; c) in the mind of the primitive Church, that received it from the Apostles and conveyed it to us.

In God's mind the meaning of the formulae was not partly explicit and partly implicit, not partly immediate and partly mediate, not partly formal and partly virtual, not partly revealed and partly revealable. On the contrary, in God's mind the meaning was, and is, utterly explicit and contains formally, immediately, and actually, all the implicitude and virtuality of which the formulae are capable. Consequently, if the question whether or not progress in the meaning of dogma is possible has for its starting point or for its point of comparison the meaning of such a dogma in God's mind in order to compare it with the meaning that it has in us, it is clear that there has been no progress but, instead, a diminution or retrogression. No matter how much we unfold the meaning of the dogmatic formulae, we shall never achieve but a vastly smaller amount of the meaning that they contain and that is seen by God in them. Hence, when theologians assert that a dogma progresses in meaning, it is obvious that no progress exists if the divine mind is taken as a term of comparison. Therefore, to discern whether there has, or has not, been an increase of meaning, that is, dogmatic evolution, the starting point is not the meaning that exists in the mind of God. Relative to this starting point there can be no increase.

57. THE MEANING OF THE FORMULAE IN THE MIND OF THE APOSTLES. – What has just been said of God's mind must be likewise said of the minds of the Apostles. Not precisely because revelation was made to them immediately by God – since both the Prophets and the Hagiographers also received their revelations immediately from God, – but because revelation was made to them as to the heads or chiefs of the Church of the New Testament, in whom the *plenitude* of divine revelation on earth was consummated and brought to a close.

Where mere prophets or inspired authors are concerned it is not absolutely necessary that they should explicitly know all the implicit meaning contained in the formulae revealed or inspired by God to them. According to St. Thomas, not even true prophets know all that the Holy Spirit intends to

signify by the visions, words or events revealed to them; and there is no inconsistency in saying that today we understand the prophecies and revelations of the Old Testament much more explicitly and fully than the Prophets themselves on account of the fuller divine or dogmatic explication of those prophecies and revelations given us by Jesus Christ, the Apostles, and His Church.[7]

But the Apostles were much more than mere prophets or mere hagiographers. As supreme teachers of the full and definitive revelation, and as foundations of the Church until the end of time, traditional theology acknowledges in the Apostles the special *privilege* of having received through infused light an *explicit* understanding of divine revelation greater than that which all the theologians, or even the Church as a whole, possess or will possess up to the end of time.

Hence, all the dogmas already defined by the Church and all those that will be defined in the future existed in the minds of the Apostles, not mediately or virtually or implicitly, but immediately, formally, explicitly. Their mode of knowing the revealed deposit was not like ours. We know by means of partial and *human* concepts, that implicitly and virtually contain much

[7]"But it must be considered that, since the mind of the *prophet* is a deficient instrument, as has been said, even the true prophets do *not* know *everything* that the Holy Spirit *intends* in what they see, or say, or even do." (ST. THOMAS, *2-2,* q.173, a.4). There is nothing incompatible with this doctrine of St. Thomas in Leo XIII's encyclical *Providentissimus,* where the Pope defines inspiration in the following terms: "By supernatural power (God) so aroused and moved them to write, was in such a manner present to them while they were writing, that they *correctly conceived in their minds,* and willed faithfully to write, and aptly expressed with infallible truth *all the things* that He had commanded, and those alone; otherwise He would not be Himself the author of the S. Scriptures." (Denz.-Schön 3293).

VACANT suggests that this text of Leo XIII teaches that the Prophets knew, as the Apostles knew, *all* the divine meaning intended by the Holy Spirit: "According to various theologians, it would not be necessary for the inspired prophets to comprehend the full scope of some of the prophecies that they were writing; they would not at all have been capable of grasping their full meaning; it would be left only to future centuries really to understand their meaning. *This view is not shared by the encyclical 'Providentissimus.'* It says that all inspired writers conceive exactly *all* the statements that God causes them to formulate. *Ut ea omnia . . . recte mente conciperent". (Constitutions du Concile du Vatican,* v.1, n.461, p.469). But it is obvious that to understand the meaning (recte mente concipere) of something is very different from understanding *all* its meaning. Leo XIII simply says that the inspired authors understood the *meaning, of* all the things inspired by God – St. Thomas had already said as much –; but the Pontiff does not say that they understood *all* their *meaning.* However, the question is unimportant relative to the subject matter we are dealing with now for we are here concerned with the Apostles, and with respect to what amount of meaning was understood by the Apostles. All the theologians concur with St. Thomas in asserting that they knew as many dogmas as the Church may define.

more meaning than they express, and require effort and time successively to unfold or explicate what is contained in them. They knew by means of *divine* or infused light, which is a simple supernatural understanding that in one stroke actualizes and illumines all the implicitude and virtuality.

Thus, if we take as a term of comparison the meaning of the revealed deposit as it was in the mind of the Apostles in order to compare it with the meaning that we know, then something similar to what we said of the mind of God must be said; namely, that there has been no progress but rather diminution or retrogression. We know, and will know, of the meaning of the revealed deposit much less and less explicitly than what the Apostles knew. When we talk of dogmatic progress, it must not be understood to mean progress beyond what the Apostles knew. Therefore, the mind of the Apostles cannot be the starting point or primitive datum required in order to detect the presence or the absence of dogmatic progress.[8]

[8]"It is not to be expected that a future state will come in which the grace of the Holy Spirit will be had more perfectly than it has been had up to now, especially by the Apostles, who received the first fruits of the Holy Spirit; that is, to say, *first in time* as well as *more abundantly than the rest."* (ST. THOMAS, *2-2,* q.106, a.4) "Sometimes, in order to manifest his power,[God] infuses in man those habits that can be aquired by natural energies; e.g. to the Apostles He gave the *knowledge of the Scriptures* and of all languages, which can be acquired by *men* through *study* or custom, although *not as perfectly."* (*1-2,* q.51, a.4) "The Apostles *knew* with *greater fullness* the mysteries of grace." (*2-2,* q.1, a.7, and 4) *"It is an error in the faith* to assert that, after the time of the Apostles, the *Doctors of the Church, or even the Church herself, believe many more things pertaining to the faith,* or believe *more explicitly,* than did the Apostles and the Sacred Writers of the evangelical doctrine." (BÁÑEZ, *2-2,* q.1, a.7) This is to be understood, as St. Thomas himself admonishes, of the knowledge of all *doctrine* of faith or of morals, not of the knowledge of *contingent facts* or future events, e.g. what Councils or Popes were going to be in the Church. "The Holy Spirit taught the Apostles *all* the truth concerning those things that are necessary for salvation; that is to say, things to be believed and to be done; but He did not teach them the truth about all future *events."* (*1-2,* q.106, a.4) "Finally, on account of that which is said of the Apostles, we can distinguish between two orders of propositions, which come to be explicitly believed in the course of time: for certain propositions belong, as it were to the substance of the mysteries; e.g. in the case of the mystery of the Incarnation, that Christ had two wills; and in that of the Eucharist, that the substance of the bread does not remain after the consecration, and others similar to these. Of these and other such propositions it is to be believed that they were known by the Apostles not only implicitly but *explicitly* for theirs was a perfect knowledge of the Scriptures and of all the mysteries that belonged to the teaching of faith. But there are other contingent propositions, which had not happened yet during the time of the Apostles; e.g. that this man is the Pope, that this Council is a true Council, and others of the same kind. Propositions such as these the Apostles had no need of knowing explicitly, but only in general, for it was not necessary that they should know all future events." (SUÁREZ, *De fide,* d.2, s.6, n.18)

These *contingent* things, that were unknown to the Apostles, are today called *dogmatic facts.* Since they are not contained in the revealed deposit except conditional-

58. THE MEANING OF THE FORMULAE IN THE PRIMITIVE CHURCH. – Something altogether different must be said of the revealed formulae as they existed in the primitive Church. The Apostles conveyed to the Church, in written or oral formulae, all the things that God had revealed to them to be communicated. However, the Apostles did not give the Church all the explication or explicit meaning of those revealed formulae which they knew, and which was really and truly implicit in them. That explication was given by the permanent dogmatic magisterium, which is nothing else but a perpetual continuation of the divine apostolic magisterium for the purpose of developing or unfolding more and more the revealed deposit's implicitude as required by the heresies, disputes, or needs of each epoch.

Thus, the primitive Church received from the Apostles the whole deposit of Sacred Scripture and Divine Tradition, with no further expectation or possibility of any new revelation. But the primitive Church did not receive from the Apostles the infused light given them by God wherewith to encompass in one single stroke all the divine meaning that is truly included in, although not formally expressed by, the revealed formulae. For this reason, the apostolic formulae, notwithstanding their divine and revealed origin, are couched in purely human language, and human formulae never succeed in expressing all the virtuality and meaning implicitly contained in them; much less when it is a question of expressing by these means sublime and fecund divine realities. Such formulae are like seeds bursting with life, or better still, like trees abounding in sap that await only a favourable environment to unfold into branches, flowers and fruits the same virtuality and vitality already contained truly in them.

Consequently, the true starting point of dogmatic progress is the apostolic formulae as they issued from the lips or the pen of the Apostles. Hence, where it is a question of determining whether dogmatic progress or evolution has existed, or whether the progress was only a transition from the formal-implicit to the formal-explicit or also a transition from the virtual-implicit to the formal, it is misleading to focus attention on those dogmas as they existed either in the mind of God or in the mind of the Apostles. In both these instances there is no sense in talking of formal and virtual, mediate and immediate, implicit and explicit. In either case everything was not only formal and immediate, but also explicit, and the question of progress or evolution makes no sense.

What must engage our attention is the state of those dogmas in the mind of the primitive Church; not in the mind of God or the Apostles. In

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ly, as we shall see subsequently (256), they are not seen in the deposit until such time as the condition is verified; that is, until the event really takes place; e.g. the election of such a Pope, the celebration of such a Council, the writing of such a book of Jansen.

other words, whether all our actual dogmas were already contained formally, or only virtually, in the written or oral *formulae* emanating from the Apostles; giving these formulae not precisely the meaning which the supernaturally illumined mind of the Apostles explicitly understood in them, but the meaning that the formulae of themselves express, as they were understood by the primitive Church.

59. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM OF THE EVOLUTION OF DOGMA. – We have just seen that the starting point of all dogmatic progress lies in the revealed formulae conveyed by the Apostles to the primitive Church. These formulae, as every other human formula, are made up partly of meaning formally expressed, and partly of meaning virtually implicit.

Now, all Catholic theologians agree in that not only the formulae are revealed, but that their immediate or formal content is also revealed, and therefore definable as of divine faith. But is their mediate or virtual content also revealed, and therefore also definable as of divine faith? If it is not, then no true dogmatic evolution is possible, since without virtuality there is no evolution, and without truly revealed virtuality there is no dogmatic evolution. If it is, then dogmatic evolution is possible: evolution because it is an unfolding of virtuality, dogmatic because it is an unfolding of revealed virtuality.

Clearly, then, the whole problem of dogmatic evolution hinges on the existence or non-existence of true *revealed virtuality*. The solution of the latter problem requires, first of all, that the theologians be unanimously agreed on what is meant by revealed virtuality. But does such unanimity exist among theologians? To this question we now turn our attention.

SECTION II

HISTORICAL ORIGIN OF THE MODERN CONFUSION CONCERNING THE TRUE REVEALED VIRTUALITY

60. UNITY IN FORMULAE AND DIVERSITY IN MEANING. – We have earlier mentioned (3) that Catholic doctrine encompasses four degrees: a) revealed datum; b) dogmas of faith; c) infallible truths; d) theological conclusions.

When the problem of determining the nature of each of those four degrees arises, all theologians agree on the four following formulae or criteria: a) in the Catholic doctrine there are formally or immediately revealed truths, and virtually or mediately revealed truths; b) formally or immediately revealed truths make up the proper or *per se* object of *divine faith;* c) virtually or mediately revealed truths make up the proper or *per se* object of *theology;*

d) the *infallibility* of the Church has for its primary object the formally or immediately revealed truths, and for its secondary object the virtually or mediately revealed truths.

To avoid useless repetitions of synonymous terms, we will note once and for all that in this matter formal is the same as immediate, and virtual the same as mediate.[9]

There is complete unanimity among all theologians, ancient and modern, on those four formulae or criteria which denote the nature of the objects of *divine faith,* theology, and the *Church's infallibility.* However, unanimity in the *formulae* is of little value where there exists a divergence in the *meaning.*

The reader will have, in effect, noticed that in these formulae divine faith, and infallibility, are defined in function of two objects; i.e., the formally revealed and the virtually revealed. Therefore, accordingly as either distinction or identity exists between the immediately or formally revealed and the virtually or mediately revealed, there will also exist a parallel distinction or identity between divine faith, theology and infallibility among themselves. The slightest change in either the nature or the extension of these objects will necessarily entail the same change in their corresponding habits. With the same formula it is possible for each author to say or understand different things simply by having a different idea of what is meant by *immediate* or *formal* and by *mediate* or *virtual.*

[9] It seems almost pointless to remark that whenever, in theology or in ecclesiastical documents, mention is made of divine *revelation,* whether immediate or mediate, the term is always taken to mean the *supernatural* revelation, not the natural knowledge that we obtain through the inspection or study of created things. The latter is sometimes improperly called *revelation,* or *mediate* revelation, but one that is completely *natural.* Of these two revelations, natural and supernatural, St. Albert the Great speaks in the following text.

"There are two modes of revelation: the first mode is that effected by the general light placed in us [natural;] and this is the mode of revelation to philosophers . . . The second light is for contemplating the things above this world [the supernatural,] and it is over and above us. By this light this science [sacred theology] is revealed. The first shines in the self-evident things [first principles of natural reason;] the second in the *articles of faith".* (ALBERTUS MAGNUS, *Summa Theolog.,* p.1., tract. 1, q.4. ad 3). St. Thomas treats of the comparison between supernatural revelation, which is usually called immediate, and natural revelation, often termed improper or mediate, in the following passages: "For it [theology] accepts its principles *not from other sciences;* but *immediately from God* through revelation." (P.1, q.1, a.5 ad 2) "By knowledge, *not taken from creatures,* but *immediately inspired by divine light..*" (*In 1 Sent.,* prol., q.1. a.1) This term *immediately* contradistinguished from the *natural* order or revelation, which is also described as *mediate,* has absolutely nothing to do with the meaning of the terms *immediate* and *mediate* within the *supernatural* revelation, which is our only concern at present.

Thus, if one wishes to know an author's opinion on the nature or extension of divine faith, theology, or infallibility; nothing is gained by investigating whether the author employs those formulae; what should be verified is the meaning he gives to the terms formally or immediately revealed, and virtually or mediately revealed, which form the basis of the four formulae. Everything depends on this.

In this section we propose to make the following clear. First, that since Suárez up to the present, the majority of the theologians employ the terms immediately or formally revealed, and mediately or virtually revealed, in a sense totally at variance with the sense in which they were, and are, understood by traditional theology, and particularly by St. Thomas. Secondly, that by holding a different notion of these two objects, they consequently hold a different concept of the nature and extension of both divine faith and theology. Thirdly, that by modifying the meaning of these two terms, they have also modified the genuine meaning of the formulae, thus giving rise to the curious phenomenon whereby with the same formulae some authors mean radically different things, while with other different formulae others mean one and the same thing. Finally, that, from the variation introduced by Suárez in the meanings of formal or immediate, and virtual or mediate, proceeds the persuasion held by many that no true dogmatic evolution is possible by way of virtuality or theological conclusion, as well as the maddening difficulty experienced by certain theologians and apologists in reconciling the teachings of modern theology with the evident facts of the history of dogmas.

To make all this as clear as possible we will briefly examine four points: a) St. Thomas's teaching on what is meant by virtually or mediately revealed, properly speaking; b) Suárez's innovation; c) the consequences of this innovation; d) the root of the modern confusion on this matter.

1. THE VIRTUALLY REVEALED ACCORDING TO ST. THOMAS

61. THE VIRTUAL OR MEDIATE AND THE FORMAL OR IMMEDIATE IN OUR NATURAL KNOWLEDGE. — To understand well what St. Thomas means by immediate or formal, and by mediate or virtual, it is necessary to grasp well the distinction between simple understanding and reason, or between intuition and discourse.

Our power of intellectual cognition, notwithstanding its being one single faculty, differs from that of God and of the angels in that it comprises two functions or ways of knowing. Following Aristotle's lead, St. Thomas gives them two different names: a) *simple understanding,* or, in Latin, *intellectus;* b) reasoning or *discourse,* in Latin, *ratio.*

By the first of those two functions of our single intellectual faculty, we know by one single and simple act of intuition, immediately, without discourse in the proper sense. By the second, we know by means of successive acts, mediately, discursively.

The dividing line between simple understanding and reason, between intuition and science, between the immediate or formal and the mediate or virtual lies in whether discourse, properly speaking, is necessary or not.

Whenever a thing can be known by us without true discourse there is simple understanding, intuition, immediate or formal. Whenever it cannot be known except through a proper discourse, there is for us not simple understanding but science, not immediate or formal but mediate or virtual.

Hence, when our mind sees the truth or the falsehood of a proposition upon merely hearing it or upon a simple exposition of the terms, without employing any new idea, the knowledge is immediate or formal, it is a knowledge of simple understanding. In this case there is no passing or transition (discursus) from one concept to another concept, but an instantaneous perception of the relation between predicate and subject; at most there is a passage from the word to the idea, but not from one idea to another idea: Thus, to assent to the proposition *the whole is greater than its part* it is enough to hear it said, or at most, to define or explain the simple meaning of the words *whole* and *part*, without the intervention of any other concept.

Whence, the following corollary of the greatest importance in the Thomist doctrine; namely, two things are required and suffice to make a proposition immediate or formal for us: a) that we require no reasoning in order to perceive either its truth or its falsehood; b) that if some reasoning be required, it be an improper reasoning, that is to say, a reasoning ordered merely to find the formal meaning of the terms.

The second function of our intellectual cognition, called *reasoning* or *science* differs essentially from the first. Often it is not enough to know or verify the formal meaning of the two terms, i.e. the predicate and the subject, but we further require the intervention of a new term or concept, the intervention of a third concept, virtually distinct from the first two. By means of this new concept with which we compare the concepts of the predicate and of the subject – and only by *means* of it – can we discover the truth or the falsehood of the proposition, in *virtue* of the principle underlying all reasoning which states that things which are identical to *a third* are identical *among themselves*.

In St. Thomas's way of speaking, this second mode of knowing is called *mediate* or *virtual*, because the truth of falsehood of the proposition is not known *in itself*, but by *means*, or in *virtue*, of another concept. The mental act whereby this mode of knowing is effected is called *reasoning* or *science;*

the truths known in this manner are called *virtual* or *mediate;* and this mode of discourse is termed *proper discourse,* it being immaterial whether the new term be only *conceptually* and not *really* distinct as in the mathematical sciences, or *really* distinct as in the physical sciences.

62. COROLLARIES. – Whence these two other corollaries, no less basic in the teaching of St. Thomas: a) for a conclusion or truth to be virtual or mediate relative to us it suffices that it cannot be known by us without a proper reasoning; b) for a reasoning to be proper it is not necessary that the new formulae or deduced conclusion be really distinct; if suffices that it be virtually or conceptually distinct.

We beg the reader's indulgence for explaining at some length so obvious a thing, which has already been indicated elsewhere (24-27); but this is a most fundamental point for anyone who wishes to understand St. Thomas's doctrine on the nature of divine faith and theology and the distinction of the one from the other, and, further, to perceive well the possibility of dogmatic evolution without an increase of real objectivity.[10]

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10. "So, likewise, the lower, namely, the human intellects obtain perfection in the knowledge of truth by a kind of *movement* and *discursive* intellectual operation, as they advance *from one known to another.* But if in the knowledge of a known principle they were *immediately* to perceive as known all its consequent conclusions, there would not be in them in any discourse at all. Such is the condition of the *angels,* because in the truths which they originally know naturally, they *at once* behold all things whatsoever that can be known in them. Therefore they are called *intellectual* beings: because even with ourselves the things which are instantly grasped naturally by the mind are said to be understood *(intelligi);* hence *intellect* is defined as the habit of first *principles.* But *human* souls which acquire knowledge of truth by some kind of *discourse* are called *rational;* and this comes of the *feebleness* of their intellectual light." (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.,* p.1, q.58, a.3) "For the act of *understanding* signifies the *simple acceptance* of something; whence *principles,* which are known *of themselves without any comparison,* are said to be *understood.* But to *reason, properly* speaking, is to come *from one to the knowledge of another . . .*" (Ibid., q. 83, a.4.. These two habits [understanding and science] are distinguished inasmuch as understanding regards the truth *known of itself,* while science regards the truth *known through another.*" (*Ibid.,* 1-2, q.75, a.2) "Now the intellect assents to a thing in two ways. First, through being moved to assent by its very object, which is either *known of itself,* as in the case of the first principles, which are held by *understanding;* or known through something else, as in the case of conclusions, which are held by science." (*Ibid.,* 2-2, q.1., a.4) "Whoever *understands* is determined to one *without any process of comparison . . .;* but one who *knows* (science) gives assent *through the very process of comparing* the principles to the conclusions . . ." (ST. THOMAS, *De Veritate,* q.14, a.1) Understanding designates *simple and absolute knowledge . . . Reason,* on the other hand, denotes a *discourse* whereby the *human* soul comes *from one to know another,*" (*Ibid.,* q.15, a.1) "*Immediate* propositions, that is, which are *not demonstrated by some middle,* but are clear *of themselves.* They are called immediate inasmuch as they *have no middle demonstrating them . . .* (ST. THOMAS, *In Post. Analyst.,* lib. 1, lect. 5) Mediate, that is, one that *has a middle* by which the predicate is demonstrated of its subject." (*Ibid.,* lect. 4) "*Immediately,* when the truth of the

63. THE VIRTUAL OR MEDIATE AND THE FORMAL OR IMMEDIATE IN OUR SUPERNATURAL KNOWLEDGE. – As *simple understanding* is to *reason* in the *natural order,* so is *divine faith* to *theology* in the *supernatural* or revealed order. The reason for this is that *revelation* is in the supernatural order what instrinsic *evidence* is in the natural order.

The starting point in the natural order is the first principles of reason known immediately by pure intuitive evidence, without any proper reasoning. Likewise, in the supernatural order the starting point is the first principles of faith, that is the propositions comprised in the primitive or revealed datum, known immediately by simple revelation, without any discourse. (31)

Everything that our mind perceives in the first principles of reason, either without any reasoning at all, or with an improper discourse, that is, any discourse designed to verify the meaning of the terms, is immediate or formal, not mediate or virtual. Similarly, everything that our mind perceives in the revealed datum, either without any discourse or with an improper discourse, is immediately or formally, not mediately or virtually, revealed.

Anything in the natural order, that cannot be known by our mind without proper reasoning or without the intervention of a new concept, is for us, science or reason, not simple understanding or intuition. Likewise, anything in the revealed datum or revealed premise that cannot be known by us without proper reasoning or without the intervention of a new concept, is for us, theology or theological science, not simple understanding or divine faith.

It is therefore clear that the whole teaching of St. Thomas on the distinction between faith and theology or between the immediately or formally revealed and the mediately or virtually revealed, in the supernatural order, is perfectly grounded on the distinction between simple understanding and reason, or between the immediate or formal and the mediate or virtual, in the natural order.[11]

propositions is infallibly clear at once *from the intelligible objects themselves.* This is the state of one who *understands principles* which are known *as soon* as the *terms are known . . . Mediately,* however, when the intellect, once it *knows the definitions* of the terms, is determined to one of the contradictories *in virtue of first principles.* This is the state of one who has *science,* as in the case of demonstrative *conclusions.*" (*De Veritate,* q.14, a.1) "*In all sciences* the mode of *reason* is preserved in so far as there should be a transition *from one to another according to reason,* but not that there should be a transition *from one thing to another thing,* the latter being *proper of natural science.*" (*In Boetium de Trinitate,* q.6, a.1, ad primam questionem, ad 3).

[11] "In the doctrine *of faith* the *articles* of faith *are as the self evident principles* in the knowledge which is achieved by *natural reason.*" (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.* 2-2, q. 1 a. 7) "The *superadded light* is to the things that are *supernaturally* known to us as the *natural light* is to the things that we know *primordially.*" (Ibid., q.8, a.1, ad 2) "Just *as* the habit of first *principles* is not acquired through other *sciences* [that is to say, through reasoning] but comes from nature, whereas the habit of *conclusions* deduced from the

The parallel cannot be more complete. Intrinsic *evidence* is the formal motive of both *intellectus* and *ratio,* in the natural order; *revelation* is the formal motive of both faith and theology, in the supernatural order. Natural evidence is divided into evidence *in itself* and evidence *in another;* the former is immediate or formal evidence, the latter mediate or virtual evidence; the former is the formal motive of simple understanding or intuition, the latter the formal motive of science or reason. Similarly, supernatural revelation is divided into revelation in *itself* and revelation *in another*[i]; the former is immediate or formal revelation, the latter mediate or virtual revelation; the former is the formal motive of faith, the latter the formal motive of theological science.

St. Thomas does not have two philosophies or two nomenclatures, one for the natural, and another for the supernatural, order. The philosophy and the nomenclature employed by him in the natural order to denote simple understanding and reason as well as the immediate or formal and the mediate or virtual evidence, which are the two cognitive habits together with their corresponding specific objects in the natural order, the same are also employed, and employed in the same sense, to denote divine faith and sacred theology as well as the immediate or formal and the mediate or virtual revelation, which are the two cognitive habits and their corresponding specific objects in the supernatural order.

64. COROLLARIES. – Hence two parallel corollaries, equally fundamental in the doctrine of St. Thomas – and never to be forgotten by anyone who does not wish to get disoriented in these matters, – to wit: a) any truth that cannot be deduced by us from the revealed datum or premise except by means of *proper reasoning* is for us *virtual* or mediate, not formal or imme-

first principles is acquired, so, too, in this doctrine the habit of *faith,* which is like the habit of *principles,* is not acquired [through science or reasoning,] whereas the habit of those things that are deduced from them [the principles of faith] is acquired." (*In I Sent.,* prol., q.1, a.3, sol.2) "'And just *as God,* by the very fact that He knows Himself, knows *other things in His own manner,* namely, through *simple intuition,* not through discourse; *so also,* from the things we grasp *by faith* through adherence to the First Truth, *we* come to know *other things in our own manner,* that is, through *discourse* going from principles to conclusions. Hence, in this science the original things themselves which we hold by *faith* are as *principles* to us, and the rest as *conclusions.*" (*In Boetium de Trinitate,* prooem., q.2, a.2) "The knowledge of *faith* belongs most of all to *understanding;* for we do not receive it through the investigation of reason, but we assent to it by the *simple acceptance* of the intellect." (*Ibid.,* q.2, a.2, ad tertiam quaestionem. ad 3). "For [sacred doctrine] does not receive its *principles* from other *sciences,* but receives them *immediately* from God through *revelation.*" (*Summa Theol.,* p.1, q.1, a.5, ad 2) "Faith clings to *divine Truth* itself as its *medium* of knowing." (*Ibid.,* 2-2, q.1., a.1)

[i] The term *revelation* is here to be understood in an *objective* sense, i.e. for the revealed deposit. – *Transl.*

diate revelation; b) any reasoning in which the new formula or deduced conclusion expresses a *concept* although not a reality, *distinct* from that of a revealed datum or premise from which it is inferred, is for us a case of proper reasoning, and therefore of virtual or mediate revelation. (27)

All the foregoing is merely the ABC of the teaching of St. Thomas, as every Thomist knows. Should anyone desire a more ample exposition on the distinction between the immediately and the mediately revealed, he will find it in Section IV of Chapter III, nn. 157-169, where we shall examine the relationship between the authority of the Church and mediate or virtual revelation.

II. – SUÁREZ'S INNOVATION CONCERNING THE VIRTUALLY REVEALED

65. Section 11 of Disputation III of Suárez's treatise *On Faith*, is epoch-making in the history of theology. That section bears the title "*Whether* **virtual** *or* **mediate** *revelation suffices for the formal object of faith.*" To this title of great significance for the problem of the evolution of dogma Suárez added the subtitle "*Where* [*study is made*] of the **formal distinction** *between the objects of* **faith** *and* **theology**." [12]

66. IMPORTANCE OF THE QUESTION. – The subtitle clearly indicates that Suárez is well aware of the importance of the subject he intends to study, and of the fact that the formal distinction or identification of divine faith and theology hinges completely on the nature of the revealed virtual or mediate.

Suárez begins by observing, and with good reason, that the question proposed in the title is almost the equivalent of the following: "Whether a proposition inferred by discourse from two principles of faith, or from a premise of faith and another natural premise, is to be held by faith."[13] This heading, to all appearances so inconsequential, that many manuals dismiss in a few lines as if it were an antiquated disquisition, conceals all of the modern problem concerning the homogeneity or the transformation of Catholic dogma.

That question, translated into modern terms, reads exactly as follows: When in the course of time divine revelation (premise of faith) comes into contact, or inters into combination, with what today we call human cultures or philosophies (premise of reason), is the result (conclusion) of such contact the corruption or transformation of the primitive Gospel, or simply its homogeneous development? Is the result – called by the ancients conclusion – of

[12] *Opera omnia*, ed. Vivès, t.12, p.95.

[13] *Loc.cit.*, n.1.

identical value as the Gospel – to be *of faith* means exactly that – or is it of merely human value – which is what is meant by saying that it is not of faith but merely a theological conclusion?

These observations, which thoroughbred theologians will find commonplace, are made because there is no dearth of superficial theologians who seem not to have penetrated beyond the rind of Scholastic terminology, and who, on the matter of the evolution of dogmas, blissfully assert that the old masters said little or nothing on the subject. There is hardly any modern problem related to dogma that has not been studied, and thoroughly at that, by the old Schoolmen. The theologian desirous of fundamental principles for the solution of such problems would be wise to go back to them. But to return to Suárez.

67. SUBDIVISION INTO TWO QUESTIONS. – Suárez, following the lead of the Thomist tradition, subdivided the proposed question into two others: first, whether the conclusion deduced from a premise of faith and a premise of reason is of faith *before* the Church's definition; second, whether it is of faith *after* the definition. He deals with the first question from No. 2 to No. 11; with the second, in Nos. 11 and 12.

68. UNANIMITY RELATIVE TO THE SECOND QUESTION. – Touching the question whether the theological conclusion is of divine faith *after* the Church's definition, Suárez observes that the affirmative answer is unanimous among the theologians, so much so that of all the great theologians who preceded him, only one has affirmed the contrary, and that one is Molina.

69. SUÁREZ'S TRADITIONAL SPIRIT. – In contrast to his predecessor Molina, or his contemporary Vázquez, or his succesor Ripalda, Suárez is an eminently traditional spirit, and when an opinion is common among the theologians, he very rarely ventures the contrary. Thus, in spite of the affection, not to say respect, he always shows for Molina, Suárez can hardly contain in the present instance his amazement (*it is amazing*, he says in No. 3) that Molina had dared, against all tradition, to deny that the theological conclusion is of faith even *after* its definition by the Church. And against Molina he establishes, not as probable, but as certain, the following thesis: "It is to be said, in the third place, that the theological conclusion *after* it has been defined by the Church, is *of faith formally and most properly*, not only mediately but immediately. This opinion seems to me *certain* and gathered from the *common consent of theologians*. Nor do I find any theologian who contradicts it."[14]

[14] *Loc.cit.*, n.11

Up to this point Suárez treads on firm ground, as does anybody who follows a view common to all the great masters of theology. That this view was not only common, but completely unanimous prior to Molina, seemed so obvious to Suárez, that he did not even bother to quote from them. We shall do so in the last chapter of this book (352-398) listing them by centuries.

70. SUÁREZ'S ECLECTIC SPIRIT. – Eminently traditional where common doctrines are concerned, Suárez is also one of the most eclectic spirits in matters where his predecessors are divided among themselves. Suárez rarely declares himself unconditionally for any of two opposed schools. More often than not, he introduces a distinction or observation of his own, undoubtedly moved by the praiseworthy intention of reducing the distance between the adversaries. However laudable this purpose, it is not always philosophically sound and can often prove dangerous; for when it is a question of harmonizing heterogeneous, or even contradictory, systems, there is the risk of making a mess of everything instead of putting things in order. This is the risk run by all eclectic or concordist spirits, a risk into which Suárez fell, as we shall presently see, in his treatment of the first question, viz., whether the theological conclusion is of faith *prior* to its definition by the Church.

71. TWO CONTRARY OPINIONS ON THE FIRST QUESTION. – On this subject Suárez found theological opinion divided.

A first opinion holds that the revealed virtual or theological conclusion is of divine faith of itself, prior to its definition by the Church; it can thus be given the assent of divine faith by any one who deduces it through evident reasoning. Such is, according to Suárez, the view of Cano, Vázquez, and Vega. We hope to show elsewhere (449) that Cano is not of this opinion, as Suárez himself recognizes subsequently.[15] Lastly, Suárez very well observes that all those who fail to distinguish specifically the habits of divine faith and theology must consistently follow this view of Vázquez and Vega.

A second opinion, described by Suárez as radically opposed (*extreme contraria*), holds the negative view, that is, that prior to its definition by the Church, the revealed virtual or theological conclusion is not of divine faith but a mere theological conclusion, to which no assent can be given other than theological assent. This is, says Suárez, *"what is commonly held by . . . Capreolus, Cajetan, the Thomists, and quite clearly St. Thomas."*[16]

[15] N.7.

[16] *Loc.cit.*, n.3.

72. SUÁREZ'S ATTITUDE. – Had Suárez been a loyal Thomist, after the manner of Capreolus or Cajetan, Báñez or Medina, John of St. Thomas or Gonet, Gotti or Billuart, it would be easy to tell *a priori* the view he would follow. Having confessed that the two above-mentioned opinions were irreconcilable *(extreme contraria)*, and that St. Thomas clearly held the second *(ac plane D. Thomas)*, a thoroughbred Thomist would have unhesitatingly commited himself to the second opinion.

But Suárez, rather than a Thomist, was, as we have indicated, one of those eclectic minds who have never taken an oath *upon the word of the master*, not even if that master happens to be St. Thomas.

Thus instead of aligning himself openly and completely with one of these two contrary opinions, Suárez opts to agree partly with one and partly with the other, that is, to concur in part with Vázquez and Vega, and in part with St. Thomas. To this effect he introduces into the problem a new factor of his own invention, to which he gives the name *revealed* **formal-confused**. To our mind, this formal confused is the real cause of all the confusion in post-Suarezian theology concerning the definability as of divine faith of the true and proper theological conclusion, or equivalently, concerning the evolution of dogma by way of a proper and rigorous implicit virtuality. The notions of the revealed formal and the revealed virtual are correlative; the slightest modification in the understanding of the one overflows into the understanding of the other, and modifies in parallel fashion the notions of divine faith, theology and dogmatic progress, which are correlative to the notions of revealed formal and revealed virtual.

73. THE FORMAL CONFUSED AND THE PROPER VIRTUAL, ACCORDING TO SUÁREZ. – There is a distinction, in philosophy, between two kinds of properties, and consequently, there are two kinds of virtuality and of conclusions. Properties of the first kind express nothing more than a *concept* distinct from the essence or principle from which they flow; properties of the second kind express, not only a different concept, but also a distinct *reality* or objectivity. The former are really identical with the starting point, and thus, inseparable from it, even by divine power; the latter are really distinct from the starting point, and therefore separable from it, absolutely speaking. The former are called metaphysical, or essential, or radical properties; they constitute the implicit virtuality of the metaphysical and mathematical sciences. The latter are called physical or accidental, or formal properties; they constitute the virtuality, not implicit, but purely connexive, of the physical sciences. (44)

Well then, Suárez considers the first kind of properties or virtuality not *virtual* in the proper sense, but truly *formal* although formal *confused*. On the other hand, he considers *properly virtual* only the second kind of properties, or virtuality, or conclusions.

Hence, by the new name of *formal confused* Suárez understands two kinds of conclusions: a) conclusions inferred through improper reasoning or mere exposition of terms, such as occurs in conclusions in which the defined is inferred from the definition, the parts from the whole, the particular from the universal, or one correlative from the other. Modern theologians call these *formal implicit.* b) Conclusions that are *conceptually distinct* from the revealed premise and, thus, *really identical* with it and absolutely *inseparable* from it. These are today known by the names *virtual implicit,* or virtual identical, or virtual connexive-essential. (32-33)

On the other hand, by the name of proper virtual, or theological conclusions in the proper sense, Suárez understands only those conclusions that express something *really distinct,* and absolutely speaking *separable* from the revealed premise from which they are inferred. The moderns call these merely virtual, merely mediate, merely connexive (***virtuale* tantum**, ***mediate* tantum**, ***connexive* tantum**); but we will always call them virtual non implicit or virtual physico-connexive.[17] This, for Suárez, is the true and proper revealed virtuality, the true and proper theological conclusion, theology in the proper and rigorous sense.[18]

Any one who is not well versed on these matters and reads Suárez for the first time, might not find it obvious that by *formal confused* Suárez understands all that we have just attributed to him. But we are certain that all true disciples of Suárez, as well as any one who attentively reads the whole of Section 11 of Disputation III of the treatise on Faith, which is the subject of the present discussion, will agree that that is the genuine mind of Suárez. In support we will quote a witness above suspicion, Ripalda: "The third opinion lies *midway* [that is, midway between the views held by Vázquez and Vega and the view held by St. Thomas,] to wit, that the object of such a conclusion is credible by faith when it is *really identified with the revealed object, but not if it be really distinct and separable from it:* and therefore the *metaphysical property* of a nature is credible by faith in virtue of the revelation of the nature itself, but not so its *physical property.* Consequently the *radical* and remote risibility of Christ belongs to the faith by which we believe that Christ is man; but not the *formal* and proximate risibility which we suppose *separable* and *distinct* from the nature, notwithstanding the fact that the *conclusion of both properties* is deduced from the revelation of human nature

[17] We could have said more briefly, and perhaps even more clearly, that of the three degrees comprised in the scale of progress (30), Suárez has grouped together the first and second degrees under the name of formal confused, and reserved the name of virtual properly speaking for the third degree.

[18] *Loc.cit.*, n.5.

and simultaneously from the evident *knowledge* whereby human nature is radically and proximately risible. Thus Suárez and Lugo."[19]

Thus similarly Lugo,[20] Haunoldo,[21] Card. Mazella,[22] or any other Suarezian author.

74. SUÁREZ'S SOLUTION. – Having made the distinctions of formal confused and proper virtual, Suárez is thereafter perfectly logical and traditional, and brings to the solution of the problem none other but the Thomist principles, according to which all that is formally revealed belongs to faith while all that is virtually revealed pertains *per se* to theology.

Thus, to the question whether revealed virtuality, that is, the theological conclusion is of divine faith *per se,* or without the Church's definition, Suárez replies quite logically with the two conclusions that follow:

1. If it be a question of that virtuality or those conclusions called *formal* confused, then such conclusions are of faith *per se* or prior to their definition by the Church and can be given an assent of divine faith by the theologian provided only that he comes to know them through evident reasoning. "In this", says Suárez, "I concur with the first opinion", that is, with Vázquez and Vega.

2. If it be a question of those conclusions described as properly virtual or merely virtual, they are not *per se* of divine faith, nor can they be given an assent of divine faith, but only a theological assent. "In this", says Suárez, "I follow Capreolo, Cajetan, and St. Thomas." Suárez deserves to be quoted literally and in Latin:

Dico ergo *primo:* Revelatio *formalis,* etiamsi *confusa* sit, sufficit ad obiectum formale fidei et consequenter ad assentiendum de fide particularibus contentis sub tali revelatione, si sufficienter ad illa applicetur, et homo utatur discursu convenienti modo ad assentiendum. *In hac assertione convenio cum prima sententia* . . . Dico *secundo:* Revelatio *tantum virtualis* seu mediata non sufficit ad obiectum formale fidei, et consequenter assensus in illa fundatus, cum iuvamine alicuius principii naturaliter evidentis, non sufficit ad proprium assensum fidei, sed tantum ad theologiam. Hanc sententiam

[19] RIPALDA, *De Fide,* d.8, s.3, n.37; ed. Vivès, t.7, p.143.

[20] LUGO, *De Fide,* d.1, s.13, nn. 259, 265, 286.

[21] HAUNOLDO, *De fide,* L3, n.145.

[22] *De Virtutibus Infusis,* n.414.

praeter auctores citatos . . . tenet non obscure Caietanus . . . etiam idem sentit D. Thomas . . . ubi etiam Capreolus."[23]

75. TRADITION AND INNOVATION. – In the position taken by Suárez we have to distinguish carefully the part which he has preserved of the Thomist tradition, and the part in which he has introduced an innovation.

Suárez hews to tradition in four things: a) in retaining the division of the revealed into immediate or formal, and mediate or virtual; b) in affirming that the former is the *per se* object of divine faith, and the latter the *per se* object of theology; c) in denying, against Vázquez and Vega, that the revealed virtual is of faith *per se*, that is, without need of being defined by the Church; d) in maintaining, against Molina, that it is of faith after the definition.

On the other hand, Suárez is an innovator in two things: a) in considering as properly virtual only the virtual non-implicit or physico-connexive, which is really distinct, and absolutely separable, from the formal; b) in considering as formal, albeit qualifying it as *confused*, the implicit or essential virtual, in other words, all conclusions really identical with the revealed premise, but conceptually distinct from it.

Thus, Suárez's theory nominally retains the division between the formally revealed and the virtually revealed. But under the new label of *confused*, Suárez has furtively transferred all implicit virtuality, that is, the whole of theology rigorously speaking, to the department of the revealed formal or of divine faith; for, it is obvious – and we hope to make it clear in the following sections – that no rigorous theological conclusion is possible, and likewise no rigorous metaphysical or mathematical conclusions, except through implicit or essential virtuality.

76. THE SERIOUSNESS OF SUAREZ'S INNOVATION. – To understand the immense transcendence of Suárez's innovation it is enough to consider three things.

1. In order to deduce or explicate implicit virtuality, our weak human reason requires in every case a proper reasoning, a reasoning that is often

[23] "Therefore I say, *first: Formal* revelation, even if it be *confused*, suffices for the formal object of faith and consequently for giving the assent of faith to the particulars contained under such revelation if the latter is sufficiently applied to the former, and the man employs discourse in a manner convenient to generate assent. *In saying this I concur with the first opinion* . . . I say, *secondly: Merely virtual* or mediate revelation does not suffice for the formal object of faith, and consequently the assent based on it with the further aid of a naturally evident principle, does not qualify as a proper assent of faith, but only as theology. This opinion, besides the authors cited, . . . is not obscurely held by Cajetan. . . . St. Thomas also is of the same view. . . . Likewise Capreolus." (*Loc.cit.*, n.6-7)

complicated and profound, as may be seen in mathematics and metaphysics. Now, then, to characterize such a virtual as formal or immediate and as pertaining *per se* to divine faith, is to overturn completely the doctrine of St. Thomas, who excludes from the domain of divine faith, which is a simple understanding, all that our reason is incapable of knowing except by a proper reasoning.

2. Implicit virtuality includes all the conclusions that are really identical and objectively homogeneous with the revealed premise or deposit of faith. Consequently, the exclusion of this virtuality from theological science properly speaking, and its inclusion in the domain of faith, leaves theology without any homogeneity or objective continuity with the revealed deposit; it opens a *hiatus* or objective abyss between dogmatic matter and properly theological matter.

3. Implicit virtuality, inasmuch as it is grounded on real identity, is immune from failure for as long as the principle of contradiction stands; it is therefore, the only virtuality capable of investing the discourse or its conclusion with an absolute certainty that not even God can invalidate. Hence, to remove such a virtual from theology means bereaving theology of absolute certainty, leaving it inferior in certainty to metaphysics and mathematics, and with only the certainty of the absolutely fallible and contingent physical sciences. (37)

III. CONSEQUENCES OF SUAREZ'S INNOVATION

77. Suárez's innovation opens an interesting historico-theological episode of incalculable consequences for the problem of dogmatic evolution, which no one, as far as we know, seems to have noticed. Three theologians of the first order: Suárez, Lugo, and the Salmanticenses, take part in it.

Prior to Suárez, no renowned theologian, with the exception of Molina, had denied the definability of faith of what traditional theology called the revealed virtual. In other words, no one had denied that the third and fourth degrees of Catholic doctrine were capable of a definition of faith. Since by that term they meant inclusive virtuality, its definability was no problem because it is in itself or objectively identical with the formally revealed. Thus, when the Church defines it as a truth of faith, she teaches us nothing but what was from the beginning objectively implicit in the revealed deposit.

On the contrary, since the innovation introduced by Suárez, the term virtual came to denote a virtual really distinct from the revealed premise and thus not implicit objectively in the revealed datum, which is the same as saying that it is not revealed. Consequently, the problem of the objective homogeneity and definability of the last two degrees of Catholic doctrine met

with an insurmountable difficulty. In his attempt to solve it, Suárez resorts to an unheard of and dangerous theory: the theory of new revelations. Lugo tries to correct Suárez's error without correcting its root, and himself falls into another theory, not as dangerous, but equally indefensible: the theory of indefinite or transforming assistance. Finally, the Salmanticenses realize that Suárez and Lugo had left behind a knot that defied unraveling. They themselves are unable to untie it because they are not aware where the tangle lay. And so they cut it clean with the daring stroke of their famous *Nego majorem*, denying, as Molina did, against all the theological tradition, that the Church had ever defined the revealed virtual, or can ever define it, as a truth of faith.

As this episode has had serious consequences for all subsequent theology, and we do not know that it has been noticed by anybody up to now, we shall describe it, explaining briefly: a) Suárez's theory of new revelations; b) Lugo's transforming assistance; c) the famous *Nego majorem* of the Salmanticenses.

A. First Consequence: Suárez's Theory of New Revelations

78. The laws of logic are all the more inexorable, the more talented the mind that employs them. Once a false step is made, especially in the definition or understandimg of primary notions, the end result can be nothing but an absurdity. St. Thomas had already observed that a small error at the beginning becomes large in the end. This misfortune befell Suárez's great talent because he misunderstood the concept of the revealed virtual, one that is most fundamental since the other concepts of faith, theology, and dogmatic progress depend on it.

With the new definition given by himself of the revealed virtual in the proper sense of the term, Suárez at once found himself between the devil and the blue sea; he found himself with these two propositions: a) the revealed virtual in the proper sense comprises only truths that are really distinct from the revealed truths, that is to say, truths that are not revealed; b) the Church has defined as of divine faith truths that are virtually revealed, or theological conclusions in the proper sense.

The antinomy between these two propositions is too glaring to escape a man as talented as Suárez. If the proper virtual is objectively distinct from the revealed formal, then it is impossible for it to be implicitly revealed. Now, no thing that is not truly revealed, at least implicitly, can ever be defined as a truth of faith, unless we take the Church's definition for a new revelation whereby that which, prior to the definition, was not revealed is converted into something revealed. To admit new revelations is an unheard of thing in Catholic theology, and Suárez was so far from ignoring this, that he repeats it time and again in various parts of his works.

Nevertheless, Suárez clearly saw that there was no other way to harmonize the two propositions, the first of which was his own personal notion of the revealed virtuality, and the second an undeniable fact of the history of dogma. What will he do? Deny evident facts of history that conflict with certain theories, or modify the theories as may be needed to adjust them to the reality of history?

Suárez is not a man to waver. Toning down his speech as much as possible, for he senses that his position is extremely delicate and serious, he nonetheless resolutely asserts that the Church's definition is a new divine witness, a new revelation. God – says Suárez – speaks to us anew in each definition of the Church; His witness through the Church concerning a given truth is identical in value as His witness through the Apostles or the Prophets, and therefore equivalent to a true revelation. Hence, that which was not a revealed truth prior to the definition, becomes such in virtue of the definition and, consequently, is a truth of faith. Here are his own words:

"The reason therefore is that *God through the Church witnesses* what the Church defines. But the Church defines such a truth [i.e. the objectively distinct virtual] in itself and formally; therefore *by the same token* it is sufficiently placed under the formal object of faith. For the divine witness is *the same* and equally certain whether God gives it by *Himself*, or by the *Church* or by any other minister . . . Consequently, this is a sign that the Church possesses a proximate and immediate infallibility from the assistance of the Holy Spirit, which is *equivalent to a revelation*, or consummates it, if I may say so."[24]

Although Suárez's thought is altogether clear from the context, it will not be superfluous to quote two other illustrious theologians, both of Suarezian pedigree. "Therefore, if it is to be subsequently believed as a truth of faith, it is necessary that it be revealed anew by God, and this is done by the Church's definition, *as Suárez opined.*"[25] "Suárez teaches that the theological conclusion belongs to the faith because he holds that in this instance the definition of the Church is a *new revelation*."[26]

After the Vatican Council this opinion of Suárez can no longer be maintained. Cardinal Mazella justifiably describes it as intolerable, without naming its author – *"Can no longer be tolerated."*[27] To this predicament was a

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[24] *Loc.cit., n.11.*

[25] LUGO, loc.cit., n.274.

[26] MENDIVE, S.J., *Institutiones Theologicae, De Fide,* th.4; Vallisoleti 1895.

[27] *Loc.cit.,* n.411, p.207, footnote.

theologian of Suárez's calibre brought by a false understanding of the proper revealed virtuality.[28]

B. Second Consequence: Lugo's Theory of Indefinite Assistance

79. Cardinal Lugo's treatise *On Faith* is no less extensive nor less profound than that of Suárez. The subject of revealed virtuality, which is the basis of dogmatic evolution, is treated by Lugo in Disputation I, Section 13, under the title: "From the foregoing is inferred the distinction between the habit of faith and the habit of theology." The section is divided into three

[28]This theory, viz., that the Church's definition is equivalent to a new revelation, may be the key to another strange theory of Suárez, which is that *private* revelations pertain to *Catholic faith*, if and when they are approved by the Church. "With regard to this part it must be observed that *private* revelation may *be referred* either to the one who receives it or to others. . . . Now, from the aforementioned Lateran Council it can be gathered that, if others are to be under obligation to believe, the approval of the Church is required as a general rule. And *then the belief begins to be Catholic belief.*" (SUÁREZ, *De Fide*, d.3, s.10, n.7)

St. Thomas teaches that no private revelation can ever become a truth of Catholic faith. "*Our faith* relies on the revelation made to the *Apostles* and *Prophets*, who wrote the canonical Scriptures, and *not on any revelation made to other teachers.*" (*Summa Theol.*, p.1, q.1, a.8, ad 2) If at times the Church approves such private revelations, this approval requires from us nothing more than a pious or *human* faith. "It must be noted that this approval is little else but a *permission* that [private revelations] may, after mature examination, be made public for the instruction and utility of the faithful. Indeed, although the *assent of Catholic faith is neither due, nor can be given*, to revelations thus approved, nonetheless the assent of *human faith* is due them according to the rules of prudence, that is, those in keeping with which such revelationa are judged to be *probable* and piously credible." (BENEDICT XIV, *De Servorum Dei Beatificatione*, lib.2, c.32, n.11)

A number of early theologians, Thomists included, at times refer to the definitions of the Church by the name of revelation. But they expressly say that these definitions do not extend beyond unfolding that which was already truly *implicit* in the revealed deposit. Therefore by revelation they understand what today we call, as it should be called in order to preclude confusions, mere divine assistance. Apropos of this meaning in the early theologians Valencia writes to the point: "Whether the new assertion or clearer proposition of the Church should be called a *new revelation* because it is infallible in virtue of the assistance of the Holy Spirit, the same Who assisted the canonical Writers; or should not be so denominated because it contains no new truth that was not known to the Apostles; this is a *question of names.*" (GREGORIUS DE VALENTIA, *De Fide*, d.1, q.1, punct.6, t.3, p.128)

Thus Suárez is not deserving of censure precisely because he employed the term *new revelation* but because he employed it with regard to things that he himself acknowledges were not implicitly contained in the revealed deposit. In this sense Card. Mazella is right in saying that *it can no longer be tolerated* (iam tolerari non potest).

paragraphs, the first of which carries the title "Of the conclusion deduced from a premise of faith and another evident natural premise."[29]

In the wake of Suárez and all the Thomist tradition, Lugo begins by subdividing the issue into two questions: a) the theological conclusion *prior* to the Church's definition;[30] b) the theological conclusion *after* its definition.[31] Relative to the first question, Lugo recites the two completely opposed opinions we already know: the opinion of Vázquez and Vega for the affirmative, namely, that it is of faith *per se* without the definition; and the opinion of St. Thomas and his school for the negative, namely, that *per se* or without definition it is not of faith but purely theological.[32]

Before pronouncing himself for either one, Lugo explains the notions of revealed formal and virtual in exactly the same manner as Suárez. He considers *formally* revealed, although *confusedly*, any conclusion that is really identical with, although conceptually distinct from, the revealed deposit. The *virtually* revealed, *properly* speaking, includes nothing else but the conclusions that that are really distinct and absolutely separable by divine power.[33] Having made these distinctions, Lugo, with Suárez and the whole Thomist school, maintains that the virtual is not *per se* of faith, that is, prior to the definition,[34] and answers several objections against this thesis.[35]

However, there remains the second question, which is the more significant, to wit, whether the virtually revealed pertains to the faith *after* its definition. Lugo cites Molina for the negative and recalls the theory of new revelations employed by Suárez for the affirmative. The learned cardinal discards both as contrary to all theological tradition. Against Molina, he establishes that the revealed virtual is truly a truth of faith after it has been defined, and this is – he says – both the common opinion of the theologians and the constant practice of the Church. "Which is confirmed, not only by the arguments adduced by Suárez, but also by the practice and custom *of everyone.*" Against Suárez, he establishes that the Church neither has nor

[29]IOANNES DE LUGO, *Disputationes scholasticae, De Fide*, t.1, p.89; ed. Vivès, Parisiis 1867.

[30]Loc. cit., nn.258-68.

[31]Nn. 269-277.

[32]*Loc. cit.*, n.258.

[33]*Loc. cit.*, n.259-260

[34]*Loc. cit.*, n.261.

[35]*Loc. cit.*, nn.262-268.

needs new revelations to define the revealed virtuality, and that this is likewise the common view of the theologians. "For this seems *to be the common opinion of the theologians.*"[36]

Up to this point it has been easy sailing for Lugo. But at this juncture, be came across, as he had to, the Gordian knot that Suárez had run afoul of. Lugo had just admitted together with Suárez and all the theological tradition against Molina, the definability of the virtual as a truth of faith. Lugo has understood the revealed virtual in the same sense as Suárez, that is, the virtual that differs objectively from the formally revealed, and which, thus, is not revealed. He has, finally, rejected, with all the rest of the theologians, Suárez's theory of new revelations, which appeared to be the only way out of the difficulty. How, then, will Lugo solve it? How can a non-revealed virtual be defined as a truth of faith, that is, as revealed, if the theory of new revelations is set aside?

If it were the case of the virtual implicit, which therefore is revealed, such as that which both Suárez and Lugo had labeled formal confused, its definability would pose no problem.[37] Neither would there be any – Lugo adds – if it were the case of a conclusion inferred from two premises of faith.[38] But that is not the case. The case is precisely the case of the virtual in the proper sense, a virtual which is obviously not revealed. That such a virtual is not revealed Lugo had already established with these beautiful and convincing words, on which the Salmanticenses later on based themselves: "Let revelation and the revealed object be explicated as much as they will bear, the object of the conclusion will never be found to have been said by God."[39] Now, if *such* a virtual is *not truly said* by God, which is the same as not revealed, how can the Church define it as a truth of divine faith, that is, as a revealed truth, without a new revelation?

At this point Lugo gives clear proof of his flexible ingenuity. Here is his curious solution. It is true, he says, that the virtual in case is not truly revealed. But it is not less true that we have it revealed that the Holy Spirit assists the Church in *all,* and consequently in *each,* of her definitions. Hence, when such a virtual is defined by the Church, we have two revealed propositions, to wit: a) The Holy Spirit assists the Church in *all* her definitions; b) The Holy Spirit assists the Church in *this* definition of this virtual. Therefore, after its definition, such a virtual is no longer deduced from a premise of faith and a

[36] *Loc. cit.,* nn.269-271.

[37] *Loc. cit.,* n.272

[38] *Loc. cit.,* n.273

[39] *Loc. cit.,* n.261

premise of reason as happened prior to its definition; now it is deduced from two premises of faith, and consequently is of faith. Here is what Lugo literally says:

"God could have *attested not to the things themselves* but *only to His assistance,* that is, that He would not allow the Church to be deceived by proposing anything false, and from this revealed assistance of God we infer that this object proposed by the Church is true: *not because God has determinately revealed this object,* but *because its truth follows from the revealed assistance of God.* Thus, now it follows, not from *one* revealed proposition and another that is not revealed, but from *two revealed* propositions, which are these: 'What the Church proposes and defines with the assistance of the Holy Spirit to preserve her from erring, cannot be false', and again, 'The Holy Spirit assists the Church when she defines that Christ is risible'. Of these two propositions, the first is of faith . . . the second is also of faith because . . . [the first proposition] is universal and comprises all the particular cases, and thus also this one . . . Now, the proposition which follows from two revealed premises is also of faith; for [the proof of] this see the following."[40]

Suárez had said: The non-revealed virtual is a truth of faith after its definition because the Church's definition is a new revelation. Lugo says: The non-revealed virtual is a truth of faith after its definition because the Holy Spirit's assistance for its definition is a revealed truth.

Obviously Lugo assumes that which he has to prove, that is, that the Church can define *such* a virtual. As we shall see later on, the Church cannot define *such* a virtual either as a truth of faith or even as an infallible truth. With Lugo's theory we could equally prove that the Church can define infallibly the number of stars in the sky or the number of drops of water in the sea. With regard to this theory, but again without mentioning its author, Card. Mazella has written with good reason: "The Church could therefore define *whatever should please her,* prescinding from the other objects contained in the revelation conveyed by the Apostles and attending only to the promise of assistance to preserve her from error."[41]

In these two theories of Suárez and Lugo there would be no problem at all about the homogeneity of the evolution of dogma. However enormous the changes in doctrine, however profound the *hiatus* or discontinuity between the primitive datum and the subsequent developments, there always is an easy way out by resorting, with Suárez, to new revelations, or, with Lugo, to an unlimited and transforming assistance. This has been the end result, even for

[40] *Loc. cit.,* n.275

[41] MAZELLA, *loc. cit.,* n.411, p.208, footnote.

such eminent theologians as Suárez and Lugo, of a false definition or conception of the revealed virtuality properly understood.

C. Third Consequence: The Celebrated "Nego Majorem" of the Salmanticenses

80. After Suárez and Lugo came the celebrated theologians of Salamanca and with them ended in lamentable tragedy the problem of whether the proper virtual, understood in the sense of Suárez and Lugo, was definable as a truth of faith.

The Salmanticenses deal with the question of the revealed virtual in *Dubium IV* of Disputation I of their noteworthy treatise *On Faith,* Nos. 124-133.[42]

In common with all the theologians, the Salmanticenses define the revealed virtual properly understood as that which is *deduced from the revealed deposit as an effect from its cause.* However, in the wake of Suárez and Lugo, by cause they have in mind the natural or physical cause, which is always *really distinct* from the effect. Consequently by revealed virtual they understand only that which is really distinct from the revealed deposit, and therefore not revealed. This makes it easy to lay down and prove with an abundance of reasons the following conclusion: "Thirdly, it must be said that the *virtual revelation* of a certain truth *in its cause,* whether adequate or inadequate, as e.g., *that Christ is risible* is revealed in the proposition *He was made man,* does not suffice for the reason *sub qua*[ii] of the habit of faith, and consequently the aforesaid truth is *not of faith,* but *a theological conclusion.*"[43] The proofs of the thesis follow up to No. 134; but before concluding their exposition they note that in the aforecited thesis they have been speaking of the *natural* cause or cause *in being.* "We answer by denying the major with respect to the natural cause, that is of the *being* and the appearing, *of which we have been speaking in our third conclusion.*"[44]

Having understood the revealed causality or virtuality in the sense of Suárez and Lugo, the Salmanticenses inevitably had to run afoul of the same difficulty the other two had previously encountered, that is to say, the *fact* that the Church had defined virtually revealed truths as truths of faith. The

[42] Ed. Vivès, Parisiis 1879. t.11, pp. 58-71.

[ii] The reason *sub qua* (ratio sub qua) is the precise formality under which, a thing is considered. – *Transl.*

[43] N. 124

[44] N.132

difficulty is all the more serious since the fact is clearly evidenced by the history of dogmas and is admitted without exception by all theologians prior to Molina.

The Salmanticenses are aware of it, as likewise were Suárez and Lugo. They propose the difficulty to themselves as an objection, whose *major* premise is as follows: "The Church often defines as truths to be accepted by faith, many truths which *are not formally revealed* in the Sacred Writings; but which are legitimately *deduced* from what is made known therein and other added natural principles."[45]

In answer to the major, which forms the basis of the objection, the Salmantices recall and reject the Suarezian theory of new revelations as contrary to truth and all theological tradition.[46] Then they review and likewise discard Lugo's theory of indefinite and transforming assistance as inconsistent and of no value at all.[47]

Having discarded these two solutions, the Salmanticenses perceive that it is pointless to essay a new one. The revealed virtual, understood in the sense in which the Salmanticenses take it in the wake of Suárez and Lugo is a virtual that is neither explicitly nor implicitly revealed. What is not revealed can never be defined as a truth of faith. Now, then, since it must be presumed *a priori* that the Church has never done what she cannot do, the Salmanticenses cut the Gordian knot, with one bold stroke and with a solemn *We deny the major* they raze history to the ground by denying that the Church has ever defined anything virtually revealed, or any theological conclusion properly understood. Here are their words:

"Therefore, setting aside these and other solutions, we reply to the argument by *denying the major.* For the Church *never* defines as a dogma of faith that which prior to her definition is not presupposed as *formally* reveal-

[45] N.143.

[46] "This solution [Suárez's] is *not in consonance with the truth* . . . for even if everyone concedes that the things defined by the Church as dogmas properly belong to the faith, nonetheless no one says that this is so because God, through the Church's definition, *reveals to us something anew;* on the contrary, *this manner of speaking is rejected by all* " (SALMANTICENSES, *loc. cit.,* n.144).

[47] "But this solution [Lugo's] is *of no value at all* . . . Nor does it make any difference what Lugo says, to wit, that the Church's definition effects that the proposition defined by her be contained in the universal divine revelation: for *this is absolutely impossible,* since there exists no potentiality in respect of the past." (SALMANTICENSES, *loc.cit.,* n.145)

ed in the Sacred Scriptures, at least *confusedly* [we have here the Suarezian *formal confused:* an effective index to the mind of the Salmanticenses] and implicitly . . .. But that which is included in a revealed proposition *only* as an *effect in the cause* [the Suarezian and Lugonian pure virtual or physico-connexive virtual] since it is not said, or attested to, by the Holy Spirit, *cannot be defined by the Church as a dogma of faith."*[48]

No theologian prior to Molina, whether of the Thomist or of any other school, had ever dared to hurl that *Nego majorem* of the Salmanticenses, which constitutes a total denial of everything evidenced by the history of dogmas and unanimously admitted by theologians up to the end of the XVI century. And yet, one must confess that the Salmanticenses were more logical than either Suárez or Lugo. For once revealed virtuality is taken in the sense of non-implicit virtuality, which is how Suárez and Lugo understand it, such a virtual's definability of faith is impossible, and the Salmanticenses are justified in denying it. But if the Salmanticenses evinced a much greater sense of logic than did Suárez and Lugo, the latter two evinced a much greater sense of history than the former.[49]

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[48] Nn. 146 and 147.

[49] We should be sorry to learn that what we have said should cause any of our readers to think that we hold a low opinion of the authority of the Salmanticenses. On the contrary, we hold these egregious Thomists of the order of Carmel in such high esteem that we do not hesitate in making our own, in principle, the words of the Spanish Dominican Jerónimo Vives: "As often as you should read the aforesaid *Course of the Carmelites,* think of something so excellent in the school of St. Thomas, that any opinion *should be considered truly Thomist* by the sole fact that it enjoys their support." (HIERONYMUS VIVES, O.P., *De Primatu Divinae Libertatis,* l.1, n.32, p.9, Valentia 1645).

Nevertheless, *in principle,* there is no human principle – however universal we suppose it to be – that admits of no exception in particular instances. Homer himself is caught napping once in a while. The authority of Card. Cajetan, Prince of the Commentators, is incomparably greater than that of the Salmanticenses. And yet, apropos of the interpretation of a certain point in St. Thomas, a Thomist as conservative and sober as the learned Fr. Norberto del Prado, had no qualms about saying this of him: *"But Cajetan,* as the good Homer who occasionally dozes, *was certainly dozing* in the interpretation of the corollary placed by St. Thomas at the end of the article." *(D. Thomas et Bulla dogmatica "Ineffabilis Deus",* Friburgi Helvetiorum 1919, p. 196)

Finally, notwithstanding the authority of John of St. Thomas, which is not inferior to that of the Salmanticenses, a blue-blooded Thomist as Fr. Santiago Ramírez, O.P., wrote, only last year, these pointed and witty words, which every Thomist would do well to keep in mind: "One should ascertain whether in *John of St. Thomas, everything is St. Thomas's or there also is something of* John's"*(La Ciencia Tomista,* March 1922, p.183)

IV. RESUMÉ: TWO HISTORICAL DATES AND THE ROOT OF THE CONFUSION

81. In the history of theology, as in the history of any other science, there are events that can be said to be epoch-making because they are the departure points of a new orientation, good or bad, on which subsequent developments hinge. Now, then, in the problem of the revealed virtuality's definability of faith, which is none other than the problem of dogmatic evolution, there are two historical epochs prefaced by two names each vying in renown with the other: Suárez and the Salmanticenses.

Up to Suárez, all the great theologians, with the sole exception of Molina, had defended or taken for granted as beyond discussion the virtual's definability of faith. Traditional theology considered obvious the following equation:

Revealed virtual = definable as of faith

The only question in which we find theological opinion divided was the question whether the revealed virtual is of faith *before* or *after* its definition. Vázquez and Vega, and all theologians more or less affiliated with Nominalism who did not distinguish between the habits of faith and theology, maintained that it was of faith before the definition. The Thomists and all who distinguished between theology and faith maintained that it was of faith after the definition. But all were unanimous in maintaining the *definability* of the revealed virtual because by revealed virtual they understood a virtual that was implicitly, but nonetheless really and objectively, revealed.

Comes Suárez. With the new notion given by him of the revealed virtual, which Lugo later made his own, Suárez completely changes the first member of the equation, since by revealed virtual he understands a virtual that is not implicit, and hence *not revealed,* although it continues being labeled as revealed.

When in any equation one of its members is changed, the other cannot remain unchanged. However, since the second member is supported by all theological tradition and by evident facts of the history of dogmas, Suárez and Lugo, moved by an excellent traditional spirit, spare no efforts to maintain it intact, even at the cost of resorting to such strange theories as those of

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The critism leveled at a theologian – however great he may be – on a particular point, detracts nothing from his authority. To convince other schools of the impartiality of the criticism we direct at some of their theologians – be they as eminent as Scotus, Suárez and Lugo – no better proof can be given than not to refrain from criticizing or not to disguise such criticisms with euphemisms where our own men are concerned, whoever they may be, John of St. Thomas, the Salmanticenses, or Billuart.

new revelations and transforming assistance. With the advent of Suárez and Lugo, the traditional equation is transformed into the following:

Virtual (not) revealed = definable as of faith

The term *not* placed within parenthesis, signifies that both Suárez and Lugo persist in calling it revealed, although the notion they give of it evidences that it is not revealed.

Come the Salmanticenses, and the traditional equation takes a new turn. These learned theologians, who never forgive Suárez and Lugo the slightest slip, notice at once the inconsistency of Suárez's and Lugo's equation. But the manifest falsity of the theories of new revelations and transforming assistance that Suárez and Lugo had introduced on the side of the second member to prop it up, divert all the attention of the Salmanticenses to the second member, thus causing them to ignore the fact that the root of the evil is not in the second, but in the first member. And therefore, with a solemn *Nego majorem* they correct the defect of the second member, paying but meager attention to the first member. The equation, then, is reformulated as follows:

Virtual (not) revealed = *not* definable as of faith

Obviously the transformation of the traditional equation is now complete. Both members have been changed from affirmative to negative. The first *not* was furtively introduced by Suárez with the new notion of the virtual given by him. The second *not* was the result of the relentless logic of the Salmanticenses.

Modern writers on faith or theology, depend almost to a man on one of these three great theologians; their citations make it immediately clear. The only difference lies in the fact that those who are not rigorous Thomists prefer to quote Suárez and Lugo; and those that are, preferably quote the Salmanticenses. These three theologians agree in defining the revealed virtual as a virtual that is not implicit, and thus not revealed. And that is the notion of the virtual that one finds in the majority of modern authors. Since to defend its definability, it would be necessary to resort to the inadmissible theories of Suárez and Lugo, almost all modern authors concur with the Salmanticenses in denying the definability of such a virtual.

With respect to the other theological conclusions, that is, the conceptual or identico-real conclusions, almost to a man they follow Suárez and Lugo and give them the name of formal confused, or formal implicit, or virtual identico-real. Furthermore, they not only affirm that these conclusions are definable as truths of faith, but also that they are truths of faith *per se* or independently of definition.

This has been the cause of a confusion among some apologists, who are desirous of defending the homogeneous evolution of dogma or the homogeneity of the 3rd and 4th degrees of Catholic doctrine. They perceive that the 3rd and 4th degrees obviously are cases of revealed virtuality. They also perceive that modern theologians seem to deny almost to a man the *virtual's* definability. Hence they conclude that it is impossible to maintain the evolution of dogma without running counter to the nigh prevailing theological opinion. All this is due to not adverting to the fact that since the time of Suárez, the formulae containing the terms formal and virtual conceal a confusion that apparently denies what, at bottom, is affirmed.[50]

To resume: it is clear that the modern confusion on this matter lies in two things: a) Many reserve the traditional term of revealed virtual to denote exclusively a non-implicit virtual, which in truth is neither a revealed virtual, nor a theological virtual, but a *physical* virtual, that cannot be the object

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[50] There are, however, even after Suárez, some theologians who have faithfully preserved the divisions, and exact definitions, of the revealed, into revealed immediate or formal explicit, revealed immediate or formal implicit, revealed mediate or virtual inclusive, and revealed mediate and or virtual physico-distinct or purely connexive, as e.g. Card. MAZELLA (*De Virtutibus infusis,* d.2; *De Fidei divinae objecto,* a.9, nn.473-474; Romae 1879). However, we think that the examples he gives are not always correct, and for this reason we omit them. "Hence in a truth revealed *formally and explicitly,* the meaning of which is clearly and distinctively expressed by the terms themselves, other truths can be *implicitly* contained *whether* formally *or* virtually. Those things are said to be contained *formally implicitly* in the explicitly revealed, which *really as well as formally are identical* with the latter. *Really,* because they are identified on the part of the object, as wisdom is identified with the other attributes and with the essence of God; *formally,* inasmuch as they have the *same formal concept,* or as others would have it, differ *only* with a distinction of *reasoning reason* and not with a distinction of reasoned reason. Now, in the *first* place, that is said to be *virtually* contained in an explicitly revealed truth, which, notwithstanding being *really identical* with it, nonetheless *differs formally* from it [this is the virtual *inclusive*]. . .; or, in the *second* place, which is *not really identical* with the explicitly revealed but is *only connected* with it [this is the virtual *physico-connexive*]; thus all the *physical* properties (in the hypothesis that they *really differ* from the essence) are virtually contained in the essence; the necessary effect is really contained in the revelation of the cause" etc. (MAZELLA, *loc.cit*) Likewise, the distinction between the *formal implicit* and the *virtual implicit* or inclusive is very well expressed, in our opinion, in the following passage from RIPALDA: "There are *some* predicates implicitly revealed that differ *only through reasoning reason, solely by an explanation of terms,* but not through reasoned reason or through an expressed perfection or objective formality; as for instance man and rational animal or a composite constituted by soul and body.[Thus far we have the *formal-inclusive;* now comes the *virtual-inclusive*] There are other *really identified* predicates that differ *through reasoned reason* and by *more than a mere explanation of terms,* because they express *different formalities* and perfections of the object with respect to different operations and connotations . . . as, for instance, to be wise and to be immense is said of God. Of this distinction we have spoken in Dialectics and Metaphysics." (RIPALDA, *De fide divina,* d.8, s.3, n.43)

either of true theological certainty or of the Church's infallibility, as we shall see in Sections 4 and 5 of this same chapter; b) under the label of formal confused they have concealed, and continue to conceal the whole domain of the true and rigorous revealed and theological virtual.

Hence two odd phenomena may be observed in modern theological authors: a) when they deny the definability of the *virtual* or theological conclusion, they deny only the definability of the Suarezian virtual, that is, the non-inclusive virtual; b) when they assert the definability of faith of the formal confused or formal identico-real, they affirm the definability of faith of the true virtual and the homogeneous evolution of dogma by way of true implicit or conceptual virtuality.

82. CONFIRMATION. – In support of this we will quote two modern theologians among the many who could be cited for this purpose. In the first place, we quote the learned Card. Mazella. "If the question be raised about a truth implicitly contained in another which is explicitly revealed, in such a manner, however, that the former is identical with the latter *only really* and *not formally*, then Ripalda, the Wirceburgenses and others hold that the former is not revealed; the contrary of which is held by De Lugo, Suárez, etc. And *this seems to be the opinion which should be subscribed to* . . . But if the question be raised regarding an object which is said to be contained in another explicitly revealed in so far as the former is *only connected* with, or follows, the latter (this they call *properly virtual* comprehension), then the same Suárez, De Lugo, etc. deny that the former is per se said by God and credible by faith . . . However, I would here make a distinction, one which seems also consonant to the mind *of these masters*, to wit: the implicit object either follows the explicitly revealed truth in such a manner that *under no hypothesis is the former separable from the latter*, and this is clear without a new revelation: in this case I would say that the former *is revealed*, since otherwise the truth of the explicitly revealed object could in no way stand fast; or the former *is separable* from the latter, at least *by God's absolute power*, and in this case the opinion of Suárez, Lugo, etc. reappears. We shall presently say what we think of it. This is, then, our opinion. *Proposition XVII:* That which is *formally* and *implicitly* contained in some explicitly revealed truth is of itself a material object of faith; however, that which is contained in it *only virtually* – in so far as, notwithstanding being necessarily connected with the latter, it nevertheless *differs* from the latter *really as well as formally*, and is even separable from it by God's power – does not seem to belong per se to the object of faith."[51]

[51] *De virtutibus infusis* ed.6ª, Neapoli 1909, n.414.

In the second place, we quote another learned theologian, Fr. Sola. *"Thesis 76:* The truth that is contained formally implicitly is another explicitly revealed truth that pertains of itself to the material object of faith. The same is to be said more probably of truths contained, *materially* and *identically* or *essentially connexively*, but not formally, in another explicitly revealed truth. *Censure:* the first part, namely, that any truth *formally* contained in another explicitly revealed is of itself a material object of faith, that is to say, truly and really revealed, is certain and common against Arriaga . . . The second part is in reality most common and very much more probable, at least where the *real identity* of the one and the other can, without a new revelation, be known by us with certainty. Among the earlier writers, this view is held by Suárez, and Lugo . . . and commonly by the more recent authors against Ripalda, the Wirceburgenses and others . . . *Thesis 77:* Truths which are contained *only virtually* in others explicitly revealed are not of themselves the material object of faith."[52]

This teaching of Card. Mazella and Fr. Sola is found in the majority of theologians posterior to Suárez and Lugo, although expressed in different terms. Whoever reads them attentively will notice at once that when they deny the definability of the revealed virtual or theological conclusion, they mean by that term the false virtual of the fourth type; and when they admit the definability of the revealed *formal* or assert that only the formally, or identically, or essentially revealed is definable, by formal, or identical or essential, they mean the true virtual of the other five types. (45-46)

Whatever may be one's opinion on the subject of the revealed virtual's definability, it will be impossible to interpret the true mind of theologians posterior to the XVI century without keeping in mind clearly the distinction between the false virtual, that of type No. 4 – admitted into theology after Suárez – from the other five types of the true revealed virtual.

SECTION III

CLASSIFICATION OF THE PRINCIPAL OPINIONS AMONG CATHOLIC THEOLOGIANS ON THE EVOLUTION OF DOGMA

83. THEOLOGIANS PRIOR TO MOLINA. – A brief survey of the various opinions held by Catholic theologians on the subject will be helpful before proceeding to investigate the existence and nature of true revealed virtuality.

[52] *De gratia Christi et virtutibus infusis*, Vallisoleti 1919, nn.619-627.

All theologians prior to Molina, with no exception that we know of, maintain that the true revealed virtuality or true theological conclusion is definable as a truth of faith. This is equivalent to maintaining the possibility of true evolution in dogma.

There is no difference among these theologians except the following. The Thomists, who have always specifically distinguished faith from theology, take pains to point out that, notwithstanding its definability as of faith, the theological conclusion, prior to its definition by the Church, is not formally a truth of divine faith but only a theological truth. On the other hand, the Scotists and Nominalists who do not specifically distinguish, or are not quite clear about the specific distinction of faith from theology, are satisfied with saying that every theological conclusion is of divine faith, without specifying whether it is so prior to, or after, the definition.

But all, Thomists and Scotists, agree in maintaining that it is definable as a truth of faith and, consequently, is a true dogma of faith if the Church defines it. Hence Suárez, who was fully aware of the tradition of the Schools, wrote without any hesitation: "This view is, in my opinion, *certain* and *gathered from the common conviction of theologians; I find no theologian* who contradicts it."[53] Lugo, with equal justification and historical sense, adds: "Apart from the arguments adduced by Suárez, it is confirmed *by the practice and the usage of all.*"[54] On this point no historical doubt is possible.

84. MOLINA'S INNOVATION. – Of all theologians, Molina was the first to assert that no true theological conclusion – even one as inclusive or implicit as the conclusion of the existence of two wills in Christ – is or can be a truth of divine faith, whether before or after the Church's definition. Consequently, even if the Church defines them, such conclusions do not deserve the assent of divine faith but only a theological assent based on reasoning, because it is through reasoning that the Church knows them and defines them. And it makes no difference that the Church should define such conclusions with the dogmatic *anathema,* as the Sixth Ecumenical Council defined the existence of two wills in Christ. There is thus no growth in dogma, which is the same as saying that there is no true dogmatic evolution.[55]

[53] *De fide,* d.3, s.11, n.11.

[54] *De fide,* d.1, n.270.

[55] "In this science the *principles* are all the things revealed by God *immediately* and *in themselves.* These are *exclusively* the things contained in the Canonical books, together with the tradition not included in the Holy Scriptures, which are conserved in the Church as certainly revealed by God. There were some who have said that the principles of theology should *also* include the *definitions* whereby the *Church has established certain truths* because She sees that *they are evidently deduced from those that are revealed,* as e.g. that *in Christ Our Lord there are two wills,* the divine and the human, which, although it is not expressed in the Holy Scriptures, is nonetheless evidently gathered from them. They are moved by this reason, namely, that just as the Holy Spirit stood by Paul and the other Sacred Writers to prevent them from straying in any way from the truth in anything that they were writing, so also does He stand by the Church to preclude her from erring in anything that She defines as certain. Therefore, as the conclusions that Paul deduced from other truths. . . . have the nature of immediately revealed principles by the very fact that they are asserted by Paul, *so too the conclusions that the Church defines because She sees that they are evidently deduced from revealed truths, will have the nature of immediately revealed principles by the very fact that they are defined by her. This opinion does not please me.* Cano has likewise rejected it in 12 of *De locis,* chap. 3. For the concurrence whereby the Holy Spirit stands ready by the Catholic Church and the Supreme Pontiff, who is her head, is *not meant for the purpose of turning into a truth of faith anything that previously was not of faith,* but only for the purpose of keeping her from error when she declares anything that belongs either mediately or immediately to the faith. . . . You will therefore ask: through which habit do the faithful assent to those truths defined by the Church, which are deduced from other revealed truths, if they do not immediately assent to them through the habit of faith? I answer: if they know how to infer them from other revealed truths, as the Church infers them, then they assent to them through the *theological habit* in two ways." (MOLINA, *Commentaria in I p. D. Thomae,* q.1, a.2, d.2, t.1, p.7; Venetiis 1602)

[56] *Controversiae in D.Thomae et eius scholae defensionem,* auctore F. BALTASSARE NAVARRETE, O.P., Vallisoleti 1605, t.1, cont. 7.

[57] See below, n.407.

Granados subsequently defended Molona's truly innovative opinion no less ardently than brilliantly. Ripalda followed it in part. Kilber or the so-called Wirceburgenses and some others embraced it *in toto.* The Salmanticenses and Billuart apparently seem to concur with Molina as a consequence of their failure to advert to the confusion introduced by Suárez in the notion of the revealed virtual.

On the other hand, Molina's innovation was energetically assailed not only by all the Thomists prior to the Salmanticenses, including John of St. Thomas, but also by Suárez and Lugo, and by the great majority of theologians of different schools prior to the introduction of the modern ecclesiastical faith.

Molina's innovation, which eliminates all dogmatic evolution, earned the following judgment from the great Navarrete: "This opinion is plagued with many falsehoods, which *for the time being* we do not wish to *qualify with a censure* because it is not sufficiently clear what this author thinks . . . Therefore the aforesaid author [Molina] is *very much mistaken* when he asserts that the theologian assents to that truth through the habit of theology, in the same manner that the Church deduces it. For even if the Fathers present in those Councils *deduced that conclusion by the habit of theology,* nonetheless, *supposing the definition to have been made,* they assented to it *through the habit of faith.*"[56] The Thomist Nazario plainly qualified it as *Molina's error.*[57]

This is the innovation which so astonished Suárez that he could not but exclaim: *"It is amazing . . ."*[58] Recently, the Jesuit Schiffini has commented on it in the following terms: "Suárez is amazed at the *novelty* of this opinion [Molina's] and he exposes it as *contrary to the common conviction of theologians."*[59]

85. THE POSITION OF VÁZQUEZ AND VEGA. – Vázquez and Vega hold, not only that the true theological conclusion is definable as of faith, but also that it is *per se* of divine faith even before the definition; hence, any theologian who deduces it through an evident reasoning can, and ought to, give it the assent of divine faith. In the first part Vázquez and Vega follow the traditional view against Molina; in the second part they hew to the Scotist or Nominalist line against the Thomist.

Vázquez, in effect, teaches that, even prior to its definition by the Church, any theological conclusion can be considered under two aspects: a) formally, that is, precisely as a conclusion; b) materially, that is, in so far as it is contained in the revealed premise or premises. Under the first aspect, it deserves theological assent; under the second, it is worthy of divine faith, even before it is defined by the Church. These are the two famous assents which Suárez – and in his wake almost all modern theologians – later applied to the formal-confused or metaphysico-inclusive conclusion, and which the Salmanticenses – contrary to all Thomist tradition – applied to the conclusion deduced from two revealed premises.[60]

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[58] *De Fide*, d.3, s.11, n.3.

[59] *De Virtutibus infusis*, n.126; Friburgi Brisgoviae 1904.

[60] "In the next place mention must be made of the teaching of Cano and Vega. . . . Some regard this teaching as less true and attempt to refute it with the argument that the conclusion always follows the weaker part . . . However, these doctors do not seem to have understood the aforecited opinion of Cano and Andrés de Vega. The reason adduced only proves that the assent given to the theological conclusion, *insofar as it is inferred* either from premises of faith or from one of faith and another of natural reason, is not the assent of infused faith, but either an assent inferior to that given to the premises, or an assent of another kind. But Cano and Vega contend that, besides this assent that is produced by reasoning and is called *theological*, there exists another assent proximately produced by the light of *faith*, which requires, as a previous condition, the theological assent, notwithstanding that it is less certain than the assent of faith. But this should not be cause for surprise. For as they very appositely observe, and as we shall explain at greater length, the assent of infused faith also demands as a condition an assent of human faith: for in order to believe through infused faith any proposition defined by the Church it is necessary to believe first that it was defined by the Council or the Pontiff, and yet this can be known only through human faith. Likewise, we first believe with human faith the preacher or the man who proposes the articles of faith, and once this faith is supposed, there follows the assent by the light of infused faith. Cano and Vega, therefore, similarly teach that, given the *previous*

Vázquez bases his view, that conclusions known by evident reasoning are of divine faith for the theologian even without the Church's definition, on the fact that the reasoning is to the theologian's private mind as the Council's definition is to the whole Church. "Theological demonstration is proportionally to the demonstrating theologian what the Council is to the whole Church, when it defines something as a truth of faith. The only difference between the two is this: the Council proposes what it defines *to all* for them to believe, so that the obligation to believe is laid on everyone; whereas theological reasoning proposes it *only to those* to whom the inference from the articles of faith is evident."[61]

This theory of Vázquez has given rise both to the distinction made today between dogmas of *divine faith* and dogmas of *Catholic faith*, and to the theory that the authority of the Church is absolutely necessary for the faith of the common faithful but not for the faith of learned theologians. This distinction and theory, both of which are false, will be examined later on. (135-156)

Of Vázquez's theory the usually mild-spoken John of St. Thomas says the following: "The parification seemingly intended by the opposite theory between the certainty of the theological conclusion and the Church's definition *can in no way be tolerated* . . . Otherwise, if it were granted that the conclusion theologically inferred possessed relative to the theologian who inferred it as much certainty as the Church's definition, then it would have no need of the definition of faith as the confirmation and as the rule of its certainty; and, consequently, the theologian would be unto himself the sufficient rule of certainty in matters of faith without any recourse to the Church: this would be a *most pernicious error."*[62]

86. THE THEORY OF SUÁREZ AND LUGO. – The reader is already familiar with the theory of these famous theologians. They distinguish two kinds of revealed virtuals: the metaphysico-inclusive and the physico-con-

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condition of an *evident consequence* from the articles of faith, or from a premise of faith and a natural premise, there follows the assent of *infused faith*, for *theological demonstration is proportionally to the demonstrating theologian himself what the Council is to the whole Church, when it defines something as a truth of faith.* The only difference between the two is this: the Council proposes what it defines to all for them to believe, so that the obligation to believe is laid on everyone; whereas theological reasoning proposes it only to those to whom the inference from the articles of faith is evident." (VÁZQUEZ, *Commentaria in I partem D. Thomae*, q.1, a.2, d.5, c.3, p.15; Lugduni 1631). We shall quote the text of Vega in no. 388. We shall treat at length of the true mind of MELCHOR CANO elsewhere (449-464).

[61] VÁZQUEZ, *in I partem*, a.2, d.5, c.3, n.8.

[62] *Cursus Theol.*, q.1, d.2., a.4.

nexive. In respect of the former they maintain, like Vázquez and Vega, that not only is it definable of faith, but also that it is of divine faith for any theologian who knows it through evident reasoning, even before its definition. Thus they applied to this species of virtual the two assents introduced by Vázquez.

In respect of the latter, they held that it alone was the virtual or theological conclusion in the proper sense of the term. Consequently they applied to it what the Thomist tradition teaches of all true revealed virtuals, namely, that prior to the definition it is not of divine faith but merely a theological conclusion, whereas after the definition it is truly a truth of faith. However, having considered as properly virtual that which is not implicit, and thus a virtual that is not revealed, they had, in consequence, to resort to the theory of new revelations or the theory of indefinite and transforming assistance, as we have seen earlier. (72-79)

87. THREE, NOT TWO, THEORIES. – Therefore, relative to the question whether theological conclusions, or the revealed virtual, are *of faith* or not, it is a mistake to say, as theological manuals commonly do, that there are *two* opinions, to wit: that of Cano, Vázquez and Vega; and that of the rest of the theologians. There are *three* fundamentally different theories; two diametrically opposed to each other, namely that of Molina, and that of Vázquez, and a third which holds the middle ground between them, which is the Thomist.

The *first,* Molina's, denies that theological conclusions are of divine faith either before or after the definition. This theory, followed only by a handful and censured or rejected by the majority, subsequently gave rise, as we shall see at the proper time (233), to the so-called ecclesiastical faith by applying to dogmatic facts almost the same things that Molina had said of theological conclusions.

The *second,* Vázquez's and Vega's, lies at the opposite pole. It affirms that theological conclusions are of divine faith not only after but also before the definition. We hope to show fully later that Melchor Cano never subscribed to this opinion, although it is commonly affirmed that he did. (449-464) But Suárez and Lugo did follow it with regard to the metaphysico-inclusive conclusions, as likewise do most of modern theological manuals, with hardly any awareness of so doing, when they treat of the formal confused or the virtual identico-real.

The *third,* which lies midway between the first two, is the traditional Thomist theory which distinguishes between before and after the definition. Before the definition, no true theological conclusion, not even that which is deduced from two revealed premises, is of divine faith, nor is it worthy of an act of divine faith; it is merely a theological truth and deserves no more than

theological assent from either the learned theologian, or the common faithful. However, after its dogmatic definition by the Church, any true theological conclusion – as we shall presently see, only the metaphysico-inclusive are true theological conclusions – is as truly a truth of faith as the articles of faith themselves.

These three theories must be understood with respect to the true theological conclusion, which is exclusively the metaphysico-inclusive conclusion, since prior to Suárez it had not occurred to any theologian to consider the physico-connexive conclusion as truly theological. Thus, if we were to extend the name of theological conclusion or revealed virtual to include also the physico-connexive virtual, we would have to admit a *fourth opinion,* held by Suárez and Lugo, which applies to such false virtual or theological conclusion what the third theory teaches regarding the true virtual or theological conclusion. In truth, it is only this fourth opinion which the Salmanticenses assail with irrefutable logic when they deny the definability of the mere virtual *(virtuale tantum),* although they seem to deny the definability of any and all virtuals in consequence of their failure to distinguish between the true virtual and the physico-connexive virtual.

The third, or traditional Thomist theory is expounded by John of St. Thomas in the following terms: "The third opinion maintains that propositions evidently deduced from the principles of faith, *if defined by the Church,* belong immediately *to the faith . . . This opinion is commonly held by the Thomists,* as can be seen in Master Navarrete and Master González."[63] In the treatise *On Faith,* alluding to this same passage, he writes:

"The foregoing justifies inferring that virtual or mediate revelation, or that which is *deduced through discourse,* such as is found in *theology,* differs *specifically* from *immediate* revelation which is had through the testimony of Him who speaks and attains to what must be believed as a truth *of faith.* We have examined this at greater length in part I, question I, disputation 2, article 4, where we *rejected* two *extreme* opinions. One of these is *Vázquez's,* who holds that a conclusion deduced from premises of faith is, *with respect to him who knows the reasoning,* as certain as a proposition defined by the Church. The other is *Molina's,* who maintains that, even if a proposition, which *previously was not a truth of faith, should be defined by the Church,* the definition would not turn it into a truth of faith; for the Holy Spirit assists the Church *to prevent her from erring, but not to turn into a truth of faith that which previously was not of faith.* These two opinions can be found *impugned* in the aforesaid place."[64]

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[63] *Cursus theologicus,* q.1, d.2, a.4, n.3.

[64] *De fide,* d.1, a.2, n.13.

The reader will have noticed that, of these three theories concerning the metaphysico-inclusive conclusion, the third, which is the Thomist, defends its definability as of faith, which is to say, that it defends the evolution of dogma by way of a true theological conclusion. The same defense is made in the second theory, which is that of Vázquez and Vega, Suárez and Lugo. However, these sin by excess in asserting that such conclusions are not only definable as of faith but also formally of faith *per se* or independently of the definition. Only the first theory, that of Molina, Kilber and a few others, denies their definability as of faith, which is the same as denying true dogmatic evolution.

Therefore it can be truly said that the position which maintains that inclusive or conceptual conclusions are definable as of faith, and thus upholds the evolution of dogma by way of implicit virtuality, is common doctrine among theologians, past and contemporary, notwithstanding the fact that many manuals give a contrary impression by not distinguishing between inclusive conclusions and physico-connexive conclusions.

88. INTRINSIC STUDY OF THE PROBLEM. – Setting aside the opinions of theologians, since at the end of this book we shall be literally quoting most of them (353-448), let us now proceed to the examination of the problem of the evolution of dogma in itself. Fundamentally, this problem is none other than the problem of the existence and nature of the virtuality of the revealed deposit combined with the problem of the nature and compass of the Church's authority with respect to that virtuality.

We have seen (46) that the six types of virtuality or reasoning reduce to two: the physico-connexive virtuality, which is that of the fourth type of reasoning, and the metaphysico-inclusive, which comprises all the other five. In the following sections we shall investigate whether these two virtualities, or at least one of them, are truly revealed virtualities and capable of dogmatic evolution, and whether dogmatic evolution is possible, or not, without the Church's definition. These are most fundamental questions, for they lie at the heart of, and provide the key to, the existence of dogmatic evolution, and the specific distinction between dogmatic evolution on the one hand, and theological evolution on the other hand.

SECTION IV
THE PHYSICO-CONNEXIVE VIRTUALITY IS NEITHER A REVEALED NOR A THEOLOGICAL VIRTUALITY

89. THE FOURTH TYPE OF VIRTUAL. – We have previously seen that, since the time of Suárez up to the present, the properly revealed or properly theological virtual has been and continues to be identified with the

virtual physico-connexive, that is, the fourth of the six types of reasoning or virtuality considered above. (45 and 73).

In the present section we intend to make clear that the physico-connexive reasoning is not a rigorous *theological* conclusion, not conclusive in *theology*, not a *theological* or *revealed* virtual, not *necessarily connected* with the revealed major or revealed deposit from which the attempt is made to deduce it. Now, if it is not a *revealed* or *theological* virtual, if there is no *necessary* nexus between it and the revealed deposit, much less can it be an object of *infallibility*, and least of all can it be definable as a *truth of divine faith*. To many, our assertions will, no doubt, seem to contradict what is said in most theological manuals since Suárez. However, we think that it is not difficult to prove our position conclusively, and to show that in all this there is nothing but a confusion between the pure essence or essence in the abstract on the one hand, and the connatural or the perfect essence on the other.[65]

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[65] What we call today immediately or formally revealed and mediately or virtually revealed, St. Thomas respectively designated, in the very first pages of the *Summa Theologica*, with the names of divine *revealed* and divine *revealable*. The former is the formal object of divine faith; the latter, the formal object of sacred theology. "Hence, since the *Holy Scripture* considers certain things inasmuch as they are divinely *revealed*, all things whatsoever that are divinely *revealable* share in the one formal reason of the object *of this science.*" *(Summa Theologica,* p.1, q.1, a.3) "St. Thomas places the *immediately revealed* on the part of the Holy Scripture, because the things conveyed by the Scripture are believed as truths of faith; but on the part of theological *science* he places the *revealable*, which are *potentially* or *virtually* revealed." (JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *Cursus Theologicus*, q.1, d.2, a.1,) For St. Thomas, to be *divinely revealable* or to be *virtually* or *potentially revealed* means to be *knowable* [scibile] or *cognoscible* by the light itself (*objective* principles) of divine revelation, for revelation itself (objective revelation) is the *formal medium* of knowing of sacred theology. "And similarly the sacred science, remaining one, can consider the things dealt with in the different philosophical sciences under one *formal* reason, that is, in so far as they are *divinely revealable.*" *(Summa Theol. loc. cit.,* ad 3). "That is, in so far as they are *knowable by divine light.*" *(Ibid.,* a.4). "The formal reason of the object of theology, qua object, is what I call the *revealable* or the *knowable through the light of divine revelation*" (CAPREOLO, *In I Sent.*, prolog., q.1) "The medium shining with *divine light* constitutes the *theological knowable [scibile]*" (CAJETAN, *In Summam Theologicam*, p.1, q.1, a.2). What is meant by *properly knowable [scibile]* or cognoscible as distinct from the *believable*, and, consequently, what is meant by theological science properly speaking as distinct from faith? The Angelic Doctor replies: "Observe that, since science is of the conclusions whereas understanding is of the principles, the *conclusions* of demonstrations in which the *passions* [properties] are predicated of their proper subjects are said to be *properly knowable [scibilia]*" (*In Post. Analyt.*, lib. 1, lect.9). This is the source of the classical definition of theology in its true and proper sense, and of the true and proper theological conclusions, namely, *the conclusions contained in, or deduced from, the revealed deposit as* properties *in the* essence. Our purpose in this and two following sections is to bring out the true Thomist meaning of this *definition* of sacred theology, of the true theological or revealed virtuality.

90. THREE PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS. – It should be remembered, in the first place, that the physico-connexive reasoning endeavours to infer in the conclusion, not the metaphysical or essential or aptitudinal or radical properties, but the physico-actual properties; and, further, that it is *assumed* that physico-actual properties *differ really* from the essence, and that they are absolutely, or by God's power, *separable* from the essence. (44)

In the second place, it should be kept in mind that, in order to deduce these physico-actual and absolutely separable properties, we take for our starting point the essence in its pure or abstract state, that is, we *assume* that God has revealed nothing more than that N has such an essence, and has said nothing either explicitly or implicitly about whether the essence is in a connatural or preternatural state, in a state of integrity or defect, in a perfect or imperfect state.

In the third place, the conclusion we want to arrive at is not a *conditioned,* but a simple or absolute conclusion. In other words, assuming that by revelation we know that N is a man (mere or abstract essence), we are not after a conclusion that says: therefore N is actually risible *if* he is in a connatural state; we are after a conclusion that states simply: therefore N is actually risible. If we mean to infer a conditioned conclusion, we would be straying outside the boundaries of type 4. To deduce that N is actually risible *if* he is in a connatural state reduces to: N is in the connatural state; therefore, N is actually risible. This is not a type 4, or physico-connexive reasoning, the only one with which we are now concerned; it is a reasoning of type 5, which we readily grant to be, not only theological, but also definable as of divine faith.

We have made these preliminary observations, even at the risk of being considered repetitious, because we judge them to be indispensable, given the delicate nature of the problem. We will now present the proofs on which we base our contention that any reasoning of type 4, or physico-connexive, is not conclusive in *theology,* and thus neither is, nor should be called, a true revealed virtual or a true *theological* conclusion, except in the broad sense whereby we call conclusion, not only that which is rigorously demonstrative or conclusive, but also that which is theologically uncertain and probable.

91. FIRST AND FUNDAMENTAL PROOF. – It is axiomatic in logic that a false conclusion can never follow from a true antecedent, or that if a conclusion is false, it can only be either because one of the premises is *false* or because the reasoning itself is *ill constructed.* Let us, then, examine one or several reasonings involving a true physico-connexive virtual, or, reasoning of type 4, viz., reasonings whereby from revealed knowledge of the mere essence of any thing, we deduce in the conclusion a physico-actual property through a physically necessary minor premise.

By *revelation* we know that the body of Christ in the Eucharist is a *true* body; that the eucharistic species are *true* accidents; that the fire in the furnace of Babylon was *true* fire, etc. By physical *science* we know with full physical certainty or necessity that every body is locally extended, that is, occupies space; that every accident has actual inherence in its subject; that all fire duly applied actually burns, etc. Let there be, then, the following reasonings of type 4:

1st: The body of Christ in the Eucharist is a true body; but, every body actually occupies space; therefore, the body of Christ in the Eucharist actually occupies space.

2nd: The eucharistic species are true accidents; but every accident actually inheres in its subject; therefore, the eucharistic species actually inhere in their subject.

3rd: The fire of the furnace of Babylon was true fire applied in the proper and due conditions; but, any true fire properly and duly applied actually burns; therefore, the fire of the furnace of Babylon actually burned.

4th: The fire of hell or of purgatory is a true fire; but no bodily thing is capable of torturing or imprisoning a spirit; therefore the fire of hell or of purgatory neither tortures nor imprisons spirits.

5th: Elijah was a true man; but all true men actually die; therefore, Elijah actually died.

6th: Jesus Christ is true man; but every true man is both a human person and conceived of a human male; therefore, Jesus Christ is a human person and was conceived of a human male.

7th: The Blessed Virgin is a descendant of Adam and was conceived of a man; but, in these conditions original sin is actually contracted; therefore, the Blessed Virgin actually contracted original sin.

8th: Jesus Christ and His Blessed Mother truly and really died; but no dead human rises again or comes back to life; therefore neither Jesus Christ nor the Blessed Virgin has risen or come back to life, etc., etc.

Let anyone examine these reasonings attentively. They all are true reasonings involving the physico-connexive virtual. In the major premise we know by revelation the *essence.* In the minor premise we state a physically necessary or certain principle. However, the conclusion, is so far from being a *theological conclusion,* so far from having *theological certainty,* so far from having *theological necessity* or *nexus,* that it is, on the contrary, a *theological error.* Therefore, the virtual physico-connexive is not a true theological conclusion, does not have theological *certainty,* does not have theological necessity, does not have a necessary nexus with the *theological* that is with the *divine,* that is, with the *revealed* major or revealed deposit.

We are convinced that whoever reflects upon these reasonings carefully, without preconceived notions, and does not allow himself to be misled by considerations alien to their intrinsic value will soon perceive that there exists a radical difference between *physics* [iii] and *theology*, and that the physico-connexive reasoning is absolutely bereft of demonstrative value in *theology*.

As a matter of fact, all these reasonings are true physico-connexive reasonings or virtuals and yet, far from being conclusive in theology, they end in false conclusions. It is evident that a false conclusion cannot proceed in any case except from these two sources: either one of the premises is false, or the syllogism is incorrectly structured. In the above syllogisms, neither of the premises is false, since the major premises are revealed premises, and the minor premises are physically certain. Therefore it can only be that these syllogisms are incorrectly structured. In other words, a syllogism, the major of which expresses only a mere essence, and the minor is not essential but denotes a purely physical connexion, is an incorrectly structured syllogism in theology. But that is precisely the structure of the virtual physico-connexive or type 4. Therefore, it is obvious that such virtuality is *not conclusive* in *theology*, is not a theological conclusion.

92. A DODGE. – Let no one say that these reasonings are not conclusive or that these conclusions are false *because* we happen to know by *revelation* that their contradictories are true.

In the first place, such a reply is quite proper in *simple* or common faithful, but highly unseemly in true philosophers or theologians, as both Báñez and Cajetan observed [66] apropos of a similar remark.

[iii] *Physics* does not have in this book the meaning that it usually has in the academic curriculum as distinct from chemistry, biology, etc. Much less does it mean that specialized part of physics known as theoretical physics which is more mathematical than physical in nature, and which might be appropriately termed theoretico-mathematical physics, and is concerned with pure theory, as distinct from what might be termed theoretico-experimental physics which is concerned with verifying the mathematically constructed theory in the world of nature.

The author takes the term *physics* in the classical tradition, and means by it what today we designate by the name of *natural experimental, or observational, sciences*. Thus physics would include physics, chemistry, biology, mineralogy, astronomy, etc. – *Transl.*

[66] Since one truth cannot contradict another truth, and since dogmas revealed by God are *infallible truths*, St. Thomas teaches that no presumed demonstration or conclusion opposed to a dogma is a true demonstration or conclusion, but a fallacy or false argument that can be *solved*. "Since faith is grounded on infallible truth, and it is impossible to demonstrate the contrary of what is true, it is manifest that the proofs adduced against the faith are not demonstrations but *soluble arguments*." (*Summa Theol.*, p.1, q.1, a.8) Commenting on the words *soluble* arguments, Báñez says that there are two ways of solving an objection against a dogma: first, by saying that it is not conclusive *because God has revealed the contrary*, without, however, pointing out the internal defect of the objection or argument.

Secondly and fundamentally, these conclusions are not false *because* God has revealed the contrary, but vice versa, God has revealed the contrary *because* they are false. Their intrinsic falsity is not caused by divine revelation, but by their lack of necessary connexion with the principles or premises from which the attempt is made to deduce them. God could, undoubtedly, have revealed to us only the major premises of these reasonings while keeping absolute silence on their conclusions, and yet these conclusions would continue to be as false as they are. God could have revealed the real presence of Christ's body in the Eucharist without telling us whether it is extended in space or not. He could have revealed the real existence of the eucharistic species, and said nothing of their actual inherence. He could have revealed the death of the Bl. Virgin without disclosing her resurrection. He could have revealed the fact that the three young men were cast into the furnace of Babylon and told us nothing about their being burned or not.

He could have told us nothing about these supernatural facts in which the *connatural* state of the essence is by divine will suspended, as He has told us nothing about many other supernatural events pertaining to His supernatural providence; and yet whether we knew them or not, the facts would not have been one whit less true whether we were cognizant of them or not; and the physico-connexive reasonings and conclusions that deny these facts would not have been one whit less false in the absence of revelation, as we now know them to be through revelation. Revelation does not change the value of resoning; it only make us know what was already true or false, but the truth or falsity of which we either might not perceive or not perceive as clearly but for the help of revelation.

Therefore no reasoning of type 4, that is, the physico-connexive, leads, or can lead, to *theologically certain* conclusions. No reasoning of such type is conclusive in theology.

Secondly, by exposing the weakness of the argument or objection. The first way of solving, says Báñez, belongs to people of little account – proper of the common faithful – and unseemly in a theologian; the second is proper of the theologian. "Solutions of the first kind are *not theological*, this mode of answering belongs to the common run of the faithful. But those of the other kind are *theological*." (*Comment. in loc. cit.* D. Thomae, concl. 3.) Cajetan and the other commentators express themselves likewise. Let, then, anyone examine those eight instances or arguments of physico-connexive virtuality we have given in the text; let him pinpoint the reason why they lead to false conclusions, and he will immediately see that it is because, whereas the major only asserts the mere *essence* of an individual, the conclusion infers its *actual* physico-distinct property. Therein precisely lies the intrinsic *defect* which causes the argument to conclude erroneously, and therein precisely lies the essence of the physico-connexive virtual, or that of type 4. On the other hand, if the major affirmed the mere essence and the conclusion inferred the essential property (types 1, 2, and 3), or if the major affirmed the connatural, or the perfect, essence and the conclusion inferred the actual property (types 5, and 6), the argument would conclude perfectly.

93. WHY ARE SUCH REASONINGS INCONCLUSIVE IN THEOLOGY? – These reasonings are inconclusive both in theology and in metaphysics simply because they are *invalidly structured;* because, under a seemingly faultless form, they are actually *four-footed.* The major premises affirm only the mere *essence* in the abstract, an essence that abstracts from both the natural and the preternatural order, from both the integral and the defective state, from both the perfect and the imperfect state. The major affirms only the *essence* and nothing but the essence.

On the other hand, the minor premises state something that is not true of the essence in each and every one of its states, but is true only and exclusively of the essence in its connatural, but not in its supernatural, state. These arguments, thus, contain four terms. The middle term does not have the same sense in the major and in the minor. In the major the middle term is taken in the *essential* or abstract sense; in the minor it is taken, not in the essential, but in the *connatural* sense. The argument has four terms, instead of three. It is not surprising that it should be inconclusive.

WHY ARE THEY CONCLUSIVE IN PHYSICS? – Because in physics, *as the physicist*[iv] *understands them,* they are validly structured. In physics there are no *essential* premises, that is, premises that abstract from the natural and supernatural. In physics all premises, all statements are always understood, in virtue of the formal object itself of the science, in the *connatural* sense. The physicist, as such, is not concerned with the supernatural. When physics, or the physicist, says, N is a man, he understands the term *man,* not essentially or abstractly, but connaturally; he takes the essence in so far as it is subject to, and governed by, the physical laws of nature. The starting point for the physicist is not essence, but *nature.* If the essence be thus understood in the major premise, then the minor is faultless. The minor states that *every* essence (that is, every *connatural* essense, an assumption made by the physicist as such), always and indefectibly has its actual properties. In the assumption of connaturality, which is always presupposed and is the starting point for the physicist, the conclusion is entirely flawless. The conclusion states nothing but that N is actually risible in the *supposition* (starting point for the physicist) that the laws of nature are operative or that the connatural state is verified.

But it should be obvious that *in this hypothesis* we no longer have a physico-connexive argument. We have instead a physico-connatural argument. We are no longer dealing with a type 4, but with a type 5 reasoning. (90) No physico-connexive argument is valid in theology; if it is valid in physics it is

[iv] *Physicist* here means any natural scientist, i.e., one engaged in the study of nature or the material world through observation or experimentation. – *Transl.*

because in physics it no longer is physico-connexive in view of the restriction of physics to the natural or connatural state and its consequent inability to rise to the supernatural or to the essential levels, which are proper of theology and metaphysics respectively.

94. WHERE IS THE THEOLOGICAL DEFECT OF THE PHYSICO-ABSTRACT REASONING? – To perceive clearly where the defect of such theological arguments lies, nothing else is required but to attend to the *middle* term *man,* which is the predicate of the major and the subject of the minor. The major exclusively states, or we assume that it exclusively states, that *N is man essentially,* that is, has a true human essence. Taken thus *essentially,* the term *man* does not determine any of the states in which the human essence might find itself; on the contrary, it abstracts from all such states. A man is essentially man in the natural or in the preternatural or in the supernatural state; in the integral or in the defective state, in the supremely perfect or in the imperfect state, with all the *actual* properties, or without them. A man can be found in any of these states without forfeiting his human essence. This being the case, we assume that the major of the argument affirms merely the essence and abstracts completely from any of its *states.*

But next we find that the minor states that *every man has actual properties.* What does this term *every man* suppose for? Does it, perhaps suppose for every man whether in the natural or the supernatural state, whether subject to the ordinary laws of nature or subject to the miraculous dispensation of God? No. In this sense, the minor would be very far indeed from being true; it would be one of the greatest errors, it would be the rationalist error, the very denial of othe supernatural order

Therefore, when we assert in the minor that *every* man has these or those actual properties, that *all* accidents actually inhere, that *all* fire burns, that *all* who die stay dead, that *all* bodies occupy space and are impenetrable; that *all* who are men are human persons, etc., we make these assertions of *all* such beings *on condition* that they be in the *connatural* state, or on *condition* that God has not miraculously intervened. Consequently, either we should infer the conclusion conditionally, e.g., *N is actually risible if God has not intervened* miraculously – but in this case we have strayed beyond the boundaries of the physico-connexive reasoning; – or, if we infer it absolutely and unconditionally, we deduce in the conclusion something that was not in the premises.

The theological defect of physico-connexive reasonings can also be seen clearly by taking note of how the physicist concedes them, whereas the theologian distinguishes them. If we propose the following argument to a physicist: The eucharistic species are true accidents; but all true accidents inhere in a subject; therefore the eucharistic species inhere in a subject, the physicist's

comment will be: *I concede the whole argument.* And *qua physicist,* he will have answered well. However, if the same argument is proposed to a theologian, he will at once distinguish, as he should, the minor and the conclusion as follows: All true accidents inhere in a subject, I *distinguish:* they inhere *aptitudinally,* I concede; they inhere *actually,* I *subdistinguish:* if the accidents are in a *connatural* state, I concede; if they are not in a connatural, but in a supernatural or miraculous state, I DENY.

This elementary distinction that every theologian makes, as he must, evidences three things:

1st, That the reasoning whereby aptitudinal, or radical, or essential properties are deduced from the essence of a thing (types 1, 2, and 3) must be *conceded* in theology, that is, such a conclusion is a *theological conclusion.*

2nd, That the reasoning whereby *actual* properties are deduced from the essence of a thing, on *condition* that the essence is either in a *connatural* or perfect state (types 5 and 6), must likewise be *conceded* in theology, in other words, the conclusion is also a *theological conclusion.*

3rd, That the reasoning whereby *actual* properties are *unconditionally* deduced from the *mere* essence of a thing (type 4) must be *denied* in theology, which is to say, that the conclusion is *not truly a theological conclusion.*

These three assertions embody our position, and, we think, the true Thomist teaching on the nature of the authentic, as well as of the false, revealed or theological virtuality.

95. THE SO-CALLED *PHYSICAL NECESSITY* – But someone might ask: is physical necessity not a true necessity? Yes. Physical necessity is true necessity, but *physical* necessity, not metaphysical nor theological; similarly, moral necessity is true necessity, but *moral* necessity, not physical nor metaphysical.

The term *necessity,* as Cardinal Cajetan already pointed out,[67] is not a *univocal* term; it is *analogical* and thus it is neither applied, nor can it be applied,

[67] "For the *necessity* of propositions, which is the concern of the Posterioristic investigator, is to be taken from the *matter:* and just as it exists *analogically,* not univocally, in different things, so, too, it is to be required *analogically* in the *premises* and *conclusions of different demonstrations.* For it is foolish to require that all necessary propositions be *univocally necessary,* if the things signified be themselves not univocally necessary. Hence, as we have previously remarked of the term *all,* so also the *necessary* must be distinguised into *three orders.* The *simply* (simpliciter) *necessary* is found in things separated from matter [the metaphysical or essential order]; the *regularly necessary* exists in mobile but incorruptible things; while the *necessary in the majority of cases* (ut in pluribus) is found in mobile and corruptible things." (CAJETAN, *In Post. Analyt.,* lib.1, c.6; Lugduni 1572, p.340). A different kind of

equally to all orders of being or of science. That which is *morally necessary* that is, necessary in the moral order,[v] is not physically necessary, but *contingent* or uncertain in *physics.* That which is physically necessary, that is, necessary in physics, is not necessary in *metaphysics* and much less in *theology,* but *contingent* or uncertain in theology and metaphysics. It is therefore possible for an argument to *conclude* in moral science but not in physics; or to *conclude* in physics but not in metaphysics nor in theology. A conclusion can be a true or certain conclusion in moral science and be uncertain or probable (which amounts to not being a true conclusion) in physics. Likewise a conclusion can be a true and certain conclusion in physics and be uncertain or probable in metaphysics and theology, which amounts to not being a rigorous metaphysical or theological conclusion.

Thus, e.g., the principle, *every mother loves her children,* is a necessary and certain principle in morals, but uncertain and contingent in physics, metaphysics, and theology. If we reason thus: *A was the mother of B; therefore A loved B,* the conclusion is a necessary, true, proper, and certain conclusion in *morals;* but it is not a true conclusion either in physics, or in metaphysics, or in theology. The principle, *any fire that is applied in the proper physical conditions actually burns,* is a certain and necessary principle in *physics,* but contingent or uncertain in metaphysics or in theology. The conclusion, *N is fire that is properly applied to something combustible; therefore it actually burned it,* is a necessary and certain, proper and rigorous con-

necessity, then, is to be required in accordance with the matter. But the *matter* or the *subject* (subjectum) of the theological syllogism is not the minor of reason, but the *revealed* major. Therefore, if the revealed major asserts only the *essence,* we are in the *metaphysical* order, and the necessity required in the minor is the *simply necessary* (necessarium simpliciter) which exists only in an aptitudinal or essential minor. If the revealed major asserts, not merely the essence, but the *connaturality* of the essence, we are in the *physical* order and a minor characterized as *regularly necessary* (necessarium regulariter), that is, a physico-actual minor, suffices. There is, thus, no attempt at denying entry into theology to physical or actual minors. What is denied is that they may be combined with purely *essential* majors in order to infer *particular* conclusions, when any physical law can be suspended by God in any *particular case.* Hence, Cajetan admonishes that in *physical* demonstrations actual properties can be deduced, "but in general, *not in particular.*" (*Ibid.,* c.4, p.309) Or, as Cardinal Zigliara has very appropriately remarked: "Third corollary: It is *illegitimate* to infer per se a singular proposition from a proposition that is true *physically or morally.*" (*Dialectica,* 22, 4)

[v] *Moral* order, *moral* laws, *moral* science do not mean only the order of morality, or the laws governing the morality of human behaviour, or the sciences that study the moral goodness or evil of human acts. Moral, as contradistinguished from metaphysical and physical, is equivalent to the contemporary term *behavioral.* Thus moral order means behavioral order; moral laws, behavioral laws; and moral science, behavioral science. – *Transl.*

clusion in *physics*, but contingent and uncertain (and, thus, not a true conclusion) in metaphysics and theology.

Consequently, if God has revealed that *A was the mother of B*, and nothing more, that is, without disclosing that she was a *good* mother or that she behaved in accordance with the impulses or moral laws of motherly love, the moralist[vi] will be certain, with moral certainty that is, that A loved B. But the physicist will not be certain; he will be uncertain because no principle of physics crumbles due to the fact that A loved, or did not love, B. The metaphysician will be even more uncertain, for none of his principles is ruined because A did not love B. Since the theologian's starting point, or principle, is the revealed major, and the major premise merely states that A was a *mother* (i.e. essentially, not that she was a *good* mother), the theologian is as uncertain of the conclusion as the metaphysician because the revealed principle, that A was the mother (essentially) of B, remains utterly unimpaired and firm whether A loves B or not.

96. THE MINORS OF REASON[vii] – The confusion in this matter proceeds, we think, either from misunderstanding or overlooking the true role of the *human sciences* or *minors of reason* in the reasoning of the *science of the revealed* or sacred theology. Theology indeed utilizes all sorts of sciences or minors of reason, whether metaphysical, or physical, or moral. But it is often overlooked that the starting point, the true principles, the formal subject of theology is, not the human sciences or the minors of reason, but the majors of faith or revealed majors. Theological reasoning, thus, does not have as its purpose to draw out or to deduce the virtuality contained in the minors of reason with the aid of the revealed majors; on the contrary, its purpose is to employ the minors of reason in order to draw out, or to deduce, or to *explicate* intellectually the virtuality contained in the principles or majors of faith. Consequently, the revealed majors are not instruments of the minors, nor do they enter into the constitution of theological reasoning *on a par* with the minors; on the contrary, the minors are mere intellectual instruments to unfold or *explicitate* the objective virtuality which the revealed majors contain even if they do not express it. These minors of reason are of themselves or objectively unnecessary. If they are needed by theology, – or better, by *our* theology; or better still, by the *theologian*, – the need is simply due to the feebleness of our intellect, which is incapable of seeing

[vi] The term *moralist* includes both the ethician and the behavioral scientist. – *Transl.*

[vii] In the context of a theological syllogism a *minor of reason* means the *minor premise* or proposition, the truth of which is ascertainable by human *reason on its own power*. The *major of faith* signifies the *major premise*, which is a *revealed* proposition, i.e. whose truth is formally accepted only through *faith* grounded on divine revelation. – *Transl.*

intuitively, or in one stroke, everything that is *really included* in the revealed majors; and thus requires these instruments or minors of reason to unfold or bring to light by degrees what was already contained in the revealed majors or revealed deposit. This is the only true Thomist concept of sacred theology.[68]

Therefore, in a *theological* reasoning the revealed majors are never to be subordinated or accomodated to the minors of reason; it is the minors of reason that are to be subordinated and accomodated to the revealed majors. Where the revealed principle merely discloses the *essence* of a thing, the minor can only be *essential*. Where the revealed principle, besides the essence, discloses also its *connatural* state, the minor can be physical or *natural*. Where

[68] "That this science [sacred theology] utilizes them [the human sciences or minors of reason] is not on account of a defect or insufficiency in *itself*, but on account of *the deficiency of our intellect*." (*Summa Theol.*, p.1 q.1, a.7) "The supernatural light [major of faith] does not of itself need the natural premise [the minor of reason,] for it can encompass the latter even without the aid of the natural light through the largesse of the revealing God, if it were more explicated in the intellect itself [this is the purpose of the minor of reason, viz. to explicate the major of faith] .... considering that premise [the minor of reason] in respect of the natural light that exists in it, it is in this regard an *assistance* so that we may *more connaturally* use the premise of faith in keeping with our mode of knowing, by *applying* and *explicating* it [the premise of faith] to infer the conclusion. ... Although the natural premise concurs in inferring the conclusion, nevertheless the ultimate resolution does not stop in it, but the resolution proceeds further so that it becomes *dependent on the premise of faith and elevated by it* . . .The natural premise joined to the premise of faith does not remove the latter from the reason of a revealed virtual, as explained previously, and therefore the role of the natural premise is merely to *explicate* or to lead to *explicating* the connexion of the object to be inferred [the conclusion] with the revealed object [the major of faith], and thus all of it remains within the boundaries of the *virtually revealed* object." (JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *Cursus Theologicus, De Sacra Doctrina* q.1, d.2, a.6, nn.12-13, and a.9, n.6)

The premise of faith alone contains the whole truth and certainty *of the conclusion*, and the other, known by natural light, is assumed *only accidentally* (per accidens) and because of the *imperfection of the subject* . . . in the theological demonstration the *premise of faith alone* is the per se *cause of the conclusion*, and *to it alone* the conclusion is reduced by way of resolution; but the natural premise is only a condition *applicatory and explicatory* of the supernatural principle, which is needed because of the defect of *our* intellect," (GONET, *Clypeus theol. thom.*, disput.prooemialis, a.1, n.38; a.4, n.58).

Today many manuals of theology, including some of Thomist persuasion, take it as a matter of fact that when the minors are *explicatory* of the majors, the theological conclusions are not properly conclusions or virtual, but *formal*, albeit *confused* or *equivalent*. In consequence, they also take it that properly theological conclusions are only reached through minors that are not *explicatory* but *completory* of the majors of faith. These theologians have completely lost the Thomist notion of theology, and have unwittingly adopted the Suarezian notion. Hence the difficulty they experience later when it comes to accepting the theological conclusion's definability as of faith.

the revealed principle discloses the essence in the *perfect* or *moral* state, the minor can be *moral.*

Thus, and only thus, is the subordination of the minors of reason to the revealed majors and the subordination of reason to faith maintained in that unique and sovereign science, in which both faith and reason must function together, yet not as equals. This is exactly what St. Thomas and every Thomist understands when they speak of the *elevation* of the minors of reason by the majors of faith. This is precisely the reason why theology possesses a certainty greater than the moral, or physical, or metaphysical certainty even when it employs metaphysical, physical, or moral minors.

It is, then, one thing to reveal that A was truly or *essentially* the mother of B; and quite another ro reveal that she was not only a mother essentially but also a mother in keeping with all the physical or *connatural* laws of motherhood; and still quite another to reveal that she was a *good* mother, that is, in keeping with all the moral laws and instincts of motherhood. To determine the *meaning* of the revealed datum belongs, as we have said, to the Church; to deduce its *consequences* is the function of theology.

If, in accordance with the meaning or teaching of the Church, it has been revealed merely that *A is the true mother of B,* then theologically we can infer that A possesess all the *essential* attributes or properties of motherhood, e.g., the consubstantiality of nature. But it cannot be inferred with theological necessity that she possesses all the physico-natural requisites or attributes, e.g. marital intercourse, loss of virginity; etc., etc. If the knowledge that a woman is truly or essentially a mother were enough to establish the theological certainty or necessity of her not being a virgin, then we should be theologically certain that Christ's Mother *was not a virgin,* since we know by revelation that She *was a mother.*

On the other hand, if it were revealed that A was not only the true mother of B, but also that she was a mother in the *connatural* or ordinary way as other women, then we can be theologically certain of any conclusion that is *physically* connected with motherhood, e.g. that she conceived through a man, etc., etc. However we will remain uncertain of the *moral* attributes or conclusions, e.g., whether she loved her child, or not.

Finally, if it were revealed not only that she truly and connaturally was a mother, but also that she was a *good* mother, then we will be theologically certain that she loved her child.

There is, thus, room in theology for all kinds of *minors* (and, consequently, for their corresponding reasonings and conclusions) whether metaphysical, physical or moral, provided that they are applied proportionally to the nature or meaning of the revealed major. To posit as a revealed major a proposition the meaning of which is merely *essential,* and then to join to it an

accidental minor is to ignore the homogeneity of any science, and worse still, to ignore the subordination of the minors of reason to the majors of faith; it is to construct an argument that is neither theological nor metaphysical nor physical, but a hybrid amalgam of theology or metaphysics, and physics. If such arguments seem *conclusive* in physics, it is due to the fact that the physicist assumes *a priori*, that is, in virtue of the formal object itself of his science, the essence's *connaturality,* and excludes *a priori* the essence's preternatural and supernatural state. But such an assumption cannot be made by either metaphysics or theology without denying themselves.

97. THE ANALOGY OF BEING. – What has been said of the term *necessity* must be equally said of the term *being* or *to be.* It is not a univocal, but an analogical term or concept; hence when it is extrapolated from one science to another, this must be done with due regard to maintaining its analogy of proportionality, that is to say, it must be employed in due proportion to the being or science in question. If the revealed major merely affirms the *essential* being (essentially man, essentially accident, essentially fire, etc.), the minor cannot simply affirm *being* in any manner whatsoever, it must likewise affirm *essential* being; otherwise, the common term *being* in the major and the minor will conceal two different concepts, and there will be four terms to the argument.

If I argue as follows : N *is* (essentially) a man; therefore N *is* (essentially) risible, which is the same as saying that N possesses radical or essential risibility, the argument is correctly constructed. The verb *is,* not only is literally identical, but also has the same meaning in both the major and minor premises, to wit, an *essential,* radical or aptitudinal meaning.

But if I say: N *is* (essentially) a man; but every man *is* (actually) risible; therefore, N is (actually) risible; in this argument the verb *is* despite its literal sameness in the major and the minor, has two different meanings: an *essential* meaning in the major and an *actual* or accidental meaning in the minor. Under the same term *is,* two different meanings have surreptitiously entered into the argument. Under the appearance of three, the argument has four terms. This is why it does *not conclude* in theology.[69] If it concludes in physics, it is because the physicist takes the term *is,* and for that matter any

[69] Thomists have always distinguished, and very carefully, the *essential* character of radical or metaphysical properties, and the *accidental* character of physico-actual or formal properties. "*Radical* risibility pertains *essentially* to man; the *formal* [the physico-actual risibility] *accidentally.*" (JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *Cursus Theol., De virtutibus,* d. 17, a.3, n.14) With regard to actual risibility, St. Thomas had earlier already adverted, "The property predicated by this term *man* and by this term *risible* is *not identical by essence, nor does it have one* esse." (*De Veritate,* q.1, a.5, ad 21) Hence, when one premise affirms the mere *essence,* and the other asserts the actual property, the reasoning has four terms. "It does not have *one* esse."

other term or concept, in the connatural or accidental sense, and thus there are only three terms to the argument. The physicist knows nothing of *essential* concepts, or of preternatural, or *supernatural* concepts. These are all ultra-physical; that is, metaphysical, or theological. Consequently, the necessity that characterizes the *deduction* or *consequence* in the physico-connexive reasoning is not a *theological necessity*.

98. ANOTHER CONCLUSIVE PROOF. – The Angelic Doctor provides another proof, which in our opinion is completely convincing, for the assertion that the physico-connexive reasoning is not a true *theological* conclusion or a true revealed virtual. According to St. Thomas, it is of the essence of any true reasoning that the destruction or denial of the conclusion carries with it the destruction or denial of the principle from which it is deduced. If the denial of the conclusion leaves the principle intact, we have therein an infallible sign that the presumed conclusion is not a true conclusion of the given principle.[70]

Now, then, let us examine *any* physico-connexive reasoning, that is, any argument the major of which merely affirms the *essence* of an individual thing while the conclusion affirms its *physico-actual* properties, and it will be palpably clear that the conclusion can be false and denied without having therefore to deny or falsify the major premise or principle. Let us examine the same classical example: N is true man or *essentially* man; therefore, he is *actually* risible. Does one cease to be a man essentially because one ceases to be actually risible? Does an accident cease to be truly and essentially an accident because it ceases to have actual inherence? Does a body cease to be truly and essentially a body because it actually does not occupy a place or because it is compenetrated by another body? Does fire cease to be truly and essentially fire because it does not actually burn? Does anything, in general, cease to have the essence it had because it ceases to have the actual properties, on the assumption that these differ really from the essence? Obviously, no. Therefore, the *actual* properties are not true theological conclusions from the *essence*. Therefore, the physico-connexive reasoning – that in which in the revealed major only the essence of an individual is asserted, whereas the conclusion attemps to deduce its *actual* properties – is not a true revealed or *theological* virtual, nor a true *theological* conclusion, but a hybrid mixture of theology and physics, that is neither physics nor theology.

[70] "This is the relation of the conclusion to the principle, viz. that *when the conclusion is destroyed, the principle is destroyed.*" (ST. THOMAS, *In Poster. Analyt.*, lect.38) "Demonstrative conclusions have a necessary relation to the principles by which they are demonstrated, so that *if the conclusions are not true, it is necessary that the principles be not true.*" (*De Veritate*, q.24, aa.1-18)

On the other hand, if in lieu of the actual, we were to deduce the aptitudinal or radical properties, or also, if we were to deduce the actual properties from a revealed major that posits, not the mere essence or the essence in the abstract, but either the connatural or the perfect essence, it would be immediately obvious that in neither instance can the conclusion be denied without denying the principle. *Radical* risibility cannot be denied without denying or destroying the *essence* of man, on the assumption that the former is identical with the latter. Nor can actual risibility, or any other physico-natural property, be denied without denying or destroying the *connatural*, or the *perfect*, state of the essence. Consequently, the conclusions that infer radical or essential properties from a revealed major that posits the essence, or the conclusions that infer actual properties from a revealed major that posits the connatural, or the perfect, state of an essence, are true theological conclusions or true revealed virtuality; but this must be denied of conclusions that infer actual properties from a revealed major that posits only the essence.

What has been said of the aphorism, *deduction of the* property *from the* essence, must be applied *exactly* to the aphorism, *deduction of the* effect *from its* cause.

There is a *metaphysical* cause, also termed virtual, and there is a *physical* or *real* cause. The former is really identical with, although conceptually distinct from, its effect; as e.g, absolute immutability is the metaphysical or virtual cause of eternity, and spirituality the cause of immortality. The latter really differs from its effect, as e.g, the essence of fire differs really from its effect or from the act of burning. (50) This physical and really distinct cause can (as we have just said of the essence) be considered either in the pure or abstract state, in the connatural, or in the perfect state. Hence these three consequences:

1st. The conclusion that infers the *metaphysical* effect from its *metaphysical* or virtual cause is a true, proper, and rigorous theological conclusion; e.g, *N is absolutely immutable; therefore eternal;* or *N is spiritual; therefore immortal.*

2nd. The conclusions that infer the *physico-actual* effect from its physical cause in the *connatural* or integral or perfect state is likewise a true, proper, and rigorous theological conclusion; e.g, *N is fire in the connatural state that is properly applied; therefore it actually burns;* or, *the powers in Christ were in a completely perfect state; therefore Christ actually possessed the acts of knowing and loving.*

3rd. The conclusions that presume to infer the *physico-actual* effect from its mere or *abstract* cause are not rigorously theological conclusions, that is, they have no theological certainty; e.g, *N was fire that was properly applied, therefore it actually burned;* or, *N was a heavy body, therefore it sank in water;* or, *N was a composite of contrary or corruptible elements,*

therefore it was corrupted. All these effects can fail in the supernatural or theological order. Therefore they are neither rigorous theological conclusions, nor revealed virtuality.

We believe that the foregoing has amply explained the traditional *definition* of the theological conclusion or revealed virtuality, viz., that which is contained in the revealed deposit as the property in the essence, or as an effect in the cause. To explain and understand well the definition of a thing is to explain and understand well that thing's nature or *essence.* "For the *definition* signifies the form and the *essence* of the thing."[71]

99. THE PHYSICO-CONNEXIVE VIRTUALITY AND THE INFALLIBILITY OF THE CHURCH. – Can the Church, therefore, infallibly define that *N is risible,* or that he has any other property, in the supposition that it has been revealed that *N is a* true *man,* that is, that *N possesses the* essence *of man?*

We believe the answer to this question should be clear from all that has been said. If it be a question of defining the *radical* risibility, or any other radical or aptitudinal or essential properties, the Church can define them infallibly upon the *one and only condition* that She knows by revelation that N is essentially a man. It is impossible to preserve or save the truth of the revealed major which states that N is a man, if it be denied that he is essentially or radically risible. Hence, the conclusion is necessary for the preservation of the revealed deposit and, thus, it is an object of infallibility.

If it be a question of defining the *actual* risibility, or any other physico-actual properties, the Church can also define them infallibly, provided, however, that the meaning of the revealed major is, not merely that N is *essentially* a man, but that he is a man in the *connatural* or *integral* state, or that he is a man *with no defect,* or a man like the *common run* of men, or a man in the *perfect* state. It is impossible to save or preserve the revealed truth that states that N is a man in the *connatural* or *integral* or *perfect* state if he be deficient in any connatural property or attribute or perfection. Thus the conclusion is also an object of infallibility.[72]

[71] ST. THOMAS, *In Poster. Analyt.,* lib. 1, lect. 9.

[72] Reasonings through which the actual properties are deduced from the connatural or integral or perfect essence, are as *inclusive* as those in which the essential or radical properties are deduced from the mere essence. The revealed major, *N is man integrally or perfectly or connaturally,* contains two revealed concepts, to wit: the concept of *man* or *human essence,* and the concept of the *integrity* or *perfection* or *connaturality* of that human essence. The actual properties are included, not in the first, but in the second concept. When, e.g., I argue: N is a contingent being; therefore it is a *created* being, the term *created* is really included, not in the concept of *being,* but in that of *contingent.* Likewise, when I say: The Church is a perfect society; therefore, she is independent, the concept *independent* is included, not in the concept of *society* in the major premise, but in the concept of *perfect.* Consequently, such reasonings, are not only perfectly theological but, as we shall see, also definable of faith, because they are *inclusive.*

But, if instead of saying: N is a *contingent being;* therefore it is a created being; we were to say: N is a *being;* therefore it is a created being; such an argument would not conclude either in metaphysics or in theology, notwithstanding the fact that there is only one possible case in which something is a *being* and not a *created* being, viz. God. Similarly, if instead of saying: N is man integrally or perfectly, therefore he is actually risible, or therefore he possesses any other actual property; if we were to argue: N is man essentially, therefore he is actually risible; such an argument is not conclusive theologically. To be a *man* without being *actually risible* can happen by exception not only once, but as many times as it should please God.

But if it be a question of defining the actual risibility, or any other *actual* properties of an individual, on the *sole* basis of a revealed major that merely states that N is essentially or truly a man, and provides no further information on whether he is in a connatural or a preternatural state, in a state of integrity or of deficiency, in a state of perfection or of imperfection, then our view is that the theologian cannot deduce with *theological* certainty, nor the Church define *infallibly,* that N actually has these or those actual properties. The Church can define that N connaturally *requires* them (radical property); She can define that he actually has them *if* or *on condition* that, he be in a connatural state (reasoning of type 5, not of type 4). But to define infallibly that N actually and unconditionally possesses actual properties can neither be the object of theological science nor of infallibility for as long as no other data are available except a revealed major in which only the *essence* is affirmed, and a minor in which a *physical* law is affirmed.

To be essentially a man, essentially an accident, essentially a body, essentially fire, is perfectly consistent with not being actually risible, not having actual inherence in a subject, not actually occupying a place, not actually burning. Therefore, to save or preserve the revealed majors or the revealed deposit which states that N is essentially a man, an accident, a body, fire, it is not indispensable to affirm the truths or conclusions that N is actually risible, actually inherent, actually occupying a place, actually burning. Now, then, if these conclusions are not indispensable for the conservation of the revealed deposit, if the truth of the revealed deposit can be preserved without them, then they are not the object of infallibility as *erroneous,* although they might be the object of infallibility as *temerarious, imprudent,* etc. If revelation *merely* discloses the essence of a thing, then whoever affirms that such an essence is not in a state of connaturality and integrity but in a preternatural or in a defective state; that is to say, whoever affirms that such an essence is deprived of this or that actual property through a *miracle* or by divine intervention, such a one might be imprudent, rash, foolish in affirming a miracle *without reason.* But to be *without reason* or rash is one thing; and

quite another, to be *contrary to reason,* or better still, *contrary to revelation,* which is the only thing that constitutes an *error* in theology.[73]

100. THE ACTUAL PROPERTIES IN CHRIST. – Then how is it that the Church has defined infallibly, and even as a truth of faith, the existence of certain *actual* properties in Christ; e.g., that He had a human intellect and a human will? We believe that here lies the origin of the mistake or the inadvertence of many a modern writer. The Church has defined these actual properties of the most sacred human nature of Our Savior because by revelation we have, not merely that Christ was man *essentially* or *in the abstract,* but also man in the state of *integrity* and *connaturality* and *without defect,* and even more, that as a man He was *perfect* or utterly perfect in everything not contrary to the hypostatic union or to the purpose of redemption. Starting from the revealed major that Christ was a *whole and perfect man,* the Church can define as infallible truths, and even as truths of faith, not only the intellect and the will of Christ, but also each and everyone of the properties or attributes that belong to a perfect human nature, e.g. actual risibility, all the external and internal senses, quantity, gravity, and all the other properties of soul and body.

[73] By the way, it will not be amiss to point out that the physical or moral necessity of *deduction* or *consequence* which is our concern here, must not be confused with either the physical or moral necessity of *means* to an *end.* When God prescribes an end. He must provide the means necessary thereto, be they necessary with metaphysical, physical, or moral necessity. That He has to provide the necessary means is certain, not merely with a moral and physical certitude, but with a certitude that is metaphysical, theological, absolute, with no exceptions. *God does not command the impossible.* Hence, if He has commanded the Church to preserve and explain the revealed deposit, He cannot but give her *all that is necessary* to preserve that deposit. Therefore, the Church is infallible *in anything necessary* to preserve and explain the revealed deposit, be it necessary with metaphysical, physical or moral necessity. Everybody is agreed on this. But this necessity of *means* to an *end* must not be confused with the necessity of *consequence* from a *principle.* God, who has established the physical principles, can suspend or cause the failure of their physical properties or consequences; whereas He cannot deny the physical or the moral means to the end He has prescribed.

Therefore, when from the fact that the Church is infallible in any and everything necessary (with whatever sort of necessity) for the preservation of the revealed deposit, one argues that the Church must also be infallible in the conclusions or consequences that are certain or necessary with physical or moral necessity, there is a confusion between the necessity of means to the ends prescribed by God – a necessity which is absolute and can never fail in any case, – and the necessity of physical or moral *consequence,* which relative to God is a *contingent* necessity subject to failure as often as it should please Him. To preserve the revealed proposition that *Mary is the true Mother of Christ,* there is no necessity (of whatsoever kind) to maintain the proposition that *she conceived through a man,* notwithstanding that a man is physically necessary in order to be a mother.

But if God had merely revealed that Christ is man essentially, without disclosing further, whether explicitly or implicitly, that His human essence was, or was not, in an integral or defective, connatural or preternatural, perfect or imperfect, state, then it would be impossible to claim either theological certainty or infallibility about any of His actual properties, just as no such claims can be made in the case of many other individuals, of whom we know through the Bible that they were men, but yet of whom neither the Church nor theology know whether, or not, they were whole men or without defect.

In the case of our adorable Saviour it was necessary or proper for us to know not only the essence in the abstract but also His properties and perfections. Hence, God revealed to us not only the essence but also its connatural and perfect *state.* Of many other men and things revelation has only disclosed to us the *essence,* because we had no need of knowing *divinely* or *theologically* anything else. The starting point for both theology and infallibility is the revealed datum, and it alone. In the order of reasonings or conclusions, that alone is theological or the object of infallibility without which the *revealed truth* cannot be saved or preserved. Now, the *essence* can be perfectly safe even if God should deprive it of any, or of all, its actual properties.

101. THE TREATISE *ON THE INCARNATION.* – In the *Summa Theologica's* treatise *On the Incarnation* any one can verify how carefully the Angelic Doctor distinguishes the three revealed principles (Christ is true or essentially man – Christ is a whole or perfect man – Christ is an utterly perfect man), and how he employs one or the other accordingly as it is a question of deducing *essential* parts or properties, *connatural* properties, or *accidental* perfections. If it be a question of whether Christ had something *essential* to human nature, e.g. whether He had a *true body,* St. Thomas utilizes the first revealed principle, which concerns the *essence* of man: "Whether the Son of God should have assumed a true body. I answer that it must be said that . . . three reasons can be given for this. The first of which is taken *from the reason* [*essence*] *of human nature,* to which it belongs to have a true body. Assuming therefore from the foregoing that it behooved the Son of God to assume a human *nature,* it follows that He assumed a true body."[74]

But when the Angelic Doctor wishes to deduce any of Christ's *connatural* properties, e.g. whether He had the powers of the intellect, or of the will, or of the concupiscible and irascible appetites, he does not resort to the revealed principle that "Christ is truly or essentially man", but to the other which says that "Christ is a whole or perfect man". "Whether in Christ there

[74] *Summa Theol.,* p.3, q.5, a.1.

are two wills. I answer that it must be said that . . . For it is manifest that the Son of God assumed a *perfect* human nature, as has been shown previously. Now, the will belongs to the *perfection* [not to the essence] of human nature, of which it is a natural power, as is the intellect, and this is clear from what has been said in the first part. Therefore it must be said that the Son of God assumed a human will in the human nature."[75]

"Next it is supported by the reason given by St. Thomas in this article. For the power of willing is a *perfection* of human nature, without which the latter would not be *whole* and *perfect:* but the Word assumed a human nature that was *perfect* and *integral,* with all its properties: therefore the Word assumed human nature together with the power of willing, which is proper and connatural to it."[76]

Finally, when the Angelic Doctor wishes to deduce the *accidental* or acquirable perfections of human nature, e.g., science or virtue, he does not resort either to the principle that "Christ is true man", but to the principle that "Christ is a *perfect* or utterly perfect man". "Whether Christ had some knowledge other than the divine knowledge. I answer that it must be said that . . . . it behooved Christ to possess created knowledge for three reasons. The first is for the sake of the *perfection* of the soul. For the soul, considered in itself, is in potency to know the intelligibles. But what is in potency is *imperfect* unless it be reduced to act. Thus, it behooved that the soul of Christ should be *perfect* by some knowledge."[77]

Next the conclusion is proven by the argument of St. Thomas in this article, which we can reduce to the following form: Christ the Lord had an *integral* and *perfect* human nature: but without the created act of intellectual knowing the said nature would not have its *integral* and *perfect* being; therefore . . . ."[78]

The same procedure can be seen even more clearly where the Angelic Doctor asks: "Whether the virtues existed in Christ. I answer that it must be said that . . . . the *more perfect the principle,* the more it impresses its effects: wherefore, since the grace of Christ was *utterly perfect* there consequently proceeded from it the virtues to *perfect* each and every power of the soul in respect of all the soul's acts; and therefore Christ possessed all the virtues."[79]

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[75] *Summa Theol.*, p.3, q.18, a.1.

[76] SALMANTICENSES commenting on the Angelic Doctor's just quoted words, *Cursus Theol.*, vol. 16, ed. Vivès, p. 12.

[77] *Summa Theol.*, p.3, q.9, a.1.

[78] SALMANTICENSES, *loc.cit.*, vol.15, p.5.

[79] *Summa Theol.*, p.3, q.7, a.2.

Thus, in the treatise on the Incarnation, where the properties or perfections of the human nature of Our Saviour are determined through reasoning, the starting point is not restricted to the principle that "Christ is essentially man". The starting point is made up of these three principles: 1st. Christ is *essentially* man; 2nd. Christ is a *whole* man, that is without any physical deficiency in whatever is not opposed to the hypotastic union or to the purposes of redemption; 3rd. Christ, as man, is *utterly perfect,* that is, has all the perfections that are not opposed to the same hypostatic union or to the purpose of redemption. All *essential* properties are deduced from the first principle; all the actual or *connatural* properties are deduced from the second principle; all the accidental or acquirable properties, from the third. Whoever denies any of the essential properties, runs counter to the first principle that affirms that Christ is true man. Whoever denies any of the *actual* properties in the belief that God had suspended them in the human nature of Our adorable Saviour, as He has suspended its human personality, would not run counter to the principle that Christ is essentially man, for the essential being of man can be maintained without this or that actual property; but he would run counter to the revealed principle that Christ is man connaturally or integrally, or without defect, or like the rest of men. Finally, whoever denies any of the accidental perfections, e.g., Christ's knowledge or virtue, would not run counter either to the principle that Christ is man or to the principle that Christ is man *connaturally,* but he would run counter to the principle that Christ is an *utterly perfect* man. The failure to distinguish clearly the three concepts of *mere* essence, *connatural* essence, and *utterly perfect* essence, has caused in many a misunderstanding of the aphorism, *deduction of the property from the essence,* that is the classical definition of the revealed or theological virtual and the specific constitutive and distinctive element that sets theology apart from divine faith.

102. COROLLARIES. – All the foregoing leads to these two evident corollaries:

1st. True and proper *revealed virtuality,* and true and proper and rigorous *theological conclusions* are: a) all the conclusions that from the revealed essence (including the mere essence or essence in the abstract) infer any of its *essential* or metaphysical or aptitudinal or radical properties; that is to say, all the conclusions of types 1, 2, and 3 (45); b) all the conclusions that from the revealed *integral* or *connatural* or *perfect* essence infer any of its *physical* or actual properties, that is, all the conclusions of types 5, and 6 (45). This is the true Thomist understanding of the *revealed virtual* or of the *deduction of the property from the essence* which is the classical definition of the true and proper and rigorous and specific *theological conclusion.*

2nd. The conclusions that from the revealed *mere essence* or essence in the abstract of an individual infer its physico-actual properties are neither

true and proper revealed virtuality nor true and proper theological conclusions. This means all the conclusions of type 4, which make up the physico-connexive virtuality and are the only ones that belong to the third degree of the scale of progress. (46)

SECTION V
THE TRUE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUALITY IS THE METAPHYSICO-INCLUSIVE VIRTUALITY

103. A DIFFICULTY. – If, as we have just seen, the physico-connexive virtual is not a true theological virtual, then it is obvious that theological reasoning must be metaphysico-connexive,[viii] it must proceed intrinsically not extrinsically, it must pass from one to *another according to reason* but which is *not other in reality.* In one word, theological reasoning must be merely conceptual, that is, restricted to different aspects of the same objective reality of the starting point.

However, this does not seem to be always the case, or else it presents a grave difficulty. For, as a matter of fact, both theology and metaphysics do not argue solely through formal causes, as mathematics and logic, but also through efficient and final causes. Thus e.g., the existence of God and the creation of the world are true metaphysical and theological conclusions, and yet, they do not seem to be deduced through formal but through efficient and final causality. Now, it is common knowledge that, whereas the formal cause is an intrinsic cause, the efficient and final causes are extrinsic causes and really distinct from the effect from which our reason infers them. Therefore a conclusion can be a true theological conclusion and at the same time be really distinct from the revealed deposit and extrinsic to it. There are many who argue thus because of a want of clear understanding of the true metaphysical, and hence of the true theological, process.[80]

[viii] *Metaphysical connexion* is the same thing as intrinsic inclusion. The author immediately clarifies what he means by saying that theological reasoning must proceed intrinsically, not extrinsically. Cf. also footnote 85. – *Transl.*

[80] The majority of modern theological treatises is dominated by the teachings of Suárez and Lugo on the revealed or theological *virtual*, and thus also on the relationship between *theology* and *faith*. Suárez's and Lugo's whole system, whose logical consequences were drawn by the Salmanticenses with their celebrated *Nego maiorem*, can be summed up in these four propositions: 1. The *revealed virtual* is the specific constituent of theology and the specific characteristic that distinguishes it from faith. 2. Now, the *properly* revealed virtual, and therefore the properly theological conclusion, is *solely* that which is deduced from the revealed deposit by a merely *connexive* process, that is, a process from one to *an other in reality.* 3. Therefore, that which is deduced by such a process is objectively distinct from the revealed deposit, that is, a *non-revealed* objectivity. 4. Therefore, the true and proper revealed virtual, that is, the true and proper theological conclusion, is not definable of faith (Salmanticenses), except in virtue of a new revelation (Suárez) or in virtue of transforming assistance (Lugo). Of these four propositions, the first or major premise is the teaching of the whole of traditional theology. The third and fourth are perfectly deduced conclusions if one *assumes* the truth of the second or minor proposition, which is the basis established by Suárez in order to explain Molina. The whole system is thus grounded on the second proposition which asserts that "the properly revealed virtual, and therefore the properly theological conclusion, is solely that which is deduced from the revealed deposit by a merely connexive process, that is, a process from one, to *an other in reality.*"

In this section we propose to demonstrate that this second proposition is a *Thomist heresy*, by making it clear that in theology, as well as in metaphysics, it never is a case of *mere connexion* but always a case of *inclusion* or objective implicitness, and consequently even the conclusions arrived at through the *efficient* or the *final* cause, which seemingly are cases of mere connexion or transition to *an other in reality*, are, when the reasoning is rigorously theological, connexive-inclusive, that is a transition "from one to an other according to reason".

104. THEOLOGY EMPLOYS ALL SORTS OF ARGUMENTS. – Let us begin by recalling that sacred theology is truly *wisdom,* nay that it is the highest of human wisdoms; that it is the foremost among sciences; that it extends itself to the subject matter of all sciences; that therefore it can employ all sorts of procedures.

Hence, sacred theology can use all kinds of arguments: it can use probable arguments as well as certain arguments; if the latter, it can argue *a priori* or *by cause,* and *a posteriori* or *by effect;* if *by cause,* it can argue by formal, as well by efficient, exemplary, and final causes.[81]

But, if both metaphysics and theology employ all sorts of arguments, still these arguments are not all of equal worth nor are they all rigorously metaphysical or theological.

Indeed, even if we eliminate probable arguments as not strictly scientific, and confine ourselves to those that are certain, these are still classfiable into three essentially different species of certitude, to wit: *moral, physical,* and *metaphysical.* Thus, only arguments characterized by *metaphysical* certitude qualify as rigorously metaphysical arguments. Since theology is nothing but metaphysics applied to God, no argument is rigorously theological unless between its premises and its conclusion there exists a metaphysical or absolutely certain link.

[81] "The sacred doctrine, being itself one, *extends itself* to things that belong to the *various* philosophical sciences." (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.1, q.1, a.4) "Theology can employ the principles of *all* other sciences, although they are posterior in dignity, since they are somehow ancillary and preliminary to itself." (In *Boetium de Trinitate,* q.2, n. 3, ad 7) "This doctrine is *supremely wisdom* among all human wisdoms, and not merely in a particular order, but unqualifiedly (simpliciter)." (*Summa Theol.*, loc. cit., a.6) "Theology has in itself *something from all other sciences* inasmuch as it is the foremost of them all." (ST. THOMAS, *In 1 Sent.*, d. 22, q.1, a.4, expositio textus)

105. SACRED THEOLOGY IS THE METAPHYSICS OF THE REVEALED DEPOSIT. – Theology, according to St. Thomas, has God as its formal object, and nothing can fall under its consideration unless by reference to God.

Since God can be known in two ways, either naturally through creatures or supernaturally through divine revelation, there are correspondingly two species of metaphysics of God or theology. The first is the natural metaphysics of God or natural theology or theodicy. The second is the sacred metaphysics of God or sacred theology.[82]

However, the knowledge we have of God in this life, whether in the natural or in the supernatural order, is not a knowledge of God *in Himself* but only a knowledge of God through his *effects*. Hence, in both natural theology and sacred theology the *medium of demonstration* is not God Himself but some effect of God. Natural theology employs as a medium of demonstration the natural effects of God that we call creatures. Sacred theology employs as a medium of demonstration that supernatural effect of God called divine revelation or revealed deposit. Metaphysical principles applied to creatures produce the conclusions of natural theology or theodicy. These same metaphysical principles applied to the revealed deposit produce the conclusions of sacred theology. The principles of metaphysics alone are analogous and transcendent; consequently, they alone are applicable to the divine and to the human, to the supernatural or revealed as well as to the natural. Metaphysical principles alone are grounded on the principle of contradiction, and hence on the principle of *identity;* therefore , they alone are capable of

[82] "Theology, i.e., the third part of speculative knowledge, which is called *divine* or *metaphysics*, or *First Philosophy*." (ST. THOMAS, *In Boetium de Trinitate*, q.4, a.4, c.2) "All of this is the concern of *Theology* or *Divine Science* because God is in it the chief object of consideration; it is also known by another name as *Metaphysics*." (*Ibid.*, q.5, a.1) "Thus *Theology* or *Divine Science* is of two kinds. There is one in which things divine are not considered as the subject of the science but as the principle of other subject, and this is the *Theology* which the philosopher pursues, and which by another name is called *Metaphysics*. There is another that considers things divine for their own sake, as the subject of the science, and this is the *Theology* that is called *Holy Scripture*. However, both of them treat of things that are abstracted from matter and motion . . . although *some things* are considered in it [the Theology of Holy Scripture] that are in matter and in motion, insofar as they are required for the manifestation of things divine." (*Ibid.*, q.5, a.4,) "That which is not taken into a science except for the manifestation of some other thing does not belong *per se* to the *science* but only quasi *accidentally*." (*Ibid.*, ad 1) *"In all sciences that which is accidental* is *set aside* and that which is *per se* is *taken in*." (*Ibid.*, q.5, a.3) "Although in respect of God we cannot know *what He is*, in this doctrine we take His *effect*, whether in the order of *nature* or of *grace*, in lieu of the definition in respect of the things considered in this doctrine, just as in some other philosophical sciences something is demonstrated of the cause, through the effect, by taking the effect in lieu of the cause." (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.1, q.1, a.7, ad1)

producing conclusions that are really identical and homogenous with their principles.

Since theology is a true metaphysical science, we propose to show, with all the clarity that we can muster, how every rigorously theological conclusion issues from the revealed deposit *intrinsically* not extrinsically; by way of *implicitness* or inclusion or analysis, not by way of mere connexion or synthesis or addition; by way of objective identity within the revealed deposit; by way of perfect homogeneity. And that this is the case irrespective of whether the reasoning proceeds by effect or by cause, irrespective of whether it be by formal, or efficient, or final cause, provided that the reasoning process is truly metaphysical.

106. THE TRUE METAPHYSICO-THEOLOGICAL PROCESS. – For what is *metaphysical certitude?* Metaphysical certitude is said to be, and is, that which is absolute, that is, which obtains *in every case;* that which can never fail; that whose denial implicates the ruin of the principle of contradiction, and hence of the principle of identity; it is, in one word, the certitude grounded on the very *essence* of the thing, and therefore a certitude that belongs to the *understanding* itself (*de intellectu*) of the thing.

What, then, is a *metaphysical proposition*? That which is characterized by metaphysical certitude, that whose certitude is the very certitude of the principle of contradiction and identity, that whose predicate is of the essence of the subject or vice versa.[83]

[83] "We do not always speak *metaphysically*, sometimes we speak morally, i.e., taking into consideration the customary behaviour of men. Consider these examples: *the circle is round; fire burns; parents love their children.* These propositions are both true and universal; but roundness is inseparable from the circle in such a manner that if it be removed, the *nature* of the circle perishes. This proposition is said to be *metaphysically* universal. The second proposition is similarly universal and true, *not because of the intrinsic nature* of the subject, but on account of the laws of nature which the author of nature, God, has imposed on the things created by Himself, which therefore He can suspend by His omnipotence; consequently, the proposition does not exclude *exceptions*. These propositions are said to be *physically* universal. Likewise, the third proposition is true and universal but on account of the laws by which human behaviour is *generally* governed. These propositions are said to be *morally* universal, and they admit more exceptions than physically universal propositions. Whence follow some corollaries worthy of note. First corollary: A universal metaphysical proposition is *absolutely false*, better still, it should *not be called metaphysical*, if it admits *any exception* . . . Third corollary: It is *illegitimate* to infer per se a *singular* proposition from a proposition that is true *physically* or *morally*." (ZIGLIARA, *Dialectica*, 22, 4) "A thing is judged to be *absolutely necessary* from the relationship of the terms: inasmuch as the predicate is placed *in the definition of the subject*, as it is necessary for man to be an animal; or because the subject is *of the reason* of the predicate, as it is necessary that a number be either odd or even." (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.1, q.19, a.3.) "Just as in the *reasoning* intellect the *conclusion* is compared to the *principle*, so in the *composing and dividing* intellect the *predicate* is compared to the *subject*." (*Ibid.*, q.58, a.4) [To *compose and divide* said of the intellect signifies the mental act of judging. – Transl.]

What is *metaphysical reasoning?* Since the relationship between the *conclusion* and its *principle* in *reasoning* is the same as the relationship between the *predicate* and the *subject* in the *proposition,* metaphysical reasoning is that which is characterized by metaphysical certitude; that whose conclusion cannot fail without implicating the failure of the principle; in one word, that whose conclusion is *of the very essence* of the principle.

For the sake of clarity, let us first examine some examples of metaphysical reasoning by formal cause and then some examples of metaphysical reasoning by efficient and final causes.

When I say, *the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles,* or *that which is spiritual is immortal,* these are propositions of metaphysical, absolute, *essential* certitude; propositions of *intrinsic* truth, of absolute *inclusion* and *identity.* In these propositions the predicate is of the *essence* of the subject. The predicate and the subject are *other and other according to reason,* but they are *not other* but one in reality.

When I argue thus: *It is a triangle, therefore its angles are equal to two right angles;* or *it is spiritual, therefore it is immortal,* these are reasonings or processes of metaphysical, absolute, essential certitude; processes that are inclusive and of perfect identity and homogeneity. Why? Because the conclusion is of the essence of the principle from which it is deduced. The conclusion and the principle are *other and other according to reason* but *not other in reality.*

All this is rooted in the fact that the worth, the fabric and the nature of any argumentation depends on the *middle* term or *minor* proposition.[84]

Hence, in truly mathematical or metaphysical propositions the predicate must be of the reason of the subject; in truly mathematical or metaphysical reasonings the conclusion must be of the reason of the principle. Since the true principles of sacred theology are the principles of faith or the revealed deposit, the truly theological conclusion must be, and is, of the reason *of the revealed deposit,* of the understanding *of the revealed deposit.*

84 "The *whole strength* of any argument lies in the *middle* term." (ST. THOMAS, *de Veritate,* q.14, a.2, ad 9) "The *whole process* of any argumentation is contained in the *middle* term." (ST. THOMAS, *In 3 Sent.,* d.25, q.2, a.1) "The *formal* reason of science lies in the *mediums* of demonstration by which the conclusions are known." (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.,* 2-2, q.1, q.1) In *every* rigorously mathematical or metaphysical process the *minor* is *always* intrinsic, inclusive, essential, really identical; in *every* physical process the *minor* is *always* extrinsic, merely connexive, contingent, really distinct. Therein lies the dividing line between the contingent physical sciences and the necessary mathematical and metaphysical sciences.(38) Therein lies the *essence* of theology and of true theological conclusions deduced with the aid of minors of reason. Therein, as we shall see, lies one of the keys to the homogeneity of the true theological conclusion and to its definability as of faith.

Unfortunately, this is often overlooked in spite of its elementary and fundamental character. One's attention is focused on the *external* fabric of the process, whether it is by *cause* or by *effect,* instead of being focused on the *middle term* or *minor premise,*[ix] on which everything depends. If the minor premise is a metaphysically certain proposition, then the process and the conclusion possess metaphysical, intrinsic, essential value, the value of identity. Now, what are the minors or middles of those two reasonings? The following: *the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles,* and *that which is spiritual is immortal,* the very same propositions cited as paradigms of a structure that is metaphysical, intrinsic, essential, proceeding from one to an other according to reason.

Let us now examine the metaphysical and the theological process by efficient, final, and exemplary causes, which because they are denominated *extrinsic,* have given rise to the difficulty described above. Let us take as models the two examples already mentioned, viz. the conclusions concerning God's existence and the creation of the world.

The process or ways by which St. Thomas and the First Philosophy[x] prove the existence of God are based *on the reason of motion, on the reason of efficient cause, on the reason of contingent being.*

Let us begin by taking note of those words *the* reason *of,* for they are the key to the whole process, and without them the argumentation would not be metaphysical. Metaphysics employs as physics does, arguments from efficient causes, from effects, from *motion,* from *contingency.* Thus metaphysics apparently assumes the extrinsicity characteristic of physical science. However, metaphysics employs only the *reason* or *essence* of causality, effect, motion, and contingency. Since nothing is more intrinsic than the *essence,* the process, which to all appearances is extrinsic, is in reality as intrinsic as the process of mathematics.

In metaphysics or theology God's existence is proven thus: *changeable, or potential, or manifold, or contingent being exists; therefore God exists.* This seemingly extrinsic and merely connexive reasoning is essentially intrinsic or inclusive; this process which seemingly is a transition *from one thing to*

[ix] The middle term is put on a par with the minor premise because of the identity of their functions. In a syllogism there are three terms: the major, the minor, and the middle. There are likewise three propositions: the major premise (which the author often calls the *principle,* since it is the final point of resolution), the minor premise, and the conclusion. The function of the middle term is to link the minor to the major term. The function of the minor premise is to link the conclusion to the major premise or principle, into which it is logically resolved. – *Transl.*

[x] A term employed by Aristotle to designate metaphysics. Cf. footnote 82. – *Transl.*

another thing is in reality a transition *from one to another according to reason.* Undoubtedly God is a *thing other* than changeable being; nonetheless, the *truth* and hence the *being,* of the conclusion are *essential* for the truth, and hence for the being of the principle. The major or principle does not *express,* but it nevertheless *includes* the truth and the being of the conclusion.

When our mind passes from the *datum* of the major (*changeable* being exists) to the truth and being of the conclusion (God *exists*), there has not been a transition to something *extrinsic,* but simply an intellectual unfolding of the *twofold* reality essentially included in *one and the same* datum. The datum of the major premise contains two realities: one which expresses changeable being, and another that *essentially implies* necessary being. In order to perceive the second reality it is not necessary for the mind to add *another* new reality, a new *datum,* but merely to analyze or open up the reality or truth already existing in the major by means of a minor belonging *to the essence* of the major (the *reason* of motion, the *reason* of contingency, etc.), a minor that is essentially inclusive, that is, *identical to the essence or reality* of the major. If our minds were sufficiently powerful and intuitive, that minor would be superfluous, for *in the major itself* we would see infallibly and quasi *simultaneously* – and nothing is truly seen that is not there – the truth and reality expressed in the conclusion. Thus, the transition is not precisely a transition from the reality of potential being to the reality of God's existence, but a transition from the reality of potential being *plus* the reality of God's existence, *essentially implicit* in the term potential, to the reality of God's existence *explicitated,* in the conclusion. The reality of God's existence, *as explicitated,* is the *term* of the process. However, that same reality was already *essentially implicated* in the *starting point* of the process. Thus, the process is one of mere *intellectual explication;* it is really a process "from one to an other according to reason."

This is *always* the case in *every* truly mathematical or metaphysical process. This is *never* the case in any physico-connexive process, which, according to St. Thomas is proper of the natural or physical sciences.[85]

[85] The sciences or conclusions of absolute certainty, e.g. metaphysics and theology, precisely because they are metaphysical sciences or conclusions, i.e. sciences or conclusions of real identity, are by the same token connexive, since no thing can be more connected with a thing than itself: "for there is no greater connexion than that of a thing to itself" (JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *Cursus Theologicus,* p.1, d.4, a.3, n.12). However, they are never merely connexive but connexive-inclusive. Since to say connexion is the same as to say virtually, inclusive sciences possess true and proper virtuality; however, theirs is not mere or pure virtuality but inclusive or *implicit* virtuality (virtuale *implicitum*). The merely connexive or merely virtual (virtuale *tantum*, connexive tantum) is proper of the physical sciences; *proprium naturalis scientiae.*

CONFIRMATION. – It is unquestionable that, whereas mathematics and logic admit no demonstration other than by *formal cause,* both metaphysics and theology, as well as the physical sciences, demonstrate by efficient and final causes. "The logician and the mathematician consider things only according to formal principles."[86] "But the things which the *theologian* considers are separated [substances] existing in reality. Now such can be the principle and the end of motion. Therefore there is nothing to hinder the theologian from demonstrating through efficient and final causes."[87]

However, since the metaphysical and theological sciences differ essentially from the physical sciences, the metaphysical argumentation by efficient and final causes employed in metaphysics and theology must differ essentially from the mode of argumentation employed in physics. "For each science takes a part of being *according to a special mode different from the mode* according to which being is considered in metaphysics."[88] The mode according to which metaphysics considers any being – and therefore also the final, efficient, and exemplary causes – is to consider it not from the point of view of *this or that* cause or effect, but from an *essential* or *transcendental* point of view. "For metaphysics also considers each being, not according to *proper* reasons whereby it is *this* or *that* being, but in so far as it participates the *common reason* of being."[89]

Hence the relation of efficient cause and effect whereby we proceed from creatures to the existence of God is not the physico-connexive relation of the *natural* sciences, but the essential-inclusive relation of the metaphysical sciences. Which is why the relation is *one and the same* in each and every creature. "For all creatures, in so far as they are His creatures, are referred to God by *one* kind of relation."[90] "This mutability which belongs to *every* creature is not consistent with any *natural* movement but consistent with their dependence on God, by Whom if they were to be forsaken, they would fall short of that from which they have being. Now this dependence pertains to the consideration of *metaphysics* rather than to that of *natural science.*"[91]

Therefore, the process whereby the transition is made from the contingency of being to the existence of God or to the necessity of creation is a process by way of *essence,* and thus it is *utterly formal.* The conclusion *God*

[86] ST. THOMAS, *de Potentia,* q.6, aa. 1-12.

[87] ST. THOMAS, *In Boet. de Trinitate.* q.5, aa.5-7.

[88] *Ibid.*, q.5, aa.1-6.

[89] *Ibid* aa.4-6

[90] ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.1, q.32, a.2.

[91] ST. THOMAS, *In Boet. de Trinitate,* q.5, aa. 2-7.

exists, or *God is the creator of everything*, is essential for the principle *contingent* or *participated being exists*. "Therefore the efficient cause is necessary not merely because the effect is contingent, but because the effect would not exist [principle][xi] if the cause did not exist [conclusion]."[92] "Creatures are *contained* under the *divine* order and it is their *nature* that they depend on God."[93] This *essential* relationship between God and any creature may not be *expressed* in the definition of contingent being, but it is *included* or *implicit* in the very *essence* of every contingent being. "Although the relation to the cause does not enter the *definition* of the being that is caused, it is nevertheless consequent to the things *pertaining to its reason.*"[94]

Physico-actual properties, which provide the basis for the physico-connexive process, are intrinsic to the subject but extrinsic to the subject's existence, since, absolutely speaking, the subject can exist without them. But God's existence, or any other thing deduced by a metaphysical process, is *intrinsic, intimate*, of the *utmost immediacy* not only to the subject but to the existence of the subject or principle from which it is deduced because it is intrinsic, intimate, immediate to *being* as being, and being as such is what is most intimate and *most formal*. "Since God is being itself by essence it is necessary that created being be His proper effect, as to ignite is the proper effect of fire. But being is what is *most intimate* in anything, what lies *deepest* in everything because it is what is *formal* in respect of *everything* found in a thing. Therefore it is necessary that God be, and be *intimately*, in all things."[95] "All this makes it obvious that God exists *intimately*, within each thing *just as the proper being of a being* is intimate in it."[96]

Therefore, when by such a process a transition is effected from the *datum* or principle *contingent being exists* to the conclusion *God exists*, there has been no transition to a reality outside the datum or principle but to a reality that was within, although not explicitly, the datum itself. Thus the process is really and essentially *intrinsic*, one that stays within the same reality of the datum. That is what is meant by the phrase "from one to an other according to reason" used in reference to *inclusion* and *homogeneity*. We do not mean to say that the reality of God's existence is not distinct from the reality of contingent being, but that the reality of God's existence is

[xi] Datum or premise from which the reasoning starts and into which the conclusion as such is resolved. – *Transl.*

[92] ST THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.1, q.44, a.1, ad 2.

[93] *Ibid.*, q.28, aa.13.

[94] *Ibid.*, q.44 a.1, ad 1.

[95] *Ibid.*, q.8, a.1.

[96] ST. THOMAS, *In 1 Sent.*, d.27, q.1, a.1

essentially required for, and is essentially included in, the reality or existence of contingent being.

The fact that a metaphysical conclusion or metaphysical science is essentially *intrinsic* is the reason why, according to St. Thomas, *faith and metaphysically certain knowledge* cannot coexist in the same subject in respect of the same truth, even if such a truth be known by the process of cause and effect, as in the case of the truths of the existence of God and of the creation of the world. And it is commonly accepted that, in St. Thomas's view, only knowledge through *intrinsic* evidence is incompatible with faith. Gonet profoundly observes that the impossibility of faith in the existence of God in anyone who knows it by the seemingly extrinsic process of cause and effect is due to the fact that the creature and God are essentially or intrinsically linked, and thus both the process and the evidence are really intrinsic. "The *reason* for the disparity lies in the fact that, since every effect is in its cause, not formally of course, but virtually, it can be said that any creature is, with regard to *everything* it has, virtually *intrinsic* to God."[97] "Although the First Cause, which is God, is not part of the *essence* of created things, still the *being* found in created things *cannot be understood except as drawn from the divine being.*" (ST. THOMAS, *De Potentia*, q.3, a.5, ad 1) If God's existence were not *of the understanding* (de intellectu) of the creature's existence, the demonstration of the existence of God would be neither metaphysical nor theological.[98]

[97] GONET, *de Fide*, c.2, §.2

[98] "If in mathematics, demonstrations are some times made through extrinsic means, nevertheless, in such cases an *entirely intrinsic* proportion or adaptation of one to another is supposed, and thus *because of the included relation* the process is not entirely extrinsic, although the aforementioned relation is not one of either effect or cause, but one of proportion. Now, in the case of things that are demonstrated through supernatural light [supernatural objective revelation – Transl.] this light although extrinsic, is nonetheless derived from God in Whom exist immutable and infallible connexions with things, howsoever contingent these may be; hence their manifestation is in the last instance resolved into something *intrinsic at least on the part of the relation that all creatures have to the First Cause.*" (JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *Cursus Philosophicus, Logica*, p.2, q.25, a.2, ed. Vivès, vol.1, p.688) "Thirdly, I say that there are two kinds of *consequences:* one that is essential and intrinsic and another that is *accidental and extrinsic.* When the holy Doctor says that from the fact that something is a being by participation *it follows* that such a being is caused, he speaks of an *essential* and *intrinsic consequence*, as from the fact that something is a man it follows that it is an animal, since to be caused is *of the reason* of the being by participation." (PAULUS NAZARIUS, O.P., *Disputationes et Commentaria Scholastica in Summam D. Thomae Aquinatis*, t.1, q.44, a.1, in fine; Coloniae Agrippinae, 1621) "There are *relations*, not accidental but *essential*, which are *implicit* in a given essence. The *concept which expresses this essence expresses at the same time the relations* which it contains." (GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, *Dieu, son existence et sa nature*, Paris 1951, p.542)

107. TWO WAYS OF ARGUING FROM CAUSE TO EFFECT. – To answer the proposed difficulty directly we say that physics as well as metaphysics or theology argue by cause (efficient, final, or exemplary) and effect, but that they argue through essentially different processes since there are two essentially different ways of considering any cause and any effect. In any being there are two really different things: 1. the *essence,* which includes the *metaphysical properties* and the *essential or transcendental relations or connexions.* 2. The *physical properties* and the *accidental or contingent relations,* both of which *differ really* from the essence. Hence there are two ways of arguing by cause or by effect: 1. Taking as medium the *essence of the* cause (or effect) or, which is the same thing, the *metaphysical properties* or *essential relations* of the cause (or effect). 2. Taking as middle the *physical properties* or the *accidental relations* of the cause (or effect). Both are processes by cause and effect. But the first process utilizes only what is essentially *intrinsic,* that is, the *essence* of the so-called extrinsic cause or effect. The second process, on the other hand, utilizes precisely what is *extrinsic,* viz., the physico-contingent properties or relations, of the cause and effect. The first process is metaphysical; it can never be employed by physics. The second is properly physical; through this process the certitude proper of metaphysics or theology, that is, absolute certitude, can never be obtained.

Let us consider some simple instances of both processes, to wit, the physical process *by cause* or *by effect,* and the metaphysical or theological process *by cause* or *by effect.*

Physical process *by cause.* The physical effect of fire is burning; the physical cause of burning is fire. If I argue: *there is fire* with all the physical requirements for burning, therefore *there is a burning* or the effect of combustion, this is a true argument *by cause,* not metaphysical but physical, not of absolute but of contingent and fallible certitude, which actually failed in the furnace of Babylon and can fail any time that it should please God. Now, what is capable of failing is neither metaphysical nor theological.

Why is it not metaphysical but physical? Why is it not necessary but fallible? Because I have taken as a *medium* or *minor* something that is not *essential* or not *intrinsic* to the essence: burning is not of the essence of fire; it is not of the *reason* or of the *understanding* of fire.

But if we argued instead: *there is fire,* therefore there is the *aptitude* to burn or the *exigency* of burning, the argument would be rigorously metaphysical and impossible of failure. That aptitude or exigency existed in the fire of the furnace in Babylon;[99] it will always exist by absolute necessity in any fire

[99] "Hence the *order to* burning remained in the fire of the furnace *even if it did not burn* the three young men in it." (ST. THOMAS, *de Potentia,* q.6, a.1, ad 2) He asserts the same thing of the eucharistic accidents: "The *aptitude* for a subject

because it is of the essence of fire, because it is an *essential* relation of the cause to the effect.

Let us now turn to examples of demonstration, both physical and metaphysical, by *effect.*

Physical demonstration. Take any effect you please. The argument, then, will run this way: *the effect N exists; therefore, its immediate or physical or secondary cause exists.* For instance, N has recovered from such a disease; therefore the physical causes or conditions of his recovery have existed. Or, N has obtained nourishment from the Eucharist; therefore, in the Eucharist there is nutritive substance; etc., etc.

These arguments, in which from the existence of the effect we conclude its secondary or physical cause, are physical, not metaphysical; connexive, not inclusive; contingent and fallible, not necessary and infallible. They can fail through divine intervention any time it pleases God, simply because the relation of the secondary cause to its effect or that of the effect to its secondary cause or physical cause is accidental, not essential. God can supply directly by Himself any action and any effect of any efficient secondary causes, which is what He does in any miraculous happening in which the so-called physical process or demonstration fails. Physical demonstration can never be a rigorous demonstration because it does not demonstrate through the essence or the *quod quid est*[xii] of the cause, or effect.

It must be kept in mind that these demonstrations, and all physical demonstrations, are not fallible and contingent *because* God causes them to fail; but, on the contrary, God can cause them to fail *because* they are fallible and contingent, because they are merely connexive and not inclusive, because they are physical and not metaphysical (92).

On the other hand, when, to prove God's existence, I say: potential or changeable being exists, therefore God exists; when, to prove the creation of any being other than God, I argue: God is being by essence, therefore any other being must proceed from Him; or, any being other than God is potential or composed of essence and existence, therefore it is a caused being; the

always remains in them but not the actual inherence." (*Summa Theol.,* p.3, q.77, a.1, ad 2) The action or the effect as well as the physico-actual properties are contingent, and they can be suspended or supplied by God. This is the reason why the physico-connexive process does not, and cannot, serve the purposes of metaphysics and theology. But the process by way of *essence* or of essential relations is a process of absolute and indestructible certainty, it is characteristic of sciences that are superior to physics, and thus of theology.

[xii] Literally *which what is. Quod quid est* is itself a literal Latin translation of Aristotle's TO TI HN EINAI, a term employed by the Philosopher to denote the essence of a thing. – *Transl.*

uncaused being is essentially *one,* therefore all multiple being proceeds from the uncaused being; these arguments, although by cause or by effect, proceed via the *essence* of the cause or of the effect; they are metaphysical, not physical, arguments; absolutely necessary, not fallible, because essences are necessary and immutable and not even God Himself can cause the nature of a thing, or its essential relation, to fail.

Since the relations of creatures to God, as to their *first* efficient and exemplary cause or as to their *ultimate* end, are *essential* relations, the metaphysical reasoning between God and creatures, whether by cause – efficient, exemplary, or final – or by effect, is not an extrinsic but an intrinsic process, not merely connexive but inclusive, not contingent but essential.

And since nothing is more *formal* than the essence, the argument between God and creatures via efficient or exemplary cause, and every argument drawn *from the reason of the cause, end, exemplar, effect,* etc., is always and in reality a formal process,[100] notwithstanding the appearances of extrinsicity.

108. TWO SOURCES OF MISUNDERSTANDING. – The illusion or appearance of extrinsicity in the metaphysical argument drawn from the *efficient cause* or from the *effect* comes from two sources.

1. The causes are classified into material, formal, efficient, final, and exemplary. The first two are called *intrinsic,* and the last three are said to be *extrinsic.* This creates the impression that when one argues by efficient, final, or exemplary cause, the process is extrinsic and not intrinsic. What is here overlooked is the fact that these three causes, as well as the effect, can be employed for purposes of argumentation either in an *intrinsic* sense (the *essence* and the *essential* properties or relations of cause and effect), or in a merely connexive-extrinsic sense (physico-actual properties or relations). Metaphysics and theology employ them in the first sense; physics, in the second.

2. For a process to be intrinsic or inclusive or from one to an *other according to reason,* it is commonly required that it proceed formally. Again it is overlooked that the term formal, said of any thing, means not only its form or *formal cause,* but also whatever is *essential* to it, whatever is *of the reason* of it, anything without which *the thing cannot be understood,* which is precisely one of the definitions of essence.

When I say: A is a part of B, therefore it is smaller than B; when I say: A is the son of B, therefore B is the father of A; when I say: A has primary matter, or primary matter exists, therefore A has substantial form, or substantial form exists; these arguments or processes are not really extrinsic but intrinsic; not merely connexive but inclusive; they do not proceed from one *to an other in reality,* but from one *to an other according to reason.* Not because the whole is identified with its part, or the father with his son, or form with matter; but because the part, the father, the form are essentially included, although not expressed, in the whole, the son, primary matter; because the one is *of the reason* or *of the understanding* of the other.

Likewise, when I say: a *contingent being exists, therefore God exists; or it is a contingent being, therefore it is a created being;* the reasoning process is really intrinsic, inclusive, from one *to an other according to reason.* Not that God, we repeat, is identical to the reality of contingent being, nor that the being of the Creator is identical to the being of the creature; but that the existence of God is essential for the existence of the contingent being, and the existence of the Creator is essential for the existence of the created or potential being. The former is *of the reason* or *of the understanding* of the latter; the former is included in the latter.[101] The only difference is this: in the arguments about the whole and its part, the father and the son, the

100. "Thirdly, I say that there are two kinds of consequences: one that is *essential* and *intrinsic* and another that is *accidental* and *extrinsic.* When the holy Doctor says that from the fact that something is a being by participation *it follows* that such a being is caused, he speaks of an *essential and intrinsic consequence,* as from the fact that something is a man it follows that it is an animal, since to be caused is *of the reason* of the being by participation in as much as caused being bears a transcendental relation. It is the same as if he said: *formally,* by the same token that something is a being by participation it is caused by another, just as by the same token that a thing is a man it is an animal. But the predicamental relation and the proper passion *(physical* properties and relations) follow the subject by an *extrinsic* consequence because they are extrinsic to its *reason;* hence the example of the *risible* (actual or *physical* risibility) is not entirely similar, but only in the manner previously explained. This seems to be the better solution and coincides with that given by the Ferrariensis." (NAZARIUS, O.P., *op.cit.,* p.1, q.44, a.1, in fine). "This proposition: the world was created by God, is an analytic judgment in spite of its *synthetic appearance,* for the *intimate* notion of the world *contains the notion* of an infinite cause." (FR. DE REGNON, S.J. *Etudes sur la Sainte Trinité,* vol. p.22)

101. "From the fact that something is attributed to some other thing it is necessary that *everything* that is *of the reason* of the former be attributed to the latter." (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.,* p.1, q.28, a.3) "In the nature of creatures is that they *depend on God.*" (*Ibid.,* a.1, ad 3) "Therefore, when that which constitutes the *reason of a nature,* whereby the nature is in itself understood, has an *order to, and dependence on,* another, it then is manifest that that nature *cannot be understood without it;* and this holds not only in the case where one is conjoined to the other with that conjunction whereby the part is conjoined to the whole . . . or as form is united to matter . . . but *also in the case where the one is in reality separated from the other,* as the father cannot be understood without the understanding of the son, notwithstanding the fact that *these relations are found in things that are distinct.*" (ST. THOMAS, *In Boet, de Trinitate,* q.5, a.3) Thus, the process, even where it takes place between things that are distinct and separated, is a process employing "that without which the thing cannot be understood"; hence it is an *essential* process, an *intrinsic* process; and since whatever is essential is also called formal – "The essence is also called *form*" (ST.

implicitness is simple and superficial (formal implicit), one that only requires a mere explanation of terms. and thus the reasoning is improper, and the knowledge is *immediate* or one of *simple understanding.* But in the cases of contingent being and God, matter and form, spirituality and immortality, immutability and eternity, the implicitness is profound and recondite to human reason (virtual implicit or inclusive), so that it requires a combination of new *concepts,* and thus the reasoning is *most properly proper* and the knowledge is *mediate* or scientific. However the new concepts or minors combined by human reason to effect the discovery of those mediate or scientific conclusions are not *new realities* but the definition itself, or essence, of what is contained in the datum or principle: the definition or essence of the contingent and necessary, of primary matter and form, of cause and effect, of spirituality and immortality, of immutability and eternity. Therefore the process is by way of *essence, formal,* by way of *inclusion,* by way of *perfect homogeneity.*

THOMAS, *De Ente et Essentia,* c.1) – the argumentation employs a *formal process* although not always a formal *cause.* Hence metaphysics can never argue by secondary causes, whether efficient or final, because then its process would be physico-fallible. Metaphysics argues by *formal* causes, or by *first* efficient and final causes. Since when it argues by these *first* causes its process is as essential and formal and intrinsic as when it argues by formal causes, it is commonly, and more briefly, said that metaphysics argues by *intrinsic causes* alone. "Metaphysical consideration does not proceed except by *internal* cause," (PESCH, *Philosophia Lacensis,* Lib.4, n.1082)

Finally, the fact that the *minor* premises of all true metaphysical process must be *intrinsic* or *of the essence* of the majors which are their starting point is the reason why St. Thomas says that the conclusions of metaphysics or of theology are *proximate to the principles themselves.* And since the principles of Christian theology are the *truths of faith,* the genuine Thomist school has always considered the conclusions truly and rigorously deduced from them to be not only definable as truths of faith, but even already *proximate to faith.* "Hence it is manifest that metaphysical or theological consideration is *supremely intellectual.* Whence, too, metaphysics provides the principles to all other sciences inasmuch as intellectual consideration is the principle of rational consideration. . . . To proceed intellectually is attributed to the divine science not because it does not reason from principles to conclusions, but because *its reasoning is closest to intellectual consideration and its conclusions closest to the principles.*" (ST. THOMAS, *In Boet. de Trinitate,* q.6, a.1) "It should be observed, in our judgment, that the first and highest degree of *erroneous* propositions, according to the common way of speaking among theologians, obtains when someone asserts the contrary of a manifest *theological conclusion,* which is deduced by evident consequence from the faith but is not yet defined by the Church. . . . It must be noted that this degree is *so close* to heresy that at times it may even be called heresy." (BÁÑEZ, *in 2-2,* q.11, a.2)

The more thoroughly we study St. Thomas and his great commentators, the more amazed we are at the poor idea that has been formed of the true theology, and the true theological conclusions, and the true theological process, as a consequence of the wretched virtual or *extrinsic* or non-inclusive process, in which since Suárez, the essence of properly theological science is said to consist.

109. COROLLARIES. – All the foregoing leads to the following five corollaries:

1. Sacred theology, *over and above* the physico-connexive process or from one *to an other in reality,* which is proper of physics, possesses another intrinsic-inclusive, rigorously metaphysical and theological process. This is a formal process, or from one *to an other according to reason,* which is proper and exclusive of the mathematical and metaphysical sciences, that is, of sciences possessing an abstraction, dignity, and certitude superior to those of physics. This is the solid ground on which objective homogeneity is based. Of course, this does not mean that theology is necessarily limited to this process, or that theology must deduce all its conclusions by such a process; but it underscores the abundance with which theology is endowed.

2. Any rigorously metaphysico-theological conclusion is always deduced through a process of reasoning by *essence* or *essential relations* implicit in the essence itself, irrespective of whether the argument employs the *effect* or the *cause,* or whether the cause is material and formal, or efficient, exemplary, or final.

3. Therefore, every metaphysico-theological conclusion is deduced by an intrinsic and inclusive process, by a process of objective identity.

4. Every rigorously metaphysico-theological conclusion is homogeneous with the revealed deposit itself because it is objectively implicit in it.

5. Therefore, the whole of theology properly and rigorously understood, and all theological conclusions in the proper and rigorous sense, far from being *extrinsic* to the revealed deposit, as modernly they are thought to be since Suárez, are, on the contrary, in the view of St. Thomas, intrinsic to the revealed deposit and pertain to the very essence or *understanding* of *revealed being.* Just as natural theology or metaphysics is of the essence or *of the understanding of natural being* (40).

SECTION VI

THE TRUE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUALITY, OR TRUE THEOLOGICAL CONCLUSION, IS OBJECTIVELY AND TRULY IMPLICIT IN THE REVEALED DATUM.

110. THE STRUCTURE OF THE TRUE THEOLOGICAL REASONING. – The foregoing makes it sufficiently clear that the true theological conclusion, that is, the metaphysico-inclusive conclusion, is truly implicit in the revealed premise or revealed datum from which our reason does nothing but deduce it. However, since this implicitness or objective containment is the true foundation or requisite for its definability as of faith, and consequently, for

homogeneous dogmatic evolution, we will confirm it by another means, through the examination of the true structure of theological reasoning.

For this purpose, let us take and analyze any example of a true and proper theological reasoning, and hence of a true and proper theological conclusion, and thus of theology in the true and proper sense of the term, provided that such a reasoning satisfies the conditions required by the teaching of St. Thomas.

These conditions are *four: first,* that at least one of the premises be a truth of faith. *Second,* that the other premise, if it is a truth of natural reason, be really identical or inclusive, but at the same time virtually distinct: in other words, it must neither be merely nominal nor merely physico-connexive. *Third,* that this premise be neither doubtful nor probable, but evidently demonstrated. *Fourth,* that the reasoning be well made, that is to say, that the conclusion be correctly deduced from the premises.

The first condition is required because the true principles of theology are the truths of faith. Consequently, if neither premise is a truth of faith, the reasoning is not theological but philosophical.[102]

The second condition is required because if the minor were purely nominal and did not have even a virtual distinction, the reasoning would be improper (27); on the other hand, if the minor were merely physico-connexive and without real inclusion, the reasoning would not have theological nor even metaphysical, but physical, certitude. "In divine matters it is necessary to be engaged *intellectually* . . . From one to *an other according to reason:* not from one thing to another thing, which is proper of *natural* science . . . Theology is *supremely intellectual.*"[103] *Obviously, this second condition* implies the condition mentioned by many to the effect that the reasoning

[102]"For it [this science or theology] accepts its principles not from other sciences but immediately from God *through revelation.*" (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.1, q.1, a.5, ad 2) "The *principles* of this science are the *articles of faith.*" (*Ibid.*, a.7) "This doctrine does not argue in order to prove *its principles* which are the articles of faith." (*Ibid.*, a.8) "From the things that we grasp through faith by adhering to the First Truth we come to know other things in accordance with our own manner of knowing, that is, through reasoning from principles to conclusions. Hence, the original things themselves that *we hold by faith* are for us as the first principles in this science, while the rest are as the conclusions." (ST. THOMAS, *In Boet. de Trinitate, Prooem.*, q.2, a.2) "This doctrine has as first principles the *articles of faith,* and from these as principles, without disdaining the *common principles,* this science proceeds." (ST. THOMAS, *In 1 Sent.*, prol., q.1, a.3, qa.3, sol.2, ad 2) By the way, note the term *common principles* employed by the Saint to denote the kind of *minors* of reason admissible in theological reasoning, and how, even then, he does not admit them except in the absence of two revealed premises, which would constitute a more compietely *theological* reasoning.

[103]ST. THOMAS, *In Boet. de Trinitate,* q.2, and 6.

must be proper, not improper, since where virtual, and not merely nominal, distinction is present the reasoning is not improper but proper, and even supremely proper.

The third condition is required because it is quite pointless for a thing to be absolutely certain in itself if it were to be doubtful to us for want of evident demonstration. The Trinity of Persons is most certainly included in the divine nature, but relative to our natural reason it is the same as if it were not included since our reason cannot demonstrate its inclusion. For *science* to exist it is not enough that there be inclusion, it is further necessary that it be possible to see or demonstrate that inclusion without a new revelation.[104]

The fourth condition is required because it is quite possible to reason incorrectly even with certain and evident premises, so that a conclusion is drawn that is not contained in the premises, or drawn with a greater extension than the premises allow.[105]

Of these four conditions, the third and the fourth are common to *all* sciences. The second is proper of supraphyical sciences or sciences of absolute objective certitude, that is, mathematical, metaphysical, and theological sciences. The first is characteristic and exclusive of sacred theology.

Hence every *definition* of the true and rigorous theological conclusion must contain or presuppose these four conditions: the third and fourth as the *remote genus,* the second as the *proximate genus,* the first as the *ultimate difference.* Should any of the four be missing, there would be no rigorous theological conclusion for lack of something *essential.*

111. A MODEL OF INCLUSIVE REASONING. – Let the following be a model in which we *suppose* that all four conditions are present:

God is altogether immutable (major of faith).

What is altogether immutable is eternal (minor of reason).

Therefore God is eternal (theological conclusion).

We repeat that we take for *granted:* 1. That the major premise is a truth of faith. 2. That the minor is merely a truth of reason, that is to say,

[104]"For the perfect knowledge of the conclusion requires two things, viz. the understood principle and the derivation of the principle to the conclusion by reason. Hence the *perfect knowledge of conclusions* will not exist in any man who either is in *error* or in *doubt* concerning the principles, or is *deficient* in the reasoning, or fails to understand the *force of the argumentation;* and consequently neither will he have science insofar as it is an intellectual virtue." (ST. THOMAS, *De Veritate,* q. 14; *De Fide,* a.6)

[105]"Man is *often* deceived in that he *thinks a process to be demonstrative, which is not so.*" (ST. THOMAS, *In Boet. de Trinitate,* lect.1, q.1, a.1,)

that revelation has said nothing about either eternity or the relationship linking eternity with immutability; better still: let us suppose that the whole of divine revelation, the whole of the Holy Bible and Tradition reduces to God speaking the four words of the major premise, and not one word more. 3. That the minor is an inclusive and demonstrated proposition. 4. That the reasoning is correctly done.[106]

Under these four conditions, which St. Thomas holds to be necessary if a true theological conclusion and true theology are to exist, let us investigate the nature and the worth of the theological conclusion and of theology.

112. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATION. – Note, in the first place, that the *subject* of the conclusion is the very same subject of the premise of faith. This must always be the case, whether overtly or covertly. The reason for it is the fact that, since science or the conclusion is nothing else but the actual unfolding in the conclusion of the virtuality contained in the principles, the subject of the conclusion or science has to be necessarily the self-same subject of the principles of the science. Since the true principles of theology are the truths of faith, the theological conclusion must take its *subject* from the premise of faith and not from the premise of reason.[107]

This observation is not absolutely necessary for what we propose to demonstrate. Nonetheless it is useful in order to point out that the theological conclusion always aims at discovering something in the revealed major, not at discovering anything in the minor of reason. The premise of reason must serve to uncover what lies in the premise of faith; not the premise of faith to uncover what lies in the premise of reason. Hence the premise of faith and the premise of reason do not come into theological argumentation on

[106] In this model given to examine the structure of theological reasoning, the conclusion *God is eternal* is formally revealed *elsewhere*, and hence a truth of faith. But it should be evident to anyone that that is absolutely accidental to our purpose. Let it be simply assumed that revelation says nothing about the conclusion, or that, as we have suggested in the text, the whole of revelation, Sacred Scripture and divine Tradition contains nothing but the four words of the major proposition. We have chosen this example in preference to others because these two ideas, *immutability* and *eternity*, are those given by Cardinal Cajetan (Super., 1, Post., c.2 *super illam particulam ex causis*) to prove that true *reasoning*, and true *science*, and true deduction of the *effect* from the *cause* and of the *property* from the *essence* exist when *theology*, or *metaphysics* or *mathematics* proceeds through *intrinsic* or *virtual causes*. The reader is free to choose any other example more agreable to his taste from any of the forty three questions of the treatise on God, or from any of the other treatises in the *Summa Theologica*.

[107] "The subject of the principles is the same as the subject of the whole science, since all of the science is virtually contained in the principles." (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, q.1, a.5) "The subject of the science is that which is the subject in the demonstrated conclusions." (CAPREOLO, *In prol. Sent.*, q. 4)

equal terms: the premise of reason comes in as an auxiliary (ancilla) of faith or as an auxiliary of human reason, inasmuch as the latter is incapable of seeing at one stroke or in one act everything contained *in* the premise of faith and thus needs an auxiliary (the premise of reason). There are two reasons for this need: one is the native condition and feebleness of our reason in so far as it is a reason and not simply an intellect;[108] the other is the fact that the truths of faith are divine truths and realities of inexhaustible fecundity. When such realities are locked up in human language, it is impossible for the latter to express all the implicitness hidden in the former, which is indeed divine and revealed but compressed, concealed, profound, mediate, beneath the explicit and surface meaning of the human statement of the divine, beneath the formally and immediately revealed.[109]

113. THE PREMISE OF FAITH. – Note, in the second place, that one of the premises is a *premise of faith.* What does it mean to be a premise *of faith?* In the doctrine of St. Thomas, it means – as it should mean in any Christian philosophy or theology – that in the major of faith we have divinely revealed not two mere names (God and immutability); nor two merely subjective concepts nominally linked by the verb *to be;* nor two symbols of an agnostic reality, or of a subjective experience or of a pragmatic attitude – all of this is Kantian-Bergsonian philosophy, the basis and the starting point of all the various forms of Modernism. For St. Thomas, the premise of faith means that in the two terms standing for the subject and the predicate we have divinely revealed two objective ideas, that these two ideas are an authentic and faithful expression of reality, a reality expressed by a verb at once real and transcendent to the human and the divine,[xiii] the verb *to be.*

[108] "The fact itself that this science uses them [the profane sciences, the minors of reason] is not due to its own deficiency or insufficiency, but to the imperfection of our intellect." (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.1, q.1, a.5) "But human souls, which aquire knowledge of truth by some kind of discourse, are called *rational;* and this comes of the *feebleness of the intellectual light* in them. For if they had the fulness of intellectual light, as the angels, they would immediately, at the first viewing of the principles, comprehend all their virtuality by intuiting everything that can be syllogized from them." (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.1 q.58, a.3)

[109] "Thus the truths of faith are proposed to the intellect, not indeed in themselves, but *in certain words which are not sufficient to express them.*" (ST. THOMAS, *In 3 Sent.*, d.24, a.20, q.1, a.3)

[xiii] By "transcendent to the divine" the author does not mean that the verb *to be* can go beyond and above the divine, since there is nothing higher than, and beyond, God. He simply means that the verb *to be* is transcendent inasmuch as it is applicable not only to the sphere of the human but also transcends it and is proportionally applicable even to the sphere of the divine. Cf. no. 117 below: "... the transcendent notions of the human mind, that are proportionally and really applicable to that which is within as well as to that which is without, to the human as well as the divine ..." – *(Transl.)*

For St. Thomas it means that, through the premise of faith, the theologian is in possession of two objective-real ideas, two ideas whose truth and reality are divine, two ideas of unconditional and absolute consistency, two ideas whose reality and union, being affirmed by God Himself, provide greater certainty to human reason than can be provided by any and all metaphysical evidence, and to the eyes of faith shine with a light that, if not as clear, is a thousand times more intense, firm and certain than the very light of the first principles of reason.

The reader will do well to keep this in mind: at the very first stage and starting point of his reasoning the theologian is in possession of two divine ideas, those of the subject and the predicate, whose objectivity and truth are guaranteed by the authority itself of God and illumined by divine light, to wit, the divine light of faith.

THE MINOR OF REASON. – Note, in the third place, that the minor of reason is one that is, or that we suppose to be, *inclusive.* For St. Thomas this means that the predicate *eternal,* although expressing an intellectual aspect other than that of the subject, *altogether immutable,* is nonetheless *really identical* with it; in other words, these are not *two* objects or two realities or two distinct things joined by a distinct physical link, these are but *one* and the self-same and identical *objective reality, one* self-same *object, one* self-same *thing* under *two* intellectual aspects or *expressions* that differ only intellectually. *In divine matters it is necessary to proceed intellectually . . . by intrinsic causes . . . from one to another according to reason, which is not an other in reality.*

A COROLLARY NOT TO BE FORGOTTEN. – The predicate of the premise of reason is the self-same reality or object or thing as the subject: it is the *essence itself* of the subject.

THE MIDDLE TERM. – Note, in the fourth place (and this, together with the corollary just stated constitutes the essence, the greatness, and sublimity, the divine character, of theology), that the subject of the minor is the very same predicate of the major, the very same predicate of the premise of faith, one of the two ideas that are formally revealed, which means that theology's middle term is a *formally revealed* term illumined by the light of revelation: it is a term of faith!

Whoever understands the role of the *middle* term[110] in the reasoning

110. "The *whole strength* of any argument is in the *middle term.*" (ST. THOMAS, *De Veritate,* q.14; *De Fide,* a.2, ad 9) "The *whole process of the argumentation* is virtually contained in the middle term." (ST. THOMAS, *In 3 Sent.,* d.23, q.2, a.1) "The *formal reason of knowing* (*ratio sciendi*) is the *middles* of demonstration through which the conclusions are known," (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.,* 2-2, q.1, a.1)

process, and the meaning of *objective homogeneity,* would need no further explanation.

THE MINOR TERM (or the predicate of the minor which is the very same predicate of the conclusion, and consequently, is the *conclusion* and the science of theology) is *really identical with the middle term, and the middle term is itself a revealed idea.*

114. THEOLOGY'S SUBLIME AND DIVINE CHARACTER. – Whoever reads carefully the immortal introductory question of the *Summa Theologica,* in which St. Thomas examines the essence, object and procedure of theology cannot but experience a profound feeling of respect for the *sacred science* at the sublime phrases employed by that privileged mind – used to weighing the accuracy of his terms as if they were gold – to denote the *middle term,* the *ratio sciendi,* the *ratio sub qua*[xiv] of the science of theology.

To enable those of our readers, who are not used to the reading of the Holy Doctor and of his foremost commentators, to perceive the whole significance of the texts we shall shortly quote, we will permit the remark that the terms *divine revelation,* and *divine light* or the *light of divine revelation* have two meanings, as will presently be clear. Two verbal nouns are derived from the verb *to reveal;* they have the same term but different meanings: 1. *revelation,* i.e., the act of *revealing;* this is revelation in the *active* sense. 2. *Revelation,* i.e., the *revealed truth:* this is revelation in the *objective* sense. Both the act of revealing and the thing revealed are called *divine revelation* (divina revelatio). By the same token, the term *light of divine revelation* also has two meanings: 1. the divine light that accompanies the transient act of revealing (*infusing light,* lumen infundens, Cajetan). 2. The permanent light surrounding the revealed object, which is said to shed divine light (*revealing light,* lumen revelans, Cajetan) on the believer's mind with much more reason than when we say that a mathematical or metaphysical truth sheds light on this or that.

St. Thomas deals with the *act* of revealing (first meaning of *divine revelation)* and the divine light that transiently accompanies it (first meaning

xiv *Ratio sciendi,* literally the reason of knowing. *Ratio sub qua,* literally the reason under which (something is known or knowable). These terms denote the precise aspect or viewpoint, mode, process, medium, whereby a thing is knowable. They all are correlated in perfect correspondence. Thus, if something is supernatural, under that aspect it is knowable only through faith (mode), which is a simple act of assent (process) relying on the witness's testimony (medium). If a thing is natural, under that aspect it is knowable either immediately or mediately (modes). If immediately, it is known through intuition (process) motivated by the self-evidence of the subject itself (medium). If mediately, it is knowable through discourse (process), which is dependent on the middle term (medium). – *(Transl.)*

of *light of divine revelation*) in the questions On Prophecy.[111] On the other hand, in the first question of the *Summa Theologica,* he studies the *object* of theology. Thus, every time that the holy Doctor and his commentators here speak of *divine revelation* or of the *light of divine revelation,* the terms are taken in the second sense, in the objective sense, in the sense of the *revealed truth itself (revelation)* and the *divine light* of that same revealed truth (light *of divine revelation).*

By the same token that revelation here is the same as the *revealed* or the object revealed, the term *revealable* must not be understood as that which is *revealable by God,* that is to say, that which God has not yet revealed but which He *can* reveal; for that which in the sense just described is revealable *by God* can ill be the object of science for as long as God does not reveal it. The term then must be understood in the sense of *revealable* by the *revealed object itself,* that is to say, what is *knowable (unveiling-revelation)* through the divine light of the revealed object itself and not through any thing other than it; *revealable, that is, knowable through the light of divine revelation* (Capreolo). Since it is in and through the middle term that the conclusions are known and scientific knowledge is obtained, where the middle term does not differ really from the revealed object and its objective light, but is really and essentially the self-same object or revealed truth, we can say, and we do say, with mathematical exactitude and realism, that the middle term, the *ratio sub qua,* the *medium of demonstration* of theology is *divine revelation,* the *divine light;* that the science of theology is acquired *through divine revelation, through divine light.*

Let the reader now ponder the following texts: "The difference in the *reason of the knowable* induces the diversity of the sciences. For the same conclusion is demonstrated by both the astrologer and the natural philosopher, e.g., that the earth is round. But the astrologer demonstrates it through a mathematical *middle,* that is, abstracted from matter; whereas the natural philosopher does it through a *middle* considered in reference to matter. Hence, there is nothing to hinder the things, which the philosophical science considers in so far as they are knowable through the light of natural reason, from being also considered by another science in so far as they are known through the light of divine revelation."[112] "In theology the *ratio sciendi is the light of divine revelation.*"[113] "*The middle shining with divine light constitutes the theological knowable* (scibile)."[114] "*The divine revealing light*

[111] *Summa Theol.,* 2-2, qq.171-177.

[112] *Summa Theol.,* q.1, a.1, ad 2.

[113] CAPREOLO, *In I Sent.,* prol., q.4.

[114] CAJETAN, *In Summam Theol.,* p.1, q.1, a.2.

is the ratio sub qua of our theology."[115] "All things whatsoever are *divinely revealable* participate in the one *formal reason of the object* of this science."[116] "The sacred doctrine, remaining one, extends itself to matters that pertain to different philosophical sciences because of the common *formal reason* which it considers in different things, viz., insofar as they are *knowable through divine light.*"[117] "And thus in the text the unity of theology is inferred *from the unity of the divine light* as from the *formal reason sub qua.*"[118]

"This science . . . transcends all other sciences, both speculative and practical . . . It is manifest that in every way it excels all others in dignity."[119] "Among all human wisdoms, it [sacred doctrine] is wisdom in the fullest sense, not only in a certain order but unqualifiedly (simpliciter)."[120] "The *knowledge* that is *proper of this science* is that which is obtained through *revelation,* not that which is acquired through natural reason. Hence its proper concern is not to prove the principles of the other sciences, but only to judge them. For whatsoever in the other sciences is found to be inconsistent with the truth of this science, all of such is condemned as false."[121] Etc.

It will be immediately obvious to the reader that all these texts of the holy Doctor and of his chief commentators possess an utterly formal meaning if the *middle* term in the theological reasoning is the *essence itself* (inclusive process) of the *revealed* idea or reality, the *light* itself *revealed by God* and in its turn revealing with regard to our minds. But let the middle term be a physico-distinct connexion, which is to say, something that differs really from the revealed reality or idea, something *not* revealed, something contingent and fallible, and the whole of theology and of all those phrases of the holy Doctor vanishes into smoke.

115. CONFIRMATION. – To bring all the above within the grasp of everyone, let us restate it in terms of a simple mathematical formula. Let *A* be the meaning of the major term, which is a revealed term. Let *B* be the meaning of the middle term, which is also a revealed term. Let *C* be the meaning of the minor term, which is the predicate of the conclusion or the theo-

[115] CAJETAN, *Ibid.*

[116] ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.,* p.1, q.1, a.3.

[117] ST. THOMAS, *ibid.,* a.4.

[118] CAJETAN, *ibid.*

[119] ST. THOMAS, *ibid.,* a.5.

[120] *Ibid.,* a.6.

[121] *Ibid.,* ad 2.

logical predicate. The following formula will then express the value of the inclusive reasoning:

A = B (major of faith)

but B = C (inclusive minor)

therefore A = C (theological conclusion)

The first identity is guaranteed by God. The second identity is granted, since by supposition the minor is inclusive, that is, one where there exists real identity between predicate and subject. Therefore $A = C$, that is to say, the meaning of the revealed datum is the same as the meaning of the theological predicate. There is progress, but progress *in the same sense:* homogeneous progress.

Observe, furthermore, that B, which is the middle term, must have the same meaning in both the major and the minor, for otherwise the argument would have four terms. Now, then, where does our reason see *C,* which is the theological predicate? It sees it in *B,* since by supposition the minor is analytic or inclusive. In other words, it sees it *in the formally revealed,* in the very light of objective divine revelation.

This is the true meaning of that text of St. Thomas: "[Theological conslusions] are known through the *light of divine revelation.*" And of that other of Cajetan: "The middle shining with divine light constitutes the theological knowable (scibile.)"[xv] Well could they speak thus since they were speaking of *inclusive* conclusions.

116. THE THEOLOGY OF THE NON-INCLUSIVE VIRTUAL. – After reading St. Thomas or his chief commentators one can hardly seriously consider the non-inclusive or physico-connexive virtuality as constitutive of the properly theological conclusion. On such a virtuality not only is it impossible to build a *wisdom* of the kind that theology is, it is even impossible to build a science that would rise one inch above Aristotle's Physics in either certitude, or abstraction, or dignity.

But let us examine, if only briefly, this physico-connexive virtuality. The reader is already acquainted with the fact that the physico-connexive virtuality or conclusion, or that of type 4 (45), consists in inferring from the revelation of the mere essence its physico-distinct properties, employing as the *middle* term of the argumentation the bond of physical connexion between the nature and its physical or actual properties, the latter being really distinct from the former.

[xv] These texts are among those quoted in no.114. – *(Transl.)*

Thus if it is revealed to me that *N is truly man,* and I infer, *therefore he is physically or actually risible,* I have deduced a physico-distinct property, and such is the theological conclusion properly speaking, such is the true science of theology in the current explanations found in theology handbooks is the wake of Suárez's innovation.

Let us consider a model of a merely connexive theological conclusion, as we have done in the case of the inclusive theological conclusion.

Oddly, almost comically, no example can be given about God. Where God is concerned no merely connexive reasoning is possible. Since there can be no real but only virtual distinction between His essence and His attributes or between His attributes among themselves, in the case of God there can be no merely connexive, but only inclusive, reasoning. Hence, to state it crudely, given the notion of theology in the proper and rigorous sense of the term proposed by Suárez, Lugo, and the majority of modern handbooks, there can be no theology nor any theological conclusion, properly speaking, about God. And God is, for St. Thomas, the subject of theology, that is, theology has God for its principal subject-matter and cannot concern itself with any other thing except in reference to God! This alone should suffice to drop all mention of the merely connexive virtual.

Since no example can be given about God, let us consider an example about some other thing. Here is the very one given by the authors:

N is truly man (by supposition a major of faith).

Every man is *actually* risible (minor of reason).

Therefore N is actually risible (theological conclusion!)

What is the dignity, abstraction, and elevation of theological arguments of this sort? Exactly those of the following:

The eucharistic accidents are truly accidents (a major which we suppose to be of faith).

Every accident actually inheres in its subject (minor of reason).

Therefore the eucharistic accidents actually inhere in their subject (theological conclusion!)

What does any student of theology have to say of this true theological conclusion . . . of the merely connexive type of virtual? Simply, that it is a sophism. But how is it possible that an argument should be, as it is, *conclusive* in *physics,* whereas it is a sophism in theology? St. Thomas replies: "The definition of an accident is not that it is a being in a subject, but that it *belongs* to the *quiddity* or *essence* of the accident to have existence (esse) in a subject . . . Thus in this sacrament it is not given to the accidents not to exist in a subject *in virtue of their essence* . . . nor is the definition of the accident

removed from them, to wit, the accident's *aptitude* for a subject, which always remains in them, but not the actual inherence", etc.[122]

Which, for anyone capable of reading, means in plain language: the argument, and any other argument of the sort, fails, that is, is not *theological,* because the reasoning does not proceed via the *essence,* or *quiddity,* or *definition,* or *aptitude,* or metaphysical property, but via *actual inherence;* an inherence or actual property that fails in the instant case, that absolutely speaking is always subject to possible failure, that often fails where the supernatural order is involved. A theology that can possibly fail even in one single instance, a theological conclusion that can possibly be false, as all conclusions based on a merely connexive virtual can be, is not *theology* but *physics* (98).

If in the natural order we take as the *middle term* of demonstration the essence or the *inclusive* properties of *being,* the result will be the sublime *wisdom* of metaphysics. On the other hand, if we take as middle the properties linked by physico-real connexion, the result will be the poor and fallible science of physics.

Likewise, if in the supernatural order we take as the *middle* of demonstration the essence or the *inclusive* properties of *revealed being,* of the true faith, the result will be the sublime *wisdom among wisdoms,* the divine theology. But if we take as middle the physico-distinct properties, the result will be the *physico-theological* [sic], of exactly the same consistency, abstraction, and certitude as natural physics.

Whereas in St. Thomas's view of the theological conclusion, that which is *inclusive-identical* to the *revealed,* the essence of the *formal revealed,* is employed as the middle to draw out from its depths the *revealed* implicit virtual, the sacred *revealable* or *theological;* in the theological conclusion of the connexive virtual type the middle employed is a physico-distinct connexion, something objectively distinct from the revealed, something that is *not* implicitly *revealed,* and its necessary result or conclusion is a *physico-contingent* conclusion, but nothing of *divine* essence, nothing of *theological* essence.

SECTION VII
TWO CONCEPTS OF THEOLOGY OR REVEALED VIRTUALITY

117. – We believe that the foregoing sections have clearly shown that a great confusion exists in modern theology with respect to the understanding and the nature of the immediately or formally revealed and the mediately or virtually revealed which specifically constitute and distinguish faith and theology respectively; that this confusion dates back to a false notion of the revealed virtual introduced by Suárez in order to mitigate an extreme theory of Molina; that the result of this Suarezian notion, widely accepted in theological handbooks today, has been to confuse the authentic theology and theological conclusion with the faith. Thus Suárez's teaching merges with the Scotist doctrines of Vázquez and Vega, and what emerges as theology and theological conclusion in the proper sense of these terms is a nominal theology devoid of any possible homogeneity with the revealed datum and of any certitude and abstraction greater than those of the physico-contingent order.

[122] ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.,* p. 3, q. 77, a. 1, ad 2.

Further, we hope to have established that the preceding doctrine is not the doctrine of traditional theology, and, particularly, not the doctrine of St. Thomas; that in St. Thomas's view the inclusive virtual, that is, a virtual whose reality and objectivity are identical to the revealed formal, is the specific constituent and difference of theology and of the theological conclusion; that theology and the theological conclusion constitute a development that differs conceptually but is objectively identical to, and homogeneous with, the immediately revealed truth; that there exists a perfect objective-material identity, a complete real continuity, albeit together with a conceptually distinct virtuality and a different formal motive, between the theological conclusion and the revealed datum or between theology and faith; that authentic theology and the rigorous theological conclusion are not material found *outside* the revealed deposit through a connexion with that which is within the deposit, but material found *in* the revealed principles, *within* the revealed deposit, through an identico-intellectual analysis made by human reason of the divine principles or propositions contained in the deposit, employing therefor not a physical connexion between that which is within and that which is without, but the transcendent notions of the human *intellect* that are proportionally, yet really, applicable to that which is within as well as to that which is without, to the human as well as the divine, the natural as well as the supernatural, the revealed as well as the non-revealed. If this our notion of theology, which we believe is that of St. Thomas, is legitimate, then there are two supremely different, and even opposed, concepts of theology.

What these may be can be gathered from reflecting on the fact that God has not revealed to us all the truth but only a determinate number, a definite range of truths. Thus there has to be a boundary to mark off the range of the revealed from the range of the non-revealed. There must be two ranges: one, the range of *revealed truth;* the other, the range of *non-revealed truth.* The former is the range of divine truth; the latter, the range of human truth.

Recall to mind now that all the truths that make up the whole body of Catholic doctrine are distributed into four groups or departments: 1. The *revealed datum,* or the ensemble of divine statements committed by the

Apostles or the inspired writers to the two sources of revelation viz. Holy Scripture and Tradition; 2. the *dogmas,* that is, the ensemble of dogmatic statements defined by Church as truths of divine faith; 3. the *infallible truths,* to wit, the ensemble of statements defined by the Church as infallible, but not yet as truths of divine faith; 4. the *theological conclusions,* the ensemble of propositions demonstratively deduced by theology from the principles of faith. (3)

All these four departments or ensembles[xvi] must be either truly revealed or not truly revealed. They must all be either really within the revealed field or outside of the revealed field. Advisedly we have here avoided the term mediate and immediate, formal and virtual, since a bad or a different understanding of these terms leads to confusion. Instead we have employed the term *really,* since there can be no middle between really revealed and not really revealed, between really within the revealed field and really in the non-revealed field.

Now, then, let the reader ask himself: in which of these two fields is each of those four degrees of Catholic truth located? To which of the former must one go in order to find the latter? In the attempt to answer these questions he will clearly realize that there are two concepts of theology, two theories on the nature of theological truth manifestly at variance with one another. Both concepts or theories agree in affirming that the revealed datum and the dogmas are located within the revealed field. Both also agree in maintaining that in order to discover the infallible truth and the theological truth – wherever these may be located – the investigation must start from within the revealed field. But Suárez maintains that the theological truth is located in the non-revealed field, so that one must cross over to the latter to look for the theological truth. St. Thomas maintains that the theological truth is located within the revealed field and thus one must keep himself within it in order to find the theological truth.

In Suárez's view, theology starts from the revealed fields (majors of faith) advances through the procedure of physical connexion (virtually connexive minors), by means of which it crosses over from the revealed field to that which is not revealed, and reaps its harvest (conclusions) in the latter field. In St. Thomas's view, theology utilizes the procedure of the virtual implicit or the bond of metaphysico-inclusive connexion that runs through the interior of the revealed field, and reaps its harvest *within* the revealed field itself.

[xvi] "All these four. . . .", not in the sense that each and every one of the four is either truly revealed or not truly revealed; but in the sense that *any of these four* is either truly revealed or not truly revealed. – *(Transl.)*

Suárez thinks of the theologian as being properly a technician situated in the revealed field but looking through a telescope at the objects in the other field, the non-revealed field. St. Thomas thinks that the proper work of the theologian is to look through a microscope at, or to apply the scalpel to, the objects themselves within the revealed field in order to find what lies within them.

Suárez conceives the authentic theological minor as a road that begins in the revealed field, goes out of it and runs along the outside; all the things that the wayfarer discovers along the road are human, profane, not divine, not revealed; although it is certain that he would not have discovered them if he had not set forth from the revealed. St. Thomas conceives the theological minor as a path running through the interior and the depths of the revealed; thus, everything one finds is objectively divine and revealed; however, these findings are made by human reason, and there always is the possibility that human reason might take a wrong turn and unwittingly end outside, or that it might, much against its will, blemish or becloud the revealed object.

In short, in Suárez's thinking the authentic theological conclusion expresses objectivity that differs really from the revealed deposit, that is *not implicitly revealed,* that is *matter not definable as a truth of faith,* barring a new revelation. In St. Thomas's thinking, the authentic theological conclusion, the theological truth is really or objectively identical to the revealed deposit, it is implicitly revealed, it is matter definable as a truth of faith without need of any new revelation.

The parallel we have just drawn between the different concepts maintained by Suárez and St. Thomas is rigorously exact. The parallel is drawn with reference to theology in the proper sense of the term, that is, to theology in so far as it is a rigorous science "that does not reason in order to prove its *principles* which are the articles of faith, but proceeds from these to make some *other thing* (the conclusion) clear." Therefore the parallel does not refer to theology's other role, the *sapiential* role of defending and explaining its own principles. "For whereas this sacred doctrine has no other superior to itself, it argues against anyone who denies its *principles.*"[123]

We make this observation to obviate the possible dodge that could be made by anybody who advances the claims that Suárez also admits that theology likewise deals with the revealed field since it is engaged in the explanation of its principles, which are revealed principles. But that is not the point. Principles are not the point at issue. The point at issue is the concept of theology *qua* science of properly called conclusions.

[123] ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.,* p.1, q.1, a.8.

In the following chapter we shall see how these two different notions of theology have brought forth correspondingly in Suárez and St. Thomas two divergent parallel theories on the organic place occupied by the authority of the Church in relation to our divine faith and to the evolution or explication of the revealed deposit.

CHAPTER III

DOGMATIC EVOLUTION AND THE AUTHORITY OF THE CHURCH

118. AN OBJECTION. – It is quite possible that an objection should occur to our readers after reading what we had to say on the nature of the true revealed virtuality or true theology.

Someone might say: I will grant that sacred theology's specific constitutive is not the physico-connexive virtual but the metaphysico-inclusive virtual. I will grant, in consequence, that true theology is perfectly homogenous and continuous with the revealed datum since it always has to do with concepts that are objectively implicit in the starting point. I will grant, in the last place, that true theology always moves within, and never outside of, the revealed field, and that its results or rigorous conclusions are only different facets or aspects or intellectual explications of the fecund dogmas or divine statements revealed by God to His Apostles and by them committed to the Catholic Church for safekeeping and explication. All of this seems clear in St. Thomas's teaching.

But then this upgrading of the notion of virtual revelation or theological conclusion seems to downgrade formal revelation or dogma. The safeguarding of the dignity of sacred theology and of its homogeneity with the revealed datum appears perilously close to confusing it with divine faith. In raising theology from the valley of physics, where Suárez had consigned it, to the lofty regions of ultrametaphysics, where it properly belongs and where St. Thomas has always placed it, there is the danger of falling into the antithomist and discredited theory maintained by Vázquez and some other theologians of nominalist affiliation, who do not distinguish specifically – not clearly, at any rate – between human reasoning and divine faith.

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119. TWO KEYS TO THE PROBLEM. – The whole problem of the homogeneous evolution of dogmas rests authentically on two bases, which also provide the true keys to the solution of all the objections that are raised against it. The first is the objectively inclusive or *implicit* character of any true theological conclusion in respect of the revealed datum. The second is the *divine* authority given by God to His Church, not merely to safeguard, but to *explicate* all that is objectively implicit in the revealed deposit, provided only that such explication or unfolding can be done without any new revelation.

In the preceding chapter we have dwelt at length on the first of these two bases. It is now time to examine the second, that is, to delve deeply into the true nature of the Church's authority relative to the explication or unfolding of the revealed deposit and the precise organic place occupied by the Church's definition between theology and faith.

TWO EXTREMES TO BE AVOIDED. – As a matter of fact – and this will be clear as we get on through the present chapter – the problem of authentic dogmatic evolution reduces on the one hand to the problem of what value must be given to human reasoning or to the theological conclusion, and on the other, what value must be given to the authority of the Church, relative to the unfolding of the revealed truth.

The theologian may find himself floundering against two opposite reefs. He might, in the first case, place so much value on human reasoning as to rate it on a par with the divine value of the Church's authority. Or, on the contrary, he might attach so little weight to the authority of the Church as to identify it with the human value of theological reasoning, or to distinguish it from the latter only accidentally.

Vázquez exaggerated the value of theological reasoning; thus he was misled into confusing it with the value of the Church's definition. He maintained that in respect of the act of divine faith evident reasoning performs relative to the theologian a function that is identical or similar to that of the Church's definition relative to all the faithful. Hence, his theory that the theological conclusion is formally a truth of divine faith and deserves an assent of divine faith from any one who arrives at its knowledge through evident reasoning, independently of the Church's definition. (85)

On the other hand, Molina failed to recognize the truly divine value of the Church's definition and thus came to rate it on a par with the human value of the theological reasoning. In his view, the Holy Spirit assists the Church to prevent her from erring but not to enable her to turn into a truth of divine faith what previously was not formally a truth of faith. Hence his theory that, no matter how inclusive and implicit it may be, no true theological conclusion is a truth of divine faith whether before or after the Church's definition. (84)

Molina's theory radically precludes all dogmatic evolution via true theological conclusions. Vázquez's theory formally confuses theological evolution with dogmatic evolution. Both theories disregard the essential, and not merely accidental, difference between the formally human – and thus neither divine nor dogmatic – value of theological reasoning and the truly divine and dogmatic value of the Church's authority or definition.

120. DIVISION. – In order to show that the divine magisterium established by Jesus Christ in His Church is one of the hinges on which the possibility of true dogmatic evolution rests, but that nonetheless, dogmatic evolution must be essentially distinguished from theological evolution, we shall divide the present chapter into eight sections:

1. The revealed virtuality or theological conclusion prior to the Church's definition.

2. The revealed virtuality after its definition by the Church

3. The organic locus occupied by the Church's authority in our divine faith.

4. Whether the Church turns the mediate or virtual revelation into immediate or formal revelation.

5. The authority of the Church compared with the authority of God and the authority of the Apostles.

6. Two functions of the Church's magisterium relative to the revealed deposit.

7. Whether the Church's definitions complete revelation.

8. Whether the dogmatic evolution that takes place after the Apostles is objective or subjective.

SECTION I

THE REVEALED VIRTUALITY OR THEOLOGICAL CONCLUSION PRIOR TO THE CHURCH'S DEFINITION

121. THE FORMAL CONCLUSION AND THE SPECIFICATIVE CONCLUSION. – In the matter of the definability or non-definability of theological conclusions as truths of faith, two divisions or distinctions are usually made.

The first distinction is that made by some theologians who, as Vázquez, distinguish between the conclusion qua conclusion and the conclusion qua consequent. The conclusion qua conclusion is the conclusion as *deduced* from the principles. The conclusion qua consequent is the conclusion as *included* in

the principles. The conclusion qua conclusion is usually termed *formal* conclusion. The conclusion qua consequent is ordinarily termed material or *specificative* conclusion. To assent to a conclusion qua conclusion is to assent not only to the truth affirmed by it but further to assent to the fact that the given conclusion is deduced from the given principle. To assent to the conclusion qua consequent is to assent to its truth but without any regard to its deduction. In this case, says Vázquez, the inference or reasoning is not the formal motive but simply the condition to come to the knowledge that the given conclusion is contained in its principles, and as soon as the reasoning has served this purpose of letting us know the fact of such containment, we assent to the conclusion, not because of the reasoning, but because of the conclusion's being contained or included in the revealed principles. They say that in this matter of conclusions there is something analogous to what happens in the act of divine faith. No act of divine faith exists without previous motives of credibility. However, these motives of credibility are never the formal motive of divine faith; they are but a condition *sine qua non* for us to arrive at the certain knowledge of divine revelation. As soon as this divine revelation is known to us we assent to the revealed truth because of the revelation itself and not because of the motives of credibility.

Likewise, as soon as through reasoning the inclusion of a conclusion in the revealed premises becomes known, this inclusion or revelation is the formal motive of belief, and not the reasoning process.

Thus Vázquez, and thus also many other theologians, at least, in cases involving metaphysico-inclusive conclusions. (85)

122. THE CONCLUSION BEFORE AND AFTER ITS DEFINITION BY THE CHURCH. – The second division or distinction between theological conclusions, which every theologian – particularly the authentically Thomist theologian – ought to make, consists in distinguishing clearly and radically between the conclusion *in itself*, that is, without the Church's definition, and the same conclusion *after* its definition by the Church. Prior to the Church's definition the conclusion is not known to us except through one, and only one, medium: through reasoning. After it has been defined by the Church, the conclusion is known to us through two essentially different mediums, to wit: through reasoning, and through the definition.

The conclusion in itself, or prior to its definition by the Church, is usually called by Thomists "the conclusion considered *per se*", and also "the conclusion *as such.*"

We will devote the following section to the examination of the conclusion after its definition by the Church. In the present section we will be exclusively concerned with the conclusion in itself or prior to its definition. We intend to show that in St. Thomas's doctrine, no true theological conclusion, if it be known merely through reasoning, can be a truth of divine faith or ever be deserving of an assent of divine faith for as long as it is not defined by the Church. And we mean to show that this holds true no matter how clear and evident the reasoning may be, no matter how much inclusiveness or implicitude is involved in it. And that it holds true whether the conclusion be considered as a *formal* conclusion or as a *specificative* conclusion, provided that they truly and properly are conclusions, that is to say, truths that differ virtually or conceptually from the revealed datum from which they are deduced.

In order to make this clear, let us set forth St. Thomas's teaching on the nature and specific distinction of cognitive habits. Both theology and faith are essentially cognitive habits; thus it is impossible to determine when faith alone exists, when theology alone exists, and when both theology and faith exist simultaneously, without a good understanding of that which is material and that which is formal in the specific distinction of both the habits and the acts of our intellectual knowledge.

123. THE FORMAL AND THE MATERIAL IN ANY KNOWLEDGE. – Let us begin by recalling that in St. Thomas's view: 1. every theological reasoning must begin from a premise of divine faith, a premise believed with divine faith; 2. that the other premise must be inclusive and not merely connexive; 3. that, consequently, the *middle term* is itself a revealed idea; 4. that, in consequence, the theological conclusion, that is to say, the theological truth or the science of theology acquired in virtue of such reasoning possesses *objective* identity and *real* homogeneity with the premise of faith, or the revealed datum.

We have advisedly underscored the terms *objective* and *real* when we mentioned real homogeneity and objective identity. For it must never be forgotten, (as it has been, ever since the physico-connexive virtual was unfortunately introduced as the constitutive of the theological) that there are two kinds of identity and of homogeneity because there are two kinds of objects: 1. the *material,* or *real,* object; 2. the *formal* object.

Faith, theology, as well as every other intellectual or scientific habit is knowledge. Now, in *any* knowledge two things must be distinguished: *that which* is known and the *medium whereby* it is known: the *res cognita* and the *medium cognitionis.* If I know that *the human soul is immortal,* that is the *thing known,* the *res cognita.* If I know it through *divine authority,* through *scientific reasoning,* through *human authority,* these are the *medium cognitionis* – three essentially different mediums relative to one self-same *res cognita* or known truth.

Well then, St. Thomas views the *thing known* as that which is material, secondary, accidental. The *medium cognitionis,* the medium whereby the

thing is known, is that which is formal, specific, that which constitutes and essentially distinguishes the knowledge and the cognitive habit. St. Thomas repeats this view to the point of satiety every time he treats of the specification and distinction of cognitive powers and habits in general. But he lays it down particularly and explicitly and as the basis from the very beginning of his treatises on the *Sacred Doctrine* and on *Faith.*[1]

Consequently, when one seeks to determine the value of any affirmation, or proposition, or truth that is the object of the human intellect, one completely loses his bearings, in the Thomist view, should one focus his attention exclusively, or even principally, on the *thing known* by our intellect. That upon which attention should be focused primarily and above all is the *medium whereby* our intellect *knows* the thing.

Thus if two men both know that *the human soul is immortal,* but one knows it *exclusively* through divine authority whereas the other knows it *exclusively* through reasoning or a scientific medium, the thing known is materially the same, homogeneous, identical; but the knowledge itself is formally different; in the former it is *divine faith,* in the latter it is *science.*

[1] "In the distinction of powers, or even of habits, the object itself, taken *materially,* is *not considered,* but the *reason of the object.* And therefore [things that are contrary in reality] *insofar as they agree in one reason of cognoscibility,* belong to *one cognitive* habit." (ST. THOMAS, 1-2, q.54, a.2, ad 1) "The *different* mediums are as different active principles according to which the habits of the sciences are *diversified.*" (*Ibid.* ad 2) "The different *reason of cognoscibility* induces the difference of the sciences." (*Op.cit.,* p.1, q.1, a.1) "[The holy doctor] designates with the term *reason of cognoscibility* the *medium whereby* something is knowable." (CAPREOLO, in 1 Sent., q.1, p.3a, pg.19; ed. Paban et Pègues) "For the *unity* of the power and the habit is to be considered according to the object, taken *not materially,* but in accordance with the *formal reason of the object.*" (ST. THOMAS, p.1, q.1, a.3) "The conclusions are known *materially;* but the formal reason of knowing is the *medium* of demonstration *whereby* the conclusions *are known.*" (2-2, q.1, a.1) "The object of any cognitive habit has two things, viz. *that which is* materially *known,* and *that whereby it is known,* which is the *formal reason* of the object." (*Ibid.*) "Nothing falls under any power, or habit, or even any act, unless on account of the *formal reason of the object.*" (*Ibid.,* a.3) "Indeed, every *cognitive* habit *formally* regards *the medium whereby* something *is known;* and *materially that which is known* through the medium." (*Ibid.* q.9, a.2, ad 3) Etc., etc. Thus, in order to find out whether any theological conclusion, not precisely *qua conclusion* (because in this sense there are very few theologians who have thought of saying that it is *of faith*), but even *specificatively qua truth, is of divine faith* for the human intellect, or not, one must not consider whether it has more or less identity with the major or principle of faith, but whether *we know it* through the same medium through which we know the major. The unequivocal and constant teaching of St. Thomas is that no assent of divine faith is possible for as long as the *medium whereby we know it* is not the medium of divine authority, but of scientific reasoning; and St. Thomas's reason is that when a truth is *known only* as a conclusion, it cannot be given any other assent but the assent *proper to a conclusion,* since *cognitive* habits are not specified by subjective or voluntary viewpoints, but by objective reasons of the intellect, i.e. by the *medium of knowing.*

If one of the two knows it through reasoning *alone,* and the other through human authority *alone,* the thing known is the same; but the knowledge and the habits wherewith the same thing is known differ essentially: in the former it is *science,* in the latter it is *human faith.*

Assume now the case where both employ reasoning or a scientific medium. But one knows through a metaphysical reasoning or medium, whereas the other knows through a physical reasoning or medium. The thing known remains ever the same; but there is a difference in the *medium cognitionis;* hence there exists a difference in the species and in that which is the formal element in the cognitive habit and in the assent. In the former it is metaphysics, in the latter it is physics.

Finally, let us suppose that one and the same individual knows the same truth or proposition through *different mediums* simultaneously, e.g., through divine authority, through scientific reasoning, and through human authority. In that case he would, or could,[2] have different knowledges, different habits, and different assents relative to the same truth at the same time. The habits, knowledges, and assents of divine faith, science and human faith.

All of the foregoing points stress the following principle which is utterly fundamental in St. Thomas' teaching. One medium of knowing can have one, and only one, corresponding species of habit, assent, and certitude; *different mediums of knowing* have correspondingly different species of habits, assents, and certitudes. "In the distinction of habits one must consider not the *object itself materially,* but the *reason of the object.* And thus in so far as different things coincide in one *reason of cognoscibility,* they belong to *one habit.* But cognitive habits are *diversified* in accordance with the *diversity* of the mediums."[3]

124. THE *MEDIUM COGNITIONIS* OF THEOLOGICAL TRUTH. — In the light of this teaching of St. Thomas, let us proceed to examine the specific or essential value of any theological truth, no matter how inclusive and identical might be the reasoning whereby our intellect deduces it. The value of the propositions or truths of the last three degrees of Catholic

[2] We say "or could have", because there are habits so incompatible of their own formal nature that not even with different *mediums of knowing* is it possible for them to coexist in the same subject with regard to the same thing. Such is the case, according to St. Thomas (2-2, q.1, aa.4-5) with the habits of *faith* and *science* (science of intrinsic-perfect *evidence,* which, theology is not), or the habits of *opinion* and *science.* But this is accidental relative to the question we are dealing with, since there is no incompatibility of any kind between faith and theology, because theology does not have that kind of evidence, provided, however, that there be *two mediums of knowing:* the medium of faith and that of theology.

[3] ST. THOMAS, *loc.cit.*

doctrine depends wholly on their inclusion and on the mode of such inclusion in the first degree which is the revealed datum or deposit. Their value in no way depends on their inclusion in the principles of reason or in the sciences acquired through the natural light. Let us therefore examine the theological proposition or truth, not in relation to the principles of philosophy or of natural reason, for this would be accidental or extrinsic to any truth of faith or to any theological truth. Let us examine it in relation to the revealed deposit.

As an example let us consider this proposition of Christian truth: *the human soul is immortal.* Three different cases are possible: 1. the human intellect finds this truth in the revealed deposit through a *simple understanding* of the literal meaning of the revealed deposit without any deduction or discourse. 2. The human intellect discovers the same truth only through a proper *deduction* from the simple understanding of the revealed deposit. 3. That both the two cases just mentioned take place. In other words, our intellect finds the proposition or truth in one part of the revealed deposit through simple understanding and without any deductive reasoning. However, it can also be found in another part of the revealed deposit through deduction or reasoning in the proper sense of these terms.

Between being found *without reasoning,* being found *through reasoning,* and being found *in both ways together,* no other alternative exists. These three alternatives exhaust all the possibilities. For as we have already remarked, a fourth supposition; to wit, that the truth is not to be found in the revealed deposit, whether with or without reasoning, would place us out of the problem. Any truth not contained in the deposit in any manner whatsoever would *ipso facto* have no relationship with either faith, or dogma, or infallibility, or theology. It would be merely a profane truth, as the holy Doctor says: "For example, in matters pertaining to geometry or in other similar matters, which *in no way* can belong to the faith."[4]

Let us make these three cases completely clear by making the three simple suppositions that follow: *First supposition:* the whole of the revealed deposit reduces to this single proposition: *the human soul is immortal. Second supposition:* the whole of the revealed deposit reduces to one single proposition, but this time the proposition is: *the human soul is spiritual,* and not *the human soul* is immortal as in the previous case. *Third supposition:* the whole of the revealed deposit reduces to two propositions or verses; namely: *verse 1, the human soul is immortal; verse 2, the human soul is spiritual.* In each of these three suppositions, what is the value of the proposition or truth under study, i.e., *the human soul is immortal?*

[4]ST. THOMAS, 2-2, q.11, a.2.

125. FAITH ALONE, WITHOUT THEOLOGY. – The answer is quite obvious in the first supposition. In this first supposition, the proposition *the human soul is immortal* is found by my intellect in the revealed deposit, in the *word* or *authority of God,* through simple understanding, without any sort of reasoning, without any other *medium* of knowledge except the immediate meaning of the revealed deposit. I know it directly, immediately, only and merely through divine revelation, through the divine witness, through the divine authority. There is *only one medium of knowing,* and this medium is divine revelation or authority. Consequently, there is *only one habit,* one knowledge, one assent -- the knowledge, assent and habit of *divine faith.*

Similarly, we should still be in the first supposition (and not in the second), if in the attempt to assess the value of the proposition *the human soul is immortal,* we repaired to the revealed deposit and found not the same proposition stated *explicitly* but these others instead: "the human soul will never perish", or "the human soul will live forever", or any other proposition with the same meaning but with different *words;* that is, when no true reasoning, but only a *mere explanation of terms,* is needed in order to find or see it in the deposit or *divine word.* This is what is called the *formal implicit:* implicit because some explication is required to find it; *formal* because the explication is a mere exposition of the meaning of the different terms (which is also known as *improper discourse,* or discourse *only in regard to the form* – John of St. Thomas[5]), whereby *one* and the same *idea* is expressed, and does not involve the admixture or mediation of *another idea,* in which *true reasoning consists.* (27, 61)

As we have previously remarked, this formal implicit comprises the nominal definition and the defined, the unconditioned universal and the particular, the correlatives, the contradictories, and all those things that are *simultaneous in nature and knowledge,* since there is no *virtual* distinction between them, but only a nominal distinction or distinction of reasoning reason. (32)

126. FAITH AND THEOLOGY TOGETHER. – In the third supposition, the proposition whose value is being assayed, is found by my mind in two different parts of the divine deposit. But my mind finds it through different modes or through *different mediums* of knowing. In the first verse I find it directly, immediately, through mere divine affirmation, statement, witness, or authority; without any reasoning or any other scientific or deductive medium. In the second verse I do not formally find, i.e. through mere understading, that *the human soul is immortal;* but instead I find that the *human*

[5]*De Fide,* a.2, n.8.

soul is spiritual. Now, my human intellect possesses *another medium* of knowing, which is nonetheless, a suitable medium for operating on that which is affirmed by divine authority without introducing a break in homogeneity or an admixture of new objectivity. My intellect employs *this medium*, and through it, that is, through the inclusive-analytic-identical-*transcendent* relation that links and identifies *objectively all* spirituality (hence also *revealed spirituality*) with immortality, I infer and know deductively that *the human soul is immortal* through that *medium*, which is a medium *distinct* from mere divine authority.

In this third supposition I have found the proposition I was seeking for in two parts of the deposit or divine word, but I have found it through *two different mediums of knowing:* one is the medium of mere divine revelation or witness; the other is the medium of human discourse or deduction -- a discourse that is thoroughly analytic, and thoroughly inclusive, and thoroughly homogeneous –; but still a discourse and a *true discourse,* the most rigorous, proper and scientific that is possible; so rigorous, true and scientific that it characterizes the superior sciences – the mathematical and metaphysical sciences, which are almost the only ones that strictly deserve the name of *science* and *demonstration,* taking these terms in all their extension and fullness.[6]

Thus, in this third supposition I have two *mediums of knowing:* one, the medium of mere divine revelation or authority; the other, the medium of human discourse, although a discourse employed on a divine truth. I will, consequently, have two essentially or formally different knowledges, and two habits, and two assents: a knowledge, habit and assent of *divine faith;* and a knowledge, habit and assent of *theological science* or *theology.*

127. TRUE AND MERE THEOLOGY. – Up to this point there has been no great difficulty, and it can be said that all theologians, the earlier and the modern, are fundamentally in agreement.

The difficulty, or more properly, the confusion made by theologians posterior to the Suarezian virtual, lies in the second hypothesis, the case in which a proposition or truth is not found in the deposit without the aid of

[6] "Nowhere but in the metaphysical and mathematical sciences are *true demonstrations* found." (A. de POULPIQUET, O.P., *L'object intégrel de l'Apologétique,* p.40, Blond, Paris 1912) To characterize as *formal confused* or *improper virtual* the conclusions of real identity or metaphysical connexion is tantamount to denying to the mathematical, metaphysical, and theological sciences and demonstrations the nature of true sciences and demonstrations. This is, on the one hand, to reduce human reason and human science, in the proper sense of the terms, to physics; and, on the other, to confuse the metaphysico-theological conclusions, which are the only ones that constitute the true and rigorous theology, with simple understanding in the natural order, and with divine faith in the supernatural order. A complete confusion between theology and divine faith.

reasoning, the case in which to find it or to come to know it the human intellect must employ a deductive reasoning of inclusive virtuality, and *only through such reasoning* and as a consequence of it does our human intellect *know* it. The problem can be stated as follows: What is the value of any theological proposition or of any truth pertaining to the last three degrees of the Catholic doctrine, in the case that the human mind does not find it in the revealed deposit *except* through metaphysico-inclusive reasoning or as an inclusive deduction from the deposit? Is such a truth (prior to the Church's definition) formally a truth of divine faith, or a truth of theology, or of both divine faith and theology at once?

Ever since Suárez, with the intention of saving or *attenuating* Molina's extreme and radical theory, made of the physical or merely connexive virtual the essential and specific constitutive of theology, there was nothing else to do but assign the whole of the metaphysical or inclusive-identical virtual to the formal department of faith and affirm that the metaphysical virtual is of itself or formally a truth of faith; hence, that it could be given the assent of faith and that the theologian should give it the assent of faith from the moment that he deduces it demonstratively. (74)

But since it was obvious that where *reasoning* or *deduction* exist there *science* and *theology* must also exist, a second doctrine had to be added; namely, that *two* species of assent could be given to such conclusions, even if they were *known through only one medium,* which is the medium of inclusive reasoning: *theological assent* to the proposition considered as *conclusion,* i.e. to the conclusion taken *formally;* and the assent of *divine faith* to the conclusion taken *specificatively.* In other words, the doctrine explained earlier in the case of the third hypothesis when the proposition is known through *two mediums,* divine authority and reasoning, was extended and made to apply also to the second hypothesis when the proposition is known *exclusively through reasoning.* Thus, in the end, the positions reached are identical to those of Vázquez and Vega, whose teachings, on the other hand, are contested.

Finally, since the traditional theology of St. Thomas and his school had always considered reasoning, taken in its proper sense, as the antipode of faith (63), the theological confusion was consummated by affirming, as Suárez and Lugo did, and many other theologians after them, that the implicit or identico-real virtual is neither a proper reasoning nor a proper virtual, but immediate or formal, although . . . *confused.* This is the height of confusion that can be arrived at, by turning all the ideas of Aristotle and St. Thomas upside down. (86)

Let us, then examine this second hypothesis, which is the case of the true and mere theological conclusion. It provides the key to the specific distinction between divine faith and theology. On it depends the correct

understanding of what Catholics call dogmatic progress and Modernists characterize as transformistic evolution. The reader will recall that this hypothesis is the following: God has *only* explicitly revealed to us that *the human soul is spiritual.* On this assumption we want to ascertain the value of this other proposition *the human soul is immortal,* a proposition which differs *virtually* from the former.

In this hypothesis, human reason knows the first proposition *the human soul is spiritual* through one medium, through divine revelation, without true deductive reasoning of any sort, through mere inspection or understanding of the revealed deposit, through divine authority. Hence reason assents to it not through *science* but through *authority,* not through *theology* but through *divine faith.* But, in this same hypothesis, how does human reason know the second proposition *the human soul is immortal?* Does reason know it through mere divine revelation, without true reasoning, without true deduction, without true science, without *any other medium* distinct from the medium of mere divine authority? Is it possible for human reason *immediately* to see or know or apply the divine revelation or authority (which is the formal motive of faith) to the proposition *the human soul is immortal* (which is the *thing known* or the material object)? Or does human reason require *another medium,* a human bridge to serve the purpose of joining *mediately* the revelation or formal motive contained in the major, with the *thing known* or material object contained in the conclusion?

The matter is rather obvious: human reason requires *another medium,* it needs to employ a minor of reason. It is true that the medium employed is inclusive, objectively identical, really homogeneous; which is why the *thing known,* the matter of the conclusion (or the *conclusion taken specificatively*), the objective reality that is known, that which is secondary or material in any habit, knowledge, or assent are matter, reality, *thing known,* and conclusion *really identical* and homogeneous with the revealed deposit, with the major of faith. Thereby, because of their *material* identity with the major of faith, they are matter of faith, a mediate or virtual object of faith. However, the reasoning or deduction (which is the *medium of knowing* or that which is *formal* in any habit, knowledge, or assent) does not cease to be a true, and real, and essential reasoning or deduction, simply because it is a reasoning or deduction of inclusion and identity; it does not thereby cease to be a *scientific medium* and thus a medium that differs essentially from the *medium of authority* or faith; it does not thereby cease to be, *absolutely speaking,* a *fallible* medium, and therefore distinct from the *Primary Truth* (*Veritas Prima*), which is the formal medium of faith and an *absolutely infallible* medium. Hence, it does not thereby cease to be a *different medium of knowing* and consequently it belongs, and can only belong to a habit, knowledge and assent of *theological science. Theological* because of its inclusion in, or identity with, the *divine* (which is the primary *material* object of

theology); *theologico-supernatural* (and not natural theology) because of its identity with the *revealed divine,* i.e. with the major of faith from which it is inferred through a rigorous identico-real analysis. To repeat: it is *theological and objectively supernatural;* however, it is not an object of faith but of *science,* because it is not an immediate knowledge or one obtained through mere authority, but a mediate knowledge or one achieved through true deduction. Since in this second case we do not have *two* different mediums of knowing, as in the third case, but *only one medium* – the intellectual *deduction* from the revealed, *deductio ex revelatis* – the assent and the habit and the certainty can be none other than the assent and the habit and the certainty of *theology,* not of faith. In the teaching of St. Thomas there can be no diversity or multiplicity of habits, nor consequently of assent, without a multiplicity or diversity of *mediums of knowing.* "Nothing is placed under a habit, or even an act, except through the *formal reason* of the object. But the formal reason of the object is the *medium whereby the thing is known.*"[7]

128. FURTHER CONFIRMATION OF THE SAME. To anyone who has penetrated the *objective analysis* of faith and of science made by St. Thomas it will be mathematically evident that *no thing known exclusively through deduction* is formally of divine faith, even if the deduction is made from something divine.

For St. Thomas the formal motive of divine faith is God's *testimony;* the formal motive of *science* is *intrinsico-mediate evidence,* which we will call *seeing.* Something is *believed* because God *said* it. Something is *known* because it is *seen.* To *see deductively* is characteristic of *all* sciences; hence it does not specifically or distinctively constitute any particular science but is *common* to all of them. Any science is *seeing,* but each science is seeing by a *different medium* or by *different principles.*

In the natural order there are *physical, mathematical, metaphysical* principles or mediums. There are supernatural mediums or principles *obscurely revealed* – the principles of fatih – and mediums or principles *seen in themselves* – the divine essence. Human reason can avail itself of all these five principles or mediums to *see deductively* or to see *other things.* Thus there is deductive seeing through a physical medium, a mathematical medium, a metaphysical medium, a supernatural medium accepted by faith, a supernatural medium intuited through facial vision. And there is a physical science, a mathematical science, a metaphysical science, a theological science of the wayfarers, and a theological science of the blessed (this last without formal discourse). The first three are the deductive natural seeing through a natural medium; the fourth is a *natural deductive* seeing through a supernatural medium. There is in all of them an *intrinsic-deductive seeing,* which is the

[7] ST. THOMAS, 2-2, q.1, aa. 1 and 3.

generic characteristic of all science, and there is an objective *medium* through which the seeing is done, which is the *specific* characteristic of each science.

Let us now reconstitute the theological reasoning stating not only the material propositions or the "thing known" which shall be left out of parentheses, but also the "formal medium of knowing", which shall be enclosed within parentheses. The major of faith must contain *God says;* the minor of reason must contain *I see;* the conclusion which is *scientifico-theological* must contain the generic characteristics *I see,* and the specific characteristic or medium by which something is seen, to wit, *in what God says or reveals.* Thus:

(*God says* that) the human soul is spiritual.

(*I see* that) what is spiritual is immortal.

(*I see by* or *in what God says* that) the human soul is immortal.

That which in these propositions is outside parentheses is for St. Thomas that which is *material,* "the thing known"; that which is within parentheses is that which is *formal,* "the medium of knowing". What is outside the parentheses is material to such a degree that if we left it intact and merely exchanged the parenthetical elements in the major and the minor, *ipso facto* both the habits and the assents would be similarly exchanged, so that we would now have a major of reason and a minor of faith. Vice versa, what is within the parentheses is *formal* to such a degree that if we left it intact, the habits and the assents would remain unchanged even if we inverted the extra-parenthetical elements in the major and minor. Therefore, the greater or lesser resemblance among these propositions relative to that which is outside parentheses is *material;* their *formal* distinction or identity is due exclusively to the identity or distinction of that which is within parentheses.

Let the reader now focus his attention on the distinct "mediums of knowing" or formal motives enclosed within parentheses in the major and the conclusion which are the two propositions with which we are at present concerned. I *know* the *major* because *God says it. What God says* is always and absolutely true; in *assenting to what God says* there can never be an error in any respect. There we have the characteristic of the *Veritas Prima* [First Truth] , of the *formal* object of faith. On the other hand, in *seeing* deductively by *what God says* there is always, absolutely speaking, the possibility of error, the same possibility of error that exists in seeing deductively through any other medium.

Thus any proposition seen or known deductively *by what God says* (which is altogether different from *because God says it*) is always a subjectively fallible proposition, and consequently neither formally divine nor formally of faith.

Finally, the reader will notice that the "medium of knowing" of the conclusion or theological truth is made up of *two* elements: one is *generic,* common to all sciences, which is to *see deductively;* the other is *distinctive,* and distinguishes it from all other human sciences, namely, to see deductively BY or IN *what* God *says.* The distinctive or specific element is divine, *what God says;* the generic is human, the *deductive seeing.*

That is why when we examined the structure of theological reasoning and compared it with that of the other sciences, we said that the "medium of knowing" of theology is *divine,* the *revealed formal* (114); but now that we examine its dogmatic value and compare it with faith, we say that the "medium of knowing" of theology is *human,* the *deductive seeing.* Both assertions are true and inseparable. On the first is grounded theology's objective dignity, superior to that of any other human science, and its real or objective-material homogeneity with the divinely revealed. The second provides the basis for the subjective fallibility of both theology and its homogeneity when inferred and known *exclusively through human reason,* and its inferiority to and specific distinction from divine faith.

The inclusive and homogeneous character of the *intellectual* procedure of theology is the reason why its conclusions approach as closely as possible the principles of faith. This is why the early Thomists used to designate the true theological conclusion as *matter* definable of faith, as *mediate object* and *indirect object* of faith. The Holy Doctor had already adverted to the fact that sciences whose procedure is intellectual and inclusive have this peculiarity; namely, that their conclusions (without ceasing to be mere conclusions and thus to belong essentially to a habit distinct from the habit to which the principles belong) are so homogeneous that they can be said to border on the principles themselves. "To proceed intellectually is not attributed to the divine science *as if it did not reason* proceeding from principles to conclusions: but because its reasoning lies *closest to intellectual consideration and its conclusions lie closest to its principles.*"[8]

However, between saying this and saying that they are formally of faith or deserve the assent of faith there lies an abyss that cannot be bridged by anything human and fallible, but only by the divine and infallible authority possessed by the Church in order to explicate and to propose, with the infallible assistance of the Holy Spirit, that which is implicitly *included* in the deposit, which is, as we shall see, what St. Thomas means by *explicating* the revealed deposit.

How, then, is it possible for this *theological conclusion,* this *inclusive deduction,* this *human intellectual elaboration* of the divine material – which is *theological* because of the divine material, and *science,* not faith, because of

[8] *In Boetium, De Trinitate,* q.6, a.1, ad 1.

the human intellectual elaboration involved – ever to become a truth of faith and deserve to be given by human reason an assent that is divine, formally divine, which previously it did not, and could not, deserve? We shall examine the matter in the following section.

SECTION II
THE REVEALED VIRTUALITY OR THEOLOGICAL CONCLUSION AFTER THE CHURCH'S DEFINITION

129. THE TRANSITION FROM THE THEOLOGICAL TRUTH TO A TRUTH OF DIVINE FAITH. – It is quite possible that some readers might be surprised by the very heading of "Transition from *theological* truth to truth of *divine faith*", i.e. the transition of what for *our* reason, not for the divine or the apostolic intellect, was rigorously, exclusively, and merely *theology* to a truth of divine faith, to a *dogma* of faith. Nonetheless, there is such a transition, and it is admitted by the traditional teaching of Catholic theology. It is, at bottom, the teaching of St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, and Scotus, the teaching of Vázquez and Vega, Suárez and Lugo, of all the classical theologians of the XVI century prior to Molina, and the teaching of 90% of subsequent theologians with respect to the true theology, the metaphysico-inclusive theology.

The surprise felt by some at the mention of a transition from theology to divine faith proceeds from the false notion of what true theology consists in, stemming from the misbegotten concept of the *merely connexive* virtual, which can ill become a dogma of faith because it is not a true revealed virtual and consequently neither a rigorous theological virtual.

On the contrary, if theology consists, as it indeed does, in the *implicit* or inclusive virtuality, the respective fields in which theology and divine faith function, although formally or specifically distinct are nonetheless materially or objectively identical. This objective identity or this implicitness of theology's object in the object of faith accounts not only for the *essential* dependence of our theology on divine faith, but also for the possibility of the transition from one to the other through a new element or a *new medium of knowing*. This new element is the authority of the Church, an authority not human but *divine*. However, since this authority is grounded not on revelation, as in the case of the Apostles, but on assistance, the Church is constrained to employ as an instrument the *human labour* of the theological reasoning, in much the same manner as she employs any other instrument that is suitable to explicate or develop that which is truly implicit in the revealed deposit. This should become clear by analyzing the human labour of the Church and comparing it with the similarly human labour of theology.

130. THE HUMAN LABOUR IN THEOLOGICAL REASONING AND IN THE DEFINITION OF THE CHURCH. – This is a point of utmost importance, which often does not get the attention it deserves in spite of the fact that upon it hinges the nature, the course, and the limits of both theological and dogmatic progress. The slightest slip in the examination of the nature of this *human* labour, this *intellectual* elaboration of the divine, will land one in either of two extremes: modernist transformism, or theologicism; the denial of any true dogmatic progress, or making formally dogmatic anything theological; the rupture or objective-real breach of communication between faith and theology, or the absorption of theology by faith.

On the other hand, from its correct interpretation issues St. Thomas's profound and harmonious theory which vitally, really, objectively, and homogeneously joins theology with the faith in such a way that it maintains the formal, specific, and essential distinction between faith and theology, but leaves the door open to true and perfect dogmatic development. In St. Thomas's teaching, dogmatic development is not restricted to mere nominal explication, i.e. to mere formulae; it encompasses also the intellectual development or explication of the implicit virtuality of the revealed deposit, yet its homogeneity or objective-real identity is kept intact while the pitfalls of both modernist transformism and the theory of new revelations are avoided.

Indeed, in the view of St. Thomas, there exists a true deductive human labour both in theology and in the Church's definition of the virtual inclusive. This deductive human labour is not confined to mere nominal formalities of one and the same idea but extends itself to different ideas or aspects of the same objectivity. However, in St. Thomas, the *nature and value* of this true human labour in theology and in the Church's definition are *essentially different,* albeit materially identical. Hence the outcome of that human labour in theology (theological conclusion) differs essentially from the outcome of the human labour of the Church (definition of faith). In the former case the outcome is scientific-human; in the latter the outcome is authoritative-divine. The former is formally theological; the latter, formally dogmatic. Let us see why.

131. POINTS OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO LABOURS. – The starting point is the same for both the theologian in deducing and the Pontiff or Council in defining; to wit; the bare revealed datum in the case of the first conclusions or definitions; the revealed datum plus the previous definitions by the Church in the case of subsequent definitions. To proceed from this starting point to the theological conclusion or the definition, both the theologian and the Church need a human *deductive medium:* in the theologian's case, the minor premise of the argumentation; in the case of the Church, the reasons or considerations that precede the Council's or the Pontiff's defi-

nition. In the theologian, the human intellectual labour is represented by the theological minor. The intellectual labour of the Church is represented by what for the sake of brevity we might call the *ecclesiastical minor,* made up of the complex of *reasons* (biblical, patristic, theological . . . commonly designated as the proper *loci theologici*) that have preceded the definition for centuries, and which in the papal bulls or dogmatic constitutions are placed as the preambles or justification of the *We declare and define.*

The theologian would never reach his conclusion without the labour of the theological minor. The Church rarely proceeds to the definition without the labour of the ecclesiastical minor.[9]

Neither the theologian nor the Church seeks to add something *objective* to the major or revealed datum by means of either the theological minor or the ecclesiastical minor, but simply to develop or deduce what is *included* in the revealed datum.

Where the reasoning employed is one of identity or of inclusive analysis, the minor is employed and operates not as an objective co-cause that adds some objectivity to the major, but as an intellectual instrument to uncover the objectivity that already existed in the revealed major, but which cannot be detected by the human mind except through a true deductive reasoning. (96) On all of these points there is agreement between the labour of the theologian and that of the Church.

132. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO. – The *essential* difference between the two lies in the fact that the specific nature of the knowledge, certainty, and assent given to the *conclusion* depends *essentially* on the

[9]When we speak of the "ecclesiastical minor" or *deductive* labour that precedes the definition, we have by no means overlooked the obvious fact that, in defining a truth as of faith, the Church employs the direct procedure of tradition or authority rather than deductive reasoning. She finds out what the Church Fathers, Councils, popes, and other authentic organs of tradition have previously taught on the inclusion of such a truth in the revealed deposit. However, since the Church often defines truths that are not contained in the primitive datum except in an implicit-virtual manner, there must have necessarily existed some *deductive work.* It matters little whether this deductive work is done by the Church for the first time upon defining a truth – this happens very rarely, not to say never – or has already been done previously by those same Church Fathers, Councils, and popes, on whose authority the Church rests when she defines. In defining a truth the Church usually rests on tradition, but not merely on the primitive undeveloped tradition, but almost always on tradition already developed by the work of previous centuries. It is this developing or deductive work, whether done at the time of defining or already done previously, that we designate with the term *ecclesiastical minor.*

We will deal with the case, in which a truth is defined without the human work of reasoning but only through the "sense of faith" or common consent of the faithful, later on when we touch on dogmatic evolution through the affective or experimental way.

theological minor employed by the theologian in his argumentation. On the contrary, the nature of the knowledge, certainty, or assent to the *definition* does not depend *in the least* on the *ecclesiastical minor.*

In the theological reasoning the conclusion will be for the human mind certain, more or less probable, doubtful, entirely false insofar as the minor employed is absolutely certain, more or less probable, doubtful, false. "The *whole force* of the argument lies in the *middle* term."[10] Let us for a moment suppose that we have assented to the conclusion of a theological reasoning in the belief that it was fully demonstrative; then we find that the minor, which we had thought to be absolutely certain, is not so indeed, but only probable. The conclusion *ipso facto* loses its certainty for us, and becomes only probable. Let us suppose that we find such strong arguments aginst the minor that make it doubtful: *ipso facto* the conclusion becomes doubtful. Let us suppose the minor to be not only probable or doubtful, but that proof is found that shows it to be absolutely false: *ipso facto* the conclusion is entirely wanting in certainty.

Therefore: for the human mind, in theological reasoning, in the theological conclusion, in theology, howsoever inclusive the procedure, the *species* of the knowledge or certainty, of the *medium of knowing,* of that which is *formal* in any *habit,* depends *essentially* on the *minor* of the reasoning, on the *human labour.*

Hence, it is not formally divine, it is not formally faith. The human element may enter into the divine as a divinely rectified instrument, but never as the formal or as that on which the formal depends. Now, the faith, which is our present concern, *is divine;* its formal object must be specified by absolute, infallible truth, by the *First Truth* itself; thus no thing that does not fall under the absolute, infallible, First Truth; no thing liable to failure from any point of view, belongs, or can ever belong, formally to *divine faith. "No thing is placed* under any power, or habit, or even any *act* except through the formal reason of the object . . . Now, it has been pointed out that the *formal reason of the object* of faith is the *First Truth;* therefore, no thing can fall under faith except in so far as it stands *under the First Truth."*[11] "Faith relies on *divine Truth itself* as its *medium."*[12] The theological conclusion, known *exclusively* through reasoning, no matter how superior it is to the physical conclusion, the mathematical conclusion, the metaphysical conclusion, has one thing in common with all those conclusions; namely, the lack of the guarantee of infallibility, which is the exclusive character of the

[10]ST. THOMAS, *De Veritate,* q.14, a.2.

[11]ST. THOMAS, 2-2, q.1, a.3.

[12]*Ibid.,* a.10.

divine medium, or of the human medium but only in so far as it is a mere instrument infallibly guided and rectified by the divine medium.

The foregoing is not meant to deny that theology is capable of true demonstration; indeed theological demonstration is supreme in the order of scientific demonstration and certainty. Neither is it meant to deny that theology's concern is with the divine. What is here denied is that anything known *scientifically,* i.e. through *demonstration* is absolutely infallible. What is affirmed is that every proposition *known solely through reasoning can be* false, all the more so where it is about the divine, a field in which human reason easily falls into error. "For human reason is *greatly deficient in things divine* . . . Often a man is deceived in this: that he thinks a reasoning to be a true demonstration, which is not so indeed."[13] A PROPOSITION THAT IS FALLIBLE (from any point of view) IS NOT A PROPOSITION FORMALLY OF FAITH.

133. THE OPPOSITE, COMPLETELY THE OPPOSITE happens in the human reasoning or labour that precedes the Church's definition. Whereas in theology the nature of the knowledge, of the certainty, and of the assent given to the conclusion, depends essentially on the validity of the theological minor or the human labour; in the definition of faith made by the Pontiff or by the Council the nature of the knowledge, of the certainty, and of the assent to the definition is absolutely independent of the validity of the human labour or ecclesiastical minor which precedes it.

Let us for the moment suppose that the Council or the Pontiff defines as of faith a truth of inclusive and analytic character, that is, a truth contained in the revealed deposit in virtue of its real identity with the formal statements of the deposit. After the definition one, several, many or even all of the preambles or reasonings of the dogmatic definition are found to be not as certain as they were believed to be, but only probable, or doubtful, or false. Is the definition, or the defined truth, thereby false, doubtful, probable, or less certain? NO.

The definition is preceded by those preambles, those reasonings, that human labor, that ecclesiastical minor; but the definition is not based on them, *nor is it a conclusion derived from them.* The definition is formally based on the *divine assistance,* and this divine assistance is given to define, not to reason; it guarantees divinely and infallibly the truth of the definition, not the truth of the reasoning. However, it is true that because it is merely *assistance,* not revelation, it requires reasoning as a previous human *condition.* But with respect to this reasoning the assistance has no other purpose than that of preventing that the reasoning should ever lead to a false definition,

[13] ST. THOMAS, 2-2, qq.2-3. Also, *In Boetium, De Trinitate,* lect.1, q.1, a.1.

not for the purpose that the reasoning be true. On the other hand, relative to the definition, or the defined truth the divine assistance has for its purpose to guarantee divinely not only that what is defined as a truth of divine faith is *true,* but that it is also a *revealed truth,* that is, a truth implicitly contained or included in the revealed deposit or datum, in the starting point common to both the labour of theology and the labour of the Church.

Thus, in the Church's definition, the reasoning precedes but does not *formally* contribute to it. The definition is not made without the reasoning, but it is not made *in virtue of the reasoning.* The definition is preceded by a minor, but this precedence is merely *material,* having no *formal* part in the definition. The definition is subsequent to and follows the minor, but it has no formal nexus with the latter: *it is not a conclusion of the minor. Materially,* externally, the labour of the Church in the definition of the implicit virtual follows the same procedure (begin with a revealed datum or major, posit an inclusive minor, and draw a conclusion already *included* in the datum through a virtuality of real identity), and has the same visible appearance of the human theological labour. But *formally* there is in it neither reasoning nor any human labour. The nature and validity of the *knowledge, the certainty,* and *the assent* to the definition or defined truth is *formally* effected without any *human medium,* but solely by *divine authority:* a divine authority not to *reveal* anything new, not even to *reason* on the things already revealed, but infallibly to *hit the mark* and *discern* by divine assistance that which is revealed from that which is not revealed, that which is *included* in the deposit from that which is not included in it; in short, *to uncover* what was already *in* the deposit; however, since it is not formally stated *in itself* but *included in other* formal statements of the deposit, it is therefore said to be in the deposit not formally, but *mediately* or *virtually,* because it is solely by *means* of reasoning and *in virtue of* reasoning that its knowledge is attainable by the weak human mind; relative to which *mediate, virtual,* and *scientific* knowledge comprises not only that which is *not included* in the principles, but also that which is truly included in them provided that its inclusion is not accessible through simple understanding but requires *true deduction* and true *science,* both of which are poles apart from faith.

On the other hand, in the case of the definition by the Church, the same thing that was included and which the theologian knew only mediately and virtually through scientific reasoning, is now known *immediately, formally,* by *divine authority,* which is characteristic of faith.

134. THE "EXPLICATION OF THE FAITH" IN TRADITIONAL TEACHING. – The labour of the Church which we have described is the meaning of the well-known *explication of the faith* in traditional theology. All theologians admit that the Church possesses the divine *assistance* and mission not only to *preserve* religiously the revealed deposit, without new

revelations or any objective addition to it, but also to *expound* the same revealed deposit faithfully and with *dogmatic* authority. This doctrine has been defined by the Vatican Council: "For the Holy Spirit was promised to Peter's successors not in the sense that by His revelation they should disclose new doctrine, but in the sense that by His assistance they should inviolably safeguard and faithfully *expound* the revelation or deposit of the faith handed down by the Apostles."[14] Thus dogmatic definitions are not definitions of new things or doctrines, but authentically divine explications or expositions of that which is implicit in the revealed deposit. "And this was the reason why it was necessary to issue several creeds, which differ in nothing except in the fact that in one is *more fully explicated* what in another is contained implicitly."[15] "For the subsequent creed does not abolish the preceding one, but *expounds* it."[16] "The creed of the Fathers is a declaration of the Creed of the Apostles."[17] "The *explication of the faith* against oncoming errors."[18] "The *same* faith *more expounded.*"[19]

However this *explication of the faith* is not confined to a mere change of formulae or a mere nominal development as among things that differ only by a distinction of reasoning reason; it comprises also that which is *deduced* through a procedure of inclusion or real identity, that which differs by a virtual distinction, or by a distinction of *reasoned reason,* that is, the inclusive-intellectual virtuality of the revealed deposit. This is what traditional theology understands by *expounding* what is *implicit* in the deposit. *"The explication of the articles of faith,* happens in *two ways.* The first regards the *substance* of the articles themselves, in so far as the articles themselves are distinctly known. The second regards *those* things that are *implicitly contained in the articles themselves;* and this happens when a man knows *those things that follow from the principles."*[20]

The *articles* are *substantial* for the faith; hence the unfolding of *certain articles into other articles* was completed in Christ and the Apostles, "This explication, whereby one article is contained in another, or two in one common to both, was completed by Christ; hence it is not licit to either add to or subtract from His doctrine with respect to the *essentials* of the faith."[21]

[14]CONC. VATICANUM, Const. *De Ecclesia Christi,* c.4, (Denz-Schön. 3070)

[15]ST. THOMAS, 2-2, q.1, a.9.

[16]*Ibid.*, ad 4.

[17]*Ibid.*, ad 6.

[18]*Ibid.*, a.10, ad 1.

[19]*Ibid.*, ad 2.

[20]ST. THOMAS, *In 3 Sent.*, d.25, q.2, a.1, sol.3.

[21]ST. THOMAS, *Ibid.*, a.2, sol.1, ad 5.

On the other hand, the development or explication through the consequences is *somehow accidental. "But those things which follow from these credibles are accidental as it were."*[22] Now that which is accidental to the faith is not of faith until it is defined by the Church's magisterium whether ordinary or solemn. "But those things which relate *accidentally* to the faith are not necessary for salvation *except after they have been determined by the preaching and the teaching."*[23]

Treating of what things are definable as of faith, Cardinal Cajetan has this to say: "It makes no difference whether something has been *explicitly* revealed in the Holy Scripture and elsewhere [that is, in the Apostolic traditions and Creed] as e.g., the creation of the world, the incarnation of the Word of God and the like; or *implicitly,* as in the case of all those things the contrary of which cannot be maintained together with the truth of the Holy Scriptures and of other truths which we hold with firm faith: except for the fact that it is necessary to *show* with the aid of *ingenuity, labour, reason,* and *understanding,* that these things which are said to be *implicitly* contained are *necessarily connected* with those things in which they are said to be contained."[24] Or as Báñez puts it: "The Church has to this day never proposed to the faithful for them to believe, or defined anything not contained in the Sacred Writings or expressed in the apostolic traditions, or *virtually contained* in them in such a manner that they are *therefrom educed by evident consequence."*[25] The same teaching is held by *all* theologians prior to Molina, and by the majority of those who came after him. The reader will find them quoted in chapter 7 of this book (352-448). We shall adduce later on (239-250) eleven different proofs for this same truth.

Therefore, divine faith is not restricted to the articles of faith, nor even to the explicitly revealed. In St. Thomas's view, of itself it comprises all that is truly implicit, whether it be implicit as an antecedent, or as a concomitant, or as a consequence of the explicitly revealed, provided that it be explicated or defined by the Church. "For the faith, of its own self, sufficiently inclines to *all* the things that are *concomitant,* or *consequent,* or *precedent* to the faith."[26] "And *the same judgment applies to these* [the consequential] and to the *former* [the articles or the substantial] which are *determined* in regard to the faith, *for upon the one the other follows."*[27] There is no other difference except that that which is *substantial* or the *articles* were defined or explicated

[22]ST. THOMAS, *Ibid.*, d.24, q.1, a.1, sol.1.

[23]ST. THOMAS, *ibid.*, sol.2, ad 4.

[24]CAJETAN, op. *De Conceptione B. Virginis,* c.1.

[25]*In 2-2,* q.1, a.7.

[26]ST. THOMAS, *In 3 Sent.*, d.25, q.1, a.2, sol.2.

[27]ST. THOMAS, *In 1 Sent.*, d.33, q.1, a.5.

by the Apostles themselves, and the Church has always been teaching and preaching them through her ordinary magisterium; which is why they have been from the beginning not only *matter* of faith, but *formally* of faith; whereas what is *accidental* or *consequential,* although it is of itself *matter* of faith, does not become formally of faith until the Church *defines* or *determines* it by her ordinary or solemn magisterium. "Except after they have been *determined* by the preaching and the teaching."[28] These two views are also expressly stated by the Holy Doctor in the following text: "It is to be said that there are some things in the faith [the articles] which every man is obliged to know *explicitly;* thus should any man err in these things, he is reputed to be an *infidel,* and a heretic if he should in addition be pertinacious. But if there be *some things* [the secondary or accidental] which a man is not obliged to believe explicitly, he does not become a heretic if he should err in such matters; as e.g. if a simple man should believe that Jacob was the father of Abraham, which is against the truth of the Holy Scripture professed by the faith; *until such time* as he becomes aware *that the faith of the Church holds the contrary.*"[29]

And to preclude anyone – who pays more attention to the particular example here adduced by the Holy Doctor than to the general doctrine that he establishes – from thinking that this does not apply to the theological conclusions or the inclusive virtuality of the deposit, the Holy Doctor goes on to say: "And since there are *certain things* which are *implicitly contained in the faith of the Church* as *conclusions* in the principles, therefore it happens that in *such matters* different opinions are maintained *until such time* as the Church *determines* that one of them is contrary to the *faith of the Church, because there follows from it* something *directly contrary to the faith.*"[30]

Consequently, with respect to divine faith these two things are exactly equivalent for St. Thomas: (a) *formal* or immediate revelation, *proposed* by the Church; (b) *implicit-virtual* or implicit-mediate revelation, *explicated* by the Church.

But, then, it might be objected: Does this not make the Church a formal element of divine faith? Is this not to attribute to the Church the power to change the revealed mediate or virtual into revealed immediate or formal? We shall examine these questions in the following sections.

[28] ST. THOMAS, *In 3 Sent.*, d.24, q.1, a.1, sol.2, ad 4.

[29] ST. THOMAS, *In 4 Sent.*, d.13, q.2, a.1, ad 6.

[30] *Loc.cit.*

SECTION III

OUR DIVINE FAITH AND THE AUTHORITY OF THE CHURCH

135. THE CHURCH'S ORDINARY, AND SOLEMN MAGISTERIUM. – Having examined, in the light of St. Thomas's teachings, the true relations existing between theology and faith, there remains the consideration of the true relations of both to the authority of the Church, i.e. the organic place occupied by the Church's authority in *our* divine faith, and thus in our theology. We shall begin with some simple preliminary observations, which are indispensable for the correct statement of, and the right solution to, this fundamental question.

The Church's doctrinal authority or magisterium has for its proper and specific purpose the *conservation* and *exposition* of the revealed deposit. To *determine* or to fix infallibly the true meaning of the divine deposit is called a *definition* of faith by the Church.[31]

However, this magisterium or these definitions of faith can be exercised by the Church, as indeed they are, in two ways: the first is through

[31] "For the Holy Spirit was not promised to Peter's successors in the sense that by His *revelation* they should disclose *new* doctrine, but in the sense that by His *assistance* they should inviolably *safeguard* and faithfully *expound* the revelation or deposit of faith handed down by the Apostles." (CONC. VATICANUM, *De Ecclesia Christi,* c.4) "Futher, all those things are to be believed with a divine and Catholic faith, that are contained in the word of God, written or handed down, and are proposed by the Church, *whether through a solemn judgment or through the ordinary and universal magisterium,* to be believed as divinely revealed." (CONC. VATICANUM, *De Fide Catholica,* c.3) Instead of the phrase *definition* or *to define of faith,* St. Thomas almost always employs the terms *to determine* or *determination of faith.* "Hence to put forth a Symbol belongs to the authority of him to whose authority it belongs *conclusively to determine the things that are of faith,* so that they are to be held by all with firm faith." (ST. THOMAS, 2-2, q.1, a.10) "Thus, some teachers seem to have disagreed . . . even in certain things belonging to the faith, which were not yet *determined* by the Church. But after they have been *determined* by the authority of the universal Church, if any man should resist such an ordinance he would be judged a heretic." (*Loc. cit.*, q.11, a.1) "But those things that accidentally belong to the faith are not necessary for salvation except after they have been *determined* by the preaching and teaching." (*In 3 Sent.*, d.24, a.1, a.1) "Until he should be instructed by him to whom it belongs *to determine* the things that are doubtful in the faith." (*De Veritate,* q.14, a.11, ad 2) We have already mentioned that, with respect to their essential concepts, the *articles of faith* (134) were defined by Jesus Christ and the Apostles themselves, i.e. they are taught in the apostolic preaching in a *definite* manner ("in *determinate* articles" [ST. THOMAS, *In 3 Sent.*, d.25, q.2, sol.2, ad5]) But many other truths of faith and morals were not *explicated* or *defined* by the Apostles, but are found in the apostolic preaching in an implicit or virtual-inclusive manner. These *indeterminate* truths are those which theology *determines* (. *defines* (conclusions) with a scientific or human value, and the Church *determines* or *defines* with a divine or *dogmatic* value.

the *solemn* magisterium, whether by the Ecumenical Council, or by the Pope alone when he speaks *ex cathedra;* the second is through the ordinary magisterium, viz. through the *ordinary* teaching or preaching of the *universal* Church.

These two ways of exercising the magisterium on the content and the meaning of the revealed deposit are of equal dogmatic value, and both are true definitions of faith. Between them there exists only an accidental difference, to wit, that the magisterium exercised by the Ecumenical Council or by the Pope speaking *ex cathedra* is done with a greater solemnity and show of formulae and is easily discernible by all; on the other hand, the ordinary magisterium is exercised through the universal teaching of the Church without any special display or set formulae, and at times it is not so easy to determine its scope and signification.

These two different ways of exercising the doctrinal magisterium or of defining the revealed truth should always be kept in mind, for when one speaks of definitions of faith, it often happens that the mind tends to focus solely on the definitions by the solemn magisterium, without paying sufficient attention to the fact that there are also definitions by the ordinary magisterium.

Hence, a truth contained *in the revealed deposit,* whose meaning has not yet been infallibly fixed by either the solemn or the ordinary magisterium of the Church, is a *revealed* truth, but not a *defined* truth. A truth contained *in the revealed deposit,* whose meaning has been infallibly fixed or determined either by the ordinary or by the solem magisterium of the Church is not only a revealed, but also a *defined* truth.

Consequently, to ask whether divine faith can be given to a truth of the revealed deposit prior to its definition by the Church is to ask whether divine faith can be given to it prior to, or without, having its meaning infallibly determined or taught either by the *solemn* or by the *ordinary* magisterium of the Church.

136. WHAT CHURCH IS MEANT. — The tendency of our minds to focus solely or preferently on the *solemn* definitions, when dealing with the subject of definitions of faith, also has as a consequence the fact that at times we do not give the term *the Church* all the extension that it has. Unconsciously we consider the Church, not from her very foundation, that is, from the time of the Apostles, but the Church of the later centuries, when the Ecumenical Councils and the solemn definitions took place. But, as we have said, the definitions of faith or the Church's doctrinal authority over the revealed deposit are exercised through the *ordinary* magisterium equally or even more than through the solemn; and the ordinary magisterium did not begin with the time of the first ecumenical councils, but with the very first moment of her inception, i.e. of the primitive Church, with the very first moment of the *apostolic teaching* or *preaching*.

Consequently, a truth of the revealed deposit, whose meaning has been infallibly fixed or *determined* either by apostolic preaching or by the primitive Church or by the Church of later centuries is not only a revealed, but also a defined truth. A truth of the deposit, whose meaning has not been infallibly determined either by the apostolic preaching or by the Church of later centuries is a revealed, but not a defined, truth. Therefore, to ask whether divine faith can be given to a truth contained in the deposit without the Church's definition, is to ask whether divine faith can be given to a truth whose meaning has not been infallibly fixed or *determined* either in the apostolic teaching or in the teaching (whether through ordinary or solemn magisterium) of the Church of later times.

137. IMMEDIATE AND MEDIATE REVELATION *ON THE PART OF THE PERSON.* In previous sections we have been speaking frequently of immediate and mediate revelation; however the distinction was made *from the viewpoint of the object.* In this section we must speak once more of immediate and mediate revelation, but this time from a different viewpoint, i.e. *from the viewpoint of the person.* It is necessary to grasp well this twofold division of revelation into immediate and mediate, made from two different viewpoints, if one wishes to avoid getting mixed up in the reading of the treatises written by theologians *On Faith and the Church.*

Two things are found in faith: the object revealed, and the *person* to whom it is revealed.

The object can be revealed either *in itself,* or *in another* truth in which it is latently infolded. In the first case the revelation is *immediate* or *formal;* in the second, *mediate* or *virtual.* If God revealed the proposition *the human soul is spiritual,* its *spirituality* is revealed *in itself* or *immediately;* but its *immortality* would be revealed *not in itself,* but *mediately* in its spirituality in which it is *included* intrinsically and essentially. This is the distinction of revelation into immediate and mediate *from the viewpoint of the object.*

But in revelation there is not only the object revealed, but also the *person* to whom the revelation is made. This person can receive the divine revelation in two ways: first, directly from God without any interposition of other *men;* secondly, not directly from God, but through other *men* to whom the revelation was made by God, or perhaps through other men who by successive generations have been receiving it from those to whom the revelation was first and directly made by God. In the first case the revelation is *immediate* because there is no man in between God who reveals and the man to whom He reveals. The contrary happens in the second case, and thus the revelation is *mediate.* The angels, our first father, the patriachs and prophets,

the apostles and evangelists, those who had the ineffable privilege of listening to the Incarnate Word on earth, and even any soul to whom God has deigned to disclose His secrets *by Himself* without the intervention of any *man,* had *immediate* revelation. All others – we – who have not had direct revelation from God, have *mediate* revelation.

Obviously this distinction of revelation into immediate and mediate is made from the viewpoint of the *person,* not from the viewpoint of the *object.* What matters in this case is not whether the object has been revealed *in itself* or *in another;* what matters is whether the *person* has received the revelation *immediately* from God, or *through other men.* Every time we employ in this section the terms *immediate* and *mediate,* without a contrary qualification, we will be employing them to mean immediate or mediate revelation from the viewpoint of the *person.*

138. A VERY IMPORTANT COROLLARY. – *Our* faith, i.e. the divine faith that all Christians give, and ought to give, to the truths of the revealed deposit is a faith of *mediate* revelation (with the sole exception of the case of a private or special revelation). This *mediate* character must never be overlooked because it is the key or the formal reason for the necessity or existence of the Church's magisterium, and for the nature and scope of its relations with our faith.

"To some people the credibles are revealed *immediately* by God, as they were revealed to the Apostles and Prophets; but to others they are proposed by God sending the preachers of the faith."[32] "Since the things that proceed from God are done in a certain order, it behooved that a certain order be observed in the manifestation of the things that belong to the faith, viz. that some men should receive them *immediately* from God, and others from these, and thus in successive order up to the last."[33] "There is a twofold faith, i.e. in accordance with a twofold hearing and a twofold speaking: for faith comes from hearing as is had in Rom. 10, 17. There is an external speaking whereby God speaks to us through preachers, and another internal whereby He speaks to us through internal inspiration. From both hearings faith arises in the hearts of the faithful. From the internal hearing [faith arises] in those who *first* receive the faith, as in the case of the Apostles and Prophets. But from the second [sic] hearing the faith arises in the hearts of *the other faithful* who received the knowledge of the faith *through other men.*"[34] "*We* possess the knowledge of faith, not through a revelation made

[32] ST. THOMAS, 2-2, q.6, a.1.

[33] ST. THOMAS, *Contra Gentes,* lib.3, ch.154.

[34] *De Veritate,* q.10, a.3.

to us, but because we adhere to the revelations made *to others.*"[35] "For *our* faith is built upon the revelation made to the Apostles and Prophets, who wrote the canonical books."[36]

The fact that certain theologians have not paid sufficient attention to this *mediate* character of the revelation on which *our* faith is grounded – this character is precisely the root of the necessity of the Church's magisterium, and thus also of its nature and scope – is the reason why they have not understood St. Thomas's great theory on the relationship of the Church with our faith, and have instead resorted to the question whether *private* revelations are of divine faith or not, as the criterion to determine such relationship. The question of private revelations, by the very fact that they are *immediate,* is altogether irrelevant to the problem of the relationship of the Church to the faith given *by us* to the revealed deposit, which is a faith given to *mediate* revelation. The nature of the faith that must be given by us to the *revealed deposit* – since it is this *deposit* that is the *formal reason* of the Church's doctrinal authority – is the star by which any true theologian should set his course in the study of the relations of the Church to *our* faith; not the nature of the faith to be given by us to private revelations, which of themselves are alien to the Church's authority.

Hence it is truly amazing to see a theologian of Suárez's caliber stating and orienting the question in the following terms: "*Whether* private divine revelation belongs to the formal object of faith and *consequently* (! !) whether *the authority of the Church* belongs to this formal object, and how is faith resolved into it."[37] That *consequently* explains everything. With it Suárez debars himself from understanding St. Thomas's theory on the relations of the Church's authority to our faith, which pertains to *mediate* revelation. Suárez, as well as Lugo and Ripalda, seems not to have paid sufficient attention to the radical distinction between faith and *our* faith, and to the *mediate* character of the latter, which is the key to the Angelic Doctor's treatise On Faith, as we shall endeavor to make clear in this section.

139. THE REVEALED OBJECT, ITS PROPOSITION AND EXPLICATION. – In *faith* two essentially different elements must be distinguished: first, the revealed *object;* second, the *proposition* and *explication* of that same object.

In the case of *immediate* revelation, both elements are *divine.* It is God who reveals the object; it is likewise God who proposes and explains it.

[35] *Loc.cit.*

[36] ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theologica,* p.1, q.1, a.8.

[37] SUÁREZ, *De Fide,* d.3, title of section 10.

In the case of *mediate* revelation, the second element, i.e. the *proposition* and *explication* of the revealed truth, is made by *men,* who, howsoever holy and learned we suppose them to be, are *of themselves* always fallible, unless they should possess the *divine assistance* for the purpose of proposing and explicating all that *God has revealed,* and only that which God has revealed, without the addition or commingling of anything *human.*[38]

That which is essential or formal in the assent of divine faith is the revealed object; the proposition and explication are *conditions* without *which* faith would not exist.

140. FIRST COROLLARY. – Although in faith – be it grounded on immediate or on mediate revelation – there are two elements, viz. the revealed object, and its proposition or explication, the former, i.e. the revealed *object* is that which is really believed and to which assent is given; however this assent could not be given without a previous proposition or explication. Thus, the revealed object is that which is *essential* or *formal* in the assent of divine faith. The proposition or the explication are *conditions without which* there would be no faith.

141. SECOND COROLLARY. – Faith grounded on immediate revelation, and faith grounded on mediate revelation, are both truly *divine.* Therefore, if the latter should demand some requirement which is not demanded by the former, such requirement would pertain to the latter not because it is *revelation* but because it is *mediate* revelation, not because it is *divine faith* but because it is *our* divine faith.

142. THIRD COROLLARY. – Our divine faith is based on mediate revelation, and mediate revelation necessarily requires *human* proposition and explication. Consequently it cannot be argued: if the faith is *divine*

[38] "Two things come together in the faith. First, the habit of the intellect whereby it is disposed to obey the will that tends to the divine truth . . . Secondly it is required for the faith that the credibles *be proposed* to the believer, and this is done by man." (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theologica,* p.1, q.111, a.1, ad 1) "Two things are required for faith. One of which is that the credibles *be proposed* to man . . . The other thing required for the faith is the assent of the believer to the things that *are proposed.*" (2-2, q.6, a.1) Now, any *proposition* made by men is *fallible* unless it is done with divine assistance. "Just as created being is of itself empty and defectible unless it be contained by uncreated being, so all truth is *defectible unless it be rectified by divine Truth.*" (ST. THOMAS, *De Veritate,* q.14, a.8) It goes without saying that every time we speak of a *proposition* of faith made by the *Church,* we mean that which is made by *authentic infallible organs of the Church's faith,* such as the definitions made by the pope or by the ecumenical councils (solemn magisterium), or by the *universal* teaching of the pastors (ordinary magisterium). Consequently, the proposition made by particular organs, e.g. a missionary, a particular bishop, etc., has no other value than that conferred on it by its conformity with the proposition made by the authentic organs, which are the rule of our faith.

there can be nothing *human* in it. Nor can it be argued: if there is anything *human* there can be no *divine* faith (but only a faith that is human or ecclesiastical . . .) But it can – and ought to be – said: there can be no divine faith if the human explication that enters into it is of such nature that it is capable of altering or modifying the divine *object,* the revealed *meaning.* This is so on account of the fact that the object is that which is essential to the faith, and the object of faith is exclusively divine. *nothing other than the First Truth* (nihil aliud quam Veritas Prima).

143. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM. - Having done with these preliminary observations – which perhaps were unnecessary for many of our readers–, we will now deal with an important and delicate question: we will study the *organic place occupied by the Church's infallible authority* in OUR FAITH. Once and for all let it be understood that by the term *our faith* we mean the divine faith given by those, who neither have had nor have immediate revelation from God, to the truths by Him revealed to the Apostles and by these committed to the Church in the sacred deposit of the divine Scriptures and Tradition.

The questions which arise for the theologian are the following: Is the Church's authority an indispensable element for *every act* of our *divine* faith in the revealed deposit? Can there be any act of divine faith in any truth of the deposit *before* it is defined by the Church? Is the act of our faith described thus: *I believe because God has revealed it;* or is it necessarily described in these terms: *I believe because God has revealed it and because Holy Mother Church thus teaches it?* In short, excepting the case of a special divine revelation or intervention, is the Church the *only* medium that joins our divine faith with the revealed deposit, or are there *other mediums* through which the human mind can get in touch with the revealed deposit with a contact of *divine* faith?

144. THE THEORY OF VÁZQUEZ AND SUÁREZ. – Vázquez, an illustrious theologian in so many respects, was the first who clearly and openly answered in the negative to all these questions or aspects of one and the same problem. Vázquez held that the Church's authority is not an indispensable requirement for every act of our divine faith, except for the ignorant, for those who do not know theology or do not possess enough scientific acumen to see or deduce evidently the profound implications latent in the revealed deposit. But the Church's authority is not indispensable for the learned, for the theologian, for any man who because of his theological, exegetical, historical, critical knowledge of the Bible and Tradition, is capable of deducing evidently by himself the meaning of the revealed deposit.

The *theological demonstration* or the *individual reason* is, in such cases, to the theologian, what the authority of the Church is to the common faithful. Nor, says Vázquez, is there anything to the objection that that which is

known through *science* or through *reasoning* can deserve no other but a scientific or theological assent. For the theologian, who through evident reasoning deduces something from *that which is revealed,* has at his disposal *two assents:* one, a *theological* assent based on *reasoning;* the other, an assent of *divine faith* based on the *divine revelation* which is the starting point from which he has deduced his conclusion. These two acts are possible; both are available to the theologian; and neither requires the authority of the Church. Such is, displayed as it were in the nude, Vázquez's famous theory, the theory into which anyone who makes *theological conclusions formally of faith* without the Church's definition, must inevitably land. (85)

In his eagerness to explain or to attenuate a theory of Molina, Suárez landed into this theory of Vázquez by admitting that the *inclusive virtuality* of that which is revealed (which he denominates *formal-confused*) is formally of faith, and accepting as possible for the theologian the two famous assents, one of them being an assent of divine faith, without any intervention of the Church's authority. Lugo and Ripalda followed Suárez on this subject; and since the majority of the textbooks of theology today is more or less influenced by these great theologians, it is not infrequent to find in them, as current theological tender, the following assertions: the Church's authority or definition is not indispensable for the act of *our* faith, since our faith is the same as that of the angels, patriarchs, and prophets, and these had no need of the proposition or explication of the Church in order to make an act of faith. Thus, the act of our faith does not necessarily require the I believe . . . *because the Church so teaches it.* Nonetheless, the Church's authority is ordinarily or *for greater convenience* (ad melius esse) needed especially for the simple faithful who do not know how to rise to the *pure* motive of divine authority without the Church. But the theologian, who by his individual reason (theological demonstration) uncovers with evidence a truth, or virtuality, or meaning latent in the deposit, ought or may give it an assent of *divine* faith (in addition to, and distinct from, the theological assent) independently of any definition by the Church. Such is the purpose of the theory of the two assents.

145. – TEXTS FROM VÁZQUEZ, SUÁREZ, RIPALDA, AND FRANZELIN. – "The *theological demonstration* stands in respect of the demonstrating theologian as the *Council,* when it declares something as of faith, stands in respect of the *whole* Church. The only difference lies in this: the Council proposes what it defines *to all* to be believed by them, so that *everybody* is obliged to believe; whereas the theological reason proposes it only *to those to whom* the consequence from the articles of faith is evident."[39]

[39] VÁZQUEZ, *In Summam D. Thomae,* p.1, a.2, d.5, c.3, n.8.

"Nonetheless, however, the Church as ruled by the Holy Spirit is proposed to us as the proximate and sufficient rule of belief, because *all the faithful* cannot by themselves weigh the doctrine of faith, or bring about *in every instance* the resolution of their faith into the divine authority expressly perpended, which is much too excellent and spiritual. On the other hand, the Church is a rule *available to the senses,* which they can *more easily* hear."[40] "Lastly, it should be noted that we can in two ways avail ourselves of discourse in order to assent to the inferred proposition: first, as the formal reason of assenting and as the proper and per se cause of the assent itself to the inferred conclusion; secondly, as *proposing* and *explicating* [behold here, to use Vázquez's words, theological reasoning taking the place of the Council] what is contained, and in what manner, in the divine revelation, so that afterwards we cling solely to the latter as the formal reason and per se cause. These two ways *are possible* as is per se clear, and they depend *on the will* of man. And hence *Vázquez correctly* distinguished them, and others have not contradicted."[41]

"Although the Church's proposition *is not necessary,* nonetheless it is sufficient and much *more apt* for the assent of faith relative to the faithful who know the Church's infallible authority."[42] "Some of the truths defined by the Church are contained *by evident consequence* in the things held by faith . . . These truths, then, . . . even before they are defined by the Church, *can be believed with divine faith* by many of the faithful, i.e. *by the more learned theologians independently of the Church's authority,* because they clearly see *through theological reasonings* that they are contained in other things held by faith."[43]

But Ripalda, at least, was frank and logical as usual in drawing out the consequences of such a doctrine. "You will object in the first place: if the proposition by the Church is not per se required in order to believe, it will be possible for a heretic, who denies one article, to hold the others by faith because, apart from the Church's authority, he can still have other motives which render them sufficiently believable. In the second place, a man who is ignorant of the Church's authority, or that something is proposed by the Church, can lose the faith without heresy, by dissenting from some article that is not sufficiently proposed to him out of the others. *I admit both consequences.*"[44]

[40] SUÁREZ, *De Fide,* d.3, s.10, n.10.

[41] SUÁREZ, *loc.cit.,* d.3, s.11, n.5.

[42] RIPALDA, *De Fide,* d.6, s.4, n.3.

[43] RIPALDA, *loc.cit.,* n.32.

[44] *Loc.cit.,* n.35.

"It sometimes can happen that although a truth, of whose *theological* demonstration there is some question, has *not yet been sufficiently proposed in Catholic faith,* nonetheless to those who are capable of perceiving the *force of the arguments,* it is clearly certain from a diligent examination whether of the Scriptures or of Tradition, that it is contained in the revealed word of God. This being the case, the *arguments* that *demonstrate* that the said truth is contained in revelation is *for them* a *sufficient application and proposition of revelation* for the eliciting of an assent of *divine* faith."[45] "That which is enunciated in the conclusion is already contained as implicitly affirmed in the premises, whether conjointly in both, or in only one of them so that the other is assumed merely in order to make clear that the conclusion is included in the first one. Hence, when it is certain that both premises are revealed truths, or that one revealed premise already contains implicitly that which is enunciated in the conclusion, and this comprehension of the conclusion in the revealed premise is clearly manifested by the other premise even if it be not a revealed one, there is no doubt that the truth enunciated in such a conclusion is a revealed truth . . . This being so, the truth of the *consequent* from the revealed *premises* can be considered *in two ways:* either as formally revealed by God, and to such proposition there corresponds the *assent of faith* on the authority of God who reveals; or it can formally be considered as a truth understood on account of the truth of the premises and of the legitimate consequence and deduction, and then to such a proposition there corresponds the *theological* assent."[46]

It is pointless to quote more authors since this doctrine is currently accepted in contemporary theological manuals, and its influence can be felt even in many Thomist manuals.

In the theory of Vázquez-Suárez, currently admitted today, it is obvious that the *explication* of the revealed deposit made by fallible human *reason* is of divine faith and deserves from the learned an assent of divine faith. Thus, with respect to the *proposition* and *explication* of the revealed deposit, *reason* is to the *learned* as the *Church* is to the *ignorant* or to the *common* faithful. The authority of the Church with regard to the *conservation* and *exposition* of the deposit, of which the Vatican Council speaks, is necessary for *us;* but in this theory the term *us* does not mean *all of us* who receive revelation *mediately* (a *mediation* that can be bridged only by the Church's infallible definition or by a new revelation or extraordinary intervention of God); *us* signifies only those who are not sufficiently capable as theologians or exegetes to bridge by means of *their own reason* that mediation or distance, *to propose and explicate to themselves* the meaning of the revealed deposit.

[45] FRANZELIN, *De Deo Uno,* Prolegomenon.

[46] FRANZELIN, *loc.cit.*

146. THE TRUE THOMIST THEORY. – All the foregoing which since Suárez is common enough in modern theological manuals is, in our view, a deviation from the true theory of St. Thomas, and falls short of understanding the sublime and necessary place occupied by the Church's authority in our faith.

St. Thomas and all his faithful commentators hold that the Church's authority or definition is indispensable for *every* act of *our* divine faith in any truth of the revealed deposit. The act of *our* divine faith is not solely "I believe because God has revealed it", but necessarily is "I believe *because* God has revealed it and *because* Holy Mother Church thus teaches it". The first *because* is essential to our divine faith, not on account of its being ours, but on account of its being *divine.* The second *because* is *necessary* (and it can be replaced only by a special divine revelation or intervention), not on account of its being a divine faith, but on account of its being *ours.*

In short: *science* (theology, philosophy, exegesis, criticism, history . . .) possesses *many* mediums wherewith to obtain a *scientific, human, acquired* knowledge of the truth of the deposit, and to elicit in regard of it acts of *science* or of *human* faith independently of any intervention by the Church. However, *our divine* faith possesses one, and only one, medium, viz. the authority of the Church. In other words, mankind has no other available medium, except the authority of the Church, wherewith to get in touch with the revealed truth by an assent of *divine faith.*

To many these assertions will perhaps seem new, and even bold. Let us, then, first of all, expound the literal doctrine of the Holy Doctor by repairing to the consummate and immortal treatise *On Faith* in the *Summa Theologica.*

147. THE FORMAL OBJECT OF FAITH. – The Angelic Doctor begins his first question and his first article with the formal *object* of faith. St. Thomas never beats around the bush; from the very first article he situates himself in the central, fundamental, formal, *essential* point of the question: in the *object.* And since the essence of any thing is immutable and must be found whole and invariable wherever the thing is to be found, the object of divine faith is, in the first article, defined *in itself, formally,* without any relation to angels or men. It is defined with the laconic and lapidary phrase NIHIL ALIUD QUAM VERITAS PRIMA (none other than the First Truth).

According to St. Thomas, in the formal object, in that which is essential to the faith, there can be nothing *created,* nor the least mixture of any *creature;* neither angels, nor men, nor patriarchs, nor prophets, nor Church. All these things lie outside the *formal object* of faith, outside the object of divine faith *in itself,* outside the object of divine faith *qua divine. God,* and God alone, is its *author,* its *object,* its *end,* and its *rule.* Conceived thus from this formal viewpoint, divine faith in no way includes the "I believe . . . be-

cause the Church, or the Bible, or Tradition so teaches it". It includes solely and exclusively the "I believe *because God has revealed it.*" *Nihil aliud quam Veritas Prima.*[47]

148. THE FORMAL OBJECTS *IN THEMSELVES*, AND THE FORMAL OBJECTS *IN US* OR *OURS*. – However, the *formal objects* themselves, although admitting no *variations* nor changes in themselves, may admit *conditions*, which are not essential to the *object in itself*, but indeed absolutely necessary for the object *in us*.

Thus, e.g., the formal object of the intellect *in itself*, that is, of the intellect *qua* intellect, is *being*. The formal object of *our* intellect is likewise *being*, but with a condition or addition which are essential *for us*, to wit it is being *abstracted from sensible things*. Without such abstraction our intellect could never get in touch with its formal object, with *being*.

The formal object of *science in itself*, or *qua* science, is the certain knowledge of a truth *through the medium* of another truth, or the certain knowledge of a truth *in another* truth. The formal object of *our* science is the self-same thing but with a condition that is essential for us: it is to know one truth by another, but *through reasoning* or *succession*. Without the latter *our* science is not possible.

The *specific* or *formal* principles of theology in itself are the supernatural divine truths. The principles of our theology are those same truths, but as *believed* with divine faith, i.e., as obscurely seen. Without this condition of being *believed* or obscurely seen, *our* theology could never attain to its object, viz. the divine-supernatural truths.[48]

[47] "Thus, in the case of faith, if we should consider the *formal reason of the object, it is nothing else but the First Truth*. For the faith, of which we are speaking, does not assent to anything *unless on account of the fact that it is revealed by God*. Hence faith rests upon the *divine Truth itself* as its *medium*." (ST. THOMAS, 2-2, q.1, a.1) "Hence to assent to the testimony of either a man or an angel would not lead infallibly to the truth, except insofar as *the testimony of God speaking* is considered in them." (*De Veritate*, q.14, a.8) "When a man, led either by natural reason or by the testimony of the Law and the Prophets or by the preaching of the Apostles or others, believes, then he can say that he believes because of none of these things, not because of natural reason nor because of the testimony of the Law nor because of the preaching of the Apostles, but *because of the First Truth itself alone*." (*In Joannem*, c.4) "The First Truth is that which is formal in the object of faith, and that from which flows *the whole reason* of the object." (*In 3 Sent.*, d.24, q.1, a.1, sol.1)

[48] As every Thomist theologian knows, these distinctions between knowledge *in itself* and *our* knowledge, between theology *in itself* and *our* theology, between divine faith *in itself* and *our* divine faith, are at once fundamental and elementary for any one who wishes to penetrate the teaching of St. Thomas and not to fall into error in these questions. This is the reason why the great commentator of the *Summa Theologica* recalls them to mind from the first question, from the second article, in which St. Thomas begins to treat of the *object* of theology, and thus of its essence and its essential distinction from faith. "But you, *tyro*, when you argue, take care *not to be mistaken* by taking as identical theology *in itself* and *our* theology: for there is a great difference between these two." (CAJETAN, *In 1 Partem*, q.1, a.2)

Now then: we have seen that the formal object of divine faith *in itself* is *none other than the First Truth*. But what is the formal object of *our* divine faith, of the divine faith by us given, not on account of a revelation which we have ourselves received immediately from God, but on account of a revelation mediately received from the Apostles? Does the formal object of the faith receive an indispensable condition or addition when it is considered not in itself, but *in us;* when it is the formal object, not of divine faith in itself, but of *our* divine faith?

149. THE FORMAL OBJECT OF *OUR* FAITH. – Let us turn to Question 5, where St. Thomas treats of faith with respect to the various subjects in which it can be found: *De habentibus fidem*, on the various subjects who have the faith.

Let us skip over the first and second articles, where St. Thomas treats of faith with respect to the *angels* and the *devils*, and stop at article 3, where he treats of faith with respect *to us*, of *our* faith. The Holy Doctor poses the question whether in the heretic who denies one single article of faith, divine faith can still remain with respect to the other articles. To answer this question the Holy Doctor needs to determine *all* the elements that *necessarily* enter into the formal object of *our* faith. If, notwithstanding the denial of one article of faith, *all* the elements indispensable to our faith remain intact, then the faith remains. On the contrary, if the man who denies one single article of faith thereby destroys some element that is *indispensable* to our faith, then the faith is likewise destroyed. Which, then, are the *indispensable* elements of the formal object of our divine faith? The Holy Doctor writes:

"*The formal object of divine faith is the First Truth* IN SO FAR AS IT IS MANIFESTED *in the Holy Scriptures and* THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH, *which proceeds from the First Truth.*"[49] The formal object of faith with respect to us is no longer the *First Truth*, period; but the *First Truth* is so far as it is manifested in . . . the teaching of the Church." Not solely the First Truth; not even the First Truth contained in the Scriptures and Tradition; but the First Truth contained in the Scriptures and Tradition but *as understood and interpreted by the Church*.

What follows hence for St. Thomas? That since a habit is lost whenever anything is lost of the *formal object*, which is that which confers the *essence* or species, any man who attempts to adhere to the First Truth contained in the Scriptures and Tradition through a medium other than the *Church's authority*, no longer possesses *divine faith*, but some *other* faith

[49] 2-2, q.5, a.3.

of his own: a created, *human* faith; a scientific or acquired faith. "The species of any habit depends on the formal reason of the object; if this be removed, the species of the habit cannot remain. Hence no man has the habit of faith, who does not rely on the *teaching of the Church* which proceeds from the First Truth manifested in the Holy Scriptures, as on an infallible and divine rule; but he holds the things which are of faith *in a manner other* than faith."[50]

Does this mean that man possesses no *other* mediums, except the Church, to come to know the meaning of the revealed deposit and give it the assent of divine faith? The Holy Doctor says that man has many scientific, human mediums that lead to acts of human science or of acquired faith in the revealed deposit; however, man cannot arrive at the assent of *divine faith* except through one, and only one, medium: the authority of the Church. Without this medium the act of our divine faith is totally impossible. *"In the different conclusions of one science there are different mediums through which they are proven, any one of which can be known without the other . . . But faith holds all the articles of faith by means of one medium, to wit, on account of the First Truth proposed to us in the Scriptures according to the teaching of the Church's sound understanding; and thus any man who falls short of this medium, is totally wanting in faith."*[51]

150. CARDINAL CAJETAN. – St. Thomas's thinking will be obvious to anyone who reads the two aforecited questions carefully and without preconceived notions.[52] However, it will not be amiss to adduce the interpretations of his most authoritative commentators, beginning with the foremost among them. Anyone who wishes to obtain a true idea of the analysis and economy of divine faith, and of the primary role played by the Church's infallible authority, i.e., of the Holy Spirit who assists her, in *our* faith, will

[50] *Ibid.*

[51] *Ibid.*, ad 2.

[52] The distinguished PORRECTA, whose commentaries often are placed alongside those of Cajetan, says that the teaching of this article of St. Thomas is *worthy of being inscribed with letters of gold* for the instruction of Catholics and heretics. "Let these things be said for Catholics and against heretics as *memorable golden perpetual truths.*" (*In loc.cit.* of St. Thomas) Cardinal Toledo rates it as *most beautiful.* "St. Thomas's reason *is most beautiful.* The reason of faith is not the First Truth absolutely, but *restricted with this condition,* that it be manifested by the Church. Now, *if this necessary condition of the object be set aside,* the whole habit is removed." (TOLEDO, *Comment. in loc.cit.*) On the other hand, Suárez, preoccupied with the nature of private revelations, thinks that art. 3 of question 5 is inconsistent with art. 1 of question 1, and adduces the doctrine of each of these two articles as favouring two opposed theories on the formal object of faith, without adverting to the fact that one of the articles deals with the formal object of faith *in itself,* and the other deals with the formal object of *our* faith. (SUÁREZ, *loc.cit.*, nn.1-2)

do well to read Cajetan's whole commentary to the two quoted articles of St. Thomas. We will have to content ourselves here with some excerpts.

Commenting on the first article of the first question on faith, where St. Thomas defines the formal object of faith *in itself* with the phrase *None other than the First Truth,* Cajetan writes:

"In the 3rd place doubt occurs how is it that the First Truth *alone* is posited as the *formal* object of faith by saying that it is *none other than the First Truth.* And on this point doubt occurs both simply (simpliciter) and *ad hominem.* Simply, indeed, on account of the fact that the faith adheres to the sense and teaching of the Church as to its infallible rule; otherwise heretics who adhere *solely* to the First Truth, and do not abide by the sense of the Church, would be numbered among the faithful. And Augustine says: *I would not believe the Gospel, if the authority of the Church did not admonish me to do so.* Now, it is clear that the sense and authority of the Church are something *other* than the First Truth since they are something *created:* therefore the *object* of faith is not the First Truth *alone.*

"To the 3rd doubt I say that *to the extent* that it is possible for faith to depend on a *created* cause, *to that extent* it is possible for it to have a *created rule.* Now, then, since *two* things are jointly required for the faith, as will be shown below, viz. the assent to, and the proposition and explication of, the credenda: on the part of the *assent,* faith depends on God *alone,* as its cause, object, end, and rule. But on the part of the *proposition* of the credenda it can depend on the angels and men, *through whose mediation* God proposes this or that for belief. For with respect *to this, faith proceeds from the hearing of the word of God,* as is said in Rom. 10. And to preclude the possibility of error in the proposition and *explication* of the credenda, the Holy Spirit has provided for an *infallible created rule,* to wit, the *sense and teaching of the Church;* so that the Church's authority is the infallible *rule for proposing and explicating* the things that are to be held by faith. Since there are *two* infallible rules jointly required for the faith, viz. divine revelation and the Church's authority, there is such a great difference between them that divine revelation is the *formal reason of the object* of faith; on the other hand, the Church's authority *ministers to the object* of faith; for the act of faith is joined to the material object or things believed through this medium *that God has said it or revealed it.* And the habit itself of faith inclines the mind to assent to the things proposed *because God has so revealed.* But we believe that *this or that* has been revealed, or revealed *in this or that sense,* because the Church so teaches. And again, divine revelation is an infallible rule that *per se* befits faith; but the sense of the Church befits faith *accidentally* (per accidens), i.e. *with respect to us,* to whom these things are proposed. For the angels, to whom God *by Himself revealed and explained* the mystery of the Trinity, had no need of this rule. And likewise

the first Fathers, to whom these mysteries were revealed, had no need of this rule *for the same reason,* viz. that God *by Himself revealed them* and gave the *understanding of them* through an illumination of the mind, as will be clear later on in the treatise *On Prophecy."*

The foregoing is Cardinal Cajetan's commentary on art. 1 of question 1, where St. Thomas, speaking of the formal object of faith *in itself,* defines it as *none other than the First Truth.* Later, in his commentary on art. 3 of question 5, where St. Thomas, defining the formal object of *our* faith, seems to *correct* the *none other than the First Truth* when in truth he does nothing but introduce an *addition* or *condition* that belongs, not to the formal object of faith *in itself,* but to the formal object of *our* faith, Cajetan says the following:

"In the third article of the same fifth question two big doubts arise. The first, how is it to be understood that the *Church's teaching* is an infallible rule to the extent that he who recedes *from it,* recedes from the *formal reason* of the object of faith. But since this has been explained in q.1, art 1, there is no need of repeating, but of *adding* [to what has been said.] Indeed, the Church is the rule in *proposing* and *explicating* the things of faith, *thus modifying,* at least *with respect to us,* the divine revealing Truth. And hence whosoever recedes from the *condition that modifies the formal reason,* viz. the divine revealing Truth, recedes *from the formal reason* of the object of faith. Thus he who recedes from the rule of the Church, recedes from the formal reason of the object of faith *not only because* he recedes from *one* revealed article as we said earlier, *but also* because he recedes from the *condition or mode of the formal reason* of the object of faith *with respect to us.* And this corresponds to the plain meaning of the text. For it puts the First Truth *in the Scriptures and the teaching of the Church* as the *formal reason* of faith: the First Truth, indeed, as the *very reason itself* of believing; but the manifestation of the Scriptures and the Church as the *condition whereby* the First Truth *proposes* and *explicates itself* and other things pertaining to faith. Now, although *this sort of condition,* considered *simply* (simpliciter) with respect *to the faith,* be not of the integrity of the formal object of faith (as is obvious in the faith of the first man if he had remained eternally alone and in the faith of the angels in their own way), it is nonetheless *of the integrity of the formal object of our faith."*[53]

151. BÁÑEZ. – "Third conclusion: The *testimony of the Church,* insofar as she is ruled by the Holy Spirit and insofar as it is one of the articles of faith to believe the Holy Catholic Church, is that into which *our* faith is *at length resolved* with respect to the *distinction* and *explication* of the

[53]CAJETAN, *In 2-2,* q.1, a.1, and q.5, a.3.

things to be believed. To understand this, note that the conclusion is to be understood of *our* faith, who have *not* received revelation, together with the distinction of the things to be believed, *immediately* from God."[54] "For we readily profess that the testimony of the Church *determines the potentiality* of the light of faith with respect to the *proposition* and *distinction* of the things that belong to the faith."[55] "In the second place, I answer that with respect to the acquired *sciences* there are *many* material *mediums* that vary in keeping with the variety of the quiddity and essence of things in order to infer different conclusions. However, with respect to the *faith* there are not many mediums – *neither formal nor material* – whereby we assent to the things revealed by God; but all of these are immediately believed on account of divine revelation manifested *through the ministry of the Church."*[56]

152. JOHN OF ST. THOMAS. – "The heretic does not receive the divine testimony as it proceeds from God, but as it appears *to him;* hence he does not adhere to the divine witness but is led to the attested thing *by his own judgment* whereby he persuades himself that such a thing has been said by God, not through that medium whereby God speaks, *i.e. through the Church;* hence he believes *fallibly* because his belief is dependent on his own judgment, and this judgment *is fallible.* Thus, if he should deem it good, he will change his judgment and cease to believe; therefore the heretic does not regard the divine witness insofar as it comes from God and in the manner in which it comes from God, but insofar as it is subject to *his own* fallible judgment; and consequently *any such faith* as the heretic has is not infused by God but *acquired* by himself, as any other *human* faith."[57]

We ask the reader to ponder well the preceding paragraph, replacing the term *heretic* with the term *theologian,* if he wants to grasp well the kind of *faith* that ought to be given to the *inclusive virtual* (Suárez's *formal confused*), or to any other theological conclusion, prior to the Church's definition. But, to continue quoting John of St. Thomas:

"Should you urge: therefore faith does not have as its *formal reason* the witness of God but the Church's proposition; the consequence is proven by the fact that this man is not a heretic because he denies the witness of God, but because he does not accept the Church's proposition . . . . *The answer is* that the heretic denies the true witness of God and destroys it by his denial of the *Church's proposition, to which the true witness of God is linked,* not as to its formal reason but as to the *condition that applies* the

[54]BÁÑEZ, *In 2-2,* q.1, a.1, dubit.4.

[55]*Loc.cit.,* ad 4, argumentum.

[56]*Loc.cit.,* q.5, a.3, ad 1, argumentum.

[57]JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *De Fide,* d.1, a.1, n.27.

divine witness and is its *organ.* Nor is it necessary to be in direct opposition to a form in order to destroy it; it is enough to destroy the *requisite conditions without which* such a thing will not subsist; just as he who should remove the obscurity of faith would destroy the faith, although obscurity is only a condition; and he who destroys the dispositions that are required for the soul to exist in the body, kills the man."[58]

"Faith does not regard the proposition of things as made in particular by this or the other inferior minister, who *can* deceive or be deceived, and does not have the infallible assistance of the Holy Spirit; but faith directly regards the Catholic *Church's* proposition, as it comes from the Pope, who *cannot* err. And thus the faith is not placed in jeopardy if what this minister proposes is false; for faith does not assent absolutely to the thing proposed, nor does it assent to it as proposed by this minister, but assents to it *as proposed by the Church,* and this is virtually included *in every act of faith.* Now if any man is led to accept that thing absolutely, and *without presupposing the condition that it is truly defined by the Catholic Church, such a man does not believe through infused faith but through an acquired faith.*"[59]

"The material object of faith, i.e. the thing that is to be believed and attained through such a revelation, requires *two* conditions herein explained by St. Thomas, in order to be a matter of fatih. The *first* condition is that such a thing should not be evident . . . . The *other* condition required in order to be a *matter* of faith, which is our present concern, is that *it be proposed by the Catholic Church,* and by her Head in whom is found the infallible rule of faith or of those things that regard the faith; with this we have to do now. For its understanding, *note* that this condition and visible rule are required for faith nor for just any reason whatsoever, but they are required *with respect to us because God does not speak immediately to us* nor does He immediately by Himself *propose* the revealed things, but *through men* . . . But should God also *immediately* propose to us the things that are to be believed, we should undoubtedly have no need of any visible proposing rule, but would be immediately certified by the Spirit of God Himself concerning the matter proposed for belief, just as the Apostles and Prophets were taught [by God Himself]; they did not receive from the Church, but rather conveyed to the Church the things of faith."[60]

153. GONET AND CONTENSON. – Let us also consider the commentary of two other Thomists, Gonet and Contenson. "No one of the faithful can assent to God who reveals His mysteries, unless the divine revelation be

[58] *Loc.cit.*, nn.28-29.

[59] *Loc.cit.*, d.2, a.4, solution of the arguments, n.3.

[60] *Loc.cit.*, d.7, *De Auctoritate Summi Pontificis*, Proemium.

proposed and made known to him *through the Church.*"[61] "The *formal reason* of faith is divine revelation *insofar as it is made known* by the absolutely infallible *teaching of the Church,* to the extent that, *with respect to us,* this teaching and the persuasion of its infallibility are the *absolutely necessary condition* for divine revelation to move our intellect to assent to the truth revealed by God."[62] "Wherefore, the divine authority is the *formal* reason of faith, but the *Church's authority* is the *condition without which* we would never believe; just as the proposed goodness is the motive that entices and allures the will towards itself, but the *proposition* of the goodness made *by the intellect* is the condition without which the manifested goodness would never capture the will."[63] "The second condition of the object of faith is as follows: the formal, or the virtual revelation *declared by the Church.* The object of faith must be not only virtually, but formally revealed, or *at least expressly declared by the Church* . . . and then the statement *begins* to pertain to the object of our faith, not precisely because it is virtually revealed, but because, being virtually revealed, it is formally declared and educed from an article of faith by the Church."[64]

154. THE SALMANTICENSES. – The Salmanticenses themselves who, as we have earlier said, adopted Suárez's terminology in the matter of the revealed *virtual,* and even admitted the doctrine of the *two assents,* albeit restricting it only to the conclusions deduced from two premises of faith (80-85), have nonetheless remained faithful and profound expounders of St. Thomas's teachings on the matter of the relationship of the authority of the Church to *our* faith.

"In this regard note that the formal motive of belief through theological faith is not the witness of God taken precisely, but *as applied* to the article which we hold through such a faith . . . Whence, if the assent of faith is to be certain and firm so that it may be elicited by theological faith, it is necessary that the testimony of God be applied *certainly and infallibly;* otherwise the aforesaid assent would waver on this account. Now, the certainty and infallibility of this *application* can happen in *two ways: first,* by the fact that man is evidently aware of the fact of divine revelation, that is, of the fact that *God speaks to him,* as in the case of the prophets and of those who received the knowledge of the mysteries of faith *immediately from God.* Secondly, by the fact that the aforesaid revelation is asserted and applied *by an infallible rule* established by God for this very purpose, which is the Church. Wherefore, the *formal motive* of theological faith

[61] GONET, *De Fide,* d.1, n.53.

[62] GONET, *loc.cit.*, d.8, n.30.

[63] CONTENSON, *Theologia mentis et cordis, De Fide,* 1.8, d.2, c.1.

[64] CONTENSON, *loc.cit.*

with respect to us is the testimony of God *proposed* and *applied by the Church;* so that the aforesaid testimony is the formal reason of belief, whereas the proposition or application made by the Church is the *necessary condition* for the *infallible application* of the aforesaid testimony . . . Theological faith, being an intellectual virtue, has an *infallible order* to the truth and it is impossible for it to elicit a false assent. However, in the heretic it cannot involve this order on account of the fact that, if faith is to have *infallible* order to the truth, it is not enough that the motive of assent be infallible *in itself,* but it is further required that it *be infallibly applied to the object* of assent. It matters little that the motive be infallible *in itself* if it has either no connexion or only a *contingent connexion with the object.* On this account an opinable or contingent conclusion is frequently inferred from a necessary principle because it has no necessary connexion with the object. Now, in the heretic, the testimony of God, although it is infallible *in itself, cannot be infallibly applied to the object* of assent: for the application is neither made through evidence which the heretic has of the fact of divine revelation nor through the infallible rule of the Church . . . Therefore it remains that he does not apply the testimony of God through a certain and infallible application, either through evidence [of the fact of revelation] or through the proposition of the Church, but that he applies it *because he judges it to be so.*"[65]

As we have previously remarked, a mere substitution of the term *heretic* in these quotations by the term *theologian* will make clear the kind of assent that can be given to theological conclusions deduced through fallible human reasoning prior to the Church's definition.

155. CARDINAL GOTTI. – In order not to weary the reader with quotations from other commentators, we will end with the following words of Cardinal Gotti on the question of the two assents, the theological assent and the assent of faith. "There is no room for two assents with respect to the *conclusion:* one with respect to the conclusion *in itself,* another with respect to the conclusion *as inferred;* for whether the conclusion be considered in itself or as inferred, it *always* belongs to the same habit, viz. the habit of *science.*"[66] And, touching upon the necessity of the Church's definition for every act of our divine faith, he concludes thus: "The student of theology can easily determine these and other similar things *by keeping always in mind* that nothing can belong immediately to the faith, that has not been *proposed* by the universal Church as revealed in the word of God."[67]

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[65] SALMANTICENSES, *De Fide,* d.8, dub.3, nn.32-33.

[66] *Theologia Scholastica Dogmatica,* vol.1, tr.1, q.1, dub.3, n.14.

[67] *Ibid.,* dub.4, n.20.

156. RÉSUMÉ. – In short: according to St. Thomas nothing *purely human* can enter into the act of *divine* faith; all the elements of the latter must be *divine,* and if there be anything human, it must necessarily enter insofar as it is guided *by God* or as a mere *instrument* of the divine. Now then, since there are two elements in faith, the *object* and its *proposition* or *explication,* both these elements must be *divine.* In the case of *immediate* revelation, both elements are *of themselves* divine: both the revealed truth and its proposition and explication come immediately *from God;* hence those who have received any immediate revelation, have no need of the Church. However, in the case of *mediate* revelation, although the revealed truth comes from God, its proposition and explication come from *men,* from a *human* element. Hence, to make room for *divine* faith, it is necessary that the proposition and explication be made, not by fallible human reason (theology, exegesis, history, etc.), but by God Himself, i.e., by human reason *assisted by God,* which is to say, by the *definition of the Church,* who alone possesses *divine* assistance, not in order to reveal anything new, but in order to *expound* and *explicate* faithfully the revealed truth.

Thus, according to St. Thomas, the Church becomes a true *rule* and a true *why* of every act of *our* divine faith. *Rule* and *why,* not of our faith insofar as it is *divine,* or of divine faith *in itself,* but of divine faith insofar as it is *ours. Rule* and *why* that condition and modify the very First Truth itself or revealed deposit, not in itself, but with respect *to us. Rule* and *why,* not of the formal object of faith, but of its *proposition* and *explication.* Finally, a *rule* and *why* that are as necessary for every act of our divine faith as the proposition of the object by the *intellect* is necessary for the act of the *will.* When there is no proposition by the intellect and there is only a proposition of the lower level of the *senses,* there can be no true act of the *will,* but only an act of *passion* or of the *sensory appetite.* The proposing or proximate rule must belong to the same order as the regulated.

Hence, he who elicits an act *contrary* to the rule of the Church's definition, elicits an act *contrary* to divine faith, an act of *heresy.* He who elicits an act aside from that rule, elicits an act aside from divine faith, an act of *science* or of *human* faith.

Thus, every *explication* of the implicitness or inclusive virtuality of the revealed deposit made *contrary* to the Church's definition, is a *heretical* explication. Where it is made aside from the Church's definition, it is a merely *scientific* or *human* explication. Where it is made *by* the Church's definition, it is a divine explication, a dogma of faith.

Consequently, *theological conclusions* inferred through inclusive or explicative minors of *reason* do not belong to *our* faith, nor can they (without a special divine revelation) be worthy of a true act of *divine* faith, prior to the Church's definition made through either the solemn or the ordinary

magisterium. (In our view, this is true also of conclusions inferred from two revealed premises; however, this is secondary for our purposes). Prior to the definition, such conclusions possess, indeed, the *formal motive* of our theology, which is the inclusive deduction from the revealed datum; but they lack one of the indispensable *conditions* of the *formal motive* of *our faith:* the definition by the Church.

SECTION IV

WHETHER THE CHURCH TURNS THE MEDIATE OR VIRTUAL REVELATION INTO IMMEDIATE OR FORMAL REVELATION

157. – Having shown in section II that the revealed mediate or virtual, if it is implicit, becomes a truth of divine faith through the Church's definition, we concluded with these words: "But, then, does this not make the Church a formal element of divine faith? Is it not to attribute to the Church the power to convert the revealed mediate or virtual into a revealed immediate or formal?

We have answered the first of these two questions in the preceding section. In it we think we have succeeded in showing that, according to St. Thomas, the Church's authority is not the formal motive of faith, as Durandus and Miguel de Medina opined; nor even a part of the formal motive, as alleged by Lugo. However, it is not necessary merely *for greater convenience* (ad melius esse), or for the common faithful, as we are given to understand by Vázquez and Suárez; but for both the learned and the ignorant it is such a necessary and indispensable CONDITION *of the formal motive of our faith,* that without it there is no room for any act of true divine faith in the revealed deposit, outside the case of a private revelation or of an extraordinary or miraculous intervention of God.

The significance of this doctrine is obvious. All theologians are agreed in that there exists an essential and very fundamental difference between divine faith and human faith. On the other hand, they are all also agreed in that the difference between divine faith and Catholic faith is merely secondary and accidental. Hence, to posit the authority of the Church as an indispensable element only of *Catholic* faith but not of divine faith, as is frequently done today in the wake of Vázquez and Suárez, is to make the authority of the Church necessary, but necessary only for something merely secondary and accidental; it is to make of it, not an organic and universally necessary element, but an element of convenience and perfection. On the contrary, to posit the authority of the Church as an indispensable condition, not only of Catholic faith, but also of our divine faith; not only for the simple and ignorant, but for every man, as St. Thomas does, is to make of it an element that is organic, necessary, humanly irreplaceable.

God can today, as He can at any time, explicate by Himself the revealed deposit to any man, either through a private revelation, or by confirming with a miracle the explication of the divine revelation made by one sent by Him. But, with the exception of an extraordinary case of divine intervention, no act of *divine* faith in the meaning of the *revealed deposit* is possible without the authority or definition of the Church exercised either through the solemn or the ordinary magisterium. Theology, exegesis, history, human *reason,* in short, are instruments, nothing more than human instruments or implements in explicating the *divine* meaning of the revealed deposit. When they are employed not only *against* the authority of the Church but even *aside from* her authority or definition, they can only produce a *human* assent whether of acquired faith or of theological science. Only the Church's *divine* authority when she proposes and explicates the meaning of the deposit can lead to an act of true divine faith. The truth *already taught* by the Church can reach the infidel or the heretic in good faith; but, in St. Thomas's view, no man infidel or heretic, simple Christian or learned Christian – can ever elicit acts of divine faith with respect to doctrines not yet taught or defined by the Church. No man, aside from an extraordinary privilege from God, can be in possession of a *divine* faith more explicated than the faith possessed by the Church. The Church, not human reason, is the *rule,* not only for the conservation, but also for the explication of the revealed deposit. Any explication of the revealed deposit or principles effected solely by human reason is a *human* explication, is merely and solely a *theological* assent.

Hence, the sacred bridge between the human and the divine, theology and faith, is not the theologian's reason nor the minor premise of his scientific reasoning but the authority of the Church. Without it there will be theological, but never dogmatic, development or progress. With it there is, not only theological, but also dogmatic progress in both the individuals and the whole Church. And yet this does not make the Church the formal motive of faith; but it does make her the *intrinsic* and indispensable condition of the formal motive of *our faith,* by the very fact that she is the condition of the divine *proposition* and *explication* of the revealed deposit.

158. THE TRANSITION FROM THE MEDIATE OR VIRTUAL TO THE IMMEDIATE OR FORMAL. – There remains the problem of dealing with the second question: whether to grant the Church the authority to define as of *divine* faith (and not only as of ecclesiastical faith) the theologico-inclusive conclusions, conclusions which, as we have maintained, are mediately or virtually revealed with respect to us, is not the same as granting the Church the authority to convert the revealed mediate or virtual, without which there can be no true and proper theological conclusion, into a revealed

immediate or formal, without which divine faith cannot exist. It is common knowledge, and we have said it time and again, that, according to traditional theology, that which is revealed immediately or formally or *in itself* is the specific constituent of faith; whereas that which is revealed mediately or virtually or *in another* is the specific constituent of theology.

The solution of this problem calls for a careful exmination of what St. Thomas and traditional theology mean by *immediate* and *mediate.*

159. IMMEDIATE AND MEDIATE PROPOSITIONS IN GENERAL. – Immediate, according to St. Thomas and Aristotle, simply means *without a middle.* Thus any proposition in which no *middle* exists between the predicate and the subject, is an immediate proposition. Whence the Holy Doctor infers the following general principle, which he frequently repeats: "Every *inclusive* proposition, that is, every proposition the predicate of which is included in the subject, or the predicate of which is of the subject's essence, is *in itself* immediate." Or, in other words: "Every *identical* proposition is *in itself immediate.*"[68]

160. THE REAL OR OBJECTIVE ORDER AND THE IDEAL OR INTELLECTUAL ORDER. – In God there exists a perfect identity and adequation between the real and the ideal, the objective and the intellectual, the known and the medium through which it is known. In the judgments of the divine mind the predicate is perfectly identical and one with the subject; or to be more exact: in God there is no composition of predicate and subject, no

[68] *"Immediate* propositions, viz. those which are not demonstrated by some middle [term], but are clear *of themselves.* Those, indeed, are said to be *immediate,* inasmuch as they *lack a demonstrating middle."* (ST. THOMAS, *In Poster. Analytic.,* lib.1, lect.3) *"Mediate,* i.e. one that has a *middle* whereby the predicate is demonstrated of the subject." (*Loc.cit.,* lect.4) *"Every proposition whose predicate is in the reason of the subject is immediate and self-evident* INSOFAR AS IT ITSELF IS CONCERNED." (*Ibid.*) "This is a mediate proposition, every triangle has three angles equal to two right angles. The *middle* whereby the predicate is syllogized of the subject is a figure having an external triangle equal to the two internal that are opposed to it." (*Loc.cit.,* lect.28) "Hence *understanding* corresponds to the *immediate* proposition; but *science* to the *conclusion,* which is a *mediate* proposition." (*Loc.cit.,* lect.34)

Let the reader take note in this example taken from mathematics that propositions and reasonings of *intellectual* or *inclusive* virtuality are, and are termed, *mediate* with respect to our intellect, even without a *real* distinction. The holy Doctor and his commentators deal with the question of immediate and mediate propositions or those which are *self-evident* (per se notae) and *not self-evident* (non per se notae), together with their divisions, in the *Summa Theologica* (p.1, q.2, a.1), in the *Contra Gentes* (lib.1, c.11), in the *Quaestiones Disputatae* (*De Veritate,* q.10, a.12), in the *In Libros Sententiarum* (lib.1, d.3, q.1, a.2), and in the *In Posteriores Analyticos* (*loc.cit.*). In our opinion, the best commentaries are those of CAJETAN to the last-mentioned book. Cardinal Zigliara takes from him his principal notes for the Leonine edition of the works of St. Thomas (tom.1, pp.58 ff.)

knowledge *by way of composition and division,* no *complex* knowledge *by way of enunciables.* In God there is only a simple, infinitely comprehensive *intuition* that comprises in only one *Word* all the subjects and predicates, all the principles and conclusions, all the reality and ideality of being. In the infinite ocean of light which is God's mind, nothing is mediate, virtual, potential, *known through another;* everything is immediate, formal, actual, *known by itself.* Neither movement, nor progress, nor becoming are to be found there. In God to exist, and hence to understand and to act, are identical to His essence. God is the oneness and utmost and absolute adequation of the real and the ideal, of the objective and the intellectual.

In us it is not so. The reality that is known is one thing, and quite another the idea or concept through which we know reality. That which is known and that which is believed, in the order of science and in the order of faith, is the reality and not only the idea. But that reality and that objectivity, already involved or included in the *datum* or starting point of our knowledge, do not reach us except through *partial* and *successive* ideas or predicates, that express something of the subject's reality, but are never adequate to it. The human idea, expressed in propositions, in terms of subjects and predicates, in cognition *by way of enunciables,* in successive acts of judgment and reasoning, contains and expresses something of the objective reality of the subject, but does not exhaust it. This is a sign of the feebleness of our intellect, but it is also the indispensable basis of our *progress* in *all* orders of intellectual life. Because we are not pure act, as God is, we do not know all the reality and ideality of being, but only a small part of it. Because we are not purely *intellectual,* as the angels, but *rational,* that same small part of being and ideality known by us, is known through an *abstractive,* not intuitive, idea; through judgments and reasonings that imply *succession* and progress, not through a simple vision or understanding that comprises from the beginning all that is included in the natural or the revealed object, or all that we can know of it in the course of time. Our knowledge is *abstractive, imperfect, successive, discursive.*

161. TEXTS OF THE ANGELIC DOCTOR. – Although the foregoing is obvious, let us quote some texts of St. Thomas.

"In God the *understanding intellect,* and the thing understood, and the very act of *understanding itself,* are absolutely one and the same."[69] "Hence, since God sees everything *in Himself* as in the cause, His knowledge is not *discursive.*"[70] "Just as God knows material things immaterially and composite things simply, so too He knows the enunciables *not in the manner of*

[69] ST. THOMAS, p.1, q.14, a.4.

[70] *Ibid.*, a.7.

enunciables, but He knows each of them through *simple understanding:* as would be the case if by the very understanding of what man is, we should also understand all the things that can be predicated of man. Such indeed is not the case with *our* intellect, because it *passes* from one to another on account of the fact that the *intelligible species* [the *concept* or *idea*] represents one [object of knowing] in such a manner that it does not represent another. Thus by understanding what man is, we do not by the same token understand other things that exist in him, but we understand divisively and according to a certain *succession.* And this is why those things that we understand separately and divisively need to be brought back by us into unity *by way of composition and division*[i], by forming an *enunciation.*"[71]

In the angels their essence is distinct from their actual existence, and thus also from their actual operation. Their real being is not identical to their ideal being; hence in them that which is known differs from the idea through which they know it. However, although their essence is not pure act, it is nonetheless unmixed with *material* potentiality or matter, which is that which is opposed to cognition. Hence their act of understanding, or their idea, is neither potential nor successive, but actual and a case of simple understanding. In them there is no *discourse,* as in man, but *simple understanding.* They do not know all that is knowable, as God does; but they know from the beginning and in only one act everything that is by them knowable in their idea or proper object. Their mode of understanding is similar to God's, not to man's.

"Thus the lower intellects, viz., those of ***men,*** [not only those of the ignorant but also those of the wise, nor only those of the simple faithful but also those of the greatest theologians] obtain perfection in the knowledge of truth [whether natural or supernatural, i.e. of faith] through a certain *movement* and *discourse* of the intellectual operation, as they proceed from one known to another. But if in the very knowledge of a *known principle* [the natural or the revealed datum] they were to perceive at once as evident all its *consequent conclusions* there would be in them no *discourse* at all. Such is the case with the angels [and with those who received the revelation *immediately* and fully from God, as the Apostles] because in the things they naturally know they immediately behold all that can be known, and thus they are called intellectual beings, because even with ourselves the things which are immediately apprehended naturally are said to be understood (intelligi): hence intellect is said to be the habit of first principles. But human souls [in the case of both the theologian and of the simple faithful] are called *rational;* and this comes *from the feebleness of the intellectual light* in them.

[i] "By way of composition and division", technical term for the act of judgment -- *Transl.*

[71] *Ibid.*, a.14.

For if they had the fullness of intellectual light, as the angels [or as the Apostles] they would immediately in the first perception of the principles [i.e., of the ***articles of faith,*** in the supernatural order] comprehend *all their virtuality,* by intuiting whatever can be syllogized from them."[72]

Let us continue quoting further from the Holy Doctor on the difference between *our* discursive knowledge on the one hand and the knowledge of the angels or the infused knowledge on the other hand, since therein lies the basis of the difference between *our* faith and faith *in itself.* "The fact that our *intellect* understands through *discourse,* and through *composition* and *division,* comes from the same root."[73] "It is necessary for the human intellect to understand by composing and dividing. Since the human intellect issues from *potency* into act [from the *virtual* to the formal], it has a certain similarity with *generable* things [vital or organic progress], which do *not immediately* possess their perfection, but acquire it successively. *Likewise,* the human intellect does not obtain the perfect knowledge of a thing *immediately* in the *first apprehension* [the natural, or the revealed *datum*]: but first it apprehends *something* [the revealed formal explicit], for no man would assent by faith to things that are proposed unless he *understood them somewhat.*" (*2-2,* q.8, a.2 ad 2) "Faith cannot issue into act unless by *believing* something *determinately and expressly* " (*In 3 Sent.,* d.25, q.2, a.1 de ipsa); e.g. the quiddity [the *articles*] of the thing itself, which is the first and proper object of the *intellect,* and then it understands the properties [the intellectual and the real *virtuality*] and the accidents and the relations *surrounding* the thing's essence. And in accordance with this it is necessary for it to *compose and divide* one object of apprehension with another and to proceed *from one* composition and division *to another,* which is *to reason.* But the angelic intellect, and the divine [and that of the Apostles in virtue of *infused* light] possess perfectly all the knowledge of the thing at once. Hence by knowing the quiddity of the thing [the primitive *datum*], it *simultaneously* knows of the thing whatever we can know *through composition* and *division* and *reasoning.*"[74]

This mode of knowing "by way of composition and division, by way of the complex, by way of the enunciable", which conditions *our* knowing and distinguishes it from knowing *in itself,* that is, from the knowing proper of pure or simple intellects, also conditions *our* faith and distinguishes it (not with the respect to the *object,* but with respect to the mode of its *proposition* or *explication*) from faith *in itself,* to wit, the faith of the angels, the pro-

[72] *Ibid.*, q.58, a.3.

[73] *Summa Theologica,* p.1, q.58, a.4.

[74] *Ibid.*, q.85, a.5.

phets and the apostles and of all those who have received divine revelation *immediately* from God. For this reason, just as the Holy Doctor placed at the beginning of the treatise *On God* the question: "Whether that God exists is *known of itself* (per se notum)", since on it hinges the nature of *our* knowledge of God; so also at the very beginning of his treatise *On Faith* he places this other correlative question: "Whether the *object of faith be something complex* IN THE MANNER OF AN ENUNCIABLE. I answer that it must be said that the known is in the knower *according to the mode of the knower.* But the *proper* mode of the human intellect is to know the truth by *composing* and *dividing,* as has been said in the first part. And thus the human intellect knows the things that are simple *in themselves* according to a certain *complexity* . . . Therefore, the object of faith can be considered in two ways: first, on the part of the *thing believed* itself, and so considered the object of faith is something *incomplex:* that is, the *thing* itself which is believed. Secondly, *on the part of the believer,* and considered thus the object of faith is something *complex in the manner of an enunciable.* But the act of the believer terminates, not in the *enunciable,* but in the *thing.* For we do not form *enunciables,* except to gain through them knowledge of the *things, as in science, so in faith* . . ."[75]

162. FIRST COROLLARY. – Therefore, in any proposition one thing is the *objective reality* of the subject and the predicate, and another thing is the partial *concepts* that we form of that reality. It is possible for us to form *multiple* concepts of *one and the same reality,* and to employ some of these concepts to deduce the others. All of these concepts are really included in the subject, but none of them adequates or exhausts the subject.

SECOND COROLLARY. – Since the immediate proposition is that which is understood *without a middle,* and since there are two kinds of middle, to wit, a *real* or objective middle, and an intellectual or *conceptual* middle, there will accordingly be different kinds of immediate or mediate propositions, depending on whether the middle required to understand them differs really or conceptually from the predicate and the subject. In other words: there will be different kinds of propositions depending on whether between the predicate and the subject there exists a *real* distinction or identity, or only a *conceptual* distinction or identity, also known by the name of *virtual* distinction or distinction of *reasoned reason.*

Hence, only three combinations are possible: 1. propositions of both real and conceptual *identity;* 2. propositions of both conceptual and real *distinction;* 3. propostions of real *identity* but of conceptual *distinction.* In other words: propositions that are really and conceptually *immediate,*

[75] 2-2, *De Fide,* q.1, a.2.

propositions that are really and conceptually *mediate,* propositions that are really *immediate* but conceptually *mediate.* Or, as St. Thomas calls them: propositions that are immediate *in themselves* and *to us* (*quoad se* et *quoad nos*), propositions that are *not* immediate *either in themselves* or *to us* (*nec quoad se, nec quoad nos*). propositions that are immediate *in themselves,* but mediate *to us.* Let us examine them briefly.

163. PROPOSITIONS THAT ARE *IMMEDIATE* **IN THEMSELVES AND TO US.** – Every proposition in which not only is the reality of the predicate included in the reality of the subject, but also the *idea* we have of the predicate is identified with the *idea* we have of the subject, is a proposition that is immediate, not only really, but also intellectually; immediate, not only in itself, but also with respect to us. Thus, the propositions the *whole is greater than any of its parts, man is a rational animal, all the points of a circumference are equidistant from its center, the son is engendered by his father,* are immediate propositions, not only really, but also intellectually. Not only is the reality of the predicate identical to the reality of the subject, but the *idea* of the predicate is the same as the idea of the subject, although expressed with different words. The idea of *generation* is included, not only the reality, but also in the idea or *definition* of the son; the idea of part is included in the *definition* of the whole; the idea of equidistance of all the points is included in the idea or *definition* of the circumference; the idea of rational animal is included in the idea or *definition* of man. In these propositions the predicates are not ideas that differ from the ideas of the subjects: they are the same idea or concept of the subject, only expressed with different terms. In this kind of propositions the distinction between predicate and subject is neither real nor intellectual or virtual, but only a nominal distinction or a distinction of reasoning reason. They are propositions that belong to *simple understanding,* not to *science* or *reason.* To know or demonstrate them no true reasoning is required, but only an explanation of terms; if at times the form of reasoning is employed, it is an *improper* reasoning, that possesses only the form of reasoning, and is *merely* explanatory. There is no room for any proper or true reasoning without, at least, a *virtual* distinction between the subject and the predicate, or between the *middle* and the extremes. (27) In these propositions the predicate is known through the *self-same concept* of the subject; the propositions are known *without any middle.*

164. PROPOSITIONS THAT ARE *MEDIATE* **IN THEMSELVES** AND **TO US.** – There are propositions in which there exists not only an intellectual or virtual, but also a real or objective distinction between the predicate and the subject; in which not only the *concepts,* but also the *realities* expressed by the concepts of the predicate and the subject differ. Hence, to know or to demonstrate them our intellect needs a medium that differs, not only intellectually, but also really. The propositions *every body is actually impenetrable* or *all that is heavy actually falls towards the center,* are propo-

sitions that are *mediate,* not only intellectually, but also really; mediate, not only *with respect to us,* but also *in themselves.* The middle on account of which impenetrability belongs to a body is not the *essence* or definition of body, but its *extension,* which differs really from actual impenetrability, and can even exist without it. The middle on account of which the fall towards the center belongs to anything that is heavy is not its *essence,* but the attraction or *gravity,* which differs really from the fall towards the center, and can even exist without it. In such propositions, although the *essence* of the subject be known evidently or through revelation, the actual existence of the predicate can by this sole means be never known with absolute or theological certainty. In the case of such propositions, the predicate is not revealed by the revelation of the subject, nor is the conclusion revealed by the revelation of the principle. The maxim that with the destruction of the predicate the subject is destroyed, or that *with the destruction of the conclusion the principle is destroyed* ("This is the relation of the conclusion to the principle, that *with the destruction of the conclusion the principle is destroyed.*" ST. THOMAS, *In Post. Analyt.,* lect. 38) is not applicable to this kind of propositions, that are mediate both to us and in themselves, as it is applicable to the propositions of the first and third groups. In the propositions of this second group, it is absolutely speaking possible for the predicate or the conclusion to fail, without necessarily involving the failure of the subject or the principle. These propositions or conclusions are those which make up the inferior and contingent physical sciences, which are not grounded on objective or essential identity, but on mere physical connexion without objective implicitness. (37, 98).

165. PROPOSITIONS THAT ARE *IMMEDIATE REALLY* OR IN **THEMSELVES**, BUT *MEDIATE CONCEPTUALLY* OR **TO US**. — This third group is the most important: it comprises the famous propositions *immediately known in themselves* (*per se notae quoad se*), but *not immediately known to us* (*non per se notae quoad nos*), of which St. Thomas often makes mention, and which constitute the true and rigorous conclusions of the sciences of absolute certainty (mathematics, metaphysics, and theology). These propositions represent the bridge of objective continuity joining *understanding* and *reason* (intellectus – ratio) in the natural order, and *faith* and *theology* in the supernatural or revealed order. In these propositions lies the key to dogmatic progress.

In effect, there are propositions in which the objective reality of the predicate is included in that of the subject; thus they are immediate objectively or in themselves. However, the *concept* which *we* form of the predicate is not immediately included in the concept formed by us of the subject; thus they are mediate conceptually or with respect to us. Of themselves such

propositions belong to *understanding* or *intuition;* but *for us* they belong to *science* or *reason.*[76]

For instance, the propositions *God exists* or *the rational soul is spiritual* are in themselves identical or inclusive propositions; and hence, they are immediate *really* or in themselves, since there is no *real* distinction, no real *middle* between the predicate and the subject. But these same propositions are *mediate* intellectually, mediate with respect *to us,* that is to every *human intellect;* they are, as the ancients called them, "per se notae quoad se", but "non per se notae quoad nos". Between the predicate and the subject there is no real distinction, but there is a *virtual* distinction or a distinction of *concepts.* The predicate is *really* included in the subject, but *formally with respect to us* it is not. The idea we have of the subject and the predicate is not enough to make us see the predicate included in the subject; we need to lay hold of *another idea,* of a *middle.* And the result is, not a knowledge of simple understanding or intuition (which never comprises anything more than the two ideas of subject and predicate), but a knowledge of *science* or *demonstration,* which is the resultant of *three ideas* or concepts, the ideas of the *subject,* and the *predicate,* together with that of the *middle* term, which are known in logic as the major, minor, and middle terms. Where the middle term is a *reality* distinct from the reality of the extremes, we have the poor, inferior, contingent *physical* sciences. Where the middle term is really identical, but virtually or conceptually distinct, we have the superior, necessary, sublime mathematico-metaphysico-theological sciences. Thus, to know God's eternity, it is necessary to recur to the *middle* of His absolute immutability; to know the human soul's immortality, it is necessary to recur to the middle of its immateriality or independence in operation and in being. For the human mind these are cases of *mediate* knowledge, cases of *scientific* knowledge, not of simple understanding or of mere nominal explanation. The great schoolmen always called them *virtual* or *by cause;* but since they are *really* identical or proper of the superior sciences of intellectual or conceptual analysis, the *middle,* or *cause,* or *minor* proposition employed can never be physico-connexive, but must needs be metaphysico-inclusive.

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[76] "Is every proposition that is evident *of itself* (per se nota) also evident to us? Concerning this question we must explain the first opinion, that of Scotus and Aureolus, who hold that every proposition that is evident of itself (or immediate) is also evident to us . . . For the rest, the other opinion, which is far more true, is that of ST. THOMAS, CAJETAN, FERRARIENSIS, CAPREOLUS, and almost all philosophers, who maintain that not every proposition that is evident of itself is also evident to us . . . Hence it must be gathered that every and any proposition is by its nature self-evident (or immediate), the knowledge of which depends solely on the knowledge of the terms, meaning by these not the *words,* as ineptly held by Gregory, but the *things* signified; for Aristotle did not undertake to dispute about words but about the *things* signified by them." (DIDACUS MASIUS, O.P., *Commentaria in primum librum Aristotelis de demonstratione,* c.3. qq.2-4, pgs.280-285)

166. FIRST COROLLARY. – The fundamental distinction between the immediate or mediate *in itself* or in the *real* order, and the immediate or mediate *to us* or in the *intellectual* order, must never be forgotten. Between the intellectually immediate and the intellectually mediate no real distinction exists, but there exists a *virtual* distinction or a distinction of concepts. Between the *really* or objectively immediate and the *really* or objectively mediate, there is not only a distinction of aspects or concepts, but also a real distinction or a distinction of objectivity. To convert the really mediate into really immediate, it would be necessary to add a new *reality*, to increase the primitive objectivity. To turn the intellectually mediate into intellectually immediate, it is not necessary to modify in any way the reality or objectivity of the primitive datum, it is only necessary to change the *mode* or *medium* of knowing, i.e. to know through a *medium* of simple understanding the *same thing* that was previously known solely through the medium of science or discourse.

167. SECOND COROLLARY. – All that has been said of the relation obtaining between the predicate and the subject in the case of *propositions* is to be applied, without the least change, to the relation obtaining between the *conclusions* and the *principles* in the case of reasonings and demonstrations; since, as St. Thomas teaches, and the matter is evident of itself, the relation of the conclusion to the principle in a demonstration is exactly the same as the relation of the predicate to the subject in a proposition.[77] Thus, the conclusions will be either really immediate or mediate, or intellectually immediate or mediate, depending on whether a *real* or a *virtual* distinction exists or not between the conclusion and the principles, and this in turn depends on whether the *middle* term employed differs really or virtually from the extremes. On the other hand, where the middle term differs neither really nor virtually from the extremes, but differs only with a nominal distinction or a distinction of reasoning reason, no proper reasoning exists, but only an improper reasoning, i.e. a reasoning *as to form*, and the conclusion is not a true *conclusion*, but the *principle* stated in other words.[78]

[77] "*Just as* in the *reasoning* intellect the *conclusion* is compared to the *principle*, so in the *composing and dividing* intellect the *predicate* is compared to the *subject* . . . Thus it is clear that the fact that *our* intellect understands by way of *discourse*, and of *composition and division*, proceeds *from the same root*, viz. that in the first apprehension of something that is apprehended, it cannot at once see everything that is contained *virtually* in it; and this comes *from the feeblesness of the intellectual light* in *us*." (ST. THOMAS, p.1, q.58, a.4)

[78] "In the reasoning that constitutes a *new* mode of knowing in the *true* and *full sense*, the conclusion is enunciated in the major premise not *formally implicitly* but only *virtually implicitly*." (PESCH, *Philosophia Lacensis, Institutiones logicales*, lib.2, c.3, n.326) "Those things are said to be contained *formally implicitly* in the explicitly revealed, which are identical with it *both really and formally* . . . That is said to be contained *virtually* in an explicitly revealed truth, which: *either* first, although *really identical* with it, is nonetheless *formally distinct* from it; or, secondly, is *not really identical* with the explicitly revealed but is *only connected* with it." (MAZELLA, *De virtutibus infusis*, n.405, 6th ed. Naples 1909)

Thus conclusions are divided into the same three groups into which we have classified the propositions: 1. *immediate* conclusions, both really and intellectually; 2. *mediate* conclusions, both intellectually and really; 3. conclusions that are *immediate* really or in themselves, but *mediate* to us, i.e. to *human* reason.

The first are conclusions of *improper* reasoning or of nominal explanation; the second are conclusions of *proper* reasoning, but a reasoning of *mere physico-distinct connexion;* the third are also conclusions of *proper* reasoning, but a reasoning of *inclusive* connexion. (24-28)

The first are not properly conclusions, but principles in the *form* of conclusions; the second are true conclusions, and belong to the contingent physical sciences; the third are likewise *true* conclusions, and belong to the true and necessary sciences of the superior order, to the only *rigorously* true *sciences*, the mathematical, metaphysical, and theological. (36-41)

168. ANSWER TO THE QUESTION. – The answer to the question whether the Church converts or can convert the revealed mediate into a revealed immediate can be easily gathered from what has been said. The answer is either negative or affirmative depending on whether the mediate is *non-inclusive*, as is the mediate or virtual of type 4 introduced by Suárez and Lugo; or *inclusive*, as are the other five types of mediate or virtual, which, according to St. Thomas, constitute the true and rigorous revealed virtuality or theological conclusion.

In the case of the non-inclusive mediate, the predicate of the minor is not included objectively in the essence of the subject; nor, consequently, is the conclusion objectively included or implicit in the revealed major. Thus, it is clear that the Church does not, and cannot, convert such a mediate into immediate. Such a mediate is not objectively revealed since it is not included or implicit in the revealed major. Hence, to convert such a mediate into immediate by defining it as of divine faith, would be the same as to convert the non-revealed into revealed and to increase objectively the deposit of revelation. Not even God can do such a thing except through a new revelation. Hence, Suárez was consistent in appealing to new revelations in order to defend the definability as of faith of such a mediate. Hence, too, the Salmanticenses and Billuart, and all Thomists, are logical in denying the definability as of faith of any mediate or virtual understood in this sense.

But where the mediate is *inclusive*, as is the case in all rigorous theological conclusions, it is obvious that the Church can, and does, convert such a

mediate into immediate. As we have seen, the inclusive mediate is mediate only *to us,* but immediate *in itself.* "Any proposition the predicate of which is *included* in the *reason* [the *essence*] of the subject, is immediate *insofar as it itself is concerned* . . . As the *conclusion* is compared to the *principle* in the reasoning intellect, so is the *predicate* compared to the subject in the composing and dividing intellect." (ST. THOMAS) (159-167). To convert such a mediate into immediate means nothing else than to convert that which is revealed *immediately in itself* into something *revealed immediately with respect to us.* All theologians have always granted that the Church can do this. This, and nothing else, is what the Church does when she defines as of divine faith the implicit virtual or the inclusive theological conclusion.

Hence, when all Thomists, and even all theologians prior to Molina, affirmed that the Church can define, and has defined, as of divine faith, not only the immediately revealed, but also the mediately revealed; when they affirmed that not all of our dogmas are immediately contained in the revealed deposit, but that some of them were mediately or virtually contained; they spoke a great truth because they had in mind the truly *inclusive* mediate, the truly *implicit* virtual.

All these statements mean nothing more than that not all the dogmas have been revealed *in themselves* to us, but that some of them have been revealed only *in other* truths, from which human reason cannot deduce or know them except through a proper and rigorous reasoning, albeit an *inclusive* reasoning. They mean nothing more than that not all the dogmas were contained in the deposit in terms of the *proper concept* in which they are defined, but in terms of *another concept,* which is really identical although virtually distinct, and from which they are known and inferred. They mean nothing more than that the Church's dogmatic definition provides the human mind, not with new non-revealed matter or reality or object, but with a *new medium* of knowing the matter or object originally revealed. Prior to the dogmatic definition, these virtually or mediately revealed truths or concepts are not known except through a *theological medium,* which is the *deduction from the revealed;* or, in other words, *reasoned revelation;* or, in other words, *revelation explicated by reason.* On the other hand, after the dogmatic definition, those same truths are no longer known by *another medium* different from that of faith, but are known by the self-same medium of faith, viz., *revelation explicated by the Church.* Prior to the definition those truths were *mediately revealed* or mediately of faith, because although they come from revealed majors or majors of faith, nonetheless they proceed from them through minors or *mediums* of reason, and reasoning or deduction is the medium, not of faith but of science. After the definition they are known by the medium itself of faith, which is not revelation *alone,* nor much less *reasoned* revelation, but revelation *explicated by the Church: the First Truth manifested by the Church.* (156)

Since before the definition they were known by a *medium other* than that of faith they were *mediate* and were designated as such. Since after the definition they are no longer known by another medium, but known by the *self-same medium* of faith, they are *immediate* and are designated as such. Likewise, since before the definition they already had the same objectivity (*res* cognita, the *thing* known) of the revealed principles, but had only the medium of knowing (*medium* cognitionis) of theology, they were *materially* of faith or matter definable of faith, but *formally* theological. Since after the definition they have not only the same objectivity of the principles of faith, but also the same medium of knowing, they now are not merely matter of faith but also formally or immediately of faith. *"Every cognitive habit* FORMALLY *regards the* MEDIUM *through which the object is known; but* MATERIALLY *it regards* THAT WHICH IS KNOWN *through the medium."*[79] *"Now the* FORMAL *reason of the object in the case of* FAITH *is the First Truth* MANIFESTED BY THE CHURCH, *just as the* FORMAL *reason of* SCIENCE *is the* MEDIUM OF DEMONSTRATION."[80]

169. – SCOTIST ORIGIN OF THE EXTREME POSITIONS OF VÁZQUEZ AND MOLINA. – We beg the reader to allow us a small digression in order to show that in the third group of *inclusive* propositions (165) lies the line that divides St. Thomas and Scotus with regard to the nature and *specific* distinction between *understanding* and *reason* in the natural order, and between faith and theology respectively in the revealed order. St. Thomas says: inclusive propositions are immediate *in themselves* but mediate *to us;* of themselves they belong to simple understanding but relative to us they belong to science or reasoning. Since the *reality* or the thing in itself is that which is *material* in any habit, and the *medium* through which we know the reality is that which is *formal,* those propositions belong *materially* to understanding but formally to reason or science. (123)

Scotus, with whom Vázquez and Molina show themselves to be in sympathy, says: *every* objective (since our concern is not with the merely *logical* order) proposition either is immediate in itself and to us, or is not immediate in itself and to us; it either belongs materially and formally to understanding, or belongs materially and formally to reason or science. There is a middle with respect to the objective *reality,* or with respect to the merely *logical* or formal proposition; but there is no middle with respect to *objective propositions.* All objective propositions are either totally immediate or totally mediate.[81]

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[79] ST. THOMAS, 2-2, q.9, a.2.

[80] ST. THOMAS, *QQ. Disputatae De Caritate,* a.13, ad 6.

[81] On the question of what is meant by *immediate* or "per se notum", and by *mediate* or "non per se notum", the sympathy of Vázquez and Molina in favour of Scotus and against St. Thomas is obvious.

Up to this point the difference could seem to turn on a merely technical question, to be merely a disagreement in words between the two great geniuses of Scholasticism on a minor point of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics. It would be easy, indeed, to show the relation which that difference bears to the gravest problems of both *ancient* and modern philosophy; but all that would matter little if it did not have a very close bearing on the problems and theories concerning faith, theology, dogmatic progress, and the authority of the Church.

The revealed truth is not communicated to us through merely *logical* or symbolic propositions, nor through divine *realities* experienced immanently, as Modernism pretends; but through *conceptual-objective propositions*, as Catholicism teaches. Hence, the question that had arisen in the Posterior Analytics concerning the nature of the propositions known by natural reason crops up later relative to the objective propositions known by *divine revelation.* Are the propositions or conclusions found in revelation with the character of, or through, *inclusive* virtuality *immediately* or *mediately* revealed? Do they belong to *understanding* or to *reason?* To *faith* or to *theology?* Do they represent to the human mind *divine* values, or values that are merely human, or at best, *ecclesiastical?*

"Finally, Gregory, Gabriel, Ockham, and Basolis do not admit the division of the proposition into evident per se and evident to us . . . Now if they are speaking of the connexion itself and the concept, the opinion of these men, with which Scotus concurs, has my approval." (VÁZQUEZ, *In 1 Partem,* q.2, a.1, ed.cit., p.58) "Wherefore, since no proposition is found in things themselves considered in themselves, but only inasmuch as they are *apprehended* by the intellect, or are *signified* by these or those words or writings, properly speaking no proposition ought to be called evident in itself which is not also evident to us, *as Scotus correctly affirmed* . . . Although, *St. Thomas spoke with less propriety."* (MOLINA, *In 1 Partem,* q.2, a.1, ed.cit., p.33) Molina, as also later on Ripalda and Kilber, was unable to free himself from a narrow conceptualism in these matters nor to rise to the true *objective realism* of the Thomist doctrine, which John of St. Thomas expounds as follows: "There is the well-known division of the per se evident proposition, made by St. Thomas, into that which is per se evident in itself and that which is per se evident to us. But this division is not admitted by Scotus nor commonly by his school; and some later [writers] say that St. Thomas *spoke improperly* . . . Nonetheless, St. Thomas, *considering more profoundly* the per se evident proposition, dealt with it not only in accordance with the formal reason of the proposition on the part of the *concept* or the *signifying word,* but also on the part of the *basis* which is found in the *thing* signified *itself:* for the fact that a proposition is demonstrable by some middle, or lacks a middle whereby it is demonstrated, and thus is *immediate* and per se evident, does not arise from the *signification itself of the terms,* but from the *connexion itself of the things signified."* (JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *Cursus Philosophicus, Logica,* p.2, q.24, a.4) Please take note, all those modern Thomists who, for purposes of determining what is, or is not, immediately contained in the revealed statements, affirm that no account should be taken of either *connexions* or *reality,* but only of the conceptual *meaning* of the propositions (515).

A true Thomist must say: all propositions or conclusions of revealed-inclusive virtuality are immediate or of faith *in themselves,* but mediate or of theology *with respect to us* for as long as we do not know them except through the human medium of reasoning. If the *divine* authority of the Church did not exist, if there were no medium to *explicate* them, i.e. to develop their inclusive virtuality, other than fallible human reasoning, that virtuality would never acquire divine values, values of faith relative to us.

The Scotist theory must say, and does say: such propositions are either *immediately* revealed both in themselves and to us, or they are not so in themselves and to us. Either they are *of faith* in themselves and for us (Scotus and Vázquez), or they are not of faith either in themselves or for us (Molina). Either they are of faith in themselves and for the theologian, without any need of the Church's definition (Vázquez), or they are not of faith either for the theologian or in themselves, even if the Church should define them (Molina).

In this matter, says Vázquez, the theological reason or minor is to the theologian as the authority of the Church is to the faithful. If such propositions are immediate or of faith for the faithful after the Church has defined them, they must likewise be immediate or of faith for the theologian when his reason deduces them evidently.

Molina says: in this matter the authority of the Church is of no more value to the faithful than the authority of the theologian. If they are not immediate or of faith, in spite of being evidently deduced by the theologian, neither will they be so even if the Church defines them.

The Thomists must say, and do say: such propositions and conclusions are immediately revealed *in themselves,* but mediately revealed *with respect to human reason,* whether in the simple faithful or in the theologian. But *in this matter,* i.e. in the *explication* of the implicitly revealed virtuality, in the unfolding of that which is included in the deposit, the authority of the Church is essentially different from, and infinitely superior to, the private authority or reasoning of the theologian. The former is *divine* authority; the latter, *human* authority. The explication of the implicit virtuality of revealed propositions made by the theologian's reason is a *human explication* of *divine revelation;* hence, a subjectively fallible explication, a *theological* explication. The explication made with the Holy Spirit's divine assistance to the Church is a *divine explication* of *divine revelation;* thus it belongs immediately to *divine faith.* It is a true development, but a development that is divine, *dogmatic.*

As we have indicated, these three theories proposed by St. Thomas, Vázquez, and Molina are the only ones that have been propounded and the only ones possible, concerning the inclusive virtuality's definability as of faith (87). The latter two have the Scotist origin that we have pointed out,

which is also found in the two different existing theories on the nature and the distinction between the immediate and the mediate. After the XVI century, many authors have become entangled in difficulties on the question whether the Church converts mediate revelation into immediate, because they have not distinguished clearly between these theories. They have overlooked the fact that mediate revelation, if it is *inclusive,* is already immediate *in itself* (quoad se); the Church does nothing more than explicate and propose it, whereby it becomes immediate *to us* (quoad nos).

SCOTIST ORIGIN OF SUAREZ'S *FORMAL CONFUSED.* – The origin of Suárez's *formal confused* or *improper virtual* is also to be found in the teaching of Scotus. In the view of Scotus, the reasoning of real identity is an improper reasoning, or, as he calls it, a *begging of the question,* since in this kind of reasoning there are two terms, not three. Ferrariensis, in defense of St. Thomas's teaching, replies with good reason that, *materially* speaking, there are indeed two terms; however, *formally* speaking, there are three terms, and thus the reasoning is proper. The objection by Scotus, and the reply of Ferrariensis follow:

"Confirmation: if such a proposition were self-evident (per se nota), the demonstration in which a proposition is demonstrated by the definition of the subject, besides being impossible because it attempts to demonstrate what is indemonstrable, would involve a *begging of the question,* because the same would be demonstrated by the same, and the equally obvious by the equally obvious.

"To the confirmation [of Scotus] I say that if everything is considered *formally,* there is no *begging of the question* involved, because the *same thing conceived distinctly formally differs from itself conceived confusedly.* But, considered *materially,* there is indeed a begging of the question, and there are only two terms: because the middle and the subject of the conclusion are materially identical."[82] The defect in Scotus, and later on in Vázquez, Suárez, and Lugo, lies in the fact that he deals with these questions *materially,* whereas that which specifically distinguishes the habit of faith from the habit of theology, or simple understanding from reason, is not the material, but the formal. (123)

The known conclusion or the *res cognita* – if we may be allowed the repetition – is *materially* the same after and before the Church's definition; but the medium of knowing or the *medium cognitionis* is *formally* different. Prior to the Church's definition the *medium of knowing* was *revelation explicated by the human reason of the theologian.* After the definition, it is *revelation explicated by the divine authority of the Church.* "But the *formal* reason in *faith* is the First Truth *manifested by the Church,* as the *formal* reason of *science* is the *medium of demonstration.*"[83]

[82]FERRARIENSIS, *In Contra Gentes,* lib.1, c.11, nn.4-6; Leonine ed., tom.13, pp.26-27.

SECTION V

TWO FUNCTIONS OF THE CHURCH'S DOGMATIC MAGISTERIUM

170. THE CONSERVATION AND THE EXPLICATION OF THE DEPOSIT. – The Church's *dogmatic* magisterium exercises two functions with respect to the revealed deposit. The Vatican Council has very distinctly pointed out these two functions, which had been earlier stated with admirable clarity and beauty by the great expounder of dogmatic progress, Vincent of Lérins.[ii] These two functions are: 1. to *conserve* the revealed deposit; 2. to *explicate* it. "*Inviolably* to KEEP SAFE and *faithfully* to EXPOUND."[84] "Let her *take care of* and *finish* whatever things are of old unformed and inchoate, and *keep safe* whatever has been firmed and defined."[85]

Whence the two fundamental characteristics of Catholic dogma: *immutability* and *progress.* Which does not mean, as is commonly understood, immutability in matters of dogma, and progress in matters of discipline; but immutability with respect to dogma, and progress with respect to the same dogma. For relative to discipline there is room not only for progress, but also for a true transformation by adding, subtracting, changing, reforming, abolishing whatever is convenient in matters that are merely disciplinary.

These two functions – the conservation and the explication of dogma itself – are correlative but distinct, and deserve our careful attention.

Every living or developing thing conserves itself as it develops and develops as it conserves itself. Without the conservation of something that remains fixed and identical, there would be not only progress but also transformistic evolution; without the unfolding or acquisition of something *new within* the same conserved thing – if the new thing came from *without,* it would be *addition* and not merely development–, there would be no real, but only nominal, progress.

[ii]St. Vincent of Lerins is commonly quoted in theological treatises by the name of Lirinensis.

[83]ST. THOMAS, *loc.cit.*

[84]VATICAN COUNCIL. *loc.cit.*

[85]LIRINENSIS, *Commonitorium,* c.23.

According to St. Thomas, there are *two* different elements in revelation: the revealed *object,* and its proposition or *explication.* (139) Thus, when God and the Apostles conveyed to the Church the revealed deposit of the Scriptures and Tradition, they conveyed to her two things: 1. a sum total of divinely revealed truths or propositions; 2. a certain quantity or degree of explication or *explicit meaning* of those propositions. Hence, the primitive Church received from the mouth of the Apostles both a revealed *object* and a *divine explication* of the object. This is called the *primitive datum;* it is the *starting point* of dogmatic progress. (55)

To preclude transformism it is necessary that the revealed object and its divine explication should remain substantially *immutable;* however, if true, and not merely nominal, progress is to exist, it is necessary that the starting point should *unfold itself,* i.e. should acquire something *new.*

Since in the starting point there are two things: revealed object, and divine explication of the same object, the acquisition of something new can come from only two sources: from an increase of *new* revealed *objects,* or from an increase of *new* divine *explication* of the object already revealed. The former is not admitted by Catholic teaching since the death of the Apostles. Therefore, if true *progress,* and not mere *conservation,* of the revealed deposit is to exist, it becomes necessary to admit a *new* or a *greater* divine explication of the revealed truth. Such is the purpose of the Church's dogmatic authority, the second of the two functions of the Church with respect to the primitive datum. That is what the church does when she develops and defines the *inclusive* intellectual virtuality of the revealed deposit.

171. DOGMATIC REDEFINITIONS AND DEFINITIONS. – Thus, the definitions of faith or the dogmatic authority of the Church must not be thought of as merely *repeating* the explication already given by the Apostles to, and possessed by, the primitive Church. Undoubtedly the Church often does so; but that would not properly be a *definition,* but rather a *redefinition;* it would not belong properly to the second function of *explicating,* but rather to the first function of *conserving* the *explication already given* by the

[86] The phrases "to declare the faith", "to expound the faith", "to explicate the faith", are employed as synomymous by St. Thomas and the Councils. "The Symbol of the Fathers is *declarative* of the Symbol of the Apostles." (ST. THOMAS, 2-2, q.1, a.9, ad 6) "For the subsequent symbol does not abolish the one preceding, but rather *expounds* it." (*Loc.cit.,* ad 4) "In one [symbol] the things, that are contained implicitly in another, are more fully *explicated.*" (*Loc.cit.,* ad 2) "To be faithfully safeguarded and infallibly *declared.*" (VAT. COUNCIL, Denz.-Schön. n. 3020 "Inviolably safeguarded and faithfully *expounded.*" (VAT. COUNCIL, Denz.-Schön. n.3070) "Furthermore, we define that the *explication* of those words "Filioque" . . . was licitly and reasonably added to the Symbol." (FLORENTINE COUNCIL, Denz.-Schön., n.1302). We have already seen (134), and we shall see it again (506), that the term "to explicate" means "to unfold the implicit virtuality".

Apostles themselves to the primitive Church by repeating and proclaiming it solemnly. The definitions of faith or dogmatic authority of the Church must be *further* understood as giving, in virtue of *divine* authority or assistance, a *new* or *greater* explication than that given by the Apostles to the Church; thereby something *new* results: not a *new* revealed *object,* nor a new revelation of the same object, but, indeed, a *new divine explication* of the very same object or deposit revealed by God to the Apostles and entrusted by them to the *safekeeping* and *explication* by the Church's divine authority.

It is true, as we have elsewhere pointed out (57), that the Church cannot give a dogmatic explication greater than that which the Apostles received from God; but it is likewise true that the Church can give – and in fact does give – a dogmatic explication greater than that given by the Apostles to the primitive Church.

172. AN EXPLICATION GREATER THAN THAT OF THE PRIMITIVE CHURCH. – The primitive Church was in possession of two things: 1. a *determinate* number of revealed articles; 2. a *determinate* degree of divine explication of those same articles.

Future Christian generations have been, are, and will be till the end of time, in possession of something *new,* of a third element acquired by them in virtue of the Church's dogmatic authority. They, or we, are in possession, not of two, but of *three* things: 1. the *very same* revealed articles; 2. the *very same* explication of those articles given by the Apostles. All of these the Church has conserved, and will conserve, unchanged and unchangeable. It is to these two things that the first function corresponds, which is to *conserve* the deposit. But we have besides a *third thing,* which is a *new explication,* which neither is in any way contrary to the previous one, nor comes from without, but is drawn or *deduced* from *within,* and *increases* or unfolds the explication given by the Apostles without changing it.

It is to this third thing that the second function corresponds, which is to *explicate* the deposit, as spoken of by Lirinensis and the Vatican Council. This *new* dogmatic explication passes immediately on to the first function to be *conserved* immutably as an integral and divine part and development of the deposit, whence new explications will issue, and new conservations of the explicated. In such consists the true, living, continuous, perennial and *homogeneous* progress of the Catholic doctrine.

Of this dogmatic progress or development, *human reason,* in all its various endeavours: theological, exegetical, critical, historical, etc., etc., is only the *human* and fallible *instrument;* likewise, the Church, in her ordinary or solemn magisterium, is nothing more than an instrument, but a *divinely assisted* and infallible instrument; and the Holy Spirit, who perpetually assists and guides the Church in her twin progressive function of conserving and explicating the revealed, is the *principal* author or *cause.*

173. GROWTH BY WAY OF EXPLICATION IN THE DOGMA ITSELF. – The foregoing shows clearly the weak point of the common objection usually urged by many beginners against the evolution of dogma. Their argument runs thus: The formal object of dogma or of divine faith is divine revelation; now, after the Apostles there is no longer room for new divine revelation; therefore, there is no room for new dogmas or for dogmatic growth.

If such novice theologians should pay more attention to the two elements comprised in the object of faith, and to the two functions of the Church, they would argue in this other way: the formal object of dogma or of divine faith is not only divine revelation but also the divine explication of the already revealed; now, the divine explication of the divinely revealed can, and does, grow by the Church's definition; therefore, there can be, and there is, a growth in dogma.

CAN IT BE SAID THAT THE PRIMITIVE CHURCH WAS IGNORANT OF SOME OF OUR ACTUAL DOGMAS? – What is not known except implicitly can somehow be said *not to be known,* or that one is *ignorant of it.* "It must be said that as it is implicitly believed, so it is implicitly known. *But that which is not known explicitly is said to be unknown.*"[87] "*Explicitly* to believe is nothing else but to believe something *in itself,* so that it is the proximate object on which the assent of faith falls. But implicitly to believe is to believe something *only in another,* because what is so believed is *really not known,* nor does the intellect form a *proper concept* of the proposition which is said to be believed only implicitly, but *of another proposition* in which it is contained."[88]

Thus there is no inconvenience in saying that, aside from the Apostles, the primitive Church was *ignorant* of some of our actual dogmas, provided that this be understood only to mean that she did not know them *explicitly,* although she did explicitly know others in which such dogmas were implicitly contained.

Hence, when the councils or the popes employ the phrases "the perpetual sense of the Church", "it has always been the persuasion in the Church of God", "from the very beginning of the Church", and others in the same vein, it is not absolutely necessary to hold in every case that such phrases mean that the Church knew or believed such a truth *explicitly;* in some cases it is enough to hold that the Church knew and believed it *implicitly* in other truths explicitly known and believed by her in which it was implicitly contained. Speaking of the minor Orders, Pesch writes: "What the Council of

[87] ST. THOMAS, *In 3 Sent.,* d.25, expositio textus, towards the end.

[88] SUÁREZ, *De Fide,* d.2, s.4, n.2.

Trent says: *'From the very beginning of the Church,* the names and ministries of the following Orders . . . . have been known to be in use', *refers to the time of Pope Cornelius,* for it is certain that the Council Fathers had no such clear information in respect of earlier times."[89] In order to teach and define, the Church need not always ground herself on what is explicit; she can also ground herself on what is implicit in the Scriptures or Tradition.

However, although it can be said that some dogmas were not believed or known explicitly in the first centuries, it would be *false* to say that they have come neither from the Holy Scriptures nor from divine Tradition, for in such a case they could never be dogmas; likewise it would be *extremely* imprudent to affirm without any explanation that such dogmas were *unknown,* since this term uttered without further explanation commonly means that they were denied or rejected by all. Hence Pius X justly censured the article *Pensées sur la question de l'Union des Eglises* published in the periodical *Roma et l'Orient.* The pope declared: "Indeed it, no less rashly than *falsely,* opens the doors to the opinion that the dogma of the Holy Spirit's procession from the Son does not at all flow from the very words of the Gospel nor is substantiated by the faith of the ancient Fathers. Similarly, it *most imprudently* casts doubt on whether the holy men of the first centuries had any knowledge of the sacred dogmas of purgatory and the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin."[90] All the dogmas, without exception, were *explicitly* known by the *Apostles,* and all of them are to be found, at least *implicitly,* in the apostolic statements explicitly known and believed by the primitive Church.

SECTION VI

THE CHURCH'S DOGMATIC AUTHORITY COMPARED TO THE DIVINE AND THE APOSTOLIC AUTHORITY

174. THREE FACTORS PERTAINING TO OUR FAITH. – Three factors intervene, although under different aspects, in any act of our divine faith in the truths of the revealed deposit. With respect to the revealed deposit or public revelation, we believe all, and only, those things committed by the Apostles to the Church; all, and only, those things that the Church teaches us through her ordinary or solemn magisterium. To appreciate with exacti-

[89] *Praelectiones Dogmaticae, De Sacramento Ordinis,* t.7, n.590; 3rd ed. Friburgi Brisgoviae 1909.

[90] PIUS X, Epistola *Ex Qua* to the bishops of the East, *Acta Apostolicae* Sedis (1911), pg.117.

tude the different ways in which the authority of God, that of the Apostles, and that of the Church, intervene in that faith or revelation, we must bear in mind two elementary and important distinctions, viz.: 1. that two elements are comprised in divine revelation: (a) the *object* revealed by God to the Apostles and by them conveyed to the Church; and (b) the proposition and *explication* of that same object subsequently made to us by the Church. 2. That one thing is to be mere *organ* or instrument, and quite another thing is to be the original *source* or principal cause.

God intervenes in revelation or in our faith as the original *source* or principal cause, not only of all revealed *objects,* but also of all the divine meaning or *explication* of those objects. No truth can be the object of true divine faith if it has not been really and truly revealed by God. No meaning or explication, even of truly revealed truths, can be the object of divine faith if God, upon revealing such truths, did not really intend to express or signify such a meaning or explication.

Neither the Apostles, nor any creature whatsoever, can be the original source or principal cause of any divine or revealed truth, or of the divine explication of that truth. Any truth, or any explication of any truth, that should have its origin in the Apostles, and not in God, would be a *human* truth and a human explication incapable of deserving *divine* faith. However, although the Apostles are not the source of either a revealed object or of a divine explication of such an object, they have been, nonetheless, divine *organs* or instruments of both things; i.e., not only of a *new explication* of that which was already revealed, but also of new *revealed objects* or *new revelations.* The world received through the Apostles, not only the explication of things already revealed (just as we receive it today from the Church), but also new revealed truths or new revelations.[91]

[91] It is well known that the Council of Trent, following the language of the Church Fathers, calls the *Apostles* the *source* of all *revealed* truth. ". . . as the *source* of all truth, both of that pertaining to salvation and of that pertaining to the discipline of behaviour." (TRIDENTINE COUNCIL, Sess.4; Denz.-Schön. n.1501) But it is obvious that the term *source* is not employed by the Council in the sense of the *originating* or principal source, but in the tense of a *derived* source, which is what we designate by the terms *channel* or *organ* or *instrument* of God. Thus, theologians divide the *apostolic* truths or traditions into two essentially different classes: *divine-apostolic* traditions, and *merely apostolic* traditions. The former are *divine;* the latter, *human.* The Apostles were merely *organs* of the former, since they received them from Jesus Christ or from the Holy Spirit, as the Tridentine teaches in the aforecited place; of the latter, they were the *authors* or sources. Hence, the former are of *divine* faith, and *immutable:* with respect to them the Church can do nothing else but *preserve* and *explicate* them. Thus, it is with reference to the former that it is said that neither the Apostles, nor the Church, nor any creature whatsoever can be their *source,* but only their *organ.* (CANO, *De Locis,* lib.3, c.5; DE GROOT, *Summa Apologetica,* q.19, a.1; 3rd ed. Ratisbonae 1906) Speaking of the revelation of the Old Testament, we employ almost always the disjunctive

The Church coincides with the Apostles in that she cannot be the original *source* of either new objects or revelations or of a new explication. At the same time she differs from the Apostles in that she cannot be the *organ* or instrument of new objects or revelations; but she coincides with the Apostles in being an *organ* of new explications of an already revealed truth. Through the Church's dogmatic magisterium we receive, not new objects or revelations, but, indeed, new *explications* (and not merely the *conservation*) of truths already revealed.

To resume: God is the principal *source* of new *objects* and new *explications;* the Apostles are *organs* both of new *objects* and new *explications;* the Church is an *organ* of new *explications.* It becomes obvious that *new explications* are common to God, the Apostles, and the Church.

175. COMPARISON RELATIVE TO NEW REVELATIONS. When a comparison is attempted between the authority of the Church and that of God or of the Apostles, the comparison can be made either relative to new objects or revelations, or relative to new explications of truths already revealed.

When the comparison is made relative to new objects or new revelations, the Church's authority is evidently inferior to that of the Apostles and of God. Whereas God has revealed to us new truths, and likewise the Apostles have disclosed or taught us new truths, the Church cannot teach us new truths or objects; her dogmatic magisterium is restricted to truths already revealed. But if the comparison is made, not relative to new objects or revelations, but relative to new *explications* of truths already revealed, it can, and must, be said that in this respect the authority of the Church is *the same* as that of the Apostles and that of God; viz., it is a *divine* authority.

Let us make this clear by means of an example. Suppose we go back to the last years of the first century. With the exception of Christ's beloved disciple, who is still alive in Ephesus, all the other Apostles are dead. In Rome, the head of the universal Church is a successor of St. Peter, e.g. St. Clement. In this case there are within the Church three *mediums* to arrive at the *divine* truth: God (Who can, if He so wishes, intervene extraordinarily and reveal, or explicate by Himself the revealed truth), the Apostle St. John, and the Pope St. Clement. The authority of God, that of the Apostle, and that of the Church. Let us compare them.

phrase "new objects or new revelations" because, as we shall see later on, what is called the progress of *new objects* in the Old Testament was in reality only a progress of *new revelations* concerning that which was already implicitly included in the one and the same object of all public supernatural revelation, i.e., in the two most general principles of faith, which constitute the starting point of all dogmatic progress in the Old Testament, just as the apostolic enunciata constitute the starting point of all dogmatic progress in the New Testament. Thus, every time we use the phrase *new objects,* we mean *new revelations* (313).

Obviously God's revealing authority is not limited to the revelations already made by Himself to the Apostles. He could have revealed new truths by the end of the first century, as He could have done on Pentecost. And if He should have done so then, just as if He should do so today, God's authority is always divine and the faith that it deserves is divine.

Similarly, the authority of the Apostle St. John is not restricted to the truths already taught by the other Apostles, since the revelation of new truths, or at least the promulgation and teaching of the same by the Apostles to the Church, was not closed until the death of the last Apostle. The new truths that the Apostle should teach as revealed would be truths of divine faith, and would deserve divine faith.[92] On the other hand, Pope St. Clement's dogmatic authority is confined to the truths taught by the Apostles, he cannot dogmatically teach any truth not yet taught by the Apostles or not contained really in the revealed deposit. If we suppose that he did teach any such truth, it would not be a divine truth or doctrine, but an ecclesiastical tradition, nor could it deserve divine faith. Thus, relative to new revelations, the authority of the Church is inferior to that of the Apostles and that of God.

176. COMPARISON RELATIVE TO NEW EXPLICATIONS. – But let us suppose it is not a case of any new object or new revelations, but simply a case of explicating the implicit meaning of a truth already revealed, e.g., in a scriptural text laden with meaning. Let us suppose that God intervenes extraordinarily and by Himself explicates the text to the Church or to one of the faithful; and that, on the other hand, St. John exercises his apostolic charism to explain to another believer or believers that same text; and finally, that Pope St. Clement in turn gives to the universal Church a dogmatic explication or definition of the same text. We would, then, have a case in which God, the Apostle, and the pope give us at the same time, not a new revealed *object*, but an authentic explication of a previous revelation. Which of these three authorities or *explications* would be of greater value? All three would have *identical authority;* all three would be a *divinely authentic* explication of a divine truth; all three would be deserving of *divine faith.*

Thus, the authority of the Church is inferior to that of God and that of the Apostles relative to new revelations, but relative to the *explications* of all

[92]For our present concern, the debate among theologians on the nature of the faith that ought to be given to private revelations is an accidental question. We have written "the revelation of new truths, or at least the promulgation and teaching of the same by the Apostles", to sidestep the question whether revelation was closed on the very day of Pentecost, as some would have it, or continued until the death of the Apostles, as others would have it. (BÁÑEZ, 2-2, q.1, a.7; LUGO, *De Fide,* d.3, s.5, n.67; FRANZELIN, *De Traditione Divina,* 2nd ed., pg.272) All are at least agreed on the fact that the revealed truths were not all promulgated at once by the Apostles, but that their promulgation continued, or could have continued, until the death of the last Apostle. This suffices for our purpose.

the *real content* of the deposit already revealed, it is the same divine authority; it is the authentic and permanent prolongation of the magisterium of Jesus Christ and of the Apostles.

The Apostles combined in their persons the threefold *divine* charism of being *prophets,* hagiographers (this existed in some of them, at least), and *apostles.*[93] The prophetic charism of public *revelation* has ceased to exist in the Church; the hagiographic charism of *inspiration* has likewise ceased to exist; but the apostolic charism of *divine assistance* to conserve and *explicate* or unfold all the meaning that is truly inclusive or implicit in the revealed deposit continues, and will continue, to exist in the Church till the end of time.

SECTION VII

WHETHER THE DOGMATIC EVOLUTION THAT TAKES PLACE AFTER THE APOSTLES IS OBJECTIVE OR SUBJECTIVE

177. THE CONSUMMATION AND CLOSING OF CATHOLIC REVELATION. – All Catholic theologians, ancient as well as modern, are agreed in that the deposit of Catholic revelation was completed and closed with the death of the last of the Apostles. The Church has already condemned the contrary doctrine in the following proposition: "The revelation, which constitutes the object of Catholic faith, was not completed with the Apostles."[94] This is the twenty-first among the sixty-five Modernist propositions condemned by the Congregation of the Holy Office in the famous decree *Lamentabili* commonly known as Pius X's "Syllabus against Modernism". St. Thomas had already formulated this traditional doctrine of the Church in these terms: "For *our faith* [the Catholic or universal faith] rests upon the *revelation made to the apostles* and prophets, who wrote the canonical books; but not upon any revelation that may have been *made to other teachers.*"[95]

[93]On the question, that has modernly arisen, whether the office of the apostleship carries with itself not only *assistance,* but also a permanent *inspiration* every time that the Apostles explained or explicated the truth already revealed, anyone can, if he wishes, see UBALDI who upholds the theory of permanent inspiration (*Introd. in S. Scripturam,* Rome 1878, vol.2, pg.78), and CRETS who refutes his reasons in detail (*De divina Bibliorum inspiratione,* n.20 ff.). PESCH (*De Inspiratione S. Scripturae,* Friburgi Brisgoviae 1906, n.625 ff) treats of the subject more extensively and deals with all the arguments adduced by SCHANZ to defend Ubaldi's opinion with some modifications. For our purpose it is enough that the Apostles had, at least, divine assistance; and on this score all are in agreement.

[94]Denz.-Schön., n.3421.

[95]*Summa Theologica,* p.1, q.1, a.8.

178. SUBJECTIVE PROGRESS OR PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE. Consequently there can be no doubt that no objective-real progress in dogma, that is, progress of new revelations, is any longer possible. There can be only a subjective progress or a progress of greater knowledge of that which was already revealed by God to the Apostles and by them conveyed to the Church in the twin deposit of Holy Scripture and divine tradition. However, the terms *subjective* progress, and progress of *knowledge* can have various meanings, and some theologians fail to give them all the meaning and scope given them by St. Thomas and traditional theology. To understand them well nothing more is needed than to notice that in all true *progress* there must be two elements: a term *from which* (a quo), or the starting point of the progress, which today usually goes by the name of *primitive datum*, and a term *to which* (ad quem). The term *a quo* has to be something substantially permanent and identical; otherwise there would not only be progress, but also *change* or transformistic evolution (18-19). The term *ad quem* must be truly *new* or *distinct* from the term *a quo;* otherwise there would be no true, but only a nominal, progress (22-26).

To appreciate, therefore, the nature and extension of the progress made at a given moment, nothing else is required than to take good notice of the *distinction* existing between the term *a quo*, from which the development started, and the term *ad quem*, at which it has arrived; between the *new* or acquired and the *primitive* or permanent. In the case of *dogmatic progress*, notice must be taken of the *distinction* existing between the body of dogmas that the Church believes and teaches today, and the body of dogmas believed and taught by the primitive Church. If no distinction exists at all, there will have been no progress at all; the kind of progress made will depend on the kind of distinction that is found to exist.

There are two kinds of distinction: *real* or objective distinction, and distinction *or reason*, i.e. subjective.[96] All theologians agree in that there can be

[96]"It should be obscure to no one that the most learned teachers have held various opinions concerning the *number of distinctions*. For some have taught that there were *eight* kinds of distinctions . . . Other teachers, commonly called Nominalists, say that there are only *three* kinds of distinctions . . .

But it has always been the view of St. Thomas everywhere in his teachings, that there are *only two* kinds of distinction, to wit, *real* distinction and distinction *of reason;* for from Aristotle and other Peripateticians he has gathered but *two kinds of being*, viz., *real* being and being *of reason*, as Aristotle himself has avowed in 5 Metaphys., text 13, and 6 Metaphys., text 8, when with complete sufficiency he divided being into *being within the soul*, which is the being *of reason*, and *being outside the soul*, which is *real* being." (AQUARIUS, O.P., *Formalitates iuxta doctrinam Angelici Doctoris*, Neapoli 1065, c.1, p.2) This teaching is extremely important for determining whether the progress of virtual distinction is formally *objective* (outside the soul) or *subjective* (within the soul).

no real or objective distinction between today's dogmas and those of the primitive Church; the distinction can be only one of reason or subjective. All of our actual dogmas, and whatsoever dogmas may be defined by the Church in the future, must have been, and are *really* or *objectively* contained from the very beginning in the revealed deposit. The *distinction* or non-inclusion can only be one of reason, or of knowledge, or *subjective*. This is what both the Church and traditional theology teach, and herein lies the firm basis against Modernism.

But now comes the important thing, which no theologian should overlook, if he does not wish to be led by the fear of Modernism into the opposite extreme, that of excessively restricting dogmatic progress and disabling himself from understanding and explaining the undeniable facts attested by the history of dogmas, facts that are fully explained in St. Thomas's profound and ample theory.

179. TWO KINDS OR DEGREES OF SUBJECTIVE DISTINCTION. There are, in fact, two kinds of distinction of reason or subjective distinction: a distinction of *mere reason* (*rationis ratiocinantis*, i.e. of reasoning reason), and *virtual* distinction (*rationis ratiocinatae*, i.e. of reasoned reason). Both are distinctions of reason, not real distinctions; both are subjective distinctions (23).[97]

But the first is a distinction of mere reason, a distinction grounded on the subject and not on the object, which is why it is said to be *merely subjective*. The second is not a distinction of mere reason, because it is grounded on the wealth of aspects of the *object* itself, and thus it is said to be, and truly is, a *subjective-objective* distinction. This virtual or subjective-objective distinction is that which, as we have so often stated, is found between the conclusions and the principles of mathematical, metaphysical, and theological sciences; whereas between the conclusions and principles of the physical sciences, the distinction is not only virtual or subjective-objective, but real or merely objective (40).

Corresponding to these three kinds of distinction, there will be three degrees of progress: (a) progress of real distinction or *merely objective;*

[97]"But the other member of the distinction, which is called *distinction of reason*, is of two kinds, as St. Thomas teaches . . . One is a distinction of reason according to the signified or conceived reason, which is called among Thomists distinction of *reasoned reason* . . . The other is a distinction of *reasoning* or conceiving *reason.*" (AQUARIUS, O.P., *loc. cit.*, p.3) It is thus clear, as we have elsewhere noted (23, footnote) that the virtual distinction or distinction of "reasoned reason" is a species of distinction *of reason*. Consequently, it is "formally", or "simply" (simpliciter), or "in itself" *subjective*, although it is "in some way" (secundum quid) *objective*, i.e. on account of its *basis*.

(b) progress of virtual distinction, or *subjective-objective;* (c) progress of nominal distinction, or *merely subjective* (26).

180. THE DOGMATIC PROGRESS AFTER THE APOSTLES IS SUBJECTIVE-OBJECTIVE PROGRESS. – The foregoing makes it easy to answer the much-debated question today, whether the dogmatic progress after the Apostles is objective or subjective. In the preceding chapters we have seen that the Church can define as of divine faith, true inclusive conclusions, that is, conclusions that differ from the revealed premise or revealed datum neither with a real nor only with a nominal distinction, but with a true virtual distinction. In the following chapters we shall see that the Church has factually defined such conclusions. Now, as we have just seen (179), virtual distinction is neither merely subjective nor merely objective, but subjective-objec-

Hence, after the Apostles, there is in dogma no room for merely objective progress, since that would be transformism and not homogeneous evolution. There is room for merely subjective progress, but that is not enough, for it would be a merely nominal progress, or a progress of mere formulae. Finally, a subjective-objective progress is not only possible but actually exists, which is the view maintained by the great majority of Catholic theologians together with Lirinensis and St. Thomas. We believe that only this view satisfactorily explains the obvious facts of the history of dogmas.

181. THE PROGRESS OF THE BELIEVER IN THE FAITH AND THE PROGRESS OF THE FAITH IN THE BELIEVER. – As a matter of fact, the nominal or merely subjective distinction is a distinction of the subject in itself, that is, of the subject independently of the object. The real or merely objective distinction is a distinction of the object in itself, that is, existing in the object independently of the subject. The virtual or subjective-objective distinction is not only a distinction of the subject in the object, but at the same time a distinction of the object in the subject; for it is a distinction made by the subject *in the object,* and a distinction received conceptually by the object in the subject.[98]

[98] *Virtual* distinction or distinction of reasoned reason is described by St. Thomas as a distinction *"not only* on the part of the *reasoner but due to the property of the thing itself."* (*In 1 Sent.*, d.2, q.1, a.2) "For although they signify the same *thing,* they do not signify the same *reason."* (*Contra Gentes,* lib.1, c.36) "Although they signify one *thing,* they do not signify it according to one *reason."* (*In 1 Sent.*, d.22, q.1, a.3) Any reader knows that in these texts the term *reason* signifies the *objective concept* or *objective reason.* On the other hand, the merely mental distinction or distinction of reasoning reason is described by St. Thomas as *"only* in the intellect of the *reasoner".* (*Loc. cit.*) "A distinction *solely* due to the *mode of signifying."* (*Summa Theol.*, p.1, q.41, a.3) "Now these two kinds of distinction, although otherwise explained by others, can be conveniently made clear in this way, viz., that the distinction of reasoning reason

Likewise, the progress that is grounded on virtuality, or the subjective-objective progress verified in dogma after the Apostles is not merely a progress of the believer in himself, nor does it attain to a progress of the faith in itself; but it is indeed true progress, not only of the believer in the faith, but also of the faith in the believer: "Progressus tam fidelis in fide quam fidei in fideli."

182. SPEAKING FORMALLY, IT IS A SUBJECTIVE PROGRESS. – Thus, both those who say that the dogmatic progress is subjective and those who say that it is objective are correct up to a certain point, for it occupies a *middle place* between, and participates in something of both, just as virtual distinction lies midway between the real and the nominal distinction, and participates in something of both.

However, we believe that the dogmatic progress that exists in the Church should not, and cannot, be termed objective without further explanation. There are two reasons for this: the first is that the term *objective progress,* taken without further qualifications, is usually taken today to mean an

is made with reference to the *same* adequate or simple *concept* of the same thing, *only* by a sort of *repetition* or comparison of it, which is done in the *mind* . . . But the latter distinction of reason [that of reasoned reason] is made through *inadequate concepts* of the same thing; for although the same *thing* is conceived, nonetheless *all* that is in the thing is not conceived adequately through either concept, nor is its *whole* quiddity and *objective reason* exhausted." (SUÁREZ, *Disputationes Metaphysicae.* d.7, s.1, n.5)

The *generic* distinction between *objective* and *subjective* progress with respect to revelation or divine faith is designated by St. Thomas with the following phrases: *relative to the substance of the articles* and *relative to their explication* (2-2, q.1, a.7); *relative to the substance of the articles* and *relative to their explication* (2-2, q.1, a.7); *on the part of the teacher* and *on the part of the learner,* (*ibid.*, ad 2); *on the part of the thing believed* and *on the part of the believer* (*ibid.*, q.1, a.2); *on account of the object* and *according to the subject's participation* (*ibid.*, q.5, a.4); *in accordance with itself* and *in so far as participated in the knower* (*De Veritate,* q.14, a.12); *in accordance with the object* and *in accordance with the efficaciousness of the act about the object* (*In 3 Sent.*, d.25, q.2, a.2, sol.1); etc., etc. St. Thomas does not admit any rigorously *objective* progress, not even in the Old Testament, because everything was already *implicitly* contained in the primitive revelation of the two most general principles of faith. It was, therefore, not a progress of new *objectivity,* but one of *explication* of the *implicit* (2-2, q.1, a.7) However, in the Old Testament there was an explication of that which was *implicit in such a way* that it could not be *explicated* or known without *new revelations.* Consequently, there was a progress not by mere human reasoning nor by mere divine assistance, but by *revelation.* On the other hand, in the New Testament, after the Apostles, there is no progress by new revelations, but an unfolding of that which is *implicit* in the deposit in such a way that it can be *explicated,* without revelation, either by mere inclusive *human reasoning* (theological progress) or by *divine assistance* (dogmatic progress).

Consequently, a distinction must be drawn between the *dogmatic* progress prior to the Apostles, the *dogmatic* progress after the Apostles, and *theological* progress. The first is progress by *divine revelation;* the second by *divine assistance;* the third by *human reason.* All three are progress by way of explications of the *revealed implicit.*

objective-real or merely objective progress; after the Apostles, such kind of progress does not, and cannot, exist in dogma. The second is that virtual distinction, although it can be truly called a subjective-objective distinction because it is based on the object, is nonetheless a formally subjective distinction (23); hence, likewise dogmatic progress based on inclusive virtuality, although it can be said to be subjective-objective, is nonetheless *formally subjective*. Thus, dogmatic progress, although it is *objective in a way* (secundum quid), remains nonetheless simply (simpliciter) or formally (formaliter), that is to say, *in itself, subjective,* as is exactly the case with the virtual distinction among the divine attributes.

Therefore, although it can be said to be progress of the believer in the faith as well as a progress of the faith in the believer, nonetheless, formally speaking, it must be *rather* said to be a progress of the believer in the faith than of the faith in the believer. "A progress *rather* of the believer in the faith than of the faith in the believer."[99] "An increase *rather* on the part of the believers than of the things believed."[100] "A progess in the *knowledge* or revelation, not *in the object itself.*"[101] "The explication of the faith against rising errors."[102]

SECTION VIII
WHETHER THE DEFINITIONS OF THE CHURCH COMPLETE OR PERFECT THE DIVINE REVELATION

183. COMPLETION THROUGH REVELATION, AND COMPLETION THROUGH EXPLICATION. – To wind up the study of the relations between the evolution of dogma and the authority of the Church, which constitutes the subject of this long chapter, there only remains to study the question whether the Church, through her definitions, completes or perfects divine revelation. Although this question is as delicate as the previous one, its solution is simply a corollary of the same.

To see it clearly, we need but recall to mind that revelation is one thing, and the explication of revelation is quite another thing. Likewise, a new revelation is one thing, and a new explication of the old revelation is quite another. Consequently, one thing is to complete or perfect the revealed deposit through new revelations or through new non-revealed truths, and quite another is to complete or perfect it through new explications of the truths already revealed.

[99] ALBERTUS MAGNUS, *In 3 Sent.*, d.25, a.1, ad 1; ed. Vivès, t.28, p.475.

[100] PETRUS DE TARANTASIA, *In 3 Sent.*, d.25, q.5, a.1, Tolosa 1652.

[101] *Acta et Decreta Concilii Plenarii Americae Latinae*, n. 26, p. 27, Rome 1906. Rome 1906.

[102] ST. THOMAS, *2-2*, q.1, a.10, ad 1.

184. NO POSSIBILITY OF COMPLETION THROUGH REVELATION. – If it be a case of completing the revealed deposit with new revelations, we have already seen that all theologians teach that the Church cannot do such a thing, and that this teaching has already been consecrated by the condemnation of its contrary in the 21st proposition of the *Syllabus* of Pius X. (177) The deposit of Catholic revelation was closed with the Apostles, and since then there is no longer any room in the Church for any public revelation or for any hagiographic inspiration, which amounts to the same thing, but only for divine assistance to conserve and explicate what has already been revealed. This has been defined by the Vatican Council.[103]

Similarly, if it be a case of completing the revealed deposit with truths that are not contained in the deposit neither explicitly nor implicitly or inclusively, and which, thus, are not truly revealed, it is obvious that the Church cannot complete or perfect the revealed deposit with such truths by defining them as of faith. No thing can be a dogma of divine faith it it be not truly revealed. That would not be completing or perfecting the deposit, but corrupting it. That would not be homogeneous evolution but heterogeneous transformism.

185. POSSIBILITY AND FACT OF COMPLETION THROUGH EXPLICATION. – But if by completing or perfecting the revealed deposit is understood not to perfect it with new revelations or with non-revealed truths, but with a greater explication of the same truths, which is what is meant by implicit virtuality or inclusive conclusions, then there is no doubt that the Church can thus complete and perfect the revealed deposit, and that she thus completes and perfects it every time she defines as a dogma any of those inclusive-consequential truths.

Being truly inclusive in the revealed deposit they are truly and implicitly revealed. Being truly consequential, the Church needs no new revelation in order to arrive at their knowledge, but divine assistance suffices together with the employment of human reasoning as a previous condition or as a mere instrument to deduce, develop, or as the ancients termed it, *explicate* them;

[103] "For the Holy Spirit was *not* promised to Peter's successors in the sense that by His *revelation* they should disclose new doctrine, but in the sense that by His *assistance* they should *inviolably safeguard and faithfully expound the revelation or deposit of faith handed down by the Apostles.*" (VAT. COUNCIL, *De Ecclesia Christi*, c.4; Denz.-Schön., n.3070)

for a thing is properly said to be explicated when that which was beforehand included or implicit in it is unfolded. Finally, being a true virtuality of the revealed deposit, and not mere subjective formulae of the believer, its development is a true development of the revealed deposit, whereby the latter is completed and perfected, as any living being that does nothing but unfold its latent or implicit virtualities, completes and perfects itself without any corruption or transformation. This is nothing else than a simple corollary of the doctrine already expounded on the implicit virtuality of the revealed deposit.

Let it not be said that the revealed deposit was completed with the Apostles, and that which is complete admits of no further completion. The revealed deposit was completed with respect to *revelation;* but it was neither closed nor completed, but remained open and completable with respect to the *divine explication* of what had already been revealed.

186. THE TEACHING OF THE VATICAN COUNCIL. — Let it not be objected either that the Vatican Council teaches that the Church cannot perfect the revealed deposit. The Vatican Council does not teach that the Church cannot perfect the revealed deposit, but that she cannot perfect it *in the manner* of a *philosophical system,* which is a fruit of human inventions.[104]

As we have elsewhere explained, the development of any philosophical or human system comprises three things: (a) the *subtraction* or rejection of any datum, no matter how long standing it might be, which is shown to be false by either reason or experience; (b) the *addition* of any new datum shown to be true by experience or reason, even if it happens not to be included in the primitive datum; (c) the *modification* of the meaning of the primitive datum whenever reason or experience shows that the old meaning was inexact. This is the manner in which all human systems, all institutions that are fruits of man or of nature, are developed, viz. by withdrawing, adding, modifying incessantly.

[104] "For the *doctrine of faith,* which God has revealed, has not been proposed as a *philosophical invention* to be *perfected* by human talents, but has been handed over to the Spouse of Christ as a divine deposit to be faithfully *safeguarded* and infallibly *declared.*" (VAT. COUNCIL, *De Fide Catholica,* c.4; Denz.-Schön. n.3020) The Church, therefore, does not condemn all perfecting of the revealed deposit, but the perfecting of it "in the manner of a philosophical system". This is seen even more clearly in the formula for the oath prescribed by Pius X: "Likewise, I condemn all errors whereby the *divine deposit* handed over to the Spouse of Christ to be faithfully safeguarded by her is *replaced* by a *philosophical invention* or creation of human conscience gradually shaped by the efforts of men, and which is to be perfected in the future through an indefinite progress." (Motu Proprio *Sacrorum Antistitum,* Sept. 1, 1910; Denz-Schön. no.3541) The canons and the doctrine of the Vatican Council as well as the formula against Modernism have been worded with such precision and dogmatic refinement, that the theologian, on reading them, must analyze and carefully weigh each word if he wishes, in his efforts to avoid one error, not to fall into the opposite error.

In the development of the revealed deposit, which is the fruit of neither man nor nature but of God and of a supernatural God, neither the Church nor true theology can do any of these three things. In the process of development through *inclusive* minors of reason nothing of the old is *discarded,* nothing alien is *added,* nothing is *modified.* The inclusive minors are not employed for the purposes of subtracting, adding, or modifying anything in the majors of faith, but simply for the purpose of developing, unfolding, *explicating* the inexhaustible fecundity locked up in the majors revealed by God, and which, being divine, are laden and overflowing with divine truth, with dogmatic sap.

Let then no reader be shocked upon hearing us say that the Church perfects the deposit. She does not perfect it in the manner of a philosophical system, but she does perfect it because she increases the explication of the deposit, and this authentic explication given by the Church becomes a part of the revealed deposit itself to be conserved as a true and legitimate constituent part of the revealed deposit.

We all know from the teaching of traditional theology, and from the Vatican Council's definition, that the Church has the divine mission not only of *conserving* but also of *explicating* the deposit. Nonetheless, an excessive fear of Modernism, or the reading of certain theological textbooks, has made some people so timid or so narrow-minded as to think that the action of *explicating* exercised by the Church is an action that falls, not on the revealed deposit, which they regard as completely immutable and untouchable, but exclusively on the *subjective intellect* of the believers.

These people are, in our opinion, very much mistaken. *To whom* something *is explicated* is one thing; *what* is explicated is another thing. Undoubtedly, those to whom the Church explicates the deposit are the faithful; but that which the Church explicates or unfolds is not the faithful, but the *deposit.*

Thus the action of the Church falls not only on the faithful but also on the revealed deposit itself. Corresponding to every action or dogmatic definition by the Church there occurs in the deposit itself a degree of development or growth, but always with respect to us. It is a growth that occurs not through something coming from without, but through something that issues from within, as is the case with anything that is vital or homogeneous. It is a growth not of new substance, but of explication or greater development of the substance. Nonetheless, it is a case of true and proper growth, of true and proper *evolution,* but never a case of *transformism.*[105]

[105] What we have said about the term "objective progress" (182) must similarly be said of the terms "evolution of dogma" or "new dogmas", notwithstanding the fact that these terms are true, that is to say, such terms must not be employed without an

187. THE TEACHING OF LIRINENSIS. – Lirinensis, whose authority in this matter is recognized by all, has stated well what the Church cannot do, and what she can do with respect to dogma or the revealed deposit.

What the Church cannot do, and does not do, he states in the following terms: (a) she *permutes* nothing; (b) *takes* nothing *away;* (c) *adds* nothing; (d) does *not excise* the necessary; (e) *does not append* the superfluous; (f) *loses* nothing of what is hers; (g) *does not usurp* what is another's. The Church does none of these things with respect to the deposit. Insofar as such behaviour is concerned, the deposit is sacred, immutable, untouchable.

What the Church can do, and does, with respect to the deposit itself (and not only with respect to the faithful), he states in these terms: (a) let it be *cultivated;* (b) let it *flower;* (c) let it *mature;* (d) let it *grow;* (c) let it be PERFECTED.

Let our objector take note of the two last terms of Lirinensis. Under the action of the Church, which is none other than the action of the Holy Spirit, the deposit itself *grows* (proficiat), the deposit itself is *perfected* (perficiatur).

The reason for this is that not all the dogmas existed in the primitive deposit *formally* relative to us, but some existed therein in an *unformed* manner; not all existed in a *finished* state, some existed only in an *inchoate* state. To the Church, of which theology is only an instrument, God entrusted the mission not only of *conserving* that which already existed formally or in a finished state, but also of *explicating,* i.e., of developing, maturing, and finishing that which relative to us existed only as something *unformed* and *roughly sketched.* "Let her take care of and finish any things that of old are *unformed* and *inchoate,* and keep safe those that have been firmed and defined."[106]

explanation or distinction because they lend themselves easily to a false understanding. When without further qualification a thing is said to evolve, the term is usually taken today to mean *transformistic* evolution; when "new dogmas" are mentioned, the term usually means "completely new"; when "objective progress" is mentioned without further explanation it usually means the progress of the object "in itself", independently of the subject. Taken in these senses, such terms would be false. Hence, this book does not bear the title "The *Evolution* of Dogma", but that of "The *Homogeneous Evolution* of Dogma".

106. "But perhaps someone might say: Is there, in consequence, *no progress* in the Church of Christ? Let there be progress, and in the *greatest* measure. However, let it truly be *progress of the faith,* not a permutation. For it belongs to progress that each thing be increased *in itself;* but to permutation, that something be changed from one thing into another . . . . Therefore, whatsoever has been sown by the faith of the fathers in this husbandry of God's Church, let the same *flourish* and *mature,* let the same *grow* and *come to perfection.* But the Church of Christ, being a sedulous and circumspect guardian of the dogmas committed to her, *permutes* nothing in them, *subtracts* nothing, *adds* nothing; she *excises* nothing necessary, *appends* nothing superfluous, *loses* nothing of what is hers, *usurps* nothing that belongs to another; but with all diligence strives after this one thing: that by faithful and wise treatment of the old heritage, she may render accurate and polished anything that of old is *unformed* and *inchoate;* consolidate and firm anything that is already expressed and clarified, keep safe anything already firmed and *defined.*" (LIRINENSIS, *Commonitorium,* n.23; MIGNE PL 50, 667) St. Thomas expresses himself in a similar vein: "The article is an *indivisible* truth with regard to what is *actually* explicated in the article; but it is *divisible with regard* to those things that are *potentially* contained in the article, for he who says *one thing,* somehow says *many things;* and these are the things that *precede* the article and which are *consequent to it;* and in this regard the article of faith can be *explicated* and *divided* . . . and through the efforts of the Church Fathers [the faith] has been more and more *explicated.*" (*In 3 Sent.*, d.25, q.2, aa.2-4, also a.1, sol.3)

Thus, through the Church's action the revealed deposit is not perfected in the manner of a philosophical or human system, but it *is perfected.* It is not perfected with regard to the *substance,* but with regard to its *explication.* It is not perfected through new divine *revelation,* but through perpetual divine *assistance.* Since that authority or assistance is divine, the growth is dogmatic. Since it is *assistance,* not revelation, it must, and does, employ all human means; and no human means has been, or will ever be, found to be more connatural to our feeble intellect for the purpose of unfolding or explicating the content or inner fecundity of an *intellectual* deposit, such as the revealed deposit, than *inclusive reasoning.* In other words, by way of theological conclusion, by way of transition *"from one to an other according to reason, which is not other in reality."* (ST. THOMAS)

CHAPTER IV

THE DIFFERENT CHANNELS OF THE EVOLUTION OF DOGMA

188. OBJECT AND DIVISION OF THIS CHAPTER. – In the preceding chapter we have seen that a true homogeneous evolution is possible in dogma without detriment to its substantial immutability. In the present chapter we shall study the different ways, or channels, or processes through which such an evolution is carried out. At the same time we shall touch briefly on the analogies exhibited by dogmatic evolution relative to the various kinds of evolution in the natural order.

We shall therefore divide this chapter into seven sections:

1. Dogmatic evolution through speculative processes.
2. Historical examples of dogmatic evolution through this channel.
3. Still more examples.
4. Whether dogmatic evolution through assimilation is possible.
5. Dogmatic evolution through affective or experimental processes.
6. Further observations on the affective way.
7. The analogies of dogmatic evolution.

SECTION I
DOGMATIC EVOLUTION THROUGH SPECULATIVE PROCESSESES

189. AN ANTI-INTELLECTUAL BIAS. – Even among theologians who admit the evolution of dogma there are those who hold the view that

the way of pure speculation or reasoning – to which they contemptuously refer as "mere dialectics" – has had little or no influence at all in its development.

For such theologians dogmatic evolution has taken place, and takes place, only or almost only by way of Christian praxis or Christian sense. The basis for this lies in their belief that the primitive deposit or revealed datum was principally made up of facts or institutions: if any intellectual statements were found in it, such statements were neither explicit nor clear, as required for the possibility of speculative reasoning, but vague and confused, and thus more apt to undergo development through the praxis and experience of the whole Christian community than through the abstract speculative processes of a handful of dialectical theoreticians.

190. AN INTERESTING LETTER. How firmly such ideas have taken root even in great Catholic theologians can be seen from the interesting paragraphs that follow, transcribed from a letter which a renowned writer and professor of theology sent us years ago when we were writing on these matters in *La Ciencia Tomista.*

"Indeed, if we consider dogmatic development *a priori,* it would seem that it should take place as you describe it, and so it would insofar as such a development is realized *dialectically.* However, I believe that such a process has scarcely taken place, if at all. First, because, in my view, a great part of the deposit is not to be found from the beginning, not even *implicitly,* in intellectual statements, but only embodied in facts and institutions, whose explication, based on sound experience and guaranteed by the Church, leads us to recognize such doctrines as *virtually* contained therein; it is in this sense that I usually understand this term. Secondly, because even that which is implicated in certain statements cannot be easily deduced therefrom through *mere dialectics:* (a) because it is not contained in clear statements, as in the case of the first principles of any science, but in expressions that are vague and even confused, from which, with no other light or guide but *dialectics,* I fail to see how anything can be rigorously deduced; (b) because when we are dealing with ineffable and mysterious realities, where terms are not employed in a univocal but in an analogical sense, their supposition at times varies somewhat without our being aware of it, and thus propositions that seem equivalent, are not totally so. Hence, some kind of flaw creeps into the deduction, which, therefore, no matter how logical it appears to be, is not conclusive unless its legitimacy is vouched for by good Christian sense and guaranteed by the Church. Hence, too, the fact that *dialectical* development should so often lead to an aberation, a heresy, an error, or to mere doctrines held by the various schools, with no hope of ever being defined some day.

"In short, dogmatic development very very rarely, or almost never, takes place through *pure dialectics.* Dialectics usually comes in subsequently

to justify the development made spontaneously or *intuitively* by way of Christian praxis or experience. Thus, St. Thomas's dictum is fulfilled: 'Life comes ahead of doctrine.' If such were not the case, you should find it easy to cite *concrete, real* instances of dialectical development, and you should not content yourself with some *hypothetical* case."

It is clear that our objector agrees with us in that not only theological, but also true dogmatic development exists in the Church even after the Apostles. He further agrees with us in that the principal cause of this dogmatic progress is the Church's divine authority, or in other words, the Holy Spirit's assistance, which the Church possesses not merely to *conserve*, but also to *explicate*, or unfold, or develop the revealed deposit.

Thus the disagreement is not about the existence of dogmatic progress nor about its principal cause, but solely about the *human instrument* or way or medium of the aforecited progress. For the Church possesses neither revelation nor even inspiration but only the *assistance* of the Holy Spirit; hence it is necessary to assign some human medium whereof the Church may avail herself for the dogmatic explication or development of the revealed deposit.

We said that the usual medium employed by the Church for the development of dogma is *reason*, or in other words, reasoning, or by another name, the way of theological *conclusion*. Our objector, on the other hand, says or seems to say that dogmatic progress never or almost never takes place by way of reasoning.

At first glance, the disagreement cannot be more radical; however, we suspect that the disagreement is more a question of names than of reality, and that it lies in the peculiar and restricted sense given by our objector to the term *reasoning*. Our suspicion is based on the fact that wherever we have employed the terms *reason, argumentation, reasoning*, our objector never employs such terms; instead he employs solely and exclusively the terms *dialectics, simple dialectics, mere dialectics*, as if there were no argumentation other than the formal, i.e., that which is disposed in the form of a reasoning, which is the concern of dialectics.

To preclude such a momentous problem, as this one on the progress of dogma, from turning into a mere question of names, let us recall to mind briefly what St. Thomas understands, and what we have understood by the terms *reason, argumentation*, and *reasoning*, when we affirm that this is the more usual channel of dogmatic progress.

191. INTUITION AND REASONING. — Any truth must be either known *in itself*, or known *in another* truth. There can be no middle between being known *in itself* and being known *in another*.

This is applicable both to knowledge that is intrinsic, i.e., science, and to knowledge that is extrinsic, i.e., based on authority. In the case of intrinsic or evident knowledge, every truth is either evident *of itself* or evident *through another*. *Per se notum, notum per aliud*, philosophers are wont to say. Likewise, in the case of revealed knowledge or the knowledge of faith, every truth is either revealed *in itself* or revealed *in another* truth. *Revelatum in se, revelatum in alio*, theologians are wont to say. The knowledge of a thing through itself and without the intervention of another objective truth, in which it is wrapped up, is called *simple understanding* or *intuition*. The knowledge of a truth, not through itself, but through another virtually distinct truth in which the former is wrapped up, is called *reason* or *reasoning*.[1]

According to this doctrine, which we have elsewhere expounded in greater detail, to reason is nothing else but to know one truth through another, or to pass from the knowledge of a truth or proposition to the knowledge of another, or to affirm one truth on the strength of another. The *kind* of that *other* truth on which the former is based, or from which it proceeds, is accidental. It may be a revealed or a non-revealed truth; a metaphysical, physical, or moral truth; speculative, or practical; a truth of fact, or a truth of law; a theory, or an experience — there will be different kinds of reasoning, but there will always be reasoning because it will always be knowledge of a truth not through itself but *through another* that differs virtually from it. All of it is argumentation or reasoning; all of it is science; all of it is conclusion — something quite different from simple understanding or intuition, which is knowledge of a truth through itself; and something quite different from faith, which is knowledge of a truth simply and solely through *authority*. (61-64).

192. CONSCIOUS REASONING, AND SPONTANEOUS OR UNCONSCIOUS REASONING. — This reasoning or comparison of one truth with another is not always consciously done by us; rather it is often done in a spontaneous or unconscious manner. There are very many truths that seem clear and obvious to us, and undoubtedly so they are. However, they are not clear of themselves but in virtue of other truths that our minds habitually

[1] "To *understand* means the *simple acceptance* of something, hence *principles* which are known *of themselves without any comparison* are properly said to be understood. To *reason* is properly to arrive *from one to the knowledge of another*. Hence, we properly reason about *conclusions*, which are made clear by the principles." (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p. 1, q.83, a.4) "And thus it is necessary that one apprehended term be combined with or divided from another, and that advance be made *from one* combination or division to *another, which is to reason*." (ST. THOMAS, *loc. cit.*, q.85, a.5) "These habits [understanding and science] *differ insofar as understanding* views the true that is *known of itself*, whereas science considers the true that is known *through another*." (ST. THOMAS, *op. cit.*, p.1-2, q.75, a.2)

possess and with which our minds continuously compare them without our being aware of doing so. This is proven by the fact that if someone doubts the truth of any of those statements, or asks us why we hold any of them, we readily proffer the reason or proof on the strength of which we affirm it to be so; thus evidencing that what seemed to be clear of itself was in reality clear through another truth existing in our minds, which served as the ground or basis of our statement even when we were not explicitly aware of it.

Consequently, whenever there exists in our minds a "why" or intrinsic reason for our statements or opinions, a reasoning also exists. If we point out the "why", or are aware of it, the reasoning is conscious. If the "why" exists in our minds without our being expressly aware of it, the reasoning is unconscious or spontaneous. But, in any case, where an objective or intrinsic reason for what we affirm exists in our minds, there reasoning exists, not simple understanding or intuition.

193. REASONING IN FORM OR DIALECTICAL, AND FORMLESS REASONING. The conscious reasoning whereby we express the reason for our statement, or whereby we become aware of it, can be done either *in the form* of a reasoning, or done *without such a form*. The various forms of reasoning are well known, and they are dealt with in *dialectics*. The primary form is that in which from a major proposition and another minor proposition prefaced with a *now* or *but*, a third proposition or conclusion is inferred identified by a *therefore* or *consequently*. When we argue in this manner there is not only a real reasoning – since there is a transition from one truth to another – but also a *formal* or *dialectical* reasoning, i.e., a reasoning done *in dialectical form*.

However, this manner of reasoning is too technical, too formal, too artificial to suit the exercise of such a natural and daily function of our minds, such as reasoning is. Hence, we rarely employ such a formal manner of reasoning. Instead we usually employ the formless mode of arguing, in which we set aside the three distinct propositions with their *nows* and *therefores*, and settle for only one proposition whereby we express our *reason* or reasoning by means of a simple conjunction, an adverb, or a participle. Instead of saying with the dialecticians: "Every spiritual being is immortal; now, the human soul is spiritual; therefore, it is immortal"; we say simply: "*being* spiritual, it has to be immortal"; or, "*since* it is spiritual, it is also immortal." This is the usual manner of reasoning. Such reasonings are true reasonings even if they are not cast in dialectical *form*. Instances of reasoning in dialectical form are so uncommon that they are to be found almost exclusively in textbooks or in the intellectual gymnastics of academic *acts* or disputations.

Thus, intuition or simple understanding is one thing; and quite another, reason or reasoning. Likewise, reasoning can be either spontaneous or conscious; and the conscious reasoning can be either formless or dialectical. To know a truth through itself and not through another is intuition or simple understanding. To know it, not through itself, but through another in which it is intrinsically wrapped up and from which we deduce it, is always a case of reasoning, although not always a case of formal or dialectical reasoning.

194. REPLY TO THE OBJECTION. – We said that the most common human instrument employed by the Church in the development of dogma is argumentation or reasoning. This means nothing else but that dogmatic development usually takes place through comparing certain truths with other virtually distinct truths, whether it be a comparison of revealed truths among themselves, or with truths of reason.

On the other hand, our distinguished correspondent says that it never, or almost never, takes place through dialectics, through mere dialectics.

If by dialectics our correspondent understands the *formal* argumentation or that which is done *in the form* of reasoning, we find no inconvenience in answering: *transeat*. We could as easily deny it since there has been some instance of dogmatic development effected in dialectical form. However, in view of the fact that when we speak of reasoning relative to dogmatic development, we have never employed the term in the narrow sense of reasoning cast in dialectical form, but in the broad and proper sense of knowing one truth through another virtually distinct from it, we prefer to answer: *transeat*, since it is not good to confuse the issues.

But if by dialectics or speculative processes our correspondent understands any kind of true and proper reasoning, then his statement would be equivalent to saying that dogmatic development has never or very rarely been effected through comparing certain truths with other truths or through a rigorous deduction of some truths from other truths. In which case, his statement is contrary to the common view of traditional theology and to clear facts of the history of dogmas.

Our correspondent asks for concrete and real instances of dogmatic development through speculative channels or reasoning. We think that, although the matter is very delicate, the request poses no great difficulty, and we shall oblige with numerous instances in the following two sections. But first let us touch on his two other observations concerning the scarcity of speculative or intellectual statements in the revealed deposit, and the obscurity or vagueness of such statements.

195. THE SCARCITY OF INTELLECTUAL STATEMENTS IN THE REVEALED DEPOSIT. – Intellectual statements are of two kinds: some are expressed in abstract, conceptual, philosophic terms. Cardinal Newman usually designates these with the name of *notional* statements. Others are ex-

pressed in concrete, individual, ordinary terms, which we call terms of *common sense.*

The councils or theologians say: 'In God there is a trinity of hypostases in the unity of essence," "The Son is consubstantial with the Father", "In Christ there are two natures and only one person." These are intellectual but abstract or notional statements because the terms "essence," "hypostasis", "nature", "consubstantial", are conceptual or philosophic and not ordinary or common terms.

On the other hand, the Holy Bible says: "There is but one God". "Jesus Christ is the true Son of God", "He is like unto us in everything except sin". These are also true *intellectual* statements, and not one whit less intellectual than the former, but they are concrete and individual, not abstract or notional, statements because the terms "only one God", "Son of God", "like unto us", are ordinary or common-sense terms, terms of universal usage.

We, therefore, readily grant that, as a general rule, the revealed deposit is not couched in abstract or philosophic statements; but rather in concrete, singular, popular, common-sense statements. The reason for it is obvious. The revealed deposit was not written for the wise alone, as were the works of Aristotle or Plato; but for the whole of mankind, just as much, perhaps even more, for the simple folk than for philosophers or theologians. And when one speaks or writes for everybody and not for a learned group, when one addresses himself to the popular mind and not to specialists, the language employed is, and has to be, concrete, singular, couched in ordinary, common-sense terms. As a general rule, such is the language of the Holy Bible and of divine Tradition. It is the strongest token of its perenniality and catholicity, since thus the language is accessible to all kinds of persons, places, and times.

But if in the revealed deposit there is a scarcity of abstract statements, there is, on the contrary, an abundance of concrete statements. The Holy Bible is replete with such *concrete* statements, which are not less *intellectual* than the abstract or notional simply because they are concrete. The Holy Bible abounds in statements overflowing with divine truth and life, statements that overflow with life precisely insofar as they overflow with truth. This is particularly true of the New Testament, and much more of the fourth gospel and the epistles of St. Paul, which is why so much is being said and written today on the so-called "*Theology* of St. John and of St. Paul." Dogmatic reasoning takes off from these biblical statements which, we repeat, are not one whit less intellectual for being concrete; from these *theologies* of St. John and St. Paul, which are not one whit less divine or less of a *primitive datum* than the simplest statements of the Synoptics, since they are all equally divinely inspired. Then it either compares some revealed statements with others, or compares them with clear statements of human reason. The basis or starting point of dogmatic argumentation or reasoning can indifferently be

either an abstract or a concrete statement, provided only that it be divinely revealed. Likewise, if a statement of reason is to intervene as a minor premise without jeopardizing objective homogeneity, it is indifferent whether it be theoretical or practical, of external or internal experience, immediately or mediately evident, provided that it be *evident,* whatever be the source of that evidence.

Thus, for example, although we do not have explicitly revealed the abstract statement that "Jesus Christ is *consubstantial* with the Father", we have instead the *concrete* revealed statements that "Jesus Christ is the true Son of God" and that "There is but one God"; and from these concrete statements mutually compared, the abstract statement of *consubstantiality* follows by true reasoning. Although we do not have divinely revealed the abstract statement that in Christ there are two natures and two operations, we have instead divinely revealed the concrete statements that Christ is not only God but also man "in everything like unto us"; and from these two statements combined with the minor of natural reason that every man has a human nature, and, if he be in either a *perfect* or a *connatural* state, also possesses a human will and all the other powers, there followed the abstract statement of the two natures and the two wills and operations. Although we do not have explicitly revealed the abstract statement that it is necessary to confess all sins stating their species, number, and specific circumstances, we do have revealed the concrete statement that the ministers of the Church are true *judges* in the matter of retaining or forgiving sins; and from this concrete statement combined with the natural minor premise regarding the nature of *judgment,* there followed the abstract statement regarding the species, number, and circumstances. Although the abstract statement regarding the *transubstantiation* has not been explicitly revealed to us, the concrete statement *This is my body* has been revealed to us; and from this concrete statement combined with what is evidently required for the *truth* of this mystery there followed the abstract statement of the transubstantiation. And so of many other dogmas or dogmatic developments, that is to say, of all or almost all derived dogmas.

It is true that all this, which sounds simple enough when stated in a few sentences, has required prolonged labours and experiences, countless trials and discussions, at times even centuries of slow and troubled gestation. But that is one more proof of the fact that the development has been effected through intellectual channels or by way of knowledge, rather than through affective or devotional channels. For as St. Thomas subtly observes, the difference between these two methods of development lies precisely in the fact that the development effected through intellectual methods requires experience and time; whereas time, external experience, or any other external ele-

ment, are accidental to the development effected through affective or devotional channels.[2]

196. ANOTHER REPLY. – But let us gratuitously assume that in the revealed deposit there hardly exists any intellectual statement, whether abstract or concrete; that the revealed deposit reduces to *facts* and *institutions*, as our objector seems to say. Even if such an entirely gratuitous hypothesis were granted, we fail to see that anything could be inferred therefrom against dogmatic progress by way of reasoning. Whether the starting point be an intellectual statement or a fact or institution makes no difference with respect to true theological reasoning, provided such facts or institutions are revealed or divine, as anything included in the deposit necessarily has to be.

Thus, let us take as an example any of those dogmas that do not seem to be contained in the deposit in the form of intellectual statements but in the form of facts or of the constant practice of the Church. For instance, the dogma, already defined as a truth of faith, that the baptism administered by a heretic is valid. This dogma does not seem to be recorded, at least not explicitly, in any statement of the Holy Scriptures, but only in a fact or practice of apostolic-divine origin, in the constant practice of the Church whereby those who had been baptized in heresy were never rebaptized upon their conversion. Now, then, it is obvious that this mere fact or practice would have been, and is, sufficient to infer by means of true reasoning the dogma of the validity of such baptisms provided that such a fact is related to another revealed truth, viz. the necessity of baptism for salvation. If we posit as major the revealed truth that baptism is necessary for salvation, and as minor the constant practice of the Church not to administer a new baptism to those who were baptized in heresy, it evidently follows that the first baptism, although administered by heretics, has always been considered valid by the Church; and this is the defined dogma.

Similarly, the dogma of the universality of original sin can be inferred from the sole *fact* of baptism being administered to children; the dogma of the real presence from the sole *fact* that adoration has always been given to the host and the wine after their consecration; the dogma of papal infallibility from the sole *fact* that in the Church nothing has ever been considered firm and definitive in matters of faith without the approval of the Sovereign Pontiff. The same can be said of many other dogmas.

[2] "Speaking *per se* the increase of the magnitude of *faith* as to steadfastness and *devotion* is effected in proportion to the readiness of the *will* which comes *from grace, not from the passage of time*... But to *reflect* (cogitare) belongs to the *intellect*, the virtues whereof *require experience and time;* and thus, the quantity of faith relative to the *knowledge* of the articles, speaking *per se, grows in accordance with the difference of time.*" (ST. THOMAS, *In 3 Sent.*, d.25, q.2, a.2, sol.1).

Truth to say, St. Thomas frequently bases himself on *facts*, rites, customs or institutions of the Church in order to deduce through rigorous and true reasoning the dogmas that we believe. Thus, in the *Summa Contra Gentiles* (book 3, ch.1) he deduces the dogma of original sin from the universal practice (according to the common custom of the Church) of administering baptism to children. In the *Summa Theologica* (2-2, q.75, a.2) he proves that neither the bread nor the wine remains after the consecration by means of the Church's custom (the Church's rite) of offering the worship of adoration (latria) and of the eucharistic fast. Earlier, in q.2, a.1, he had proven that the making of a symbol of faith belongs to the Pope from the constant fact that the graver questions have always belonged to the Pope (to whom the graver and more difficult questions of the Church are referred), and from the fact that no council, not even a general council, has ever been held to be valid without his confirmation (by whose authority a Synod is congregated and by whose judgment it is confirmed). In q.10, a.12 of the same part, in order to prove that the children of infidels or of Jews are not to be baptized against the will of their parents, he adduces as a fundamental reason the constant custom of the Church. (This has never been held by the usage of the Church . . . Beside the custom hitherto observed in the Church). So far is the Holy Doctor from believing that theological reasoning cannot be based on facts or institutions or customs, when they are of divine origin, that he places the custom of the Church above the very authority of the Holy Fathers. "The Church's usage possesses the greatest authority, which should be followed in all things, since the very teaching of Catholic Doctors derives its authority from the Church. Hence, one should abide by the authority of the Church rather than by the authority of Jerome or of any other doctor."[3]

So that our objector may palpably see how a true and rigorous reasoning can be grounded on a *fact* or rite or *institution*, and how a true dogma can be inferred from it through what our objector calls *mere dialectics*, we will transcribe literally the reasoning whereby St. Thomas deduces the existence of original sin in children from the constant *practice* of the Church.

"Baptism and the other sacraments of the Church are certain remedies against sin, as will be clear below. *Now, in accordance with the common usage of the Church,* baptism is administered to newly born children. *Therefore,* it would be administered in vain if no sin existed in them. *But* no actual sin exists in them because they are wanting in the use of free judgment, without which no act is imputed to man unto guilt. *Consequently,* it must be said that there exists in them the sin derived *through origin, since* there is nothing in vain or useless in the works of God and the Church."[4]

[3] *Loc cit.*

[4] ST. THOMAS, *Summa Contra Gentes*, bk.4, ch.50.

Here we have a true *dogma* deduced by means of true *reasoning* based on a *custom* or fact or institution. The particles *now, therefore, since,* are the indelible marks of reasoning, or the bonds of comparison of various truths among themselves. If our objector prefers to call this *mere dialectics* at one time, and *Christian sense* or *intuition* at another, "What's in a name?" It has always been known by the name of reasoning, and the history of dogmatic progress is replete with such reasonings.

It is obvious that true reasoning and true dogmatic progress or development are no less possible in the case of facts and institutions than in the case of intellectual statements. The profound reason for this is given by St. Thomas in his analysis of the value of *facts,* customs, or institutions. Man has at his disposal two means wherewith to express his interior thought: the first is words; the second, deeds. Both, words or deeds, are alike signs of the thought of him who speaks the words or performs the deeds.[5]

Thus, assuming that we are dealing with facts or institutions of divine origin, that is, contained in the revealed deposit, we come through them to know the *mind* of the inspired author exactly as if he had expressed himself by means of words or intellectual statements instead of facts or institutions. The words or intellectual statements of the Bible are objects of dogma or of faith insofar as they are signs or expressions of the inspired author's thought or of God's thought. Such a thought is expressed no less by facts or institutions than by abstract or concrete statements.

Putting together the two replies to the first objection we have: (a) the revealed deposit does not perhaps contain many abstract intellectual statements, but it does contain a very great number of concrete statements; (b) even if we grant that the greater part of the revealed deposit is made up of facts or institutions, such facts or institutions equally serve the purpose of dogmatically unfolding the deposit through reasoning just as if they were intellectual statements.

197. THE OBSCURITY AND VAGUENESS OF THE STATEMENTS. – The second difficulty against dogmatic progress by way of reasoning or conclusion is taken from the obscurity and vagueness of the statements of the revealed deposit. This difficulty is stated by our friend in the following terms:

[5] "Just as man's reason and will in things that are to be done is manifested through *words* so also it is manifested through *deeds* . . . insofar as the interior movement of the will and the *concept of reason* is most efficaciously made clear by multiplied external acts." (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.* p.1-2, q.97, a.3) Boutroux himself acknowledges that every religious fact is always the expression of an idea or intellectual statement. "Indeed, every sentiment, every religious act enfolds ideas, concepts, theoretical understanding."

"In the second place, that which is implied in certain statements is not easily deduced therefrom through mere dialectics because it is not embodied in *clear* statements, as the principles of a science, but in *vague* and *confused* expressions, from which, with no other light and guide than dialectics, I fail to see that anything can be rigorously inferred." (190)

Reply. – In any statement or principle whether it be a statement or principle of science or a statement or principle of faith or revelation two parts must always be distinguished: there is a part that is explicit, formal, determinate, *clear;* and there is another part that is implicit, virtual, vague, *obscure.* If everything were explicit, determinate, clear, there could be no *progress,* nor would such a statement be a principle. If everything were vague, indeterminate, obscure, there could be no *understanding* nor even *faith;* nor would it deserve to be called a statement or proposition but a logogriph or undecipherable riddle.[6] Indeed, no thing can be deciphered if we do not start from something clear just as no equation can be solved if all its quantities are unknown or indeterminate. Thus, there has to be *something* clear. (55)

This clear part, big or small, of the primitive datum or deposit provides the reasoning with the starting point from which it proceeds to make clear the part that is obscure, to determine the part that is vague, to actualize the part that is virtual. This is precisely that in which reasoning consists. This is the condition for all progress. Provided that there is something clear – and without this no faith is possible – the virtual and obscure part can be the cause for exerting greater effort and consuming more time, but it will at the same time be the source of more ample, more fruitful, more inexhaustible progress.

Indeed, where a principle is more profound, higher, more divine, the greater is the part of implicitness, virtuality, indetermination, vagueness, obscurity, that it contains. Clear and transparent waters are usually not indicative of great depth. On the other hand, insofar as a principle gets to be clear, fixed, determined, it loses implicitness, virtuality, fecundity. A force loses its potential to the degree that its energy is actualized. Hence, the statements of the councils, popes, theologians, are much more clear, more precise, less vague than the statements of the sacred deposit; but the latter are more evocative, more fecund, more pregnant with truth and life than the statements of the theologians, and even of the popes and ecumenical councils.

Thus, if all that is meant is that, even with respect to truths that exist today defined as dogmas of faith, there was in the revealed deposit much that was implicit, virtual, undetermined, obscure, which required a great amount

[6] "For a man would not assent by giving faith to certain proposed things unless he *understood them somewhat.*" (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.2-2, q.8, a.8, ad 2).

of effort and time for its explication, actualization, determination and definition – then there is no difficulty in admitting it. But if what is meant is that *everything* in the primitive deposit was obscure, or vague, or indetermined, or virtual, as happens in a seed or in an unformed embryo, then that would render impossible not only theology but also the faith itself; besides, it would be in manifest contradiction to what the history of dogmas teaches and to what is plain from the mere reading of the Holy Bible.

Of course, no one should expect to find explicitly or clearly in the primitive deposit the multitude of dogmatic developments which are found, e.g., in the so-called Symbol of St. Athanasius, in the ecumenical councils, in the papal definitions. If such developments were to be found clearly in the deposit, they would not be developments or progress, nor would there have been any need of Church Fathers or theologians to clarify or determine them, or of councils or popes to define them. To expect to find explicitly, or even (in our opinion) *formally*, in the primitive deposit all the dogmas defined, e.g., by the Tridentine, would be like expecting to find in a sapling the variegated and splendid foliage of a secular tree.

198. THE DOGMA OF THE MOST HOLY TRINITY. But if we do not find clearly and explicitly such developments, nonetheless we always find clearly and explicitly certain fundamental concepts out of which such developments have issued. For instance, in the statements of the primitive deposit relative to the Trinity we do not find explicitly, nor anything like it, all that the councils and theologians have determined or said about hypostasis and nature, processions and notions, absolutes and relatives, concepts *in* and concepts *ad*, properties and appropriations. Not even the terms *persons* and *trinity* are primitive terms. But if we find none of these things explicitly, nonetheless we find, on the other hand, clearly and explicitly stated the oneness of God, clearly and explicitly stated the *distinction* between the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, clearly and explicitly stated the *procession* of the Son and the Holy Spirit from the Father, clearly and explicitly stated the *divinity* of the Father and the Son, and in clearly equivalent terms the divinity of the Holy Spirit.

Well then: from these four primitive and clear concepts of *oneness, distinction, procession,* and *divinity,* have followed, and follow, through reasoning, and rigorous reasoning, all the dogmatic developments relative to the sacred dogma of the divine Trinity and all the manifold and complicated trinitarian formulae elaborated by councils and theologians culminating in the master formula "In God everything is one and the same except where relative opposition is encountered", which is the key to, and the crowning accomplishment of, the treatise *On the Trinity*.

Of course, not all dogmas are as purely speculative in character as the dogma of the Most Holy Trinity, nor consequently do they evidence as clearly the logical rigorousness that has presided over the development of the

latter. But every one without exception has for its basis one or several formal and explicit concepts found in the Holy Scriptures or in the divine Tradition. From such data theological *reasoning*, which is the ordinary instrument of dogmatic progress, has always proceeded, on them it has unceasingly grounded itself under the guiding norm of the Christian sense and of the authority of the Church.

199. FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS AND DERIVED CONCEPTS. To resume: if not all the dogmatic concepts we possess and hold by faith today were explicitly contained in the primitive deposit or revealed datum, neither were all of them merely implicit; if not everything in the deposit was formal, neither was everything virtual; if not everything was clear from the beginning, neither was everything confused.

In the primitive deposit there is an ensemble of actual, formal, explicit, clear, determined concepts; this was the starting point of theological reasoning and of dogmatic progress.

In such a formal and *determined* manner – says St. Thomas – are contained in the apostolic deposit, not all the dogmas or articles *of faith*, but all the principal dogmas or articles *of the faith*, meaning by articles of the faith not the derived but the fundamental dogmas, and in these fundamental dogmas not the secondary or concomitant concepts but the primary or essential concept, which St. Thomas calls *the essence* of the articles. The secondary or derived concepts, although contained in the deposit, are not contained therein except *by way of consequence* (those things that follow from the articles), and such are not of faith until they are defined by the ordinary or solemn magisterium of the Church. (154)

200. SCIENCE IS POSSIBLE WITHOUT HOLINESS. – St. Thomas's beautiful phrase: "Life is prior to learning inasmuch as *life leads* to the *knowledge* of truth", on which our objector bases himself to dismiss the speculative channels, means nothing more than the fact that a good life is one of the conditions that contribute to a greater penetration or a deeper knowledge of supernatural truths, because it contributes to the growth of charity and of the gifts of the Holy Spirit and consequently of "the sense of faith", about which we will soon be speaking (216-220), and which is something like "common sense" in the supernatural order.

Thus, everything else being equal, the saint or the fervent will penetrate deeper in the Bible or in sacred theology than the sinner or the lukewarm. "Hence, it follows that, all else being equal, he who possesses *charity* will be more *learned* in *theology* than he who does not. For without charity these *gifts of the Holy Spirit* are not conjoined to the faith, which *illumines* the mind and *gives understanding* to little ones."[7] We only need to read the bio-

[7] BÁÑEZ, *In 2-2*, q.1, a.4, ad 2.

graphies of the great theologians to become aware at once that almost all of them excelled in holiness of life or in great supernatural fervour. This should never be forgotten by teachers and students of sacred theology.[8]

However, this is not to say that a holy life is the only means or the indispensable condition to be a great theologian or to effect the development of dogma. The want of a holy life can be compensated with a greater talent or a greater industry. A talented and assiduous, albeit not fervent, man can be a greater theologian than another who is fervent but short of talent or busy with other things. Says St. Thomas: *"Not everyone who is good has a greater aptitude for prophecy than any sinner, since some men wanting in charity possess minds with greater aptitude to perceive spiritual matters,* inasmuch as they are unencumbered with carnal and earthly pursuits, and *are endowed with a natural clarity of intellect;* whereas others who possess charity, are involved in the pursuit of earthly interests and engaged in carnal procreation and do not have a naturally perspicacious intellect."[9] To think that without being a *saint* one cannot be *learned,* even in divine matters, would be intolerable ultramysticism.[10]

SECTION II

HISTORICAL EXAMPLES OF DOGMATIC EVOLUTION THROUGH SPECULATIVE CHANNELS

201. IMPORTANCE OF EXAMPLES. – Let us now proceed to give historical examples of true dogmatic developments after the time of the Apostles, which were effected through the speculative channel of reasoning in the proper sense of this term. Among the many that could be given, we will submit ten taken from the different dogmatic treatises. In each example we will point out the majors of faith and the inclusive minors of reason that have

[8] "The *moral virtues,* especially the virtue of chastity, *contribute a great deal* to *knowledge* . . . They *greatly dispose* man for the perfection of *intellectual* operation." (ST. THOMAS, *In 7 Sent.,* q.2, a.2, ad 6; *Summa Theol.,* p.2-2, q.15, a.3)

[9] ST. THOMAS, *Disputed Questions on Truth,* q.12, a.5, ad 6.

[10] "As to what is said, that there are many who, not having the gift of understanding but *existing in mortal sin, understand many things concerning the Scriptures and the mysteries of faith* and also possess great certainty about the faith, the answer is that *they can have all these things . . . Reading, and study, and human effort suffice* in order to have an *abundant store of knowledge and certainty . . . Sinners can have even a great certainty of faith,* without the gift of understanding, on account of the testimony of divine Truth to which they adhere, and which is of itself *most firm."* (JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *Cursus Theologicus de Donis Spiritus Sancti,* d.18, a.3, n.63; ed. Vives, t.6, pgs. 625-626)

entered into the reasoning. At the same time we will quote testimonies of theologians of the first order who have thus understood them.

Of the ten examples, one or another might be debatable or might not satisfy the reader. But we are convinced that, taken together, these ten examples will produce in any unprejudiced theologian the conviction that the evolution of dogma by way of theological conclusion is not only possible but an obvious historical fact accepted by all the great theologians.

202. FIRST EXAMPLE. – The first example on record of dogmatic development done in a solemn and authentic manner is the celebrated *omoousion* or *consubstantial* defined against Arius by the first ecumenical council. In the Holy Scripture it is explicitly stated that Jesus Christ is the Only-begotten of the Father, true Son of God, true God as the Father, but it is not explicitly stated that He is *consubstantial.* Yet, as St. Athanasius observes, to slam the door on the subtle and endless quibblings of Arius and his followers, the only thing needed was to define as of faith the concept of *consubstantiality* and the term *omoousion.* In consequence, the Teaching Church convened in the Council of Nicea and, basing itself on data culled from the Holy Scriptures and Tradition, defined explicitly the consubstantiality of the Word, and added to the traditional Creed the celebrated formula *consubstantial with the Father.*

This celebrated formula solemnly initiates in the Church the series of dogmatic developments through *philosophical* concepts, or as Cardinal Newman would say, through *notional* propositions, or as our objector would have it, through *intellectual* statements (190), a series that was to continue *in crescendo* up to the Tridentine and Vatican Councils and seemed almost to have reached the summit in the immortal encyclical *Pascendi,* were philosophy and theology at their most technical and abstruse levels are utilized by the Church in the exposition and unfolding of dogma. But let us not digress.

As we were saying, the Nicene Council defined the consubstantiality of the Son with the Father as a truth of faith. That truth was and is a revealed truth, since only that which is revealed can be defined as of faith. But where and how was that truth revealed? [11] It was revealed *in other* truths in which it is implicit and out of which it is educed through reasoning or inference. Those other truths are the two that follow: first, "Jesus Christ is the true Son

[11] Whenever, with reference to dogmatic progress, the question is asked "How was, or is, a certain truth revealed? ", the question refers to how it was, or is, revealed in the *statements* of the revealed deposit, i.e., in the statements of Holy Scripture or of divine Tradition; it does not refer to how it was, or is, revealed in the *mind* of the Apostles. In the mind of the Apostles every revealed truth existed in an explicit manner or as revealed *in itself;* in the *statements* of Holy Scripture or of divine Tradition, a great part of what is revealed exists implicitly or as revealed *in another* (57-58).

of God", or "Jesus Christ is true God"; second, "in God there can be no division, but only mere unicity, of substance".

Indeed, if to be a true *son* requires to be *of the substance* of the father, since that is the definition of sonship or of generation; and if to be Son of *God* requires *unicity* of substance with God, since no division is possible in the divine substance; it follows that between the Father and the Son there necessarily is consubstantiality or unicity of substance.

This reasoning or combination of concepts, whereby the concept of consubstantiality is inferred from the concepts of sonship and divinity, throbs and even stands out in all the Fathers who have written on the consubstantiality of the Son, whether before or after the Council of Nicea. To avoid lengthening this section with endless quotations from the Fathers, we will confine ourselves to the resumé made of them by three eminent theologians from the ranks of those who have distinguished themselves by outstanding knowledgeability of the Fathers and of the history of dogmas. Two of them, Petavius and Bellarmine are well known; the third, the renowned Greek theologian Emmanuel Calecas,[12] can well be ranked together with Bellarmine and Petavius.

Let us begin with the immortal author of the *Dogmata Theologica*, who has this to say: "The *argumentation* whereby one thing is proven to be *omoousion* with another because it is born of it, is common to *all* the Greek and Latin Fathers, who *thence* assert against the Arians the Son's equality and identity of substance, so to speak, with the Father, as is obvious from the second and fourth books of this work."[13]

[12] "*Manuel Calecas*, Greek, *distinguished theologian* of the Order of Preachers as attested by John Cardinal Torquemada in *Summa de Ecclesia*, lib. 11, ch.93, did not attend the Council of Lyons, as affirmed by Galesino, but flourished after the Council, during the time of the elder Andronicus Emperor by whom he was harrassed out of hatred for the faith and the Roman Church. A *very learned man*, he wrote four books *Against the Errors of the Greeks*, the book *On Essence and Operation against the Palamites*, the book *On the Principles of Catholic Faith*, which he translated into Latin and our Combefisius published. It is said that the book *On the Trinity* is also his. Some of his sermons are praised by Leo Allatino in the diatribe "De Simeonum Scriptis". The *Grammar of Manuel Calecas* exists in the library of the Most Christian King. Item, excerpts from the books against the errors of the Greeks, in which are found testimonies of St. Augustine and other Latin Fathers excellently translated into Greek. This author's accurate method of dealing with things is sanctioned by the authority and tradition of the Holy Scriptures, Fathers, and Councils. The very learned Turrianus, S.J., in the book on the sixth and seventh Synod, extols our *Calecas as a man of great learning and faith. Catholic Church with brilliant writings.*" (NATALIS ALEXANDER, *Historia Ecclesiastica*, 13th century, ch. 4, a.5, tom. 8, pg. 114)

[13] PETAVIUS, *Dogmata Theologica, De Trinitate*, bk. 7, ch. 4, n. 13; ed. Vivès, tom. 3, pg 295.

Bellarmine: "When the Nicene Council defined that Christ is omoousion with the Father, it *deduced the conclusion* from the Scriptures in which the assertions that God is one, and that the Son is God, are directly contained; from which *it follows necessarily* that the Father and the Son are of the same substance and divinity."[14-15]

The eminent theologian Calecas expresses himself in similar vein. Not only does he assert what both Petavius and Bellarmine asserted later on, but goes on to explain it beautifully. "To employ reasoning is not always wrong, except where principles are employed that are not suitable to the question proposed, and where one seeks to demonstrate the faith through natural principles. But if to the point in question one should bring to bear such common principles of faith as are repeatedly said of God, together with established and definite statements of the Fathers, and having laid these down and without overturning any of such as are laid down, should conclude things that are consentaneous with them, as was usually the case with the early Fathers in the disputes over the *consubstantial* and many other questions of faith, it is nonetheless to be admitted that such a *conclusion*, which depends on the aforementioned principles and is consonant with the aforecited causes from which it proceeds, is a statement of the Scripture. In like manner such a conclusion is to be termed *theological* and known through revelation, just as we call conclusions of geometry those that are derived from the principles of geometry. Otherwise we shall have to discard many things that are certain through faith but are not expressly contained in the Scriptures."

Calecas then mentions the reasoning usually employed by the *Church Fathers* in the unfolding of dogma, which are either made up of two premises of faith, or of one premise of faith and another of reason, and goes on to say:

[14] *De Verbo Dei*, bk. 3, ch. 10.

[15] Someone might object that the Gospel text *I and the Father are one* has been interpreted by all the Fathers as referring to the consubstantiality of the Word, and that, consequently, no reasoning was needed to come to know this dogma. The answer to this is quite simple. It is true that all the Fathers have seen the consubstantiality of the Word as *implicated* in this text. But it is not quite as certain that *all* of them have seen it as *directly expressed* in it, and not rather as indirectly deduced through *reasoning*. Thus, e.g., St. Chrysostom interprets this text directly as referring to the oneness in *power*, and *in consequence*, to the oneness in *substance*. And likewise St. Cyril. Thus Petavius: "If both were one solely by consent, Christ would have settled nothing, nor could he have spoken so magnificently of himself. Hence he must profess himself to be one with the Father at least in *strength* and *power*, as *Chrysostom interprets*, inasmuch as *the discourse versed on strength and power*. However, *therefrom the oneness of substance is also concluded*. *'For if* the *power* of both is one, *also* the *substance* is the same', says he. With whom also Cyril concurs." (*De Trinitate*, bk. 1, ch.2, n. 10, *ed cit.*, tom.2, pg.443).

"However, should anyone think that a false conclusion results from any syllogism both of whose propositions are not expressly contained in the Holy Scriptures, such a one is mistaken in his thinking, and slanderously assails *all the Doctors of the Church*, who often have employed arguments of this sort to establish the truth in divine matters. Take for instance the following: 'What is substantially engendered by somebody is of the same substance as the generator; but the Son is engendered by the Father; therefore the Son is of the same substance as the Father'. The first proposition, which is also called the major, is not taken from the Holy Scriptures, but from natural knowledge. And yet what is inferred from it together with the other proposition, which belongs to the faith and the Scriptures, is held with certainty by faith. For if this mode of arguing were not to be allowed, it would be pointless for God to exhort us in the Scriptures to rise to the knowledge of God from the things that we know and which we hold by the teaching of nature."[16]

Lastly we will quote no less than the IV Lateran Ecumenical Council, which in its dogmatic definition against the abbot Joachim expresses itself in these terms: "However, with the approval of this Holy Council, We believe and confess with Peter Lombard that one supreme, truly incomprehensible reality exists, which verily is Father and Son and Holy Spirit. Wherefore, although the Father is someone else, the Son someone else, the Holy Spirit someone else, they are not something else; but that which the Father is, the same entirely is also the Son and the Holy Spirit; so that, in keeping with the orthodox and Catholic Faith, they are believed to be *consubstantial.* [There now follows the *reason* or the *why* the divine Persons are consubstantial.] *For* the Father in generating the Son from eternity gave Him his substance, according to what the Son Himself testifies: 'What the Father has given Me "is greater than everything" . . .' *Now,* it cannot be said that the Father gave Him a part of his substance and kept the other part for Himself, *since* the Father's substance is indivisible *inasmuch* as it is entirely simple. *But neither* can it be said that the Father through generation transferred his substance to the Son, in the sense that He gave it to the Son without keeping it for Himself; *otherwise,* He would cease to be a substance. *Therefore* it is evident that in being born the Son received the Father's substance without any diminution, and *thus* the Father and the Son have *the same substance* . . . *Consequently,* if any man should presume to defend or approve the opinion or teaching of the aforecited Joachim with respect to this part, let him be by all confuted as a *heretic.*"[17]

[16] MANUEL CALECAS, translated and quoted by PETAVIUS, *Dogmata Theologica,* Prolegomena, ch.5, n.4; ed. Vivès, tom.1, pg.32.)

[17] 4th LATERAN COUNCIL, ch.2; Denz.-Schön., 806.

If our objector does not see in all this not only a *true reasoning,* which is the only thing that interests us, but even *dialectical reasoning,* then we fail to understand what he means by *reasoning.*

203. SECOND EXAMPLE. – Against Nestorius, the Council of Ephesus defined as a dogma of faith that the Blessed Virgin Mary is the true *Mother of God.* This truth was and is a revealed truth.

But where and how was it revealed? It was revealed *in two other* truths in which it is implicit and out of which it is drawn out through reasoning. Those two other truths are: first, "The Blessed Virgin is the Mother of Jesus Christ"; second, "Jesus Christ is true God, there being in Him no person or hypostasis other than the divine". From these two revealed truths there follows as a *conclusion* the truth that the Blessed Virgin is truly the Mother of God, and not merely the Mother of Christ, as Nestorius would have it. Says St. Thomas: "Although it is not expressed in the Scriptures that the Blessed Virgin is the Mother of God, nonetheless it is expressed in the Scriptures that Jesus Christ is true God, as can be seen in I John, last chapter, and that the Blessed Virgin is the Mother of Jesus Christ, as can be seen in Matt. 1. Whence *it necessarily follows* from the words of the Scriptures that she is the Mother of God."[18]

That it is a conclusion becomes even clearer if we take into account that, aside from the two aforecited revealed truths, a truth of reason must intervene so that the Blessed Virgin may be said to be truly the Mother of God. This truth of reason is the truth that generation or motherhood does not terminate in the nature but in the person. If the act of engendering were *abstractive,* as is the case with the act of *understanding,* and could terminate in the nature, prescinding or abstracting from the person, then the Blessed Virgin would not yet be the true Mother of God but only Mother of Christ's humanity. Hence, to deduce or unfold the dogmatic truth of Mary's divine motherhood this third truth intervened: "To be begotten or to be a son is not an attribute of the nature but of the hypostasis". Once again St. Thomas writes to the point: *"Now,* to be conceived and born is attributed *to the hypostasis* according to the nature in which it is conceived and born. *Therefore,* since the human nature was assumed by the divine person from the very beginning of conception, *it follows* that it can verily be said that God was conceived and born of the Virgin . . . Hence *it follows* that the Blessed Virgin is truly said to be the Mother of God."[19]

Still more, the same Ephesian Council, in its definition of Mary's divine motherhood, clearly indicates the *reasoning* that has intervened in the unfold-

[18] ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.,* p.3, q.35, a.4, ad 1.

[19] *Loc. cit.,* body of article.

ing of this dogmatic truth. Here are its own words: "If any man does not confess that God is verily Emmanuel, and that *on account of this* the Holy Virgin is the Mother of God, *for* she gave birth to the Word of God made according to the flesh: let him be anathema."[20] The terms *on account of* and *for* are the marks of informal reasoning just as the terms *now* and *therefore* are the marks of formal or dialectical reasoning. Both the former and the latter are indications that human *reason* is being employed by the Church as an instrument for the explication or unfolding of dogma, subject to the infallible assistance of the Holy Spirit, who is the principal cause.

The character of reasoning or *logical derivation* found in the dogma of the divine motherhood and in many other dogmas is, in our view, well elucidated by the learned modern theologian Fontaine in the following terms:

"One becomes quickly aware that some of these secondary dogmas proceed from the fundamental mysteries through some kind of *deduction* that is at once *logical* and *ontological*... These explanations, no matter how elementary they may be, are enough to show that the dogma of divine motherhood *follows* from the notion, well penetrated and correctly analyzed, of the incarnation of the Word. On account of this we say that it is a secondary dogma, and even that it is derived from the first; the fact expressed by it *flows* from the first and remains dependent on it; there exists between the two an essential and necessary relationship... To bring into indisputable evidence the dogma of the divine motherhood, the Church had to investigate the essence of the Word, his consubstantiality with the Father, his eternal generation, and his divine personality. Then she needed to determine precisely the kind of union between this Word, that is eternal and consubstantial with the Father, and human nature, which is what we call the hypostatic union. The Greek councils in which this long labour of elucidation took place, consummated it at Ephesus in 431, when they proclaimed Mary to be the true Mother of the Incarnate Word."[21]

204. THIRD EXAMPLE. – The Third Council of Constantinople, sixth ecumenical, defined as a dogma of faith, against the Monothelites, that in Jesus Christ there existed not only two natures, but also *two wills* and two different operations. This was and is a revealed truth. But where and how was it revealed? It was revealed *in two other* truths in which it is implicit and from which it is inferred through reasoning. These truths are: first, "Jesus Christ is not only a true man but also a *perfect* man, or in a *connatural* state, or *like us in everything* except sin or anything opposed to the end of redemption"; second, "no one can be a *perfect* man, or man in a connatural state, or man like us in everything, without a human will and the other physico-natural powers or properties (although one can be truly or essentially man without them)".

[20] Denz.-Schön., 252.

[21] ABBE J. FONTAINE, *La Théologie du Nouveau Testament*, pgs. 272-274.

This reasoning, one of whose premises is of faith and the other of natural reason, has been the human instrument employed by the Church under the Holy Spirit's assistance to uncover and define the dogma of the two wills in Christ. In previous sections we have indirectly examined this particular point; we have also adduced numerous texts from St. Thomas in confirmation thereof. Suffice it now to adduce some new quotations.

St. Thomas: "It would derogate from the *perfection* of the incarnation of the Word of God if there should be wanting in him any of those things that are *natural* to man ... *But the faith* confesses Him to be altogether *like us in natural attributes*, without sin."[22] "It must be said that Christ was *altogether like* to the brethren (as the Apostle says in Heb. 2:17) in such things as were necessary for their reparation. Now, these are the things in which the truth of human nature consists, to wit, the parts *essential* to the same, and the *natural properties*, and the sufferings through which the work of redemption was to be carried out."[23]

Báñez: "Previous to the Council's definition that there existed two wills in the Lord Christ, the following was a *theological conclusion:* Christ has two wills, divine and human. For from the principle of faith that Christ is *a perfect man* subsisting out of a rational soul and human flesh, it was evidently inferred through a *valid consequence:* therefore Christ has a created will. By the fact that this truth was defined in a council, the conclusion is now held as *of faith immediately*, and it is proposed to everyone as a truth to be believed under threat of anathema."[24]

Likewise Bellarmine: "Similarly when the Sixth Council defined that there existed two wills in Christ, the divine and the human, it *deduced the conclusion* from the Scriptures in which it is said that Christ is perfect God and *perfect* man."[25]

We could continue quoting a great number of classical theologians in the line of traditional theology, but we would simply be repeating texts similar to those already quoted in other sections. We will, therefore, limit our-

[22] *Summa Contra Gentes*, bk.4, ch.43.

[23] *In 3 Sent.*, d.3, q.5, a.2, ad 1.

[24] BÁÑEZ, *In 2-2*, q.1, a.5, 5th conclusion.

[25] *De Verbo Dei*, bk.3, ch.10.

selves to three illustrious modern theologians: one a Thomist, the other belonging to Suárez's school, the third independent of any school.

Let the first be Fr. Berthier, who expresses himself as follows: "We call mixed or middle theology that which depends partly on a supernatural and partly on a natural principle. Such is this conclusion, viz., Christ had two intellects, two wills, and the operations connaturally belonging to both powers. This conclusion is obtained, in the first place, from a principle of supernatural theology, to wit, that in Christ there were two natures and both verily perfect; and in the second place, from a natural principle, to wit, that proper operations belong to a *perfect nature.*"[26]

Let the second be Cardinal Franzelin who, in his noteworthy introduction to the treatise *On God insofar as He is One,* expresses himself on the present subject with far greater profundity and precision than in his much more quoted work *On Divine Tradition.* Says he: "Hence when it is established that both premises are revealed truths, or when one revealed premise already entails implicitly what is stated in the conclusion, and the other premise, *albeit it is not revealed,* evidently manifests this entailment of the conclusion in the revealed premise [according to Thomists, this is the case for every true and rigorous theological conclusion], it cannot be doubted but that the truth enunciated in the conclusion is a revealed truth . . . An example of a conclusion of the latter form [i.e., a conclusion drawn from a revealed premise and a premise of natural reason] can be brought against the Monothelites. The revealed proposition that, besides a divine nature, Christ possesses a *perfect* human nature [splendid!] in virtue of which he is true [perfect, is what he means to say] man, already entails the other truth that Christ also possesses a human will and human volitions in addition to his divine will. Therefore when, in order to complete the argumentation, another premise is assumed thus: Christ is true [it would be more exact to say perfect] man; but the power of rational will is essential to any true man [meaning perfect man, as he has noted earlier]; therefore Christ possesses a human will [or, therefore he possesses risibility, or any other physical property], the assumed proposition merely makes manifest the fact that the conclusion is comprehended in the revealed proposition . . . In truth, in such theological syllogisms *in most instances* [*always,* where the reasoning is metaphysical] the naturally certain proposition, especially where the certainty is metaphysical, merely makes clear the fact that the consequent is comprehended in the revealed premise [in St. Thomas's view, that is the true role of *every* minor of reason in theology]; and thus such conclusions are implicitly contained in the objective

[26] *De Locis Theologicis,* prol., n.2.

revelation, and consequently they can be explicitly proposed and *defined* by the Church *as truths to be held by faith.*"[27]

It is gratifying to note that a writer of Franzelin's stature and affiliation recognizes that the theological conclusion is *in most instances* (plerumque) definable of divine faith, and that this is the case especially where the minor of reasons possesses *metaphysical* certainty.

However, what matters to us at present is his testimony that the dogma of the two wills in Christ, defined by the Sixth Ecumenical Council, is a dogma that has come to be known through reasoning, and even through a reasoning in which one of the premises is not a revealed premise but a premise of natural reason.

Let the third be the, on so many counts, illustrious Cardinal Newman, the modern theologian who had the clearest vision of the existence of dogmatic progress. In his brilliant work, *An Essay on the Development of Catholic Doctrine,* written while he was still a Protestant – it was in the course of writing this work that he became a convert – Newman perhaps gave excessive importance to *sense, life, experience, praxis,* as instruments in the development of Catholic dogma while taking little or almost no account of reasoning, which he seems to regard with the same dislike as our objector. Any man whose reading of Newman is limited to this work, knows him only partially, and will at times be inclined to find in Newman a way of speaking akin to Modernism. But his subsequent years as a Catholic enabled Newman to see more deeply into the great problem of dogmatic development, with the result that instead of giving little or no importance to the role played by reasoning in this matter, he seems at times to overrate it, or rather he gives it the importance that it deserves, that which St. Thomas and the great masters of Scholasticism always accorded it. Thus, in his famous conferences at the Catholic University of Dublin, a good many years after his conversion, he writes the following: "Revelation is all in all the doctrine; the Apostles its sole depositary; *the inferential method its sole instrument;* and ecclesiastical authority, its sole sanction." Still many years later, with regard to the dogma of the two wills in Christ, Newman wrote: "The sixth Council condemned the doctrine that there is but one *energeia* in Christ, which is condemned neither by Scripture, except by *inference,* nor by tradition."[28]

But even before all these theologians, the Prince of them all, St. Thomas, had already said the same thing with these words: "Nothing *natural*

[27] *De Deo Uno,* prol.; Rome, 1870, pgs. 20-22.

[28] *Idea of a University,* dis.9, n.4; London, 1912, pg. 223. – *Letter to Canon Jenkins* (Dec. 2, 1875); see WARD, WILFRID, *The Life of John Cardinal Newman,* London 1912, vol.2, pg.575.

was wanting in Christ who assumed the *whole* nature [nature in its integrity], as has been previously said. *And therefore* the proposition of those who denied that in Christ there are *two knowledges* or two wisdoms was condemned in the sixth Council."[29-30]

Finally, even if the theologians had said nothing, it would be enough to pay attention to the Council's own words in order to see that reasoning was the instrument employed by the Church in order to arrive at knowing and defining this dogma, deducing it from the revealed dogma that Christ is a perfect man or a man like us in all things.

Thus the Council says: "This holy and universal Synod faithfully receives and embraces with outstretched hands the suggestion made by the Most Holy and Blessed Agathon Pope of ancient Rome . . . Further, it accepts the things written by the Blessed Cyril in the Synodal letters against the impious Nestorius and in those written to the Eastern bishops. It likewise follows the five holy and universal Councils and the holy Fathers deserving of approbation, and consonantly confesses and defines that Our Lord Jesus Christ our true God, one of the persons of the holy and consubstantial and life-giving Trinity, perfect in divinity and *perfect in humanity*, is truly God and truly man, constituted of a rational soul and a body; consubstantial with the Father according to the divine nature, and consubstantial to us according to the human nature, *like unto us in everything* but without sin."[31] "And, in accordance with the teaching of the Church Fathers we proclaim that in Him exist indivisibly, inconvertibly, inseparably, unconfusedly, two natural wills and two natural operations."[32]

The reasoning or inference whereby the Council deduces the two wills and the two operations from the revealed principle *perfect man* is even more clearly seen in the dogmatic letter addressed to the Council by Pope St. Agathon, which, as the Council itself attests, was the basis of the dogmatic definition. "*Thus consequently,* just as we confess that he truly has two natures or substances, i.e. divinity and humanity, unconfusedly, indivisibly, incommutably, *so too* does he have two natural wills and two natural operations, *inasmuch* as he is perfect God and *perfect man.*"[33] It could not have been said more clearly.[34]

[29] *Summa Theol.*, p.3, q.9, a.1.

[30] "Therefore, since from the positing of one action in Christ *it follows* that there is in him only one nature and only one will, this position has *accordingly* been condemned as *heretical* in the sixth synod." (ST. THOMAS, *Quaestio unica de Unione Verbi Incarnati*, a.5)

[31] *Hebrews* 4:15.

[32] Denz.-Schön., 553-556.

It is beyond all doubt that *reasoning*, and even reasoning from a premise of faith and a premise of reason, was the human instrument employed by the Church under the assistance of the Holy Spirit to arrive at the knowledge and the definition of the dogma of the two wills in Jesus Christ.

AN OBJECTION. - Someone might come up with the Gospel text: "Not my will, but thine, be done", and "Not as I will, but as Thou wilt"[35] to object that there was no need of any theological conclusion, in the proper sense of the term, to define the dogma of the two wills in Christ. We must here note three things:

First, the Church Fathers differ in their interpretation of these texts. The term *will* can be taken in three different senses: (a) the rational or free will (voluntas *rationis*); (b) a necessary or natural tendency (voluntas *naturae*); (c) the sensory inclination or appetite (volunas *sensualitatis*). If it is

[33] Denz.-Schön., 548.

[34] The following paragraph from the distinguished Sorbonne theologian, Grandin, is worthy of note: "When two things are connected, if one of them is to be believed, the Church can propose the other as to be believed with divine faith; therefore . . . The antecedent of the above enthymeme is proven: in the first place, it appears that the Church has already proposed for belief that which was annexed to another that was immediately revealed: for she defined against the monothelites that there are two wills in Christ, a proposition that was only revealed in this one: Christ is God and [perfect] man . . .

"I know that it might be said that this proposition concerning the two wills of Christ has been *immediately* revealed. But *where is this verified*, in Scripture or in Tradition? If in Scripture, let the texts that *demonstrate* it be brought forward. Certainly the truth of those propositions can be had only from tradition. Whether they were *immediately* revealed cannot be established. Nor does it appear to be necessary that when he revealed to Peter that he was God and man, Christ should also have revealed that he had two wills: it *was enough* that he should have left Peter the latter as something to be known in the prior revelation. For to say that *from the fact that the Church has proposed it for belief* it can be gathered that the proposition about the two wills of Christ was *immediately* revealed, *begs the question* and adduces what is in dispute, viz: whether the Church can propose for belief anything that is not immediately revealed in itself." (GRANDIN, MARTIN, *Opera Theologica. De Fide.*, d.1, sent.2, "punctum postremum"; Paris 1756, tom. 3, pgs. 48-49) Very well said! Many theologians fall into that begging of the question. Since they see that the Church defines a truth as *revealed*, they at once think that it must be *immediately* revealed, when that is precisely the point under discussion (482).

[35] *Luke* 22:42; *Matt.* 26:39.

true that many of the Fathers have understood these texts in the first sense, it is no less true that others have interpreted them in the second and third senses. St. Thomas himself employs the three interpretations.[36] The interpretation commonly given to these texts seems obvious to us because we know beforehand that Our Lord was a *perfect* man. Without such previous knowledge this intepretation would not have any rigorously demonstrative value.

Secondly, whatever be the meaning of these texts (even if all three should be admitted), it is beyond doubt that the councils, the popes, and many theologians of the first rank expressly attest – as we have seen – that the dogma of the two wills of Christ has been defined by the Church *because* it was deduced from another fundamental dogma, viz. the dogma of the two perfect natures. To any true Thomist it is obvious that this dogma has been deduced through a conclusion in the proper sense of the term.[37]

Thirdly, – and principally, – the Church has defined not only that there are two *wills* in Christ, but also that there are in him two operations, two *intellects*, and even two knowledges. Now, the latter cannot be formally seen in the text "Not my will, but thine, be done" nor in any other Gospel text; it can be seen only by way of a strict conclusion from the dogma *perfect* man. Thus St. Thomas: "Nothing *natural* was wanting in Christ who assumed the *whole* [integral or perfect] nature, as has been said above. And *therefore* the position of those who deny that there existed in Christ *two knowledges* or two wisdoms was *condemned* in the sixth Synod."[38] "Thus *inasmuch as* from the fact that someone asserts one single action in Christ, *it follows* that there is in him one single nature and one single will, *therefore* this position was *condemned* as *heretical* in the *sixth Synod.*"[39]

[36] *Summa Theol.*, p.3, q.19, arts. 1,2,5.

[37] "In supernatural matters it must be proportionally said that when the consequent is inferred by a similar adroit consequence, it is a *conclusion found out by inquiry* (conclusio scita) *not a principle*, and accordingly it belongs to the faith *only per se secondarily* [*prior* to the Church's definition] as a *theological conclusion*, not per se primarily as a proposition immediately of faith; as in the case of that syllogism: Christ is man, therefore Christ is risible; for here a *property is inferred from the subject*, which belongs to *science*.

"*The same* should be said of that proposition 'Christ has two wills' if it had not been defined by a General Council; for it would be a *theological conclusion* since it is inferred by this consequence: every intellectual nature has its own will, but Christ the Lord has two intellectual natures, therefore he has two wills." (DIDACUS NUÑO, *Expositio in 3am. Divi Thomae partem, Supplementum*, q.20, a.3; Vallisoleti 1609, pg. 628)

[38] *Summa Theol.*, p.3., q.9, a.1.

[39] *Quaestio unica Unione Verbi Incarnati*, a.5.

Thus it is unquestionable that reasoning, including the reasoning made up of a premise of faith and a premise of reason, has always been the human instrument employed by the Church under the Holy Spirit's guidance, to come to know and to define the dogma of the two wills, two intellects, two knowledges, and two operations in Jesus Christ.

205. FOURTH EXAMPLE. – The Fourth Lateran, and 12th ecumenical, Council defined as a dogma of faith the following proposition: "The Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, are one supreme reality, a reality which is *neither generating, nor generated, nor proceeding.*"

The abbot Joachim had denied this proposition against the Master of the Sentences. The Council was not satisfied with upholding the latter but also defined his teaching as a dogma of faith and condemned as heretics all who presumed to defend or approve the contrary. "Hence we condemn and reprobate the pamphlet or treatise published by the abbot Joachim against Peter Lombard concerning the oneness or essence of the Trinity, calling him heretic and senseless for having said in his Sentences: 'For the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, are one supreme reality, a reality which is neither generating, nor generated, nor proceeding . . .' But we, with the approval of this holy Council, *believe* and *confess* with Peter Lombard that there exists one supreme reality, which is indeed incomprehensible and ineffable, and which truly is the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit . . . *and this reality is neither generating, nor generated, nor proceeding . . . Therefore if anyone should presume to defend or approve the opinion or teaching of the aforementioned Joachim with regard to this part, let him by all be confuted as a heretic.*"[40]

This is, consequently, a revealed truth. But where and how is it revealed? It is revealed *in other truths*, in which it is contained virtually, and from which it follows, and can follow only through reasoning. These other truths are: first, in the Trinity there exists a real distinction of persons but not of essence; secondly, if the essence generated or were generated, spired or were spired, there would exist a real distinction in the essence, since neither generation nor spiration are possible without a real distinction of terms. Out of these two truths, one of faith and another of reason, but of inclusive reason, there follows through rigorous reasoning the dogmatic truth defined by the IV Lateran Council, at least insofar as that definition was understood by St. Thomas and by the theologians generally.

That reasoning, simple in form but inwardly laden with metaphysical profundity, is expressed by St. Thomas in these terms: "I answer that it must

[40] Denz.-Schön., nn. 803-806.

be said that the abbot Joachim erred in this matter when he asserted that, as it is said that God engendered God, so it can be said that the essence engendered the essence, for he considered that on account of the divine simplicity God is not something other than the divine essence. But there he was mistaken, for with regard to the truth of what we say, not only the things signified but also the mode of signifying must be taken into account, as was previously said. Now then, although in reality *God* is the same thing as *Deity*, the mode of signifying is not the same in each case. For this term, *God*, because it signifies the divine essence as existing in one who has it, is naturally able, on account of its mode of signifying, to suppose for a person; hence the things that are proper of the persons can be predicated of this term, *God*, so that it can be said that God is engendered, or engenders, as was previously said. But this term, *essence*, cannot suppose for a person on account of its mode of signifying, because it signifies the essence as an abstract form; *hence* the things that are proper of the persons, whereby they are distinguished from each other, cannot be attributed to the essence, for *then* it would be understood that there exists a distinction in the divine essence just as there exists a distinction in persons."[41]

If all of this is not reasoning, and even dialectical reasoning, then we do not know what some people mean by reasoning. Neither do we understand what can be contributed by *feeling* to this kind of purely speculative dogma, where only the most profound metaphysico-dialectical speculations intervene as a means of explicating or unfolding the revealed teaching on the unity of essence and distinction of persons in the august and fundamental dogma of the adorable Trinity.

Melchor Cano presents the same reasoning and the manner in which it was employed by the Council as follows: "Item, the Lateran Council under Innocent III, *through theological reasoning* against *Joachim* elucidated that the divine essence neither is engendered nor engenders. It is plain that the thing engendered and the thing that engenders must differ really: *hence* if the divine essence engendered the [divine] essence, it would differ from itself not merely in thought but also in reality."[42]

206. FIFTH EXAMPLE. – The II Council of Lyons, 14th ecumenical, defined as a dogma of faith that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son not as from *two*, but as from *one* principle: "Faithfully and devoutly we confess that the Holy Spirit eternally proceeds from the Father

[41] ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.1, q.39, a.5.

[42] *De Locis*, bk.12, ch.6, septima praeceptio.

and the Son, not as from *two* principles, but as from *one* principle, not through two spirations, but through one single spiration."[43] The definition of faith was repeated by the Florentine Council: "We define that the Holy Spirit eternally . . . proceeds from the Father and the Son as from *one* principle and through one single spiration."[44]

Consequently, this is a truth of faith, a revealed truth. But how and where is this truth revealed? It is revealed *in other* truths, in which it is virtually contained, and from which it follows through reasoning, and only through proper and rigorous reasoning. Those other truths are: first, "Wherever relative opposition is not found, everything in God is one and the same". Second, between the spiration of the Father and the spiration of the Son there exists no relative opposition. From these two truths, one of faith and the other of reason, the defined dogma follows through rigorous reasoning.

This reasoning, to all appearances simple and brief, but likewise laden with metaphysical profundity, is expounded by St. Thomas thus: "I answer that it must be said that the Father and the Son are identical in everything wherein they are not distinguished by relative opposition; *consequently, since* they are not relatively opposed in being the principle of the Holy Spirit, *it follows* that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit."[45]

And Melchor Cano: "The Council of Lyons under Gregory X similarly demonstrated by means of a firm *theological reason* that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son not as from two principles but as from one, not through two but through one spiration. *For indeed,* according to the faith, the Father and the Son are one God, one power, one wisdom, in short, one in all things where relative opposition is not encountered, for the unity of divine nature cannot otherwise be maintained in two persons. Hence, since there is no distinction of the Son from the Father in the act of spiring, it follows that the Father and the Son are not two but one principle of the Holy Spirit. From which it can be understood that both Erasmus and Ambrose Catharinus were greatly mistaken: the former because he believed that this conclusion has nothing to do with the faith, the latter because he counted it among the *first principles,* i.e., the *articles of faith* [non-derived dogmas] whereas it is a theological conclusion in the proper sense."[46]

[43] Denz-Schön., 850.

[44] Denz.-Schön., 1300.

[45] ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.1, q.36, a.4.

[46] *De Locis,* bk.12, ch.6, septima praeceptio.

Báñez, the great commentator of St. Thomas, is no less explicit and interesting. "The holy Church has many times defined as of faith propositions which are not expressly found in the Holy Scriptures but were steadfastly affirmed by all theologians generally, and were *theological propositions*, e.g. that Christ has a human will, which the theologians inferred from the fact that, according to the faith, Christ is true man [i.e., *perfect* man, as Báñez repeats time and again], and every man has a will; or that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as from one principle, which is proven *from the fact* that in God everything is one and the same if no relative opposition intervenes. *Therefore, since* the Father and the Son are not relatively opposed to each other in the act of spiring the Third Person, *it follows* that they are not two but one principle. Hence similarly *all those truths concerning which the whole community of theologians is in accord could be defined as of faith;* consequently it would be erroneous to contradict such truths [even before they are defined by the Church]. For instance, all theologians firmly teach that from the moment of his incarnation Christ Our Lord saw the divine essence. This is not found in the divine Scriptures nor has it been defined by the Church to be held as a truth of faith. But the theologians *deduce it through a good consequence* from other texts of the Scriptures and other sources of faith, and it is so universally accepted that no one could deny it without censure of error, and the Church could define it *as of faith.*"[47]

This text from Báñez, as so many others we have quoted that abound in his invaluable commentaries to the *Summa Theologica,* are worthy of being meditated by any one desirous of studying the Thomist doctrine on dogmatic progress by way of reasoning or conclusion.

SECTION III
FURTHER EXAMPLES

207. SIXTH EXAMPLE. — The V Lateran Council, 18th ecumenical, defined as a dogma of faith the transcendental and fruitful truth that no true opposition can exist between science and faith or between human reason and divine revelation: "We define that any assertion contrary to the truth of illumined faith is utterly false."[48] This same definition was repeated, and in more expressive terms, by the Vatican Council: "If any man should say that

[47]BÁÑEZ, *In I,* q.1, a.8; Salmanticae 1585, pgs. 127-128.

[48]Denz.-Schön., 1441.

human disciplines are to be treated with that degree of liberty that their assertions, notwithstanding their being opposed to revealed doctrine, may be kept as true and may not be proscribed by the Church, let him be anathema."[49]

Thus this is a revealed truth. But where and how is it revealed? It is revealed *in other* truths in which it is virtually contained and from which it is inferred through rigorous reasoning. These other truths are: first, the affirmations of revelation and the legitimate demonstrations of reason or science are both *truths,* and to say that one truth is opposed to another truth involves a contradiction. Second (and this is the root of the preceding one), both the natural and the revealed truth, or both the principles of reason and the principles of faith, proceed from God, and God cannot fail or deny Himself. Thence issues through rigorous reasoning the dogmatic truth defined by the Lateran and Vatican Councils.

This reasoning employed by both Councils had already been expounded by St. Thomas thus: "It is plain that those things that are naturally inscribed in reason are utterly true, so much so that it is even impossible to think them to be false. Neither is it allowable to believe that which is held by faith is false, since it is so obviously confirmed by God. *Consequently, since* only the false is contrary to the true, as is clear from a consideration of their definitions, it is impossible for the aforesaid truth [the truth of faith] to be contrary to the principles which reason naturally knows. Item: the teacher's knowledge contains the same thing that is induced by the teacher in the mind of the disciple, unless the teacher is merely feigning, which is impious to say of God. *Now,* the knowledge of naturally known principles is inscribed in us by God, since God Himself is the author of our nature. *Consequently,* these same principles are contained in the divine wisdom. *Therefore,* whatsoever is opposed to these principles is opposed to the divine wisdom: *thus* it cannot come from God. *Consequently,* the truths held by faith on account of divine revelation cannot be contrary to natural knowledge."[50]

That this same reasoning has been the human instrument employed by the Church to define the aforesaid dogma is clearly indicated by the very words of both Councils. They do almost little else than transcribe in briefer form St. Thomas's argument. *"Since truth in no way contradicts truth,* we define that any assertion contrary to the truth of illumined faith is utterly false."[51] "However, although faith is above reason, nonetheless no true dis-

[49]Denz.-Schön., 3042.

[50]ST. THOMAS, *Summa Contra Gentes,* bk.1, ch.7.

[51]Denz.-Schön., 1441.

sension can exist between faith and reason, *since* the same God who reveals the mysteries and infuses the faith, has also placed the light of reason in the human mind: *but* God cannot deny himself, *nor* can truth ever contradict truth. Hence, we define that any assertion contrary to the truth of illumined faith is utterly false."[52] We have already observed in the previous section that the terms *for, since, but, hence,* are the signs of ordinary or informal reasoning in everyday language, just as the terms, *now, therefore,* are the signs of dialectical or formal reasoning in logic textbooks. When these terms appear in dogmatic definitions, they are usually indicators of *derived* dogmas, i.e., of dogmas contained implicitly in the revealed deposit, and known and defined by way of reasoning under the infallible assistance of the Holy Spirit.

208. SEVENTH EXAMPLE. – The Council of Trent defined as a dogma of faith the Blessed Virgin's most singular privilege of being immune from all actual sin, including even venial sin. "If any one should say that a man, once he is justified . . . is capable, throughout his whole life, of avoiding all sins, including venial sins, except through a special privilege from God, as the Church holds concerning the Blessed Virgin, let him be anathema."[53]

This is, thus, a revealed truth. But where and how is it revealed? It is revealed *in other* truths in which it is virtually contained and from which it follows through reasoning. These other truths are: first, the Blessed Virgin is a worthy Mother of God; second, she would not be a worthy Mother of God if she were stained by a single venial sin. The dogmatic truth defined by the Council follows by reasoning from these two truths, of which the former is a truth of faith and the latter a truth of reason.

St. Thomas delivered this reasoning thus: "Now, the Blessed Virgin was divinely chosen to be the Mother of God . . . *But,* she would not be a worthy Mother of God if she had sinned at any time . . . *Thus,* it must be simply allowed that the Blessed Virgin never committed any actual sin, whether mortal or venial."[54] The following passage from Ripalda clearly shows that this reasoning was the human instrument employed by the Church to unfold the dogma in question: "The Apostles believed in the *immunity of the Mother of God from actual sin,* and their own future blessedness, because they perfectly understood the Scriptures expressing the *dignity of divine motherhood* and their own confirmation in grace, *on account of which the Church declared the former to be truths of faith.*"[55]

[52] Denz.-Schön., 3017.

[53] Denz.-Schön., 1573.

[54] ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, q.3. q.27, a.4.

[55] RIPALDA, *De Fide,* d.8., s.2, n.26.

St. Augustine had earlier indicated the same view with sufficient clarity in these terms: "With the exception, therefore, of the Blessed Virgin Mary, with respect to whom, for the sake of the Lord's honour, I wish to move no question in the matter of sins: *for we know* that she was given more grace to conquer sin totally *for the reason that she was worthy to conceive and give birth* to him who, it is plain, never had any sin."[56]

209. A DIGRESSION ON THE DOGMA OF THE IMMACULATE CONCEPTION. – In our opinion, the dogma of the immunity of the Mother of God from all stain of *original* sin flows from the same principle, through the same logical process, and with the same certainty or demonstrative value as the dogma of her immunity from all *actual* sin. To see it, one needs only to consider attentively where lay the obscure and controverted issue in the dogma of the Immaculate Conception.

As a matter of fact, all theologians, irrespective of school affiliation, including those who seemed to have distinguished themselves most by their opposition to this dogma, have admitted the following principle as beyond any doubt: "To Mary, in her capacity of worthy Mother of God, must be attributed all that degree of grace or holiness, all that degree of immunity from sin, that is compatible with the honor of her Son, that is, with her *redemption* by Christ." On this principle there never has been any doubt, any debate; for the principle expresses nothing more than the traditional understanding of the Gospel's *full of grace.*

The doubts and the debates were centered not on that major of faith, but on the minor of reason, which was as follows: "Now, it is possible at once to be *conceived without original sin* and to be *redeemed by Jesus Christ.*" This minor of reason constituted the focal point of all the doubts and debates in the history of the development of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception.

So long as in the idea of original sin the concepts of *guilt* and *due* were not clearly distinguished, and so long as in the idea of redemption no clear line was drawn between the concepts of redemption *after contracting the sin* and *preservative* redemption, that minor formulated in such absolute terms and without distinctions was false, and the conclusion had to be erroneous, if not heretical. Indeed, an Immaculate immune from *everything* included in the idea of original sin, i.e., immune from all guilt and from all *due,* obviously is an Immaculate that is not *redeemed* in any manner whatsoever. And an Immaculate that is in no way redeemed, not even with a preservative redemption, is clearly an erroneous Immaculate. In short, an Immaculate *without distinctions* is an erroneous, if not heretical, Immaculate.

[56] *De natura et gratia,* ch. 36.

Now then, the spontaneous piety of the faithful ordinarily expresses itself without making distinctions. Thus, the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception was, in its beginnings, asserted without distinctions. Formulated thus, St. Bernard, St. Albert the Great, St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas, and other saintly and eminent theologians qualified it as erroneous. In so doing they did inestimable service to the true progress of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception, due credit for which is now beginning to be given them.[57] If they did not completely steer the development of this dogma along the correct path, they at least totally precluded its taking the wrong turn. It might even be said that it was they who steered or caused it to be correctly steered, since by qualifying a non-redeemed Immaculate as erroneous, if not heretical, they forced the piety and knowledgeability of subsequent theologians to look for a *redeemed* Immaculate, that is, they spurred them to look for some means of harmonizing the idea of an Immaculate Conception with the idea of redemption.

The glory of having *initiated* the true solution to the problem undoubtedly belongs to the illustrious Scotus and his, on this matter, immortal school. It was he who began to apply to the idea of original sin the distinction between guilt and due, and to the idea of redemption the distinction between redemption *after having contracted the guilt* and preservative redemption.[58]

[57] If the Blessed Virgin's body had been preserved from all taint of original stain prior to the infusion of the soul, it seems clear that there would not be in her any proximate personal due, nor consequently any redemption by Jesus Christ since the person is posterior in nature to the infusion of the soul. Now then, not only the simple faithful but even the liturgical office itself of the Church of Lyons seemed to affirm the purification of the Blessed Virgin's body prior to its animation. "When about the year 1140 the canons of Lyons introduced into their Church the feast of the Conception, and seemed to understand it in such a manner as to believe that the *passive material conception* itself was to be venerated (for in the missal of Lyons the following could be read: 'O God, who has foreordained that the *body* of the Blessed Virgin Mary *be holy* and hast *preserved it from all stain*'), St. Bernard," etc. (GODIS, *De definibilitate mediationis universalis Deiparae*, ch. 3, a.2; Bruxelis 1904, pg. 25) If this is true, St. Bernard and all the other Doctors rendered a great service to the dogma by opposing the feast understood in such a manner.

[58] "To all the authorities for the contrary position the answer is that *any and every* child of Adam is a *debtor* of original justice, and owing to Adam's demerit is destitute of it and therefore every such one has that wherefrom he may contract original sin. However, if *grace* is given to some man in the first instant of the soul's creation, this man will never be destitute of original justice. But he does not have it *of himself*, but *owes it to the merit of another*, if grace is conferred on him because of merit: for he would have original sin unless by his mediation another *prevented* it. And the *authorities should be interpreted in this sense* that *every man* naturally descended from Adam is a sinner, that is because he receives his nature from Adam he has that wherefrom he should be destitute of the justice due him, unless it be conferred on him from another source. But just as grace could be conferred *after the first instant* so it could be conferred *in the first instant*.

"This also clears the way to the reasons offered for the first opinion, for Mary *should have had the greatest need of Christ the Redeemer*, for she should have contracted original sin on account of the common descent, unless she were *prevented* by the Mediator's grace. And just as others stood in need of Christ so that by this merit the *sin already contracted would be remitted them, so Mary* stood in greater need *of a Mediator* preventing the sin so that *she would not contract it*.

"And if against this it be argued that she was naturally the *child of Adam* prior to having grace, because she was a *person* prior to having grace, and consequently in that prior instant she was under obligation to original justice as a natural child of Adam, but was destitute, of it, therefore in that prior instant she *contracted original sin*. *I answer and say* that when two contraries are compared to each other according to the *order of nature*, they are not both found simultaneously in the subject, but only one exists in it, and the other which is said to be naturally prior does not since in the same instant its opposite is in the subject; however, it is *said to be naturally prior* because insofar as the subject is concerned *it would have then existed* unless it were impeded by something extrinsic," (SCOTUS, *In 3 Sent.*, d.3, q.1) See *Quaestio Ioannis Duns Scoti de Immaculata Conceptione B. M. Virginis*, Quarachi 1904, pg. 19. We believe that these passages suffice to crown Scotus with immortal glory with regard to this question of the Immaculate Conception.

With these two distinctions, the notions of which time and discussion eventually defined with perfect exactness and clarity, the formulation of the celebrated minor of reason emerged in the following terms: "Now, the immunity from all original *sin*, provided that a true personal or proximate *due* is contracted, is compatible with a true and proper *preservative* redemption by Jesus Christ." Thus, distinguished and formulated, the minor is no longer false, it is no longer doubtful, it is even no longer probable; it is certain, clear, evident, as Cajetan himself is forced to admit. Accordingly,

Without intending to diminish in the slightest degree the undeniable merits of Scotus in this matter, we said that he must be credited with the honour of *initiating*, and nothing more than *initiating*, the true solution to the problem. Although he makes the distinction between guilt and due, still he does not speak in clear terms of the necessity of a personal or proximate due, in the absence of which it hardly appears possible to affirm a true and proper personal redemption. The learned Fr. Honorato del Val, whom no one will accuse of bias in this instance, has rightly written: "In this respect, Scotus's argumentation has perhaps *gone out of bounds* inasmuch as he seems to have excluded from the Bl. Virgin the due of incurring sin, *in the proper sense*. Hence it is not sufficiently explained in what manner was the Bl. Virgin properly redeemed by Christ." (HONORATO DEL VAL, O.S.A., *Sacra Theologia Dogmatica*, Madrid 1906, tom.2, n.265).

In our opinion, it was Cajetan who, of all theologians, best distinguished the terms and stated the problem of a truly redeemed Immaculate in his celebrated opusculum *De Conceptione B. Virginis*, so much so that subsequent theologians have done little else than copy his distinctions. In this sense, Cajetan, without defending the Immaculate Conception and even opposing it, has done as much or even more than any other theologian for the evolution and definition of the dogma of the true Immaculate Conception.

with a major of faith admitted by everyone, and an evident minor, the dogmatic conclusion of the Immaculate Conception was assured. To get itself accepted by all and defined as of faith, only one more thing was needed, viz., to overcome the tremendous deadweight of school and partisan preoccupations, which are so connatural and entrenched that they often are the reason why many people continue to maintain a position long after the principal foundation and support on which it was based by its original authors has been overthrown. In our view, this is, in general lines, the path and course of development followed by the history of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception.

The reasoning of the theologians, the assent of the faithful, and the authority of the Church with respect to this dogma. – Thus, we do not agree with those who think that in the development of this dogma there has been no *logical process;* nor do we agree with those who, while admitting such a logical process, seem to convey the idea that, viewed from this angle, the dogma of the Immaculate Conception either is not contained in the dogma of the divine motherhood or does not follow from it except in a *probable* manner. It is our view that this dogma is contained in that of the divine motherhood and follows from it with *certainty* through exactly the same process employed by Tradition and theology to demonstrate that the Mother of God had to be immune from all *actual* sin.

Finally, neither are we in complete agreement with those who attribute the development and definition of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception totally, or almost totally, to the common *sentiment* of the faithful, and believe that *theological reasoning* played no part, or simply a minimal part, in it. That a common, fervent, and overpowering sentiment existed among the faithful with regard to this dogma is beyond doubt. But, in our opinion, it is also beyond doubt that this sentiment would never have become unanimous, nor been able to last a long time, nor, above all, would it have been able to avoid getting disoriented and going astray without the brakes, the help, and the guidance of *theological reasoning.* The theological reasoning of the great masters of the XIII century, by demonstrating that a non-redeemed Immaculate was erroneous, set up an unsurmountable dam to that sentiment when it threatened to spill all over into wrong channels. The theological reasoning of the theologians that came after, by pointing out the true distinctions whereby a *redeemed* Immaculate could, and should, be defended, opened up to that sentiment a safe and true channel, which was the only thing it needed to become universal, ardent, irresistible. In all of this, the principal factor must never be overlooked, i.e., the authority of the Chuch which, under the Holy Spirit's infallible assistance, provided gentle, constant, and sure guidance both to the sentiment of the faithful and the reasoning of the theologians toward the development and the dogmatic definition of the true Immaculate Conception by Pius IX.

Comparison between the Scotist and the Thomist schools with respect to the dogma of the Immaculate Conception. – As we see it, St. Thomas and Scotus, together with their respective powerful and loyal schools, have, in this matter of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception, played respectively the roles of the rudder and the steam in the movement and course of a ship. The steam, not the rudder, makes the ship move; but the rudder, not the steam, causes it to move in the right direction and arrive at the true port without going astray.

Scotus and his school, coming out in support of the fervent sentiment of the faithful, clamoured with all their strength that the Mother of God was and had to be, immaculate. In order to arrive at this port, descried by their ardent devotion to the Blessed Virgin, they were more concerned with getting up more steam and acceleration than with accurately determining the route to be taken.

St. Thomas and his school, accustomed to bridling sentiment with reason and not making new advances in the delicate terrain of dogma without the beacon of the old, already defined dogmas, clamoured with no less vigour that the Mother of God, as every other child of Adam, had to be truly and personally redeemed by the blood spilled on Calvary, and were ready to cut off the advance of the Mother of God herself as long as they did not see her frankly and clearly marching along the path of personal due, which is the only path of the Cross and Calvary, the only path of redemption. Under the sway of these two factors – the Scotist steam and the Thomist bridle or rudder – the ship of the Immaculate Conception advanced slowly but surely for centuries. Without Scotus and his school the ship would have advanced not at all or very little. Without St. Thomas and his school the ship would almost certainly have gone astray. After God and his Church, to Scotus and his school we owe the definition of the *Immaculate Conception,* but to St. Thomas and his school we owe the definition of the *true Immaculate Conception.* Other schools have also intervened, and very creditably, but all have taken from the Scotists the urgency of motion, and borrowed from the Thomists the firm norms of direction.

Thus, the human factors most seemingly opposed have all contributed to the unfolding of the dogma, harmonized by the visible magisterium of the Church and by the invisible but perpetual assistance of the Holy Spirit.

Through what inclusive reasoning has the dogma of the Immaculate Conception been deduced from the revealed datum. – Having written the foregoing, we find that the learned Fr. Gardeil, while giving his approval to our doctrine on the problem of the evolution of dogma, suggests that it would be interesting to indicate clearly the process or reasoning whereby the dogma of the Immaculate Conception inclusively follows from the dogma of the divine motherhood. (*Revue des Sc. Philos. et Theol.,* Oct. 1922, pg. 689)

We think that in the preceding paragraphs we have shown how the dogma of the Immaculate Conception is deduced from that of the divine motherhood through exactly the same process and with the same certainty as the dogma of the immunity from all *actual sin.* If the latter met with no difficulties whereas the former was assailed by very grave ones, this was not because of any difference relative either to the inclusion or the deduction; it was because the former, despite its being as *logical* as the latter, appeared to be at odds with the dogma of redemption. In the matter of dogmatic progress account must be taken not only of the speculative *logic* between the conclusion and the dogma or principle from which it is inferred, but also of the concordance of that conclusion with *all* the other dogmas. The difficulties, debates, and delays did not alter the deductive process or make it more evident, but simply cleared away its seeming opposition to another dogma. As soon as it became clear that *Immaculate* and *redeemed* were not inconsistent, the conclusion became assured and definable. The only other thing to be kept in mind is that in the inference of both the exemption from actual sin and the immunity from original sin, the Christian *sense* must needs be joined to speculative reasoning.

Both dogmas are deduced from the fundamental dogma expressed with the traditional formula "worthy Mother of God". Now, the determination of what is or is not due to a "worthy *mother*", let alone to a "worthy Mother *of God*", is better achieved by the loving heart of a *son* than by the cold logic of a *scholar.* Hence, the Christian sense of the "*sons* of God", that is, the filial faith and devotion of the Christian people towards Mary, their Mother and Mother of God, has been with respect to this dogma the best and greatest aid to speculative logic, as it has been and will be in any dogmas that do not concern the intellect alone but also concern the heart.

In short, we think that the dogma of the Immaculate Conception was included in the revealed deposit as a ***particular*** in the *conditioned universal.* Its deductive process is as follows:

To the Mother of God are owed *all* the degrees of purity, *provided* that they are consistent with her redemption by Jesus Christ.

Now, original purity qualified by personal due is consistent with her redemption by Jesus Christ.

Therefore, to the Mother of God is owed original purity qualified by personal due.

The *major* of this reasoning is a revealed conditioned universal, and it is admitted by *all* the Church Fathers and theologians, including those who to all appearances were opposed to this dogma. St. Thomas formulates it in these terms: "Beneath Christ *who,* as the *universal* Saviour, *had no need of being saved* [behold the condition for the Blessed Virgin], *the purity of the*

Blessed Virgin was the greatest."[59] The minor does nothing but verify the *condition included* in the revealed major. Therefore, the conclusion is also implicitly revealed and definable as of divine faith, since as we shall see later on (256), anything contained in the revealed deposit as a particular in the universal is definable as of divine faith.

Nevertheless, the conclusion is not implicit-formal but implicit-virtual, since the universal in which it is implicitly contained is not an unconditioned but a conditioned universal (32). Indeed, its condition is such that its verification requires a *proper,* and even a profound and very difficult, reasoning. It requires the intervention of a *new concept,* to wit, the concept of "conception with due and without stain." The dogmatic concept of "conception with due and with stain, which is the concept of the ordinary conception, was already known in revelation. Likewise known was the dogmatic concept of "conception without stain and without due," which is the concept of Christ's conception. But the concept of "conception with due and without stain" was as yet unknown, and this was precisely the concept needed to bring the concept of Immaculate into accord with the concept of redemption, or in other words, to verify the condition of the revealed major. All the doubts, disputes, and delays boiled down to unearthing this *new concept,* which is precisely the new dogma of the Immaculate Conception – new with regard to explication, but not new with regard to objectivity or substance, since it was already implicit in the revealed major.

But one must remember that in the deductive process whereby Mary's exemption from either actual or original sin is inferred, the Christian *sense* must be added to speculative reasoning. These two dogmas are derived from the fundamental dogma expressed in the traditional formula of "worthy Mother *of God*". And where it is a question of gathering what is or what is not owed to a worthy *Mother,* let alone to a "worthy Mother *of God,*" the loving heart of a *son* is in a better position to judge than the cold logic of a scholar. This is the reason why, relative to this dogma, the Christian sense of the "*sons* of God", i.e., the filial faith and piety of the Christian people towards Mary, their Mother of God, has been the best and most powerful auxiliary of speculative logic, as it has been and will be, relative to all dogmas that appeal not only to the intellect but also to the heart of man.

210. EIGHTH EXAMPLE. – The same Tridentine Council defined as a dogma of faith the conversion, in the Eucharist, of the whole substance of the bread into the body of Christ, and of the whole substance of the wine into his blood. This is known as the dogma of the Transubstantiation. "If any one should say that in the Holy Sacrament of the Eucharist there remains the substance of the bread and of the wine together with the Body and Blood of Our

[59] *Summa Theol.*, p.3, q.27, a.2, ad 2.

Lord Jesus Christ, and deny that marvelous and unique conversion of the whole substance of the bread into the Body, and of the whole substance of the wine into the Blood, only the species of the bread and the wine remaining, the which conversion is indeed most aptly called by the Catholic Church transubstantiation: let him be anathema."[59a]

This is, thus, a revealed truth. But where and how is this truth revealed? It is revealed *in other* truths, in which it is included and from which it follows through reasoning. Those other truths are: first, in the consecration the words of Christ must truly be verified: "This is my body", "This is my blood." Second, without the transubstantiation these words of Christ cannot be truly verified. By means of reasoning the defined dogma follows from these two truths, one of faith and the other of reason.

The reasoning is stated thus by St. Thomas: "I answer: It must be said that there were some who asserted that in this Sacrament the substance of the bread and of the wine remain after the consecration. But this position . . . is contrary to the form of this Sacrament, in which it is said, *This is my body*, which will not be *true* if the substance of the bread remains therein, *for* the substance of bread is never the Body of Christ; but it rather ought to be said, *"Here is my body."*[60]

The Tridentine itself makes it rather clear that this was the reason or reasoning employed by the Church to come to the knowledge of, and to define, the dogma. "But *since* Christ our Redeemer said that that which he was offering under the appearance of bread was *truly* his Body, it has *accordingly* always been the persuasion in the Church of God, and this Holy Synod declares it anew, that by the consecration of the bread and of the wine is effected the conversion of the whole substance of the bread into the substance of the Body of Christ our Lord, and of the whole substance of the wine into the substance of his Blood. This conversion, the Holy Catholic Church has conveniently and properly called transubstantiation."[61] The terms *since, accordingly* – we will not tire of repeating – are the indicators of reasoning.[62]

[59a] Denz-Schön., 1652.

[60] *Summa Theol.*, p. 3, q.75, a.2.

[61] COUNCIL OF TRENT, sess. 13, ch.4; Denz.-Schön., 1642.

[62] "Although Christ's words openly and formally signify the *presence* of his body in the Eucharist, *they do not, however, formally* signify the *conversion* of the whole substance of the bread. But this notwithstanding, the Council bears witness that these words have always provided the ground for its persuasion that Christ's body is made present through conversion. Hence the Council judges that even if those words contain conversion only *virtually*, this mode of signifying per se suffices to *generate faith.*" (GUILLELMUS WILMERS, S.J., *De Fide Divina*, n.250; Ratisbonae 1902, pg. 252).

Melchor Cano explains in the following terms how this reasoning was the instrument of the dogmatic definition: "Likewise, all the Fathers to a man *argued* from the principle, 'This is my body', to the fact of the conversion of the bread into the Body of Christ, without which they could understand neither the truth of the aforesaid words nor all the other things that the Catholic faith confesses regarding the true inclusion of the Body of Christ under the species of bread."[63]

The following paragraph from the incomparable Domingo Soto is also worth mulling over: "But Scotus says: This [viz., transubstantiation] the Church received through revelation of the Holy Spirit. We, too, confess it indeed as something absolutely true. However, since the Church is not privileged with *immediate revelation*, as the Apostles, but with *divine power and help* [divine assistance] so as not to err in *unearthing* the articles of faith from the sacred pages, it is *not enough* for the theologian to say, 'The Church has so decreed in truths of faith', but it is also his function to show from what places of Holy Scripture she *has gathered it.* For the Synod of Nicaea would have never accepted the term 'homousios', i.e., consubstantial to the Father, if it had not been *called* for by the Gospel text, 'I and the Father are one.' In like manner, the Fathers would have never made use of the words conversion and transubstantiation, had they not weighed them carefully in Christ's words, 'This is my body.' Indeed, since He had taken bread but given nothing but his body, *through an excellent consequence* the Fathers understood that by those very words he converted the bread into his body. Hence I do not know why Scotus said that it does not matter whether Christ said, 'This is' (Hoc est), or "Here is' (Hic est) my body, when his having said, 'This is' matters to such a degree that if he had merely said, 'Here is', i.e., in this place, *the Church would have never admitted the sacramental conversion.* Thus, not to place greater value on 'This' than on 'Here' is to sever the very *fibers* and *sinews* of truth. Nowhere but *thence do we gather* that the bread does not remain together with the body; authority against heretics, who refuse the sanctions of the Church unless they are founded on Scripture, withers and grows feeble. In the third and last place, let it be said that after the holy Fathers *had gathered* this conversion from the Gospel, they very aptly gave it the name of transubstantiation . . . For if you review all the aforementioned canons of the Fathers, you will find that *the Church came to the knowledge of the conversion for no other reason* than that of verifying the words of Christ, 'This is my body.' "[64]

Even more profound and important, as usual, are these words of the illustrious John of St. Thomas: "Nothing of the substance of the bread and of

[63] MELCHOR CANO, *loc. cit.*

[64] DOMINICUS SOTO, *In 4 Sent.*, d.9, q.2, a.4; Lovanii 1573, pgs. 245-247.

the wine remains after the consecration, but all of it is converted into Christ. This is the second and third points we earlier enumerated as pertaining to the faith with respect to this Sacrament. Both are expressly defined in the Tridentine Council, sess. 13, ch. 4, where it is defined that the substance of the bread and of the wine do not remain together with the Body and Blood of Christ, but are converted into his Body and Blood, the species of bread and of wine remaining. And the Council adds the *reason and foundation whence* the Church gathers that this conversion must be asserted: '*Since* (says the Council) Christ our Redeemer said that that which He was offering under the species of bread *truly* was his Body, it has *accordingly* always been the persuasion in the Church of God' " etc., etc.

He then enumerates some objections that can be made against this reasoning of the Church and the Council, and adds: "Moved by these foundations, *some among* Catholics feel that, although it is plain from the Church's definition that the substance of the bread and of the wine does not remain in this Sacrament, nonetheless, this is not deduced from the precise meaning of the words . . . However, this position overthrows the *whole foundation* of the Council and must, therefore, be rejected . . . Nor can it be said that it is not *gathered* precisely from the fact that it is truly said in an absolute sense, but from the fact that it is truly said in such a manner, i.e., as Christ *actually* wanted [it understood] and was understood by the Church. Indeed, this is the very thing the Council wanted to prove, *why the Church has thus understood it.*"[65]

We believe that these last quoted words from John of St. Thomas are most deserving of attention: "*Indeed, this is the very thing that the Council wanted to prove,* why *the Church has thus understood it.*"

As a matter of fact, there are theologians who, in their examination of the factors of dogmatic progress, or in their investigation of how this or that truth (which at first sight does not seem to be contained formally in the primitive deposit) could have been subsequently defined as a dogma of faith, do little else but cite a greater or lesser number of passages from the Church Fathers who assert such a truth, and conclude with no small amount of self-satisfaction in these or like terms: "This truth belongs to Tradition because it is thus taught by the Church Fathers and has thus been understood and continues to be understood by the Church."

Well and good. However, such theologians seem unaware of the fact that progress and development are possible in both Tradition and the understanding of the Church. Consequently, there remains one further question: "*Why* has it been *thus* understood by the Church Fathers and the Church? "

[65] JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *De Sacramento Eucharistiae,* d. 28, a. 1.

The true answer to this last question, where unfolded or derived dogmas are concerned, almost always is that the Church and the Church Fathers have thus understood it, and not in any other way, because of such and such a *reason.* Which almost always is the same as saying that they have thus understood it because of some proof or *reasoning,* always, of course, under the Holy Spirit's assistance, inasmuch as we are dealing with dogmatic definitions. This is, in our opinion, what is gathered from the history of dogmas, and what clearly transpires from the very texts of the Ecumenical Councils.[66]

211. NINTH EXAMPLE. — Prior to his ascension into heaven, Our divine Saviour addressed to his Apostles, and in their persons to their legitimate successors, the following words: "Receive the Holy Spirit: whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them, and whose sins you shall retain, they are retained."[67]

Basing itself on these words, as they were always understood by the Church Fathers and the Church, the same Tridentine Council defined as dogmas of faith, aside from the institution of the sacrament of Penance, the four following truths: (a) sacramental confession is by divine law *necessary* for salvation; (b) by divine law this confession must include *each and every* mortal sin committed after baptism, of which one is aware; (c) including even *hidden,* or *internal,* sins; (d) and including also the *circumstances* that change the species. These are the Council's own words: "If any one deny either that sacramental confession has been instituted by divine law, or that it is by divine law *necessary* for salvation: let him be anathema. If any one say that, to obtain the forgiveness of sin in the Sacrament of Penance, it is not by divine law necessary to confess *each and every* mortal sin of which memory is had with due and diligent previous reflection, including those that are *hidden*

[66] If some theologians are of the mind that no dogma, and particularly the dogma of the transubstantiation, was known by way of conclusion, this is because they have a mistaken notion of the theological conclusion in its proper sense. Thus, e.g., Battifol: "The transubstantiation, or to use the ancient term used by St. Thomas, the conversion, is *not properly a theological conclusion,* and the development that has explicitated it must not be confused with that which is called theological development, which presupposes the *assimilation of an extrinsic element by theology.*" *(L'Eucharistie,* 2nd ed., Paris 1931, pg. 500) If theology were as the author thinks, the *assimilation* of an element *extrinsic* (! !) to revelation, it is obvious that no dogma can be a theological conclusion in the proper sense. But this is a very poor and very *physicist* idea of theology and the theological conclusion. Similar to Battifol's is the idea of the true theological conclusion given by Fr. Poulpiquet in his otherwise excellent book *L'objet intégral de L'Apologétique* (Paris 1912). Everything said by the author in pgs. 507-513 is nothing but a physicist and extrinsicist conception of theology, besides evidencing a great confusion between theology and the theological systems or opinions.

[67] John 20:22-23.

and those against the last two precepts of the Decalogue, and the *circumstances* that change the species of sin: let him be anathema."[68]

Thus, these four truths are revealed truths. But where and how are they revealed? They are revealed *in other* truths in which they are virtually contained and from which they follow through reasoning. These truths are: first, Jesus Christ made the Apostles and their successors true *judges* of sins with the power of absolving from them or of retaining them. Second, this power of judging, or of absolving or retaining, cannot be equitably exercised without the act of confession, i.e., without confessing each and every mortal sin, even the hidden, together with their specific circumstances. The four defined dogmas have been derived through reasoning from these two truths, one of faith, and the other of reason.

The Salmanticenses have succinctly expressed the reasoning as follows: "Sacramental confession has not only been instituted, but also commanded by Christ the Lord; hence there exists a divine precept with regard to it . . . Now, this divine precept is *gathered* from those words of John, 20: 'Receive ye the Holy Spirit: whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them; and whose sins you shall retain, they are retained', as the Tridentine teaches in the aforecited fourth session, ch. 5. *For* there can be no power of retaining that does not entail the necessity of *judgment* on the part of the priests with reference to remission and absolution; and *thus* when Christ says that there is in priests the power of retaining sins, He *also* said that their judgment is necessary for absolution, and *consequently* that mortal sins are never remitted without order to this judgment. Thus all theologians . . . Nor will it suffice to confess all mortal sins in general, but one is obliged to confess them indicating, so far as is morally possible, their number and species, as the same Tridentine Council sufficiently indicates in ch. 5, when it says that all sins are to be declared not only in general, but stating their kind, and singly. The Council gives the *reason for this truth: that* priests are constituted by Christ as *judges* in the forum of Penance; *but* they cannot correctly exercise this judgment nor observe equity in the imposition of penalties, if sins are declared to them only in general and not rather in kind and singly."[69]

No one has better expounded the *reason* for all these dogmas than the Tridentine itself. Let us quote its own words: "From the institution of the Sacrament of Penance, which has already been explained, the whole Church has always understood that the Lord *also* instituted the integral confession of sins and that it is by divine law necessary for all who have sinned after

[68] Denz.-Schön., 1706-1707.

[69] SALMANTICENSES, *Cursus Theol. Moralis, De Sacramento Poenitentiae,* ch. 7, n.1, and ch. 8, n.2.

baptism, *forasmuch* as [this is the major of faith] Our Lord Jesus Christ, in view of his ascension from earth into heaven, left behind in his stead the priests as presiders and *judges* to whom all the mortal sins into which the Christian faithful have fallen are to be brought, so that, in virtue of the power of the keys, they may pronounce sentence of remission or of retention of sins. *For it is clear* [this is the reason, i.e., the evident minor of reason] that the priests could not exercise this judgment where the cause is not known, nor could they observe equity in the imposition of penalties if the faithful should declare their sins only in general and not rather singly and in kind. *From these it follows* [another dogmatic corollary or another derived dogma] that penitents ought to declare in confession all the mortal sins, even those that are entirely concealed or private, of which they are conscious after a diligent examination of themselves . . . *It follows besides* [another corollary or derived dogma] that the circumstances that change the species of sin are also to be disclosed in confession, *since without them* [the same minor of reason again] the sins themselves are neither integrally disclosed by the penitent nor become known to the judges, and it becomes impossible for the latter correctly to appraise the grievousness of the sins and to impose on the penitents the convenient penalty for such sins."[70]

There clearly appears in the above example the factor to which we have already called attention in the other examples, to wit, the reason or reasoning employed by the Church, under the Holy Spirit's assistance, as the human instrument of dogmatic development. As explained by the Councils themselves, the process is quite simple. Certain truths are defined as dogmas of faith or as contained in the revealed deposit "because the Church Fathers or the Tradition of the Church has thus understood them." This is the common criterion or touchstone generally employed by the Church in defining dogmas, be they primary or derived. But in the case of derived dogmas (and it is precisely of these that dogmatic progress is made up) there is one further step, which some people apparently fail to notice, viz., that there was a *reason* why the Church Fathers and the Church have understood them *thus*. This is exactly what is understood – or what we understand – by reasoning. However, inasmuch as these reasons are – as indeed they are – intrinsic to the revealed datum, or implicit in the revealed datum, or intellectually explicative of the revealed datum, since they are taken from the very gut or essence of the revealed datum, it is obvious that they do *not objectively add* to the said datum, but merely *explicate,* or unfold, or develop it in a continuous line of real identity or objective homogeneity.

In passing, here we have the answer to a very common objection submitted by those who deny all true dogmatic progress, at least when it is

[70] Sess.14, ch.5; Denz.-Schön., 1679-1681.

effected by means of argumentation or reasoning. The best evidence, they say, that there is no progress in dogma, or that reasoning does not intervene in its development, lies in the fact that when the ecumenical councils seek to define a dogma, they always and above all look to what the holy Fathers *and the Church* have held on the matter.

Quite true. But those who object in this manner fail to notice that reasoning had many times already intervened *beforehand* to form that persuasion of the Church Fathers and that Tradition of the Church, the very same grounds on which the Councils base themselves.

212. TENTH EXAMPLE. – It would be easy to continue submitting many more instances of such dogmas as are known and defined by the Church through reasoning.[71] The Tridentine is a rich mine of them, and many can also be gathered from the Vatican Council. However, we believe that those we have submitted are sufficient for our purposes. We will add only one more which, in our opinion, is of no small importance.

Many, perhaps the majority of theologians, consider as proximate to faith or as definable as of faith, and consequently as *revealed*, this very fundamental truth: "The Church's infallibility is not limited to what is formally or immediately revealed, but extends itself also to what is virtually or mediately revealed." This same truth is also usually expressed in these other terms: "The Church's infallibility is not limited to what is revealed *in itself*, but extends itself to everything that is necessarily *connected with* the revealed deposit or to all that is *necessary* for the conservation of the said deposit."

[71] With respect to the relations between the soul and the body in man, the Church has defined as dogmas of faith these three truths: (a) In man there is *but one* soul, the rational soul; (b) it is the *form* of the body; (c) it is the form of the body *per se* and *essentially*. (4th Council of Constantinople, can. 11; and Council of Vienne, *Constitutio de Fide Catholica;* Denz.-Schön., 657-658, 900, 902).

Those who maintain that the Church can define nothing as of divine faith except truths *formally* contained in the revealed deposit, are necessarily driven to affirm that these three truths are likewise formally revealed and that they are deduced from the revealed deposit through *improper* reasoning.

On the other hand, we believe that any theologian free of prejudices in this matter will sincerely acknowledge that these three truths – particularly the third – are not found except *virtually* in the revealed deposit since they *need* to be deduced through *reasoning in the proper sense* of the term (64).

Hence we think that instead of arguing *a priori:* "The Church can define only what is formally revealed, therefore everything that she has defined is formally revealed", it would be much more in keeping with the historical and scientific method to argue *a posteriori* or *from the facts:* "these truths obviously belong to the virtually revealed; they have been defined by the Church; therefore the Church can define the virtually revealed."

The distinguished Cardinal Franzelin expresses himself in these words: "This extension of infallibility is, with the concurrence of all theologians, so theologically certain a truth that its denial would be a most grievous error, or even, in the view of *many*, a heresy, notwithstanding the fact that up to now it has not been explicitly condemned as heretical."[72] The no less distinguished Cardinal Billot expresses himself in similar terms: "This infallibility is most certainly gathered from revealed principles; indeed, by *many* it is held as formally revealed, even if it has not yet been authentically proposed as a dogma of divine faith."[73]

Now then, how and where is this truth revealed? It is revealed *in other* truths, in which it is virtually contained, and from which it does not issue except through reasoning. Those other truths are: first, the Church has received the divine commission of safeguarding the revealed deposit; second, the Church would not be able to safeguard the deposit if she were not infallible with respect to what is mediately revealed. The truth with which we are now concerned follows by rigorous reasoning from these propositions, one of which is of faith, and the other, of reason.

Such a reasoning can be found in any handbook of theology. De Groot, always concise and clear, states it as follows: "The means must be proportionate to the end; *now*, unless infallibility is extended to include theological conclusions, proportionate means would be wanting for the safekeeping of the deposit of faith; *therefore*, theological conclusions are also the object of infallibility."[74] The theological conclusion is typical of all that is mediately revealed, thus the same reasoning is applicable to all of the latter, including the dogmatic facts.

Someone might here remark: "The reasoning advanced by De Groot and all the theologians is all right. But, over and above that reasoning, there is the persuasion of the Church Fathers and the praxis of the Church. The truth we are dealing with, in the supposition that it is dogmatic, is based on the persuasion of the Fathers and the praxis of the Church, and not on any reasoning."

Very well. But in turn we ask again: where did that *persuasion* of the holy Fathers and that *praxis of the Church* originate? They originated in a principle of *faith*, which is the divine commission to conserve the deposit, and a truth of *reason*, consisting in the natural *evidence*, both speculative and practical, of the impossibility of safeguarding the deposit without being infallible with respect to what is mediately revealed. In other words, they origi-

[72] *De Traditione*, th. 12, scholium primum.

[73] *De Ecclesia Christi*, th. 17, §2.

[74] *Summa Apol.*, q.10, a.2.

nated precisely in the aforecited reasoning, which is a reasoning explicative of the revealed major premise, but nonetheless a true, proper and rigorous reasoning. When dealing with other similar objections involving the persuasion of the Church Fathers and of the Church, as if this were inconsistent with the intervention of reason or reasoning, the theologian ought to recall always the already quoted luminous remark of John of St. Thomas: "Indeed, this is exactly what the Council wanted to prove, viz., *why the Church understood it thus.*" (210)

Whatever be the judgment concerning the ten instances offered above, no one can now say that we limit ourselves to one or another hypothetical example, without descending to concrete and real instances, as our learned objector chided us in his letter. (190)

SECTION IV

WHETHER DOGMATIC EVOLUTION BY WAY OF ASSIMILATION IS POSSIBLE

213. – The *speculative* and the *affective* channels – inclusive reasoning, and vital experience – are the two great channels through which dogmatic development is effected. Having examined the former, we will, prior to the study of the latter, briefly deal with the so-called way of *assimilation.*

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHYSICAL LIFE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLECTUAL LIFE. – Ever since Cardinal Newman wrote his brilliant *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine,* there is mention, even by Catholic writers, of assimilation as one of the channels of dogmatic development. In our opinion no such assimilation exists, not only in dogma, but not even in the sciences. All that is being written to the contrary comes from extrapolating the laws and material processes of vegetable and animal life, in the proper sense of the terms, to the spiritual life of the intellect.

As a matter of fact, there is no need whatsoever of any assimilation of foreign matter for the growth and development of an intellectual principle or statement in the intellect. What is needed is a simple comparison with other intellectual statements coming either from speculative or practical reason, from internal or external experience. St. Thomas rightly observes that every and any intellectual statement is *light,*[75] and the contact or application of

[75] "The intelligible itself is called a *beacon* (lumen) or *light.*" (*Summa Theol.,* p.1, q.12, a.5)

light – without adding to, or modifying, the objectivity of that which is seen – increases the seer's power of vision, and even the visibility of the object or of what exists in the object latently, implicitly, virtually. Herein lies the force and the value of what in ordinary speech is called *comparison* or contact of two or more truths among themselves, and in logic is technically called *reasoning.* Every statement is developed upon contact or comparison with another, or every major premise is developed upon comparison with an inclusive minor, because, upon contact, the light of the minor makes visible in the major new aspects, new relations, new predicates, new truths, new propositions, which in spite of their being already there, were not visibile previously, just as upon contact of the film with the developer, the features that already existed in the film become clear, or better still, just as upon contact with the known values, the unknown values in an equation are disclosed.

According to St. Thomas, this is the true psychology of intellectual progress and of the life of *our* intellect. Consequently, this is also the true psychology of the progress and life of faith and of dogma, since faith is formally an *intellectual* virtue. To speak of assimilations in the development of dogma is to confuse the life of the intellect with the life of an animal or of a plant. On account of their *material* character, plant or animal organisms admit no development or evolution save through intussuception and assimilation of foreign elements; and to say assimilation is to say *transformism.* On the other hand, intellectual life develops itself, not by transforming the primitive principles or statements, but by comparing them among themselves or with other statements, so that by the light of one what was concealed in the other may become visible. Intellectual life is not to be likened to chemical assimilation or combination, nor even to mathematical addition or subtraction. Rather it is like the *development of an equation,* the purpose and process of which is neither to increase nor to decrease in any way the true value of the unknown quantities but to solve or explicate their implicit or hidden values through known values.

214. Such is, according to the Thomist school, the true and only function of the much bandied about inclusive *minors of reason* with respect to the unfolding of dogma. The very serious problems related to the evolution of dogma – considered as new by many to such an extent that they almost accuse the great masters of Scholasticism of having ignored them – were examined and solved by these same masters, and above all by St. Thomas and his school, with a profundity and breadth that stand out in constrast to the superficiality with which they are studied not only in heterodox works, but even in many Catholic handbooks. What we call today the contact of revelation with the different philosophies and civilizations, the schoolmen called the contact of the majors of faith with the minors of reason. What we study today under the name of dogmatic evolution, they studied under the name of theological conclusion. What we discuss today under the question whether

dogmatic progress is the result of the assimilation of rational data by the truths of faiths, they debated under the question whether the minor of reason is a true principle or co-cause of the conclusion, or simply a helper or instrument. The modern question whether true development or evolution is possible in dogma was debated by them in terms of whether theological conclusions are of divine faith or rather definable as of faith.

The solution proferred to these problems by St. Thomas and his school has always been that in the theological reasoning the *minors of reason* are merely instruments of the majors of faith or mere helpers of our mind in the unfolding of what already exists in a latent state in the majors of faith, and that it is not their purpose to increase, diminish, or modify the objectivity of the majors of faith, but only to explicate or unfold their implicitness or virtuality; that the conclusion is not contained in both the major of faith and the minor of reason, but only and exclusively in the major of faith, that the conclusion is not gathered from the major and the minor, but solely from the major with the help of the minor; that the minors of reason are not *proper loci theologici* or *formal* principles of the conclusion but mere *auxiliary* principles; that, consequently, theology or the theological conclusion is not an *objective* addition to the major of faith or revealed deposit, but rather its intellectual *explication*;[76] that, finally, such an explication is a *divino-human* explication or an explication of the divine deposit made by human reason whenever it is effected solely through inference by mere men, i.e., by theologians, but on the other hand, it is a *divino-divine* explication, that is, an explication of the divine deposit by the authority of God Himself, when it is effected with the assistance of the Holy Spirit, as is the case in each and every infallible definition by the Church.

Thus, both the truths of revelation and the truths of reason are, for our minds, sources of light. They differ vastly in nature and value; nonetheless, they are always *light*. Brought into contact, they cannot but illumine one another mutually.[77] The truths of faith have served to develop the truths of

[76] "The *premise of faith alone* contains the whole truth and certainty of the conclusion, and the other which is known by natural light is assumed only accidentally (per accidens) and on account of the imperfection of the subject, who stands in need of the natural *light* in order to acquire science. Hence, in the science of the blessed, in which there is no need of formal discourse, this truth 'Christ is risible' is seen in this *sole* proposition 'Christ is man' [that is, *perfect man*] as in its perfect cause." (GONET, *Clypeus Theologiae Thomisticae*, d. prooemialis, a.1, n.38) This is common doctrine among Thomists (96,246).

[77] "For not only can faith and reason never come into conflict with each other, but they *also give aid to each other*, inasmuch as right reason demonstrates the foundations of faith and illuminated by its light cultivates the science of divine things; and faith on the other hand liberates and keeps reason from errors and furnishes it with manifold knowledge." (CONC. VATICANUM I, *De Fide Catholica*, ch.4; Denz.-Schön., 3019)

reason; the truths of reason have served to unfold the truths of faith. With the truths of faith we have been able to discover in those of reason truths which philosophers would otherwise have been unable to unearth. With the truths of reason we have discovered in those of faith or in the revealed deposit truths that otherwise would have remained forever concealed from the faithful or the theologians. In neither case is there any assimilation of the truths of reason by the truths of faiths, or vice versa, but rather mutual illumination. The assimilation of a truth of reason by a truth of faith would not make for the progress of faith or even of theology; it would rather corrupt them. Nothing truly belongs to the faith or to theology unless it is truly included in the principles of theology and of faith, and the true principles of faith and of theology are not, and can never be, the truths of reason, but the truths of divine faith.

In a nutshell: the relationship of the premises of faith to the premises of reason, or of the revealed deposit to the different human philosophies or civilizations with which it has come into contact, is not the *assimilating* relationship of the stomach to food, but the *instrumental* or auxiliary relationship of a telescope or microscope to sight, or of the chemical developer to the exposed film, or of the known values to the unknown ones in a mathematical equation. Their purpose is not to add, or subtract, or change, or assimilate anything, but solely and exclusively to uncover or unfold what was already *implicit*, which is why the ancients very aptly called it the *explication* of the revealed datum.

THE PHOTOGRAPHIC PLATE EXPOSED TO THE DIVINE THOUGHT

215. When a photographic plate has been exposed to an object, it does not require any new exposure. It needs only to be *developed*. It is, therefore, a *developable* plate.

But in order to develop it, one cannot indifferently use any kind of liquids or any kind of manipulations. Only such liquids and such manipulations are to be employed as will not erase, blur, or modify the image already impressed, but will only bring it out or *develop* it.

What we call the revealed deposit is nothing but a photographic plate exposed to the word of God. In such a plate there exist from the beginning certain features that can be clearly perceived, and which, consequently, require no manipulation or development of any kind in order to be seen and understood. This is what we call the *explicitly revealed*, or, in short, the *revealed*, as St. Thomas calls it.

However, there are in the same plate many other features which likewise are already impressed on it. But these features lie underneath, hidden, imperceptible to the eye, *implicit*. They need to be processed, brought out,

developed. They constitute the implicit-virtually revealed, or, in one word, the *revealable,* to borrow St. Thomas's term, features of the plate.

The chemicals or processes employed to develop or explicate this divine plate, this premise of faith, bear the name of premises of reason or reasoning. Now, one may not use any kind of chemicals or processes, that is, one may not employ any kind of premises, but only such as will not erase, blur or modify the features already impressed on the premise of faith. This is achieved when the premise of reason is of the essence or the *understanding* of the premise of faith, when the former is perfectly matched or proportioned to the nature of the latter (96 and 107). In this case, it is certain that the features of the image that are brought out or developed in the conclusion, would not have been perceived without the manipulation or the liquid of the minor of reason; but it is no less certain that the features do not come from the liquid or the manipulations used in developing the plate, but from the plate itself, i.e., from the object to which the plate has been exposed.

This is the profound and true meaning of those golden phrases with which St. Thomas describes the nature of theology and of the theological conclusion in the proper sense of the terms: "Therefore, since the Sacred Doctrine [Sacred Theology insofar as it is a science properly speaking] considers *certain things inasmuch as they are divinely revealed* [i.e., the explicitly revealed, the features that were already perceptible in the plate from the beginning, the features *already revealed*] all the things that are divinely *revealable* [all the features already impressed on the plate, but that are still *implicit* and explicable or *developable* by human reason] share in the *one reason* of this science.[78] And *thus* the sacred doctrine is like the IMPRESSION OF DIVINE KNOWLEDGE, which being one and simple, encompasses all things."[79] Every rigorous and proper theological conclusion, as well as every definition of the Church, is nothing else but the explication or development of the plate, i.e. of the revealed deposit on which God has made certain impressions. Hence what is given us by theology and by the Church is nothing else but the *implicitly* revealed. *"Everything is implicitly contained in the Holy Bible",* says Capreolo in his commentary to this same article. (378)

215. CARDINAL NEWMAN'S GENUINE THOUGHT. - The learned Cardinal Newman speaks of the process of assimilation because he is dealing with the development not only of doctrine but also of the rites and discipline and the other things accidental to Christianity. Such things are ordinarily external things, which admit not only assimilation but also transformation, as

[78] *Summa Theol.*, p.1, q.1, a.3.

[79] *Ibid.*, ad 2.

a man transforms his clothing or his nourishment without transforming his specific nature.

Truth to say, by "additions" or "assimilations", in the matter of *doctrines,* Newman means exactly the same thing that traditional theology designates with the terms "unfolding" or "explication" of the implicit virtuality. Newman maintained during his whole life the habit of calling "additions" or "assimilations" everything that was not "explicit" from the beginning. However, there are times in which he expresses himself so clearly, that there can be no doubt as to what he meant by such terms.

In 1849, four years after his conversion, Newman expressed his thinking in the following manner: "It is well known, though the creed of the Church has been *one and the same from the beginning,* yet it has been so deeply lodged in her bosom as to be held by individuals *more or less implicitly* instead of being delivered from the first in those special statements, or what are called definitions, under which it is now presented to us, and which preclude mistake or ignorance. These definitions which *are but the expression of portions of the one dogma which has ever been received by the Church,* are the work of time; they have grown to their present shape and number in the course of eighteen centuries, under the exigency of successive events, such as heresies and the like, and they may of course receive still *further additions* as time goes on."[80]

Twenty-five years after his conversion he wrote Dr. White: "The time may come when it will be seen how those traditions are compatible with *additions,* that is, with *true developments,* which those traditions indeed do not *explicitly* teach."[81]

His *Essays Critical and Historical,* published in 1871, contain the following: "The hypothesis about the *depositum fidei* in which I gradually acquiesced was that of doctrinal development, or the evolution of doctrines *out of certain original and fixed dogmatic truths, which were held inviolate from first to last, and the more firmly established and illustrated by the very process of enlargement."* And Newman immediately subjoins that when he wrote of "*new* shapes *foreign* to each other" (in the book's first edition) he was borrowing the language of a theory that was not his own: "Whereas here I have given utterance to a theory, not mine, of a certain metamorphosis and recasting of doctrines into *new shapes* – 'in nova mutatas corpora formas' –.

[80] *Difficulties of Anglicans,* London 1901, vol. 1, pgs. 394-395.

[81] Letter to Dr. White of 12 April 1870. See WARD, WILFRID: *The Life of John Henry Cardinal Newman,* London 1913, vol. 2, pg. 296.

Those old and new shapes being *foreign to each other,* and connected only as symbolizing or realizing certain immutable but nebulous principles."[82]

Here is a new text, which is no less interesting. It is found in Newman's conferences on the *Difficulties of Anglicans:* "To the Apostles the whole revelation was given, by the Church it is transmitted; *no simply new truth* has been given to us since St. John's death; the one office of the Church is to guard 'that noble deposit' of truth, as St. Paul speaks to Timothy, which the Apostles bequeathed to her, *in its fullness and integrity.*"[83]

Let us, finally, recall the terms in which Newman delivers his thinking on the development of dogma: *"Revelation* is *everything* in Catholic doctrine, the *Apostles its sole depositary;* the *inferential* method its *sole instrument,* and *ecclesiastical authority, its sole sanction."*(204)

In his celebrated *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine,* Newman determines seven marks or characteristics of the legitimate or homogeneous development. In the third place he names the "power of assimilation," and in the sixth place the "preservative additions", but he expressly requires that these truths, which he calls assimilations or additions, should not be opposed to the revealed datum, whether by excess or by defect (as happens in the case of every *contrary* concept), nor even totally unconnected with, or foreign to, it (as happens in the case of every *diverse* concept), but that there truly be affinity between them and the revealed datum, which is precisely what the great schoolmen termed *concordant* (consona) concepts or mutually implicit concepts (20). As a matter of fact, there can be no affinity between *ideas* without an internal connexion; if that connexion is absolute or metaphysical, the so-called affinity is nothing other than true *implicit identity* (247), in which case that which in physiological language both psychologists and Newman call assimilation or addition, is, in the truly philosophical and theological language of the School, no more than a true *explication of what is implicit.* That is also the meaning given by Newman to his phrase "new dogmas", that is to say, not *objectively new,* but *explicitly new.*

Hence, we believe that Newman has been the victim of a grave injustice, not only on the part of the Modernists who pretend to see in him a forerunner of their doctrines, but also on the part of certain Catholic theologians who believe that Newman's ideas on the evolution of dogma are not thoroughly consistent with Catholic teaching merely on account of the fact that his peculiar phraseology in this matter is rather different from that

[82] *Essays Critical and Historical,* London 1919, vol. 1, pg. 288. See BREMOND, HENRY: *Newman,* Preface; ed. 8 Paris 1908, pgs. 33-34.

[83] *Difficulties of Anglicans,* London 1900, vol. 2, pg. 327.

commonly employed by scholastic theologians.[84] His Holiness Pius X has rightly said of Newman: "Indeed, nothing is found in the great abundance of his [Newman's] works that *seems foreign to the common teaching of theologians:* nothing that can cast suspicion on his *faith.*"[85]

We believe that Newman's *ideas* on the evolution of dogma are not only perfectly orthodox, but also thoroughly traditional at bottom; however, his theologico-philosophical vocabulary is at times as poor and deficient as his psychological observations and his historical synthesis of dogmatic evolution are unfailingly rich and penetrating. His immortal book *An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine* – Newman began it while still an Anglican, and became a convert to Catholicism while working on it – embodies, in our view, the clearest view of the nature and development of the Catholic Church that is possible to one who is outside but so close that it is almost touching her. Newman's book is like the bridge through which one passes from Anglicanism to Catholicism; this constitutes its great merit. But, by the same token, it is also the bridge through which one can, either through carelessness or mistake, pass from Catholicism to Anglicanism or Modernism; this constitutes its possible danger. To approach this conception of the Catholic Church as seen from the outside, which Newman offers in his book, is, for a Catholic, to approach the extreme confines wherein Catholicism borders on Protestantism, whereas, for a Protestant, it is to approach the extreme confines where Protestantism borders on Catholicism.

This is why we usually refrain from indifferently advising any Catholic young man to read this and certain other works of Newman unless he possesses solid philosophico-theological grounding, and yet we would advise – as we have always advised – any Protestant or agnostic to read, and read frequently, this and all of Newman's other works, in the persuasion that his writings will do more to attract them to Catholicism than all other theological and philosophical apologias written by the greatest Catholic theologians and metaphysicians, but with a rather speculative and intellectual tenor.

[84] "Today no one is unaware that Newman was for a long time viewed with suspicion. But, if I were allowed to speak of skill in such matters as these, where only absolute sincerity is admissible, I would say that nothing is more groundless and more unjust than this suspicious attitude towards *one of the most Catholic spirits that have ever existed.*" (BREMOND, HENRY: *Newman,* ed. 8, Paris 1908, Introd., pgs. 10-11)

However, it must be admitted that there are some very weak points in his philosophy, e.g., his theory on the origin of knowledge and on the nature of certainty. But this has nothing, or almost nothing, to do with his theological theory on the origin and nature of dogmatic evolution.

[85] PIUS X, *Tuum illud opusculum* epistola ad Rmum. Episcopum Limiricensem 10 martii 1908.

We believe that if the illustrious Newman had been as great a theologian or philosopher as he was a psychologist and historian, he could have written one of the best apologias for the Catholic religion that could be dreamt of.

But he himself realized, and was not ashamed of owning it, that he was not a good theologian and had no hopes of being one. In February of 1869, he wrote to Sister Maria Pia: "Really and truly I am not a theologian . . . I am not, and never shall be."[86]

This lack of theology, or rather of precision in theological nomenclature, accounts for Newman's use of the terms additions or assimilations with respect to dogma, despite the fact that in his own mind such terms signify nothing else but homogeneous developments or explications of what was already contained in the primitive datum virtually, but truly *implicitly*. This is the only evolution possible in dogma. To speak of additions or assimilations in any other sense would not be homogeneous or explicative, but transformist, evolution.

SECTION V

DOGMATIC EVOLUTION THROUGH THE AFFECTIVE OR EXPERIMENTAL CHANNEL

216. If there is no such thing in dogma as progress by way of assimilation, there is another channel of dogmatic development entirely apart from the channel of reasoning. We are here referring to the channel of affection, of the will, of piety, of feeling, the experimental way, the mystical way, in short, that way of which St. Thomas so often speaks, and describes as the way by mode of *connaturalness*, by a certain *affinity*, quasi *experimental*, by *contact*, and other like qualifiers. This is the way of which the holy doctor always speaks in contrast to the way *by study, by inquiry, by reasoning*. To understand well this new channel, it is necessary to pay attention to three things, to wit, to the role played in our judgments by: (a) the affective life in general; (b) the natural habits; (c) the supernatural habits.

THE AFFECTIVE LIFE IN GENERAL. – The important role played by the affective life with respect to our judgments is well-known to all. Love excites and concentrates our attention, it makes one dwell on the loved object more constantly and with greater fixedness. This concentration of attention is tantamount to an increase in cognitive power for, as the well-known Latin proverb has it, "pluribus intentus minor est ad singula sensus" (power grows weaker as it is diffused). This concentrated attention is a great

[86] *Loc. cit.*, pg. 281.

advantage for the understanding and the development of any truth. The physicist, or the chemist, who wishes to study thoroughly the properties of any phenomenon or body, begins, first of all, by attempting to isolate it from any other body or phenomenon, so as to be able to study it in all its purity, without any admixture of foreign impressions that usually and frequently lead to error or confusion. Love performs exactly the same function with respect to the loved one. The lover fixes his gaze intensely, and even exclusively on the beloved; he thus receives its impressions with greater force and greater purity, and discerns more quickly certain properties or features that others fail to notice, or come to notice much later.[87] It is the Beloved Disciple who before all others recognizes the risen Christ on the shore, and exclaims: "It is the Lord."

But to this known advantage of love there is at times associated a similarly known disadvantage. To appraise things duly and well, we often need to compare them with other things, since our knowledge, in contrast to that of the angels, is rather much more relative or comparative than absolute or intuitive. The man who fails to pursue varied and comparative studies, who limits himself to one order of ideas, or even worse, to one sole object, the specialist, in short, runs the risk of being narrow and myopic in his judgments, and exclusivist in his appraisals. He is liable to scorn anything outside his specialty, to grow blind to whatever lies beyond his own field, and to exaggerate the object of his predilection as if it alone had any value and deserved any attention.[88] Experience bears abundant witness to the fact that often there is but one step separating the specialist or the impassioned from the myopic or the visionary. There must be some reason for the fact that love is usually shown blindfolded.

At any rate, if love's advantages or disadvantages, whatever they be, reduce solely, as some people believe, to facilitating or obstructing attention and, through attention, theoretical judgment, then the affective life taken as a whole would respectively be a spur or a hindrance to reason but not a second autonomous channel, distinct from it. But, as we shall see, the affective life includes much more than that.

[87] "The *lover* is not satisfied with a *superficial* apprehension of the loved one, but seeks to investigate those things that inwardly belong to the beloved, and thus he penetrates into the latter's interior." (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.1-2, q.28, a.2) "For we busy ourselves with *greater attention* and *greater perseverance* in those things which we perform pleasurably." (*Ibid.*, q.4, a.1, ad 3)

[88] "We pay great attention to those things in which we take delight; but when attention is forcefully engaged in a certain thing, it *grows weaker with regard to other things*, or *is totally withdrawn from them*." (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.1-2, q.33, a.3)

217. THE NATURAL HABITS OR DISPOSITIONS. -- Habit constitutes a *second nature.* A good or virtuous habit is one that is in conformity with *reason.* Thence it follows that anyone equipped with a virtuous habit or a good natural disposition possesses within himself, and without any need of going beyond himself, a real, physical, immanent, and at the same time objective, element whereby he is able experimentally and without reasoning to form a judgment concerning the object of such a habit comparable to, or even better than the judgment formed by another solely through science or speculative reasoning without the benefit of the habit.

It can be said, and it is said, that he who possesses a virtuous habit or natural disposition, possesses a *new sense.* Thus we commonly speak of a sense of art, a sense of modesty, a sense of humour, a sense or feeling of anything in any order whatsoever. Just as with our external senses we perceive the external objects through immediate contact, without any comparison or reasoning, through simple and genuine intuition, so he who possesses, e.g., the habit of chastity, spontaneously and intuitively perceives the purity or impurity of an action or of a doctrine related to such matters more speedily and keenly, and at times with even greater certainty, than can be achieved with all the skills of reasoning by the theoretical moralist, if he is not chaste himself. Much of the same happens in art, education, religion, in all orders of life. This is the effect of any natural disposition, or of any acquired habit, which is a kind of internal *sense* or *instinct* whereby we are able to judge experimentally or connaturally on account of the fact that in the habit we carry within ourselves a second nature, that is to say, a likeness or participation that is not merely intentional or ideal, but real and objective, of the object judged. Just as by the sense of taste we perceive and discern the various flavours, so, says St. Thomas,[89] through the habits we perceive and discern, without reasoning, the conformity of disconformity, the truth or falsity, of the acts or doctrines relative to each habit.

218. THE SUPERNATURAL HABITS. -- What happens in the natural order, happens even more truly in the supernatural order. Better still, what in the natural order is merely a *likeness*, is in the supernatural order reality and *identity.*

As a matter of fact, Catholic doctrine holds that grace, together with the virtues and gifts derived therefrom, is a real participation of the Divinity. More: through sanctifying grace, the Deity itself, in its Unity and Trinity of

[89] Later on in this section, in the paragraph entitled "Texts from St. Thomas", the reader will find gathered together the passages that confirm all that we say here on the *habits*, particularly the supernatural habits of faith, grace, charity, the virtues, and the gifts.

Persons, dwells in our souls, not merely by similitude or metaphor, but in an objective and most real, albeit mysterious and ineffable, manner. This indwelling of the Divinity itself within the most intimate recesses of our being is virtually initiated with the supernatural faith possessed by every Christian, even if he be a sinner. It is formally consummated with sanctifying grace, together with the virtues and gifts, with which every just man is endowed.

Thus, he who possesses divine faith, and to a much greater degree, he who possesses sanctifying grace with its virtues and gifts, possesses and carries within himself, in the manner of a *nature,* the very same object from which all the statements of faith proceed, and with which they all are concerned; the object from which, and from which alone, all dogmatic progress ensues, and can ensue, since nothing can ever be dogmatic or belong to divine faith if it is not a real expression of the Divinity. Thus, the believer, and, even more so, the saint, possess within themselves a *new sense,* which St. Paul calls the *sense of Christ,* and which we might very well call the *sense of faith,* or the *eyes of faith.*

Now then, by history and experience we know that, on the natural level, the aesthetic sense, for example, or the moral sense have contributed to the appreciation and development of the arts or ethics as much as, or perhaps more than, theoretical rules. Let us imagine what would be the case if, instead of being simply the patrimony of a few geniuses or a few noble souls, artistic feeling or moral virtue were universally diffused, and the world were made up exclusively of brilliant artists, or of souls endowed with a high and exquisite moral sense.

Now, what in the natural order is mere supposition, is a reality in the supernatural order. By the habit of faith, all Christians carry within themselves an inchoate, but nonetheless real, participation of the Divinity; an inestimable number of them possess sanctifying grace, and together with grace, charity, the virtues and the supernatural gifts, and through grace and charity, the Divinity itself and the divine life; some -- many more than we think -- possess that life and those gifts in that heroic degree known as sanctity, in which the *life of God* becomes almost normal in them.

That faith, that grace, that charity, those virtues, those gifts -- especially the gifts of wisdom, understanding, and knowledge -- are objective supernatural realities, *second natures* grafted onto what in modern parlance would be called the *subconscious* of our being. By means of them we are able to perceive, judge, and develop connaturally, intuitively, through contact, quasi experimentally, many supernatural truths which the speculative theologian comes to know only through science, as a conclusion, through study, through laborious reasoning.

Thus, as the history of dogmas shows, it frequently happens that some saintly person, or someone possessed of a pure and lively faith, feels or anti-

cipates a certain dogmatic conclusion or development even before it has been deduced, or indeed even surmised, by speculative theology. Such a person then proceeds to share his feeling with other faithful who spontaneously receive it as the genuine expression of their own sentiments or faith. The process is repeated until the feeling is so widely spread that it becomes the *common feeling* of all the Christian people.

Of course, no sooner does such a seemingly novel sentiment externally manifest and propagate itself than it is seized by speculative theology and subjected to strict accounting by being compared with the sources of revelation, viz., the divine Scriptures and Tradition, and with the authentic criteria represented by the Church Fathers, Councils and Popes. It will frequently happen that speculative theology will succeed in *demonstrating* that this sentiment of the faithful, albeit its appearances of novelty, is merely the explication or conclusion of what was already implicitly contained in the sources of revelation or in other defined formulae. On the other hand, it might also happen that speculative theology will not be able rigorously to *demonstrate it* and will have to be satisfied with a greater or lesser degree of *probability*. But whether theology succeeds in demonstrating it or not, the common sentiment of the faithful is *of itself alone*, even without theological reasoning, a sufficient criterion enabling the pontiff or the council to define, under the Holy Spirit's assistance, a truth as a dogma of faith. In order to define a truth, the Church is bound neither to the reasoning of the theologians nor to the feeling of the faithful, since she is not a disciple but the teacher of both the faithful and the theologians. Any human means that certifies her on the explicit or the implicit existence of a truth in the revealed deposit, is sufficient to enable her to define such a truth with the Holy Spirit's assistance. The *feeling* of the body of the faithful is one of such means, equal to, or even more than, theological *reasoning*. And such a feeling is moulded by the *habits* of faith, grace, charity, the virtues and the gifts in a manner that is connatural, i.e., without reasoning, as much as or more than by speculative theology through study and reasoning.

219. TEXTS FROM ST. THOMAS. – To confirm all that has been said in this section we will here transcribe collected together some passages from the Angelic Doctor. We will quote only a few and those that are shortest, but sufficient to indicate the constitutive elements of these two ways of knowing which we have called the *way of reasoning* and the *way of affection*.

"The rectitude of *judgment* can happen in *two ways:* one, through the perfect *use of reason;* another, on account of a certain *connaturalness* to the things that are to be judged. For instance, in matters belonging to chastity, he judges correctly through the *inquiry of reason* who has learned the *science* of

morals; but he who has the *habit* of chastity judges correctly through a certain *connaturalness* to such matters."[90]

"Just as the sense of *taste* detects flavours according to its disposition, so man's *mind* adjudicates concerning what is to be done in accordance with its *habitual disposition*."[91]

"Knowledge is *twofold* . . . One, *speculative* . . .: another, *affective* or *experimental*, insofar as one experiences in himself the taste of divine sweetness."[92]

"Now this sufficiency [in knowing] is accounted for in some people by study and instruction together with keenness of intellect; but in some others it is accounted for by a certain *affinity to things divine*, as Dionysius asserts of Hierotheus."[93]

"And also in this manner the moral *virtues* are said to operate with greater certainty than art, insofar as they are by reason moved to their acts *after the manner of nature*."[94]

"Some people possess certain virtues on account of a *natural disposition* . . . and, in consequence, they *naturally* possess a correct *judgment*."[95]

"The habit of science inclines to the knowables *after the manner of reason* . . .; but the habit of *faith*, inasmuch as it does not rest on reason, inclines *after the manner of nature*, just as the habits of the moral virtues and the habit of principles."[96]

"Now the light of faith is like an impression made by the First Truth. Hence, this light is sufficient in order to *judge*. But this habit does not move *by way of the intellect*, but rather by *way of the will*."[97]

"The mind of man is not moved by the Holy Spirit unless it be *united* to Him in some way, as a tool is not moved by the artisan unless *through contact* or through some other kind of *union*. Now the first union of man [with God] is effected through *faith, hope* and *charity*."[98]

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[90] ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.2-2, q.45, a.3.

[91] *Loc. cit.*, q.24, a.11.

[92] *Loc. cit.*, q.97, a.2, ad 2.

[93] ST. THOMAS, *In 3 Sent.*, d.35, q.2, a.1, sol.1.

[94] ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.2-2, q.18, a.4.

[95] *Loc. cit.*, q.47, a.15.

[96] ST. THOMAS, *In 3 Sent.*, q.3, a.3, sol. 2, ad 2.

[97] ST. THOMAS, *In Boetium, De Trinitate*, q.3, a.1, ad 4.

[98] ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.1-2, q.68, a.4, ad 3.

"For man is in the first place united to God through *faith*."[99]

"For faith is the *life of the soul*, according to Rom.; *The just man lives by faith*."[100]

"And thus the fact that *charity* resides in the *will* does not make it alien to *reason* . . . through a certain *affinity* to reason."[101]

"And this is what God does by increasing *charity*, that the *likeness of the Holy Spirit* be more perfectly participated in the soul."[102]

"*Grace* and *glory* are referred to the same genus."[103]

The wisdom which is a *gift* is much more excellent than the wisdom which is an *intellectual virtue*, inasmuch as it attains to God *much more closely* through *some sort of union of the soul* with Him."[104]

"By some kind of *connaturalness* or *union* with things divine which is achieved through *charity*."[105]

"Through some kind of *union* with things divine, with which we are not united except through *love*."[106]

"Uncreated Wisdom which first *unites itself with us* through *charity*, and in consequence *reveals the mysteries to us*, the knowledge of which is *infused wisdom*. Hence, infused wisdom is not the cause, but rather the *effect*, of *charity*."[107]

"But that man be *united* to such highest causes, being *transformed into their likeness*, in the same way as one who clings to God, is one Spirit,"[108] "so that he comes to judge of others *from his own inmost self*, as it were. . . this is *achieved* through the *gift* of wisdom."[109]

"As the *intellectual* virtue of *wisdom* is to the *understanding of principles*, inasmuch as it comprehends the latter, so is the *gift* of *wisdom* to

[99] *Op. cit.*, p.2-2, q.12, a.1, ad 2.
[100] *Ibid.*, ad 2.
[101] *Op. cit.*, p.2-2, q.24, a.1, ad 2.
[102] *Loc. cit.*, q.24, a.5, ad 3.
[103] *Loc. cit.*, a.3, ad 2.
[104] *Ibid.*, q.45, a.3, ad 1.
[105] *Loc. cit.*, a.4
[106] ST. THOMAS, *In 3 Sent.*, d.35, q.2, a.1, sol.1.
[107] ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.2-2, q.45, a.6, ad 2.
[108] ST. THOMAS, *In I ad Corinth.*, 6.
[109] ST. THOMAS, *In 3 Sent.*, d.34, q.1, a.2

faith, which is the *simple knowledge* of the articles which are the principles of all Christian wisdom. For the gift of wisdom proceeds to a sort of *deiform* and somehow *explicit contemplation* of the articles which faith holds in a *manner that is somehow infolded* and in a *human way*."[110]

"Hence, if there be certain things that are at once apprehended *without reason's discourse*, there, not reason, but *understanding* is said to exist . . . And this is done by the *gift of understanding*, which illumines the mind concerning the things that are heard [in the matter of faith], so that upon being heard they are immediately found good *in the same way as first principles*."[111]

"The soul is *made like God by grace*. Hence, in order that a divine Person be sent to someone by grace, it is necessary that through some gift of grace, the latter be made like the divine Person that is sent. And since the Holy Spirit is *love*, the soul is made *like* the Holy Spirit through the gift of *charity*. Thus the mission of the Holy Spirit is considered in relation to the gift of charity. Now, the Son is not any kind of Word, but one *spiring love* . . . Hence, Augustine significantly says that 'the Son is sent when he is *known* and *perceived* by anyone.' But perception signifies a certain *experimental knowledge*. And it is properly called *sapientia* [wisdom] as if to say *sapida scientia* [sapid or savoury knowledge]"[112]

"The divine persons themselves leave behind certain *gifts* as if by a certain *imprint* of themselves in our souls . . . Hence, this *knowledge* is *somehow experimental*."[113]

"*Wisdom* is called an *intellectual* virtue insofar as it proceeds *through the judgment of reason;* but it is said to be a *gift* insofar as it acts *through a divine instinct*."[114]

"And thus divine knowledge is not *discursive* or *ratiocinative*, but *absolute* and *simple*. The *knowledge* which is said to be a *gift* of the Holy Spirit is *similar* to it, inasmuch as it is its participation and likeness."[115]

"Not everyone who understands has the *gift of understanding*, but he who understands *as it were from the habit* of grace; thus too only they possess the *gift of knowledge* who from the infusion of *grace* possess a correct

[110] *Op. cit.*, d.35, q.2, a.1, sol. 1, ad 1.
[111] *Loc. cit.*, a.2, sol. 1.
[112] ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.1, q.43, a.5, ad 2.
[113] ST. THOMAS, *In Sent.*, d.14, q.11, a.2, ad 2.
[114] ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.1-2, q.68, a.1, ad 4.
[115] *Op. cit.*, p.2-2, q.9, a.1, ad 1.

judgment concerning the *things to be believed* and to be done . . . And such is the *knowledge of the Saints*."[116]

Finally, these two ways of knowing and unfolding dogma have already been indicated by St. Thomas at the very beginning of his masterpiece, the *Summa Theologica*, that is to say, in the very first question, where he writes: "Since *judgment* pertains to wisdom, wisdom is taken in two ways in accordance with the *twofold way of judging*. One way in which a man happens to judge is *by way of inclination*, as e.g., one who *has* the *habit* of virtue judges rightly of such things as are to be done in keeping with the virtue insofar as he is inclined to them. Thus, in book 10, chapter 5 of the *Ethics* it is said that the virtuous man is the measure and rule of human acts. Another way is *by way of cognition*, as e.g., one who is instructed in the *knowledge* of morals would be capable of passing judgment on the acts of a virtue even if he did not possess the *habit* of that virtue. Accordingly, the first mode of judgment about things divine pertains to the wisdom which is said to be a *gift* of the Holy Spirit, in accordance with 1 Cor., 2:15: The *spiritual* man *judges all things*. And Dyonisius in chapter 12 of *The Divine Names*, says: 'Hierotheus has been taught not only by *learning* but also by *undergoing* divine things'. But the second mode of judgment belongs to this doctrine [i.e., speculative theology] insofar as it is acquired *through study*, although its principles are had from revelation."[117]

We have already seen that what the Holy Doctor here says of the gift of wisdom is likewise applied by him proportionally to all the other habits of faith, grace, charity, the virtues and the gifts, since every supernatural habit is a real participation of the Divinity, and the Divinity is the formal object of both dogma and all dogmatic developments.

220. TWO SOURCES AND TWO WAYS. – Accordingly, there are two sources of dogma and of dogmatic development; one is a *derived* and *conceptual* source, viz., the revealed *formulae;* the other is the *primordial* and *real* source, that is to say, the Divinity itself. Albeit distinct, these two sources are not independent either in their origin or in their possession by us. Not in their origin, since the former derives and issues from the latter, inasmuch as the revealed statements or the dogmatic formulae are only conceptual and partial, but nonetheless true, expressions of the Divinity. Not in their possession by us, since no possession of the Divinity through grace is possible without faith in the revealed statements, at least in the two most general statements concerning the existence of a supernatural and remunerating God.

[116] *Loc. cit.*, a.3, ad 3.

[117] *Op. cit.*, p.1, q.1, a.6, ad 3.

Correlative to these two *sources* there also are, and there must be, *two* different *ways* of perceiving, judging and developing dogma. One is the *way of the statements* or revealed formulae, which compares them among themselves or with statements of reason. This is the *way of reasoning*. Another is the *way of the Divinity* itself, with which we come into immediate contact through the habits of faith, grace, virtues and gifts. This is the *affective way*.

A review of the passages quoted in the preceding paragraph will make it clear that St. Thomas designates the first way with the following expressions: (a) *through the use of reason;* (b) through the *inquiry of reason;* (c) *after the manner of cognition;* (d) *speculative knowledge;* (e) *by study and instruction;* (f) *after the manner of reason;* (g) *by way of the intellect;* (h) *in a human way;* (i) *through the judgment of reason;* (j) *discursive or ratiocinative knowledge.*

St. Thomas designates the second way with even more varied expressions: (a) *through connaturalness;* (b) *in the manner of an inclination;* (c) *affective knowledge;* (d) *experimental knowledge;* (e) *through affinity to things divine;* (f) *in the manner of nature;* (g) *by way of the will;* (h) *by contact;* (i) *through union with God;* (j) *through love;* (k) *from the inmost in one;* (l) *through deiform contemplation;* (m) *in the manner of first principles;* (n) *without discourse;* (o) *by divine instinct;* (p) *absolute and simple knowledge;* (q) *as if by habit.*

The first of these two ways is the way of *reason;* the second, the way of the *heart*. The first is the way of *logic;* the second, the *experimental* way, or to use the expression current today, the way of *life*. The first is the way of *speculative Theology*, or of the *science of the learned;* the second, the way of *mystical Theology*, or of the *science of the Saints*.

The bloodstream of dogma, of supernatural life, courses and develops itself along both of these two channels. Both must be taken into account, both must be equally esteemed by every true theologian and every true scholar of the history of dogmas. But, in order not to go astray, they must above all look to the beacon that sheds light on both ways, which is none other than the infallible authority of the Church assisted by the Holy Spirit, who alone is the *principal cause* of dogmatic development, and of whom both the *learning* of the wise and the *holiness* of the saint are mere instruments.

TWO EXAMPLES OF THE KEENNESS OF THE SENSE OF FAITH. – We will adduce only two examples to show how keen and strong the *sense of faith* can be at times, even independently of any theoretical reasoning.

We cite as our first example the dogma of the Immaculate Conception. For centuries prior to its definition, the sentiment in favour of this dogma was already so intense among the faithful that merely to *hear* anything contrary to it caused veritable torment and scandal. Even those who opposed

its definition were forced to admit that such was the case. Thus, Melchor Cano writes: "If the Church were to entrust to the ears of the populace the matter of ascertaining which propositions are consonant and which are dissonant, we should assuredly judge this proposition, 'The Blessed Virgin contracted original sin from our first parents', to be ill-sounding and offensive to pious ears. For upon *hearing* it, the populace is certainly *smitten, shocked, tormented.*"[118] The populace, to which Cano somewhat contemptuously refers, was, in the 16th century, all of the Christian people, simple villagers and learned alike, provided that the latter were not excessively obsessed with school rivalries. The holy and no less learned archbishop of Valencia, St. Thomas de Villanueva, similarly asserts: "And how, pray, will not the serpent – whose head She crushed – take pride at having had her in his power even for one instant, for one moment? *I refuse to listen, our ears will not tolerate* hearing it said that the Blessed Virgin was in bondage to the devil even for one instant, even for one moment."[119]

Something similar has occurred with almost every other dogma relative to the Most Holy Mother of God and ours, e.g., her perpetual virginity, her divine motherhood, her immunity from all actual sins – which have already been defined as dogmas – and her glorious Assumption into heaven, which we hope will some day be dogmatically defined.[120]

It would seem as if all the dogmas concerning Mary have been entrusted for their safekeeping and explication to the loving heart of the simple Christian faithful rather than to the reasoning of speculative theology. The reason is that, as we have said, all the dogmas concerning the Blessed Virgin derive from her being the worthy Mother of God, and the prerequisites or postulates of a "worthy Mother" are better perceived by the living and loving heart of a son than by the cold and dry logic of a scholar.

St. Theresa of Jesus provides us with *another example* typical of the strength and liveliness of the sense of faith. Misled by what some books and masters of spiritual life taught or seemed to teach, the Saint was for some

[118] *De Locis*, bk. 12, ch. 9.

[119] *4th Sermon on the Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary.*

[120] How much would it please us if the Church were to add to the Litany of the Blessed Virgin the invocations corresponding to these two truths: "Queen bodily assumed into heaven", "Dispenser of all graces", or some other formula to this effect. As a matter of fact, there is nothing better than the liturgy to express the sentiments of faith and to hasten the definitions of the Church. "Lex orandi, lex credendi" (The rule of prayer is the rule of belief). [The author's wish has been granted in part. The Litany of the Blessed Virgin now includes the invocation, "Queen assumed into heaven", as a result of the dogmatic definition by Pope Pius XII of Mary's bodily assumption into heaven. – *Transl.* note]

time persuaded that upon attaining certain higher stages of prayer it was proper to prescind completely from meditating on any sensible thing including the most sacred Humanity of Our Blessed Saviour, so as to meditate exclusively on the Divinity. However, the experimental sense derived from her ever growing faith and holiness soon made the error and danger of such a doctrine obvious to her and made it equally clear that not only Christ's Divinity, but also his Humanity was the way and the sure guide on all the levels, lower or higher, of contemplation or supernatural life. So lively and clear was her intuition on this point that she held fast to it against all and whatsoever contrary arguments were raised by theologians and by her confessors, and defended it with that energy and determination with which we defend things that we feel and experience and which are rarely employed to defend things that are perceived only through reasoning. Let the Saint speak for herself:

"You might also think that anyone who has enjoyed such eminent things [i.e., the divine communications of the *Sixth Dwelling*] will have nothing more to do with meditating on the mysteries of the most sacred Humanity of Our Lord Jesus Christ, since he will be entirely busy with love. I have elsewhere written long on this subject, and although they have *contradicted me on this point and told me that I have not understood it* (because these are ways through which Our Lord brings us, and when one has left the beginnings behind it is better to busy oneself with matters pertaining to the Divinity and steer away from things that are bodily), *yet they will never make me confess that it is a good way* . . . For the same Lord who says that He is the way, also says that He is the light and that no one can come to the Father except through Him; and he who sees Me, sees my Father. *They will say that these words are to be taken in another sense . . . I know no other senses . . . With this one,* **which in my soul I feel to be the truth,** *I have always done very well . . . and no one, no matter how spiritual he might be, will make me believe he will do well going this way.*"[121]

Here we have an unlettered woman maintaining against numerous and learned contradictors a dogmatic truth of the greatest moment, and grounding with rare determination and energy her interpretation of the Holy Scripture on this supreme consideration: *In my soul I feel it is the truth.*

Such is the attitude and the formula of the *sense of faith,* a sense that, in spite of her want of theoretical training, existed in the Saint with more vigour and more certain insight than in all the confessors and theologians that milled around her.

"Although contemplative, and, so to say, *experimental* knowledge is so unlike the knowledge acquired principally through rigorous scientific study,

[121] *Sixth Dwelling*, ch. 7, nn.5 and 10; Madrid 1851, tom. 2, pgs. 88-89.

that it may subsist without the latter, nevertheless, as a general rule, it is closely linked to it. Except in the case where the former is produced by a formal miracle, *it should be prepared and supported by the latter.* Conversely, the former not only gives the latter *greater force and insight* (Innigkeit, *intimacy*), but also *so powerfully aids in its acquisition and improvement* that there have been saints who, with comparatively little study, have reached greater heights than others with greater natural talents and more laborious endeavour."[122]

The doctrine upheld here by St. Theresa on the basis of her keen, experimental sense of the faith, is almost identical to that which was a century later defined by the Church when she condemned the following proposition of Molinos: "It is unbecoming of souls versed in this interior way . . . nor should they elicit acts of love towards the Blessed Virgin, the saints, or the *Humanity of Christ* for, inasmuch as these objects are *sensible* in nature, so also is the love for them."[123] Another similar doctrine had already been defined by the Council of Vienne when it condemned the following proposition of the Beghards and Beguines: "That they should not rise to their feet at the elevation of the *Body of Jesus Christ,* nor exhibit any token of reverence towards it. For they assert that it would be an imperfection on their part to come down so low *from the purity and height of their contemplation* as to busy their minds on things concerning the ministry or the sacrament of the Eucharist or the passion of *Christ's humanity.*"[124]

Truth to say, a very great number of dogmatic propositions defined or infallibly condemned by the Church, which today seem so obvious and so easy to prove from the Holy Scriptures or by theological reasons are obvious only on account of our lively and universal Christian sense. Frequently, such propositions were first detected by this Christian sense; then they were subsequently confirmed by reasoning of a more or less conclusive character, and defined by the Church with the Holy Spirit's assistance. But they might have remained undetected and never been defined, were it not for the sense of the faith. This sense exists in the saints in a very special manner, but it also exists in every soul in the state of grace, and is even found somehow in all the Christian faithful.

Thus, all the great theologians have acknowledged the immense value possessed by the *common feeling* of the faithful with respect to the development of dogma. Here are some brief and pertinent passages: "In any question

[122]SCHEEBEN, *Handbuch der Katholischen Dogmatik,* vol. 1, n.1005; Freiburg im B. 1873, pg 412.

[123]Denz.-Schön., 2235.

[124]Denz.-Schön., 898.

of faith the *common sentiment of the faithful people* carries no small weight."[125] "In the definitions of faith the *consensus of the faithful* must be taken into account. Indeed, inasmuch as they make up the Church, it is they who, with the Holy Spirit's assistance, conserve divine revelation so purely that it is impossible for all of them to wander astray."[126] "The Church may declare which book is to be held as canonical, and this is not to be done rashly and arbitrarily, but on the basis of the testimonies of the ancients and the similarity of the Books that are in dispute with those that are not in dispute, and finally on the basis of the *common feeling and taste, as it were, of the Christian people.*"[127] "For such a definition it is enough that a supernatural truth be implicitly contained in Tradition or in Scripture in such wise that, with the *growth of the common consensus of the Church,* through whom the Holy Spirit frequently explains the traditions or declares the Scriptures, it finally becomes possible for the Church to attach her definition."[128] "Something can be declared of faith through the *consensus of the whole Church,* when *all the faithful* concur in firmly believing a certain dogma. Falsity and deception is inconsistent with *such unanimous agreement,* since God assists the Church to preclude her being deceived as a whole."[129] "Except the case in which *all the faithful,* or the greater and better part of them, i.e., all the theologians and the experts in canon law, should concur in believing and teaching that a certain truth is contained in the Holy Scriptures or in the traditions of the Church and common doctrine of the Fathers, and should spread this estimation in writings and public discourses, for in such a case the Pontiff could define such a truth as of faith, *without any other previous examination.*"[130] "From what do we draw the certainty that the Mother of God was sanctified at least before her birth, if not from the *common feeling of the faithful?* What makes us certain that the same Blessed Virgin was taken up into heaven in soul and body? Therefore if no one entertains any doubt on this matters, how is it possible to entertain any doubt on the Immaculate Conception, which is held and defended by *all the faithful?*"[131] Modern theologians generally express themselves in similar vein.

[125]MELCHOR CANO, *De Locis,* bk.5, last chapter, de postremo argumento.

[126]VALENCIA, *De Fide,* bk.8, ch.9.

[127]BELLARMINE, *De Verbo Dei,* bk. 1, ch.10, ad 2.

[128]SUÁREZ, *De Christo,* q.27, d.3, s.6, n.4.

[129]LUGO, *De Fide,* d.1, s.13, n.277.

[130]RIPALDA, *De Fide,* d.8, s.2, n.24.

[131]ST. ALPHONSUS LIGUORI, bk.7. n.258.

As long as this "sense of the faith", is found only in a few faithful – even if these be saints –, or in a part of the Church, its theological value is very small.

But as soon as it spreads and comes to be regarded as the common patrimony of bishops, theologians and faithful, it is of itself and prior to all definition an argument whose value is the equal of the most evident theological reasoning.

And so, either one or the other – evident *reasoning* or Christendom's certain and universal *sentiment* relative to the inclusion of a doctrine in the revealed deposit – is for the Church a sufficient criterion of its definability.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE SENSE OF THE FAITH AND THE ORDINARY MAGISTERIUM. – However, it is necessary to distinguish well between the sense of the faith, of which we have spoken in this section, and the Church's ordinary magisterium, of which we spoke elsewhere (135).

The former exists in all the faithful, especially in those who are in the state of grace, and much more in those who truly are saints, even if they are neither theologians nor bishops. The latter is exclusive of the bishops or shepherds.

The former is neither teaching nor magisterium but mere experimental persuasion of a truth. When it happens to be general among all the faithful it is a sufficient criterion or preparation for that truth's definition by the Church, but of itself it is not a definition. The latter is not only a persuasion of a truth but also a magisterium or a teaching of that truth. When such a teaching is universal and definitive, it is a definition of faith through the ordinary magisterium with a value equal to the definitions of faith through the solemn magisterium.

To possess the former, i.e., the sense of the faith, it is enough to be in the grace of God, or, at least, to have true divine faith. To possess the latter, i.e., the power of ordinary magisterium, it is necessary and sufficient to have episcopal jurisdiction, which of its own nature is a doctrinal jurisdiction, although one may not have grace or even faith.

The common consensus of the faithful that is consequent to a definition of either the solemn or the ordinary magisterium of the Church is not to be confused with the consensus that is antecedent to any definition or teaching of the Church. The former is relative to a truth already defined, and therefore is as infallible as the definition. The latter refers to a truth not yet defined or taught. Consequently, it can be based only on either of two things: either on theological speculative reasoning, or on the intuitive and experimental sense of the faith. Both of these are absolutely fallible as long as the Church does not intervene with either a solemn or an ordinary definition. It is

to the latter alone that the divine assistance or infallibility has been promised. with them alone is it bound.

THE PRINCIPAL FACTOR OF DOGMATIC DEVELOPMENT. – This makes it clear that the principal or truly efficacious factor of dogmatic development is exclusively the Church's definition or the Holy Spirit's infallible assistance, since these two things – definition and assistance – are inextricably conjoined and are but one thing. On the other hand, all other factors, whether speculative or practical, are but mere channels or human and fallible instruments of the infallible exercise of the Church's magisterium.

Thus, the Church's magisterium or dogmatic definition is not merely a recording machine or a sounding board of the social awareness of the Christian community, as Modernism heretically pretends,[132] it is above all a true source, whence all consequent consensus flows explicitly or implicitly, and a true judge and true divine rule of all antecedent consensus of the social consciousness or Christian people, whether such consensus be formed through theological reasoning or through the practical and experimental sense of the faith. Consequently, every definition of the Church's magisterium, whether solemn or ordinary, is of itself infallible, independently of the antecedent, concomitant, or consequent consensus of the theologians or of the faithful. On the contrary, no consensus of either theologians or faithful, no matter how unanimous and permanent, is or can be infallible except insofar as it is an expression of a previous definition or insofar as it is confirmed by a subsequent definition of the Church's solemn or ordinary magisterium.

SECTION VI

FURTHER OBSERVATIONS ON THE AFFECTIVE WAY

220[1]. THE AFFECTIVE WAY AND THE DEPOSIT OF FAITH. – All that we have been saying goes to show that the affective way, no less than the speculative way, is grounded on faith and lives of it. "The *gifts* of the present life are compared to the *faith* as to the *principle* presupposed by them."[133]

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[132] "In defining truths, the learning and the teaching Church collaborate in such a manner that there is nothing left to the teaching Church but to ratify the common opinions of the learning Church." This is the sixth among the propositions condemned by Pius X in the Decree *Lamentabili* issued by the Congregation of the Holy Office on 3 July, 1907. (Denz.-Schön., 3406)

[133] ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.2-2, q.4, a.8.

"For *all* supernatural illuminations, as long as we are exiled from the Lord, faith is itself the steadying *foundation*, the guiding *lamp*, the introducing *gate;* it is according to its *measure* that the *wisdom* given us by God must needs *be measured.*"[134]

Neither the speculative theologian nor the mystic see the Divinity in itself[135] nor, consequently, does either see any truth directly *in* God. Here on earth, the biblical statements constitute the only *objective* source of supernatural knowledge.[136]

The difference between the theoretician and the mystic, from the viewpoint of penetration into the truths implicit in the revealed deposit, lies in that the former as such has no other means of reaching such truths except study and reasoning, whereas the latter relies more on grace and the gifts of the Holy Spirit, which permit him to reach in an experimental manner a number of latent truths either completely unknown to the theoretician or reached by him at the price of strenuous labour.

Thus, unlike the revealed deposit, God is not an immediate *objective* source of knowledge for the mystic; He is only the *efficient cause* of the revealed statements – the *objective source* – and of grace, the gifts, and the supernatural lights – the *subjective* aids that introduce the mystic into the depths of the sacred deposit.

For the role of the *intellectual* gifts of the Holy Spirit – especially the gift of understanding – is to penetrate the wealth of truths hidden in the

[134] ST. BONAVENTURE, *Breviloquium*, prol.; Quaracchi 1890, pg.2.

[135] Excepting, of course, the case of a transitory vision granted perhaps to Moses and St. Paul (ST. THOMAS, *Disputed Questions on truth*, q.10, a.11, ad 1) Contemplation in *this* life might extend *to the vision of the divine essence.*" (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.2-2, q.180, a.5) "For in this life contemplation", says Fr. Norberto del Prado, O.P., "might extend *in passing* up to the vision of the divine essence." (*De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, Friburgi 1907, tom. 1, p.185)

[136] "The spirit of man is not *moved* by the Holy Spirit unless it be somehow united to him just as an instrument is not moved by the craftsman unless by contact or by some other kind of union. Now, the *first union* of man to God is accomplished by *faith*, hope, and charity. Hence, these virtues are presupposed to the gifts as being the *roots* of the gifts. Thus, *all the gifts* belong to these three virtues as derivations of the said virtues." (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.2-2, q.68, a.4, ad 3) "The gift of understanding [as all the other gifts] *supposes* a mind united to God in order to render it *movable* by the Holy Spirit to *understand* the mysteries . . . Consequently the gifts will not formally accomplish this *union*, but suppose it and are *regulated by it.* But the union of the mind to God is done *through faith* in *the state of the present life, through vision in heaven.*" (JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *Cursus Theologicus De Donis Spiritus Sancti*, d.18, a.3, n.67; ed. Vivès, tom. 6, pg. 628)

revealed datum. "To *penetrate* as it were inwardly the many kinds of things that are *hidden in the interior.*"[137]

The mystic avails himself of his connatural penetration of the truths of faith, achieved thanks to the gift of understanding, in order to *judge connaturally* of *divine and human things* as well as of *human acts*, by means of the gifts of wisdom, knowledge, and counsel. "Thus, relative to those things *proposed to faith for belief* [the deposit of faith], two things are required on our part. *First*, that the things understood be *penetrated* or grasped, and this belongs to the *gift of understanding. Secondly*, that man have a correct *judgment of them* . . . This judgment, then, relative to *divine things*, belongs to the *gift of wisdom:* relative to *created* things, belongs to the *gift of knowledge;* and relative to *singular deeds*, belongs to the *gift of counsel.*"[138]

Of the seven gifts that constitute the basis of all mystical life, these four belong to the order of knowledge; the other three - fortitude, piety, and fear of God, – to the appetite.[139]

The first four have the intellect as their subject, since it is obvious that mystical knowledge, which constitutes the *affective* way, essentially *resides in the intellect*, but they have the will, i.e., charity, as their *cause.* "Accordingly, wisdom, which is a gift, has its *cause* indeed *in the will*, i.e., charity: but it has its *essence in the intellect*, whose act is to judge correctly."[140]

Thus the experimental way is caused by *love*, but it is essentially a keener *intellectual* penetration and a more correct judgment of the implicit content of the revealed deposit. It is in this way that it contributes to the development of dogma.[141]

[137] ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.2-2, q.8, a.1, *De dono Intellectus.*

[138] *Loc. cit.*, a.6

[139] "God, by the instinct of the Holy Spirit, moves man to taste and perceive by an experimental tasting that the Lord is delightful, and thus, so to speak, *inviscerates and connaturalizes the divine realities known in this life through faith*, which is a habit that is permanent and *regulative* of charity and the gifts of the Holy Spirit. On account of this connaturalness to, and inviscération of, divine realities, man becomes more capable of penetrating the divine realities themselves and the mysteries of faith, as well as of judging whether in accordance with inferior or in accordance with supreme causes, or of deliberating practically about the things that are to be done. And thus the mind comes to be furnished with four gifts, viz., the gift of *understanding* in order to *penetrate* and grasp well divine realities, and the gifts of *wisdom, knowledge*, and *counsel*, in order to *judge* about divine realities according to those three modes." (JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *In 1-2 S. Thomae, loc. cit.*, a.2, n.13, pg. 486).

[140] ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.2-2, q.45, a.2.

[141] "Hence, St. Thomas himself is of the mind that *wisdom has to do with the same truths as faith*, and that it achieves, as it were, an *explicit* contemplation of the articles that faith attains to in an *infolded manner.*" (JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *loc. cit.*, a.4, n.40) See *In 3 Sent.*, d.35, q.2, a.1, ad 1.

It is extremely important never to lose sight of this teaching of St. Thomas: the only *objective* source of all supernatural knowledge is the truth of *faith:* thence issue the special relations of dependence and subordination that bind speculative or mystical theology to the revealed deposit and the authority of the Church.

Thus it is that mystical theology, despite being capacitated by the intuitive channels of the gifts of the Holy Spirit to grasp more easily and more quickly a greater number of truths, is nonetheless incapable of attaining them if they are not implicitly contained in the revealed datum. According to St. Thomas, the *extent* of any knowledge is measured by the *objective medium.* "The perfection of knowledge, insofar as it is considered on the part of the *thing known,* is determined *in accordance with the medium.*"[142] Since in this case the revealed deposit is the only objective resource for knowing, neither mystical nor speculative theology can ever go beyond its *implicit virtuality,* no matter how extensive might be the development of their *subjective* mediums.

Thus St. Thomas concludes that the relation between these two theologies to the deposit of faith is exactly that of *conclusions* to their *principles.* "All the *certainty* of understanding and knowledge, insofar as they are *gifts,* proceeds from the knowledge of *faith,* as the *certainty of conclusions* comes from the certainty of the *principles.*"[143] The bloodstream that nourishes them and the source from which they spring is one and the same: the revealed virtuality, the "revealable". But the process of deduction differs: abstract study for the theoretician, immediate and vital experience for the mystic. The principal agents differ even more: in the former case it is the theologian and his own reason; in the latter it is the Holy Spirit whereof the gifts are only the instruments. But in either case the objective source whence everything comes is one and the same: the revealed deposit which is the one and only starting point of *all* dogmatic progress. No attempt at development, whether speculative or affective, will exceed its inexhaustible virtuality.

220[2]. THE AFFECTIVE WAY AND PRIVATE REVELATIONS. – What, then, is the role played by private revelations, visions, and similar phenomena which occur so frequently in the lives of the saints? Do they not constitute an objective source of dogmatic knowledge over and beyond the revealed deposit?

There are three answers to this difficulty.

In the first place, these phenomena do not belong *per se* to the mystical *life,* since they require in the subject neither grace nor faith itself. God can

[142] ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.,* p.3, q.10, a.4, ad 1.

[143] *Op. cit.,* p.2-2, q.4, a.8, ad 3.

bestow them on a sinner, or even on an unbeliever. Hence, they do not disclose the "*sense* of the faith" inasmuch as they originate neither in a *life* nor in a habit intrinsic to the subject. They proceed *extrinsically* from God, and are counted among the so-called graces "given gratis" *(gratis datae).* On the other hand, the sense of the faith, which is the principle of the affective way, is something *vital* that comes from the supernatural habits that enable the Christian, and above all the saint, to judge connaturally the content of the revealed deposit. Only of this "sense of the faith" have we affirmed – is it not obvious? – that it cannot exceed the limits of the revealed virtual precisely on account of its being a *sense.*[144]

In the second place, we observe that, although as a matter of right these private revelations could include *new teachings* by reason of their divine origin, nonetheless they never do so as a matter of fact. After the Apostles, they are limited to the revealed doctrine or to the direction of human behaviour. Such is, in St. Thomas's view, the divine economy: "But *in the New Testament* there have been many who, having the *spirit of prophecy,* have predicted many things concerning future events . . . And *in every age* there have not been wanting men *possessing the spirit of prophecy, not for the purpose of putting forth a new doctrine* of faith, but *of directing human acts.*"[145]

In the third and principal place, the Church does not employ private revelations to determine the content of revelation, but instead proceeds contrariwise.

Private revelations are never a source of definitions for the Church. But they might be the occasion to find out whether a doctrine, unsurmised perhaps by the theologians, is contained or not in revelation.

Once this is verified, the Church can define it, not insofar as it is a private revelation, but insofar as it is contained in the revelation handed down by the Apostles.[146]

[144] "However, these *gifts* of the Holy Spirit, and the *instinct* whereby they are directed, are *not given in order to form any vision* whether intellectual or imaginary . . . Accordingly, the divine *instinct* moves to *know* or to direct *those things the principles whereof are grasped in themselves through faith,* not, as in the case of prophecy, to form a vision of those things the principle whereof the vision does not grasp. And therefore *these gifts are given in a habitual manner, but prophecy is not* . . . Nonetheless, we admit that *at times* these gifts are perfected and grow as a result of *some illumination given in the manner of rapture or prophecy.* But they do *not* precisely *per se require this by their nature,* but it comes from an abundance of light. *For the gifts are per se required for salvation, whereas those illuminations are not.*" (JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *loc. cit.,* a.2, nn.14-15, pg. 586).

[145] ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.,* p.2-2, q.95, a.2, ad 3; and q.174, a.6, ad 3.

[146] "But has not the feast of the Body of Christ been instituted because of the *private revelation* made to a certain virgin? Has not the worship of the Heart of Jesus

Even if the hypothesis advanced by certain theologians were admitted, viz., that *many* saints have in their lifetime briefly seen the divine essence, no new objective source of dogma or of dogmatic evolution would result therefrom. There is no revelation other than the Catholic, which was definitively constituted and sealed with the death of the Apostles; and there are no channels of dogmatic evolution other than those that consist in explicating its content. "For *our faith rests on the revelation made to the Apostles and Prophets* who wrote the canonical books, *but not on the revelation made, if any, to other teachers.*"[147] "In the time of grace, the whole faith of the Church is founded *on the revelation made to the Apostles* . . ."[148]

220[3]. THE MECHANISM AND FUNCTIONING OF THE AFFECTIVE WAY. – The foregoing throws some light on the mechanism and functioning of both the speculative and the affective ways.

In the speculative way, the *objective* source is the inexhaustible fecundity of the revealed datum, the first principles of which are known to every believer. The *subjective* instrument of development is the intellect "informed" by faith and acting as *reason*. The more active and more constant the use of the instrument, the greater the growth of the acquired light, the penetration of the revealed datum, and the number of truths unearthed in it.

In the affective way, the *objective* source is the same, but, in addition to faith, the *subjective* instruments are grace, charity and the gifts of the Holy Spirit which constitute the patrimony of the just and operate through acts of love of God. The more intense and permanent this love is, the greater the experimental light of the intellect, the depth of its penetration, and the number of truths connaturally attained in the revealed deposit.[149]

been thus established? We answer that in God's Church this is *not the way* in which truths are accepted or norms given for public worship. Those holy virgins who have been instructed by heaven on the institution of a certain feast or on fomenting a certain devotion, have *by no means* given the Church a *new doctrine* or addressed themselves to her as teachers. They only afforded the occasion whereby the Church would be aroused to examine whether, *in accordance with the truth of the doctrine already received*, it would be expedient to institute such a feast or to practise such a cult. In other words, the Church is not taught by those virgins, but judging what they had to say, decreed whether what was being proposed should be carried out *in accordance with the norm of the old revelation and the common faith.*" (GUIDO MATTIUSI, S.J., *Utrum corporea Virginis Assumptio ad Fidei Catholicae Depositum spectet, Disputatio.* Aquipendii 1922, pg. 42)

[147] ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.1, q.1, a.8, ad 2.

[148] *Op. cit.*, p.2-2, q.174, a.6.

[149] "Accordingly, it must be said that *love* and *affection* can be considered in two ways. First, insofar as it applies itself and the other powers *to operation*, and in this sense it is related to those operations *effectively* and executively, that is, in the manner

Indeed, inasmuch as, according to St. Thomas, the Divinity itself dwells in us through sanctifying grace and charity, it follows that anyone in possession of the latter necessarily produces in the soul by means of acts of love a deeper rooting of God, a more intense supernatural light and a more comprehensive penetration of the revealed deposit.[150]

In short, the acts of love of God produce in the soul the growth of the following: first, sanctifying grace, then charity, next the possession of the Divinity, and lastly the intellectual gifts, which are a true intellectual light that increases the *penetration of the implicit virtuality* of the *revealed deposit.*

This sequence is illustrated by the following comparison from St. Thomas. As the keener is the mind the more it penetrates the *virtuality* of the principles of reason, so also, the more intense is the supernatural light of the mind the more it is able to penetrate the *virtuality* of the principles of faith. For – says he – the supernatural light is to the revealed principles as the natural light is to the principles of reason.[151]

of one that applies to action. Second, insofar as *it applies to itself the object*, and unites to itself and inviscerates within itself the object through a sort of fruition of, and, as it were, a connaturalness and proportion to such an object, so that it, so to say, experiences it by affective experience. In this sense, *affection passes on to become a condition of the object*, insofar as, because of such an affective experience, *the object is made more conformable and proportionate and united to the person* and more suitable to him. Thus, then, the *intellect tends to the object as experienced* and in contact with itself. In this manner love is not precisely a mover in the genus of *effective* cause, but also in the genus of *objective cause* inasmuch as by such an experience the object is rendered proportionate and suitable in a different way . . . "Hence, to the argument [Fr. Suárez's] that says that the will or affection does not add *more light* to the intellect, the answer can be gathered from what has been said, that the will *does not formally enlighten* the intellect, but nonetheless it can *causally give more light*, or perfect [it], insofar as it renders the object more united by love to itself, and *more immediately attained* (attactum) *in itself* and tasted, and thus, it is represented anew to the intellect with a different convenience and proportion to the affection." (JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *loc. cit.*, a.4, nn.11-15, pgs. 537-539)

[150] "*All of the Trinity* dwells in the mind through sanctifying *grace* (per gratiam gratum facientem)." (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.1, q.43, a.5) "An *invisible mission* [of a Divine Person] is also effected in accordance with the progress of virtue or the *increase of grace* . . . when a man advances into *a new act* or a new state of grace." (*Loc. cit.*, a.6) "And this is what God does by *increasing charity*, viz., that the likeness of the Holy Spirit *be more within* and *more perfectly participated.*" (*Op. cit.*, p.2-2, q.24, a.5, ad 3) "In his effects, which are the enlightening of the intellect and the inflaming of the will." (*Op. cit.*, p.1, q.43, a.5, ad 3) "And that *supernatural light* bestowed on man is called the *gift of understanding.*" (*Op cit.*, p.2-2, q.8, a.1) "Hence, as the gift of *charity* exists in all those who have grace, so also the gift of *understanding.*" (*Loc. cit.*, a.4)

[151] "In accordance with a *greater intellectual capacity*, one man has *greater knowledge of the virtuality of the principles* than another." (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.2-2, q.5, a.4, ad 3) "The more perspicacious intellect sees *better* the same principles

This makes it clear that in both ways the progress of knowledge is intrinsic and vital. In the speculative way, because it is of its essence that the intellect, which is the subject of divine faith, should proceed connaturally, and because this same intellect activated by the comparative study of the revealed principles and the principles of reason, *produces* in turn a speculative knowledge that is more luminous and more extensive. Likewise, in the other

taken *formally*. It is clear that the more outstanding mind can penetrate better the same principles taken virtually; to it is given to discover and see from such principles the truth of the *conclusions*." (CAJETAN, *loc. cit.*)

"The *superadded light* [the *gift* of understanding] is to *such things as supernaturally become known to us* [the revealed deposit], as the *natural light* is to those things that we primordially know." (ST. THOMAS, *loc. cit.*, q.8, a.1, ad 2)

"It is common doctrine among the Fathers, indeed even among schoolmen, that anyone who has sanctifying grace and charity, also has *in some* degree the seven gifts. And the more he grows and is perfected in *charity*, so also in the *gifts*.

"One of these gifts is the *gift of understanding*, whereby the things that are of *faith* are somehow *penetrated, discerned*, and *understood*, by the fact that the reasons of faith are grasped. Hence, just as heroic men, perfect in charity, by virtue of the *gift of wisdom* possessed by them in a perfect degree are as it were *participators in the counsels and secrets of God*, his familiar friends, by Him assiduously *enlightened*, and stand in *some kind of contact with the sun of uncreated wisdom;* they also by an internal supernatural and abundant *taste* (gustum) know and relish (sapiunt) the *divine credenda*, and have a correct and certain judgment of them by the conformity and connaturalness of their affection towards them; so also by virtue of the *gift of understanding*, wherewith they are adorned in a perfect degree, they understand the things *of faith* with *utmost clarity, certainty* and *subtlety*, together with the connexion and order of the credenda and the supernatural credibility of the Catholic truth; and they have the *faith* together with *the reasons* of the credenda and the *understanding* of a purified mind . . .

"Such are ordinarily all those who assiduously *experience* the *mystical theology*. Hence, this *illumination* is bestowed neither on all, nor only on those dedicated to the study of theology, but on those who are more proficient *in purity of heart and charity*. One of such was the holy brother Aegidius who refused to say, *'I believe in God'*, but rather, *'I know God.'* And above all, the seraphic Francis." (DIONYSIUS CARTHUSIANUS, *In 1 Sent.*, prolog., q.1; Opera Omnia, Montsolii, tom. 19, pg. 65). ["Reasons of faith", "reasons of the credenda". The term *reason* here does not stand for *motivation, proof*, or *reasoning*. Neither does it signify the *power* of reason. The term is here taken *objectively* to mean the *objective concepts*, or better still, the *reality* (which is in this case the divine reality) insofar as it *intelligibly* or *conceptually* exists in our mind. See ch. I, sect. III, footnote iii. – *Transl.*]

"Indeed, how can one explain the undeniable fact that so many simple and unlettered souls have, in one moment of loftiest contemplation, acquired such prodigious knowledge as presently to surpass the greatest theologians? And such souls exist in great numbers; they are called Hildegarda, Angela of Foligno, Catherine of Sienna, or Catherine of Genoa, or Catherine of Bologna; Rusbrock, Giuseppe de Cupertino, Nicholas Factor, Theresa of Jesus, Rose of Lima, Marina de Escobar, Agreda, Emmerich, Taigi, Sor Barbara, Gemma Galgani, Benigna Consolata, etc., etc., for there are many of them even in our own days.

way, sanctifying grace, which is the soul of supernatural life, gives birth to charity and to the gifts of the Holy Spirit, whence proceed, through the exercise of *love*, a growth of light and of *affective* knowledge.

But, to repeat it once more, Christian reason and study in the speculative way; grace, the gifts and love in the affective way, are nothing more than *subjective* principles. The *objective* source on which they operate, is the revealed datum, which is the intimate patrimony of every believer, speculative or mystic. Consequently, development in either case cannot but relate to the implicit content of the revealed deposit.

It is true that the source of mystical life is the Holy Spirit, God Himself; however, it is not God seen face to face, but God known under the veils of faith, since mystical life does not cease to be a *life of faith* because it is divine. When together with all the Fathers and theologians, the Council of Trent teaches that faith is the root of justification and thus, of supernatural life, including the mystical life, it does not mean to say that the truths of faith are merely the *starting point* that is quickly left behind and forsaken, it means to say that faith is the true root of the bloodstream of our supernatural life in this world, whereas charity or the action of the Holy Spirit plays the role of assimilating *warmth*.

In short, Christianity with its two branches of knowledge, speculative and mystical, and with all the progressive manifestations of its supernatural life – the purgative, illuminative, and unitive – can be compared to a living tree, one and homogeneous, the roots of which are sunk in the revealed deposit. The Catholic Church, infallibly assisted by the Holy Spirit, is in charge of its care and cultivation. The light of faith and study, the warmth of grace and love, both efficaciously contribute to its growth but leave it always rooted in the revealed deposit from which it extracts all the sap on which it lives.

Thus, every explicitly new dogma – as well as every new saint – is nothing but a new fruit out of the seed (revealed datum) deposited by Christ and the Apostles in the bosom of the Church. Under the Holy Spirit's perpetual assistance, which is similar to light and heat, the Church conserves and develops this divine seed.

220[4]. COMPARISON BETWEEN THE AFFECTIVE AND SPECULATIVE WAYS. – We have said that the affective way of the "sense of faith"

"We have had the opportunity to be acquainted with some of such who, with no other book to read but Jesus crucified, the true book of life, have left us astonished at the sublime and marvelous *experimental* knowledge they had of the adorable mystery of the Trinity and of the mysterious workings of the Spirit of love in the hearts of the just." (ARINTERO, J., *Evolución Mística*, ch.8, 5th ed. Salamanca, 1908, p.519)

has contributed to dogmatic development as much as, or even more than, reasoning. But this is not to say that there are many dogmas that have been developed *exclusively* through the former. What is meant is that many dogmas have been developed through the frequent and signal services rendered by the affective to the speculative way.

The *sense of the faith* is in the *supernatural* order what *common sense* is in the *natural* order. In almost every instance they intervene in the exercise of speculation, and do so in three ways:

First, by affording an *intimation* of the solution of the problem prior to any acquaintance with the arguments that demonstrate it.

Secondly, by *rejecting* instinctively as inadmissible certain solutions that are nevertheless based on specious reasons. These solutions are rejected exclusively on the basis of their opposition to common sense.

Thirdly, by effecting the *acceptance* of a teaching by the whole Christian community, including those of its members who are unable to comprehend the force of the arguments for the teaching.

To facilitate its acceptance is to facilitate its definition. The influence of the sense of the faith appears most obviously in matters relative to the affective order, to Christian morals and piety. Let anyone review in Denzinger any of the series of propositions relative to morals or mystical life maintained by Baius, Molinos and the laxists which were later condemned by the Church[152], and it will be obvious that there are many propositions whose error is manifest to the Christian sense, but which is difficult to refute through reasoning alone. For instance, "fornication and 'mollities' [self-abuse] are *intrinsically evil*"[153] is a proposition engraved in the heart of every godly person, yet frequently it becomes an obsession with a theologian challenged to demonstrate it *evidently* and to answer the objections levelled against it.

As in earlier times the Christian sense rejected with horror the heresies of Arius and Nestorius from the moment of their appearance and for quite some time prior to their condemnation in the Councils of Nicaea and Ephesus, because they went against dogmas dear to the heart; so, too, the Christian sense instinctively rejected from the beginning the aberrations of mystics and moralists even before the theologians demonstrated their falsity and the Church condemned them.

[152] Denz.-Schön., 1901-1980, 2201-2268, 2101-2166, 2290-2332.

[153] *Ibid.*, 2148-2149.

The "*sense* of the faith" does not attain its *perfection* except in those souls in which faith, grace, charity, and the gifts are found to exist. Without the latter there is, absolutely speaking, no true experience of divine things.[154]

But it can be said to exist, although imperfectly, in every believer, including one who is momentarily in the state of mortal sin. There are three reasons for this.

First, because, in accordance with the Tridentine, faith is the principle, the ground and the root of grace, charity and the gifts. Thus, to have faith is to have everything else in germ.[155]

Secondly, in St. Thomas's view, the virtue of faith is by its own nature a *tendency* to *everything* that is contained – in any manner whatsoever -- in the revealed deposit. "Faith, insofar as it is itself concerned, sufficiently *inclines to everything* that accompanies, or follows, or precedes the faith."[156] Since every habit is a second nature that instinctively inclines to its object as, e.g., chastity makes a man judge connaturally anything relative to itself as much as, and some times even more than, science alone –, the virtue of faith, accordingly, frequently enables us to appraise instinctively anything relative to itself. "For as the *sense of taste* judges of *flavours* according to its disposition, so the *mind* of man judges of something that is to be done according to its *habitual* . . . *disposition* . . . e.g., he who has the *science* of morals judges correctly through the *inquiry of reason* of matters relative to *chastity*, but he who has the *habit of chastity* judges correctly of such matters on account of a certain *connaturalness to chastity itself*."[157]

[154] "Sinners living without grace can *acutely discern* and dispute, and treat of divine things, *even of mystical experience itself* and of affective understanding, insofar as they are the *object and matter of study* and debate, but they are unable to make use of them as the principle and the motive of knowing. As, for instance, I can treat of the intuitive vision of God and of the experimental cognition of sensible things as objects and subject matter with which I am dealing and about which I am debating, but by this I do not have either the experimental contact with such things or the intuitive vision of God . . . In like manner, he who is in sin is unable to make use of such an experimental affective congition as the reason and formal motive [of knowing] . . . But he can argue about it as about an object and subject-matter . . . And in this regard no great change is felt when one passes from grace to sin. But in regard of the experimental and affective cognition and inward touch a great change or even oblivion is felt." (JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *loc. cit.*, a.8, n.23, p.707)

[155] "*Faith* is the *beginning* of human salvation, the *foundation* and *root* of all *justification*." (TRID. COUNCIL, sess.6, ch.8; Denz.-Schön., 1532) "For *faith* is the *life* of the soul." (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, 2-2, q.12, a.1, ad 2) "The *root* is said to be *virtually* the *whole tree*." (*Loc. cit.*, q.19, a.7, ad 2)

[156] ST. THOMAS, *In 3 Sent.*, d.24, q.1, a.2, sol.2.

[157] ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, 2-2, q.24, a.11; and q.45, a.2)

Finally, although the acts of supernatural habits do not engender another habit, they nonetheless produce a disposition or natural facility, which persists even when the supernatural habit has ceased. It is not surprising, therefore, that any Christian who has been in the state of grace should some times continue exhibiting inclinations similar to those of grace and the supernatural virtues, even if for the moment he should be in a state of mortal sin.[158]

At any rate, it is a matter of history that in the case of dogmas "accessible to the heart" the sense of the faith has manifested itself in *all* of the Christian people, making no distinction between just and sinners, although it exhibited itself more intensely in the former than in the latter, in the fervent that in the lukewarm. This has happened in the dogmas of the consubstantiality of the Word, the divine Motherhood of the Blessed Virgin Mary, and her Immaculate Conception.

If with respect to the affective way we have almost always employed the term "sense of the *faith*" instead of "sense of the *faithful*", we have done so to preclude the danger of making it exclusive of the *common* faithful at the expense of the theologians, the bishops, and the Pope.

In each and every believer – his hierarchical position is here immaterial – this sense is proportional to the degree of faith, charity, and the gifts of the Holy Spirit. On this count, it has been rightly called by some, e.g., Fr. Gardeil, "the *social* sense of the Church". (10)

It must be observed, however, that this sense might be neutralized in some theologians by either the frequency or the excess of speculative reasoning. On the other hand, in certain common faithful it can be found at times more purely and with greater intensity, but with less guarantee against deviation than when it is guided by speculative reason.

220[5]. COMPARISON BETWEEN THE TWO WAYS. – The term "mystical theology" can mean two different kinds of knowledge: (a) that which results in the saints and contemplatives *from their own personal mystical experiences;* (b) that which results from the *study* of the mystical experiences of others.

158 "Acts produced out of an infused habit do not cause any habit, but confirm a pre-existing habit." (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, 1-2, q.51, a.4, ad 3 "It must be said that such a man finds himself *prompt* and *ready* to believe and love, not because he has any acquired habit, but because *he had an infused virtue* . . . Just as a man who has lost the habit of science by becoming insane, in the very state of insanity finds himself *prompt* and *ready* to reason and argue, not because he actually has the habit of science *but because he had it.*" (MEDINA, *Commentarium in D. Thomam, loc. cit.*)

In the former sense it differs *specifically* from speculative theology and is superior to it. It was thus understood by earlier writers, and St. Thomas usually calls it the "Wisdom which is a gift of the Holy Spirit".[159]

In the latter sense, which is the more usual today, as a human science acquired through study in the same manner as speculative theology, it is inferior to it since it is nothing but a branch thereof.[160]

As a matter of fact, speculative theology is divided into: (a) *dogmatic* theology, and (b) *moral* theology. The former considers God *in Himself,* and as the principle of created beings. The latter considers God as the ultimate *end* of *human acts.* These acts, if they are *ordinary* acts, produced in a "human manner", i.e., under the influence of the *virtues,* constitute the object of ordinary moral or *ascetic* theology. But if they are *perfect* acts, produced in a "divine manner", i.e., under the influence of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, they constitute the object of *mystical* theology.

159 "The *wisdom* which is said to be a *gift* of the Holy Spirit differs from that which is an *acquired* intellectual virtue: for the latter is acquired through *human effort,* but the former *comes down from above* as is said in James 3:14." (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, 2-2, q.45, a.1, ad 2) "*Wisdom* which is a *gift* is *more excellent* than the wisdom which is an *intellectual* virtue, inasmuch as it attains God more closely by a certain union of the soul to Him." (*Ibid.*, a.3, ad 1)

"Nor does it follow from this that the *gift* of *wisdom* does not *by its own nature* differ *in substance,* but *only in the mode of acquisition,* from *acquired theology,* as inferred by Suárez against the first mode of saying . . . For, *to the contrary,* the gift of wisdom *is not theology infused accidentally* (per accidens) *and identical in species to our theology,* viz., that which we learn through sweat and schoolwork, but a *mystical and affective wisdom* that judges by internal *experience and relish* of the divine . . . Consequently, the distinction between our theology and the gift of wisdom lies in that theology regards the truths as virtually revealed and as known and inferred in a *metaphysical and quidditative* manner from the principles of faith. But the gift of wisdom does not regard the virtually revealed as *quidditatively known through metaphysical discourse, but as experimentally known in affection.* Thus it is infused not only as the other per se infused virtues *by reason of the* supernatural *object* with which it deals, but also *by reason of the* supernatural *experimental affection* on which it is founded." (JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *loc.cit.*, a.4, n.42, pgs. 647-648).

"Let us, then, demand from the mystic no *metaphysical reasonings,* but simply the conclusions of this *clairvoyant intuition,* which, according to Jörgensen, lies at the basis of all psychic sensitivity, and which effortlessly affirms, with astounding certainty, what metaphysicians offer in their weighty follios after *laborious demonstrations.*" (HOORNAERT, *St. Theresa, the Writer,* Desclée, Paris 1922, pg.544; JÖRGENSEN, *St. Catherine of Sienna,* Beauchesne, Paris 1919, pg.78)

160 "Theology is one *according to ultimate species,* whether it proceeds from premises that are both of faith, or from a premise of faith and another of natural reason, or *whether it treats of speculative or of moral matters.* This proposition is taken from St. Thomas." (JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *In I. am P.*, vol. I, d.2, a.7)

As we have said, considered ontologically in itself, mystical knowledge, which is the fruit of personal experience of things divine, is superior in nobility and value to the speculative knowledge acquired by means of study. The reason is obvious. Mystical knowledge, which is the fruit of the motion of the Holy Spirit exercised through the gifts, is formally infused, supernatural, divine. On the other hand, speculative knowledge, which is the fruit of study and produced by human reason "informed" by faith, is formally natural, aquired, human, albeit materially or objectively divine and supernatural. (309)

However, relative to the evolution of dogma, the speculative way has played a more important, or at least a more visible, role than the mystical way. The latter unfolds itself through *subjective* or personal experiences which are very evident, perhaps, to the favoured individual but which are hardly evident to others; whereas the speculative way is based on *objective* reasons that are open to anybody's examination and appraisal. On the other hand, history shows that whenever a dogma of faith is up for definition, the councils and the popes seek the advice of speculative theologians, even of those who are not mystics, rather than that of godly persons or mystics without theological science.

220[6]. COMPARISON BETWEEN THE TWO WAYS AND THE CHURCH'S AUTHORITY. – Both the speculative and the affective ways depend equally on the deposit of faith. Inasmuch as this deposit has been entrusted by God exclusively to the Church for its safekeeping and explication, it follows that all and any theology depends intrinsically and essentially on her authority, and not only extrinsically and accidentally as in the case of the human sciences.

Besides, compared to the common faithful, every theologian, far from being less dependent on and having less need of, the Church than the former, is on the contrary even more dependent and more indebted to her in direct proportion to the depth of his knowledge. The ordinary believer does not in any manner go beyond the surface of the revealed datum, whereas the theologian is the more eminent the deeper he penetrates into the wealth of this treasure entrusted by God to the Church for exclusive safekeeping. Thus he falls under her jurisdiction in the measure of his mastery.

Not to mention the fact that to attempt the exploration of the depths of a deposit that is *supernatural,* i.e., superior to human reason and of an order different to it, is always fraught with dangers. In this mysterious and slippery terrain it is easy to go astray or to stumble if one is not possessed

of the divine help promised by Christ to no one, however wise and holy, but the Church his spouse.

The theologian is frequently liable to be deluded about the force of a demonstration. "Man is *often mistaken* in that he believes something to be demonstrative, which is not so."[161]

In the case of the mystic there is the no less frequent danger of mistaking the weaknesses of his own imagination or the overexcitations of his sensibility for divine experiences, not to mention the fact that the angel of darkness often transforms himself into an angel of light. "For Satan himself disguises himself as an angel of light."[162] At any rate, since both the one and the other are dealing with *divine* matters, the deficiency of reason is very much in evidence. "Human reason is *very much deficient* in divine things."[163]

For this reason, "to be in accord with the Church" (sentire cum Ecclesia) will always be the essential norm for both the learned and the saint in any matters relating to revelation which is the source of theology.

220[7]. THE UNITY OF CHRISTIAN LIFE AND DOCTRINE. – There are in man three different principles of action: (a) *natural reason* together with the acquired virtues; (b) *Christian reason* together with the supernatural or infused virtues; (c) the *Holy Spirit* who by means of the gifts makes use of Christian reason as an instrument.

Hence three kinds of acts: (a) acts that are *entirely natural* both as to their substance and as to their mode; (b) acts that are *supernatural* as to substance and *natural* as to mode; (c) acts that are *entirely supernatural* both as to substance and as to mode.

In the first category, the substance and the mode are *human;* in the second, the substance is *divine* and the mode is *human;* in the third, the substance and the mode are *divine.*[164]

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[161] ST. THOMAS, *In Boetium, de Trinitate,* lect.1, q.1, a.1.

[162] *2 Cor.* 11:14.

[163] ST. THOMAS, *loc. cit.*

[164] "The *human virtues* [whether acquired or infused] perfect man insofar as man is naturally disposed to be *moved by reason* in the things he does interiorly or exteriorly. Thus it behooves that there be in man some higher perfections in accordance with which he be disposed to be *moved by divine influence;* and such perfections are called the *gifts.*" (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.,* 1-2, q.68, a.1) "Thus, the *gifts* of the Holy Spirit

Ethics deals with acts of the first category; *ascetic* moral theology with those of the second; *mystical* theology with those of the third.

Between acts of the first kind and acts of the second kind – the acts of an unbeliever and the acts of a Christian – there is an *essential* difference. Between acts of the second kind and acts of the third kind – the acts of an ordinary or lukewarm Christian and the acts of a perfect Christian or mystic – the difference is *modal.*

Similarly, there is an *essential* difference between ethics and moral theology; but the difference between these two branches of theology, as well as between the ascetical and mystical life, is *modal.* The latter differ as the imperfect and the perfect within the same species, as the sapling and the tree, as the child and the adult. The mystic is nothing but a perfect Christian, the mystical life is Christian life fully developed.

Thus the *unity,* not only of doctrine, but also of *life,* in the Christian becomes manifest. Just as the degrees of the former are nothing but stages of the *homogeneous development* of the *same doctrine,* so also all the degrees of the latter embody *the homogeneous evolution of the same life.*

What the Holy Spirit bestows upon the mystic is not *another life* but only *another mode of action,* the *divine* mode. Likewise, in the definitions of faith the Holy Spirit provides the Church not with *another doctrine* but with a *new mode of knowing,* the *divine* or dogmatic mode.

Thanks to the intervention of the Holy Spirit, the ascetical life – which already is substantially supernatural – becomes mystical; likewise, theological knowledge – which substantially is revealed knowledge – becomes dogmatic. In both the former and the latter cases there is a change of *mode* but not of *substance.* (304, 309)

Consequently, there is no such thing as *two Christian lives,* or *two Christian teachings,* but only different degrees of the *same life* and the *same teaching.*

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are to man *with respect to the Holy Spirit* as the *moral virtues* are to the appetitive power *with respect to reason.*" (*Loc. cit.,* a.3) "The gifts differ from the virtues in that the *virtues* perfect the acts *in a human manner,* but the *gifts* perfect them *beyond the human manner.*" (ST. THOMAS, *In 3 Sent.,* d.34, q1, a.1) "The reason of a gift is not retained in the virtues, including the *infused* virtues, because the *mode of operation,* in the virtues is in keeping with the *human* condition, although the *substance* of the habit is due to divine generosity." (*Ibid.,* ad 2) "The *gift* is not superior to the infused virtue except *by reason of its mode.*" (*Ibid.,* ad 5)

220[8]. THE FIRST ROOT OF THE TWO WAYS OF DOGMATIC DEVELOPMENT. – Inasmuch as the Divinity itself is the immediate *source* and the central *subject* of the revealed statements, and since its is also the *source* and *principal cause* of faith, grace, and the supernatural habits, it can be truly said that, albeit obscurely known under the veil of faith, it is even in this life the *first root* from which the tree of Christian doctrine and life draws sap and warmth through all the channels of its evolution.

Neither the root nor the sap nor the tree need be replaced in the next life, only the veil of faith needs be removed for there to flow from the Divinity seen intuitively a torrent of light, love, and life that will engulf and deify eternally the soul and the powers of the elect.[165]

On earth the speculative and the mystical ways sometimes exist separately; in heaven they will be united definitively. There will then be no theologian who is not a mystic, no mystic who is not a theologian. The beatific vision will necessarily engender love, and speculative intuition will always be accompanied by mystical experience.

Evolution will then no longer be possible because the supernatural tree will have achieved in every sense the fullness of growth. All *implicit virtuality* will cease to be, not because the object will have disappeared, but because it will not exist for the subject, i.e., for the human spirit. Here below the human spirit labours under the necessity of explicating little by little, piecemeal, the inexhaustible "divine revealable"; there it will contemplate it fully manifested in the beatific vision.[166]

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165 "I answer that it should be said that God is the *subject* of this science . . . Which also becomes manifest *from the principles* of this science, which are the articles of faith. Now, the *subject* of the principles is the self-same subject of the *whole* science, since the whole science is contained *virtually* in the principles." (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.,* p.1, q.1, a.7)

"Sanctifying *grace* is compared to beatitude as the *seminal reason* (ratio seminalis) in nature is compared to the natural effect; hence in 1 John, 3, grace is said to be the *seed* of God." (*Ibid.,* q.62, a.3) "*The light of grace* is a *participation* of divine nature." (*Op. cit.,* 1-2, q.110, a.3) "A kind of *inchoation of glory* in us." (*Op. cit.,* 2-2, q.24, a.3, ad 2). "Since grace imports no defect in its reason, it *becomes glory by an increase of itself.* Nor is there said to be a *different perfection of nature* in the state of pilgrimage and in heaven, as regards grace, because of a *different* perfecting *form,* but because of a *different measure of perfection.*" (ST. THOMAS, *De Veritate,* q.27, a.5, ad 6).

166 "There are two ways of *explicating* the article of faith. One, as regards the substance of the articles themselves insofar as a man distinctly grasps *the articles themselves.* The other, as regards *those things that are implicitly contained in the articles*

There will be no need in heaven of any ecclesiastical magisterium or of any external rule. First, because the formal reason for such magisterium, viz., the safekeeping and the explication of the revealed datum, will no longer exist. Secondly, because each and everyone of the blessed will possess within himself, in the vision of God, the ultimate rule of all judgment and all truth, which guarantees an absolute rectitude in all his speculative and affective acts, without any external regulation.

But prior to the beatific vision, the obscurely revealed deposit is the only *objective source,* and the Church's authority the only *proximate rule* of all our dogmatic development. Hence the necessity of *faith* as the foundation, and of the *Church* as the rule, for both the speculative and the affective ways, and for both the ascetical and the mystical lives. "For we *walk* by *faith* and not by sight."[167] "But *faith* adheres to *all* the articles on account of *one medium,* that is to say, on account of the First Truth proposed to us in the Holy Scriptures, *in accordance with the teaching of the Church* who has the sound understanding thereof." [168]

SECTION VII

THE ANALOGIES OR NATURAL IMAGES OF THE EVOLUTION OF DOGMA

221. OUTSTANDING ANALOGIES. – As a complement to the ways through which the evolution of dogma is effected, it will not be amiss to say something about the different analogies between dogmatic evolution and the cases of natural evolution observed in the natural order. Three analogies give rise to the various metaphors commonly employed to describe the evolution of dogma.

Only three of such images seem to us to be worth considering. The first is the image of the seed, or better still, of the plant. The second is the image

themselves, and this happens when a man grasps *those things that follow from the articles...* Now, no man is under obligation to the total latter explication of the articles, to wit, that he should know everything that is contained in the same articles concerning salvation, for *this is impossible except in heaven where the substance itself of the articles will fully be seen."* (ST. THOMAS, *In 3 Sent.,* d25, a.2, q.2).

[167] 2 Cor. 5:7.

[168] ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol,* 2-2, q.5, a.3, ad 2.

of the human body. The third is the image of the first principles of a science. The first is taken from plant life; the second, from animal life; the third, from intellectual life.

These three metaphors are currently accepted and in use. However, there is a very marked difference in their meaning accordingly as only merely subjective progress or progress of mere formulae, or also a subjective-objective progress or a progress of true implicit virtuality, is deemed admissible in dogma.[169]

222. THE IMAGE OF THE PLANT OR SEED. – Those who reduce dogmatic progress to a *merely* subjective progress or progress of reasoning reason, compare it to a field or panorama, of which a man sees one part today and another part tomorrow, or which he sees first at twilight and then in the full light of day. In this case the field or panorama is exactly the same; there is no development of any kind except solely and exclusively in the man's *seeing.* Such an image of dogmatic progress seems childish to us and in no wise in accord with either traditional theology or the history of dogmas.

In our opinion, if one were to compare dogmatic progress to a field or garden, one should compare it to a field or garden the plants of which upon being inspected today are found at a certain stage of growth, and upon being inspected another day the *same* plants are found at a stage of *further growth* with new shoots, flowers, and fruits. Inasmuch as they are the *same* plants (and not some other plants or seeds surreptitiously introduced), the

[169] Some theologians offer, as a further image of dogmatic progress, the parable of the yeast or leaven mentioned in the Gospel (Matt. 13:33) Just as a little yeast is enough to leaven a great mass of dough, so the teaching of Christ, small to all appearances, flung into the midst of human civilizations and doctrines, gave them new life by giving them a goal and harmony and by providing new orientations and provoking enormous progress.

Very true and beautiful. But beside the point as an image of dogmatic progress. Yeast develops the mass, but it itself neither progresses nor is developed. Furthermore, it does not develop the mass except by mixing itself with the mass and losing its own being.

Now, the crux of the problem of dogmatic progress does not consist in explaining how dogma causes the progress of human doctrines, but in explaining how the dogma itself develops and progresses. At the same time, dogma does not, and cannot, progress by mixing itself with anything human, nor by assimilating anything alien, but simply by an internal or explicative evolution.

Consequently, as an image of dogmatic progress, yeast is the most imperfect of all such images. It hardly deserves to be called an image. For this reason we make no mention of it in the text.

progress is fully homogeneous; but inasmuch as the plants have *grown some more,* the progress is not merely subjective or merely in the spectator's vision, but a development of intrinsic and inclusive *virtuality.* This second image, and not the first, is the traditional image of dogmatic progress.

The great teacher of dogmatic progress, who enjoys the rare privilege of being quoted by the Vatican Council, has the following to say:

"For example. A long time ago our fathers sowed in this field of the Church wheat grains of faith. Now, it would be very wicked and absurd that we, their descendants, should gather the surreptitious error of cockle instead of true and honest grain. On the contrary, it is right and congruous that the beginnings and the ends should show no discrepancy between themselves, and that from the growth of the wheat sown we should now also reap grains of wheat or dogma, so that if, with the flow of time, anything has *evolved* from those first seeds, it ought to be tended with joy, but *nothing should be changed of the characteristic quality* of those sprouts. Let beauty, form, distinction be added; nonetheless, let the same *nature* of each kind remain. God forbid that those tender rose-plants of Catholic teaching be changed into thistles and thorns. God forbid, I say, that cinnamon and balsam saplings in that spiritual paradise should suddenly yield darnel and aconite. Accordingly, it is seemly that what has been sown by the faith of the fathers in this tillage of the field of God's Church, the same should by the children's industry be *cultivated* and *tended.* For it is right that the old dogmas of heavenly philosophy be carefully fostered, polished, refined. But it is unlawful to *exchange* them; it is unlawful to *detruncate,* to *mutilate* them. Although they may receive clarity, light, distinction, yet it is necessary that they retain their fullness, integrity, proper nature."[169a]

223. THE IMAGE OF THE HUMAN BODY. – Similarly, if we should take, not plants, but the human body as the image of dogmatic progress, a *purely subjective* progress would be repressented by the body of a full grown man, of which we see some members today and some other members tomorrow, or which we first see in half-light and later in full light. In this case progress would lie merely and exclusively in the *seeing,* with no progress or development in the thing seen.

On the other hand, virtual-inclusive progress would be represented by the image of a child or youth whose bodily members we see today at a

169a LIRINENSIS, *Commonitorium,* 22; MIGNE, PL 50, 668.

certain stage of growth, and after some time we see again the very *same* bodily members but at a more developed stage. In this case there has been progress not only in our *seeing* but also in the thing seen. However, it is an inclusive and homogeneous progress of the *same* organism we saw before. This second image, and not the first, is the traditional image of dogmatic progress.

"Let the religion of the spirit *imitate* the condition of bodies, which with the passing of years evolve and unfold their mass but withal remain the *same* that they were. There is a *great difference* between the flowering of *childhood* and the *maturity of old age,* yet the old are the same as those who were young. Although the state and condition of one and the same man change, there is nonetheless one and the same *nature,* one and the same person. The members of the suckling infant are *small,* those of the youth are *big,* but they are the *self-same.* There are as many articulations in grown men as there are in little children; and if there be any that are brought forth at a more mature age, they have already been presown in the germ, so that nothing new later comes to light in the old that was not already ensconced in the young. Hence there is no doubt that this is a legitimate and correct rule of progress, a valid and excellent order of growth, to wit, that progressive age should uncover in the grown-ups the same parts and forms that the Creator's wisdom had preformed in the little ones. Now, if the human form should afterwards be changed into some effigy which is *not of its nature,* or something be added or subtracted from the number of its *members,* it is necessary that either the whole body should perish, or become monstruous, or be certainly weakened. So, too, it behooves the *dogma* of the Christian religion to follow these laws of *progress*, i.e., that it be *firmed* with the years, *enlarged* with time, *refined* with age, yet withal remain *uncorrupted* and *untainted,* that it be *fulfilled* and *perfected* in all the capacities of its parts which are as it were its own members and senses; that furthermore it admit no *permutation,* nor suffer any *squandering* of its property or any *diversity* of definition."[169b]

This image taken from a young *body* is a very beautiful one. It is even better than the first one proposed by the same Lirinensis, which was taken from the seed. In the seed everything is *virtual,* whereas in the young body there already are *formed* and *actual* members in which the organism's future homogeneous growths are virtually contained.

169b LIRINENSIS, *ibid.*

It would be erroneous to affirm that in the revealed deposit everything is *virtual* since the *articles* or fundamental dogmas existed therein actually and formally (in determinate articles; ST. THOMAS). But these same articles contain virtually and inclusively many subsequent dogmatic developments.[170]

Still, it must be kept in mind that these two images of dogmatic development, taken from the growth of the plant and of the human body, are no better than *metaphors,* since anything *bodily* or physical employed as an illustration of *divine* realities necessarily assumes the nature of a metaphor. These two metaphors describe well the existence of a true development in the dogma itself within the identity of nature, but they are inadequate with respect to two points relative to the manner in which the development is effected. The plant and the human body develop by the absorption and assimilation of *foreign* matter, and not by the mere internal unfolding of only the same matter of the primitive germ. At the same time, the growth of the plant and of the human body takes place in the external world of *objective reality,* and not in the purely inner world of *intellectual ideality.* If plant and animal life could develop without having to absorb anything foreign, and if that development should take place within, and only within, the human intellect,

[170] Every time that St. Thomas speaks of the natural *intellectual progress* – this is for the holy Doctor the real, albeit, analogous, model of *dogmatic progress* – he compares it also to the progress of plant life or to the progress of the human body. "There preexist in us certain *seeds* of the sciences, to wit, the *first conceptions* of the intellect... Now, from these *universal principles* all principles follow as from certain, as it were, *seminal* reasons." (*De Veritate,* q.11, a.1, ad 5). "For he has marked the soul itself with an intellectual light, and impressed on it the knowledge of the *first principles* which are, as it were, the *seeds* of the sciences, just as He has impressed on other natural things the *seminal reasons* of all the effects that are to be produced." (*Loc. cit.,* a.3) "Of this natural knowledge there is a beginning and a term. Its *beginning* lies in a certain *confused* cognition of *everything* insofar, viz., that in man there is to be found the knowledge of *universal principles* in which, as it were in *seeds,* all the *knowables* that can be known through natural reason pre-exist *virtually.* But the *term* of this knowledge is reached when the things that exist virtually in the same principles are *explicated* actually, as the term of an animal's generation is reached when from the *seed* of an animal, in which all the animal's members *virtually* pre-exist, the animal is produced having all its members *differentiated* and *perfect*... And just as nothing that belonged to the perfection of his [Christ's] body was to be found not actually *explicit* in his body so whatever existed *seminally* or *virtually* in the *first principles* of reason was all of it *explicit* in accordance with perfect knowledge." (*De Veritate,* q.18, a.4) "The *first principles* are as it were *seminal virtualities* of knowledge." (*Loc. cit.,* a.6) All of this terminology and teaching of St. Thomas on *intellectual progress* must be kept in mind in order to understand subsequently his teaching on *dogmatic progress,* which the Saint always compares to intellectual progress.

then we should have a perfect image of *dogmatic* development as described by Lirinensis and explained by St. Thomas.

224. THE IMAGE OF HUMAN INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT. – Now then, what does not take place in either plant or animal life, takes place literally in man's intellectual life. There is in it a genuine unfolding or progress of inclusive virtuality which is true of any primordial or fecund truth, or of any first intellectual principle; which requires no absorption of anything *foreign,* no addition or substraction or any mixture of *objective reality*; which is effected by mere conceptual and homogeneous unfolding of the virtuality already implicit since the beginning in the one and same object known.

Hence, according to St. Thomas, the true image of dogmatic progress must be taken from *intellectual,* rather than from plant or animal, growth because of the fact that faith is *intellectual knowledge,* and the *life* of faith and of dogma is above all an *intellectual* life. The revealed deposit was communicated by God to the prophets and apostles not as a collection of *experiences* or an ensemble of a *life of feeling* – as Modernism maintains –, but as a body of *objective, intellectual* statements. Hence the reception, life and unfolding of the revealed deposit must follow laws analogous to the reception, life and unfolding of any and every intellectual statement. The law of any intellectual statement in man is that it *really* contains more objectivity than it *formally* delivers (hence the so-called fecundity or *virtuality* of a principle or idea), and that it proceeds to unfold little by little, within the intellect itself, the fecundity which it really contains without need of any absorption or mixture of any foreign element, but simply by developing its own virtuality solely through the contact of, or comparison with, the *transcendent* principles of the human intellect. These principles are in no way physico-connexive with respect to anything; they are *inclusive* and can be really, albeit analogically, applied to *everything,* whether human or divine, natural or revealed.

Thus, according to St. Thomas, the proper and real image of *dogmatic* progress is human *intellectual progress,* that is to say, the progress of inclusive virtuality or of *intellectual explication* that takes place in man with regard to the inclusive consequences of the first principles of natural reason. However, this image is analogical, since any *created* thing, whether bodily or intellectual, becomes analogical when it is extrapolated to the *divine.*

"In the *doctrine* of faith the *articles* of faith are *as* the *self-evident* principles in the *doctrine* that is *acquired by natural reason.*"[171] "The intellective power, inasmuch as it is *comparative,* proceeds from certain things to arrive at other things; hence it is not related equally to all the intelligibles that

[171] ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.,* 2-2, q.1, a.7.

can be known. *Some* things it sees at once, as e.g., those that are *self-evident,* in which are *implicitly* contained *some other things* which it cannot understand except through the function of *reason, by explicating* that which is *implicitly* contained in the principles."[172]. "And this was the reason why it was necessary to bring forth *several symbols,* which differ in nothing but that in one are found *more fully explicated* things that in another are found *implicitly."*[173]. "When many things are *virtually* contained in one, they are said to be *implicitly* in it, as *conclusions* in the principles."[174]

With this procedure – which is neither one of addition nor of subtraction nor of change nor of mixture, but one of inclusive-intellectual explication – the two characteristics of substantial immutability and explicative progress, proper of any homogeneous evolution, are maintained in dogma.

This makes clear how rightly the Church has condemned the following proposition, the 54th in Pius X's *Syllabus* against Modernism: "The dogmas, sacraments, hierarchy, either with respect to their notion *or with respect to their reality,* are nothing but the interpretations and developments of Christian understanding, which have increased and perfected a *small hidden germ with external increments."*[175] This proposition contains three errors at least. First, it posits as the starting point a *germ* that is *small* and *hidden* or potential; whereas the starting point to be posited must be something *actual* and *explicit,* and of such breadth that it already encompasses implicitly and intrinsically all subsequent developments. Secondly, it posits a development that is carried out by *external additions*; whereas dogma admits of only *intrinsic* development. Thirdly, it posits not only a notional progress but also a progress of *objective reality;* whereas dogmatic progress can only be *notional,* never objective-real. (182)

[172] ST. THOMAS, *De Veritate,* q.2, a.1, ad 2.

[173] ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.,* 2-2, q.1, a.9.

[174] ST. THOMAS, *De Veritate,* q.14; *De Fide,* a.11.

[175] Denz.-Schön., 3454.

CHAPTER V

SCOPE OF DOGMATIC EVOLUTION AND REFUTATION OF THE MODERN ECCLESIASTICAL FAITH

225. PURPOSE AND OUTLINE OF THIS CHAPTER. – Having considered the various channels through which the implicit virtuality of the revealed datum – which is, as it were, the sap that nourishes the evolution of dogma – courses and unfolds itself, we will now consider the scope of its evolution.

To the title "Scope of Dogmatic Evolution" we have added "Refutation of the Modern Ecclesiastical Faith" because these two questions are intimately linked and are fundamentally similar. Indeed, if we were to succeed, as we hope, in demonstrating that the whole object that is today ascribed to the so-called ecclesiastical faith is definable as a dogma of divine faith, we shall thereby have proven that dogmatic evolution embraces the whole of that same object (theological conclusions, dogmatic facts, the canonization of saints), and that the so-called ecclesiastical faith is totally useless.

That is the purpose of this chapter, in which we shall examine, in all its aspects, the history and nature of the so-called ecclesiastical faith. We believe that the study we undertake in this chapter is the most extensive and thorough that has been written on this subject, since the majority of modern theologians, even of those who have devoted whole volumes to the study of faith or revelation, are satisfied with taking this ecclesiastical faith for granted, and hardly take the trouble of pausing to examine it.

In order to make this study sufficiently thorough, we will divide it into four sections:

1. The origin and meaning of the modern ecclesiastical faith.

2. Ecclesiastical faith and the theological conclusions.
3. Ecclesiastical faith and the dogmatic facts.
4. Ecclesiastical faith and the canonization of saints.

Thus, the present chapter aims to show not only that dogmatic evolution exists, as we have seen in the previous chapters, but also that its scope is so vast that it coincides exactly with the scope of the Church's infallibility.

SECTION I

THE ORIGIN AND MEANING OF THE MODERN ECCLESIASTICAL FAITH

226. THE MODERN VIEW. – The majority of contemporary theologians teach and almost submit as certain the two following propositions:

First. Mediately or virtually revealed truths cannot be defined by the Church as truths of *divine* faith, but they can be defined as *infallible truths.*

Second. When the Church infallibly defines such truths, we are obliged to give them not an assent of *divine* faith, but an assent of *ecclesiastical* faith.

Of these two propositions the latter is nothing but a corollary of the former. In the preceding chapters we have attempted to show that the first proposition is contrary to all theological tradition prior to Molina, and to all the principles of Thomism. It goes without saying that that is exactly what we think of the second proposition. Nonetheless, since we have frequently promised to deal in particular with that brand of faith called "ecclesiastical", we will do so now. Let us begin by explaining what is meant today by *ecclesiastical faith.*

227. THE MATERIAL OBJECT OF ECCLESIASTICAL FAITH. – According to modern theologians, the material object of ecclesiastical faith comprises all the truths that are revealed only in a mediate or virtual manner. In other words, all those truths that notwithstanding their not being formally or immediately contained in the revealed deposit, are nonetheless necessarily connected with that deposit, or are necessary for its conservation. It comprises, in accordance with the classification made by contemporary theologians, six things: (a) *theological conclusions,* properly speaking; (b) *propositions condemned* with a censure inferior to that of heresy; (c) the *universal laws* of the Church, as regards their morality; (d) the definitive approval of the rule and constitutions of *religious orders,* likewise as regards their morality; (e) *dogmatic facts;* (f) the *canonization of saints.*

This sixfold classification seems to us to be extremely empirical since it arises from no intrinsic principle of classification. Nonetheless we accept it both because it is common enough among modern theologians, and because it contributes to clarity. It would appear to be more philosophical to classify the mediately revealed, and consequently, the secondary object of infallibility, into two: (a) mediately revealed *teachings;* (b) mediately revealed *facts.* However, for our present purpose one or the other classification makes little difference, provided that everything that is *mediately revealed,* or everything that is *necessarily connected* with the revealed deposit, or everything that is *necessary for* its conservation, be included. Such is the true material object of the so-called ecclesiastical faith. Since such is also precisely the material object of sacred theology, it can very well be said that the material object of *ecclesiastical* faith is none other than *theology defined* infallibly by the Church.

Meanwhile, we beg the reader to take note of the vast field of truths withdrawn from divine faith and assigned by modern theologians to ecclesiastical faith. It is a commonplace that Catholic doctrine, taken it its whole extent comprises four degress: (a) the revealed datum; (b) dogmas of faith; (c) infallible truths; (d) theological conclusions. According to the modern view, the first and second degrees are made up exclusively of immediately revealed truths; the third and fourth degrees, of mediately revealed truths. Thus, the first and second degrees constitute the proper field of divine faith; the third and fourth, the proper field of ecclesiastical faith. Hence, it is obvious that two whole degrees, or one-half of Catholic doctrine, belongs, or can belong, to ecclesiastical faith, but can never belong to divine faith. Now, no matter how much we might wish to juggle with names, there can be no middle between the divine and the human. Thus, to ascertain whether the so-called ecclesiastical faith is a true divine faith, or not, is tantamount to ascertaining whether one-half of the teachings with which Christ's Church nourishes our supernatural life, and to which she obliges us to give an absolutely unconditional assent under pain of eternal damnation, is *divine,* or merely *human,* teachings.

As a matter of fact, any inquiry into whether a teaching is divine or human is always of extreme importance, for it is no less serious to attempt to pass as human what is truly divine, as to attempt to pass as divine what is merely human.[1] And the matter assumes much more serious proportions if, as we have observed, it is not a case of one isolated proposition or truth, but of one-half, or even the greater part of the Catholic doctrine.

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[1] "The measure of faith is made up of two things, viz. that nothing that falls under faith be excluded from it, and that nothing that does not fall under faith be attributed to it. For in both these ways there is an excess from the measure of faith and a deviation from what is contained in the Holy Scriptures which express the measure of faith." (DURANDUS, In 4 Sent., Prol. Paris 1527, fol. 1 vto.)

228. THE FORMAL MOTIVE OF ECCLESIASTICAL FAITH. – The supporters of ecclesiastical faith consider the two following motives as specifically different: (a) divine *revelation;* (b) divine *assistance.* These two motives are also usually expressed in the following manner: (a) the authority of *God;* (b) the infallible authority of the *Church.* Divine revelation or God's authority is the formal motive of *divine faith;* God's assistance or the infallible authority of the Church, they say, is the formal motive of *ecclesiastical faith.* Thus, the act of divine faith is formulated in these terms: "I believe such a truth *because God has revealed it.*" On the other hand, the act of ecclesiastical faith is formulated thus: "I believe such a truth *because Holy Mother Church thus infallibly teaches it.*"

Since habits are specified by their formal motives, and those two motives differ specifically in the opinion of modern theologians, divine faith and ecclesiastical faith likewise are, and have to be, specifically different. Since that which specifically differs from the divine is not divine, modern theologians commonly admit that ecclesiastical faith is *not a divine faith.*

229. THE NATURE OF ECCLESIASTICAL FAITH. – Consequently, if ecclesiastical faith is not divine faith, what is it? Is it a merely human, faith? Is it a mixture of human faith and divine faith?

It is at this point that these modern authors get themselves into a tangle, and it is delightful to observe the balancing feats they perform with words in the attempt to classify this new species of faith. Some of them affirm that ecclesiastical faith is *almost* or *quasi divine;* others, that it is *mediately divine;* others, that it is *indirectly divine,* others, that it is a *middle between divine faith and human faith;* others, that it is *human;* others, that it is *divino-human;* finally, others, that it is not *faith,* whether divine or human, but *science.*

To preclude anyone from thinking that we are exaggerating or attempting to ridicule such a serious matter, it will be proper to quote some passages, taken at random, but the briefest possible.

"This faith, by some denominated *ecclesiastical,* we might call a *mediately divine faith.*" (FRANZELIN)

"*Ecclesiastical* faith, or *mediately divine* faith." (VACANT)

"As regards the *mediately* and *indirectly divine* faith, it seems not to differ from ecclesiastical faith." (DE GROOT).

"*Neither purely divine nor purely human.*" (BECANO).

"*Middle* between divine faith and human faith." (ANTOINE)

"A *human* and ecclesiastical faith." (PÉRÉFIXE).

"Of ecclesiastical, or *divino-human,* faith." (PÉGUES).

"A *human* faith of utmost certainty, *almost* pertaining to divine faith, and only a *short* distance away from it." (GRANADOS).

"*Theological* assent which is grounded on *discourse.*" (MOLINA)[1a]

It is obvious that the terminology describing this new faith cannot be more varied. For this reason, other authors prefer, with greatest prudence, to speak abundantly of this ecclesiastical faith as if it were something self-evident, without bothering to say whether it is divine faith, or human faith, or a middle between the two.

230. THE ORIGIN OF ECCLESIASTICAL FAITH. – A distinction must be made between the origin of the *name,* and the origin of the *idea.*

The name is of very recent origin. It dates no later than the celebrated debates with the Jansenists on the faith that must be given to the definitions of the Church with respect to dogmatic facts, and consequently it goes no farther than the second half of the 17th century.[2]

[1a] "Hanc quam aliqui appellant fidem *ecclesiasticam,* possumus dicere fidem *mediate* divinam." (FRANZELIN)

"Foi *ecclésiastique* ou foi *mediatement divine.*" (VACANT)

"Quantum ad fidem *mediate* et *indirecte divinam,* a fide *ecclesiastica* non differre videtur." (DE GROOT)

"*Nec pure divina nec pure humana.*" (BECANO)

"*Media* inter fidem divinam et fidem humanam." (ANTOINE)

"Une foi *humaine* et ecclésiastique." (PÉRÉFIXE)

"*De foi ecclésiastique, ou divino-humana.*" (PÉGUES)

"Fides *humana* certissima, *fere* ad fidem divinam partinens, et *parum* ab illa distans." (GRANADOS)

"Assensus *theologicus* qui *discursu* innititur." (MOLINA)

[2] It is well known that the true nature of *dogmatic* facts was neither analyzed nor discussed thoroughly by Catholic theologians until the notorious and interminable sophistries wherewith the Jansenists sought to evade the Church's condemnation of Jansen's five propositions. Prior to the first Bull condemning Jansen's doctrine, and even for quite some years afterwards, when dealing with the Church's authority relative to facts or the meaning of a text, Catholic theologians generally understood the term "facts" to signify "particular" facts, viz. those that had no necessary connexion with dogma, and the term "meaning" of an author to designate the "subjective" meaning that the author had in his mind. This explains why theologians of such orthodoxy and stature as Belarmine, Baronius, and Pallavicini, who wrote prior to Jansen, and Gonet and Contenson, who wrote some years afterwards, seem to deny the Church's infallibility on such matters, and to provide aid to Jansenist resistance. With the various Bulls issued by Innocent X, Alexander VII, and Clement XI against the Jansenist evasions a clear distinction began to take shape between "particular" and "dogmatic" facts, and between the "subjective" and the "objective" meaning of an author. Hence Contenson writing in 1668 says that this question began to be debated *about fifteen years earlier.*

The first to employ it was the archbishop of Paris, Mons. Péréfixe, in a pastoral against Jansenism dated 7th June, 1664.

The occasion that led to the adoption of the term by archbishop Péréfixe seems to be the following.

His predecessor on the see of Paris, Mons. De Marca, had written in a pastoral against the Jansenists that the definition of dogmatic facts made by the Church was something that affected the "substance of dogma", and, therefore, something to which *divine faith* was due. This extremely unsettled the Jansenists. Worse still, there were orthodox theologians whose opinion coincided with that of the Jansenists against the archbishop. Archbishop Péréfixe, wishing to deliver his pastoral of 1664 against the Jansenists, first called Grandin and other Sorbonne theologians to a meeting. From what Fénélon says of him, we are led to think that this archbishop harboured such narrow ideas on divine faith, that in his opinion divine faith could not be given except to things revealed *immediately, nominally,* and *expressly.* Since it is evident that dogmatic facts are not revealed in such a manner, it was agreed that an assent of divine faith could not be given to definitions of dogmatic facts as Archbishop De Marca had believed. On the other hand, an assent of human faith, as propounded by the Jansenists, was not enough since the faith in question is an infallible faith. Thus, what was required was a faith less than divine, but more than human. How was such a faith, positioned midway between the divine and the human, to be called? To cut short the subtle cavils of the Jansenists, the generic term *faith* was insufficient, a specific term was needed. Various sessions were spent in consultation and debate. Since the faith in question was a faith to be given to the infallible authority of the

If we subtract fifteen from that year we get 1653, which is exactly the year in which Pope Innocent X published his famous Bull condemning as heretical Jansen's five propositions. It can therefore be stated with all certainty that prior to 1653 there was no mention of the term *ecclesiastical* faith with respect to the infallible definitions of the Church. However, since the divine and Catholic faith given by us to the dogmas of faith is not merely the faith of this or that individual but the *faith of the whole Church,* and on the other hand, inasmuch as anything pertaining *to the Church* can be called ecclesiastical, in this sense the same divine-Catholic faith can be denominated ecclesiastical, as it is in fact so denominated by Archbishop Guitmundus as early as the 11th century in his treatise on the Eucharist against Berengarius. Having cited the testimonies substantiating the Church's perpetual faith in the dogma of the Transubstantiation, the Archbishop concludes with these words: "Let us then unwaveringly draw the conclusion, which very evidently and necessarily follows, viz. that God effects the change of the bread and the wine into the substance of the body and the blood of Christ. Wherefore let the unreasonable, false, unprofitable, and worthless inventions of impudent men be stilled among all men of good judgment. Let all things, I say, yield to ECCLESIASTICAL FAITH." (GUITMUNDUS, *De Corporis et Sanguinis Christi veritate in Eucharistia,* lib. 3, n.47) It is obvious that the term *ecclesiastical faith* is given here an essentially different meaning from that given to it in the 17th century by Archbishop Péréfixe.

Church, it was agreed to call it *ecclesiastical* faith. The name was a success because it was brief and expressive. The archbishop used it in his pastoral. The theologians who had agreed on it in the conferences with the archbishops, dictated and spread it among the students in the handwritten lessons given out daily. Soon the great Sorbonne writers, e.g., Tournely, D'Argentre, and Grandin, employed it in their printed works giving it, as it were naturalization papers in theological circles. Such are, we believe, the circumstances that gave birth to the term *ecclesiastical faith,* or, at least contributed most to its adoption and spread. This can be gathered from Fénélon's authoritative account, and appears to be confirmed by Tournely and Grandin, writers extremely well versed in everything relative to the debates with the Jansenists, in which both took part.

231. TESTIMONIES FROM FÉNÉLON, TOURNELY AND GRANDIN. – In his reply to the bishop of Saint-Pons, Fénélon writes the following: "You say that Mons. de Marca required this *divine faith* . . . But Mons. de Péréfixe, who has examined what was the most rigorous language used by the *most recent scholastics,* is of the belief, which is shared by M. Grandin and some other famous doctors whom he admitted into his council for the purpose of deliberating on this matter, that the name of *divine faith* should not be given except only to the assent to truths *revealed expressly, nominally, and immediately.* Now, the heretical nature of Jansen's book is not found to be revealed *expressly, nominally, and immediately.* Indeed, it is nothing of the kind. Thence Mons. de Péréfixe concluded that, speaking with full scholastic precision, it cannot be said that it is necessary to believe with *divine faith* the heretical nature of Jansen's book. This view, which is accepted by M. Grandin, by this prelate, and some other competent doctors, is very clearly found in the writings dictated at the Sorbonne, which are still in the hands of a great number of bachelors. This worthy prelate, and these authoritative doctors, believe that it is necessary to employ the term *ecclesiastical faith* to shut the mouth of Jansen's supporters."[3]

The well-known Sorbonne theologian, Honore Tournely, writing a few years after Fénélon, clearly gives us to understand that Mons. de Marca, Mons. Péréfixe's antecessor in the archbishopric of Paris, had taught that *divine faith* was to be given to the definitions of the Church bearing on dogmatic facts, and that his successor, Mons. Péréfixe, to appease Jansenist clamours, was the first to employ the term *ecclesiastical faith.* Writes Tournely:

[3] *Oeuvres* de Fénélon, Réponse à la deuxième letre de Mgr. L'Evêque de Saint-Pons, n.15, Ed. Paris 1882, tom. 12, pp. 546-8.

"With regard to this question thus set forth, theologians offer various opinions.

"The first is the view of those that not only acknowledge the Church as infallible in the matter of doctrinal facts, but also hold that these facts pertain to the *faith* itself, and think that, after the Church's definition, they may not be denied without the mark of *heresy* on account of the inseparable conjunction between the fact and the right [iuris] or dogma . . . It is astonishing to see how *impetuously and vigorously* have Jansen's supporters attacked this view, with what *black colours* have they painted it, as if it totally overthrew the foundations of divine faith by obtruding a new and non-revealed fact in lieu of the object of faith . . . The Most Illustrious de Marca, archbishop of Paris, appears to have adopted this position when he said that the definitions of the Church concerning these doctrinal facts *belong on the side of dogma.*"

He then recounts four views extremely contrary to the preceding one, advanced by those siding with the Jansenists in the denial of the Church's infallibility with regard to dogmatic facts, and submits his own opinion in the following terms:

"Lastly, the sixth opinion, *which we here adopt*, deems that the Holy Spirit is present to the Church with such exceptional power and assistance when she judges the meaning of propositions or books, that it is impossible for her to deviate from the truth. Hence, the faithful are obliged to acquiesce to her judgment not merely with what they call a religious silence, but also with the mind's judgment, consent, and approval. Thus, the motive of this interior assent and adherence is the Church's supreme authority itself. There are some, *after the Most Illustrious Péréfixe, archbishop of Paris,* who call this faith *ecclesiastical,* which is middle between simply divine faith and simply human faith, just as ecclesiastical precepts are said to be neither simply divine nor simply human."

Tournely describes in the following passage the mind of Mons. Péréfixe in inventing the term ecclesiastical faith:

"You will urge: The Most Illustrious Péréfixe, archbishop of Paris, in his order of 8th June of the year 1664, said that only through malice or ignorance can it be affirmed that the definitions of fact belong *to the faith.*

"I answer that it was the Most Illustrious Archbishop's mind only to assert that equal faith was not due to a definition of fact and to a definition of right or dogma, as if the motive of one and the other were one, and their authority equal in all things. For dogma is believed because of immediate revelation, the fact because of the Church's authority; the latter is believed with *ecclesiastical,* the former with *divine faith.* That the Most Illustrious Archbishop required the obsequy of the mind to the definitions of fact is shown by the following words, which immediately follow in the cited order

and which should not have been omitted by the adversaries: 'Let them demand', said he in French,' 'seulement pour cet égard *une foi humaine et écclésiastique,* qui obligue à soumettre avec sincérité son judgement à celui des supérieurs légitimes'."[4]

These statements by Fénélon and Tournely are confirmed by Grandin, who was, as we have seen, one of the theologians present at the consultations with archbishop Péréfixe. He writes: "You will ask: by what *name* is that *faith* to be called. which is founded on the Church's judgment and declaration concerning *facts?* I answer that it can be called human and *ecclesiastical* . . . And, indeed, *by this name it was called by the Most Illustrious Archbishop* [Péréfixe] *in his order issued on 7th June of the year 1664.* If the *name* should seem new to anyone, the thing itself should not appear *new.*"[5] Péréfixe's pastoral carries exactly the date given by Grandin: "Given in Paris this seventh of June, sixteen hundred sixty four."[6]

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[4]TOURNELY, *De Ecclesia Christi,* q.5, a.5. ed Paris 1727, pp. 447-605.

[5]MARTIN GRANDIN, *Opera theologica, Tractatus de Gratia,* q.3, s.3, punct.2, Paris 1710, vol.2, pg.276.

[6]Here are some passages from Mons. Hardoüin de Péréfixe's pastoral letter: "Hardoüin, by the grace of God and of the Holy Apostolic See Archbishop of Paris, to all who see these present letters greetings in Our Lord. Just as there can be no question that there is no Catholic who is not obliged to submit his judgment in matters of religion to the judgment of his superiors and legitimate pastors, so too this submission cannot be more strongly recommended than by the words of St. Vincent de Lérins: *that it is through practice or through contempt that the disciples save themselves or hang themselves.*

"And this brings us to the subject of the five propositions drawn from the book entitled *Augustinus* written by Jansen, bishop of Ypres. . . .

"It is for this reason that no one can sufficiently praise the wisdom and the paternal charity of our Holy Fathers Popes Innocent X and Alexander VII who, in order to preclude all pretexts on the part of those who in the future would be of a mind to maintain these five propositions, by their Constitutions of the years 1653 and 1656 have not only condemned them as they are in themselves, but have furthermore declared, particularly Alexander VII, that the five condemned propositions are drawn from Jansen's book entitled *Augustinus,* and that they have condemned them in the sense in which the said author has taught them. To which my Lords the Archbishops and Bishops of this realm being desirous of manifesting their conformity, they are of the belief that they can do so no better than by drafting a formula of profession of faith in the very same sense as that of the said Constitutions. Upon being signed, this formula will of course make evidently known those who have submitted themselves sincerely to the said Constitutions. From these Constitutions, as well as from the said formula, it is certain that no one, unless he is malicious or ignorant, can draw any excuse for saying that they demand a submission of divine faith, for as to the fact, they only require in this respect, as it is frequently said, *a human and ecclesiastical faith,* which obliges one sincerely to submit his judgment to that of his legitimate superiors, since otherwise it would be easy by this contrivance to evade the condemnation of all kinds of errors, and under the pretext of the question of fact it will always be possible for anyone to maintain the liberty of defending his own opinion with respect to the right . . .

We beg the reader's indulgence for these long quotations. They are extremely important in order to determine the origin of the name of the so-called ecclesiastical faith. We believe that these passages clearly establish two things. First, that the term ecclesiastical faith dates from the 7th June, 1664, which is the date of archbishop Péréfixe's pastoral. Second, that the coining of this new ecclesiastical faith obeyed the demands of an *apologetic opportunism,* to wit, the desire to appease the clamours of Jansen's followers, who could not tolerate any mention of *divine faith* with respect to the dogmatic fact of the condemnation of Jansen's book.

By the way, we have noted with satisfaction that after the publication of this study of ours in *La Ciencia Tomista,*[7] a number of theologians have accepted as commonplace, although without citing us, the origin, date, and author that we have given of the modern ecclesiastical faith, and even go so far as to cite in confirmation of it the same authors and passages quoted by us. This makes us feel well rewarded for the not inconsiderable effort and time spent in clarifying this important historical point, the vestiges of which seemed to have vanished without a trace in the theologians posterior to the 18th century. We think that it will not be long before archbishop Péréfixe will be widely known among theologians as the father of the modern ecclesiastical faith.

232. THE FORERUNNERS OF ECCLESIASTICAL FAITH. – If the name of ecclesiastical faith is quite recent, the origin of the thing signified by it is not much older. It dates from the close of the 16th century.

Indeed, the first forerunner of what today goes by the name of ecclesiastical faith is, undoubtedly, the famous author of the *Scientia Media,* Luis Molina. Prior to this celebrated theologian from Cuenca, all theologians, irrespective of schools, had admitted that the revealed mediate or virtual could be defined by the Church as of divine faith, and that, after its definition, it was worthy of an assent of true divine faith.

"Given in Paris, the seventh of June, sixteen hundred sixty four." (*Ordonnance de Monseigneur l'illustrissime et Révérendissime Hardoüin de Péréfixe, Archevesque de Paris.* A Paris, chez Francois Muget 1164, pp. 3-4-5-7).

It seems evident that the phrase "as it is frequently said" *(comme il a eté si souvent dit*), refers to the term "human", and not to the term "Ecclesiastical" which appears here for the first time. The "meaning" of this word is old, but the word is new, as Grandin observes (*loc. cit.*).

Our heartfelt thanks to the learned Fr. Mandonnet, O.P. for providing us with a copy of Mons. Péréfixe's letter.

[7]March, 1921

Molina was the first to deny that the revealed mediate or virtual could ever deserve divine faith, even if it were to be defined by the Church as dogmatically as the two wills in Christ. But if the definitions made by the Church of such virtuals do not deserve divine faith, what kind of assent are they to be given? *Theological* assent, replies Molina, since it is an assent based on reasoning. The theologians assent to such a defined truth on the basis of the same scientific reasoning employed by the Church to state and define such a virtual. And the following reasoning is sufficient for the faithful: "The Church cannot be wrong in her definitions. Now, the Church has defined such a truth. Therefore, it is certain."[8]

Obviously, Molina calls such an assent not by the name of ecclesiastical faith but by that of theological assent. However, since according to Molina, the reasoning on which the faithful base such an assent is an improper reasoning, the assent is rather one of faith than of science. And since, according to Molina, it is not an assent of divine faith because it is concerned with things that are mediately revealed, nor an assent of merely human faith because it is infallible, we come up with an assent that is identical or very similar to that

[8]"There have been some who have said that we must also count among the principles of theology those definitions whereby the Church has established certain things because she sees that they are evidently deduced from revealed truths, as e.g., the proposition that there were two wills, divine and human, in Christ the Lord, which, although it is not expressed in the Holy Scriptures, is nonetheless evidently gathered from them. .. This opinion does not please me. . . . You will therefore ask, what habit is it whereby the faithful assent to Church-defined conclusions from revealed truths, if they do not assent to them immediately by the habit of faith? I answer: If they know how to gather them from revealed truths, as the Church gathers them, then they assent to them by a *theological habit* in two ways. One, by the same *reasoning* itself, whereby, not otherwise than the Church herself, they deduce them. Two, by this other *reasoning* grounded on the authority of the Church, which is common to both the learned and the not-learned: The Church cannot err in her definitions; but this or that has been defined; therefore it is certain and true." (MOLINA, *Commentaria in Primam D. Thomae,* p.1, q.1, a.2) Navarrete alludes to this opinion of Molina when he says: "This opinion contains many *false* things, which as of now we do not wish to mark with a *censure* because the thinking of this author is not sufficiently clear. However, we *take it for granted* that it is *heretical* to say that the Church, in defining matters of faith [the subject under discussion is the definitions of the revealed virtual or mediate] does not have an assistance as infallible as the assistance had by St. Paul or any sacred writer." NAVARRETTE, *Controversiae in D. Thomae et eius Scholae defensionem,* t.1 cont.7, Vallisoleti 1605)

That the Church's infallibility extends itself to the revealed mediate or virtual has always been considered by the Thomist school as a truth *of faith,* and its denial as *heretical.* Modern theologians also fairly generally admit it as a truth of faith, or at least as a revealed truth definable as of divine faith. However, they deny (albeit inconsistently, as we shall see in due time) that thence it follows that the thing defined is of divine faith. The infallible authority to define the virtual is, they say, of divine faith, but the thing defined is only of *ecclesiastical* faith.

which goes today by the name of ecclesiastical faith. Thus, Molina can well be considered as the father or the first forerunner of ecclesiastical faith.

The second forerunner of ecclesiastical faith is Granados, who, like Molina, is also a Jesuit and a Spaniard. Granados[9] undertakes to defend Molina on the question of the revealed virtual from attacks, particularly those of the renowned Navarrete. However, he corrects Molina with respect to two things. First, he is not pleased – and quite correctly – with Molina's example of the definition by the Church of the two wills in Christ. All theologians have always been unanimous in affirming that to this definition an assent of true divine faith must be given.

The second point on which Granados corrects Molina refers to Molina's contention that the assent given by us to the Church's infallible definitions of the virtually revealed is a *theological* assent based on reasoning. Granados correctly observes that the simple faithful do not bother with theologics or with reasonings; they limit themselves simply to giving faith to what the Church infallibly teaches them.

In which case, what kind of faith is it if, as Granados agrees with Molina, it is not divine faith? It is, Granados replies, a *human faith of utmost certainty,* and *so close* to divine faith that when one is not speaking with

[9]"And it is thus, in Molina's opinion, that the two wills or operations in Christ were defined in the Sixth Council. However, the *example* does not seem good, for it appears that *express* testimonies of this truth are found in Scripture. But of this elsewhere." (GRANADOS, *loc. cit.*, n.20) To this view propounded by Granados and Molina, John of St. Thomas replies in these terms: "But to the contrary, in the first place, if he [Granados] ever grants that we assent to that defined truth *without benefit of reasoning,* then in that case it loses the nature of a theological *conclusion* which is held through discourse, and thus this was the opposite foundation [of Molina and Granados] who say that it does not belong to the faith *because it is attained through discourse.* In the second place, such a truth thus defined rests upon *divine* authority, and not only on the *human* and *created* authority of the Church, which is obvious from two things: first from the fact that the Church does not define anything because it seems right to herself, but *because it seems right to the Holy Spirit;* therefore, if the Church proposes that truth as seeming right to the Holy Spirit, then we hold it *on the sole authority of the Holy Spirit.* . . . Nor is there any difficulty in the instance taken from the canonization of saints. . . . Hence in the canonization of saints it is *piously believed* that the Holy Spirit assists so that the Church will not err, as St. Thomas says, but *it does not have the certainty of faith,* as he says in the same place. But it is *certain with the certainty of faith* that the Holy Spirit assists in defining matters of faith and that the definition proceeds from His guidance; *hence* the assent given to it is not grounded on human, but on *divine,* authority." (JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *De sacra theologia,* q.1, d.2, a.4, n.8) Later on (283) when we deal with the canonization of saints, we shall see what meaning is to be given to the term "it is piously believed", to which John of St. Thomas alludes.

theological precision, as was the case before Molina, it is usually called divine faith.[10]

Obviously, with Granados the germ of the future ecclesiastical faith has advanced one little step forward. In Molina it was still a *theological* or scientific assent. In Granados it is a true faith, but a faith middle between the divine and the human. Only one thing is wanting, the name *ecclesiastical* with which archbishop Péréfixe christened it in Paris later on.

The third forerunner of ecclesiastical faith – but in a rather peculiar way – is the Jesuit *Becano.* He does not restrict what is known as ecclesiastical faith to virtually revealed truths, but broadens it to include even formally revealed truths, such as the articles of faith. For Becano, the distinction between divine faith and non-divine faith lies not at all in the matter but in the motive. There are three specifically different motives of belief, to wit: *divine* authority, *human* authority, and the authority of the *Church.* If we believe, says Becano, the articles of faith because of divine authority, the act is an act of divine faith. If we believe them because of human authority, the act is an act of human faith. If we believe them because of the Church's

[10]"Besides, when the matter with which we are dealing in this section is not treated rigorously it is usual for everybody, without making distinctions in most instances, to call certain as of faith all the propositions defined by the Church because they cannot be denied at least without error, and because they are *altogether proximate to the faith* inasmuch as they are evidently deduced from matters of faith and rest upon infallible testimony, and since what is but *a little distance apart* does not seem to be apart at all, they are thus *recognized* as principles of theology and truths of faith . . . To the first [objection] the reply is that St. Nazianzen only maintains that propositions evidently deduced from Holy Scripture *almost* pertain to the faith because they are a *short* distance away from it. . . . To the second, we reply, from what has just been said, that although the said assent is given without a proper and formal discourse,it does not properly pertain to the faith because it is not grounded immediately on the word of God but on the *authority of the Church.* . . . To its proof we say that there are two ways in which a man can assent to these propositions defined by the Church: one way is by deducing them from the revealed principles, as the Council or the Pope have deduced them, and he who thus deduces them elicits an act of theology, to which such an assent belongs. The other way is *without benefit of discourse* but *on account of the testimony of the Church herself,* and this is the act which is in most instances elicited not only by the unlearned but by the most learned as well; however, it is not elicited by means of an act of divine faith, as has been said, nor by means of the habit of theology inasmuch as it is not discursive, but it pertains to a kind of *human faith possessing utmost certainty* because it is grounded on the infallible *authority of the Church.* This kind of faith is easily perceived in the unschooled, as also that other faith whereby those who are inscribed by the Pope in the number of Saints are believed to have gone to their rest in the Lord and to be enjoying His most happy vision, notwithstanding the highly probable opinion of those authors who think that this truth does not pertain to divine faith but is contained in some other degree of lesser infallibility yet withal of certainty." (JACOB GRANADOS, S.J., *Commentarii in Summam Theologicam Sti. Thomae,* vol.1. q.1, d.3, nn.22-24; Mussiponti 1664).

authority, the act is not an act of divine faith, but of a *faith of a lesser order*, of a faith that is *quasi middle* between purely divine and purely human faith.[11]

The future ecclesiastical faith appears here in clearer relief than in Granados. Becano passed away in 1624, exactly 40 years prior to archbishop Péréfixe's pastoral. Becano's *Summa Theologiae Scholasticae*, one of whose numerous editions was done in Paris itself in 1658, must have been one of

[11] "You will say: we can still advance further as follows: why do you believe that God has revealed this? *Because the Church teaches so.* – I answer: if you believe *on account of the Church's authority*, then it is not the assent of theological faith but an assent of some other *inferior order*. It will be well to repeat here briefly what I have suggested in ch. 1, q.11, §9, viz., that a distinction can be drawn between three kinds of assent of faith. There is in the first place the assent of *divine* faith, e.g., I believe the articles of faith on the authority of the revealing God: I believe that God has revealed this or that; I believe God who reveals. Then there is the assent of *human* faith, e.g., I believe the articles of faith on the authority of *Luther* or Calvin. Thirdly, there is the assent of a faith that is *neither purely divine nor purely human*, but *somehow intermediary*, e.g., I believe the articles of faith *on the authority of the Church*. The first assent, which is the one we are speaking of, is not resolved further but comes to a stop in the revealing God alone. You will say: as God is infallible in revealing so also is the Church in proposing. Therefore the assent grounded on the Church's authority is as infallible as the assent grounded on God's authority. Therefore both assents are assents of divine or theological faith. I answer: God is infallible by his own nature or of himself; the Church is not infallible of herself but in virtue of the assistance and guidance of the Holy Spirit. Hence God's infallibility is of a higher order than the Church's infallibility. For the latter is created and dependent on another, the former is uncreated and independent. I say the same thing of the assent inasmuch as the assent grounded on God's infallibility is infallible in virtue of an uncreated and independent infallibility, whereas the assent grounded on the Church's infallibility is infallible in virtue of a created and dependent infallibility. The former pertains to divine faith, the latter does not." (BECANO, *Summa Theologiae Scholasticae, De Fide*, c.9, q.8, §.8) To all the foregoing said by Becano, and repeated today by so many theologians in Becano's wake, Cardinal Cajetan had already given a beautiful answer in these terms: "God's infallibility or authority and the Church's infallibility or authority are two infallibilities or authorities, but they are not *two formal motives;* they are *only one formal motive*, which is God's infallible authority, and one *applying and explicating condition that applies and explicates* the formal motive, and this is the Church's infallible authority. Since the two authorities constitute one formal motive, and that one formal motive is divine, from both authorities there issues but one act, and that act is an act of divine faith." (CAJETAN, *In 2-2*, q.1, a.1) Becano seems to consider God's infallibility and the Church's infallibility as two parallel motives, or as "two men pulling a ship", in Molina's phrase, instead of viewing the Church's infallibility as an instrumental or ministerial cause. "*Ministra* of the object of faith . . . whereby the First Truth *explicates itself* and *other credenda*." (CAJETAN, *ibid.*) According to Thomist doctrine, the act of the so-called ecclesiastical faith must be expressed as follows: "I believe such a thing *because God has revealed* that the Church is infallible in teaching it to me." An act formulated in such terms is an act of *divine faith*. It is this faith that is today called *ecclesiastical faith*.

those scholastic works that, as Fénélon wrote, were avidly read by Grandin and his colleagues at the Sorbonne, who were archbishop Péréfixe's consultants in the conference of 1664, where agreement was reached on the name to be given to the faith that was middle between the divine and the human.

Lastly, if not among the forerunners, we might mention among those who have contributed to the modern ecclesiastical faith, all those theologians who concurred with Molina in his contention that theological conclusions can be infallibly defined by the Church, but not as of divine faith. Such were *Kilber* among the great Jesuit theologians, and the *Salmanticenses* (at least apparently) among the great Thomist theologians. But these theologians belong to the second half of the 17th century and their works are posterior to archbishop Péréfixe's pastoral where ecclesiastical faith is mentioned by name.[12]

233. AMONG THE THOMISTS OF THE 18th CENTURY. – By the beginning of the 18th century mention of ecclesiastical faith is commonplace in a great number of non-Thomist theological works, particularly in Antoine and Tournely.[13]

[12] We have not mentioned Suárez among the forerunners of ecclesiastical faith because no man has defended with so much vigour and decision, as Suárez, the proposition that the definitions of the Church concerning the revealed mediate or virtual are deserving of *divine faith*. And yet, very oddly, it was Suárez who, more than any other man, contributed to what today goes by the name of ecclesiastical faith. The reason for it is the fact that Suárez defined the revealed virtual in such a manner that in order to maintain that it could be defined and believed as a truth of divine faith, it would be necessary to have recourse to the theory of new revelations, which is what Suárez did. But since new revelations are inadmissible, the upshot was the view that the definitions of the revealed virtual could not be given divine faith, and consequently, that they deserved nothing but an *ecclesiastical faith*.

[13] "Secondly, I say that a dogmatic text's orthodoxy or heterodoxy, once it has been decided by the Church, must be believed at least with *ecclesiastical faith*. For there are three kinds of faith, viz.: *divine* faith which immediately rests on *divine authority; human* faith which is immediately based on human authority; and *ecclesiastical faith* which *somehow occupies a middle position*, and rests on the infallible authority of the Church when she defines something with the assistance of the Holy Spirit. This latter act is expressed as follows: "I most firmly believe that such a passage or such a book is heterodox because the Church has so declared it to be". It is an *ecclesiastical faith*, and not a merely human faith, because it is an assent most firmly given on account of the Church's infallible authority which is as the intrinsic motive upon which it rests and comes to a halt. . . . But if I should believe that such a passage, which has been condemned as heretical by the Church, is in fact heretical because God who is supremely truthful has *in the past revealed that the Church is infallible* in approving or condemning dogmatic passages, in that case it would be an act of *divine faith* [very well said!] because it would have the authority of the revealing God for its immediate formal object." (ANTOINE, *Theologia Universa, De Fide Divina*, sect. 1, a.7, §4) The reader will please note the concession made by Antoine, viz.: that if we believe the Church's infallible

Among Thomists the new faith appears to be considered with misgivings, and its name is not found as yet either in *Contenson,* or in the *Salmanticenses,* or in *Gonet,* or even in *Gotti.* Among classical Thomists, the first who mentions it is *Billuart,* but even he cannot bring himself to say clearly whether dogmatic facts – and it is on this sole occasion that Billuart mentions ecclesiastical faith – are worthy only of ecclesiastical faith, or on the contrary, worthy of divine faith. Both in the treatise *On Faith* and in that *On the Incarnation* Billuart touches on the problem ex professo, but he contents himself with offering both solutions ("I answer in the first place . . . I answer in the second place . . ."), leaving it to the reader to opt for either.[14]

During the remainder of the 18th century, the more reputable Thomists follow Billuart's example; the other theologians, with the exception of St. Liguori, Muzarelly and a few others, lean gradually towards ecclesiastical faith. They begin by applying it to dogmatic facts and end by extending it also to theological conclusions.[15]

definitions concerning dogmatic facts "because God has revealed that the Church is infallible in this regard", then the act is not an act of ecclesiastical, but of *divine* faith. But this is the way in which all the faithful believe such definitions by the Church. Consequently, the so-called ecclesiastical faith, as distinct from divine faith, is superfluous.

[14]Contenson wrote his *Theologia mentis et cordis* in 1668; the Salmanticenses their treatise *De Fide* in 1676; Gonet his last work, *Manuale Thomistarum* in 1680; Gotti his *Theologia Scholastico-dogmatica* in 1717-1735. Thus they all come after archbishop Péréfixe, and Gotti is somewhat posterior to Antoine and Tournely. However, if our memory does not fail us, none of them makes any mention of ecclesiastical faith. – Billuart published the *Summa Sti. Thomae* in 1746-51, and he speaks of ecclesiastical faith in the treatise *De Fide,* dissert. 3, a.7, §3, and in the treatise *De Incarnatione,* dissert. 4, *Digressio secunda historica de Eutichianismo,* a.5, *Solvuntur objectiones.* – Gazzaniga expresses himself in these terms: "There is a problem that not too long ago was being debated with great vehemence and which even today is not yet settled, viz. whether the Church is infallible in regard of dogmatic facts at least. The affirmative view is upheld and vigorously defended by a great number of theologians of the century just elapsed. However, they do not quite agree on the kind of faith with which the dogmatic fact is to be believed, whether with divine or only ecclesiastical faith." (GAZZANIGA, *Praelectiones Theologiae, De Fide,* d.2, n.301)

[15]"Although not all the propositions condemned by the popes are heretical, but some only temerarious, others erroneous, scandalous, etc., nonetheless, upon being defined by the pope, it must be held *as of faith* that such propositions are truly temerarious or infected with some other stigma with which the pope has declared them to be tainted. And thus the man who would follow or maintain them as true and lawful would be truly a *heretic,* as Viva correctly says." (SAINT LIGUORI, *Theologia Moralis,* lib. 1, n.104) – "Nevertheless, together with many other theologians I am of the view that it can also be maintained that the definitions of dogmatic facts can be, and are truly an object of *theological faith.* . . . Although the reasons I am going to present in favour of *theological faith* are *almost evident,* nonetheless I am aware of the great regard that should be shown to the view of many learned Catholics who hold the opposite opinion.

The notion of ecclesiastical faith continued to make headway during the 19th century – the first half of which was so unproductive for theology – and what has transpired of the 20th. Today it is accepted by almost every author, if we except the Jesuit Fr. Schiffini and the Dominican Fr. Tuyaerts, both of whom combat it ex professo, and the well-known Fr. Gardeil, and a few others, who do not oppose it directly but nonetheless clearly indicate their distaste for it.

We believe that the foregoing roughly sketches the true history of ecclesiastical faith.[16]

234. PURPOSE OF THE PRESENT STUDY. – Throughout this whole chapter we shall be examining, with as much conciseness as we can muster, the so-called ecclesiastical faith. However, we are not concerned with the modern name *ecclesiastical faith,* but with its true nature. We intend to find out, in the light of the teachings and principles of St. Thomas whether ecclesiastical faith is specifically distinct from divine faith, or, on the contrary, whether it is the self-same divine faith under a new label and with purely accidental differences. The issue is one of extreme gravity, since what is not truly and specifically divine – call it ecclesiastical or civil – differs essentially and infinitely from what is essentially and truly divine. The difference between the truly divine and the truly not divine can never be a difference of *degree,* it is a difference of *species,* or even of *genus;* nay, more than a difference of genus, it is the radical and infinite difference that separates God from the creature.

For this reason I am satisfied with the assurance that the opinion I have embraced is very probable." (MUZARELLY, *Un fait dogmatique décide par l'Eglise est il objet de foi catholique?*, translated from the Italian, Avignon 1826)

[16]"Thesis XVIII: The faith, which by some people is called *ecclesiastical* because it proximately rests upon the infallible magisterium of the Church whether considered in itself or in its object, is not to be distinguished from *infused and theological faith.*" (SCHIFFINI, *De Virtutibus Infusis,* n.127) – "We are justified in concluding that the magisterium has not been given to the Church except for the purpose of teaching what God has revealed without ever going beyond it, and that, consequently, everything that the Church teaches must be believed with *divine faith* so much so that there is no room for a pretended *ecclesiastical* faith." (TUYAERTS, *L'évolution du dogme,* c.3, a.5, p.122) – "This interpretation makes it unnecessary for me to appeal to what has been called *ecclesiastical faith, a new name and reality, unknown to Thomist theology, a kind of fourth theological virtue* invented to signify the assent to common theological conclusions, or better still to those that are supported by an infallible act of ecclesiastical authority, e.g. the condemnation of a proposition." (GARDEIL, *Le Donné révélé,* 2nd. ed., p.186) We think that the notion of an ecclesiastical faith, specifically distinct from divine faith, which Fr. Gardeil so justly criticizes, will gradually disappear from theological handbooks, at least from those that are truly Thomist.

235. OUR STARTING POINT. – In dealing with this issue we take for our starting point the principles of St. Thomas, or those principles that are admitted by all, or almost all, theologians.

All theologians admit – since it is now a dogma of faith – that all formally or immediately revealed truths can be defined by the Church as of divine or Catholic faith, and not merely as of ecclesiastical faith. Hence, in this discussion of ecclesiastical faith we are not concerned with formally or immediately revealed truths, but only with mediately or virtually revealed truths.

All, or almost all, theologians also admit that the Sacred Congregations are not infallible when they teach aside from the pope. Likewise, that the pope himself is not infallible when he teaches without any intention of defining *ex cathedra*. Thus, when speaking of ecclesiastical faith, we are not speaking of the faith given to the non-infallible teachings of the Church, which is commonly denominated "religious assent". What we have to do here is with the faith given to the Church's infallible teachings or definitions.

Finally, all, or almost all, theologians admit that the proposition that the infallibility of the Church extends to the mediately or virtually revealed is a truth of *divine* faith already defined by the ordinary or practical magisterium, or at least, that it is a truly *revealed* truth and thus definable as of divine faith.[17]

Consequently, whenever mention is made of ecclesiastical faith we understand by this term the assent that is due to those truths that are: (a) virtually revealed; (b) infallibily defined by the Church; (c) whose infallibility, the Church's, is established by divine revelation.

236. CRITERIA FOR SOLVING THE ISSUE. – The essential or specific distinction between two habits can come only from either of these two sources: (a) the formal object; (b) the formal motive.

[17] "Indeed such infallibility [relative to the virtually or mediately revealed] is most certainly gathered from the revealed principles, and furthermore it is *by many* also held as formally *revealed*, albeit it has not yet been *authentically* proposed as a dogma of divine faith." (Card. BILLOT *De Ecclesia Christi*, th.17, §2) – "In the view of *many* also a *heresy*, although to date it has not yet been condemned *explicitly* as a heresy." (FRANZELIN, *De Traditione*, th. 12) – "This infallible authority is a truth *revealed by God*. . . . It is not a defined truth of faith . . . it is assuredly *definable*." (CHOUPIN, *Valeur des décissions doctrinales et disciplinaires du Saint-Siège*, pp.22-47) – "If any one says that the Church's infallibility is restricted exclusively to the things contained in divine revelation [formal revelation or that which is revealed *in itself*] and does not extend to other truths that are necessarily required in order to safeguard the deposit of revelation in its integrity: *let him be anathema*." (VATICAN COUNCIL I, Schema of the dogmatic constitution on the Church of Christ, can. 9)

The formal object of divine faith is that which is *truly revealed by God*. The formal motive of divine faith is the *divine authority* of the revealing God. We do not believe with divine faith anything but what God has revealed, and we believe what God has revealed because of the divine authority inherent in, and due to, the word of God.

Consequently, all the criteria employed in finding out whether ecclesiastical faith is divine faith, or not, are reducible to two: (a) Is the object of ecclesiastical faith, viz., the mediately revealed, truly revealed or not? If it is, it deserves divine faith. If it is not, it neither deserves nor can be given divine faith. (b) Is the authority of the Church, when she defines the mediately revealed, truly divine authority or not? If it is, it deserves divine faith. If it is not, it neither deserves nor can ever be given divine faith, but only a faith of an inferior order, essentially distinct from divine faith.

237. OUR OPINION. – It is our opinion, or better still, our most deeply held conviction, that, in accordance with the teaching and principles of St. Thomas, the revealed mediate or virtual is implicitly and really revealed; that the authority whereby the Church infallibly defines the virtually or mediately revealed, whether doctrines or facts, is really and truly a divine authority; that the so-called ecclesiastical faith that we give or ought to give to such definitions does not differ essentially, but only accidentally, from the divine or Catholic faith that we give to the definitions of the formally revealed. In short, we hold that *ecclesiastical faith is divine faith*, and not a human faith, nor a faith midway between the divine and the human faith.

In the following sections we will state as clearly and concisely as possible both the principles of St. Thomas, and the theological arguments on which we ground our conviction.

SECTION II

THE SO-CALLED *ECCLESIASTICAL FAITH* AND THE THEOLOGICAL CONCLUSIONS IN THE LIGHT OF THE TEACHING OF ST. THOMAS

238. – In this section we will attempt to make it clear that, in the light of the teaching of St. Thomas, the so-called *ecclesiastical faith* given to theological conclusions *infallibly* defined by the Church is truly a *divine* faith, of the same species as the faith given to the articles of faith.

We will present in the first place some proofs taken literally from St. Thomas, and then we will introduce others taken from theological reasoning. We will always begin by stating these proofs in the form of a concise argument with a view to stating them clearly.

239. FIRST PROOF. – The ecclesiastical faith is an infallible faith.

Now, no infallible faith is possible unless its *formal motive* is the *word of God.*

Therefore, the formal motive of ecclesiastical faith is the word of God. Which is to say: therefore, ecclesiastical faith is divine faith.

The major of this argument is admitted by all, since that is what we mean by ecclesiastical faith. The key to this whole issue lies in the minor which embodies what St. Thomas teaches in the following terms: "For the testimony of either man or angel *will not lead us infallibly to the truth, unless the testimony of God is considered to exist in it.*" Which is to say in plain language: "No man – patriarch, prophet, apostle, or pope –, and no angel or any other creature, deserves infallible faith unless their word is at the same time truly the *word of God.*"

This text is clear enough. But since the most obvious texts are liable to doubts, cavils and subterfuge when taken off their true and integral context, we shall take the liberty of transcribing almost entirely St. Thomas's article where those words are found. The article in question is the eighth of the fourteenth question of the Disputed Questions on Truth. Question XIV is wholly devoted to *divine* faith. The title of article 8 reads: "Whether the *First Truth* is the *proper object* of faith." This is the same as asking whether the *formal motive* of divine faith is the *word of God.* The holy Doctor answers:

"I answer that it must be said that the *First Truth* is the per se object of faith. This can be made clear thus. No habit has the nature of virtue unless it be a habit whose act is *always* good. For otherwise it would not be the perfection of a power. Now, since the act of the intellect is good inasmuch as it considers what is *true,* it follows that no habit existing in the intellect can be a virtue unless it be such that by it *truth is infallibly held.* For this reason it is said in Ethics VI that opinion is not an intellectual virtue, whereas science and understanding are such.

"Now, faith is not counted as a virtue on the strength of the *evidence* of things because faith is of things that are not evident. Hence, it follows that it is counted as a virtue because it adheres *to a testimony in which truth is infallibly to be found.*

"Now, just as *created esse* is of itself empty and defectible unless it be held together by *uncreated esse,* so all *created truth* is defectible unless it be *rectified by uncreated truth.*

"Hence, the assent given to the word of either a *man* [e.g., the pope or the council] or an angel will not lead *infallibly* to the truth *except insofar as we take into account the* **testimony of God who speaks** in them.

"Thus, it is necessary that the faith which is *counted as a virtue* [that is any faith ***whereby truth is infallibly held,*** as said earlier] should make the intellect of man *adhere to the truth which rests upon divine knowledge,* transcending the truth of his own intellect . . .

"And consequently, faith, which *through assent unites man to the divine knowledge,* has *God himself* as its principal object, and any other things as consequently adjoined."[18]

"Hence, the *First Truth* is related to faith [to any faith "whereby truth is infallibly held"] as its *medium* and its *object.*"[19]

We recommend to all our readers, especially to any Thomist reader, the reading and rereading, the analysis and meditation on this article of St. Thomas. It is a fundamental article from the treatise on Faith. In it St. Thomas lays the foundation of the whole treatise by proving that the formal object or formal motive of any *infallible* faith must of necessity be the divine testimony.

The kernel of the article is found in this proposition: "There is no *infallible faith* without an *infallible testimony,* and there is no infallible testimony except the *testimony of God.*" That is exactly the minor premise of our argument, which we intended to prove.

For those who are unfamiliar with the language of St. Thomas the aforecited article can be synthesized in the following propositions:

1. Divine faith is an intellectual virtue.
2. It cannot be an intellectual virtue if it does not always incline to the truth.
3. It cannot incline always to the truth if it does not have for its formal motive an infallible testimony.
4. It cannot have for its formal motive an infallible testimony if its formal motive is not the very testimony of God.
5. Therefore divine faith has for its formal motive the testimony of God, that is, the First Truth.

We ask the reader to turn his attention to the fourth proposition. This proposition is the basis of St. Thomas's reasoning. If it is denied or distinguished, the conclusion and the whole article collapse altogether. On the other hand, if it is admitted without reservations, as it should be admitted, then we have the proof required to establish that all *infallible* faith, and consequently, also the *ecclesiastical* faith, is *divine* faith.

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[18] ST. THOMAS, *loc. cit.*

[19] *Ibid.,* ad 9.

The proof of the fourth proposition is given by St. Thomas in these beautiful words: "Just as *created esse* is *of itself* empty and *defectible* unless it be *held together* by *uncreated esse,* so all *created truth* is *defectible* unless it be *rectified by uncreated truth.*"

Having laid down this principle, which is obvious, the holy Doctor argues thus: either faith has for its formal motive the *created truth as it is in itself,* in which case it is not an *infallible*, and consequently, not a *divine* faith; or it has for its formal motive the created truth insofar as it is rectified by the *uncreated Truth,* in which case its true formal motive is not the created truth, but the *uncreated Truth,* and consequently it is a *divine* faith.

If we apply this same teaching of St. Thomas to the *ecclesiastical* faith, it will be seen that the ecclesiastical faith is a divine faith. The matter is crystal clear. We say that ecclesiastical faith has for its formal motive the *authority of the Church.* Let us now apply St. Thomas's reasoning. The Church's authority is either a created authority *not rectified* by uncreated authority, or it is a created authority *rectified* by uncreated authority. If the former, then it is not an *infallible* faith, and hence, not the ecclesiastical faith in question. If the latter, then, in St. Thomas's view, to say that the formal motive is the created truth as *rectified by the uncreated Truth* is the same as saying that the formal motive is the *uncreated Truth,* and consequently it is a divine faith.

Readers who have grown used to the specific distinction between divine faith and infallible faith, as propounded in modern textbooks, will undoubtedly either deny or distinguish some of those propositions on which St. Thomas's argument is grounded. The force of schooling and habit is very great indeed, and, when it is supported by these two, imagination is a very fertile source of distinctions and evasions. However, it is not our concern at present to demonstrate whether or not what St. Thomas says is true, but simply to show that St. Thomas did in fact say it.

We urge every sincere Thomist to look up the passages parallel to the one quoted.[20]

In article 2 of a parallel passage in the Commentary on the Sentences the following text is found: "The believer believes *in a man* [prophet, apostle, pope, or council] not insofar as he is a *man,* but insofar as *God* speaks in him."[21]

In article 4, *ibid.*, we read as follows: "The *reason* [i.e., the *formal motive*] inclining the will to believe the articles is the *First Truth itself,* which

[20] *In 3 Sent.*, d.23, q.2, aa.2, and 4; *Summa Theologica,* 2-2, q.1, a.1; q.4, a.5.

[21] *Ibid.* ad 3.

is *infallible;* but the *reason* that inclines to believe *other things* is either some *fallible* token, or the word of some knower who is *capable* both of *being deceived* and of *deceiving.* Hence, in the case of the intellect assenting to *other believables,* the intellect is not endowed with *infallible truth by the will; but it is endowed by the will with infallible truth* when it believes the *articles of faith;* and on account of this the latter faith is a virtue but not so the former."[22]

In St. Thomas's thinking there can be no middle term between *created* and *uncreated* being, and every being is either created or uncreated. In like manner, there can be no specific compounds or middle terms between *created* and *uncreated* truth, or between *human* and *divine authority* or *faith.* Any authority is either specifically human or specifically divine. Any human authority that is not rectified or guaranteed completely by divine authority is a fallible authority; hence the corresponding faith is specifically a human and fallible faith, whether we call it civil or ecclesiastical. On the other hand, whenever the human authority is rectified and guaranteed completely by divine authority – and such is the case of every *infallible* definition by the Church – then, according to St. Thomas, the authority is specifically divine, and when we give it our assent we do not *formally* assent to the word of *man,* but to the word of *God* whose divine authority envelops, or rectifies, or guarantees, or divinizes the word of the Church in each and every one of her infallible definitions. Such is the meaning of the aforequoted passage of the holy Doctor: "Just as *created* being is *of itself* empty and defectible unless it be *held together* by *uncreated being,* so all *created truth* is defectible unless it be *rectified* by *uncreated Truth.* Hence, the assent given to the word of either a man or an angel *will not lead infallibly to the truth* except insofar as *we take into account the word of God who speaks in them.*"[23]

We ask the reader never to forget this fundamental principle laid down St. Thomas: No *infallible* faith is possible unless its formal motive is *the word of God.* And this is exactly tantamount to saying: all *ecclesiastical* faith is *divine* faith, or else it is not *infallible.*[24]

[22] *Ibid.* sol. 1 ad 2.

[23] *Loc. cit.*

[24] It might probably occur to someone to raise the objection that St. Thomas (*Quodlibetum 9;* a.16) expressly admits that the Church is *infallible* in the canonization of saints, and yet nonetheless he does not affirm that it is of *divine faith,* but simply of *pious faith:* "it must be piously believed." Therefore for St. Thomas *infallible* faith is not the same as *divine* faith.

We will examine at length this objection and other similar ones when we come to deal particularly with the canonization of saints. In the meantime we ask every Thomist

Ever since in modern times theologians began to distinguish between definitions of divine faith and merely infallible definitions, a number of them have taken to considering the latter as something of little account, or as pronouncements that the Church makes rather frequently. Thus every time that the Holy See addresses a doctrinal document to the whole Church, one can safely predict that some theologian is bound to raise the question whether such a document is infallible or not. Often the question is resolved by some theologians in the affirmative and by others in the negative. Whereupon we are left in the dark much the same as before, since any document whose infallibility is not evident but dubious or debatable, is not infallibly certain, or at least not infallibly certain for all practical purposes. We believe that in such disputes two things are often overlooked. The first is that, far from being

to take notice of the radical difference between the two propositions that follow: *First,* "It is *piously believable* or theologically *certain* that the Church is infallible in the canonization of saints". Second, "It is *infallibly certain* that the Church is infallible in the canonization of saints". When St. Thomas spoke of this particular problem the canonization of saints, he affirmed the first proposition, and this is what is meant by the phrase "It must be piously believed". But he neither affirmed nor denied expressly the second proposition. If he had affirmed the second proposition, that would have been equivalent to affirming that the canonization of saints is of *divine* faith, since for St. Thomas *infallible* faith is the same as *divine* faith.

Now then, that which St. Thomas did not affirm with respect to the canonization of saints, both he and all his commentators prior to the Salmanticenses have always affirmed with respect to the *theological conclusions.* And today, after the Jansenist debates, all or almost all theologians affirm it with respect to *dogmatic facts,* viz., that the Church's infallibility with respect to such matters is not only *certain* but also *infallibly certain,* and even proximately *definable as of divine faith,* if it has not already been defined by the ordinary magisterium. And our line of reasoning is that, according to St. Thomas, in matters of faith and testimony *infallible certainty* is impossible without *divine testimony,* and where there is divine testimony there is *divine* faith, and not merely a human or ecclesiastical faith.

What could be debated today in this regard, although it is an issue entirely accidental to the subject with which we are dealing in this section, is whether something more than St. Thomas's "it must be piously believed" ought to be affirmed with respect to the canonization of saints, to wit, something equivalent to what St. Thomas affirmed relative to theological conclusions, and to what almost all theologians affirm today relative to dogmatic facts., viz., that the Church's infallibility in such matters is not only already *certain,* but also *infallibly certain,* and consequently that they are definable as of *divine faith.* We shall deal with this question in due time. It is our view that the question of the canonization of saints is but a particular instance of the general question concerning dogmatic facts, just as the question of dogmatic facts is but a particular instance of the more general question concerning theological conclusions, or those things that are necessarily connected with the revealed deposit or are necessary for its conservation. We think that the decisions of the Church against the Jansenists and the document of the Vatican Council have shed abundant light on these matters.

commonplace or frequent in papal pronouncements, infallible definitions occur rarely, or even *very rarely.* Cardinal Van Rossum very wisely observes: "It must be said that the Supreme Pontiff *rarely,* better still, *very rarely* employs his extradordinary magisterial authority or *infallibility.*"[25] The second is that no papal document must be taken as an infallible definition so long as there is no evidence that it is so. The provision of the new Code of Canon Law with respect to dogmatic definitions must likewise be applied to infallible definitions, since the reason is the same for both: "Nothing shall be understood to have been declared or defined *dogmatically* unless this be established by manifest evidence."[26]

The tendency manifested by some to regard all papal doctrinal documents as infallible is not always a sign of abundant faith and obedience to the Church. On the contrary, it may sometimes betray a want of obedience and faith, for such an attitude comes from the view that the teachings of the Church merit neither faith nor obedience unless they are infallible. Granting that they do not merit divine or infallible faith, nonetheless they do merit a human faith – one that is both internal and certain – so long as there is no evident proof, and the eventuality of such a proof would be rare, that the Church has in fact erred. This human faith which we give to the non-infallible teachings of the Church is known today by the name of *pious assent.* It is this human faith that should be called *ecclesiastical faith* in the same manner that we call ecclesiastical laws the human and changeable laws promulgated by the Church to distinguish them from those laws that are truly divine and unchangeable.

240. THE SECOND ARGUMENT, taken likewise from St. Thomas, to prove that the so-called ecclesiastical faith is truly a divine faith, can be formulated thus:

Everything that has been truly *said by God,* or is merely an *explication* of what God has said, is definable as a truth of *divine* faith and merits the assent of divine faith after it has been defined.

Now, anything that is revealed in a mediate or consequential manner is truly *said by God,* or is merely an *explication* of what God has said.

Therefore, the faith that is to be given to the mediately or consequentially revealed after its definition by the Church is a divine faith. Or, in other words, ecclesiastical faith is *divine faith.*

The major premise is common teaching among theologians. By the way, the reader should take note of the manner how we have formulated this

[25] *De Essentia Sacramenti Ordinis,* n.415, Friburgi Brisgoviae 1914.

[26] Canon 1323, 3. Of the old or pre-Vatican II Code.x. – *Transl.*

major premise and how it ought to be formulated, if we are truthfully to label it as *common teaching.* If instead of saying "definable as a truth of faith", we were to say, as the textbooks frequently say, that it is "of faith" (i.e., *formally* a truth of faith) even *prior* to its definition by the Church, then the major would not state the common teaching, but the particular teaching of Vázquez and Vega, whose views have been constantly opposed by the Thomist school. But this is totally incidental to our present concern. The essential thing is that the major, as formulated by us, embodies the common teaching of theologians.

The minor premise, which is the key premise on which the whole issue turns, is the express teaching of St. Thomas, which is repeated by the holy Doctor in different places and in different forms. Let us quote some passages, beginning with the article in which the holy Doctor examines precisely the problem whether true dogmatic progress is possible. The title of the article reads: "Whether faith has progressed with the passing of time." Answering the fourth objection, he says:

"To the fourth objection it must be said that the article is an *indivisible* truth with respect to what is *actually explicated* in the article, but it is divisible [capable of explicitation, of development] with respect to those things that are *contained potentially* in the article, insofar as he who *says one thing* somehow *says many things,* and these are the things that *precede* the article or *follow* it; and in this regard the article of faith is capable of *explication* and division."[27]

In this passage St. Thomas clearly says the two things affirmed in our minor premise, to wit: first, that what *God has truly said* comprises not only the articles or the formally revealed, but also all the consequences of those articles (the things that follow it), i.e. the mediately revealed. Second, that these consequences are nothing but the *explication* of the articles ("And in this regard the article of faith is capable of *explication* and division").

Here is another similar and no less expressive text: "There are two ways of *explicating the articles of faith.* One is with respect to the substance itself of the articles, insofar as a man knows the *articles themselves* distinctly; the other is with respect to the *things implicitly contained in the articles themselves,* and this takes place when a man knows the *things that follow from the articles.*"[28]

In this passage the holy Doctor affirms once more that the mediate or consequential ("those things that *follow from* the articles") is truly *implicit*

[27] *In 3 Sent.* d.25, q.2, a.2, ad 4.

[28] *Loc. cit.*, d.25, q.2, a.1, sol 3.

in the articles of faith or in the word of God ("things *implicitly* contained in the articles themselves"), and thus is simply an *explication* of what God has said ("*explicating* the articles of faith"). Hence, both the theologian who fallibly deduces those consequences, and the Church who defines them infallibly, are engaged in no other task but that of *explicating* what God has already said implicitly. There is but one difference between them: the explication done by the theologian carries *human* authority, that done by the Church carries *divine* authority.

Here is a third passage equally or possibly more expressive than the two previous ones. "That which is contained in an article can be explicated in two ways. The first occurs in the case where one article is contained in another, or two articles in one common to both, as for instance, the resurrection of the dead is somehow contained in the Resurrection of Christ, and the Passion and the Incarnation are contained in this common article which is the Mystery of Redemption. And in this manner *implicit* faith is explicated in determinate articles of faith. *This explication has been completed by Christ;* hence nothing may be added or subtracted from his teaching with regard to the essentials of faith, as the last chapter of the Revelation declares. But prior to the coming of Christ this explication was not yet completed, and consequently it continued to grow at different times, even with respect to the elders."

In this text the holy Doctor refers to the development of some *articles* into other *articles* which took place in the Old Testament, and which can no longer take place in the New Testament. Subsequently he speaks of the development of the *articles* into their *consequences.* This is the development which is still possible in the New Testament. The holy Doctor continues:

"The other way occurs in the case where that which is contained in the article is not an article but something *concomitant* to the article, and *in this regard* the faith can be *explicated day by day,* and has been in fact *more and more explicated* through the efforts of the Fathers (the ecumenical council Fathers)."[29] "Since *faith* does of itself sufficiently incline to all the things that are *concomitant to* the faith, or *precede,* or *follow from* it."[30] When St. Thomas speaks of the *consequences* of the articles, he obviously takes the term to mean not only the improper, but also the proper consequences, i.e. anything whose denial would entail the denial of something directly revealed: "those things that are *potentially* contained in the article." (466-469)

[29] *Loc. cit.* d.25, q.2, a.2.

[30] *Loc. cit.*, d.24 q.1, a.2, sol.2.

Thus, the true object of ecclesiastical faith is something implicitly *said by God.* Consequently, ecclesiastical faith is divine faith.[31]

241. THIRD PROOF. – No man is truly a heretic unless he denies something that truly is of *divine faith.*

Now, according to St. Thomas, he who denies a truth mediately, or consequentially, or indirectly revealed, after its infallible definition by the Church, is truly a heretic.

Therefore, according to St. Thomas, ecclesiastical faith is truly *divine faith.*

The major premise is obvious and admitted by everybody. The minor premise is a proposition expressly and frequently affirmed by St. Thomas whenever he deals with any of these two questions: (a) "Whether it is allowable to have a contrary opinion of the Notions"; (b) "Whether heresy properly concerns the things that are of faith."

We briefly quote some passages: "The *same judgment* applies to the *latter* [the indirectly revealed] and to the *former* [the directly revealed], *since the one follows from the other.*"[32] "In such a matter no error is possible without *heresy.*"[33] "And on this account, many things are now considered as *heretical,* which heretofore were not reputed as such, because it is now much more evident *what consequences follow therefrom.*" *(Ibid.)* "He who would resist such an ordination would be considered a *heretic.*[34]

242. A REMARK. – Someone might remark that if this teaching of St. Thomas is held as true, then it would follow that a man is to be considered a heretic not only if he denies what the Church defines as a truth of *Catholic faith,* but also if he denies what the Church defines as an *infallible truth.*

The answer to such a remark is that no man is *formally a heretic* on the mere teaching of St. Thomas, but on the word or teaching of the *Church.* As of now the Church teaches that he who denies anything defined as truth of *Catholic faith* is a heretic; but she does not teach as yet that he who denies anything defined as an *infallible truth* is a heretic.

But it is one thing to say that the Church does not teach it as yet, and quite another to say that she might not teach it some day. The following dogmatic canon was already prepared for consideration in the Vatican Council: "If anyone should say that the Church's infallibility is exclusively restricted to those things that are contained in divine revelation [i.e., *formal* revelation], and that it does not extend itself also to other truths that are necessarily required in order to safeguard the whole deposit of revelation: *let him be anathema.*"[35]

The suspension of the Vatican Council precluded it from discussing this dogmatic canon that was already prepared. If and when, perhaps in the not distant future, the Church should resume the suspended council, and should approve or define the aforesaid dogmatic canon, it shall be a truth of *divine faith* that the Church is infallible in the definition of the consequentially revealed, or what amounts to the same thing, that anything consequentially revealed is infallibly true upon its definition by the Church. Consequently, it shall have been defined that it is *heretical* to deny that the Church is infallible in defining what is consequentially contained in revelation, or what is equivalent, that the consequentially revealed is infallibly true upon its definition by the Church.

Since the mediately or consequentially revealed, upon being infallibly defined by the Church, is precisely the proper object of the so-called ecclesiastical faith, it follows that if and when, in the not distant future, the Church should define the aforecited dogmatic canon, she will have indirectly defined that the so-called ecclesiastical faith is truly a divine faith. To define as of divine faith that the Church is infallible in her definition of the mediately revealed is the same as to define as of divine faith that the mediately revealed is infallibly true once it is defined, and the same as to define that it is obligatory to give the assent of *divine faith* to the truth of the mediately revealed once it is defined by the Church.

Let us add that in the past the Church has actually defined as dogmas of divine faith a great number of theological conclusions and dogmatic facts.

[31] The following parallel passage from St. Thomas is also worthy of attention. "Faith can be said to be a proof in three ways. First, inasmuch as faith itself makes another thing manifest [and this happens in *two* ways] *either* insofar as one *article* manifests *another* article, as e.g., the resurrection of the dead manifests the future resurrection, *or* insofar as *from the articles themselves some other things are* SYLLOGIZED *in theology.*" *In 3 Sent.*, d.23, q.2, a.1, ad 4) A comparison between the *either...or....* mentioned in this text, and the *in two ways* mentioned in the other passages will make it clear that by *the other way,* i.e by the indirectly or potentially revealed, the holy Doctor understands not only that which is secondary in the Holy Scriptures but also the *theological conclusions* in the proper sense: "Insofar as from the articles themselves some other things are *syllogized* in theology." The term *are syllogized* indicates one of two channels, the speculative channel, whereby the primitive datum has developed or explicated itself, or evolved homogeneously.

[32] In 1 Sent., d.33, q.1, a.5

[33] *Summa Theologica*, p.1, q.32, a.4

[34] *Summa Theologica*, 2-2, q.11, a.2, ad 3.

[35] *Schema Constitutionis dogmaticae de Ecclesia Christi*, can. 9.

This has always been recognized by traditional theology, and is obvious from the history of dogmas.[36]

243. FOURTH PROOF. – Every theological conclusion deduced from two formally revealed premises is definable as a truth of divine faith, and not only as a truth of ecclesiastical faith.

Now, every theological conclusion deduced from one formally revealed premise and another of natural reason, is of *the same specific nature* as that which is deduced from two formally revealed premises.

Therefore, every truly theological conclusion is definable as a truth of divine faith, and not only as a truth of ecclesiastical faith.

The major premise is commonly admitted by theologians. The minor premise is the common and constant teaching of St. Thomas and all Thomists. It is based on the *specific* and indivisible *unity* of sacred theology, and hence of *all* its conclusions, whether inferred from premises that are both of faith or from premises one of which is of faith and the other of reason. "Theology is *one according to ultimate species, whether it proceeds from premises that are both of faith, or one of faith and another of natural reason,* whether it considers speculative or moral matters. *This proposition is taken from St. Thomas.*"[37]

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[36] Someone might perhaps come up with the opposite observation, viz., that anyone who denies the conclusion even prior to its definition by the Church is a heretic, since St. Thomas expressly says "after *it has become manifest,* and especially if it be determined by the Church." (*Summa Theol.,* p.1, q.32, a.4) To this objection the distinguished commentator Philip of the Most Holy Trinity replies with as much profundity as clarity in these terms:

"To [the difficulty taken from] St. Thomas *(Summa Theol.,* p.1, q.32 a.4) it should be said that his meaning is that a man commits an error in the faith when he denies something from which there follows something contrary to the faith, not because he denies it, but because he is persuaded that from its denial there necessarily follows the denial of something that is of faith. But he would not commit such an error if *being led only by his own reasoning* he should suspend judgment and think, as he ought to, that *he could be deficient* in his reasoning: for no matter how *evident* it appears to be it is nonetheless not *altogether infallible;* thus it might indeed be sufficient for the certainty of *science,* but not for the certainty of *faith,* which is greater. And for this reason St. Thomas added: *'Principally* if it be *determined by the Church',* in order to show that an error in the *faith* is *absolutely* committed by anyone who denies *something from the denial of which it has been ascertained by* the Church there follows something contrary to the faith; but that such an error is not committed absolutely, but only in the sense already explained, by anyone who denies something such that from its denial he infers *through his own reasoning* something contrary to the faith." (PHILIPPUS A STA. TRINITATE, *Disputationes Theologicae,* t.1, pp. 28-29, Lugduni 1653) Cajetan, Porrecta, and the other commentators express themselves in the same vein.

[37] JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *Cursus Theologicus,* t.1, d.2, n.7.

The view held by those who think that there exists a specific distinction between conclusions deduced from two premises of faith on the one hand, and conclusions deduced from one premise of faith and one of natural reason on the other hand, is traceable to the fact that such persons are used to considering this and many other similar issues from a merely *material* viewpoint. They overlook the fact that the nature and specific distinction of cognitive habits stem not from the *matter* or reality of the thing known, but from the *formal medium* of knowing. Now, either the formal medium of knowing some conclusions is distinct from the formal medium of knowing other conclusions, or it is one and the same in both cases. If it is distinct, then it will be necessary to distinguish various species of theology against the clear and constant doctrine of St. Thomas. If it is one and the same, then it is impossible that some conclusions should be definable as of divine faith while others are not. Since divine faith is *specifically distinct* from theology, to be definable as of divine faith, or not, constitutes a *different species.*

There are those who think they can evade the horns of this inescapable dilemma by distinguishing a la Vázquez between conclusions as conclusions and the same conclusions as truths or consequents. Or, to employ the stock terms: conclusions taken *formally* and conclusions taken *specificatively.* With this distinction the stock answer is that conclusions deduced from two premises of faith are definable as truths of faith taken *specificatively,* i.e. inasmuch as they embody revealed truths; but not if they are taken *formally,* i.e. precisely as deduced conclusions. Hence the further distinction of *two assents:* one is the assent given to the conclusion taken *formally* or precisely as a conclusion, and this is the *theological* assent; the other is the assent given to the conclusion taken *specificatively* or precisely as a revealed truth, and this is, they say, the assent of *divine faith.*

To this we answer, in the first place, that if the distinction of the two assents, one theological and another of divine faith, is valid for conclusions deduced from two premises of faith, it is equally valid for conclusions deduced from a premise of faith and a premise of reason. Both the former and the latter are known through reasoning, and neither the former nor the latter can be known *without reasoning.* Consequently, if it is possible in some cases to prescind from reasoning for the giving of assent, it should be equally possible to do likewise in all cases.

In the second and principal place, it is possible to consider one and the same conclusion under two different aspects, and therefore to give it two specifically different assents, only when that conclusion can be known by us through *two* specifically distinct *mediums,* that is to say, when it can be known by us either *without reasoning* or *with reasoning.* This happens when a truth is contained explicitly or without reasoning in one part of the deposit, and also contained virtually or with reasoning in another part of the deposit,

as for instance, in the case of God's eternity. It also happens when we know a truth through the Church's definition or without reasoning, and also through theological deduction or reasoning, as in the case of the two wills in Christ.

But when we cannot know a truth except *through deductive reasoning*, and hence when such a truth is known by us through only one medium of knowing, i.e. *as a conclusion*, it is an absurdity in Thomist doctrine to say that such a truth can be given *two assents*. If it is not known except as a conclusion, it cannot be given any assent other than the assent corresponding to a conclusion, which is to say, theological assent, whether it is deduced from two premises of faith or from one of faith and one of reason. "There is no such thing as *two* assents to a conclusion, one given to it considered by itself, another given to it considered as inferred, because the *conclusion, whether considered by itself or as inferred*, always belongs to the same habit, viz. *science*."[38] "But with respect to the *conclusions* themselves there is but *one assent*, which belongs to *theology*, and by which the mind is led to the conclusions *considered both inferentially and entitatively*."[39] This is an elementary and constant teaching in the Thomist school with but one exception, the Salmanticenses, on account of their failure to unravel the Suarezian confusion relative to the revealed virtual.[40]

Thus, prior to the Church's definition, every true theological conclusion, whether inferred from two premises of faith or from one of faith and

[38] GOTTI, *Theologia Scholastico-Dogmatica*, t.1, tr.1, q.2, dub.3, n.14.

[39] BANCEL, *Brevis Universae Theologiae Cursus*, q.111, De Sacra Theologia, a.9, §2.

[40] With regard to conclusions deducible from two premises of faith two assertions are made today by many theologians, including even some Thomist author:

1. that such conclusions are theological conclusions *improperly speaking;*
2. that they are formally of divine faith and can be given the assent of divine faith *before* they are defined, by anyone who comes to know them with evidence.

Both assertions are certainly antithomist. According to Thomist doctrine, such conclusions not only are theological conclusions properly speaking but they are even much more properly theological conclusions than those deduced from a premise of faith and a premise of reason. All Thomists, including the Salmanticenses, are unanimous on this point. Furthermore, according to Thomist doctrine, such conclusions are not formally of divine faith, nor can they be worthy of being given the assent of divine faith by anyone for so long as they are not defined by either the solemn or the ordinary magisterium of the Church. On this point too all Thomists are agreed, with the exception of the Salmanticenses.

It would be easy to prove both these points to the hilt with passages ready to the hand. But since all theologians admit the *definability* of such conclusions, and this is the only thing that matters for the problem of the evolution of dogma, we will set it aside for the moment.

one of reason, is known through the sole medium of theology, i.e., through *revelation unfolded by reason*. After the Church's definition, they are *all* known also through *another* new medium, i.e. through *revelation unfolded by the Church*, which is the medium of divine faith. Hence, prior to the Church's definition, all such true conclusions merit one and the same assent, viz. theological assent, but in no case the assent of divine faith. After the Church's definition they merit two specifically different assents: theological assent, and the assent of divine faith.

This is the only theory that maintains these two fundamental theses of St. Thomas: (a) the *specific unity* of sacred theology, and hence of all truly theological conclusions; (b) the *specific distinction* between theology and divine faith.

244. FIFTH PROOF. – Anything that is *truly identical* with the divine deposit, or anything that is *of the essence* of the revealed deposit, is definable as a truth of divine faith.

Now, every conclusion that is truly and rigorously theological has to be really identical with, or of the essence of, the revealed deposit.

Therefore, every truly and rigorously theological conclusion is definable as a truth of divine faith, and not only as a truth of ecclesiastical faith.

The major premise is admitted by almost every theologian both ancient and modern. It describes precisely what Suárez and Lugo termed the *formal-confused, and what the moderns usually designate as the virtual implicit*, or virtual *identical*, or the *connexive-essential* virtual. (73)

The minor premise has been proven in many previous sections. (109) For the present suffice it to recall to mind the following: no conclusion is rigorously theological if it is bereft of theological certitude; no conclusion can have theological certitude if, absolutely speaking, it is possible for it to be false; absolutely speaking, it is possible for any conclusion to be false if it is not deduced through a link of real identity or of essential connexion; therefore, where no link of real identity or of essential connexion exists, no truly and rigorously theological conclusion exists.

Anyone who doubts this has the remedy at hand. Let him present just one argument of which the conclusion is *absolutely certain* despite the fact that there is *no real* identity or no essential connexion between the conclusion and the principle from which it is deduced. Such a discovery would overthrow all that Aristotle and St. Thomas teach on the nature of absolute certainty, and on the radical distinction obtaining between the sciences or conclusions of absolute certainty – mathematics, metaphysics, and theology – and the sciences or conclusions whose certainty is not absolute, such as the physical or the behavioural sciences or conclusions.(39)

In the stock example, "Christ is *man;* therefore, he is actually risible" – this is the example in which many get confused – the term *man* does not stand for *bare* human *nature,* but for *integral* and *perfect* human nature. Now, although actual risibility, or any other actual property, is not an essential requirement in order to be a *man,* it is an essential requirement in order to be an *integral* and *perfect* man. There exists true and real inclusion or identity between the predicate "actually risible" of the theological conclusion, and the predicate "integral and perfect man" of the revealed premise. This is always the case in every rigorously theological conclusion.

Therefore, *every* truly and rigorously theological conclusion is really identical with, or of the essence of, the revealed major, and, consequently, it is definable as a truth of divine faith, and not only as a truth of ecclesiastical faith.

245. SIXTH PROOF. – Everything that is really and truly *within* the revealed deposit is definable as a truth of divine faith.

Now, everything that is necessarily or theologically connected with the revealed deposit is really and truly *within* the revealed deposit.

Therefore, every thing necessarily connected with the revealed deposit is definable as a truth of divine faith.

The major is commonly admitted by theologians. Thus, the difficulty lies in the minor. As a matter of fact, there are many who think that what is connected or related to the deposit it not within, but *outside* the deposit. They are of the belief that it is not something *of* the deposit, but something other than, or really distinct from, the deposit although necessary for its preservation and defense. They imagine that these connected truths are to the revealed deposit as the walls to the city, or better still, as the fence to the orchard. The fence is necessary for the custody and defense of the orchard, but it is not a part of it. It is external, not internal, to the trees growing within the orchard. In like manner, they say, that which is connected with the deposit is necessary for its preservation and defense, but it is not part of the deposit. It is without, not within, the deposit.

In our opinion, this is a very great mistake, to which many theologians have succumbed and still succumb because they look at these matters from a *material* point of view. The *formal viewpoint* whereby truths connected with the deposit fall under the Church's infallibility is not their *matter* but their connexion or *relation* to the deposit. But – and this should never be overlooked by any theologian –, this *relation* is a *mutual* relation. It is not only the *relation of other things* to the revealed deposit, it is also the relation of the revealed deposit to other things. It is from the latter – and only from the latter – point of view that such relations come under the Church's infallibility, i.e., not insofar as they are relations of other things, but insofar as

they are *relations of the revealed deposit.* Thus, they are relations *of* the revealed deposit, something or a part *of* the revealed deposit, something from *within* the revealed deposit, and, consequently, something definable as a truth of divine faith.

The same or a similar misunderstanding occurs when we speak of the Church's power. It is a commonplace to say that the power of the Church extends itself not only to *spiritual* things, but also to some other things that are not spiritual but *temporal.* This manner of speaking is *materially* true, and therefore very convenient and useful in canon law and in any science of a practical or empirical character. However, it is *formally* false, and consequently liable to mislead the mind of the philosopher or theologian, who should focus only on the formal viewpoint whereby powers and habits are specified and distinguished. Since the Church is formally a *spiritual* society, its power cannot extend itself, *formally* speaking, except to what is *spiritual.* If we commonly say that it also extends itself to what is temporal, the latter is not taken insofar as it is temporal, but insofar as it is *related* to the spiritual. Now – and this is what many overlook –, the Church does not, and cannot, consider such relations insofar as they are *relations of the temporal* sphere, but considers them exclusively insofar as they are *relations of the spiritual* sphere. Consequently, they are relations of what is spiritual, spiritual relations. Thus, and only thus, is the object of ecclesiastical power truly homogenous, to wit: (a) *spiritual* affairs; (b) *their* relations, i.e. *spiritual relations.*

Finally, such is also the case with any power or habit, e.g. the power of sight. Sight does not have as its formal object *colour* and some *other* things, but *colour* and the *coloured.* Thus, those *other things* we speak of, e.g. extension and substance, do not come under sight precisely as extension or substance, but precisely as *related* to colour, which is to say, insofar as they are *coloured.*

Likewise, then, the infallibility of the Church does not have for its object divine revelation and *other non-revealed things,* but divine revelation and its relations. Infallibility does not create or invent these relations; it merely discovers and defines them. They already existed *in* the revealed deposit, which is why St. Thomas designates them with the classical term *revealable,* that is, *discoverable* in the revealed deposit in which they already existed from the beginning. Thus they are relations or conclusions *of* the revealed deposit, relations *implicit in* what is said by God, and hence definable as truths of divine faith. Their definition by the Church gives us nothing new with respect to *substance* or objectivity since they were already implicated or *implicit* in the primitively revealed, but only something *new* with respect to *explication.*

246. SEVENTH PROOF. – Where a conclusion is completely included in the premise of faith, in such manner that the premise of reason serves no

purpose but that of explicating or manifesting the inclusion, such a conclusion is definable as a truth of divine faith, and not merely as a truth of ecclesiastical faith.

Now, in every truly and rigorously theological reasoning the conclusion is completely included in the premise of faith, and the premise of reason serves no purpose but that of explicating or unfolding the conclusion.

Therefore, every truly and rigorously theological conclusion is definable as a truth of divine faith, and not merely as a truth of ecclesiastical faith.

The major premise is commonly admitted by theologians. Cardinal Franzelin formulates it in the following words: "When a revealed premise already contains implicitly what is stated in the conclusion, and the other premise, even if it itself is not revealed, evidently manifests this inclusion of the conclusion in the revealed premise, *there is no doubt that the truth enunciated in the conclusion is a revealed truth.*" As an instance of such conclusions he cites, and with very good reason, the conclusion that "Christ has two wills", which is deduced from the revealed major "Christ is perfect God and perfect man" and the minor of reason "Every perfect man has a human will".[41] We repeat that theologians are commonly agreed on this major premise.

Thus the difficulty lies in the minor premise. Many, not to say almost all, modern theologians think that in theology it is not only possible but also necessary to distinguish between *explicative* and *completive* minors. The former merely *explicate* or unfold what was already really contained or implicit in the revealed major; hence the conclusion is itself also revealed and definable as of divine faith. The latter, the *completive,* are not restricted merely to unfolding or explicating what is implicit in the revealed major, but further *add* to it something objectively distinct. Hence the conclusion is neither revealed nor definable as of divine faith because it is not completely contained in the revealed major, but contained partly in the minor of reason.

We wholeheartedly agree to this division of minors, and therefore of conclusions, into *explicative* and *completive.* It is a basic division which should never be forgotten. But the modern error, derived from Suárez, lies in reducing theology in the proper sense of the term to completive conclusions, when such conclusions, far from being the only properly theological conclusions, are, on the contrary, in no case rigorously *theological,* but purely physical and of themselves incapable of any *theological certainty.* We believe that this has been fully demonstrated in many of the previous sections. Every rigorously theological conclusion is an *explicative* conclusion. (89-109).

[41] FRANZELIN, *De Deo Uno,* prol.

Those who opine the contrary have given scant thought to the nature of true theology or to the radical distinction obtaining between the sciences of physico-contingent certainty and the sciences of metaphysical or absolute certainty, such as metaphysics and theology. *Sacred* theology is nothing but supernatural metaphysics, just as natural theology is natural metaphysics.

In the purely physical sciences the minors, and hence the conclusions, always express something really distinct from the majors; consequently, the minors and conclusions are *completive,* never *explicative.* On the contrary, in mathematics, metaphysics, and theology, the minors, and hence the conclusions, always express something that is of the essence of the majors, something that issues out of the majors – and out of them exclusively – not by addition, but by analysis. Hence, in mathematics, as well as in metaphysics and theology, their true and proper and rigorous conclusions are *explicative,* never completive: they are *analytical* conclusions.

For this reason, finally, the genuine Thomist school, and likewise any school that establishes a distinction between true theology and true metaphysics on the one hand, and the poor and contingent physical sciences on the other hand, have always maintained that the theological conclusion is completely contained in the revealed majors and in no wise in the minors of reason, these latter being only instruments or causes of *explicitation* but not of objectivity.[42]

247. EIGHTH PROOF. – The eighth proof can be clearly formulated in the following propositions:

1. It is impossible for the Church to condemn any proposition as infallibly erroneous unless a true *opposition* exists between such a proposition and the revealed deposit.

2. There can be no true opposition between a proposition and the revealed deposit unless between the former and the latter there really is a true *implicit contradiction* in meaning.

[42] *"The premise of faith alone contains the whole truth and certainty of the conclusion,* and the other that is known by natural evidence is only assumed per accidens and on account of the imperfection of the subject." (GONET, *Clypeus,* d.proem., a.1., n.38) "In theological demonstration the per se cause of the conclusion is the *premise of faith alone* and the conclusion is ultimately resolved into it alone; but the natural premise is only a *condition that applies and explicates* the supernatural principle and is *required* on account of the deficiency of *our* intellect." (GONET, *Loc. cit,* a.4, n.58). Such is the perpetual doctrine of St. Thomas and of all true Thomists. The learned Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange, who does not seem to share our views on this matter of the theological conclusion, speaking of another question says: "Besides, the question is to be solved not by means of religious experience, but by a *metaphysical analysis of the revealed doctrine, as theological conclusions are deduced." (De Revelatione,* t.1, p.509). Very well spoken! Thus have all true Thomists spoken, and thus should they all always speak. But

3. There can be no true implicit contradiction in meaning between the erroneous proposition and the revealed deposit unless the erroneous proposition denies a *meaning identical* to a meaning affirmed in the revealed deposit.

4. The erroneous proposition cannot deny a meaning identical to a meaning affirmed in the revealed deposit unless the *theological conclusion affirms* a meaning identical to that affirmed in the revealed deposit.

5. Therefore, every theological conclusion affirms a meaning identical to that of the revealed deposit and is, thus, definable as of divine faith, and not merely as of ecclesiastical faith.

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then, if the theological conclusion is nothing but *metaphysical analysis of the revealed teaching,* it evidently follows that the theological conclusion is not, and cannot be, *a new teaching,* nor can it be an *objective complement* of the revealed major; it can only be an analytical unfolding or *intellectual explication* of the same major, and therefore, definable as of divine faith. No analysis or explication is possible except with respect to what is truly *implicit,* and whatever is implicit in the revealed deposit is definable as of divine faith. Thus every true and proper theological conclusion is *virtual* because it is truly a *conclusion,* and it is *implicit* because it is *truly theological,* i.e., a true *analysis of the revealed deposit.*

As a matter of fact, if the theological conclusion, properly speaking, were *objectively* contained partly in the premise of faith and partly in the premise of reason, three things would evidently follow: 1. That not only the principles of faith, but also the principles of reason should be taken as the true *principles* of theology. 2. That theology would be a subaltern or *subordinate* science not only with respect to God's knowledge and that of the blessed, but also with respect to the natural sciences. 3. That the ninth of the loci theologici, i.e. natural reason, would be not only an improper, but rather a *proper* and an eminently proper locus theologicus. For every true Thomist these are three such absurdities that it would be difficult to say which is the most absurd. We have heard it said by a modern theologian that, although the theological conclusion is not contained objectively in itself in the premise of reason, still it is therein contained objectively with respect to us. It is not surprising that any Thomist head capable of admitting, without exploding, the phrase *objectively with respect to us,* should find it possible to admit ecclesiastical faith and . . . almost any other thing. Such a phrase is in Thomist doctrine a contradiction in terms. What is contained *objectively* cannot be contained merely with respect to us, it has also to be contained *in itself,* since "objectively" and "in itself" are identical things. On the other hand, what is contained only with respect to us, cannot for the same reason be contained *objectively,* but subjectively. What a mess in such simple matters! *Reasoning* is *essential* for *any and every* theological conclusion, since without either formal or virtual reasoning there is no science but merely understanding. The use of a premise of faith is also essential, since although without such a premise science is possible, still without it no *theological* science is possible, if this term is taken to denote sacred theology. But the *premise of reason* is altogether *accidental* with respect to the conclusion, since such a premise is not necessary on account of the *object,* but on account of the *subject,* i.e., on account of the feebleness of *our reason.* Hence it is not an *objective* premise or a source of objectivity, but a subjective aid or instrument for the explication of the premise of faith. "For the *natural premise* is not necessary in the angels and the blessed, as has been explained above. But *natural discourse,* whether formal or virtual [formal in ourselves, virtual in the angels], belongs to the essential constitution of any science, either of theology or of purely natural science, because it is that whereby natural sciences differ essentially from the habit of the principles, and theology from faith, and *this must be diligently kept in mind.*" (GONET, *loc. cit.,* d. proem., a.6, n.70) Inasmuch as *natural discourse* is *essential* for *every* theological conclusion, *no* true theological conclusion, even the conclusion deduced from two premises of faith, can be formally *supernatural* or formally of *divine faith* prior to the Church's definition. Inasmuch as the premise of reason is *accidental* for *every* true theological conclusion, the conclusion being thus objectively implicit or contained in the major of faith *alone,* for this reason *every* true theological conclusion, even the conclusion from a premise of reason, is definable of divine faith. Therefore, we believe it to be contrary to Thomist teaching either to admit that there are true and proper conclusions (e.g. those from two premises of faith) that are of divine faith even *prior* to the definition, or to admit that there are true and proper theological conclusions that are not of divine faith even *after* the definition. But to admit those two propositions at the same time, as the Salmanticenses *apparently* do seems to us, with all the respect due to such distinguished authors, the most complete antithesis that can be made of the true Thomist notion of sacred theology. We would like to be shown just one classical Thomist prior to the 17th century who maintains either, and much less both, of those two assertions. *All* of them always maintain or take for granted the two contrary assertions.

The first proposition is evident and admitted by all. The Church cannot define a truth or proscribe an error on account of the conformity of that truth or the opposition of that error to the principles of natural reason, but on account of the conformity or opposition they respectively display to the revealed principles or revealed deposit.

The second proposition is likewise obvious. Contradiction is implicit in any kind of opposition. We will demonstrate this at length elsewhere (340-351) with a number of arguments and abundant passages from St. Thomas. For the present let the following text suffice: "Contradiction is included in all the other kinds of opposition."[43]

The third proposition is the definition of contradiction: "To affirm and deny the same thing of the same subject according to the same aspect."

Contradiction is impossible unless the *same thing* is affirmed and denied between two extremes.

The fourth is the definition of the erroneous proposition. Every erroneous proposition has to be the contradictory of a theological conclusion.

The fifth is manifest. To say that a meaning is *identical* to that of the revealed deposit amounts to saying that it is definable as of *divine* faith.

In short: every opposition includes a *contradiction,* and every contradiction is grounded on an *identity.*[44]

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[43] ST. THOMAS, *In Metaphysicos* l. 10, lect. 6.

[44] "Observe in the next place that among theologians that proposition is *theologically condemnable* which has some kind of *opposition to the doctrine of faith.* . .

248. NINTH PROOF. – The foregoing arguments, especially the first and the third taken from St. Thomas, are good not only for truly theological conclusions, but also for dogmatic facts; nevertheless, they apply more directly to the former rather than to the latter. The arguments that follow apply *equally* to the mediately revealed *doctrines,* known by the name of theological conclusions, and to the mediately revealed *facts,* designated by the term *dogmatic* facts. Let us begin with an argument taken from the teaching of the Vatican Council, which can be stated thus:

Whatever does not constitute a substantially *new doctrine,* but is the *same doctrine* revealed by God to the apostles and *conserved* and *explicated* by the Church, can be defined as of *divine* faith.

Now, the Church's infallibility cannot give or propose any *new* doctrine but only the same doctrine revealed by God to the Apostles.

Therefore, every truth infallibly defined by the Church is a truth of *divine,* not only of ecclesiastical, faith.

The major is evident and admitted by all theologians. The minor is, in our view, rather clearly taught in these two passages of the Vatican Council: "For the doctrine of faith, which God has revealed, has not been proposed in the manner of a philosophical discovery to be perfected by human inge-

For, in order to be a theologically condemnable proposition, it is not enough that it should contain falsehood *as regards other things that in no way pertain to the faith;* otherwise all propositions that are false in philosophy would be theologically worthy of censure, which is absurd and contrary to the *common* practice." (SALMANTICENSES, *De Fide,* d.9, n.38, pg.425) "The *opposition* of propositions is the affirmation and the negation of the *identity* of the predicate with the subject, or to affirm and to deny the *same thing of the same thing.* Hence propositions having a *different matter can in no way be opposed.*" (ZIGLIARA, *Summa Philos., Dialectica,* 1.2, c.4, a.1)

Inasmuch as the *meaning* is the formal element in *teachings* (19), there can be no opposition between two propositions if in one of them is not affirmed the *same meaning* that is denied in the other. Hence, there is an identity of meaning between every rigorously metaphysical or theological conclusion and the principle from which it is deduced. The conclusion is nothing but a *part* of the principle. Otherwise, to deny the former would not imply a true opposition to the latter.

"The *principle* from which the syllogism proceeds is to the *conclusion* as the *whole* to the part, and the conclusion is to the principle as a *part to the whole.*" (ST. THOMAS, *In Post. Analyt.,* lib.1, lect.38) "The consequent is a *certain part* and *something* of the antecedent." (JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *Cursus Philos., Logica,* p.1, c.2, ed. Vivès vol. 1, pg 67) "*Opposites* have *regard to the same thing.*" (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.,* p.1, q.17, a.1)

Since the *revealed* principles are the true and only formal principles of theology, every rigorously theological conclusion is a true, albeit *implicit, part* of the revealed deposit. There is an *identity of meaning* between them. This will emerge even more clearly when we explain the nature of *opposition according to St. Thomas.* (333-345)

nuity, but it has been entrusted to the Spouse of Christ as a divine deposit to be by her inviolably *safeguarded* and infallibly *declared* . . . Let, then, the understanding, knowledge, wisdom both of each and every one, both of one man and of the whole Church, grow . . . . and advance extensively and intensively in the course of time and the flow of centuries, but *only within its kind,* that is to say, *in the same dogma, the same understanding, and the same* meaning."[45] For the *Holy Spirit was not promised* to Peter and his successors *so that* by His revelation *they should disclose* a NEW DOCTRINE, but so that by his assistance they should inviolably *safeguard* and faithfully expound the *revelation handed down by the Apostles* or the deposit of faith."[46]

We ask any theologian to read and reread without prejudices these two Vatican Council texts, especially the second. They explicitly say that the Holy Spirit's assistance, which is tantamount to saying infallibility, *was not,* promised to the Church nor is the Church endowed with it in order to propose any *new doctrine,* but to preserve inviolably and expound faithfully the *same doctrine* that was revealed to the Apostles.

Consequently, either the doctrine defined by the Church is substantially or in its meaning *the same* as that which God revealed to the Apostles, or it is a *new* doctrine. If the former, then it is obvious that it is definable as of divine, and not only as of ecclesiastical, faith. If the latter, then it does not fall under infallibility, since the Council expressly says that infallibility was not promised to the Church in view of *new* doctrines.

Someone might here interpose that the Council does not say precisely that the Church cannot infallibly teach us new doctrine, but that in the teaching of new doctrine she cannot count on new revelation but only on new assistance or infallibility. This is a childish evasion. The Council expressly says that it is precisely on account of the fact that the Church cannot count on new revelation but only on mere assistance to safeguard and expound the doctrine already revealed to the Apostles, that she cannot propose to us any *new doctrine,* but only the *same doctrine* handed down by the Apostles inviolably safeguarded and faithfully expounded.

In consequence, any doctrine of which it can be truly said that it is simply the *revelation handed down by the Apostles* inviolably *safeguarded and faithfully expounded* (Vatican Council), is obviously a truth of *divine* faith. On the other hand, according to the Vatican Council, no doctrine of which the same cannot be truly said can be the object of infallibility nor, consequently, of ecclesiastical faith.

249. TENTH PROOF. – Any truth expressly taught by the Apostles to the Church is definable as of divine, and not only as of ecclesiastical, faith.

[45] *Constitutio de fide catholica,* c.4; Denz.-Schön. 3020.

[46] *Constitutio de Ecclesia Christi,* c.4; Denz.-Schön. 3070.

Now, the Apostles taught, or could have taught, the Church many truths that were known, not immediately through revelation or inspiration, but simply through infallibility or the Holy Spirit's assistance.

Therefore the object of infallibility or divine assistance, which is identical to the object of ecclesiastical faith, is definable as a truth of divine faith.

The major is commonly admitted by theologians. It is established by the constant praxis of the Church. The Church has always looked on *apostolic teaching and doctrine definable as a truth of divine faith* as identical things. This has always been the criterion that has always guided her in her definitions of faith.[47]

The minor will also be clear to anyone who considers these two things. First, the Apostles, during their lifetime, did not have less authority than that which the councils and the popes have today. Hence, if the councils or popes can define and infallibly teach not only the things expressly revealed or inspired by God, but also the things necessarily connected with them, each and every one of the Apostles could do the same. At the time when the pope St. Clement and the apostle St. John were both alive, there was nothing that the former could teach that the latter could not likewise teach. Thus, if St. Clement could define and teach a theological conclusion or a dogmatic fact, the apostle St. John could do likewise.

Second, a great many theologians of solid reputation are of the opinion that it is not necessary that the apostles should have been favoured with either revelation or inspiration every time they preached or wrote, as were the sacred writers. In the case of the apostles it is enough that they should have had divine assistance or infallibility. (176, footnote)

Now, it is obvious that the Church has always held anything taught by the Apostles to be definable as a truth of divine faith, without ever requiring therefor that the apostles should have declared that they were teaching it in virtue of revelation or inspiration and not in virtue of mere assistance or infallibility. Hence it is clear that infallibility or divine assistance suffices for divine faith. Otherwise we will be constrained to say that the Church has no criterion whereby to discern what things are of divine, and what things are of ecclesiastical, faith in the preaching of the apostles.

What we have just said concerning the preaching of the Apostles appears even more clearly when we apply it to the preaching or tradition of the subsequent Church or to the unanimous agreement of the Church Fathers. The ecumenical councils have always based themselves on the tradition of the Church and on the unanimous agreement of the Fathers of the Church. Now then, an examination of the proceedings of all the councils, from the Nicene to the Vatican, and of all the testimonies from Tradition or from the Church Fathers quoted by these councils, makes it clear as the light of day that the councils have never required that the constant Tradition of the Church or the unanimous testimony of the Church Fathers should have taught such or such a truth as of *divine faith* or as formally revealed, but simply that such or such a truth was the *teaching of the Church*, or a doctrine *necessary for salvation* or a doctrine that is *indubitable and obligatory* for the Christian, or some such other formula equally suitable to doctrines of divine faith and to doctrines of ecclesiastical faith. And yet this, and only this, sufficed to enable all the councils to define such truths as dogmas of faith, as truths of divine and Catholic faith. If, to define as dogmas of faith the consubstantiality of the Word in the Council of Nicaea, or Mary's divine motherhood in the Council of Ephesus, or the two intellects and two wills of Christ in the Council of Constantinople, or the transubstantiation in the Council of Trent, or the Immaculate Conception in the Bull of Pius IX, or papal infallibility in the Vatican Council, the Church should have had to rely on a constant tradition or a unanimous teaching of the Holy Fathers in which such truths were affirmed to be of *divine* faith or formally revealed, then such dogmas could never have been defined.

Moreover, not only would the ecumenical councils be left without any criterion whereby to determine which of the things contained in the preaching of the Apostles or in the tradition of the Church or in the doctrine of the Fathers of the Church are of divine faith, and which of ecclesiastical faith, but we ourselves would be deprived of any reliable gauge whereby we might know which things are of divine, and which of ecclesiastical, faith in the definitions of the councils or popes. It is true that, in the dogmatic definitions given after the dispute concerning the distinction between divine and ecclesiastical faith, the Church has often taken pains to express in the definition itself that the defined truth was a *revealed* truth, as for instance, in the definition of the Immaculate Conception by Pius IX, or in the definition of papal infallibility by the Vatican Council.[48]

[47] "Things pertaining to religious *doctrine* are shown to be *divinely revealed* by the same token that they are proven to be *handed down by the Apostles*. Hence, to inquire into a teaching's *apostolicity* and to inquire into its *divine revelation* have *always* been considered in the Church as utterly *one and the same thing*." (FRANZELIN, *De Divina Traditione*, th. 1, n. 2)

[48] In the Bull *Ineffabilis Deus* the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception is defined to *have been revealed by God*. (Denz.-Schön. 2803) Similarly, in the Constitution *De Ecclesia Christi*, the formula "we define that it is a *divinely revealed dogma*" is used in defining papal infallibility. (Denz.-Schön. 3073) On the other hand, as every theologian knows, in a very great number of earlier dogmatic definitions the formula employed, is merely that of "we firmly believe", or "we declare and define", or some such other formulae, without mention of the term *revealed*. Thus, e.g., in the dogmatic Bull *Benedictus Deus*, in which it is defined that souls already purged enjoy the im-

But it is no less true that prior to the invention of the new so-called ecclesiastical faith, and hence, prior to the 17th century, the Church frequently issued dogmatic definitions or definitions of divine faith under the simple formulae of "We firmly believe," or "We declare," or "We define", or some other similar formula, without further mention of whether the defined truth was a *revealed* truth or not. And yet, this notwithstanding, all such definitions have always been considered as definitions of divine faith, as true dogmas of faith.

In the professions of faith that we all make, as e.g., Pius IV's profession of faith, which no one will deny is a profession of divine faith, we simply say "I believe and profess", or "hold unswervingly," without any mention of the fact that the faith in question is *divine*. In these professions of faith the formula "I believe and profess" extends itself not only to what the councils have defined as of divine faith, but to *everything* that the councils have *defined*, thus giving us clearly to understand that *everything defined* by the councils is of *divine faith*.[49]

250. ELEVENTH PROOF. – Leaving aside, so as not to make this chapter excessively long, other proofs or confirmations[50], we conclude with

mediate beatific vision of God, it is simply said: "By apostolic authority we define". (Denz.-Schön. 1000) Yet all such definitions have always been considered as definitions of divine faith. Furthermore: in the two definitions of the Immaculate Conception and of papal infallibility the Church has been satisfied with defining that they were *revealed* doctrines, but without mentioning whether they were immediately or mediately revealed.

[49] "I N. *firmly* believe and profess each and everything contained in the Symbol of faith... I likewise undoubtingly accept and profess all the other things that are taught, *defined* and declared by the Sacred Canons and the ecumenical Councils, especially by the holy Synod of Trent... This true *Catholic faith...*", etc. (Tridentine profession of faith, Denz-Schön, (nn. 1862-1870) Finally, should we care to press the point, if this modern ecclesiastical faith were not truly a *divine* faith it would follow that we would be left in a state of uncertainty as to whether the Athanasian Symbol itself is of divine faith or not. This Symbol merely states that "This is the *Catholic faith*, and no man can be saved unless he faithfully and firmly believes in it." Now then, in the Church's language ecclesiastical faith is as *Catholic* as public divine faith. Witness the following passage: "In the thirteenth place: if you have believed and still believe that it is only the Roman Pontiff who can put an end to the doubts that arise concerning the CATHOLIC *faith* by means of an authentic determination to which adherence must be inviolably given, and that *whatever he, by the authority of the keys entrusted to him by Christ, determines to be TRUE is true and* CATHOLIC . . . (CLEMENT VI, Epist. *Super Quibusdam* ad Consolatorem Catholicon Armenorum, 29 Sept. 1351; Denz.-Schön. 1064). The terms *infallible* faith, *divine* faith, *Catholic* faith, when employed with regard to doctrine *defined* by the Church, have always been taken as identical or synonymous in all the documents of the ancient Church and by all theologians prior to Molina.

[50] Among others, the following reasons or confirmations might be adduced:

1. In every infallible definition the Church says, or can say, with complete truth: "It has seemed good to the Holy Spirit." And the view or judgment of the Holy Spirit is not a matter of ecclesiastical, but of divine, faith.

an argument which, in our opinion, is one of the clearest as well as fully conclusive. It can be formulated in the five propositions that follow:

1. God has revealed that the Church is infallible in defining the mediate or connected.

2. Hence, God has revealed that the definitions of the mediate or connected made by the Church are infallibly true.

3. Therefore, it is of divine faith that the definitions made by the Church of the mediate or connected are infallibly true.

4. But, the proper and specific object of ecclesiastical faith are the definitions made by the Church of the mediate or connected.

5. Therefore, ecclesiastical faith is divine faith.

2. The Church can change, or give a dispensation from, anything she does by ecclesiastical authority. Thus the Church can change, or dispense from all laws that are not divine but ecclesiastical, and even in those cases where a law is partly divine and partly ecclesiastical, the Church can change, or dispense from it, with respect to that part which is ecclesiastical. But it is evident that the Church can neither change, nor dispense from, whether totally or partially, any infallible definition once it has been made. Therefore, the authority whereby the Church makes such a definition is not ecclesiastical, nor partly ecclesiastical and partly divine, but wholly divine, and, consequently, of divine faith.

3. The word of man, if it is formally guaranteed by God, has the same authority as the word of God. Every infallible definition is formally guaranted by the word of God.

4. What pertains to an instrument, *insofar as it is an instrument*, is not attributed properly to the instrument but to the principal cause. Now then, the Church possesses infallibility not of herself, but insofar, and only insofar, as she is God's instrument. It is true that when the pope defines his *action* is not an *instrumental action* of God (this is where some authors have been mistaken), as was the action of the sacred writers when they wrote, and for this reason the definitions of the Church are not *divine Scripture*. But it is not less true that the pope's infallible *authority* in defining is as much an *instrumental authority* as that of the sacred writers, and for this reason it is a *divine authority* and worthy of divine faith.

5. Since there is no room for any *discourse* in any act of faith, whether divine or human, anything that enters as a *formal motive* into an act of faith has to enter into it *immediately* inasmuch as *mediate* is equivalent to *discourse*. Consequently, either divine authority in one way or another enters as a formal motive into ecclesiastical faith, or not. If it does not enter in any way, there can be no infallible faith. If it enters, it has to enter *immediately*, and hence the faith is divine. To say that both the ecclesiastical and the divine authority enter immediately as two *parts* of one and the same motive would be to fall into Lugo's discredited *mediate faith*.

6. Lastly, either *reasoning* enters as a formal motive into the assent of the so-called ecclesiastical faith, or not. If it enters, such an assent cannot be an assent of *faith*, whether divine or ecclesiastical, since faith and reasoning are inconsistent. If it does not enter as a formal motive, the foundation on which our opponents base themselves in order to deny that such a faith is divine, collapses.

The first proposition is admitted by all or almost all, theologians, ancient as well as modern.

The second is the very same proposition in another form, or put into passive form. It is evident that to say that "the Church is infallible when defining the mediate or connected" is *the same* as saying that "the definitions made by the Church of the mediate or connected are infallibly true".

The third is the same second proposition where the phrase "God has revealed" is replaced by the phrase "it is of divine faith".

The fourth is the definition itself of ecclesiastical faith.

Therefore, the fifth proposition is evident, viz., that ecclesiastical faith is divine faith.

We are absolutely certain that any reader who considers those five propositions with unjaundiced eyes, will clearly see that they are really identical and that the subsequent ones are nothing but the simple explication of the previous ones. To affirm, as some people affirm, that the infallibility of the Church when defining the mediate or connected is of divine faith, but that the infallibility or truth of the thing defined is not of divine faith, does not make sense. To say that the "the Church is infallible in what she defines" is the same as saying that "that which is defined by the Church is true". Hence to say that "it is of divine faith that the Church is infallible in what she defines" is the same as saying that "it is of divine faith that that which is defined by the Church is true" or that "the truth of that which is defined by the Church is of divine faith", or that "that which is defined by the Church is of divine faith".

251. A LUMINOUS CONFIRMATION. – Finally, even at the risk of making less clear what is of itself transparently clear, we will add one confirmation. Suppose that God or Jesus Christ should today come in person to tell us: "I testify that everything that the Church has defined up to this moment is true". We believe that in such a hypothesis no theologian will dare seriously assert that the definitions of the Church are not of divine, but of ecclesiastical faith.[51]

But that which God would tell us *today*, He has already told us *before*, and every theologian knows that the difference of before and after does not

[51] In their famous propositions on the nature of the effects of *subsequent revelation*, Lesius and Bonfrerius are undoubtedly mistaken when they affirm that a *human* book, if it were posteriorly approved by a public *divine revelation*, would become an *inspired* book or *Sacred Scripture*. But they would not have been mistaken but, on the contrary, they would have stated a great truth if they had limited themselves to saying that such a book or doctrine would be truly the *word of God* and truly a *revealed truth*. Franzelin himself acknowledged this. "From such an attestation of the book's veracity made by God himself through a Catholic revelation it would indeed follow that the things contained in a book of human origin would be *divine truths* and thus the *word of God* to be believed. But it would not therefore be an *inspired book* or *Sacred Scripture* in the proper sense of the term," *(De Divina Traditione et Scriptura*, Rome 1885, pg. 374). Very well said. But the same thing should be said of every infallible definition of the Church, since it has God's express approval through *antecedent* revelation, which is of equal value as consequent revelation. Cf. what we have to say later on, in No. 304, on whether the definitions of the Church are the "word of God" or not.

alter in any way the species of faith. Instead of telling us now that "everything that the Church *has defined* is true", God had already told us from the beginning that "everything that the Church *would define* is true". Consequently, such definitions are of *divine* faith, not precisely because *the Church says so*, but because *God has said so.*

In a nutshell, the *formal motive* of the faith we give to infallible definitions is not really the authority of the *Church*, nor even precisely the authority of the *assisting* God; it is really and formally the authority of the *revealing God.* The act of faith, which has modernly been termed ecclesiastical, is not formulated by saying: "I believe such a truth *because the Church is infallible* when she teaches it to me." Neither is it formulated by saying: "I believe such a truth *because God assists the Church* when she teaches it to me." But it is, and should be, formulated with entire truth in the following terms: "I believe in such a thing because *God has revealed* that the Church is infallible when she teaches it to me." Which is exactly the same as saying: *"I believe with divine faith* that what the Church has defined is true, *because God has revealed* that what the Church has defined is true." Such an assent is obviously an act of *divine* faith, and not merely of *ecclesiastical* faith.

Consequently, if divine faith extends itself to all theological conclusions defined by the Church, the evolution of dogma likewise extends itself to all such conclusions. Hence, the modern ecclesiastical faith is useless.

SECTION III
THE ECCLESIASTICAL FAITH AND DOGMATIC FACTS

252. – WHETHER DOGMATIC FACTS ARE OF DIVINE FAITH. – All theologians agree with St. Thomas that nothing can be the object of *divine* faith unless it is really and truly *revealed by God.* "For the faith of which we speak, does not assent to anything except on account of its *being revealed by God.*"[52] This is the foundation laid down by St. Thomas from the very first article of his immortal treatise on divine faith.

Thus, if dogmatic facts, or any other of the objects of the so-called ecclesiastical faith, are to be held by truly *divine* faith, it is indispensable that

[52] ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, 2-2, q.1, a.1.

they should have been truly *revealed by God.* But have dogmatic facts been truly revealed by God? If the answer be affirmative, in what manner have they been revealed, or in what manner are they truly contained in the revealed deposit?

Such is the object of this section. The importance of the subject should be obvious to any theologian.

253. THREE KINDS OF FACTS. – In the first place, let us say something very briefly about what is meant by *dogmatic facts.*

There are three kinds of facts: (a) *expressly revealed* facts; (b) merely *particular* facts; (c) *dogmatic* facts. The problems or questions concerning these different facts are respectively denominated by theologians as: (a) the question of the *revealed fact;* (b) the question of the *particular fact;* (c) the question of the *dogmatic fact.*

By *expressly revealed* facts we understand, as the name itself indicates, those facts that the Apostles expressly bequeathed to the Church in the deposit of the Holy Scripture or Divine Tradition. Examples of such facts are the facts that our beloved Saviour was born in Bethlehem or the fact that His most Holy Mother remained always a virgin.

By *particular* facts we understand all those facts that are neither expressly contained in the revealed deposit nor have any *necessary relation* with it. These facts are either totally unrelated to the *doctrine* of faith or morals, or if related, concern only *particular* persons, and not the whole Church, and consequently, are not absolutely necessary for the preservation or explication of the revealed deposit. Instances of these facts, aside from exclusively *profane* facts, are the fact whether such a marriage is valid or not, or whether such a person committed or not the crime with which he is charged or whether this piece of property belongs to this or the other individual. "As when it is a question" says St. Thomas, "of possessions or crimes, or some such other things."[53]

In between these two extremes – the expressly revealed facts on the one hand, and merely particular facts on the other hand – there is the third kind of facts which, since the time of Jansen, have been termed *dogmatic* facts. These facts are not expressly contained in the revealed deposit, and in this they are like the particular facts; however, they differ from these in that they do have a necessary relation with the preservation, explication, or application of the *revealed doctrine,* and thus they concern not only one or several particular persons, but the *whole* Church. Such facts, among others, are the facts relative to the *orthodoxy* or *heterodoxy* of passages or books, as e.g.,

[53] *Quodibetum* 9, a.16.

whether the book of Jansen is or not heretical, or whether it contained or not the notorious five heretical propositions that the Church declared were contained in it.[54]

254. WHAT IS CERTAIN AND WHAT IS DEBATABLE. – With respect to the first category of facts, viz. those *expressly revealed,* all theologians are agreed – the thing being obvious of itself – that they are objects not only of infallibility or ecclesiastical faith, but also of divine and Catholic faith, at least when the Church defines them either through solemn or ordinary magisterium. "*All* those things are to be believed with *divine* and *Catholic* faith that are contained in the word of God whether written or handed down and are by the Church proposed for belief as divinely *revealed,* either through its solemn pronouncement or through its ordinary and universal magisterium."[55] If *all* things that are divinely *revealed* can be the object of divine faith, then the same is doubly true of that which is *expressly* revealed. Where it is a case of divine revelation or inspiration, the same faith is due to doctrines and facts. The word of God possesses divine and equal authority with respect to *anything.*

With regard to the second category, viz. the *particular* facts, all theologians are likewise agreed in affirming with St. Thomas that they can neither be the object of divine faith, nor even of ecclesiastical faith or of the infallibility of the Church. "But in the other pronouncements, which relate to *particular facts,* as when it is a question of possessions, or crimes, or some such other things, *it is possible for the Church's judgement to be mistaken.*"[56]

Lastly, with respect to the third category, the so-called *dogmatic* facts – and it is with these that we are now concerned – there is a point on which

[54] We cite as examples of dogmatic facts "the orthodoxy or heterodoxy of texts", e.g., of Jansen's book, omitting the facts of whether such a council is infallible, or such a version of the Bible is authentic, or such a pope is a true pope, etc., etc., in order to avoid the impression that with such examples as are accepted by everybody as instances of *divine* faith, we seek to prejudge the very same question we are going to deal with. But, in reality, both the former and the latter are equally dogmatic facts, and nothing more than dogmatic facts. Modern authors, when dealing with dogmatic facts, ordinarily cite Jansen's fact and not the fact of whether such a council is infallible, etc., because otherwise they would be equivalently making obvious the inconsistency or incoherence into which they later fall by accepting certain facts as of divine faith, and certain others as of ecclesiastical faith. As we shall see, the *dogmatic* character of all those facts is exactly the same. There is but one *atom species of dogmatic facts,* just as there is but one atom species of *theological conclusions.* To say otherwise is, in our view, pure empiricism.

[55] VATICAN COUNCIL, sess.3, c.3; Denz-Schon. 3011.

[56] ST. THOMAS, *Quodlibetum 9,* a.16.

all theologians are agreed since the Jansenist debates, and there is a point on which they disagree. They agree on affirming that such facts can be *infallibly* defined by the Church and that to such infallible definitions must be given, at least, the assent of an absolutely certain and unconditional faith, which they denominate *ecclesiastical* faith. But they disagree on whether this ecclesiastical faith is truly a *divine* faith or, on the contrary, a new species of faith lying midway between divine and human faith.

As we have said, nothing that is not divinely revealed can be of divine faith. The issue then depends on whether these dogmatic facts are truly revealed by God or not. If they are, then they can become an object of divine faith, and not merely of ecclesiastical faith. We shall attempt to make it clear that the dogmatic facts are truly revealed and to show the manner in which they are revealed.

255. THE IMPLICIT REVELATION OF THE PARTICULAR IN THE UNIVERSAL. — The first and most essential division of divine revelation is its division into *explicit* and *implicit* revelation. It is obvious that dogmatic facts have not been explicitly revealed. If, then, they have been revealed, they can only have been revealed implicitly.

What is meant by implicit revelation or what is the scope of the implicitness of divine revelation is a question on which, since Molina up to the present, the theologians are not in accord. However, there is one point on which all or almost all theologians are in agreement, viz., that when a *universal* proposition is explicitly revealed, all the particular propositions certainly contained in it are by the same token implicitly and truly revealed and are consequently definable as of divine faith.

Thus, if it is revealed that *all* things have been created by God, it is *implicitly* revealed, and definable as of divine faith, that *this* particular thing, e.g., the angels, have been created. If it is revealed that *all* men have been redeemed by Christ, it is implicitly revealed, and definable as of divine faith, that *this* man has been redeemed. If it is revealed that *all* ecumenical councils are infallible rules of faith, it is implicitly revealed, and definable as of divine faith, that *this ecumenical council, e.g., the Tridentine, is an infallible* rule of faith. If it is revealed that *all* the popes accepted by the universal Church are successors of St. Peter, it is implicitly revealed that this pope, e.g., our Most Holy Father Pius XI, is a successor of St. Peter, or a true pope. On this point all, or almost all, theologians are today agreed. But precisely because it is admitted by almost all theologians, it becomes necessary to tarry awhile in its analysis in order to be able later to pass on from what everybody admits to what everybody should admit if he were logical.

It is said, and said truly, that it is implicitly revealed that the Tridentine is infallible, that the Vulgate is authentic in matter of faith and morals, that

the actual pope is a true pope. Now, then, we all know that the deposit of divine revelation was closed upon the death of the last of the apostles and that no new public or Catholic revelation was thenceforth possible. How then, is it possible for such facts as the Vulgate, the Tridentine, or the actual pope, to have been truly revealed by God when they took place many centuries after the apostles? Do not such facts constitute a true *addition* to the revealed deposit? Is this not tantamount to an admission that the Church is capable of giving us *new dogmas?*

Any student of theology knows the answer - and a good answer it is — given to these questions. The revealed deposit was closed with the last of the apostles with respect to *new* Catholic *revelation;* however, it was not closed, but remains and will remain open, with respect to the infallible *explication* or *application* of the old revelation. The Church cannot give us *new* dogmas in the sense of being *new unqualifiedly* (simpliciter), or new in *substance;* but she can give us new dogmas in the sense of being *new only somehow* (secundum quid, i.e., in some manner), i.e., new as to their *explication,* provided that such explication is not done through new revelations, as was the case until the death of the last of the apostles, but only through mere infallibility or *assistance* of the Holy Spirit.[57] Now, this, and only this, is what the Church does when she applies a proposition that has been revealed in a *universal* form to a *particular* proposition.

256. CONDITIONED PROPOSITIONS. — To see clearly that such particular propositions are merely the *explication* or *application* of the revealed *universal* we need only consider the nature or meaning of such universal propositions. They are *conditioned* universals. The universal propositions, "*every ecumenical* council is a rule of faith" means to say that *every* council is a rule of faith *if it is ecumenical".* Thus, it is true that no *particular* council, e.g. the Tridentine, was celebrated until many centuries after the

[57] "The Apostles and their successors are God's vicars as regards the government of the Church already constituted by faith and the sacraments of the faith. Hence, just as they are not allowed to constitute *another Church,* so neither are they allowed to teach *another faith* or to constitute *other sacraments.*" (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.,* p.3, q.64, a.2, ad 1) "There are two ways of *apposing* [or *adding*]: either [by *affixing*] something that is *contrary* or *diverse,* and this is erroneous or presumptuous; or by *expounding* something that is *implicitly* contained, and this is praiseworthy." (ST. THOMAS, *In 1 Sent.,* divisio textus prolog.) "Consequently, by no human authority can *new things* be introduced *for belief,* but only an *explication* of what has been *revealed* to the *Apostles and Prophets* by the Word of God." (CAJETAN, *In Epist. ad Romanos,* c.10) "Neither the Supreme Pontiff nor the whole Church can allow a *new article* or a *new dogma as regards its substance.* Whence it follows then when we ask whether the Supreme Pontiff can err in *defining* matters of faith, we understand this to mean the *explication* of matters of faith by his definition." (BAÑEZ, *In 2-2,* q.1, a.10)

apostles, or after the revealed deposit was closed. But it is no less true that before the revealed deposit was closed, and while the aposles were still alive, it was already truly *revealed* that *"any* council, e.g., the Tridentine, is a rule of faith *if it is ecumenical"*. Merely by *purging* or infallibly verifying that condition, the conditioned proposition, "it is revealed that the Tridentine Council is a rule of faith, *if it is ecumenical"*, is converted into this *absolute* proposition,"it is revealed that the Tridentine Council is a rule of faith".

Hence, without any *new* revelation, and simply by the purging or verifying of a *condition,* any particular proposition contained in a universal or conditioned proposition can become a proposition of divine faith. This is the case at least when infallibility exists in order to verify or remove the condition. Such infallibility exists in the Church, according to *all* theologians.

Even at the risk of being called redundant and tedious, we will reduce the foregoing considerations to the form of reasoning, for once this is grasped it will be easy to understand the nature of *any and all* truly dogmatic facts. Let the reasoning be as follows:

It is revealed that *every ecumenical* council is infallible", or what amounts to the same thing, it is revealed that *"every* council is infallible *if it is ecumenical"*.

Now, *such a Council* is certainly ecumenical.

Therefore, *such a Council* is infallible.

We ask the reader to pay attention to the conclusion, which is precisely the fact with which we are now concerned. It will be clear that it is simply a particular case of the revealed universal major, the only difference being that the *condition* has disappeared. If he now looks at the minor, he will see that it neither adds nor subtracts anything *doctrinal* from the major; the minor merely verifies or purges the *condition.*

Hence the minor does not enter the reasoning as the *formal motive* or as the cause of the conclusion, but only as a *condition.* Now, then, it is a commonplace among theologians that in any case where the minor enters the reasoning, not as the formal motive, but simply as the condition to explicate or apply the revealed major, the conclusion is also revealed and definable as of *divine* faith. Thus theologians commonly admit that the Church can define as of divine faith, and not only as of ecclesiastical faith, that such a Council, e.g. the Vatican, is infallible, or that such a pope, e.g. the actual pope, is a true pope.[58]

58."Whenever a *universal* proposition is of faith, the *singular* propositions that are contained in it pertain likewise to faith; and the natural proposition that is necessary is *only a condition* for assenting by faith to such a singular proposition. . . The *minor* is only a required *condition,* not the *formal reason* of the conclusion." (DIDACUS NUÑO,

257. JANSEN'S NOTORIOUS BOOK. – Everything hitherto said is commonly admitted by modern authors when it is applied to the aforementioned facts, viz., the ecumenicity or infallibility of *such* a council or the legitimacy of *such* a pope. On the issue whether such facts are of divine, or only of ecclesiastical, faith, the answer given is that they are of *divine* faith, and no distinction is made between the question of the principle and the question of fact.

However, when the issue is raised regarding other dogmatic facts commonly grouped under the general label of "the orthodoxy or heterodoxy of books or passages", as, e.g., whether Jansen's book *Augustinus* contains, or not, the five heretical propositions which the Church declared it contained, the same authors suddenly change their tune and distinguish the question of principle from the question of fact. The question of *principle* is the following: "Are such propositions heretical or not? ", and that can be defined by the Church as of *divine* faith. The question of *fact* is as follows: "Are such propositions found, or not, in Jansen's book? ", and that, they say, cannot be defined by the Church as of divine, but only as of *ecclesiastical,* faith. The reason, according to them is that the question of principle is a *revealed* truth whereas the question of fact is not, and it is a commonplace that no thing that is not truly revealed can ever be defined or believed as a truth of divine faith.

Offhand we might ask these theologians why they have not made such a distinction in the case of whether such a council is truly infallible. Why is it that they have not answered that the question of the principle, viz. that *"every* ecumenical council is infallible" is a matter of divine faith, and the question of fact, viz., that *"such* a council is ecumenical" is only a matter of ecclesiastical faith.

They will doubtless say that they have not made the distinction because the question of fact is nothing but a particular instance of a revealed universal proposition, and consequently it is also revealed and a matter of divine faith. We will now attempt to make it clear that the question of *fact* relative to Jansen's book, or relative to any other dogmatic fact of whatsoever kind provided that it truly be *dogmatic,* is nothing but a *particular* instance of a revealed *universal,* and that, consequently, the fact concerning Jansen is as

O.P., *Expositio in 3.am D. Thomae partem,* q.20, a.3, Vallisoleti 1609, pg. 627) "For we say that it has been *revealed* by God that *this* individual man, to wit, Our Most Holy Lord Urban VIII, is the Supreme Pontiff, by the *universal* revelation whereby He revealed that the Church would not err in acknowledging this individual as true head." (LUGO, *De Fide,* d.1, n.330) "That *particular* truth is sufficiently contained in the *universal* dogma of faith." (SUÁREZ, *De Fide,* d.5, s.5, n.10) "And the subsumed natural proposition is a *mere explication* of the *universal* proposition and its *application* to a determinate and *particular* subject." (SALMANTICENSES, *De Fide,* d.4, n.36)

truly revealed by God as the fact concerning such a council, and that it is revealed in exactly in the same manner, i.e., as a ***particular*** in the *universal*. But first let us premit four brief remarks:

258. FIRST REMARK. – When the Church defines that such or such heretical propositions are found in such a book, she does not mean to say, nor is it necessary to understand, that such propositions are found in the book as to their *material* words, but only as to their *meaning*. The reason is obvious. In revelation, as in faith, what is essential is the meaning. The words, provided that they express the same meaning, are accidental.

Hence, to define that such a book contains such propositions means nothing more than that it contains the same meaning as such propositions. Vice versa, to contain the same meaning as such propositions is to contain such propositions. All theologians are agreed on this point.

259. SECOND REMARK. – The deposit of the Holy Scripture and divine Tradition is not only revealed or inspired *in general*, but *each and every one* of the parts, or truths, or propositions that make up the deposit is likewise revealed.

Thus the nature of heresy applies not only to what is contradictorily opposed to the *whole* deposit, but also to what is contradictorily opposed to *this* or that part, truth, or proposition of the deposit.

260. THIRD REMARK. – Consequently, the Church can condemn a book as heretical in two ways. First, by condemning it simply as *heretical*, or as contradictorily opposed to the revealed deposit *in general*, that is to say, without specifying the *particular* heresy it contains, or the particular doctrine or propositions of the revealed deposit to which it is opposed. Secondly, by condemning it as heretical *in particular*, that is to say, indicating the particular heresy it contains, or the particular portion or proposition of the revealed deposit to which it is opposed.

261. FOURTH REMARK. – God has truly revealed the two following universal propositions. *First*, "*Every* book that contains a meaning contradictorily opposed to the meaning of the revealed deposit, contains heresy". Second, "*Every* book that contains a meaning contradictorily opposed to the meaning of *such* a truth or proposition of the revealed deposit, contains *such* a heresy or *such a heretical proposition*". As we observed in our first remark, to contain *such a proposition* means nothing more than to contain the *meaning* of such a proposition.

We believe that these four remarks will be admitted by every theologian, and even regarded by some of them as platitudes. We will now submit two instances or reasonings: one in which the Church condemns a book as containing heresy *in general*, and another in which she condemns a book as containing *such a heresy* or *such* particular heretical *propositions*. These are the

two ways in which the Church usually condems books written by heretics. Many books or writings before and after Jansen have been condemned in the first manner. Jansen's book *Augustinus* was condemned in the second manner. But in either case we shall see that the so-called *question of fact*, i.e. whether *such* a book contains *heresy*, or contains *such a heresy* or *such* heretical *propositions*, is neither more nor less than a *particular* proposition or instance of a *revealed universal*.

262. FIRST INSTANCE. – *Every* book that contains a meaning contradictorily opposed to the meaning of the *revealed deposit*, contains *heresy*. Or equivalently, *any* book contains heresy *if it contains* a meaning contradictorily opposed to the meaning of the revealed deposit.

Now *this* book contains a meaning contradictorily opposed to the meaning of the revealed deposit.

Therefore, *this* book contains *heresy*.

263. SECOND INSTANCE. – Every book that contains a meaning contradictorily opposed to the meaning of *such particular propositions* of the revealed deposit, contains *such heretical propositions*. Or equivalently, *any* book contains *such heretical propositions* if it contains a meaning contradictorily opposed to the meaning of *such propositions* of the revealed deposit.

Now, *this* book (e.g., Jansen's book) contains a meaning contradictorily opposed to the meaning of such propositions of the revealed deposit.

Therefore, this book contains *such heretical propositions*.

We beg the reader to consider attentively the foregoing conclusions, and it will be obvious that they state precisely the *question of fact*, with which we are now dealing. Let him then compare them with the revealed universal majors, and it will be clear that they are neither more nor less than a *particular* instance of those *universals* (*every–this*), with no other difference than that the *condition* has disappeared. Let him, finally, examine the minors, and it will be clear that they neither add nor subtract anything *doctrinal* from the majors and that they are limited exclusively to verifying or purging a *condition* of those revealed majors.

It is the common teaching of theologians that every proposition contained in the revealed deposit as a particular in the universal is of divine, and not only of ecclesiastical, faith. Furthermore, it is likewise common teaching that every conclusion to which the minor contributes only as a *condition* is of divine, and not only of ecclesiastical, faith. Consequently, every theologian ought to admit that dogmatic facts are of divine, and not only of ecclesiastical, faith.

Inconsistencies of some theologians. — In our opinion, almost all modern text books are guilty of a manifest inconsistency in this matter. To prove the *infallibility* of the Church in the matter of dogmatic facts they offer as an argument the constant *praxis* of the Church, and as instances of this praxis they cite the condemnation of the book of Arius by the Nicene Council and of the writings of Nestorius by the Council of Ephesus, the declaration of the Vulgate's authenticity by the Tridentine and of the absence of all error in the Canon of the Mass by the same Council, and other infallible definitions of dogmatic *facts* made by the Church.

Van Noort, who is always clear and concise, says: "In the second place it is proven by the praxis of the Church who has frequently rejected in a definitive manner heretical writings, as, e.g., Ariu's *Thalia* in the Council of Nicaea, the writings of Nestorius in the Council of Ephesus; in the Council of Trent she has declared the Vulgate to be authentic and the Canon of the Mass to be free from all error."[59]

De Groot[60] and almost all textbooks express themselves in similar vein. Well then, let anyone examine the records of the aforementioned Councils and it will be obvious that such facts have been defined by the Church not only as *infallible* or as of ecclesiastical faith, but also with the very same formula *anathema sit,* which is the classical formula of definitions of *heresy* and of *divine faith.* Suffice it to quote the Tridentine's definition relative to the Canon of the Mass: "If any man say that the Canon of the Mass contains errors and is therefore to be abrogated: *let him be anathema.*"[61] The reader has here a true *dogmatic fact,* which is nonetheless defined not only as of ecclesiastical, but as of divine faith. With this same formula *anathema sit* or *anathematizamus* the Church condemned the book of Nestorius, the writing of Arius, the writings known by the name of "The Three Chapters", and other dogmatic facts. This constitutes a new argument to prove that dogmatic facts can be defined as of *divine* faith and that, in consequence, the so-called ecclesiastical faith is a truly divine faith.

Almost all textbooks, particularly Thomist textbooks, are also guilty of another contradiction. Having denied that theological conclusions and dogmatic facts are definable as of divine faith, they of course affirm that they are objects of infallibility. To prove this they quote passages from St. Thomas that refer to the indirectly revealed [62]. in which the Saint expressly affirms that the denial of the indirectly revealed corrupts the faith. Well then, either

[59] VAN NOORT, *De Ecclesia Christi,* n.89.

[60] *Summa Apologetica,* q.9, a.3.

[61] COUNCIL OF TRENT, sess.22, can.6; Denz.-Schön. 1756.

[62] *Summa Theol.,* 2-2, q.11, a.2 and other parallel passages.

St. Thomas includes theological conclusions and dogmatic facts in the term "indirect", or not. If they are not included, then such passages are beside the point, and apart from them there are no other passages in the holy Doctor that are applicable to the secondary object of infallibility. But if they are included, then they are definable as of divine faith, since St. Thomas expressly says that once it is defined by the Church the indirectly revealed is of divine faith, and to deny it is truly *heresy.*

264. THE ROOT OF THE CONFUSION. — In our opinion, the confusion in which many theologians find themselves mired in these matters has its root in the wrong formulation or in the misunderstanding of the division of the dogmatic facts into a question of principle and a question of fact. These theologians formulate or understand the division as follows:

Question of Principle: "Whether these or those propositions are *heretical*". *Question of fact:* "Whether these or those propositions are contained in such a book". (The reader will please observe that in the *question of fact* thus formulated there is no longer any mention of the term *heretical,* or of the term *erroneous,* or of anything that indicates a relation to the *revealed* deposit)

Having *thus formulated* the division, they concede that the question of principle is definable as of *divine faith,* but they deny that the question of fact can ever be of divine faith although it can be, and is, of *ecclesiastical* faith.

To this we answer, as every theologian ought to answer, that *thus formulated* the question is not, and cannot be, of divine faith; but neither is it, nor can it be, of *ecclesiastical* faith since it lies outside the Church's infallibility. For a very simple reason. Thus formulated the question is not a question of *dogmatic* fact but a question of merely *particular* fact, and where the fact is not dogmatic but particular no divine faith is possible, but then neither is infallibility possible. That division is of Jansenist origin and a great many theologians continue formulating it in the same manner without becoming aware that all the *dogmatic* character of the fact has been lodged in one of the members (in the question of principle), leaving the other member (the question of fact) entirely bereft of any *dogmatic* traces. Hence it is not in the least surprising that the question of fact *thus formulated* should be alien to divine faith since it is likewise alien to any infallible faith inasmuch as it is not a question of *dogmatic fact.* Let us see if we succeed in explaining this matter with some degree of the evidence that it inherently possesses and with which we believe we see it.

That which puts anything within the ambit of the Church's infallibility is not precisely its character of *principle* or of *fact;* it is exclusively its *dogmatic* character or the quality of being necessarily connected with the revealed deposit. Without that dogmatic character no question falls within the ambit of the Church's infallibility, be it a question of principle or a question of fact.

On the other hand, where that dogmatic character is present, *any question,* be it a question of principle or a question of fact, lies within the compass of infallibility.

Thus, the question whether "such a mathematical proposition is true or false" is a question of *principle;* the question whether "that same proposition is found, or not, in this book by Euclid" is a question of *fact.* Yet neither the one nor the other fall within the scope of the Church's infallible authority. They are both wanting in *dogmatic* character.

On the other hand, the question whether such a proposition is *heretical* is a question of principle; the question whether that same *heretical* proposition is found in such a book is a question of fact; both the one and the other fall within the scope of the Church's infallibility, but this is accounted for exclusively by the *dogmatic* character of both the one and the other, i.e., by the quality of being *heretical* or opposed to the revealed deposit that they both exhibit. Remove that character from any of these two questions, and infallibility vanishes.

Hence, if the dogmatic fact concerning Jansen is to be divided into two questions in such a manner that both should fall within the ambit of infallibility, it must be divided not into a question of *principle* and a question of *fact* but into a question of *dogmatic principle* and a question of *dogmatic fact,* making sure that *both* members exhibit the character of *heretical* or of being opposed to the revealed deposit, as follows: *Question of dogmatic principle:* "Whether such propositions are *heretical*". *Question of dogmatic fact:* "Whether such *heretical* propositions are found in Jansen's book".

If we remove from either question the term *heretical* or the character of being opposed to the revealed deposit, its dogmatic character vanishes and by the same token not only divine faith but infallibility or ecclesiastical faith vanishes as well. On the other hand, if we preserve in both their dogmatic character, then not only the question of principle but likewise the question of fact is of divine faith because the question of dogmatic fact is nothing but a *particular* instance of a revealed *universal.* This will be obvious to anyone who cares to review the second instance of reasoning mentioned earlier. The *conclusion,* which is precisely the statement of the question of fact, that is, of a dogmatic fact, is merely a particular instance (*every–this*) of the *major,* which is a *revealed* universal.

265. THE DOGMATIC FACT IS INDIVISIBLE. – Truth to say, the dogmatic fact considered with respect to the Church's authority or to our faith is indivisible or unpartitionable. Only two divisions are possible: (a) question of *dogmatic* principle and question of *non-dogmatic* fact; (b) question of *dogmatic* principle and question of *dogmatic* fact.

The first division is useless for our present purpose since no infallibility is possible with respect to any *non-dogmatic* fact. The second division is a merely *nominal* division and goes against the elementary rules of logic. Logic prescribes that no member of a division may include any of the other members nor be adequate to the whole that is divided. This would happen if we should divide man into *animal* and *rational animal,* i.e., into *animal* and *man,* which would not be a true division since the second member includes the first and is adequate to the whole that is divided.

Similarly, the so-called question of fact, if it be a *dogmatic* fact, essentially and inseparably includes the question of principle. This is the reason why both the one and the other are equally of divine faith since both constitute one and the same judgment. The act whereby sight perceives *colour* and the act whereby it perceives the existence or the location of the *coloured thing* are one and the same act of vision because colour is the *ratio sub qua* of every act of bodily sight. "Just as matter and form", says St. Thomas, "are *one in being* (unum in esse), so the *reason of knowing* and the *thing known* are *one as known* (unum cognitum), and *on this account* both are attained by *one knowing* (una cognitio), understanding by this term the *act* as well as the *habit.*"[63]

Thus, to anyone who keeps in mind the fact that the *dogmatic* character is the *ratio sub qua* of the whole authority of the Church it will be obvious that every question of principle, i.e., of a truly *dogmatic* principle, is at the same time a question of *fact.* And vice versa, any question of fact, i.e., of truly *dogmatic* fact, is at the same time a question of *principle.*

In effect, to say that "such a proposition *is* (question of principle) heretical", is exactly the same as saying that "such a proposition *contains* (question of fact) a meaning contradictorily opposed to the meaning of such a portion or proposition of the revealed deposit".

Similarly, to say that "such a book *contains* (question of fact) such a heretical proposition" is exactly the same as saying that "the meaning of such a book *is* (question of principle) contradictorily opposed to such a portion or proposition of the revealed deposit".

266. THE DEEPER ROOT OF THIS CONFUSION. – The ultimate root of all this is to be found in the fact that the judgments of the Church are not judgments of mere principle or of *intrinsic* analysis of the subject or the predicate of a proposition, but judgments of *fact* or of *confrontation* between the proposition or book on the one hand and the revealed deposit on the other. The Church has divine authority for such a confrontation. If she

[63] *In 3 Sent.*, d.14, q.1, a.1, q.4

does not, no divine faith in any of her decisions would be possible, neither in those that concern principles nor in those that concern facts. But if she does, then she has divine authority equally for every and any confrontation, unless someone should imagine that she has divine authority for cases in which a short proposition or five loose propositions are to be confronted with the revealed deposit, whereas she has only ecclesiastical authority for cases where the propositions are longer or are stitched together or bound in a book.

It is being overlooked that the *revealed deposit,* and *only* the revealed deposit, is the eyes or the spectacles of the Church. Without these spectacles she sees nothing, be it a question of principle or a question of fact, a proposition or a whole book. With these spectacles the Church sees *all* that is *dogmatic,* and *only* what is *dogmatic,* be it facts or principles. Place before the Church this proposition: "A triangle is equal to two right angles", and, notwithstanding the evidence of such a proposition, the Church as such sees nothing because there is nothing dogmatic. Place before her this other proposition: "Christ is (or is not) God", and the Church sees at once its orthodox or heterodox character. Her *divine* spectacles detect it.

Similarly, place before her a profane or a secular book; she sees nothing. Place before her a dogmatic book or one in which the profane and the dogmatic are intermingled, and those *divine* spectacles detect at once the orthodoxy or heterodoxy of whatever dogmatic propositions are found in the book.

The place where the Church sees those orthodox or heterodox propositions is Jansen's book; but the medium or the spectacles whereby she sees them is the *revealed* deposit, divine revelation. Grammar, philology, history, all the labour of human *reason* employed by the Church are neither the spectacles nor the act of vision since they *precede* the definition or vision of the Church; they are not even required of the Church except as *previous conditions.* Infallibility itself is not the *medium of vision,* it is merely assistance: assistance to perform infallibly the act of vision, to apply the spectales of the revealed deposit perfectly and without error to Jansen's book.

We ask the reader to reread the two instances of reasoning given above, and he will clearly see that the *minors* of those reasonings – it is in these minors that the labour of the Church is embodied – are simply a *confrontation* between Jansen's book and the revealed deposit. Jansen's book is the subject or object of these minors; the meaning of the revealed deposit is the *predicate* or the spectacles; the verb or copula is nothing but the result of the act of confrontation: the *vision.*

267. DIVINE SEARCHLIGHT. – If we had no misgivings that some people would misinterpret as anthopomorphic bodily images or metaphors on

account of their inability to extrapolate them properly to the intellectual order, we would compare the revealed deposit to a divine searchlight which, when focused by the Church with infallible certainty on Jansen's book, would, analogously to certain chemicals, reveal or colour all, and only, those portions or propositions in the book which are written either with *orthodox* or with *heterodox ink.* Whatever else is in the book written with any other kind of ink appears blank for the Church as such no matter how brightly coloured and legible it may appear to *human reason.* Infallibility (we will keep repeating it time and again) is given not for the purpose of increasing, or diminishing, or modifying the beam of that divine searchlight which is the *revealed universal* major, but for the purpose of focusing or *applying* it without error to the *particular* conclusion. This is the reason why what the Church sees – in this case it is precisely the particular conclusion or dogmatic fact – is seen by means of *divine light,* by the same light of the revealed deposit or of the revealed universal. This, finally, is the reason why the conclusion or dogmatic fact is not something *human* or *ecclesiastical,* but something *divine* since it is nothing but the infallible *application* of the *revealed* universal to a particular instance or proposition.

268. ANOTHER PROOF. – There is a simpler way to prove that the dogmatic fact, once it has been infallibly defined by the Church, is not only a truth of ecclesiastical faith, but a truth of truly divine faith.

Take the following universal proposition: *"It is a revealed truth* that the Church is infallible in the definition of *any and every dogmatic* fact". This proposition is commonly admitted by theologians, even by those who deny or seem to deny the definability of faith of theological conclusions.[64]

This universal proposition, by simply changing it into passive form is exactly the same as the following: *"It is a revealed truth* that *any and every* dogmatic fact defined by the Church is infallibly true", or what amounts to

[64] "There are some who answer that the Church's infallibility relative to dogmatic facts is indeed *of faith* considered in itself, but that it is not of obligatory faith because the Church has not defined it. However, others maintain that it is also of *obligatory faith* because, although the Church has not defined it in *express* terms, nonetheless she has defined it through constant use and *practice* by *anathematizing* the heretics who would resist her decrees regarding dogmatic facts." (BILLUART, *De Regulis Fidei,* d.3, a.7, §3, *solvuntur objectiones*) "Indeed this infallibility is most certainly gathered from the revealed principles, and by *many* it is even regarded as also formally *revealed,* although it has not been yet *authentically* proposed as a dogma of divine faith." (Card. BILLOT, *De Ecclesia Christi,* th. 17, §2) "In the opinion of *many* it is also a *heresy,* although up to now it has not been *explicitly* condemned as heretical." (Card. FRANZELIN, *De Traditione,* th. 12)

the same thing. *"It is a revealed truth* that *any and every* dogmatic fact is infallibly true *if the Church defines it".*

With this evident presupposition it is easy to make it clear that not only the question of *principle* but the question of dogmatic *fact* as well is truly revealed as a particular instance in the universal, and consequently that it is of divine faith. The argument follows:

It is revealed that *any and every* dogmatic fact is infallibly true *if the Church defines it.*

Now, the Church has defined *this* dogmatic fact, e.g., that the five heretical propositions are found in Jansen's book.

Therefore, *it is revealed* that *this* dogmatic fact is infallibly true.

We ask the reader to view and review this reasoning without biases. It will be obvious that the conclusion is neither more nor less than a particular case (*any and every – this*) of the revealed universal major. It will also be obvious that the minor does nothing but purge or infallibly certify a *condition* in the *major.*

If, according to all theologians, whatever is contained in revelation as a particular in the universal is truly revealed; furthermore, if, also according to all theologians, every conclusion in whose deduction the minor does not intervene except as a *condition* is revealed, it follows that every dogmatic fact defined by the Church is of divine faith.

Finally, the reader will please note that in the aforementioned reasoning the major is the formal motive of the assent to the conclusion since the minor does not intervene except as a *condition.* Inasmuch as all of the labour effected by the Church's authority or infallibility reduces to the minor, i.e. to verifying the condition, it becomes obvious that the authority of the Church does not intervene as the formal motive, but as the *condition,* of the act of faith given by us to the conclusion, which is precisely the dogmatic fact. The *formal motive* is its inclusion in the revealed universal major, in other words, *divine revelation.*[65]

[65] Since it has not been revealed that "*every* host contains the body of Christ", but that "*every consecrated* host contains it", the fact whether this particular host contains the body of Christ or not necessarily depends on one *condition: whether* the host is *consecrated* or not. Now then, on the one hand, since that condition depends on a number of *fallible* elements, it cannot be by us established with complete certainty without the intervention of an infallible definition by the Church. On the other hand, it is not possible for the Church's infallibility to intervene, nor does it extend to such a fact because it is a particular fact which does not concern the faith of the whole Church but the faith of the few particular persons. Hence, as St. Thomas says, such a fact cannot be the object of divine faith, but of *human* faith or prudence. The same thing must be said of every other fact that meets these two conditions: that it is impossible to know it with complete certainty without a definition, and that it cannot be defined because it does not concern the whole Church. Such facts, even when invested with a *religious* character, do not go beyond the category of *particular* facts and fail to qualify as *dogmatic* facts.

On the other hand, prior to the definition or acceptance or approval of the Church, a mistake or error is also possible with respect to the facts whether such a council is ecumenical or infallible, whether such a pope is a true pope, whether such a version of the Bible is authentic, whether such *orthodox* or *heterodox* propositions are contained in such a symbol or book, etc., etc.; and thus no divine faith is possible in spite of all the universal revelations. But since such facts are related to the doctrine or the faith of the *whole* Church, and not only to that of these or those particular persons, they can be infallibly defined by the Church, and *after* such definition they are of divine faith. This divine faith accrues to such facts not precisely from the definition or the authority or the infallibility of the Church, but from their being *contained* in the *revealed* universal, a containment that is made infallibly known to us by the definition. Thus, the authority of the definition of the Church is not the cause of their *being contained,* but only of *our infallible knowledge* of such containment.

269. If nonetheless, no one who denies a dogmatic fact is called a heretic, this is because, although the universal and therefore its particular conclusion are *truly revealed,* still it *has not yet been defined,* at least clearly, that they are revealed. For any man to be called a heretic it is not enough that what he denies be truly revealed, it is furthermore required that it be defined by the Church as revealed. Now, the major of the aforementioned reasoning is commonly admitted by theologians as a *revealed* truth; however, its revelation *has not yet been defined* by the Church, at least clearly.

270. AN OBJECTION. – A very learned theologian, who deals with every problem with remarkable depth, seems to be aware of the inescapable force of this second argument that we have adduced, and attempts an indirect reply to it as follows:

"You will object: Nothing that has been defined by the Church's infallible magisterium can be rejected without *heresy* because by its very denial the *infallibility* of the Church, which has been *revealed* by God, would *also* be denied. Now, whatever cannot be rejected without *heresy* must be held by *divine* faith. Therefore.

"Now, it would seem that there is a flaw in the minor, which you will distinguish thus: That must be held by divine faith which cannot be rejected without heresy, I distinguish: without heresy *directly* incurred by the rejection of such an object, I *concede;* without *merely concomitant* heresy, I *deny.* Now, even granting that one would incur heresy by denying a dogmatic fact defined by the Church, this would happen not on account of rejection of the dogmatic fact *by itself,* but only on account of the *concomitant* denial of the Church's infallibility in the definition of such matters. This infallibility could certainly be defined as a dogma of faith, although up to the present it has not been expressly so defined. Hence we have *carefully* said in the thesis

that the things dealt with at present cannot *per se* and *of themselves* be a matter of heresy."

In the first place, the terms *it would seem* and *carefully* clearly indicate that the author himself does not have full confidence in the proposed solution. They give the impression that the author, seeing that the argument was conclusive but unable, on the other hand, to admit the conclusion, is at a loss whether to distinguish the major or the minor, and finally makes up his mind, although warily, to distinguish the minor. "*It would seem* that there is a flaw in the minor."

In the second place, notwithstanding so much wariness, our objector ends up by conceding that dogmatic facts are truly of divine faith, since what he denies is only that they are of divine faith *by themselves,* but not that they *are of divine faith* although *on account of some other truth.* What we are after is whether they are, or not, of divine faith; whether they are so for this or that *reason* is of little importance.

In the third place, our objector appears to have momentarily forgotten that to be of divine faith, yet not on account of *their own selves* but on account of some *other* truth is proper not only of dogmatic facts but also of everything that is *indirectly revealed,* including those things that are expressly contained in the Bible. The fact that Samuel was Helcana's son and all the other secondary facts in the Holy Scriptures are objects of truly divine faith, yet not on account *of themselves* but on account of *another revealed* truth that is involved in them or in which they are involved, a truth that is affirmed or denied when such facts are affirmed or denied. That *other* revealed truth is: "The Holy Scriptures are inspired by God and, therefore, cannot be false". Since this truth would be denied by the denial of the fact that Samuel was Helcana's son for this reason, and only for this reason, and not for their own selves, are such facts of divine faith. "But *indirectly* all those things pertain to the faith from which something would *follow* contrary to the faith, as, e.g., if someone were to say that Samuel was not Helcana's son, for thence it would follow that the *divine Scriptures are false.*"[66]

In the fourth place, and this is the principal point we wish to stress and which has escaped the attention of the learned theologian, the fact that Samuel was Helcana's son is of divine faith not precisely because the Bible is revealed or inspired *in general,* but because it is revealed or inspired *in everything,* and consequently also revealed and inspired in that particular fact. Otherwise *that* fact would not be of divine faith.

When, therefore, we affirm or deny that fact, we not only affirm or deny the revelation of *another* truth, but we deny the revelation of *that* fact.

[66] ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.1, q.32, a.4. Cf. also 2-2, q.11, a.2; *in 1 Sent.*, d.32, q.1, a.5; and *In 4 Sent.* d.13, q.11, a.1.

Hence that fact is capable of divine faith or of heresy not only concomitantly, but also immediately or in itself. Although the fact is not revealed *on account of itself,* nonetheless *the fact itself* is revealed.

In exactly the same manner not only has it been *revealed* in general that the Church is infallible but also that the Church is infallible in the definition of *every* dogmatic fact, and consequently in the definition of *this dogmatic fact.* Hence, when one denies this dogmatic fact, one not only denies the revelation of *another* truth, one also denies the revelation of *this* truth. *The fact itself* has been revealed, although it has not been revealed *on account of itself.*

Consequently they are in error who think that the formal motive of the assent to the definition of a dogmatic fact is the *infallibility of the Church* which is why the corresponding faith is *ecclesiastical.* The formal motive is not the Church's *infallibility* but the divine revelation of that infallibility in the definition of *every* dogmatic fact, and therefore of *this* dogmatic fact. Because divine revelation is involved that faith is divine; because it is divine revelation of *this* dogmatic fact that divine faith is not concomitant but proper, formal, and immediate.

As a matter of fact we would ask this question of any theologian: If Christ were personally to come down from heaven and tell us that such a dogmatic fact, e.g., the fact that the five propositions are found in Jansen's book, is *true,* would that fact be of divine faith, or not? Now then, what Christ would tell us *today.* He had already told us twenty centuries before. When He said or revealed that the Church is infallible in the definition of *every* dogmatic fact, and therefore in *this* dogmatic fact about Jansen, He had already told us that *this* dogmatic fact about Jansen, once defined, is *true.*

271. The foregoing also provides the solution to another objection indicated by the same learned theologian, to wit, to be able to say that a particular proposition has been revealed in its universal it is necessary that in both the universal and the particular propositions the *subject* be identical as, for instance, "*Every council* is infallible", and "*This council* is infallible". However, in the case of dogmatic facts the revealed universal is "*The Church* is infallible", and the particular is "*This dogmatic fact* is infallible", where the subjects are different.

From what has been said the reader knows the answer to this dialectical subtlety. The revealed universal proposition does not merely state that "the Church is infallible", but that "the Church is infallible in the definition of *every* dogmatic fact", which is the same as "*all dogmatic facts,* once defined, are infallible". The latter proposition has *the same subject* as the following: "*This dogmatic fact,* once defined, is infallible". Which is why it is of *divine* faith.

272. THE THOMIST OPINION. – Contemporary Thomists who deny that theological *conclusions* are definable as of divine faith also deny, and with greater vehemence, that dogmatic *facts* are definable as of divine faith. In so doing they are being consistent with themselves.

However, since these Thomists in arguing for the view denying that theological conclusions are definable as of faith often quote Billuart as a representative of the Thomist tradition and accordingly attach great importance to his testimony, it will not be amiss that we in turn should briefly quote Billuart's opinion on the subject of the definability of dogmatic facts. This is what he says:

"*You will urge:* Faith comes from hearing, and hearing from the Word of God. But the fact about Jansen is *not contained in the Word of God.* Therefore.

"*Besides,* the Church has no *new revelations,* and the articles of faith do not *grow* with the passage of time. But it would seem necessary to admit both these things if the fact about Jansen is held to be *revealed* and of *divine* faith. Therefore.

"I answer that the solutions to both instances can be had from what has been said.

"*To the first,* I distinguish the minor: The fact about Jansen is not contained in the Word of God *explicitly* and *immediately,* I concede; *implicitly* and *mediately,* I deny. For it is contained in this revealed universal proposition: *Every text condemned by the Church is deserving of condemnation.*

"*To the second.* The revelation of the universal proposition just mentioned is not a *new* revelation, but it was given from the beginning. Consequently the condemnation of Jansen's text is not a *new article* of faith, but the *explication* and *application* of the revelation of the universal to a *particular* and determinate object. When a man is born, it is of faith that he sinned in Adam: however, there is neither a new revelation nor a new article of faith, but only the explication and application of the revelation of this universal proposition, *all men sinned in Adam,* to a particular object."

A little earlier Billuart had said: "Now, it is has been universally *revealed* that *every* text, *every* proposition, *every* book condemned by the Church is truly deserving of condemnation, since this is included in the *revealed* infallibility of the Church; therefore also this text of this proposition, e.g., Jansen's."[67]

[67] BILLUART, *De Regulis Fidei,* d.3, a.7, *solvuntur objectiones.*

Now then, how is it possible that Billuart, who clearly appears to deny that theological conclusions can be defined as of divine faith, could have gone so far as to admit that dogmatic facts are definable as of divine faith? For it must be noted – and this is the funny part – that Billuart's admission of the definability of divine faith of dogmatic facts is grounded, and grounded well, on the argument that "the Church's infallibility with respect to every dogmatic fact has been truly revealed", without adverting to the fact that it is likewise revealed that the Church is infallible with respect to *everything* truly *connected* with the revealed deposit, and therefore with respect to *every* truly theological *conclusion,* as almost every theologian concedes today. (212)

273. Billuart's oversight has a very simple explanation. It is common knowledge that Billuart frequently does little else but summarize, albeit with characteristic French clarity, the teachings of John of St. Thomas and the Salmanticenses. These two eminent theologians failed to discern the Suarezian muddle relative to the revealed *virtual* or theological conclusion, and thus denied, and did well in denying, that the *mere* virtual (virtuale *tantum* – connexive *tantum*) was definable as of faith since it is not a rigorous theological conclusion, but a merely physical conclusion. However, they employed such a phraseology as to seem to deny the definability of faith of every true virtual, including the identical or *implicit* virtual, and consequently of every truly and rigorously theological conclusion. In this matter, as in almost everything else, Billuart simply summarized these two theologians.

On the other hand, neither John of St. Thomas nor the Salmanticenses dealt with the issue of dogmatic facts since theologians had no cause to deal with the subject until it was raised by the evasions of the Jansenists. This made it possible for Billuart to do his own thinking on the subject of dogmatic facts which led him, as it ought to lead every Thomist, to the conclusion that dogmatic facts are implicitly revealed as particular instances in the universal, and that consequently they are definable as of divine faith. Thus on the two occasions that he touches on this problem,[68] he places the view which holds that dogmatic facts are of *divine* faith alongside the other then rather current view that held them to be of ecclesiastical faith, and takes pleasure in providing extensive solutions to whatever objections were marshalled by the Jansenists against it.

274. If John of St. Thomas and the Salmanticenses had lived somewhat later and had dealt with this subject, they would certainly have come to the

[68] *Loc. cit.* Also *De Incarnatione,* d.4, digressio secunda de Euthichianismo, s.5, solvuntur objectiones.

same conclusion. On the question whether it is of *divine* faith that "the present pope is a true pope" or that "the Council of Trent is a legitimate council" – these were the only *facts* then commonly discussed in connexion with faith – both give an affirmative answer on the ground that such facts are truly contained in divine revelation as the particular in the universal.[69]

But every dogmatic faith is contained in just the same manner, and hence it is definable as of *divine,* and not only as of ecclesiastical, faith.

275. If such early Thomists as Torquemada, Cajetan, Cano, etc., denied that certain dogmatic facts, including the fact that "such a pope is a true pope," were of divine faith, this is explained by taking into account that the *revealed* status of the Church's infallibility with respect to those facts was *not yet* clear at the time. Those great Thomists have never been guilty of the glaring inconsistency involved in admitting the *revelation* of the Church's infallibility with respect to something and denying that that same thing is of *divine* faith once it has been defined. Since today both Thomists and non-Thomists concede the *revealed* status of the Church's infallibility with respect to dogmatic facts, everybody should concede that such facts are of *divine* faith once they have been defined.

276. THE ATTITUDE OF THE CHURCH. – There has been progress in Catholic theology in the matter of dogmatic facts as in so many others. As it almost always happens, the practice or attitude of the Roman Church has been a principal factor of this progress. Clement VIII's forceful attitude, at the beginning of the 17th century, against the supporters of Alcalá's notorious thesis ("It is not of faith that this individual man, e.g., Clement VIII, is a true Pontiff"), oriented the thinking of theologians in the study of that dogmatic fact in particular, and since then almost everybody admits that the fact is of divine faith.[70]

[69] "Since the *particular* proposition contained in the *universal* revealed to the whole Church is immediately *of faith,* as the universal itself; but *this proposition,* 'Innocent XI is the Supreme Pontiff of the Church', is contained in a *universal* proposition revealed to the whole Church; therefore this proposition is immediately of faith... The containment is declared in this syllogism: 'Every man duly elected by the Church to succeed Peter is the Supreme Pontiff of the Church; but Innocent XI is duly elected by the Church to succeed Peter; therefore Innocent XI is the Supreme Pontiff of the Church . . . The subsumed natural proposition [i.e., the *minor* of such reasonings] is a pure *explication* of the universal proposition, and its *application* to a determinate subject. Hence, if the universal proposition is but *once* taken to be immediately of faith, the middle natural proposition whereby it is *applied* and *explicated,* will not in the least hinder the *particular* proposition, which has the nature of a consequent, from being also immediately of faith." (SALMANTICENSES, *De Fide,* d.4, nn.33 and 36)

[70] "This view was given *great weight* by Clement VIII, who incarcerated some teachers for maintaining the contrary, and commanded them to go to Rome to give an account of the opinion which that See considered *deserving of punishment."* (PETRUS HURTADO, *De Fide,* d.3) Confronted by this attitude of Rome the theologians of the Society as well as the Thomists made such haste to support the papal directives that presently Lugo writes that *"our* later teachers *commonly"* teach this doctrine *(De Fide,* n.326); and the Salmanticenses, after quoting for their view almost all the Thomists posterior to Clement VIII, qualify it as "the *common opinion" (loc. cit.,* n.30) Thus, to argue for the view that dogmatic facts are of divine faith once they have been defined by the Church, the modern theologian needs do no more nor less than apply to dogmatic facts in general exactly the same principles that have been applied by almost all theologians since Clement VIII to the fact of "whether it is of divine faith that such a pope is a true pope once he has been accepted by the Church", or "whether it is of divine faith such a council is a rule of faith once it has been accepted by the Church as ecumenical". Neither more nor less.

Subsequently, the no less forceful attitude of Popes Innocent X, Alexander XII, and Clement IX against the resistance and the interminable quibbles presented by the Jansenists, similarly oriented Catholic theology in the study of the dogmatic fact in general. Since then there is almost no theologian who does not admit that it has been revealed that the Church is infallible with respect to every dogmatic fact. For every Thomist this is equivalent to saying that *every dogmatic fact* has been *revealed,* and consequently that it has been *revealed* that this dogmatic fact is infallibly true once it has been defined. Or in other words, that it is of *divine* faith since divine faith extends itself not only to *what God reveals* but also to *what God reveals as true.* However, although such a fact is *of divine faith* inasmuch as it is contained as a particular in a revealed universal, nonetheless *it is not of divine faith that such a fact is of divine faith* inasmuch as the revelation of the universal has not yet been *defined.* Hence, *no one who denies it is a heretic.*

We beg the reader's indulgence for so much insistence and repetition, but all of it is necessary in order to uproot ideas that are so widespread as that of the modern and heterogeneous *ecclesiastical* faith. In our opinion the term *ecclesiastical* faith would have perfectly described the kind of faith or *human* – not divine – *religious* assent given by us to the *non-infallible* teachings of the Church.

277. APPLICATIONS. – Everything that has been said in this section about dogmatic facts applies equally to such facts as whether this law, discipline or custom of the universal Church, or this Rule or these Constitutions of this religious order are *morally right* (the fact in question is the fact of their *morality,* not of their timeliness or prudence), or to any other truly *dogmatic* fact, to wit, one that is necessarily *connected* with the divine deposit or *necessary for* its preservation, explication or application, and has been *infallibly* defined or approved by the Church. The morality of such a fact is not only of ecclesiastical, but of *divine,* faith.

There is not the least difference between defining the *truth* of this conclusion or fact, and defining the *morality* of this Rule or Constitutions, this law or discipline, this practice or custom. Just as the Church can define as of *divine* faith that *"This* council is infallible" inasmuch as it is only a particular instance or application of the revealed universal, *"Every* ecumenical council is infallible," so too she can define as of divine, and not only as of ecclesiastical, faith that *"This* law, or custom, or Rule, etc., is *morally right"* inasmuch as here we have only a case of the particular application of the revealed universal, "Every law, or custom, or Rule, etc. in conformity with the morality of the revealed deposit, is morally right." The *divine* faith due to such a particular proposition does not derive from the Church's authority or infallibility but from its being *included* in the revealed universal or revealed deposit. The Church's authority or infallibility does not effect such inclusion, it only makes *us know* that inclusion infallibly. It does not intervene as the formal motive, but as the condition or the application of the formal motive, which is none other than divine revelation. It is, therefore, a case of *divine* faith, not of ecclesiastical faith or of human faith.[71]

278. Finally, the canonization of the saints is very probably nothing but an accidental variant case of dogmatic facts, and hence, also an object of divine faith. However, since its dogmatic character, that is, its necessary relation to a revealed universal or to the revealed deposit is not clear at first glance, and above all, since it has been expressly discussed by St. Thomas and by almost every Thomist (although we have already mentioned that there has been progress in theology relative to these questions concerning facts), we shall study it in a separate section for we think that the subject deserves a separate treatment.

[71] "Just as the proposition *'every* man is mortal' and the proposition *'this* man is mortal' are of faith in the *same manner,* so also the proposition 'the morality of the laws of the pope is in *every instance* good' and the proposition 'the morality of *this* law is good' are of faith in the *same manner."* (JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *De Auctoritate Summi Pontificis,* d.3, a.3, n.10) Those who think that to hold as of divine faith the truth of every *new* defined dogmatic fact, or the morality of every *new* Church law or of every *new* Rule for religious infallibly approved by the pope, is equivalent to multiplying *new dogmas* in a prodigious and unheard-of manner, have failed to take note of the fact that such a dogmatic *novelty* is not a novelty in *doctrine* but simply a new application of the same one and unchangeable doctrine, and that such a dogmatic novelty can be effected not only by the Holy Father, but that it can be, and is in fact, effected every day by any *father.* Merely by procreating a new child, every father gives us a new dogma: the dogma that *this* new child – of whom, we can be sure, the Apostles were not thinking - was redeemed by Christ, etc., etc. But all such novelty reduces simply to a particular application of what the Apostles had already taught us in universal form. What any father does by the act of *procreation,* the pope does by the act of *definition.* We omit many other proofs of this same truth, with which we have already dealt. (239, 248-252)

For the present suffice it to have demonstrated, as we believe we have, that every truly *dogmatic* fact has been implicitly revealed by God as a particular in the universal, and consequently, once it is infallibly defined, it is an object of a faith that is truly and properly *divine,* and not only of that modern discovery called *ecclesiastical* faith. By the same token it has also been demonstrated that the scope of the evolution of dogma includes not only theological conclusions but also dogmatic facts.

Section IV

THE CANONIZATION OF SAINTS AND ECCLESIASTICAL FAITH

279. MEANING OF THE PROBLEM. – In the previous section we have attempted to show that every dogmatic fact is definable as of divine, and not only as of the so-called ecclesiastical, faith. Since the canonization of saints is only a particular instance of dogmatic fact, it would not have required a separate study, it would have sufficed to apply to it the teaching already expounded in the previous section. Nonetheless, we shall deal with it separately in order to explore the mind of St. Thomas who expressly treated the question of the canonization of saints.

In the first place, it is one thing to have the *power* to canonize, and quite another thing to be *infallible* in canonizing. That the Church has the power to canonize is a truth of Catholic faith; to deny it would constitute heresy. "In this question it must be assumed as certain that it is *of faith* that the Pope and the Church have the *power* to canonize Saints. For to say that the Church has the *power* to canonize Saints is very different from saying that the Church cannot err in their canonization."[72] "It is *heretical* to deny that the authority to canonize Saints exists in the Church and the Pope."[73]

In the second place, canonization and beatification are two different things. Canonization is the Church's *definitive* judgment concerning the holiness and eternal glory of the canonized saint, and further includes a *precept* to pay him religious worship. On the other hand, beatification is a judgment that is *not definitive* but amendable, it does not carry a precept but only a permission to pay worship to the beatified person. Inasmuch as without a *definitive judgment* infallibility is not possible, almost all the theologians concede that the Church is not infallible in the beatification of the blessed, although it would be rash to assert that she has in fact erred in this or

[72] JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *De Auctoritate Summi Pontificis,* d.3, a.2, n.8.

[73] BÁÑEZ, *In 2-2,* q.1, a.10, dubium 7.

that beatification. "Although from this it could be inferred that any one who dared to affirm that the Roman Pontiff has erred in this or that formal beatification deserves to be branded with the mark of *temerity* or of a more grievous theological censure . . ., nonetheless it cannot be concluded with certainty that the judgment itself is *infallible* or that it is of faith inasmuch as it is always permissive, *never preceptive,* and it does certainly lead to a final judgment, but it is itself not the last word."[74]

In the third place, a distinction must be made between canonization on the one hand, and the miracles, private revelations, apparitions, historical events, or relics of the canonized saint, on the other hand. When the Church in the process of canonization approves the miracles performed by a saint, or includes them in the lessons of the breviary; when she institutes a special holiday to honour the apparition of a saint, e.g., the feasts of the Apparition at Lourdes, the Apparition of St. Michael the Archangel, the Transfer of the House of Loreto, etc., etc.; when she approves the private revelations made to a saint, e.g., those made to St. Bridget, or the authenticity or veneration of his relics, it is a fairly common opinion that such miracles, apparitions, revelations, historical events, or relics are not thereby infallibly defined, albeit they are always deserving of the pious assent and the reverence due to the teachings of the Church, including those that are not infallible. "When the Church makes an inquiry or a pronouncement concerning *revelations, apparitions, miracles,* she does not intend to acquire anything other than a *human* probability or certainty of a practical order, that is to say, sufficient to foster worship. The same goes for the authenticity of *relics.*"[75]

In the fourth place, canonization is one thing, inscription in the martyrology is another. Since the Church inscribes in the martyrology not only the names of those who have been canonized but also of those who have been

[74] BENEDICTUS XIV, *De Servorum Dei Beatificatione,* lib. 1, c.42, n.10.

[75] BAINVEL, *De Magisterio Vivo et Traditione,* n.107, Paris 1905. We are amazed at reading in a distinguished contemporary Roman theologian the following statement: "The *fact,* e.g., of the *Presentation of the Bl. V. Mary* in the temple, cannot be denied *without detriment to the faith* since concerning it there is a feast regarding the whole Church." By the same token we should also hold with divine faith the fact of Lourdes, of the House of Loreto, etc., etc., which are also commemorated by a feast in the whole Church. In our view, such facts are not only not of divine faith but neither of ecclesiastical or infallible faith, but merely of practical or prudent religious assent, which does not require infallibility. Benedict XIV writes: "But certain other things pertain to *religion* in such a manner that they cannot be rejected without *culpable arrogance,* e.g. that *the Most Bl. Virgin was presented in the temple.* Indeed, to such things the Church does not attribute the character of *undoubted truth,* although it is not lawful to teach otherwise, at least publicly: for in such things only the *nature of practical truth* is required, to wit, the congruence with the dictate of *prudent* reason." *(De Servorum Dei Beatificatione,* lib.1, c.43, n.13)

beatified, and even of those who are simply venerable, it is obvious that the mere inscription in the martyrology is not an *infallible* argument of sanctity.

The present problem, then, concerns *canonization* exclusively and none of the other things mentioned. Canonization is usually defined as "the last and *definitive* judgment whereby the Church declares that a person has led a holy life and has been received among the dwellers in heaven, and proposes him to all the faithful to be worshipped and invoked by them."[76]

280. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM. — In the previous section we have seen that modern theologians usually distinguish two questions when dealing with dogmatic facts, viz., the question of *principle* and the question of *fact.* "To the first," they say, "we give the assent of divine faith, but to the second we give the assent of ecclesiastical faith." (257)

They make a similar distinction when dealing with the canonization of saints inasmuch as the latter is nothing but a variant of dogmatic facts. Although no express mention is made of the question of *principle* or of the question of *fact,* the attentive reader will notice that they make a distinction between these two questions: (a) What kind of faith do we give to the question "Whether the Church is infallible in the canonization of saints", which is a question of principle; (b) What kind of faith do we give to the question "Whether this canonized saint is truly a saint or is truly in heaven", which is a question of fact.

Not only do they make a distinction between these two questions, although without express mention of principle or of fact, but they also give a different reply to each of them. The faith given to the first question, "Whether the Church is infallible in the canonization of saints", is, they say, *divine* faith. On the other hand, the faith given to the second question, "Whether this canonized saint is truly a saint or truly in heaven", is, according to them, *ecclesiastical* faith.

Thus, even if modern theologians usually make a distinction between the case of dogmatic facts and the case of the canonization of the saints, nonetheless, the force of logic has led them to apply to the canonization of the saints a solution identical or similar to the one given by them to the problem of dogmatic facts.

In the previous section we have seen that the question of fact, if it is truly dogmatic, includes the question of principle, and hence, both the one and the other are equally of divine faith. In this chapter we hope to show that the case of canonization is exactly the same by making clear that the ques-

[76] DE GROOT, *Summa Apologetica,* q.9, a.5.

tion, "Whether this canonized saint is in heaven" deserves the same kind of faith as the question, "Whether the Church is infallible in the canonization of saints", and that, consequently, the faith in question is divine faith.

As a matter of fact, every attentive reader of St. Thomas, and even of every Thomist prior to the Jansenist disputes, will notice at once that they hold that the faith we give to both questions is one and the same. Hence, they reduce the problem to finding out whether the Church is infallible or has divine assistance in the canonization of saints and ascertaining the kind of faith we give to that infallibility, since once we have ascertained what kind of faith we give to the Church's infallibility on a certain issue, we have also ascertained the kind of faith we give to that same issue once it has been infallibly defined by the Church. John of St. Thomas says to the point: "Thus the doubt *reduces to this:* whether the *judgment* made by the Church in the canonization of a saint is *infallible,* and *with what degree* of certainty is it to be held that the *Pope cannot err in such judgment.*"[77]

Everything, as we shall see, turns on this point, i.e., on the kind of faith with which we believe the authority or infallibility of the Church in the matter of facts connected with the revealed deposit. However, inasmuch as there has been progress on this subject in Catholic theology since the time of St. Thomas, and even since the time of John of St. Thomas, we shall briefly explain: (a) the mind of St. Thomas; (b) the views of subsequent theologians up to the debates on the Church's authority in the matter of dogmatic facts, i.e., up to the rise of Jansenism; (c) the view of modern theologians.

281. THE MIND OF ST. THOMAS. – *Doctrine* is one thing, *facts* are another thing. The Church is infallible when she defines a *doctrine* of faith or of morals. This is a fundamental dogma that has always been believed in the Catholic Church without any need of definition by any council. It was defined from the very beginning in the teaching itself of the apostles inasmuch as it is the basis or indispensable condition for every other dogma. The Vatican Council did not define the infallibility of the *Church,* which it took for granted, but the infallibility of the *Pope,* declaring that the latter possesses the very same infallibility given by Christ to his Church. "We define that the *Roman Pontiff* . . . when he defines a DOCTRINE of faith and morals . . . enjoys the *same infallibility* with which the Divine Redeemer willed that his Church be equipped."[78]

However, although everybody believed that the Church was infallible in matters of *doctrine,* St. Thomas, to our knowledge, was the first to touch expressly on the Church's infallibility in the matter of *facts,* devoting a whole

[77] *Loc. cit.*, n.9.
[78] Denz.-Schön. 3074.

article to the infallibility of the Church in the *fact* of the canonization of saints. As usual, in dealing with this particular problem of the canonization of saints, St. Thomas rose to the general level of principles; introducing for the first time in the history of theology the distinction between *doctrine* of faith and morals, *particular facts,* and *facts connected with the doctrine,* he laid down the future bases of a whole new treatise on *dogmatic facts,* whereof the canonization of saints is only a particular case. Let us then carefully examine the process employed by the holy Doctor, since that is the surest means to penetrate well his mind.

The question of the canonization of saints is treated by St. Thomas in *Quodlibetum 9,* art. 16, with the title "Whether the Saints canonized by the Church are in heaven, or some of them in hell." The whole article is given in a footnote so as to enable the reader to appraise by himself the analysis we are going to make of it.[79]

[79] Art. 16. *"Whether all the Saints canonized by the Church are in heaven or some of them in hell.*

[Objection 1] "Next it is asked, as regards heaven, whether all canonized saints are in heaven, or some of them in hell; and it seems that some of those who are canonized in the Church can be in hell. For no one can be certain of somebody else's state, as he himself is of his own state, for "no man knows the things of a man save the spirit of the man which is in him" as is said in 1 Cor. 2:11. But no man can be certain of himself, i.e. whether he is in the state of salvation: for it is said in Eccles. 9:1, 'No one knows whether he is worthy of hatred or of love.' Therefore, much less can the pope know; therefore, *he can be mistaken in canonizing.*

[Objection 2] "Besides, whosoever depends on a fallible medium when making a judgment can err. But the Church, when canonizing saints, depends on human testimony, since she inquires through witnesses about their life and miracles. Therefore, inasmuch as the testimony is fallible, it seems *that the Church can err in canonizing saints.*

"But to the contrary: In the Church there cannot be any damnable error. But this would be a damnable error if someone who was a sinner should be venerated as a saint, because those who know his sins would believe this to be false; and if this should happen, they could be led into error. Therefore, the *Church cannot err in such things.*

"Besides, Augustine says in a letter to Jerome that if any lie be admitted in the Canonical Scriptures, our faith, which depends on the Canonical Scriptures, would falter. But just as we are obliged to believe that which is contained in Holy Scripture so also that which is commonly determined by the Church. Hence he who judges contrary to the determination of the councils is considered a heretic. Therefore, the *common judgment of the Church cannot be erroneous; and thus the same as before.*

"[Preliminary consideration] *I answer: it must be said* that something can be judged possible when considered in itself, which is found to be impossible when considered in relation to something extrinsic. I thus say that the judgment of those who preside over the Church can be mistaken as regards anything whatsoever, if their persons alone are taken into account. However, if divine providence is taken into account, which guides his Church by the Holy Spirit, so that she should not err, as He himself promised,

In a brief preliminary observation the Saint notes that every man considered in himself is fallible and can be infallible only through divine assistance. Having established this point he begins his argument with a *major premise* made up of the three propositions that follow:

(a) "It is certain that the judgment of the universal Church *cannot* err in anything that pertains to the *faith* [*doctrine* of faith or morals]."

(b) "But in other decisions that concern *particular facts . . . It is possible . . . to err.*"

(c) "The *canonization* of saints is *midway between these two.*"

Hereto the argument's *major premise.* With it alone no conclusion could be inferred relative to the Church's infallibility or non-infallibility in the canonization of saints. If we knew nothing else about canonization than that it is *midway* between *doctrine* which is an object of infallibility, on the one hand, and *particular facts* which are not objects of infallibility, on the other hand, we would be left in the dark as to whether infallibility in canonization is possible or not.

For this reason the holy Doctor introduces a *minor premise,* which is the root and the central point of the whole article, and which reads thus: "But *nonetheless*" – the reader will please note that *nonetheless,* which means to say, *in spite of* being "midway between these two" – "inasmuch as

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John 14, that the Spirit who was to come would teach all truth, viz., concerning the things necessary for salvation:

"[Major premise] it is certain that it is *impossible* for the judgment of the universal Church to *err* in the things that pertain to the *faith.* Hence one should abide by the judgment made by the pope, to whom it belongs to determine matters concerning the faith, more than by the opinion of whatsoever learned men in matters of Scripture, for we read in John 11 that Caiaphas, in spite of being wicked, nevertheless prophesied, even without knowing, because he was the Chief Priest. But in the case of other *decisions* regarding *particular facts,* as when it is a question of possessions or crimes or something similar, it is *possible for the judgment of the Church to err* because of false witnesses. The *canonization of saints is midway between these two.*

"[Minor premise] NONETHELESS, *since* the honor we exhibit to the saints is a *kind of profession of faith* whereby we *believe* in the glory of the saints,

"[Conclusion] *it is piously to be believed that even in these matters* the judgment of the Church *cannot err.*

"To the first [objection] it must be said that the pope, whose it is to canonize saints, can become certain of the state of a man by the examination of his life and the attestation of miracles, and *especially by the impulse of the Holy Spirit* who "scrutinizes all things even the depths of God" (I Cor. 2:10).

"To the second it must be said that divine Providence preserves the Church from being deceived in such matters by the fallible testimony of men." (ST. THOMAS, *Quodlibetum,* 9, a.16; ed. Frette or Vivès, Paris, vol. 15, pg. 566)

the honour that we exhibit to the saints is, *a kind of profession of faith* whereby we *believe* in the glory of the saints." In other words, although canonization is midway between the doctrine of faith and particular facts, nonetheless (*tamen*) it is a *particular application of the doctrine of faith* (*quaedam* professio fidei est); it is something *related* to the dogma of faith of the glory of the saints (*qua* sanctorum gloriam *credimus*). Thus, although it is not purely *doctrine,* but a *fact,* it is a *doctrinal fact,* or, as we would call it today, a *dogmatic* fact.

Thus, although in the major premise canonization appeared as midway between the doctrine of faith and particular facts, or as an island isolated from those two extremes, the holy Doctor, by means of the minor premise, has succeeded in discovering a *bridge,* viz., the *doctrinal* character of the fact of canonization. That bridge or doctrinal character links canonization not with the particular facts and, consequently, with those things relative to which infallibility is impossible, but with the doctrine of faith, and, therefore, with those things which of their own nature fall within the Church's infallibility.

Of course, once that bridge has been established it comes as no surprise that the holy Doctor should very naturally infer the following conclusion: ***"It is to be piously believed*** that it is *impossible* for the Church's judgment to **err *even in these things.***"

Having summarily seen the process employed by the holy Doctor in his reasoning, let us briefly consider the exact meaning of these two celebrated phrases: (a) *"Canonization is midway between these two",* which appears in the major premise; (b) *"It is to be piously believed,"* which is found in the conclusion. These two phrases have been the butt of innumerable conjectures on the part of the supporters of the modern ecclesiastical faith.

282. MEANING OF THE PHRASE "CANONIZATION IS MIDWAY BETWEEN THESE TWO". – In the first place, if the reader will please carefully consider the whole article of the holy Doctor he will reap the confirmation of what we have previously said, viz., that in St. Thomas's mind these two questions are identical: (a) What certainty do we have that this canonized saint is in heaven? ; (b) What certainty do we have that the Church is infallible in the canonization of saints? Thus in the article's title he places the first question and then in the objections, the arguments *to the contrary* (sed contra), the body of the article, and the solution to the objections, he always replies with the second question. Therefore, the kind of faith we give to the first question depends on the kind of faith we give to the second question. For St. Thomas the two questions are one and the same.

In the second place, the reader will please note that the phrase "is midway between these two" does not make reference to the phrase "it is to be

piously believed," but to the term "canonization." Hence, St. Thomas does not say that the "to be piously believed" occupies a middle place; what he says is that such a middle place is occupied by canonization. *Canonization is midway between these two.*

In the third place, the reader will please note that the minor premise or key to the whole reasoning is to be found not in the proposition that "canonization is *midway* between these two", but in the proposition that canonization or the worship of saints "is a kind of *profession of faith.*" Consequently, the conclusion "it is to be piously believed" is not deduced by St. Thomas from the assertion that "canonization is midway between the two," but from the assertion that "canonization is a kind of profession of faith." Indeed, so far is St. Thomas from saying that the conclusion "it is to be piously believed" is deduced from the term "midway between the two" that he explicitly states that it is deduced *in spite of it:* "But nonetheless", etc.

We insist on such a clear thing because certain supporters of the modern ecclesiastical faith read this article of St. Thomas as if the holy Doctor had reasoned thus: "Canonization is *midway* between these two; therefore, it is to be *piously* believed." Whence they argue that the *pious* belief whereof St. Thomas speaks is a faith *midway* between divine and human faith, or in other words, the modern ecclesiastical faith. They have missed the point that St. Thomas has reasoned in a completely contrary manner, to wit: "Canonization is *midway* between these two; but, *nonetheless,* it is a kind of *profession of faith;* therefore, it is to be *piously believed",* etc. In other words, it is not to be *piously* believed because it is *midway,* but *in spite of being midway,* inasmuch as although it is midway between the *doctrine* of faith and the *particular facts,* nonetheless (*tamen*) it somehow belongs to the first member, i.e., to the doctrine of faith (it is *a kind* of profession of faith), because it is necessarily related to the dogma of the glory of the saints.

Thus, the holy Doctor argues in the following manner. We know for certain that the Church is infallible in *one* field, to wit, the *doctrine* of faith and morals. We also know for certain that the Church is not infallible in *another* field, which is that of *particular facts.* If canonization directly belonged to either of those *two* fields, the issue would have been decided in favour of infallibility if it belonged to the former, or in favour of non-infallibility if it belonged to the latter. But it so happens that canonization belongs directly neither to the first nor to the second of those two fields, but lies midway between the two: "Canonization *is midway* between these two." Therefore, if we had only those *two* principles or categories of things it would be impossible for us to know anything for certain relative to the Church's infallibility or non-infallibility in the canonization of saints.

But this notwithstanding (*nonetheless*) – the holy Doctor goes on – there is a *third* principle or way to find out. That way is the indirect path of

relation or consequence. Although canonization is not directly the *doctrine* itself of faith since it is a fact, it is nevertheless *necessarily related* to the *doctrine* of faith. Why? Because in canonization the *worship* of the canonized saint is prescribed to the *whole* Church, and this worship or homage is a kind of *profession of faith* in the dogma of the glory of the saints. Consequently, if the Church is infallible in the *doctrine* of faith, it would be *impious* to believe that she is fallible in the *profession* of that same faith, i.e., in the canonization of the saints.

In a nutshell: in the phrase "canonization is midway between these two" the *two* are not *two faiths,* one divine and one human, and the *midway* is not a *third faith midway* between divine and human faiths. Such a notion, invented four centuries later, never passed through St. Thomas's mind. The *two* are two categories of objects, viz., the *doctrine* of faith and the *particular facts,* and the *midway* is a third category of objects, i.e., the *doctrinal facts* connected, as in the case of canonization, with the doctrine of faith or the first category. It was not the purpose nor the merit of St. Thomas to invent a *third* or *middle* faith, but to examine that *middle object* and discover a connexion or bridge whereby it could break away from its middle status or isolation, and remain linked to the first extreme. Thus, this whole article of the holy Doctor can be synthesized in a simple enthymeme as follows: Canonization is *necessarily connected with the doctrine of faith;* therefore it must be *piously believed* that the Church is infallible in the canonization of saints.

283. MEANING OF THE PHRASE "IT IS TO BE PIOUSLY BELIEVED."

– What is for St. Thomas the value or the meaning of the phrase "it is to be piously believed"?

Obviously it does not mean that it is to be believed with *divine* faith since here we have only a simple *consequence* deduced exclusively through reasoning or *connexion* with the doctrine of faith. It is common knowledge that, according to St. Thomas and his school, no consequence or connexion is of divine faith as long as it has not been defined by the Church.

Much less does it mean that it is to be believed with *ecclesiastical* faith. The reason is clear. As understood by its supporters, ecclesiastical faith *presupposes* the Church's *infallibility* since it is grounded on it. Now, it is precisely this infallibility which the holy Doctor intends to prove, and it is of this infallibility that he says that it is to be piously believed. Hence, to say that the Church's infallibility must be *piously believed,* and at the same time to take "pious belief" in the sense of believing with *ecclesiastical faith,* is tantamount to saying that the Church's infallibility must be believed on account of . . . the infallibility of the Church. St. Thomas is never guilty of such theological twaddle.

Consequently, the assertion "it is to be piously believed", deduced as a mere *consequence* of a reasoning, has for St. Thomas no meaning or value other than *scientifico-theological* value, the value of a *theological conclusion;* the same value proper of any and every thing *indirectly* revealed or necessarily *connected* with the revealed; the same value inherent in anything "from which there follows something contrary or unsuitable to the faith", all of which, as long as it remains undefined by the Church, is not of divine faith except "indirectly" or "reductively", and belongs directly and formally to *theology* for anyone who evidently perceives the connexion, or to *human faith* for anyone who, without perceiving the connexion, assents to it on the authority of the theologians who perceive it.

Since that consequence was not yet of divine faith, as it was not yet defined by the Church, St. Thomas did not say, nor could have said, that "it is to be believed with divine faith" or that "it is heretical." However, since that consequence was *sufficiently certain,* and furthermore involved a matter that was not merely *speculative* – as, e.g., the conclusion that divine grace is a *quality* – but a matter related to the virtue of *piety,* viz., the *worship* of the saints, St. Thomas was not satisfied by the phrase "it is certain", but instead employed the phrase "it is to be piously believed," thus, qualifying as *impious* the contrary view.

All the foregoing has been well expressed by John of St. Thomas in the following terms: "That *causal* proposition of St. Thomas [viz., *'Nonetheless since* the honour we exhibit to the saints is a kind of profession of faith whereby we believe the glory of the saints, *it is to be piously believed",* etc.] is to be explained in this manner: that *inasmuch* as canonization is a judgment *about the honour* and *veneration* to be exhibited to the saints, whereby in the very act of passing such a judgment we *profess* the special glory of a certain saint, *for this reason it reductively, so to say, pertains to the faith,* and therefore *it is piously believed* that the pope cannot err in such matters . . . We therefore say that it is . . . *impious* because it is contrary to the *veneration* and *worship* due to the saints themselves . . . However, we do not *expressly* brand as a *heretic* anyone who denies it . . . *because it is not certainly and expressly defined in particular* that such a canonization is a definition of faith, but only that from things already held by faith *it follows as something unsuitable* that error could be found in such a canonization . . . And thus it is not of faith *directly,* but *reductively."*[80]

To resume: the phrase "it is to be piously believed" with which St. Thomas qualified the Church's infallibility in the canonization of saints, signifies human *certainty* or *human faith* since any certainty or any faith that is

[80] JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *Loc. cit.,* nn.11-16.

solely based on theological reasoning is formally *human* albeit materially divine. Such is, e.g., the certainty of the theologians, or the faith of the faithful, regarding the theological conclusion that "Christ's soul enjoyed the beatific vision from the very first instant ot his conception," or of any other theological conclusion that has not yet been defined by the Church. Such conclusions are *certain,* but they are not *infallibly certain* or certain as truths of *divine faith.* To deny them is *temerarious* or *impious* but not *heretical.*

284. SUBSEQUENT THEOLOGIANS UP TO THE 17th CENTURY. – Since St. Thomas' discussion of the canonization of saints almost all subsequent theologians dealt with the subject. The vast majority maintained the position defended by St. Thomas, viz., that the Church's infallibility in the canonization of saints, and hence, the sanctity of the canonized saint, were theologically certain, albeit not infallibly certain or certain with the certitude of divine faith.

However, there were some theologians who denied such infallibility. Others went to the opposite extreme and affirmed that it was already a truth of divine faith so that to deny it was heresy.

There thus emerged three opinions which John of St. Thomas concisely describes as follows: "The *first opinion* teaches that the pope *can err* in the canonization of saints. On the opposite extreme, the second opinion considers that *it is of faith* that the pope *cannot err* in the canonization of saints, and *hence,* after the canonization *it is of faith* that such a saint *is in heaven.* The *third* middle *opinion* holds that it is indeed *certain* that the pope *cannot err* in the canonization of saints, and that he who says the contrary is *worthy of censure, however, he would not be a heretic but temerarious, impious and scandalous,* or even *close to error* or *savouring of heresy.* This opinion is lately the *more common* . . . and is taken from St. Thomas (Quodlib. 9, a.16)"[81] These three opinions are similarly, although more extensively, described by Benedict XIV.[82]

The first opinion, which denies the Church's infallibility in the canonization of saints, is upheld by a few and not very noteworthy theologians, although the eminent Cardinal Cajetan is usually cited as one of them. The third opinion, which not only affirms that the Church's infallibility in the canonization of saints is certain but also that it is already a truth of divine faith, is likewise upheld by relatively few theologians, although among them we find such prestigious names as the Franciscan Alfonso de Castro and the Jesuits Valencia and Tirso González. Finally, the

[81] JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *loc. cit.,* nn.9-11.

[82] *Loc. cit.,* c.43.

second opinion, that of St. Thomas, which affirms that the Church's infallibility in the canonization of saints is certain, but not infallibly certain or certain as a truth of divine faith, is upheld by the vast majority of theologians, not only of the Thomist but of all schools. Benedict XIV cites names and passages from all those theologians in chapters 43 and 45 of his aforementioned book.[83]

The Thomist view, which has been just stated by John of St. Thomas, is also described by Suárez in the following terms: "Likewise, the faithful may not licitly place the glory of a canonized saint in doubt, for that is commanded under precise obligation by the popes in the very act of canonization. *Therefore* it is necessary that such a precept should *not be liable to error,* otherwise God would be found wanting in a matter most necessary to the Church, which is contrary to his providence and his promises. And thus, although *this* INFERENCE *is not of faith,* I hold it as *fairly certain,* and its contrary as *impious* and *temerarious.*"[84]

Although during this period, from the time of St. Thomas up to the second half of the 17th century, the status of the question has remained almost the same, there are two things worthy of note:

1. *All* those theologians, irrespective of their partiality to any of the three aforementioned positions, concur with St. Thomas in considering as identical these two questions: (a) What is the certainty with which we believe in the infallibility of the Church in the canonization of saints? (b) What is the certainty with which we believe in the sanctity or the glory of the canonized saint?

[83] Benedict XIV ends the whole question by saying that the Church has *as yet* defined nothing on this matter, and fairly inclines to the view that the fact of canonization is of divine faith. "*Up to the present* no definitive judgment has been passed on these matters, and many Catholic and pious teachers deny that he who says that it is *not of faith* either that the pope is infallible in canonizing or that a man canonized by him is a saint, will be a *formal heretic.* . . . Thus it seems to us that *both opinions* are to be left in their *probability until such time* as a judgment should issue from the Apostolic See. . . . However, we also *willingly admit* that it *favours not slightly* the view that maintains that it *is of faith* that whoever is canonized is a saint and is in eternal glory." (*Loc. cit.,* c.45, nn.26-27) Whoever attentively reads Báñez, John of St. Thomas, Benedict XIV, and almost everyone of the great theologians of this period, will at once notice that they say that canonization is not of divine faith *as yet,* that he who denies it is not a *formal* heretic or *evidently* a heretic, etc. Such phrases are not employed with respect to things that *cannot be* of divine faith, but with respect to those things that *can be* of faith but are not yet of faith. If by *ecclesiastical* faith modern theologians were to mean the faith we give to certain truths that *can be* defined as of divine faith but have not *yet* been so defined, we would have no qualms in admitting such ecclesiastical faith.

[84] SUÁREZ, *De Fide,* d.5, s.8, n.8.

2. All of those who with St. Thomas deny that the second question pertains to divine faith, do so because with St. Thomas they deny that the first question pertains to divine faith, or in other words, that the Church's infallibility in the canonization of saints is of divine faith.

285. FROM THE 17th CENTURY TO THE PRESENT. – As we mentioned earlier when we outlined the history of ecclesiastical faith, the debates on the question of fact concerning the five propositions of Jansen's book, which took place in the second half of the 17th century and persisted even long after, were fruitful for the study of the problem of "the infallibility of the Church with respect to *dogmatic facts.*" Besides, they provided the occasion for bringing the so-called ecclesiastical faith into Catholic theology. Since the canonization of saints is nothing more nor less than a *dogmatic* fact or a fact *connected with dogma,* any development in the doctrine on dogmatic facts was bound to have repercussions sooner or later, if the theologians were consistent, on the doctrine on the canonization of saints.

In the face of repeatedly issued papal bulls that infallibly defined not only the question of principle but also the question of fact about the propositions of Jansen's book, and demanded from all the faithful not only an external obedience or religious silence but also an internal and unconditional obedience, all Catholic theologians, some sooner and some later, eventually agreed on the following proposition: "It is absolutely certain that the Church is infallible in the definition of dogmatic facts", i.e., in the definition of any fact *necessarily connected* with the preservation or explication of the revealed deposit. Inasmuch as the canonization of saints is but a particular instance of dogmatic fact, no theologian subsequently denied the infallibility of the Church in the canonization of saints.

Once the issue of the Church's infallibility relative to dogmatic facts was thus decided, a second question arose: "What kind of faith must be given to such *dogmatic facts* after they have been defined? "

On this point there was a division among theologians. Some of them maintained that such a faith was *divine* faith based on *divine revelation.* Others said that it was *ecclesiastical faith* based on the *infallibility of the Church.* Those who upheld the so-called ecclesiastical faith in the matter of dogmatic facts subsequently extended it, and quite consistently, to the canonization of saints.

Finally, this second question was necessarily bound to raise, although somewhat later, a third question, to wit: "With what kind of faith do we believe in the *Church's infallibility* relative to dogmatic facts? " If we believe the dogmatic facts on account of the Church's infallibility, with what kind of faith do we hold that infallibility itself?

The answer to this third question necessarily had to be unanimous. Those who maintained that dogmatic facts were worthy of divine faith, and hence that they were truly *revealed,* had an even more compelling reason for maintaining that the Church's infallibility in the matter of dogmatic facts was also a truth of divine faith since the Church's infallibility relative to any and every *revealed* thing has always been considered as of divine faith. Likewise, those who maintained that dogmatic facts were objects of ecclesiastical faith had to come sooner or later to the same conclusion. To maintain that we believe in dogmatic facts with ecclesiastical faith means that we believe in them on account of the infallibility of the Church. If the infallibility itself of the Church were to be believed with ecclesiastical faith we would fall into the absurdity or vicious circle of believing in the infallibility of the Church on account of the infallibility of the Church. Consequently, the infallibility of the Church cannot be believed with ecclesiastical, but with divine, faith. Which is tantamount to saying that the infallibility of the Church is a truly revealed truth.

The reader will now be able to appreciate the vast progress in Catholic theology from the 17th century to the present on the question "Whether the Church is infallible in the matter of *facts connected* with the revealed deposit." The answer given to that question by St. Thomas and the vast majority of Catholic theologians prior to the rise of Jansenism was that "it is to be piously believed," i.e., that such infallibility of the Church was *theologically certain* but not yet of *divine faith.* After the definitions and the attitude maintained by the Church against Jansenism, and even much more after the Vatican Council, all, or almost all, theologians answer that the infallibility of the Church in the matter of facts connected with dogma is a truth of *divine faith* already defined by the Church's praxis or ordinary magisterium, or at least that it is a truth that is *revealed* and *definable* as of divine faith.

Although this is clear enough, and even at the risk of being accused of repeating the same things, we will briefly quote some passages:

"Hence it is inferred, in the first place, that the Pope *cannot err in the canonization of saints,* even if he does it outside of a council. In accordance with Bonaventure, Valencia, Bellarmine, Amico, theologians more commonly teach that this is *of faith;* however, others teach, in accordance with Suárez, Azorio, Granados, that it is *proximate to the faith.*"[85] "Indeed, this infallibility. . . . . is *by many* reputed to be likewise formally *revealed*. . . . . .; indeed, this infallibility could be *defined as a dogma of faith.*"[86] "In the opinion of

[85] DOMINICUS VIVA, S.J., *Damnatae Theses, Quaestio Prodoma,* n.11; Patavii 1724, pg.6

[86] Card. BILLOT, *De Ecclesia Christi,* th.17.

many *it is a heresy,* although up to now it has not been condemned *explicitly as a heresy.*"[87] "This faith [viz. the *ecclesiastical* faith given to *dogmatic* facts] is said to be revealed mediately because its assent is grounded on the *Church's infallible authority which we believe with divine and Catholic faith.*"[88] If any man deny that *the Church is infallible in defining such matters,* he would by the same token be formally a *heretic.*"[89] "Perhaps the controversy could be settled by adverting to the fact that it is one thing to say that *the Supreme Pontiff is infallible in decreeing the canonization of a given saint,* and it is another thing to say that this saint, canonized by the pope, is one of the blessed in heaven. And, indeed, the first is of *divine-Catholic faith.*"[90]

286. SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM. — With this presupposition it becomes very easy to show that the fact "this canonized saint is in heaven" is an implicitly revealed truth and, consequently, definable as a truth not only of *ecclesiastical,* but of *divine faith.*

For this purpose we need only apply to this fact the same principles we applied in the previous section to dogmatic facts in general, and which all contemporary theologians apply specifically to these facts: whether such a council is a rule of faith, or whether such a pope is a true pope.

As the reader will recall, those principles are two, to wit: (a) where a universal proposition is revealed, all the particular propositions contained therein are also revealed; (b) in these cases the minor premise does not intervene as the formal motive but as the *explication* or *application* of the universal major premise to the particular conclusion. These two principles are generally admitted by all theologians.

By this process of inclusion of the particular in the universal we could marshall many arguments to prove that the fact that such a canonuzed saint is in heaven is of divine faith. We will limit ourselves to two arguments: one based on the revealed universal that the Church is infallible in the canonization of *every* saint, and the other based in the similarly revealed universal concerning the glory of *all* the saints in heaven.

287. FIRST ARGUMENT. — According to all, or almost all theologians of today it has been truly revealed that "the Church is infallible in the canonization of *the* saints", or, in other words, in the canonization of *every* saint.

[87] Card. FRANZELIN, *De Traditione,* th.72.

[88] HURTER, *Compendium Theologiae Dogmaticae,* t.I. n.663,footnote, 3rd ed. Oeniponte 1880.

[89] LEPICIER, *De Stabilitate et Progressu Dogmatis.* Rome 1910, pg. 47.

[90] LEPICIER, *op. cit.,* pg.88.

This proposition converted into its passive form is exactly identical to the following: "It has been revealed that *every* saint canonized by the Church is infallibly a saint and that he is infallibly in heaven". This is what we all understand by canonization.

Restating it in conditional form, so as to reveal the texture of the reasoning and the function of the minor in it, we obtain the following exactly identical proposition: "It has been revealed that *every* saint, if he is canonized by the Church, is infallibly a saint and is infallibly in heaven".

Let the argument, then, be as follows:

It has been revealed that *every saint,* if he is canonized by the Church, is infallibly a saint and is infallibly in heaven.

Now, *this* saint (e.g., St. Isidore) has been canonized by the Church.

Therefore, it has been revealed that *this* saint is infallibly a saint and is infallibly in heaven.

We invite all our readers to examine without biases the three propositions of this argument. The major, according to all modern theologians, is a universal that is revealed and definable as of divine faith, if it is not already defined as such. The minor is limited to verifying a *condition* of the revealed major. The conclusion is exactly the same revealed major with no other difference than that of universal and particular (every-this). Consequently, if it is true that when a universal is revealed all the particulars contained therein are similarly revealed, it is clear as the light of day that the conclusion "this canonized saint is in heaven" is likewise revealed and worthy of divine faith.

The fact that St. Thomas and the vast majority of theologians prior to Jansenism did not hold that particular conclusion to be of divine faith, is explained by the fact that they did not hold the universal major premise to be of divine faith, but only of *pious belief.* But today almost all theologians admit that universal major as of divine faith.

288. SECOND ARGUMENT. — Instead of assuming as our major premise the infallibility of the Church in the canonization of *every* saint, let us take as our universal major the glory that is due in heaven to *every* saint. This is likewise a truth of divine faith. Let, then, the argument be as follows:

It is of divine faith that the souls of *all* true saints are in heaven enjoying God himself. Restating it in conditional form we obtain the following: It is of divine faith that *every* soul, *if* it was truly holy, is in heaven enjoying God.

Now, *this* soul (e.g., that of St. Isidore or of any other canonized saint) was truly holy.

Therefore, it is of divine faith that this soul is in heaven enjoying God.

Again we invite the reader to examine the three propositions of this argument. The major is a revealed universal, and was defined as of divine faith by Benedict XII.[91] The minor is the very same formula that the Church employs in the canonization of saints, and has no other purpose but that of verifying a condition of the major of faith. The conclusion is exactly identical to the major of faith with no other difference than that of universal and particular (*every – this*).

Consequently, either we must deny the *principles* commonly admitted by all theologians, or we must admit that the *fact* that "this canonized saint is in heaven" is of divine faith or definable as of divine, and not only as of ecclesiastical, faith.

289. THE SALMANTICENSES AND JOHN OF ST. THOMAS. — To confirm the foregoing we will adduce the testimony of two theologians, who are precisely the two who hold out the least promise on this subject, viz., the Salmanticenses and John of St. Thomas.

These two, as well as almost all theologians prior to the decisions of the Church on dogmatic facts, maintained with St. Thomas that the dogmatic fact of canonization was not a matter of divine faith, but of theological certainty or of human faith. However, they gave to understand fairly clearly that the *fact* of canonization was not of divine faith *because* the *infallibility* of the Church was not *yet* of divine faith.

When the Salmanticenses maintained that the fact that "this pope is truly the pope", is of divine faith, they put to themselves objection: "Just as the universal Church accepts Innocent XI as the Supreme Pontiff, so too she accepts, e.g., St. Isidore as one of the saints in heaven. But it is not im-

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[91] "By this Constitution which shall remain in force forever, we define in virtue of Apostolic authority that in accordance with what God has commonly ordained the souls of ALL the *Saints*. . . . are, and *will be, in heaven* . . . and see the divine Essence with intuitive vision . . . . and that thus seeing it they enjoy the same divine Essence." (BENEDICT XII, Constitutio Dogmatica *Benedictus Deus,* Jan.29, 1336; Denz.-Schön. 1000) The usual formula of canonization is given by Benedict XIV in the following paragraph: "Meanwhile we must treat of the formula of the sentence pronounced in the act of canonization, which is conceived as follows:

"Unto the honour of the Holy and individual Trinity, unto the exaltation of the Catholic faith and the growth of the Christian religion, by the authority of Our Lord Jesus Christ, of the Blessed Apostles Peter and Paul, and Our own, after mature deliberation and frequent imploration of divine assistance, with the advise of Our Venerable Brothers the Cardinals of the Holy Roman Church, the Patriarchs, Archbishops, and Bishops who are in the City, *We decree and define* that the Blessed N. and N. *are saints,* and inscribe them in the Roster of Saints, ordaining that their memory be piously honored again by the Universal Church every year on [such a] day. In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. Amen." *(Loc. cit.,* c.36, nn.20-21).

mediately of faith that *this* canonized man is a saint and *is* in heaven. Therefore it is not immediately of faith that Innocent XI is the Supreme Pontiff.

Here is their truly noteworthy reply: "To the confirmation. The major must be denied because this proposition 'every man duly canonized and accepted by the Church as one of the saints is a saint and is in heaven' is not immediately *of faith,* as Ferre correctly shows. Hence the inferred consequent, viz., that St. Isidore is truly a saint and is in heaven is not immediately of faith. [Comes now something truly remarkable] *But if the contrary supposition is made and it is assumed that the universal 'Every man duly canonized'* etc. *is immediately of faith, it must consequently be said that it is immediately of faith that St. Isidore is in heaven and is truly a saint."*[92]

The reader will please note what the Salmanticenses already conceded even then, viz. that if it is admitted as of divine faith that *all* canonized saints are in heaven, then it must also be logically admitted that it is of divine faith that *this* saint is in heaven. Now then, modern theologians already generally admit to be of divine faith that *all* canonized saints are infallibly in heaven when they admit that it is of divine faith that the Church is infallible in the canonization of *all* saints.[93]

John of St. Thomas provides us with another no less clear confirmation. Granados had cited the example of the canonization of saints in support of his position denying that theological conclusions are of divine faith even after their definition by the Church. Replying to this objection John of St. Thomas writes: "As St. Thomas says, Quodl. 9, art. 16, *it is piously believed that the Holy Spirit assists* the Church in the canonization of saints, so that she will not err, however, this is *not certain with the certainty of faith,* as he says there. On the other hand, it is *certain with the certainty of faith that the Holy Spirit assists* her in defining the things that pertain to the faith, and it is from his guidance that the definition proceeds; hence [the reader will please take note of that *hence*] the assent to it does not rest on *human,* but on *divine,* authority."[94]

It is obvious that the reply given by John of St. Thomas is equivalent to the following: If the Holy Spirit's *assistance to the Church* in the canonization of saints were not only a matter of "pious belief", but a truth of *divine faith,* then the fact of canonization or that this canonized saint is in heaven would also be a matter of *divine,* and not of human, faith. But we all know that theologians admit today that the Holy Spirit's assistance to the Church in the canonization of saints is of divine faith by the same token that they admit that her infallibility is of divine faith, since *infallibility* and *Holy Spirit's assistance* amount to the same thing.

In one word: St. Thomas and all the early theologians have always considered as identical the faith with which we believe in the Church's infallibility in the canonization of saints and the faith with which we believe in the glory of the canonized saint. Since at that time the former was not yet of divine faith, neither was the latter admitted by them as of divine faith.[95]

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[92] SALMANTICENSES, *De Fide,* d.4, dub.2, n.46.

[93] The following passage from the SALMANTICENSES is also worthy of note: "If there be any who maintains that the blessedness of the saints is *of faith, he will not find it difficult* to indicate in the Holy Scripture the *universal* revelation in which this truth is *formally included:* for in the Sacred Writings it is revealed what true holiness consists in, and that all who die in grace are brought to heaven; and it belongs to the Church to discern true holiness, and to judge who have died in grace; for in view of this discernment she has also been promised the prompting of the Holy Spirit, who scrutinizes all things, even the depths of God. "(*De Fide,* d.1, dub.4, n.149) From the phrase "he will not find it difficult" we can see how close were the ancient Thomists, even the most rigid ones, to admitting canonization as of divine faith. By the way, what the Salmanticenses term "*formal* inclusion" is in our view "*virtual* inclusion" because the condition of the revealed universal is not a self-evident condition; on the contrary, its verification requires reasoning, and is even susceptible to error. For this reason neither the fact that "this council is a true rule of faith", nor the fact that "this pope is a true pope", nor the fact that such a translation of the Bible is authentic,", nor the fact that "this book contains such heretical propositions", nor the fact "this saint is truly in heaven", nor the fact that "this canon of the mass is free from error", nor any other *fact* (nor, likewise, any *conclusion*) that requires the labour of *human* and *fallible* reason, is or can ever be of faith prior to its definition or its acceptance by the Church's solemn or ordinary magisterium. Where *human* labour exists without *divine* assistance, error is possible, and where *error is possible, divine faith is not possible.* In the case of divine faith, all its elements (the *object* and its *explication* or application) have to be *divine* or *rectified by God.* (156-239)

[94] JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *De Sacra Theologia,* q.1, d.2, a.4, n.8.

[95] This is also clearly discernible in the attitude of Billuart. This distinguished theologian already admits, at least as probable, that dogmatic facts are of divine faith, because he already admits that the Church's infallibility in such facts is probably of divine faith. On the other hand, if he still persists in denying that canonization is of divine faith, it is because, as he himself confesses, such infallibility is not *yet* clearly defined. These are his words: "I say, in the second place: It does not *appear* to be of *faith* that the *Church* is *infallible* in the canonization of Saints; *consequently,* (the reader will please take note of this *consequently)* neither that whoever is canonized by the Church is a *saint* and one of the blessed. The first part is confirmed by the fact that *there is no definition of her infallibility,* as a truth of divine faith, in the canonization of saints, nor can this be gathered from her praxis. *The second part follows from this.* For if it is not of faith that the Church *is infallible* when she canonizes someone, then a fortiori neither is it of faith that this canonized person *is a saint,* since it is not elsewhere revealed either immediately, as is per se obvious, *or mediately, in the infallibility itself of the Church,* inasmuch as *this is not certainly a truth of faith,* as has been said." (BILLUART, *De Regulis Fidei,* d.3, a.8) It is plain that Billuart confesses that if the Church's *infallibility* in the canonization of saints were revealed or a truth of faith, the sanctity and the glory of the canonized saint would likewise be revealed or of divine faith. Well then, we know of no theologian today who denies that the infallibility of the Church with respect to everything truly connected with the revealed deposit is a revealed truth and definable as of divine faith.

Today the former is generally admitted as of divine faith. Therefore anyone who wishes to be faithful to the principles and the spirit of St. Thomas and the other great theologians must also admit the latter as of divine faith. To do otherwise is to stick to the material letter of traditional theology while foregoing its spirit and its guiding principles in the treatise on faith.

290. A FURTHER CONFIRMATION. — As a final confirmation we will briefly sketch another argument which we have already adduced when we dealt with the problem of dogmatic facts in general.

Suppose that Christ were to come down in person from heaven and say to his Church: "All the saints that you have canonized to date are with me in heaven." In this supposition there would be no one to deny that such a statement would be of divine faith inasmuch as "God had said" it.

Well, then, we invite all theologians to advert to the fact that what Christ would be telling us *today* He had already told us *before,* and the differences of today and before make no difference in the species of faith. To admit, as the greater part of theologians admit today, that *"it is a revealed truth* that the Church is infallible in the canonization of all saints" amounts to admitting that *"God has said it",* and the faith due to what God has said is *divine,* and not merely ecclesiastical, faith.

Hence, the act of faith given to the canonization of saints (or to any other *infallible* definition by the Church) is not described correctly by the formula: "I believe that such a saint is in heaven *because the Church says so."* Nor is it exactly formulated by saying: "I believe that such a saint is in heaven *because the Holy Spirit assists the Church in the canonization of saints."* With full truth it is, and should be, formulated thus: "I believe that *such* a canonized saint is in heaven *because God has revealed* that the Church is infallible in the canonization of *all* saints". Obviously, such an act is an act of *divine faith.*

291. REPLY TO OBJECTIONS. — Almost all the objections that are usually raised concerning this matter boil down to the following: that sanctity is an internal fact or phenomenon incapable of being verified with complete certainty; that the witnesses are capable of deception; that it is possible, even for the holiest of men, to fall into sin at the last moment and be damned in spite of all external appearances to the contrary; that, even in the supposition that he has escaped damnation, it is not possible to know whether he is still in purgatory or not, etc.,etc.

The discerning reader will already have noticed that with respect to the point at issue all these objections miss the target since they would prove not only that divine faith in the fact that such a saint is in heaven is impossible, be also that infallibility, and consequently ecclesiastical faith, are similarly impossible.

Thus these is one identical and very simple solution to all such objections. Either divine assistance, which is tantamount to infallibility, is admitted in the canonization of saints, or not. If divine assistance is not admitted, then obviously no divine faith is possible; but equally no ecclesiastical faith is possible. On the other hand, if divine assistance is admitted, all those objections are left without support since even if sanctity is an internal fact about which every man can be mistaken, nonetheless it is not fact about which either God or man assisted by God can be mistaken.

Likewise, without divine assistance, the Church can err in judging whether such a council was ecumenical or not (or even whether such a council existed or not), whether such a pope is a true pope, whether such a translation of the Bible, e.g, the Vulgate, is correct, etc., etc. Where error is possible, divine faith is impossible. However, since there is divine assistance to verify the particular fact, there is no room for either error or fallibility in the determination of such a fact. On the other hand, since that particular fact is an instance of *a revealed universal* (*every* council, *every* translation of the Bible, *every* canonized saint. . . .), it is for this reason, and not precisely because of the divine assistance, although not without such divine assistance, that such particular facts are of *divine faith* once they are defined.[96]

292. A FURTHER OBJECTION could be raised as follows: the fact that *this particular* saint is in heaven is *something more* than the revealed universal that all saints *in general* are in heaven. But if it is something more and it is also of divine faith, which is the same as that it is *revealed,* then there is an *increase,* no matter how small, in *revelation* after the Apostles, which is inadmissible.

We must confess that every time we read or hear this objection we cannot help conceiving a very poor opinion of those that raise it. In our way of thinking, it reveals an extremely narrow idea of the divine authority of the Church as if it had no other purpose but the *preservation* of the revealed deposit not including therein also its *explication* and *application.* Such theologians seem to imagine that for anything to be capable of divine faith it must

[96] Every time a man comes into this world by way of carnal generation, it is of divine faith — so say the theologians — that *such* a man sinned in Adam or that he was redeemed by Christ. In the same manner, every time a man exits from this world by way of sanctity, it is of divine faith that he goes to enjoy God in Heaven. The *only* difference between these two cases is that with our own eyes we perceive with certainty the fact that this man is a true man, whereas with our own eyes we do not perceive with certainty the fact that this man is truly a saint at the moment of death, and error is possible. Well then, this difference ceases from the moment that we suppose the Church's infallibility in canonizing, which is the same as the infallibility of the Church in her judgment of sanctity, Let any theologian weigh it carefully, and he will find that the two cases are substantially *equal.*

have come from the lips of the apostles down to its last detail, and that the Church has no function other than that of transmitting or repeating faithfully like a gramophone what the apostles said without adding, developing, or introducing any novelty in the least. This extremely narrow conception of the Church's dogmatic function and of the development of dogma is the reason why many modern theologians, haunted by a childish fear of falling into transformistic Modernism, fail to grasp the whole scope of the ample theory proposed by Lirinensis and St. Thomas, which is the only theory capable of explaining successfully the authentic facts exhibited by the history of true *dogmatic development* by way of true connexion or *theological conclusion* or by way of *dogmatic fact.*

We concede, therefore, that the theological conclusion is *something more* than the revealed principle from which it is deduced. But if such a conclusion is deduced through an inclusive or *implicit* process – and only thus is it definable as of divine faith – then it is something more not of *doctrine* or objectivity, but something more of *explication* of one and the same revealed doctrine. We also concede that every dogmatic fact and every canonization of a saint is *something more* than the revealed universal with which such facts are connected; but they are not something more of objectivity or doctrine, but of *application* to particular instances of one and the same doctrine already revealed in general.

Thus the only thing that follows therefrom is that the Church has divine authority for *something more* than the *preservation* of the revealed deposit, for she has it also in order to *explicate* and *apply* the deposit provided that the explication and application can be done without any *new revelation.*

293. Finally, THE THIRD OBJECTION that might be urged by some people is that if it be granted that the canonization of saints and every *infallible* definition by the Church are of divine faith, then there appears to be no distinction left between what is defined as a *dogma of faith* and what is defined as merely *infallible,* between what is condemned as *heretical* and what is condemned as *erroneous* or with any other censure inferior to that of heresy.

The answer to this objection is that although both definitions are of divine faith, and consequently there is between them no specific or formal difference, there always have been, as there are, two accidental or material differences.

The first difference consists in this: what is expressly defined by the Church as a *dogma of faith* or the contradictory of which is condemned as *heretical,* not only *is itself of divine faith,* but also *it is of divine faith that it is of divine faith.* Thus he who denies it is a *heretic.* On the other hand, what is defined by the Church simply as an infallible truth or whose contrary is condemned with a censure inferior to that of heresy is itself indeed *of divine faith* but *it is not of divine faith that it is of divine faith,* and thus he who denies it is not a heretic. The reason for this difference is the fact that the Church has already defined that anything defined by her as *revealed* must be believed with divine faith and under pain of heresy. However, she has not yet defined that there is any obligation to believe with divine faith or under pain of heresy anything she defines as infallible.[97]

The second difference lies in this: it is of *divine faith* that whatsoever is defined by the Church as a dogma of faith or whose contrary is condemned as heretical is a *revealed* truth; on the other hand, it is of *divine faith* that whatsoever is defined by the Church only as an infallible truth or whose contrary is condemned with a censure inferior to that of heresy is an *infallible truth* but it is not yet of divine faith that it is a *revealed truth.* The reason for the second difference lies in the fact that, not being discursive, faith limits itself to assenting to what is *defined* and only to what is defined. Now then, in definitions of the first kind the Church not only defines the *truth* but also the *revelation* of such a truth. On the other hand, in definitions of the second kind the Church defines the truth but without defining expressly the revelation of such a truth. Yet both the one and the other are equally revealed. God has revealed the former *in particular,* He has revealed the latter *in the universal.* When God revealed that the Church is infallible in the definition of *any and every* dogmatic fact and in the canonization of *any and every saint* He revealed implicitly, but truly, that *this* dogmatic fact or *this* saint are infallibly certain once they have been defined.

Thus the differences between the so-called ecclesiastical faith and divine faith are accidental or material. In either one what is essential or formal in faith, i.e., the *formal motive* of belief, is one and the same: *divine revelation.* Therefore both are *divine faith.*

294. SUMMARY. – We believe that with this study of the question of the canonization of saints together with those previously done on theological conclusions and dogmatic facts, a sufficient examination has been made of both the nature of the modern ecclesiastical faith and the *scope* of dogmatic progress.

The reader, especially the truly Thomist reader, will have noticed that the nature of the so-called ecclesiastical faith necessarily and totally depends

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97 "There are some propositions where it happens that not only are they of faith, but *their respective reflexive propositions are likewise of faith, that is, that they are also of faith,* that such propositions are of faith, as e.g., Christ's incarnation and the Trinity of Persons are of faith in such a way that *it is also of faith that they are of faith.* But some times the propositions themselves are of faith *but their respective reflexives are not of faith because there is still some controversy regarding their definition.*" (JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *De Auctoritate Summi Pontificis,* d.2, a.2, n.5)

on the nature of the faith we give to this proposition: "The Church is infallible with respect to *everything* necessarily connected with the revealed deposit". If this is a proposition of *divine faith,* as almost all theologians today admit, then every true Thomist, who is acquainted not only with the letter but also with the spirit of St. Thomas's principles, must admit that the so-called ecclesiastical faith is truly divine faith. On the other hand, anyone who thinks that the Church's infallibility in such matters is not *yet* of divine faith but merely a *theological conclusion* (as the early theologians maintained in the case of *dogmatic facts*), must logically admit that ecclesiastical faith is formally *human,* inasmuch as any faith or any certainty grounded only on theological connexion is formally human. At any rate, and whatever be the supposition made, the so-called ecclesiastical faith must, for every true Thomist, be either a divine or a human faith. A faith that is *specifically a mean* between divine and human faith is an evident inconsistency in Thomist doctrine.[98]

[98]Every conclusion proceeds from the major premise through the minor. Thus, in order to know how the minor enters into the reasoning – that is to say, into the assent we give to the conclusion – it is only necessary to take note of the *difference* between the conclusion and the major premise. If they differ only in a condition – and this is the case in any and every dogmatic fact – it is obvious that the minor has not entered into the reasoning except as a *condition that applies* the revealed universal major to a particular instance.

If the reader will consider one of the examples we have given of dogmatic facts (any one will do), he will see that the predicate of the conclusion is exactly the same as the predicate of the revealed major. Between them there is no real distinction, as in the case of physico-connexive conclusions; nor virtual distinction, as in the case of metaphysico-inclusive conclusions; not even a nominal distinction, as in the case of improper conclusions, since there is no difference at all in doctrine or in meaning. The only difference is that the condition has been verified and has been removed. This is the reason why the minor premise does not enter into the assent to the conclusion except as a *mere condition.*

There is no doubt that, apart from *divine assistance,* we can scarcely have anything better than a *moral certainty* as regards the verification of the condition, and that, absolutely speaking, there is always room for error. But if we presuppose God's assistance, which is assured in every infallible definition, it follows: (a) that the defined dogmatic fact in no way differs from the revealed major except as a mere condition; (b) that this condition is, consequently, infallibly and divinely applied. Therefore, in accordance with the principles accepted today by all theologians, any truth that satisfies these two conditions is of *divine* faith.

Thus, it is understandable that, before the distinction between particular facts and dogmatic facts had been clarified, some theologians should have denied the Church's infallibility with regard to facts. Likewise, it is understandable that, once such infallibility had been accepted, though not as a truth of faith, they should have persisted in refusing to admit that the defined dogmatic fact is of divine faith. But we cannot understand how some theologians find it possible to admit that the Church's infallibility with respect to

Thus, although the definability as of divine faith of both the *dogmatic facts* and the canonization of saints is intimately linked to the rigorously and truly theological conclusion's definability as of divine faith, the Thomist theologian should not confuse these two questions as if they were of equal value.

Truly and rigorously theological conclusions, i.e., conclusions absolutely connected with the revealed deposit, are definable as of *divine faith.* We hold this to be an evident and fundamental truth; a truth expressly affirmed by St. Thomas and all traditional theology up to the confusion introduced in the 17th century with regard to the "revealed virtual"; a truth without which it is impossible to explain the authentic facts of the history of dogmas.

On the other hand, the question of whether dogmatic facts, and hence the canonization of saints, deserve divine or only human belief is a question we consider secondary and of little importance or significance for the fundamental problem of dogmatic progress. Although we are persuaded, and we think we have proven, that the faith we give to dogmatic facts and the canonization of the saints is truly a divine faith, it would make little difference to us that anyone should deny it provided that he admits that the Church can define as dogmas of divine and Catholic faith all those *theological conclusions* that are deduced from the revealed deposit by a process of *real identity,* or *essential connexion,* or *absolute certainty.*[99] This is what Suárez and Lugo

dogmatic facts is a truth of divine faith, or at least definable as of divine faith, and then deny that such facts can be defined as of divine faith. Hence it is with satisfaction that we have called attention to the fact that many theologians, in their reviews of the Spanish edition of our work, agree with us in rejecting the pretended ecclesiastical faith as specifically distinct from divine faith. Among them are two Thomist theologians of the first rank, Fathers Ramírez and Pégues.

"We harbour the persuasion that the ecclesiastical faith, theologically unjustifiable, will disappear from Thomist theology, and even from Catholic theology." (S. Ramírez, O.P., in *La Ciencia Tomista,* Nov.-Dec., 1923, pg.395. J. PÉREZ DE URBEL, O.S.B., in *Revista Eclesiástica,* 15-30 Nov.,1923, pg.654. JUAN MANUEL LÓPEZ, O.S.A., in *España y América,* Feb. 1924, pg.290)

"The ecclesiastical faith, presented as a faith different in nature from divine faith and inferior to it, seems, as a matter of fact, something entirely inadmissible." (THOMAS PÉGUES, O.P., in *Revue Thomiste,* Jan., 1924, pgs. 66-67).

[99]In the present case, *absolute inseparability* is the same as essential connexion and *real identity.* There can be no absolute inseparability without essential connexion, nor can there be essential connexion without *contradiction* to its opposite, nor can there be contradiction if it is not grounded on real identity. Hence, every rigorously metaphysical or rigorously theological consequence is really identical with the principle or antecedent from which it is deduced. The conclusion is but a *part* of the principle. "The principles from which the syllogism proceeds, are to be conclusion as the *whole* to the part, and the conclusion is to the principle as the *part to the whole.*" (ST THOMAS, *In*

called the *formally-confusedly* revealed, what the moderns call the *identico-material* or *connexive-essential* virtual, and what traditional theology had simply termed *implicit* or *virtual,* since if it is to be rigorously scientific or theological, implicitness has to be virtual, and if it is to be rigorously theological and not merely physical, virtuality has to be *connexive-essential* and, therefore, objectively implicit.

295. THE CONCLUSION that follows from this chapter on ecclesiastical faith is that the evolution of dogma is of such magnitude that it encompasses the four degrees of Catholic teaching. These four degrees are: (a) the *revealed datum* or truths expressly revealed; (b) truths already defined as *dogmas of faith;* (c) truths defined as *infallible* but not yet as dogmas; (d) truths not yet defined but *necessarily connected* with any of the three previous degrees: such truths are known as *theological conclusions* and *dogmatic facts.*

The difference between these four degrees is not expressed in terms of revealed and not revealed, but in terms of the revealed explicitly and the revealed implicitly. Since anything truly revealed by God, whether explicitly or implicitly, is an infallible truth, all the truths found in those four degrees of Catholic teaching commonly possess two characteristics: (a) they are *revealed truths;* (b) they are *infallible truths.*

The Church may, if she so wishes, define at once the characteristic of being *revealed* or *of divine faith* of any of the propositions of those four degrees, without previously defining its characteristic of being an *infallible truth.*

Poster. Analyt., lib.1,lect.38) "The consequence is *a part* and *something of the antecedent.*" (JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *Logica,* p.2, q.7, a.2) Since the true and only formal principles of theology are the revealed principles, every rigorously theological or essentially-connexive conclusion is really identical to the divine deposit and truly *implicit* in it. Hence we are greatly pleased to read the following passage in a modern Thomist as distinguished as Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange: "On the other hand there are relations, not accidental but *essential,* which are *implicated* in a determinate essence or in one of its faculties. And the concept that *expresses* this essence, *expresses at the same time* the relations *which it contains.* Thus *being* designates that which has a relation to existence, this relation is *implicated* in the very *nature* itself of that which exists . . . . That which we have said of *being* in general and of its *properties* is true of *all the* absolute analogous *perfections* which common sense attributes to God, as e.g. intelligence, wisdom, providence, free will, mercy, justice." (*Dieu,* n.56, pgs. 542-545) We also read in the learned Fr. de Regnon: "This proposition, 'The world is created by God', in spite of its *synthetic appearances,* is nonetheless an *analytic* judgment, for the intimate notion of the world *contains the notion* of an infinite cause," *(Etudes sur la Sainte Trinité,* vol. 1,pg.22) Of this same nature is every rigorously theological, conclusion, i.e., that which is essentially connexive. They are not judgments that are synthetic or that *add* to the revealed deposit, but analytic or *really identical* to the deposit. This is why they are homogenous to it and definable as of faith.

She thus defined as of divine faith, e.g. the theological conclusion concerning the two intellects and two wills in Christ, or the obligation of confessing the circumstances that change the species of sin, and the dogmatic facts that the Vulgate is authentic, or that the Canon of the mass is free from all error.

On the other hand, the Church may also first define a theological conclusion or a dogmatic fact as infallible truths without as yet defining them as revealed or of divine faith. This is the more usual procedure. Thus, e.g., she has already defined as infallible the need of jurisdiction in the confessor, or the dogmatic fact about Jansen's book, without as yet defining them as revealed or of divine faith. However, although she has not yet defined them as revealed, she may so define them should she wish, or should it become necessary to do so. Just as the Church has said: "If any man say that in order to obtain the remission of sins in the sacrament of Penance it is not necessary by divine law to confess. . . . the circumstances that change the species of sin; let him be anathema", and, "If any man say that the Canon of the mass contains error and should therefore he abrogated: let him be anathema", so she could likewise say: "If any man say that in the sacrament of Penance it is not necessary for the confessor to have jurisdiction: let him be anathema", or, "If any man say that the Symbol said to be of St. Athanasius contains error, or that Jansen's book *Augustinus* does not contain errors; let him be anathema." The necessity of confessing the specific circumstances of sins is as much a theological conclusion as the necessity of jurisdiction in the confessor. The freedom from error of the Canon of the mass is as much a dogmatic fact as the orthodoxy of the Symbol of St. Athanasius and the heterodoxy of Jansen's book. And the same thing can be affirmed of any other conclusion, provided it is rigorously theological, and of any other fact, provided it is truly dogmatic.

Consequently, the difference between infallible definitions and definitions of divine faith – and thus between ecclesiastical faith and divine faith – is not a specific difference of teaching or objectivity, but a difference of stage through which one and the same teaching passes, or can pass, before reaching the supreme stage of dogma of faith. There is no truth definable as of divine faith that might not be first defined as an infallible truth, and there is no truth defined or definable as infallible which may not be defined as of divine faith. In our opinion this is a traditional teaching of utmost certainty in the case of rigorously theological *conclusions,* and most probable, not to say certain, teaching in the case of truly dogmatic facts.[100]

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[100]This merely accidental difference between definitions of divine faith and infallible definitions might perhaps become clearer to some people by means of the following historical example. In the Tridentine Council the following dogmatic canon had already been prepared: "If any man say that, in accordance with the evangelical and apostolic teaching, the bond of matrimony can be dissolved on account of the adultery

296. THE CAUSE OF TWO TRENDS. – If some modern Thomists do not accept this teaching, it is because they fancy that for *any thing* to be implicitly revealed and definable as of divine faith it is necessary that it be contained in the revealed datum *directly*, and not only indirectly; *formally*, and not only virtually or consequently.

On the other hand, we consider it obvious that St. Thomas and all of traditional theology prior to the confusion introduced into these matters in the 17th century, held as also implicitly revealed and definable as of divine faith everything contained in the apostolic deposit *indirectly*, everything contained in it in a rigorously theological, or virtual, or consequential manner, everything from whose denial there follows with *absolute* necessity the denial of that which is formally revealed. Says St. Thomas:

"It must be said that the article is an indivisible truth with respect to what is *actually explicated* in the article, but divisible with respect to *those things that are contained* POTENTIALLY *in the article*, insofar as he who says one thing, somehow says many things: and such things are those which precede the article or are *consequent to it:* and in this regard the article of faith can be *explicated* and divided."[101] "To *explicate* the articles of faith

of one of the spouses. . . . let him be anathema". In this canon, the teaching denied by the Greek Church was defined as a teaching of Catholic faith, and thereby the Greek Church itself stood condemned as heretical. Since this could cause a considerable cooling off among the Greeks and render union more difficult, diplomacy or prudence intervened as usual, and without altering in the least the *doctrine* of the dogmatic canon, its *formulation* changed by rewriting and redefining it in the following manner: "If any man say that *the Church has erred when she taught* and teaches that, in accordance with evangelical and apostolic doctrine, the bond of matrimony cannot be dissolved on account of the adultery of one of the spouses: let him be anathema." (TRID. COUNCIL, sess. 24,can.7; Denz.-Schön. 1807) What difference is there between these two canons, or between these two doctrinal versions? There is no essential difference or difference in meaning at all, but merely a difference in formulation or wording. "*Merely the sound*, but not the *meaning*, has been changed", says with good reason the great historian of the Tridentine, Card. Pallavicini. Indeed, if it is of divine faith that the Church *does not err* when she teaches that doctrine, it is also of divine faith, or definable as of divine faith, that the Greeks *err* when they teach or practice the opposite. Well then, let the two following canons be considered without biases: (a)"If any man say that such a theological conclusion is not true, or that such a dogmatic fact is not true: let him be anathema"; (b)"If any man say that the Church has erred when she taught and teaches that such a theological conclusion is true, or that such a dogmatic fact is true: let him be anathema." Those who defend the modern ecclesiastical faith must say, and do say, that the Church can define the second of those two canons as of divine faith, but that she cannot define the first. But anyone who considers them without preconceived ideas will plainly see that if the Church can define one as of divine faith, she can similarly define the other. To say that the Church does not err when she affirms a given teaching is the same as saying that they err who deny it, and the same as saying that such a thing is true. There is no difference other than that of implicit or explicit. Therefore, if one of them is definable as of divine faith, so is the other.

[101] *In 3 Sent.*, d.35, q.2.,a.2, ad 5.

can happen in two ways: first . . .; Secondly, with respect to *those things that are* IMPLICITLY *contained in the articles themselves:* and this takes place when a man knows *the things that follow from the articles.*"[102] "And *in this regard* the faith can be *explicated* day by day, and *has been more and more explicated* through the efforts of the Fathers, (*ibid.*) "A thing can pertain to the *faith* in two ways . . . But *indirectly those things* pertain to the *faith from the denial of which there follows something contrary to the faith.*"[103] *"Those things from which there follows the corruption of some article."*[104] *"Those things from which there follows something unsuitable and contrary to the faith."*[105]

When such an inclusive, or indirect, or consequential virtual is defined by the Church "the *same judgment* applies to the *latter* [the indirect] and to the *former* [the direct] which are already determinate in the faith *because the one follows the other."* (See place last quoted) "And *for this reason* many things are now considered heretical which were not so reputed previously, *because it is now much more clear what follows from them.*"[106] "The answer is that by the term *indirectly* pertains to the faith St. Thomas understands *that which is by a necessary consequence deduced from any proposition that is immediately of faith.* As, e.g., he who denies that *Christ is risible* commits consequently and *indirectly* an error in the Catholic faith. . . . . because to date the Church has *not yet defined* that Christ is risible. But if the Church should define it, then he who denies that Christ is risible *would be* a heretic."[107] All the early Thomists express themselves in similar vein.[108]

297. THE THOMIST FORMULA. – Thus, the truly Thomist and traditional formula of the scope of dogmatic progress is not the narrow formula given by the Salmanticenses as follows: "The Chuch never defines as a dogma of faith anything that is not presupposed to its definition as *formally re-*

[102] *Loc. cit.*, d.25, q.2, a.1, sol.3.

[103] *Summa Theol.*, p.1, q.32, a.4.

[104] *Summa Theol.*, 2-2, q.11, a.2.

[105] *In 1 Sent.*, d.33, q.1, a.5

[106] *Summa Theol.*, p.1, q.32, a.4.

[107] BÁÑEZ, *In 2-2*, q.11, a.2; and *In p.1*, q.1, a.2.

[108] In the sciences whose reasoning process is *essential* or *inclusive* or *intellectual*, and such is the case with metaphysics and theology (Theology is *intellectual in the highest degree* – ST. THOMAS), what we denominate mediate or virtual or potential is so denominated relative *to us*, but *in itself* it is neither mediate nor virtual nor potential, but immediate or formal or actual. This is obvious to every Thomist who has penetrated St. Thomas's teaching on the "per se notum quoad se" and the "non per se notum quoad nos". "Any proposition, the predicate of which is included *in the reason of the subject* is *immediate* and self-evident insofar as *it itself* is concerned." (ST. THOMAS, *In*

vealed"[109], but this other truly ample formula given by Báñez: "The Church has never to this date proposed to the faithful or defined as something to be believed, anything that is not contained in the Holy Scriptures or in the Apostolic traditions *expressly or virtually included* in such a way that it is *deduced therefrom by evident consequence*."[110]

This Bañezian formula is the true formula of traditional theology: the formula of St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, and Scotus; the formula of *all* theologians prior to Molina; the formula of Suárez and Lugo; lastly, the formula of the vast majority of subsequent theologians, although many of them sometimes appear to say the contrary because of the use they make of Suárez's new and ambiguous terminology.

Hence the scope of dogmatic progress is as large as the implicit *virtuality* of the revealed deposit.[111] This implicit virtuality, explicated or unfolded by the individual reason of theologians through a reasoning of real identity or essential connexion, constitutes the true and rigorous science of theology or the truly and rigorously *theological conclusion*. The same implicit virtuality explicated or unfolded by the Church's divine authority, with the

Post. Analyt, lib.1, lect.4) "For it is on this account that a proposition is *self-evident* [or immediate], that the predicate is *included in the reason of the subject.*" (*Summa Theol.*, p.1, q.2, a.1) Hence metaphysics, and theology in its connexive-essential conclusions, and the Church in her definitions, do not change the *purely mediate* (that which is *only* mediate) into immediate, but they change what is immediate *in itself* (the *implicit* mediate or the *implicit* virtual) into immediate *to us*. In this sense there is no objection to saying that the Church can define as of faith nothing but the *immediately revealed;* but in this sense everything really identical or connexive-essential is *immediately* revealed, that is, immediate *in itself*, although mediate *relative to us*. It is in this sense that the term *immediate* is understood by a great many theologians after Suárez, with the result that many become confused and are led to believe that they deny the definability as of divine faith of every true mediate or virtual, whereas they only deny the definability of the virtual or mediate that is *merely connexive*. (82-168)

[109] SALMANTICENSES, *De Fide*, dub. 4, n.146.

[110] BÁÑEZ, *In 2-2*, q.1, a.7.

[111] This *implicit* virtuality, which is attainable by us only by way of theological conclusion, existed and exists in such wealth and abundance in the revealed deposit that, according to St. Thomas, explicate and unfold it is as much as she may, the Church will never exhaust it until we see it in its totality clearly and explicitly in the facial vision of the divine essence. "The *explication* of the articles of faith happens in two ways. *One*, with respect to the substance of the articles themselves insofar as the articles themselves are *distinctly* known. The *other way* is with respect to those things that are contained *implicitly* in the articles themselves; and this happens when a man knows the things that *follow* from the articles. . . . But no man is totally obliged to the *second explication* of the articles so as to know *everything* that is contained in the articles concerning salvation: for this is *not possible except in heaven* where the substance itself of the articles *will be fully seen*." (ST. THOMAS, *In 3 Sent.*, d.25, a.2, q.3)

Holy Spirit's assistance, constitutes the *dogma of faith*. The explication made by the individual reason of the theologians, no matter how evident and clear the reasoning, is a formally human or theological explication, it is never of divine faith (either for the theologian himself or for others) so long as it is not defined by the Church. On the other hand, the Church possesses *divine*, and not only human or ecclesiastical, authority in order to *explicate* or unfold, and not only to *preserve, everything that is truly implicit* in the revealed datum. It makes no difference whether the implicitness is formal, or virtual, provided that it is *true implicitness* and that it can be explicated or unfolded without any *new revelation*.

Chapter VI

SOLUTION TO THE OBJECTIONS

298. LIGHT AND SHADOW. — With the exception of truths of immediate evidence — and unfortunately, our poor minds are in possession of only a very limited number of such truths — all other truths always exhibit two faces: one bright, the other dark. The bright side provides the ground for the demonstrations or proofs of the truth; the dark side gives rise to the objections against it.

In the previous chapters we have submitted the proofs for our position on the evolution of dogma. There remains the task of solving the objections that may be raised against it. We intend to do so in this chapter.

All the objections or observations we are going to deal with have been submitted to us by four distinguished theologians. We will not disclose their names, since three of them are still alive, but we will transcribe their words literally so as to maintain all their vigour intact.

We will allow ourselves only the liberty of italicizing certain words of phrases in order to focus the reader's attention on them.

We will divide this chapter into four sections:

1. Objections against dogmatic evolution in general.
2. Further objections against it.
3. Objections against the identification of the scope of dogmatic evolution with the scope of the Church's infallibility.
4. Objections against one of the principal arguments for dogmatic evolution.

The reader will have noticed, after the perusal of these four sections, that almost all the objections against our position are raised: (a) either by those who consider us as a theoretician of transformism and charge us with

maintaining the definability as of divine faith of non-implicit conclusions, and consequently affirming that that which is not-revealed can become a dogma; (b) or by those who accuse us of lapsing into "theologism" (119) believing that we affirm with Vásquez that theological conclusions are formally of faith prior to their definition, or in other words, that we confuse *human* theological reasoning with *divine* faith.

Hence — and the reader ought to be aware of this from the beginning — our position will consist in insisting repeatedly, against Modernism, that truly implicit theological conclusions alone are definable, and, against Vázquez, that *no* theological conclusion is of faith prior to its definition by the Church.

Thus all the objections are as a matter of fact aimed against the adversaries of the traditional teaching which we maintain.

Furthermore, we are firmly persuaded that every impartial reader of chapter 6 (Solution to the Objections) and, especially, chapter 7 (The Voice of Tradition) will: (a) either fully accept the traditional thesis upholding the evolution of dogma by way of truly theological conclusions; (b) or confess that the debated question is, at least, entirely free.

This will eventually lead theologians to adopt our theory. For, even discounting the fact that it accords better with tradition, it allows — as everybody admits — for an easy, clear, and impartial solution of the problems that arise from evident and numerous facts in the history of dogmas, which is not the case with the opposed theory.

Let us, then, proceed to the objections that have been raised.

SECTION I

OBJECTIONS AGAINST DOGMATIC EVOLUTION IN GENERAL

299. FIRST OBSERVATION. — The objections we will be dealing with were submitted to us in the form of *observations*. We will transcribe them in the same form. The *first* one follows:

"By a dogma of faith I understand every truth *formally* or *immediately* revealed by God in the divine Scriptures or in Tradition and as such proposed by the Church to all the faithful."

Reply. If our objector begins by assuming that nothing is a dogma of faith, except what is *formally* or *immediately* revealed, then he assumes the very issue in dispute and takes for granted precisely that which he should prove.

For anything to be definable as of divine faith the Church has never demanded that it be formally or immediately revealed, but simply that it be

revealed. The Vatican says: "Further, everything that is contained in the word of God, whether written or handed down, and is by the Church proposed for belief as divinely revealed, whether through a solemn pronouncement or through the ordinary and universal magisterium, is to be believed with divine and Catholic faith." It is clear that the text simply and only speaks of being *revealed;* not one word about being *formally* or *immediately* revealed.

If from the teaching of the Church we pass on to the teaching of traditional theology we will find that, with the sole exception of Molina, *all* the great theologians prior to Suárez, Suárez himself, Lugo and a multitude of theologians after Lugo and Suárez teach that *mediate* or *virtual* revelation suffices to make a thing capable of being defined by the Church as a dogma of faith. The following passage from Suárez perfectly resumes theological tradition. Let it suffice for the moment: "In the third place it must be said that the *theological conclusion* that before was *contained only virtually* in revelation, after its definition by the Church is most properly and formally of faith . . . This assertion is in my judgment *certain* and taken from the *common consensus of theologians. . . . Nor do I find any theologian contradicting it.*"[2]

Our objector is free to hold a view contrary to what Suárez with good reason calls *certain* doctrine and the *common* view of theologians. But he should not make the mistake of taking his own view as a starting point, and much less of introducing it as a necessary element in the very definition of dogma, even if certain theological compendiums – among them some of Thomist authorship – do so. In the definitions of theological concepts, as in the concept of *dogma,* no elements should be introduced except those that the Church teaches or that are admitted unanimously by theologians; never those that are disputable, and much less those that are contrary to the almost common opinion of the great masters in theology.

300. SECOND OBSERVATION. – "Likewise, by theological conclusion in the strict and proper sense I understand every *virtually* or *mediately* revealed truth, that is, everything that is deduced from the revealed deposit as 'effect from the cause' or as 'property from the essence'. This, I take it, is the definition given by the Salmanticenses and Billuart."

Reply. The definition of the theological conclusion is well given. It is the traditional definition. (42) But the difference or defect is not in the definition but in the manner it is understood. The Salmanticenses – and Billuart does little else but resume them – understood the revealed virtual or theological conclusion after the fashion of Suárez and Lugo, and *thus understood,*

[1] VATICAN COUNCIL, Const. *De Fide Catholica,* ch.3; Denz-Schön. 3011.

[2] SUÁREZ, *De Fide,* d.3, s.11, n.11.

they did very well and very logically in denying their definability as truths of faith.

Indeed, one can reason or pass from cause to effect or from essence to property along two radically different ways, to wit: (a) the way of metaphysico-essential connexion, and this is a connexion of identity or objective inclusion, which cannot be made to fail even by God Himself; (b) the way of *natural* or purely physical connexion, and this is a connexion bereft of identity or objective inclusion, which, consequently, can be made to fail by God every time it pleases Him to do so.

Hence the whole meaning of that classical definition depends on how we take the cause or the essence, and how we take the effect or the property when we reason or pass from the one to the other extreme.

If to deduce as a conclusion an *actual* effect we take as a principle or major premise the cause in a purely *natural* or physical sense, i.e. the so-called *real* cause or cause *in essendo,* e.g., "It is fire, therefore it *burns in fact*", the conclusion is not a *theological* conclusion – a theological conclusion demands absolute certainty – but a *physical* and fallible conclusion. Likewise, if to deduce as a conclusion an *actual* property we take as a principle or major premise, not the *integral* or the *perfect* essence, but the *pure* or bare essence – between the latter and the actual properties there is no other but a *natural connexion* –e.g., "he is a *man*, therefore he is *actually* risible", the conclusion is not and cannot be a theological conclusion; it is a physical conclusion. (98, 107)

Well, then, an attentive reading of the Salmanticenses will make it clear that this is what they, together with Suárez and Lugo, understand by theological conclusion or revealed virtual, although at times they mix other concepts proceeding from the traditional Thomist notion. The same thing happens with many modern compendiums.[3]

[3] "We answer by denying the major understood in the sense of the *natural* cause, or cause *in esse et apparere,* of which we have spoken in our third conclusion." (SALMANTICENSES, *De Fide,* d.1, dub.4, n. 132). "Or it could be said that the cause, is understood in two ways, viz.: *in the first act,* and *in the second act.* Thus although the express revelation of a cause causing in the second act is the formal revelation of the effect that terminates its causality, such is not the case in the revelation of the cause considered *in the first act,* for on the strength of this revelation there is signified only that there exists in it the *power to produce a given effect, but not the actual production of the effect,* which is necessary for considering the existence of such an effect to be formally revealed." (*Loc. cit.,* n.150) It is obvious that the cause in which there exists a distinction between its *productive power* and the *actual production,* is the *physical* cause or cause *in essendo,* not the metaphysical or virtual cause, as we have elsewhere observed. (50)

Thus, when the authors deny the definability as of divine faith of the theological conclusion or revealed virtual, what they in effect deny is only the definability of something which is neither a true theological conclusion nor a true revealed virtual. On the other hand, when they affirm the definability as of divine faith of the revealed formal-confused, they affirm the definability of true theology because without being aware of so doing they have nonetheless included within the revealed formal-confused the whole of the true, proper and only theology, the existence of which is impossible without the essential, or absolute or objectively *infallible* connexion between the principle or major premise and the conclusion. (82)

301. THIRD OBSERVATION. – "The Salmanticenses, in *De Fide*, disp. 1, n.124, quote St. Thomas and a large chorus of early Thomists against the definability of the revealed virtual or theological conclusion as of divine faith."

Reply. Our objector should distinguish two questions that ought always to be distinguished in these matters.

The first question is "whether the revealed virtual or theological conclusions are of faith *per se*, that is, prescinding from the Church's definition". This is the true question treated by the Salmanticenses in the cited numbers 124 to 127. To this first question the Salmanticenses reply, and do very well in replying, *negative;* and cite, and very aptly too, St. Thomas and that large chorus of Thomists mentioned by our objector. Against Vázquez and Vega, we subscribe to everything said by Salmanticenses in those numbers, and every Thomist would do likewise.

The second question is "whether the theological conclusion or revealed virtual is definable by the Church as of divine faith, or equivalently, if it is formally of divine faith *after* its definition." The Salmanticenses do not touch upon this question until number 143 ff., and then on the occasion of an objection. To this second question the Salmanticenses likewise reply, it is true, *negative*. Having understood the virtual and the conclusion in the same sense as Suárez and Lugo, they had to reply in the negative. But in this second question the Salmanticenses do not cite – and nobody will ever cite – even one single text from St. Thomas, or from any distinguished Thomist before the Suarezian confusion, *contrary* to the definability of the truly theological conclusion as of faith. On the other hand, passages from every one of them can be adduced in favour of definability.

Anyone who reads the Salmanticenses on this subject should pay attention to three things:

First, the Salmanticenses, far from opposing Molina's opinion as every previous Thomist, including John of St. Thomas, had done, quote him, on the contrary, in their favour.

Secondly, every time they cite Suárez and Lugo in order to impugn them, the citations refer to passages in which Suárez and Lugo speak of the virtual physico-connexive and not to the passages in which they speak of the formal confused or the virtual metaphysico-inclusive.

Thirdly, every time they adduce the stock example of the theological conclusion, viz. "man, therefore risible", not once do they mention the term "perfect man" in lieu of "man".

All these clues, and many others that could be mentioned, point to the fact that the Salmanticenses take the terms formal confused and pure virtual in the same sense as Suárez and Lugo, or at least that they employ the new Suarezian and Lugonian terminology quite unaware of the anti-Thomist contraband hidden in it. In any case the question whether the Salmanticenses and Billuart were truly of this or that mind is for us a problem of secondary importance, as it should be for every Thomist, in view of the fact that the mind of *all* classical Thomists prior to the 17th century and of great many other subsequent Thomists is quite plain on this point. This is definitely established by the clear and positive passages that the reader can see for himself in the last chapter of this book.

302 FOURTH OBSERVATION. – "That which is not known by revelation, but by reason, cannot be of faith. But the theological conclusion is known by reason, not by revelation."

Reply. That the theological conclusion is not known by *revelation?* No Thomist should be guilty of such a faux pas. *Divine revelation* is the *formal medium* whereby every truly theological conclusion is known, although the *minor* of reason is the *instrument* – only the instrument – of which *our* theology stands in need on account of the weakness of our minds. For our objector's benefit we quote here what St. Thomas laid down at the very beginning of the *Summa Theologica* in the very first question, and the commentaries of his two chief commentators:

"They are known by the *light of divine revelation.*"[4] They are knowable by *divine light.*"[5] "The proper knowledge of this science is by *revelation.*"[6] The *reason of knowing* in theology is the *light of divine revelation.*"[7] The *medium shining with divine light* constitutes the theological knowable."[8] "The *divine revealing light* is the *ratio sub qua of our theology.*"[9]

[4] ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theologica*, q.1, a.1, ad 2.

[5] *Ibid.*, a.4.

[6] *Ibid.*, a.6, ad 2.

[7] CAPREOLUS, prol. *In I Sent.*, q.4.

[8] CAJETAN, *In I Partem*, q.1, a.2.

[9] CAJETAN, *ibid.*

Hence both divine faith and sacred theology have for their object what is *truly revealed.* With no other difference but this: that which is truly revealed, but revealed *in itself,* is known simply by divine authority, without the instrument or *medium* of reasoning, and is for that reason called revealed *without medium* or *immediate.* Whereas that which is truly revealed, but revealed *in another* cannot be known by *us* unless we employ the instrument or *medium* of reasoning, and is for that reason revealed *mediate.* It is clear then, that it is not a difference of revelation on the one hand, and no revelation on the other, but a difference of two different *modes* of true revelation, or of two different mediums of knowing what is truly revealed.

Important Distinction. – Certain theologians, posterior to the 16th century, do not seem to distinguish well these three things: (a) formal revelation; (b) the *revealed formal;* (c) the revealed virtual.

Both formal revelation (revelation in the active sense) and the revealed formal (revelation in the objective sense) are designated by St. Thomas and his early commentators with the term "divine revelation". (114, 215)

Of these three things, the first, i.e. formal revelation or active revelation, is the formal motive or *reason sub qua* of divine faith. The second, i.e., the revealed formal or objective revelation, is the material object of divine faith and simultaneously the formal motive or *reason sub qua* of theology. The third, i.e. the revealed virtual, is the material object of theology.

Indeed, with divine faith we believe the revealed formal *because of* formal revelation; and we theologically know the revealed virtual by the revealed formal. Now then, *that which* is known or believed is always what is material in every cognitive habit, whereas *that by which* anything is believed or known is what is formal. "Every cognitive habit *formally* looks *to the medium whereby* something is known, but *materially* looks to *that which* is known by the medium".[10]

The revealed virtual or theological conclusion is not known immediately by active revelation which is the formal motive of divine faith; but is indeed known by means of or *through* objective revelation or the principles of faith, which constitute the formal motive of theology. However, since the principles of faith or objective revelation are themselves known by active revelation, the result is that the theological conclusion is proximately known by the principles of faith or revealed formal, and mediately by formal or active revelation, which is the formal motive of divine faith. For this reason, it was common among the early theologians to say that the theological conclusion is immediately a truth of theology, but mediately a truth of divine faith.(453)

[10] ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.,* 2-2, q.9, a.2, ad 3.

The so-called "virtual revelation" is nothing but the second of the three aforementioned things, i.e. the revealed formal insofar as it contains and makes known the third thing, which is the revealed virtual or theological conclusion. Thus, of these four things: (a) formal revelation; (b) revealed formal; (c) virtual revelation; (d) revealed virtual, the second and the third are really identical in the case of inclusive virtuality. To say that the revealed virtual or inclusive conclusion is known by means of virtual revelation is the same as saying that it is known by means of the revealed formal. Since the revealed formal is none other than *objective* revelation, St. Thomas and all the early theologians prior to the introduction of the physico-connexive virtual, affirmed briefly and truthfully that the theological conclusion is known "by divine revelation" or "by the light of divine revelation" (objective).

The twofold meaning, active and objective, of the term "revelation", as well as the different meaning of the terms "immediate" and "mediate" in the schools of Aquinas and Duns Scotus (169), which was further complicated with Suárez's introduction of the mediate or physical virtual (73), have contributed to the awful confusion of terminology in this matter. And it is a well known fact that when terms begin to get mixed up, ideas end up by following suit.

303. FIFTH OBSERVATION. – "As you have said repeatedly, the *formal* or *specific* object of divine faith is the *immediately* revealed, and the *formal* or *specific* object of theology is the mediately revealed. Now then, the formal or *specific* object of the sciences or habits are unchangeable, as happens likewise in the case of species, unless we are ready to admit *transformism* in dogma as advocated by the Modernists. Hence, the Church cannot change the mediately revealed into immediately revealed. Not even God can do that, as the Salmanticenses correctly observe. You have dealt with this difficulty in an article, however, you did not reply to it directly but with 'circumlocutions'. I believe that Fr. Matías called your attention to it in his *Boletín Teológico."*

Reply. Here goes our direct reply without "circumlocutions" since the point is completely clear for anyone who has penetrated the Thomist doctrine on the true nature of sacred theology whose procedure is always *inclusive.*

Whatever is known through deductive reasoning is said to be *mediate;* whatever is known simply through authority is said to be *immediate.* But every Thomist knows that if the reasoning is *inclusive* – as in the case of the mathematical, metaphysical, and theological sciences – what is said to be mediate is mediate only *with respect to us* but is *immediate in itself.* St. Thomas says: "Any proposition whose predicate is *in the reason of the*

subject is immediate and per se evident so far as it itself is concerned."[11] "It is on this account that a proposition is *per se evident,* that the predicate is *included in the reason of the subject."*[12]

Thus, in the case of inclusive conclusions – and such are all truly theological conclusions – that which so alarms our objector, to wit, "that the Church would be changing the mediate into immediate", reduces to the following simple case: "The Church would be changing that which is *immediate with respect to itself* into *immediate with respect to ourselves."* Nobody will deny that the Church can do this. That, and only that, is what the Church does when she defines theological *consequences,* or better still, theological *consequents* as dogmas of faith.

The case of the *non inclusive* mediate or virtual understood a la Suárez and Lugo is an altogether different one. The predicate of the minor is not really included in the subject. Neither therefore is the conclusion really included in the revealed major premise. In which case not even God can change such a mediate into immediate barring a new revelation. And on this point the Salmanticenses were right.

Our objector adds that the species and the specific objects are unchangeble. He is right, but only in the case where the medium of knowing remains unchanged. If the medium of knowing is changed, then whatever belongs to a certain habit comes *ipso facto* to belong also to another habit on account of the fact that the formal or specific element in *cognitive* habits – theology and faith are cognitive habits – is the *medium of knowing,* not the *matter* or reality known. "Every cognitive habit *formally* depends on the *medium whereby* something is known, but materially on *that which* is known by the medium."[13] "The species of any thing is chiefly judged by taking into account its *formal* reason and not by taking into account the *matter* or *subject."*[14]

Now then, when the Church intervenes with the dogmatic definition of a theological conclusion the *medium whereby* the conclusion is known changes for us. Before the definition we knew it solely *by revelation with reasoning* which is the formal medium of theology. After the definition we come to know it *by revelation without reasoning,* that is to say, *by revelation explicated and proposed by the Church,* which is the formal medium of divine faith.

[11] ST. THOMAS, *In Poster. Analyt.,* lib. 1, lect. 4.

[12] ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.,* p.1, q.2, a.1.

[13] ST. THOMAS, *op. cit.,* 2-2, q.9, a.2, ad 3.

[14] *Ibid.,* q.99, a.2.

There is a change in the mediums of knowing and, thus, also a change of habits and assents. But there is no change at all of matter or objective reality, and, therefore, no transformism or Modernism.

In a nutshell: the Church does not, and cannot, change the *non inclusive* mediate into immediate; but undoubtedly she can, and does, change the *inclusive* mediate into immediate. Which is simply to change that which is *immediate in itself* into *immediate to us.* (168)

Our objector may now accuse us of being unnecessarily repetitious given his keen intelligence, but he cannot now accuse us of not replying directly and without "circumlocutions".

304. SIXTH OBSERVATION. – "No thing is, or can be, of divine faith if it is not said by God. I do not believe that theological conclusions are what God said; they are rather what we deduce from what God said. They are our deductions, not divine sayings."

Reply. It is obvious that no thing can be of divine faith if it is not truly said by God; but it is false, in the teaching of St. Thomas and of traditional theology, that only the principles have been said by God, whereas the conclusions have not been said by Him in any manner whatsoever. St. Thomas says: "Whoever *says* one thing, *somehow says* many things, and *these* are the things that precede the article and are consequent to it, and in this regard the article of *faith* can be *explicated* and divided."[15]

In this text St. Thomas with his habitual precision employs the term somehow because there are two *ways* of saying something or two sorts of sayings: (a) to *say* something *explicating* it fully; (b) to *say* something but *without explicating* it fully. Thus there are two sorts of divine sayings: fully *explicated sayings,* and *not explicated,* that is, implicit sayings. The former are the articles of faith or major premises of faith; the latter, the theological conclusions. Let us quote St. Thomas again: "The *explication* of the articles of *faith* happens in two ways. . . . The other way refers to the things that are *implicitly* contained *in* the articles themselves, and this takes place when a man knows *the things that follow from the article."*[16] "For there are certain things that are contained in the *faith* of the Church as *conclusions* in the principles."[17]

Thus, the First Truth or God ceased speaking or revealing with the death of the last of the apostles; but He has not ceased, nor will He cease *explicating* what was said or revealed. Each and every definition of the

[15] ST. THOMAS, *In 3 Sent.,* d.25, q.2, a.1, sol.3.

[16] *Ibid.*

[17] ST. THOMAS, *In 4 Sent.,* d.13, q.2, a.1, ad 6.

Church is nothing but an explication given by God of what He had already said through the apostles. Hence Cardinal Cajetan graphically describes the Church as "the minister of the object of faith. . . . whereby the First Truth proposes and *explicates itself and other credenda.*"[18]

Consequently, both the theologian submitting his conclusions without definition, and the Church defining those same conclusions give us nothing but the *explication* of what God has implicitly *said.*

The difference between them lies in this: the theological conclusions, if they are *inclusive,* are what *God has truly said* because they are *included* in what God has said; nonetheless, as long as they are not defined by the Church, they are what God said *explicated by man.* On the other hand, those same conclusions, once they are defined, are what God said *explicated by God,* even if God makes use of the Church's ministry in order to explicate them.

For this reason, the theologian, for all his wisdom and holiness and for all the evidence of his deduction or conclusion, can only say: *It is my view.* . . . On the other hand, the Church in all her infallible definitions – and infallibility comprises not only the principles but also all theological conclusions – can, and does, say without any metaphor: *It is the view of the Holy Spirit* . . .

ARE THE DEFINITIONS OF THE CHURCH "THE WORD OF GOD"? – The foregoing makes plain the answer that must be given to the question whether the definitions of the Church are the word of God – *Verbum Dei* – or not.

The term "word", as also the term "scripture", can be taken in two different senses: the objective or material sense, and the subjective or formal sense. One thing is "what is written" (objective scripture), another thing is "the writing" (formal or subjective scripture). Likewise, one thing is "what is said" (objective word or saying), another thing is "the saying or the diction" (subjective word or saying).Peter can write down his own ideas, or he can write down what John said. In the first case, both what is written and the writing itself are Peter's. In the second case, the writing is Peter's but what is written is John's. Similarly if Peter speaks his own mind, both what is spoken and the speaking are Peter's. But if Peter says or repeats what John said, then the diction or speaking (subjective word or speech) is Peter's but what is said (objective word or speech) is John's.

In the case of the Holy Scripture, or inspired authors, both what is said or written and the speaking or writing are God's. Holy Scripture is, thus, the

[18] CAJETAN, *In 2-2,* q.1, a.1; and q.5, a.3.

word of God in both the objective and subjective senses. In the case of the definitions of the Church, what is said is God's, since the Church does nothing but repeat in a more explicated manner what was said implicitly by God. But the speaking or saying is not God's because God does not *move* her to say it, as is the case in inspiration, but simply assists her in saying it, so that is *she,* and she alone, who says it. Thus, the definitions of the Church are the word of God in the *objective* sense, but not in the *subjective* sense. And this explains why her definitions are not *Holy Scripture.*

A great number of theologians, including classical ones, deny that the definitions of the Church are *divine words.* But anyone who reads them attentively will clearly notice two things: (a) that this denial is made not only with respect to infallible definitions but with respect to definitions of divine faith as well, and no one will deny that the latter are the word of God in the *objective* sense; (b) that they take the term "divine word" in the sense of "Holy Scripture" or "inspired word", and in this sense every theologian must deny that the definitions of the Church are "the word of God."

305. SEVENTH OBSERVATION. – "The revealed deposit was closed and completed with the Apostles. This is the common teaching of theologians. It has already been consecrated by the Church in the twenty first proposition of Pius X's *Syllabus* against the Modernists."

Reply. The revealed deposit was closed and completed with the Apostles with respect to revelation; but it was neither closed nor completed, but remained open and *to be completed* by the divine magisterium of the Church with respect to the *explication* of the truths already revealed. Such divine or dogmatic explication by the Church covers, as we have seen in St. Thomas, not only the principles of the deposit but also the conclusions ("the things that follow from the principles"), without ceasing to be in the latter case an explication of what is revealed; an *explication of the faith.*

Our objector should not confuse these two radically different propositions: (a) Catholic *revelation* was closed and completed with the Apostles; (b) The *divine explication* of Catholic revelation was closed and completed with the Apostles. The first proposition is true. It is the proposition taught by the unanimous agreement of the theologians and consecrated in Pius X's *Syllabus.* The second proposition is false.

306. EIGHTH OBSERVATION. – "The theological conclusion in the strict and proper sense does not require that the conclusion should express new objectivity. I agree with this. But, as you say yourself, it does require the expression of a *new concept,* and not merely a new formula.

But, new concept is the same as *new meaning* or *new dogma.* Consequently, if the Church should propose to us as of divine faith any theological conclusion in the proper sense, we would have *new dogmas.* This is

inadmissible. The Church cannot give us new dogmas, although she can, and does, give us new formulae of the same old dogmas."

Reply. New concepts are of three kinds: (a) concepts that are new, but not completely new because they are deduced or come out of the old concepts. These are called *derived* or *consonant* concepts. (b) Concepts that are not only new, but *completely* new since they do not come out of the old ones. However, they are not incompatible with the latter. They are called *diverse* concepts. (c) Concepts that are not only *completely new* inasmuch as they do not come out of the old ones, but are also incompatible with them. For this reason they are called *contrary* or *opposed* concepts.

Thus we have three kinds of new concepts: (a) derived or consonant; (b) diverse; (c) contrary or opposed.

Instances of the first kind are absolute immutability and eternity, or spirituality and immortality, or immateriality and cognoscibility, and, in short, all those concepts which like the attributes in God are distinguished only *in the manner of the implicit and the explicit.* Instances of the second kind are quantity and quality, or colour and taste. Instances of the third kind are the concepts of spiritual and material, uncreated and contingent, white and black.

Derived or consonant concepts come out the one from the other by means of *inclusive* reasoning. Concepts that are diverse, or opposed, do not and cannot come out the one from the other since nothing can come out that was not within.

When something *new* is acquired which does not come out of what was already possessed, it is called in Thomist teaching *new in substance.* When something new is acquired which in its totality comes out from *within* of what was already possessed, it is called *new in explication.*

Thus *diverse,* or *contrary,* concepts are new not only *in explication* but also *in substance,* whereas *derived* concepts are new *in explication* but not *in substance.*

We can now clearly spot the weak point of the argument.

When our distinguised objector argues, as so many modern writers argue, that if the Church could define inclusive theological conclusions as of faith, we would in that case have new concepts, new meanings, new dogmas, the solution to the argument lies in a simple distinction in any of these forms:

First distinction: New, that is, completely new, *denied;* new, but not completely new, *conceded.*

Second distinction: new, that is, either contrary or diverse, *denied;* new, however, neither contrary or diverse, but totally derived from the old concepts, *conceded.*

Third distinction: new, that is, new *in substance, denied;* new, that is, new *in explication, conceded.*

These three ways of distinguishing say exactly the same thing.

WHAT IS THE KIND OF DOGMATIC EVOLUTION THAT HAS BEEN CONDEMNED BY THE CHURCH? – The Church has not condemned the *evolution of dogma in the same meaning* – as in the case of homogeneous evolution –; what she has condemned is the *evolution of dogma into diverse meanings,* and, therefore, much more dogmatic evolution into *contrary* meanings, as happens in all transformist evolution. "I utterly reject the heretical phantasy of *dogmas evolving into other meanings diverse* from the meaning previously held by the Church."[19] The evolution of dogmas keeping within the same meaning is so far from being condemned that it is taught by the Church: "Let it therefore grow . . . but in the same sense."[19a] Or in the words of St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure: "There are two ways of adding: either by adding what is *contrary* or *diverse,* and this is erroneous or presumptuous; or by *exposing to view* what was *implicitly* contained, and this is praiseworthy."[20] "There is an addition whereby what is added is *contrary;* another whereby what is added is *diverse;* and another whereby what is added is *consonant.* The first addition pertains to error; the second, to presumption; the third, to faithful instruction since it *explicates* what is *implicit.*"[21] What is to be understood by *implicit* is explained by the same St.Thomas: "Whenever many things are *virtually* contained in one thing, they are said to be in it *implicitly,* as the *conclusions in the principles.*"[22-23]

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[19]Formula of the anti-Modernist oath prescribed by Pius X's motu proprio *Sacrorum Antistitum* of Sept. 1, 1910; Denz Schön. 3541.

[19a]VATICAN COUNCIL, Const. *De Fide Catholica,* ch.4; Denz.-Schön, 3020.

[20]ST. THOMAS, *In 1 Sent.,* division of the text of the Prologue with its exposition.

[21]ST. BONAVENTURE, *In 1 Sent.,* exposition of the Prologue.

[22]ST. THOMAS, *De Veritate,* q. 14, a.11.

[23]"Another question arises on account of what he [the Apostle St. Paul] says: *Other than that which we have preached.* Therefore no one may teach or preach except what is written in the Epistles and the Gospels. But this is false since in I Thess. 3:10, it is said: *That we may supply those things that are lacking to your faith.*

"I answer that nothing should be preached other than that which is contained in the Gospels, the Epistles, and the Holy Scripture *implicitly* or *explicitly.* For the Holy Scripture and the Gospel preach that faith is to be given to Christ explicitly. Hence, whatever is contained implicitly in them that is conducive to his teaching and to faith in Christ may be preached and taught. And hence, when he says: *Other than that which you received,* i.e., adding *something that is altogether alien.* Apoc., last chapter, 18; *if anyone shall add* [*viz., altogether* alien] *to them, God will add unto him the plaques.* And Deut. 4:2: You shall not add to the word that I speak to you [i.e., anything *contrary* or

"The distinction of reason *changes nothing on the part of the thing.*"[24] Thus, the so-called *new* dogmas introduce no change at all in the primitive or revealed datum, provided that they do not differ really, but only conceptually, from the primitive dogmas. The newness is conceptual or subjective, not real. Something *somehow* new (secundum quid), not substantially new. There is a new mode, a new aspect; but the *objectivity*, which is the substance, is not new but the same. The Lirinensis expressed it felicitously: "When you say, *newly*, do not mean *new*."[25] "From one to an *other according to reason* which is not an *other in reality*."[26] Such is the case with every *conceptual* conclusion, with every rigorously theological conclusion.

When an old tree puts forth a new branch, the branch is new, but it is neither totally new nor new *in substance* since it grows out of the same substance or sap of the tree. This analogy of the tree and the revealed deposit is not a perfect analogy because in the case of the tree the sap is made up of elements originating from without. If the tree's sap were exclusively made up of the substance itself of the tree without any intussuception of any foreign element, there would be a more adequate analogy between the development of dogma and the development of the tree. (223) Such is the case with the new dogmas defined by way of implicit virtuality: they are new shoots of the ancient tree of the revealed deposit.

For this reason we have elsewhere (180) said, and we say it again now, that dogmatic development after the Apostles is neither merely subjective nor

alien], neither shall you take away from it." (ST. THOMAS, *In Epist. ad Galatas*, ch. 1, lect. 2)

"*Catholic conclusion:* Addition to the Symbol of the Apostles has been, and may be, licitly made by the Church . . .

"That which is added to the Symbol is neither *contrary* to, nor *diverse* from it. Contrariety induces blasphemy; diversity, want of knowledge. Only what was already *potentially* in the apostolic articles, which are the *seeds and principles* of the Christian faith, is *determined by explication, but nonetheless it was not outside of the scope of the principles* since it lay hidden in it.

"Thus to add anything *contrary* to the faith is heretical perversity; to add anything *diverse* or not pertinent and beside the faith is madness; but to *explicate* what was contained in the articles of faith is Catholic piety and erudition.

"To add anything in the *first* manner is *against* the rule faith; in the *second* manner, *beside* the rule of faith; in the *third* manner, it is *in accordance with* the rule of *faith to draw conclusions from its principles*, and it is *in this manner that it was, and is, lawful for the Church to make additions to the Symbol.*" (GRAVINA, O.P., *Catholicae Praescriptiones*, 1.4, a.4, p.358; Neapoli 1619)

[24] ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.1, q.75, a.7.

[25] *Commonitorium*, c.23.

[26] ST. THOMAS, *In Boetium De Trinitate*, q.6, a.1.

merely objective, but subjective-objective. To speak in rigorous scholastic terms it is formally or "simpliciter" subjective, but "secundum quid" objective.

It is "simpliciter" subjective because the *distinction*, and thus the newness of the development are not in the object itself independently of the subject, but are effected by the subject, as happens in every virtual or conceptual distinction.

It is "secundum quid" objective because the *foundation* of the distinction, and thus of the newness, is not in the subject alone, as happens in the case of any merely logical distinction or in any distinction of mere formulae, but is found in the object itself, viz. in the fecundity and wealth of objective aspects, already implicitly contained from the very beginning, in the object itself, that is, the primitive deposit.

Some excessively scrupulous theologians shy away from saying that the deposit itself grows, and imprison themselves in the sacred phrase that that which grows is "our" explication of the deposit. They overlook the fact that what they call "our explication of the deposit" does not, simply because it is "ours", cease to be also an explication "of the deposit". Since that new explication, or better still, since the explication made by the Church becomes incorporated into, and made an integral part of, the deposit, to say that the explication of the deposit grows is the same as saying that the deposit itself grows as regards its explication. (186)

It is one thing, therefore, to say that the deposit grows *with regard to itself*, that is with regard to its real objectivity and quite another thing to say that the deposit *itself* grows, not with regard to its objectivity, but with regard to its explication. The definitions of the Church do not make the deposit grow with regard to itself; nonetheless the deposit itself grows because *its* explication grows and that same new or greater explication becomes an integral part of itself. It is a development of explication but a development of the revealed deposit itself. (173)

307. NINTH OBSERVATION. – "John of St. Thomas expressly says and repeats several times that no thing can be defined by the Church as of divine faith unless it is *immediately* revealed."

Reply. In the passage referred to by our objector *(De Sacra Theologia*, d.2, a.4) John of St. Thomas expressly and clearly says five things:

1. That the question whether the truly theological conclusion is of divine faith or not cannot be answered without drawing a distinction between *before* or *after* the Church's definition.[27]

[27] "With regard to the certainty of the conclusions deduced by theology a *distinction* must be made: for they are *either* attained *solely through* theological *reasoning, or*, in addition to theological reasoning, they are vouched for by the *definition of the Church.*" (*Loc. cit.*, n.1)

2. That *before* the Church's definition the truly theological conclusion does not pertain to the faith immediately but mediately, and consequently, *of itself* it belongs to *theological* science. He adds that this is the more common opinion of the theologians against Vázquez, and makes it his own.[28]

3. That *after* the Church's definition *that same* conclusion becomes an object of *divine faith* and a true principle of theology. This is, he says, the *opinion commonly followed by Thomists* against Molina.[29]

4. That even if such true conclusions are known *solely through reasoning* prior to the definition, this notwithstanding, the Church does not define them as of faith insofar as they are known precisely through reasoning, but in so far as they are intended, albeit in a *hidden* manner, by the Holy Spirit. In

[28] "In the first case [i.e., prior to the Church's definition] there are two opinions . . . Others think, and theirs is the *more common* opinion, that the conclusions thus evidently deduced do not pertain immediately, but *mediately*, to the faith, but pertain *per se* to theological science . . . I say in the first place: the certainty of the theological conclusion deduced by evident consequence from the principles of faith is not *as such* [i.e., before its definition] immediately of faith, but a *scientific* and *theological* certainty . . . The contrary opinion [Vázquez's] seems to make the certainty of the theological conclusion equal to the definition of the Church, and this is altogether intolerable." (*Loc. cit.*, nn.1, 4-5)

[29] "If the certainty of theology is considered in the second case [i.e., after the Church's definition] . . . Molina and some others quoted by him, with whose opinion Granados concurs, hold that the propositions deduced and thus defined by the Church are not, on the strength of the definition, *immediately of faith*, but continue belonging to *theological science* as *conclusions*, not as *principles*. But to allay the fears of anyone who might think that these authors deny, absolutely speaking, that the propositions defined by the Church are of faith, Granados distinguishes *two ways* in which the Church proceeds: for if she declares something as *immediately* revealed by God, it undoubtedly *pertains* immediately *to the faith*. But if she defines something deduced from the revealed principles, *it does not pertain to the faith*, but to theological *conclusions*. Hence they [defined propositions] are not *principles* of theology, unless they are defined in the *first manner*, since the Holy Spirit does not assist the Church to make new revelations. Consequently, *if a thing is not immediately revealed, but only deduced through reasoning, the Church cannot turn it into something immediately of faith.*" Hereto John of St. Thomas has been describing the opinion of Molina and Granados. He goes on to say: "The *third opinion* holds that propositions *evidently deduced* from the principles of faith, *if they are defined by the Church*, pertain *immediately to the faith*, and become *principles* of theology; they rest no longer on reasoning, but their certainty derives from the divine testimony proposed by the Church in conformity with the infallible assistance of the Holy Spirit given for the purpose of defining matters of faith. *Thomists commonly are of this opinion*, as can be seen in the aforecited Navarrete and in Master González. Granados cites Bellarmine, Vega, Cano, Vázquez, and others, as being of this view . . . *I say in the second place:* the truths which the Church defines by a definition that is declarative of the faith, whatsoever be the manner in which she defines them, [the term *whatsoever be the manner* alludes to the *two ways* which Granados had just distinguished], *pertain immediately to the faith*, and can be *principles* of theology." (*Loc. cit.*, nn. 2, 3-6)

order to know or discover this hidden intention of the Holy Spirit the Church is endowed with divine assistance.[30]

5. If we call *immediately revealed* everything that is *intended by the Holy Spirit*, it follows that no thing can be defined by the Church as of divine faith unless it is immediately revealed, at least in a hidden and implicit manner.[31]

These five propositions faithfully condense everything said by John of St. Thomas. Now then, does our objector fully admit these five propositions, particularly the first three, and above all the third, of which John of St. Thomas says, "Thomists commonly follow this opinion"? If he admits them, then we both are in agreement with respect to every substantial point. There only remains an imprecision of language regarding the terms *immediate* and *mediate*, an imprecision dating from Suárez, from which some posterior Thomists, John of St. Thomas among them, are not entirely free.

This imprecision or vagueness of terms is found in the fifth proposition, the only one which seems to have caught the attention of our objector. John of St. Thomas there employs the term *immediate* as a synonym of *intended by the Holy* Spirit. If the term *immediate* is taken in this sense, it is obvious that no thing not *immediately* revealed, that is, not intended by the Holy Spirit, can be defined as of divine faith. If the term *immediate* is understood thus neither the debate between Thomists and Vázquez on the hand, nor the debate between Thomists and Molinists on the other hand, would make any sense since everyone admits that no thing is definable as of divine faith unless it is truly revealed, or truly intended by the Holy Spirit. On this point no differences exist among the schools. But the things that are truly revealed or truly intended by the Holy Spirit have always been classified into two members: (a) that which is revealed or intended *in itself;* (b) that which is revealed or intended in another. With reference to our minds, the former is called revealed *immediate* or formal never mediate or virtual; the later, re-

[30] "Hence the Church cannot define anything *precisely on account of its being deduced by theological reasoning*, as if this were the *formal* reason, although debate and reasoning precede as a previous disposition for the purpose of inquiring whether it is contained in divine revelation; but *because it is so in the eyes of the Holy Spirit.*" (*Loc. cit.*, n.8)

[31] After the words just quoted, John of St. Thomas goes on immediately to say: "But because it is so in the eyes of the Holy Spirit, *and therefore* because it is *immediately* revealed by God, although to us it is *implicit* and *concealed until* it shall have been declared by the Church." (*Loc. cit.*, n.8) We ask the reader to take notice of the term *and therefore*, and he will plainly perceive the sense in which John of St. Thomas understands the term "*immediately* revealed". It is a manner of speaking which lends itself to confusion. If John of St. Thomas had only added to the term "immediate" the qualifier "in itself", no one would be misled by it.

vealed *mediate* or virtual, never immediate or formal. The former is not only revealed *in reality* but also *in itself;* the later, again with reference to our minds, is revealed *in reality* but not *in itself.* Herein precisely lies the specific difference between faith and *our* theology.

This small imprecision or vagueness in describing as immediate everything revealed or intended by the Holy Spirit is responsible for the contradiction in terminology incurred by John of St. Thomas, who ends by calling, and correctly so, *virtual implicit* and *revealed* IN REALITY that which previously he had ambiguously called revealed IMMEDIATE.[32] That is exactly what St. Thomas denominates immediate *in itself* but mediate *to us.*

That is the true name of the truly theological conclusion: *virtual implicit* or revealed *IN REALITY.* All truly theological conclusions are such. Virtual since we need true reasoning in order to know or explicate or deduce them, it being impossible for us to know them without reasoning. Implicit inasmuch as the reasoning is a reasoning of real identity or of intellectual inclusion.

Thus, and setting aside ambiguous terms, the teaching of John of St. Thomas, which is the one that "Thomists commonly follow", lies *midway*

[32] "Hence you may gather that something can be virtually contained in the truths of faith in two ways. The first is in an *exclusively virtual inferential* manner, and this belongs to theology which has for its object the things inferred from the truths of faith. The second is in a *virtually implicit* manner, that is, things that *in reality* are revealed and intended by the Holy Spirit, but are hidden to us and therefore reached by *reasoning.* These things the Church can, and does, define." (*Loc.cit.,* n.16) It is obvious that John of St. Thomas's teaching is in substance identical to that of all previous Thomists, but with two imprecisions of language. First, that of calling *immediate* implicit what he eventually admits is only a *virtual* implicit, since before its definition we know it *only through reasoning (attained solely through reasoning, loc.cit.,* n.13). Secondly, that of being too vague in explaining the distinction between virtual *implicit* and virtual *inferential.* If the inference is truly *theological,* the virtual inferential is always *implicit.*

However, although John of St. Thomas concurs with all Thomists in maintaining against Molina the definability of conclusions that are truly and properly theological, there is in him a small weakness or flaw. This flaw lies in his failure to assign an objective criterion, or one that is *prior to the fact,* which would enable us to tell which conclusions are definable and which are not. Those conclusions are definable, he says, which were intended, even if in a hidden manner, by the Holy Spirit. And the Holy Spirit intended in a hidden manner all those conclusions which the Church defines with divine assistance. Which is tantamount to saying: those conclusions are *definable* which have been *defined.* The learned Fr. Gardeil, in his excellent book *Le donné révélé,* p. 173 had already called attention to this flaw in John of St. Thomas. What we need, what the Church herself needs, is an *objective criterion of definability* since the Church has not been given *revelation* but only *assistance.* According to St. Thomas, that criterion is the characteristic property of every *truly theological conclusion* of being intellectually *explicative* or *implicit* with regard to the revealed major. The *minor* is merely an *instrument of explication.*

between the *extreme* opinions of Vázquez and Molina, and comprises two parts: (a) Vázquez's opinion, which asserts that the true conclusion or true mediate or revealed virtual is of divine faith *before* the Church's definition, is false; (b) Molina's opinion, which asserts that the truly theological conclusion is not of divine faith *after* the Church's definition, is false.

Anyone who would demand incontrovertible evidence that John of St. Thomas's true meaning is such as we have described it is invited to look up the treatise *On Faith,* where John of St. Thomas, referring expressly to the same *art.4* cited by our objector, says the following:

"From the foregoing it can be gathered that *virtual* or *mediate* revelation or that which is *deduced by reasoning,* as is found in theology, *differs specifically* from *immediate* revelation which is had on the testimony of the witness and has to do with what must be believed by faith. We have dealt with this at greater length in the first part, q.1, d.2, *article four,* where we *rejected* two *extreme* positions: one, that of Vázquez, who holds that the conclusion *deduced* from premises of faith is, relative to the knower's reasoning, just as certain as any proposition defined by the Church; the other, that of Molina, who holds that, even if the Church's definition should be added to a proposition that *was not of faith before,* such a definition would not make it be *of faith,* but that the Holy Spirit assists the Church so that she does not err, but not so as *to make of faith what was not of faith before. These opinions* can be found *impugned in the aforecited place.*"[33]

Any student of theology knows that Molina and Vázquez, both of whom John of St. Thomas impugns, speak of the true and proper *mediate* or *virtual.*(409,495)

308. TENTH OBSERVATION. – "The 'starting point' of theology, or what is commonly known as 'the principles of theology' is or are what is 'revealed'. Consequently, if a truth is truly revealed, it is not truly a conclusion or development but purely the starting point or principle. Vice versa, if a truth is truly a conclusion, it cannot be something truly revealed for in that case it would be a principle, and not a conclusion of the theology."

Reply. The starting point or first principle of theology is not what is revealed purely and simply, as our objector says, but what is revealed *immediately* or *formally* or *in itself,* or better still, what is revealed *explicitly.* (31)

But in the explicitly revealed there is a lot of content or of *implicitly* revealed, and the implicitly revealed makes for *development* and for *conclusions.* Where the implicitness is one solely relating to names or formulae,

[33] *De Fide,* d.1, a.2.

that is, an implicitness so shallow and superficial that for its explication or unfolding no proper reasoning involving different concepts is required, but only a mere explaining of terms, then the development or conclusion is also *improper;* in this case no true virtual or mediate exists as yet. This is known as the *formal implicit* or the *immediate implicit.* This is the sort of implicitness obtaining between the defined and its definition, between correlatives, between the whole and its parts, and between the unconditioned universal and its particulars.

On the other hand, if the implicitness is so recondite and profound that its explication or development requires a combination, not only of terms, but also of *concepts,* and thus true and proper reasoning, then the development and the conclusion, while remaining a true *explication of the implicit* and thus an explication of what is truly *revealed,* constitute now a true and rigorous development of concepts or ideas and not simply of mere formulae; they now are truly and properly conclusion, not principle. Such is theology in the true, proper, and rigorous sense. (33)

The Church possesses *divine* authority not only to *propose* what is revealed, but also to *explicate all* that is *implicit* in what is revealed. When she defines such a conclusion as a truth of divine faith, then what was a conclusion comes to be a principle of sacred theology; what did not formally belong to the faith, but to theology comes to belong formally to the faith.

In the case of the human habits of *simple understanding* and of *science,* what belongs to science can never come to belong to simple understanding because on the human level we cannot avail ourselves of some other medium which will enable us to know *without reasoning* or immediately what we could not know before except *through reasoning* or mediately. But in the case of habits that have reference to the supernatural or the divine or the revealed, as in the case of divine faith and of sacred theology, we have at our disposal another medium that enables us to attain without reasoning or through *divine authority* the same thing that we could not attain before except by means of reasoning. Hence we have at our disposal a medium which enables us to convert conclusions into principles, or theology into divine faith. That medium is the Church's divine authority or the dogmatic definition made by the Church, which presupposes reasoning as an *instrument* or as a *previous* condition but is not formally grounded on reasoning but on *divine* assistance. For this reason John of St. Thomas utters a profound insight when he says that theology has something proper and exclusive which is not had by the other sciences, viz., that its conclusions can come to be principles. "And thus this is *peculiar* in *theology:* that that which at some time was a *conclusion* can be changed into a *principle.*"[34]

[34] *De Summo Pontifice,* d.2, a.2, n.5.

By the way, our objector has there a new proof that John of St. Thomas speaks of the true and proper conclusions when he maintains that the theological conclusion is definable as of divine faith. *Improper* conclusions can become, and are, principles not only in theology, but in every other science. That is not something *peculiar* to theology.

309. ELEVENTH OBSERVATION. – "For this reason the greater part of Thomists maintains, against Contenson, that theology is not *formally,* but only radically, supernatural."

Reply. With the majority of the Thomists we hold, against Contenson, that theology is a habit that is not *formally,* but only radically supernatural. But in Thomist teaching *radically* means *objectively* or with respect to the *thing known,* just as *formally* means with respect to the *mode* of knowing. Thus, theological conclusions are objectively supernatural or revealed although *modally* natural or acquired. Now then, what *formally* specifies the cognitive habits is the *mode* or medium of knowing, not the known thing, and for this reason the habit of theology is formally a natural or acquired habit in spite of being objectively supernatural.[35] Thus the difference between the majors of faith or the habit of faith and the theological conclusions or habit of theology is not a difference of the *objectivity* known but a difference in the *mode* of knowing that objectivity. Says John of St. Thomas:

"To the arguments, starting from the beginning, we reply: To the first we say that the *object* of theology is *something supernatural,* but disposed, and penetrated or gathered in a *natural manner;* thus, it belongs to a natural and acquired habit. . . . And so although it deals with and infers many *supernatural* truths about God, nonetheless it attains them in a natural and inferential *manner* through its own industry and effort. . . . Hence when it is said that the medium of proof is supernatural, viz. the truths of faith, I distinguish: the truths of faith as connected and penetrated in a natural *manner* and by an acquired studious skill, I concede; the truths of faith *precisely* as

[35] "The different genera of knowables are distinguished according to the *different mode of knowing.*" (ST. THOMAS, *In Post Anal.,* lib.1, lect.39) "Indeed, any cognitive habit *formally* regards the *medium* by means of which something is known, but *materially, that which* is known by means of the medium." (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.,* 2-2, q.9, a.2, ad 3) "The difference between the *explicit* and the *implicit* [which is the difference between *faith* and *theology*] can be referred to different things. And if it is referred to *that which* is said to be implicitly or explicitly, then it is certain that they *do not change the species,* as in the case of act and potency. For man in act and man in potency are of the same species, and the implicit truth is one with the explicit. But if it is referred to the *modes* themselves, or to the things that require such *modes,* then the *species is changed,* as is obvious in the case of *principles* and *conclusions,* and of their respective *habits.*" (CAJETAN. *ibid.,* q.10, a.5) "The habit of theology is somehow *supernatural,* i.e., radically and *objectively,* as is *commonly* held. This we readily concede." (BILLUART, *Dissertatio proemialis de Sacra Theologia,* a.6).

standing under a supernatural light, I deny. Now, a dependence of whatever kind does not suffice for the reason of supernatural light, but it is necessary that the *manner* itself of illumination be supernatural and not disposed and acquired and penetrated in a natural *manner*. . . . and by this we determine the *formal* reason."[36]

In the foregoing passage from John of St. Thomas our objector will notice how insistently he repeats that the difference between the objects of faith and of theology lies in the *manner* of knowing and not in the objectivity known. Above all we ask him to take note of the profound and masterly definition of the *object* of theology, i.e., of the theological *conclusion:* "The *object* of theology is *something supernatural,* but disposed in a *natural manner.*" The conclusion or thing known is supernatural or revealed; the *manner* whereby it is deduced or known is natural or scientific or acquired.

310. THEOLOGICAL EQUATIONS. – Many modern textbooks believe – and our objector appears to agree with them – that there exists a distinction of *objectivity* where there exists only a distinction of *modality.* There is no objective-real distinction between faith and theology; both contain the *same thing* but with a different *manner* or degree of explication. The one is only a greater *explication* or penetration of the other.

The idea conveyed by these modern textbooks, and apparently held by our objector, of the *formal* objects of divine faith, sacred theology, and purely human sciences can be stated in the following formulae or equations:

divine faith = revealed
sacred theology = not revealed
human sciences = not revealed

The third equation is obviously correct. But we believe that there are two basic deficiencies in the first two equations.

The first deficiency is found in the first formula relative to divine faith. It lies in the fact that therein no mention is made at all of "the *proposition* and *explication* by the Church". Our objector will say that the Church is an *accidental* condition for divine faith. We reply that, according to St. Thomas and the Thomist school, the Church is an accidental condition for divine faith considered *in itself,* but she is an *essential* or formal condition for *our* divine faith, i.e., for the faith of those of us who have not received revelation immediately from God as the angels, the patriarchs and the apostles, but have received it only mediately. (146) Our objector will also say that the Church is a requisite for *Catholic,* but not for *divine* faith. We reply that the distinction between Catholic faith and divine faith is or might be good in the case of

[36] *De Sacra Theologia,* q.1, d.2, a.8, n.12.

private revelations; but in the case of the public or *Catholic* revelation, such as the revealed deposit, without private revelation of any kind, then no divine faith is possible that is not also *Catholic* faith. In other words, no divine faith is possible without the Church's proposition or explication. The contrary is precisely Vázquez's teaching.[37]

The second and even more serious, deficiency is found in the second formula or equation relative to *sacred* theology. For all those *three formulae* there are, and there can be, no more than *two* genera of objects, viz. the *revealed* and the *non revealed.* The defect lies in putting sacred theology in the same boat as purely human sciences, as if they were two branches or subdivisions of one and the same main trunk, the *non-revealed;* whereas St. Thomas and the whole of tradition have always placed sacred theology on the same side as faith, as two branches or subdivisions of the *revealed.* (323-325)

If sacred theology had for its object or conclusion the *non-revealed* much the same as the profane sciences, such a theology would be *sacred* only in name since in truth it would be just as *profane* and *alien* to supernatural life as any of the purely human or natural sciences.

[37] "As happens in the case of almost all terms that are old and full of meaning, the word 'dogma' has a history which I have resumed elsewhere. Let us bear only this in mind: *etymologically,* 'dogma' is at first said, in general, of a subjective opinion, a subjective affirmation, only to settle itself immediately in the language *of the law* with a firmer and denser meaning, coming then to signify an ordinance, a decree issued authoritatively. Having, at this stage, come into *ecclesiastical* usage, its meaning shifts gradually towards the *intellectualist* sense and eventually becomes settled there. Since the beginning of the 5th century, a dogma is a *truth revealed by God,* which as such imposes an irreversible adherence on the spirit of the faithful. In *current* usage a distinction is sometimes drawn between *dogmas of divine faith,* revealed truths that impose themselves prior to any formal definition, and *defined dogmas of faith,* revealed truths proposed by the Church's infallible teaching." (GRANDMAISON, *Revue Pratique d'Apologétique,* 1908, pg.522)

The different and successive senses – etymological, juridical, and ecclesiastical – of the term "dogma" given by the distinguished Fr. Grandmaison are correct. But the last distinction of dogma into dogmas of divine faith and defined dogmas of faith or dogmas of Catholic faith, is false, although Fr. Grandmaison correctly observes that such a distinction is actually drawn by some thologians. This distinction is only a derivation from Vázquez's teaching (85). As we have already seen elsewhere (156), Thomists hold that neither Catholic nor divine faith with respect to any truth in the revealed deposit is possible prior to the Church's definition, whether by solemn or by ordinary magisterium; after the Church's definition not only divine, but also Catholic faith is possible. Such a distinction could possibly be maintained only with respect to *private* revelations, to which, in the opinion of many theologians, an assent of divine faith might be given, but which, nonetheless, can never become truths of Catholic faith. However, with respect to the revealed deposit, the terms Catholic faith and divine faith are synonymous and inseparable in our faith.

It will be said that although sacred theology has for its object or conclusions the *non-revealed,* still it has the *revealed* as its *origin,* which is not the case in the profane sciences. This retort makes no difference. The value of any thing resides in its *being,* not in its *origin.* Origin itself has no value except insofar as it is capable of introducing some distinction in the being. The man who was born blind miraculously received his sight from Christ, but the nature of his sight was no different from the sight of other men because although its *origin* was different or supernatural, it had the same natural *being.* His *sight was* entirely *natural in its substance,* it was supernatural only in its *mode.* On the other hand, the case of sacred theology is, and has to be *exactly the reverse,* that is to say *supernatural* in its *object* or subject matter, and *natural* only in its *mode.* As John of St. Thomas reminds us: "The *object* of theology is something *supernatural* but disposed in a *natural manner.*"[38] (309)

311. Hence, the formulae or equations describing divine faith, sacred theology, and the profane sciences are, in our opinion, as follows:

DIVINE FAITH = the *revealed,* explicated by the Church.
SACRED THEOLOGY = the *revealed* explicated by reason.
PROFANE SCIENCES = the *non revealed,* explicated by reason.

In these three formulae three things of the greatest and transcendental importance become immediately obvious: (a) between sacred theology and the profane sciences there exists a difference of *substance* (revealed and non revealed); there is agreement only in the mode (explication through human reason in both cases); (b) on the contrary, the *substance* is the same in sacred theology and in faith (the revealed in both cases); the difference is only in the *mode* (the way of divine authority or of the Church in the case of divine faith, and the way of human reasoning in theology); (c) the possibility of theology passing into divine faith simply by changing the *mode* or medium of knowing that is to say, simply by having the Church propose or explicate with divine authority or assistance the *same thing* that the theologian proposed and explicated by way of human reasoning. Such is, we believe, the true Thomist teaching.

SECTION II

FURTHER OBJECTIONS AGAINST DOGMATIC EVOLUTION IN GENERAL

312. FIRST OBSERVATION. – "What the Church can, and does in fact define as of divine faith is that which requires nothing but *improper* reasoning for its deduction from the revealed deposit, and which is called

[38] JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *loc. cit.*

formal implicit. For example: "Indeficient foundation of the Church; therefore, infallible'; or likewise, 'Full of grace, therefore, immaculate'. Such conclusions, even prior to their definition were already included *formally,* and not only virtually, in the revealed deposit."

Reply. We admit that the Church can define as of faith all that is deduced from the revealed deposit through *improper* reasoning. We also admit that anything which requires only an improper reasoning for its deduction is called, and is, *formal* implicit. But we are surprised that our objector should consider those two examples as instances of *improper* reasoning or of the formal implicit. They are not instances of the formal implicit but of the virtual implicit and the true virtual. They are not instances of improper but of proper reasoning and even of proper reasoning in the highest degree.

As our objector himself grants, the improper reasoning or formal implicit requires that the deduced conclusion should not express a *new,* but the *same* concept. Where a new concept intervenes the reasoning is no longer improper but proper, what is deduced is no longer formal but virtual. Now then, the concept "indefectible foundation", which is a Gospel concept, and the concept "infallible on account of itself not on account of the consent of the Church", which is the concept defined by the Vatican, are not one and the same concept but *two concepts,* albeit one *implicit* in the other. Similarly, the concept "full of grace", found in the Gospel, and the concept "conceived without taint of original sin in the first instant of her conception on account of the foreseen merits of her Son", which is the concept defined by Pius IX, are not the same concept but *two* concepts or different aspects, albeit of the *same thing* or reality. It is true that they are not *contrary,* nor even *diverse* concepts, but they are indeed new or *different* concepts derived the one from the other. Such is the true theology, the true virtual implicit: virtual inasmuch as there exists a distinction of concepts, which is what constitutes virtual distinction; implicit inasmuch as one concept comes out of, or is derived from, the other.

To convince himself of it, we ask our objector to open any dictionary, look up the *formal* meaning or *definition* of "indeficient foundation" and verify whether in that definition there is any mention of "personal infallibility" or "without the consent of the Church". Let him also look up the definition of "Mother of God" and see whether there is in it any mention of the concepts "free from original sin", "first instant", and "on account of the foreseen merits of her Son's death". What is not mentioned in the definition cannot be, with respect to *our* minds, *formally* contained in the defined term.

On the other hand, if he looks up the definition of "whole" he will find in it the concept of "parts"; if he looks up the definition of any correlative, e.g., "father" he will find in it the concept of the other correlative, "son"; if

he, finally, looks up the definition of "universal" he will find in it the concept of "singulars". For this reason, anything contained as a part in the whole, as a correlative in its correlative, or as a particular in the actual unconditioned universal, is *formal,* because, insofar as the one enters into the *definition* or *simple understanding* of the other, there is only *one concept* under *two* different *words.* Everything else is not formal but virtual for anyone capable of distinguishing *our* science or *our* theology from simple understanding or faith.

Our objector will retort that even if in the given instances one concept does not enter *explicitly* into the definition of the other, it nonetheless enters *implicitly* because the *analysis* of the concepts "indeficient foundation", or "full of grace", uncovers the defined concepts. Such is indeed the case. But that is precisely what, in our opinion, constitutes the true virtual implicit or the true and proper reasoning of the superior sciences, viz. the *analysis* of a concept whereby it is broken up into *two* or more concepts, thus giving us new *concepts.* All the superior sciences are *analytic.* Sacred theology is nothing but the intellectual analysis of the revealed deposit.

It might also be said that in the foregoing examples the transition from one concept to the other is clear and obvious. Nothing else is required than to penetrate correctly all the biblical meaning of "indeficient foundation", or of "full of grace" in order to see at once the other concepts that have been defined by the Church.

We admit that those other concepts become obvious or come out of the previous ones provided that the *whole* meaning of these is correctly penetrated. But this is exactly what constitutes the nature of the true conclusion and the true virtual: delving correctly into the *whole* meaning, without stopping at the shallow or formal meaning. If our objector takes as formal *all* the meaning contained in the principles or major premises of the reasoning, then it is obvious that every conclusion reached by inclusive reasoning is formal. But the term *formal* has never been understood to include *all* the meaning of proposition or principle but only its explicit meaning, or perhaps also that meaning which is so shallowly implicit that its explication requires only a simple definition or explanation of the *words.* When the explication of the implicit meaning requires conceptual analysis, the implicitness is no longer formal but virtual; it is no longer a case of simple understanding or faith but of science or theology. Any one who penetrates correctly *all* that is contained or implicit in any mathematical or metaphysical principle or theorem would clearly see at once all its true conclusions. But this does not prevent such conclusions from being conclusions in the true and *proper* sense – and thus truly new concepts and virtual in the true sense – with respect to *our* minds which are not capable of understanding or penetrating *all* the meaning at one stroke.

We take it that there is only one reason that leads our objector to look upon the two aforementioned instances as *formal*-implicit and not as *virtual*-implicit. And that reason is that he is *a priori* persuaded that the Church cannot define as of divine faith anything but the *formal.* Since it is a *fact* that the Church has defined those two instances as of divine faith, he has no other alternative but to juggle terms so as to be able to maintain that those two cases are instances of *formal,* albeit of formal-*implicit* as he calls it, or of formal-*confused* in the more delightful terminology preferred by others. We believe that instead of reasoning thus: "The Church cannot define anything but the formal; therefore, those instances are instances of the formal." we should reason as follows: "Those instances are obviously cases of the virtual; therefore, the Church can define the virtual". Thus did our early theologians reason. Thus does the history of dogmas compel us to reason.

A DIGRESSION ON THE ASSUMPTION OF THE BLESSED VIRGIN. – We have elsewhere observed that it is not necessary that the primitive Church should have *explicitly* known a truth for it to be definable as of faith. It is enough that is should have been *implicitly* known in other explicit dogmas. (173)

Thus, absolutely speaking, it is not necessary that the primitive Church should have explicitly accepted the Immaculate Conception and the Assumption of Mary.

These dogmatic truths – of which the former has already been defined, and the other is likely to be defined in the not too distant future – are implicitly contained, as are almost all the dogmas referring to the Blessed Virgin, in the scriptural texts, "I will put enmity", "Full of grace," and "Mother of Christ", all of which the Christian sense of faith has translated as "Worthy Mother of God", and "New Eve". *Inclusive* reasoning suffices to deduce the two former truths from these latter truths. And whatever could have been wanting in the evidence of the reasoning has been amply supplied by the sense of faith inasmuch as where this sense of faith turns out to be the firm adherence of the whole Church, it suffices by itself to establish the definability of a truth.

We cannot but praise those theologian-historians who have devoted themselves to researching and gathering all the texts and monuments of antiquity relative to these dogmas. Often it turns out that the explicit belief of the Church has begun much earlier than we commonly think.

However, it is also necessary that these theologians should not forget that it is not absolutely required for the definability of these dogmas that they should have been *explicitly* taught by the Apostles.

Suárez has admirably resumed the traditional teaching on this matter in the following passage:

"What is necessary for a thing to be defined by the Church? In the first place, I say that this truth, viz., that the Virgin was conceived without original sin, can be defined by the Church whensoever she thinks it expedient... In the second place, this can thus be made clear: this is a supernatural truth that is greatly relevant to the utility and piety of the Church, and things can come to such a pass where, *without a new and explicit revelation*, the Church possesses sufficient motives to define this truth on account of *God's implicit and tacit revelation* sufficiently proposed to her. Therefore. The antecedent is clear from the fact that many times the Church has by her authority and with the Holy Spirit's assistance defined similar controversies without a new express revelation; this can be shown by manifest instances in the questions of the *infused habits*, the *canonical authority of certain books of the Holy Scripture*, the *freedom from all venial sin* in the Virgin hereself. Other examples can be added, e.g., *her resurrection, her glorious Assumption*, and the *holiness of her birth*. Of these some already pertain to the faith, others are proximate to the faith and no one doubts that *these can be eventually defined*. For this definition *it is enough* that a supernatural truth be *implicitly* contained in the Scriptures or in Tradition so that with the *growth of the common consensus of the Church* – it is through her that the Holy Spirit often explicates the traditions or clarifies the Scriptures – the Church may eventually give her definition, which has with respect to us the force, as it were, of a revelation on account of the Holy Spirit's infallible assistance."[39]

Cajetan had condensed the same teaching in the following terms:

"It makes no difference whether a thing has been explicitly or *implicitly* revealed in the Holy Scriptures and other sources . . . except that ingenuity, effort, reason and intellect are needed to make manifest that such things as are said to be *implicitly* contained are necessarily *connected* with those things in which they are said to be contained."[40]

Thus, even if a truth has not been the object of explicit faith during the first centuries, it can nonetheless be defined provided that it is implicitly connected with the primitive dogmas, and connected in such a manner that it can be evidently demonstrated either through reasoning or through the sense of faith.

It is in this manner that the dogma of the Immaculate Conception is

[39] SUÁREZ, *De Virginis Mariae Sanctificatione*, d.3, s.6, n.4, ed. Vivès, vol.19, pgs.47-48.

[40] *Opusculum de Conceptione B. Virginis*, ch.1, on two ways of discerning matters of faith.

implicitly connected with the dogma of her divine Motherhood, and the dogma of her Assumption with these two.[41]

As Christ is of his own nature the "New Adam", so Mary is by the merits of Christ the "New Eve". Tradition has always regarded her in this light.

Christ, of his own nature, was free from *all* the consequences of original sin – aside from such consequences, as, e.g., death and the bodily defects common to all mankind, which he voluntarily assumed in order to redeem us, – and the Blessed Virgin had to be exempt from them by the merits of her Son.

Of his own nature Christ was entitled to the freedom from bodily corruption, the resurrection, and the ascension. Mary, inasmuch as she had been preserved, through the merits of her Son, from original sin, must have had been endowed *in fact* with these three privileges since bodily corruption, death, and debarment from heaven are simply *consequences of original sin*. Consequently, even if we suppose that the Apostles had *explicitly* taught nothing concerning the Blessed Virgin except the dogma of her being the "worthy Mother of God", they would have, by the same token, *implicitly* taught all the others. This capital dogma accounts for the definability of the dogmas of her Immaculate Conception and her Assumption. To call this implicitness *formal* as our objector wishes, or *virtual* as we prefer, makes no difference at bottom, provided that it be truly *implicit*. The Church can dogmatically define *everything* that is truly *implicit* in the revealed deposit, provided that this "implicitness" is not so profound that it cannot be uncovered except through a new revelation.

313. SECOND OBSERVATION. – "During the whole of the Old Testament there was, it is true, progress not only of formulae but also of *new concepts*, since there was a progress of *new revelations*. But after the Apostles no new revelations are admissible, and what progress there is, is merely a progress of *formulae*, each clearer and more precise, of the *same concepts* revealed by God to the Apostles and by them bequeathed to the Church."

[41] "It certainly does not help our purpose to exclude *explicit* tradition from the beginning. Indeed, if that clear tradition is admitted, belief in the Assumption becomes more evident. However, it is not our wish that such a clear affirmation since the beginning be considered *necessary*, nor do we maintain that the Assumption's definability depends on such a condition, which would certainly make our purpose more difficult. For just as it is to be denied that the Immaculate Conception was *explicitly* believed and affirmed in the first centuries, although it is today of faith that this same truth was *implicit* and contained in the revelation handed down by the Apostles and in the teaching of the Fathers, so also we hold that this is sufficient in the case of the Assumption." (GUIDO MATTIUSI, S.I., *Utrum corporea Virginis Assumptio ad fidei catholicae depositum exspectet disputatio*, Aquipendi 1922, pg.24)

Reply. Our objector mixes up and almost identifies two radically different statements. First, in the Old Testament there was a progress of *new revelations;* in the New, after the Apostles, there is none. Second, in the old Testament there was progress of *new* dogmatic *concepts;* in the New, after the Apostles, there is and can be none.

The first of these two statements is indubitably true, but the second is so far from being indubitably true, that it is contrary to what Suárez with good reason calls certain teaching and the common consensus of traditional theology.

According to St. Thomas, neither in the Old nor in the New Testaments has there been any development as to the *substance* but only as to the *explication.* This is accounted for by the fact that all the dogmas revealed by God, in both the Old and the New Testaments, as well as all the dogmas that the Church has defined and will define, were truly *implicit* from the beginning in the two most general articles of faith. Some were implicit *by the very nature of things,* as, e.g., those concerned with the divine *being;* others were implicit by the determination of the *divine will,* as e.g., those concerned with the supernatural divine *providence* of God the Remunerator. But all, with no exceptions, were and are truly implicit in one way or another. Thus all that we term revelations of the Old and New Testaments up to the Apostles, or dogmatic definitions after the Apostles have one thing in common: they are but *explications* of what was already implicit in the two universal articles of faith.

The difference between the Old and the New Testaments is not a difference or progress *as to the substance;* it is a difference *in the degree of implicitness,* and consequently in the *medium* of explication.[42]

[42] "All the articles of faith are *implicitly* contained in certain primary credibles, viz., that it is to be believed that God *exists* and that He has *provided* for the salvation of men, in accordance with Hebrews, 11: 'For he who comes to God must believe that God *exists* and is a *rewarder* to those who seek him.' For in the divine *being* are *included* all those things that we believe are in God eternally, in which our happiness consists. But in the belief in *Providence* are *included* all the things that God dispenses in the course of time for the salvation of men, and which are the way to happiness . . . Thus it must be said that, as regards the *substance* of the articles, no increase has taken place in the course of time, since whatsoever things later men believed, were contained in the faith of the earlier Fathers, although *implicitly.* But, as regards *explication,* the number of articles has grown because certain things were known by men who came later, which were not explicitly known by those who went before." (ST. THOMAS, *2-2,* q.1, a.7) "For this reason, not even the Lord Jesus Christ himself made any new article of faith, as regards the *substance.*" (BÁÑEZ, *ibid.,* a.10) Thus, the progress of *new revelations* should not be confused with the progress of *new substance,* although many textbooks are guilty of this confusion. The former existed in the Old Testament, but it no longer exists in the New Testament. The latter does not exist either in the New, or in the Old Testament.

For it must be borne in mind that there are two different degrees or levels of implicitness. There is one level of implicitness that is so profound and recondite that even if the *thing itself* is truly implicit, nonetheless, *with respect to human reason* it is the same as if it were not implicit because reason and human means are not sufficient to explicate or unfold it, and *divine revelation* is necessary for this purpose. Such is the implicitness whereby the dogma of the Trinity is implicit in the dogma of the existence of a supernatural God, or the dogma of the Incarnation in the dogma of God the Remunerator. Such truths, although truly implicit *in themselves* are not so *for us.* They are called *fundamental* dogmas or *articles of faith.*

It was this kind of implicitness that God undertook to unfold more and more throughout the whole of the Old Testament. Thus, although in the Old Testament there was no progress as to the substance but as to the explication, nonetheless it was a progressive unfolding of *new articles* or fundamental dogmas, and consequently a progress of *new revelations.* This kind of explication ended with Christ and his Apostles. "This explication was completed by Christ". (ST. THOMAS)

But there is another level of implicitness. This one is not so shallow as to require only an explanation of terms; but neither is it so deep or recondite as to demand revelation. For its explication or unfolding one thing is both necessary and sufficient, namely, human reasoning. Such is the implicitness wherewith the dogma of the two intellects and two wills of Christ is contained in the dogma of the two perfect natures or the dogma of the Immaculate Conception in the dogma of the divine Motherhood.

Such truths, inasmuch as they are truly implicit, are truly revealed truths; but inasmuch as their implicitness is explicable by human *reason* they do not require any new revelation. The implicitness of the New Testament

Even with regard to the Old Testament, PETER DE TARANTASIA says the following: "The number of *implicit* credenda was not increased, but the number of *explicit* credenda. But this sort of increase is *accidental* to the faith, not substantial; and it exists *more on the part of the believers than on the part of the things believed.*" *(In 3 Sent.,* d.25, q.5, a.1, Tolosae 1652)

"Fourth objection: The number of credenda is determined from eternity; therefore, it cannot be increased.

"I answer: Although the number of credenda is determined in itself, nonetheless, it is not determined *with respect to us;* hence it is possible for it to grow *in us.*" *(Ibid.)*

With respect to what is meant by explicit, implicit, and distinct faith, the following beautiful passage is worthy of note: "*Explicitly* to believe is to believe *in the particular; implicitly* to believe is to believe *in the universal; distinctly* to believe is *to know how to distinguish the articles.* To give an example: grains exist in the *ear* explicitly but not altogether distinctly; in the *seed* neither explicitly nor distinctly; but in the *barn* explicitly and distinctly." (*Loc. cit.,* a.2, expositio litterae)

after the Apostles is made up of such truths. If their explication is done by human reason *alone* with no divine assistance or authority, such an explication is called Theology or theological progress. If their explication is done by reason with divine assistance or authority, as in the case of dogmatic definitions, then it is called dogmatic progress; however, it is not a dogmatic progress of *fundamental* dogmas or *articles of faith,* but dogmatic progress of *derived* dogmas or simple *truths of faith.*

All of this – profoundly and pithily expressed as usual – had been taught by St. Thomas in the following terms: "To the fifth [objection] it must be said that what is contained *in* an article can be *explicated* in two ways. The first, insofar as *one article* is at times contained in *another,* or two articles in a *common one* [the reader will please note that it is a case of *articles* being contained *in articles*], as, for instance, the resurrection of the dead is somehow contained in the resurrection of Christ, and the Passion and Incarnation in this common one which is the Mystery of the Redemption. *In this manner* implicit faith is explicated in *determinate* articles of faith, and *this explication was completed by Christ* [i.e., by *Christ* and his *Apostles*]. Hence, with regard to the *essentials* of faith, it is not lawful either to add or to subtract anything to his teaching, as is said in the last chapter of the Revelation. But before the coming of Christ it was *not yet completed* [the Saint is still speaking of the *articles*], and thus even with respect to the elders it *continued to grow* at different times. [Hereto the Saint has been speaking of the dogmatic unfolding of *articles* into *other articles,* that is, of the dogmatic progress in the Old Testament. There follows now the dogmatic unfolding of the *articles* into *their consequences,* that is, the dogmatic progress in the New Testament.] The second way takes place when that which is contained in an article *is not an article* but something *concomitant* to the article; and *in this regard the faith can be unfolded day by day, and has been more and more unfolded through the efforts of the Fathers.*"[43] These words deserve to be indelibly engraved for the benefit of all who are engaged in the study of the scope of dogmatic progress. What St. Thomas means by "something concomitant to the article" is common knowledge, to wit, *"those things that follow from the articles."*[44]

Today it is already commonplace to call every *dogma* of faith an *article* of faith. Such a practice can be found in almost all textbooks. Not only is such a terminology improper but it also contributes to make many people fail to achieve an understanding of St. Thomas and our classical theologians, and to achieve a true idea of the immense scope of dogmatic evolution after the Apostles. St. Thomas has always made a distinction between *dogmas-articles*

[43] *In 3 Sent.,* d.25, q.2, a.2, sol.1, ad 5.

[44] *Ibid.,* d.24, q.1, a.1, sol.1.

and *dogmas-conclusions.* There was a growth of the former throughout all of the Old Testament, but there neither is nor can there be any such growth after the Apostles. Of the latter there is, and will continue to be, a progressive unfolding until the end of time inasmuch as the revealed deposit possesses such a fecundity that we shall not be able to exhaust it until we see the divine essence itself. "But no one is obliged totally to the second explication, that is, to be able to explicate everything that is contained *in* the articles concerning salvation, because this is not possible except in heaven where the truth itself of the articles will be fully seen."[45]

In short, the difference between the Old Testament and the New does not consist in the presence or absence of new concepts, but in the *kind* of new concepts. In both Testaments there has been, and there is, a progress of new concepts. In the Old Testament there was a progressive development of *concepts-articles,* for which *revelation* is necessary. In the New Testament there is a progressive development of *concepts-consequences,* for which it is enough to have divine *assistance* in the use of the human means available to us, viz. inclusive reasoning and the sense of faith. The divine assistance is operative in the definition of faith.

314. THIRD OBSERVATION. – "For this reason St. Thomas does not use the term *virtually* when he speaks of the dogmatic progress in the Old Testament and of the manner whereby all posterior dogmas were contained in the prior ones, instead with admirable profundity and precision, he always says *implicitly.*"

Reply. In the first place, our objector has fallen unawares into a manifest contradiction. He has already told us that in the Old Testament there was a progress of *new concepts,* which is true. Now he tells us that St. Thomas has with good reason never described such a progress as a progress of virtuality but of implicitness. But if it was a progress or a containment of new concepts, it had to be a case of *virtuality* since virtual is the same as new concept. The mistake lies in thinking that if it was virtual then it could not be implicit, when it was precisely an implicit-virtual.

In the second place, it is true that St. Thomas uses profoundly and with precision the term *implicit;* but it is simply because in this matter implicit containment is for St. Thomas the same as virtual containment. In a parallel passage where the holy Doctor deals with exactly the same question, our objector will find him speaking in these terms: "When many things are *virtually* contained in some one thing, they are said to be in it *implicitly,* as the conclusions in the principles."[46]

[45] *Ibid.,* d.25, q.2, a.1, sol.3.

[46] *De Veritate,* q.14; *De Fide,* a.11.

If our objector takes the trouble of reading the holy Doctor where he deals with the question of how the New Law was contained in the Old Law, which is identical to asking how the dogmas of the New Testament are contained in those of the Old Testament, he will find the holy Doctor expressly saying that, they were contained "*virtually*, as the tree is contained in the seed."[47]

Let our objector also take the trouble of looking up any of the great commentators of the holy Doctor, e.g., Báñez, and he will find that where St. Thomas says *implicitly* Báñez always says *virtually implicitly* or *virtually*, period.[48] What is even more serious, even with respect to the New Testament he says the following: "Secondly, it is proven by the fact that the Church has up to now never proposed for belief to the faithful or defined anything that was not contained in the Holy Scriptures or in the Apostolic traditions expressly or *virtually* contained therein in such a manner that it was gathered therefrom by an evident consequence."[49] There our objector can see for himself the term *implicitly* clearly translated as *virtually*, which is exactly what we have said time and time again. That is the true Thomist teaching.

Consequently, the term *implicit*, when applied both to the Old and the New Testaments, is generally taken to mean the same thing as *virtual*, and the same thing as *new notions*. However, when the term is said of the Old Testament it signifies such a depth of virtual implicitness as to require *new revelations* for its unfolding. But when the term is said of the New Testament, it signifies a virtual implicitness for the unfolding of which no new revelations are required but *divine assistance* suffices. Such a divine assistance, precisely because it is merely assistance and not revelation, necessarily requires the use of human means. And for purposes of explicating or unfolding an intellectual deposit, the human means most connatural to man is *reasoning* or the way of *new concepts* within the same reality. "From one to an other *according to reason*, which is not other *according to reality*." "The diversity of reason changes nothing on the part of the thing."[50]

315. FOURTH OBSERVATION. – "In my opinion, dogmas are contained in the revealed deposit not in the *virtual* manner in which the genus contains its differences which are *extrinsic* to itself, but in the *implicit* manner in which being contains all the other notions, or in the manner in which the *Divinity* contains all the 'simpliciter simple' or pure perfections, which is to say, in a *formal* and *actual*, not *virtual* or *potential*, manner."

[47] *Summa Theol.*, 1-2, q.107, a.3.
[48] BÁÑEZ, *In 2-2*, q.1, a.7, conc. 1-2.
[49] *Loc.cit.*
[50] ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p. 1, q.75, a.7.

Reply. We admit that no dogma can be contained in the revealed deposit as the specific differences are contained in the genus, that is, in an extrinsic manner. Hence we also admit that if the virtual is taken to mean the *extrinsic* or non-implicit virtual, which is the sense in which our objector always takes the term, then no dogma is contained *virtually* in the deposit. Such an *extrinsic* or non-implicit virtual cannot become a dogma – as the Salmanticenses so clearly saw – but neither is it nor can it be a true theological conclusion. Every true theological conclusion is truly *implicit* in the revealed deposit inasmuch as it is deduced therefrom by an *inclusive* process; and since every truly theological conclusion is a *virtual*, it follows that every truly theological conclusions is at once *implicit* and *virtual*. The reason for it is that in theology, as in metaphysics and mathematics, the rational process is always *analytic* as we say today, or *intellectual* in terms of the schoolmen. "Hence it is obvious that metaphysical or theological consideration is *intellectual in the highest degree*."[51] Hence, the implicit is not opposed to the virtual, nor the virtual opposed to the implicit. It is exactly a *virtual-implicit*. Such is the nature of true theology. Inasmuch as it is virtual and not formal. it is reason or science and not simple understanding nor faith. Inasmuch as it is *implicit* it is *definable as of faith*. Thence the twofold characteristic or every truly theological conclusion: (a) it is not *per se* or formally of faith; but (b) it is definable as of faith. Vázquez failed to appreciate the first characteristic; Molina, the second. The Thomists have always positioned themselves in between Vázquez and Molina by affirming both the first and the second.

Coming now to what our objector says about the manner in which the subsequent concepts are contained in *being* or in the *Divinity*, we think that our objector fails to make a distinction between two manners of containment which are markedly different with respect to *our* human reason, viz.: (a) the manner in which such concepts are contained in the objective *reality* of the Divinity or of being; (b) the manner in which they are contained, not in the reality of being or of the Divinity but in the *concept* that *we* have of that reality.

All the concepts that we deduce from the divine reality, e.g. wisdom, immutability, eternity, etc., are contained in that same *reality* not only virtually but *formally*. God is not virtually wise or immutable or eternal, but formally.

On the contrary, the *concept* that we form of the Divinity does not contain formally but *virtually*, albeit with intrinsic or implicit virtuality, all the attributes that are deduced in the treatise on *The One God*. The proof of it lies in the fact that in order to affirm such attributes *our* reason requires a

[51] ST. THOMAS, *In Boetium*, q.6, a.1.

true and proper demonstration, and true and proper demonstration is the same as true and proper *virtuality*. Anyone who thinks that once the existence of God is demonstrated in the second question of the *Summa Theologica*, all the questions that follow concerning the divine attributes are not truly and properly conclusions but conclusions in the improper sense, would reveal his ignorance of what theology, or a conclusion, is. The ensuing questions on the divine attributes are formally contained in the *reality* of God whose existence is demonstrated in the second question; however, they are not formally but *virtually* contained in the abstract and fragmentary concept that *our* minds have of that reality. And, on the contrary, anyone who believes that inasmuch as we have here a true and proper conclusion and a true and proper virtuality, there is therefore no *implicitness*, would only show that he confuses the metaphysical or theological virtuality with the *physical* virtuality and destroys all the absolute or transcedent value of theological reasoning.

Thus, the medium constitutive of the whole treatise on *God*, which is to say of every and any *theological* treatise, is the *virtual implicit*. The reason for it, as has just been explained, is that at the beginning of the *Summa* or of theology we possess or know the concept of God, not his reality and although in God's reality everything is contained formally, in the concept that *we* have of God it is not contained except in a virtual manner.

Now then – and here lies the root and the key to the whole matter – what we call divine revelation or revealed deposit is not the revelation of the divine *reality* itself, as is the case of the revelation or vision given to the blessed in heaven, but *only* the revelation of a complex of formulae or *concepts* concerning that same and only divine reality which remains inevident and obscure to us. Consequently, when it is asked, How are the dogmas contained in the *divine deposit?*, the question does not refer to the manner in which they are contained in the deposit's divine *reality* which we do not know, but to the manner in which they are contained in the *concepts* or formulae about that reality which God has revealed to us.

Thus, if we speak of the *revealed deposit's reality*, all the dogmas are formally contained in the deposit; but if we speak, as in fact we do, of our *concept of that reality*, then not all dogmas are formally contained therein, but many are contained *virtually*, albeit with implicit or inclusive virtuality.

ACTUAL INCLUSION "WITH RESPECT TO THE THING ITSELF", BUT POTENTIAL INCLUSION "WITH RESPECT TO US". – Inasmuch as in the conceptual order of *our* reason *formal* is equivalent to *actual*, and *virtual* to *potential*, speaking with respect to ourselves, not all dogmas are *actually-implicitly* contained in the revealed deposit, as our objector says; but many of them are contained *potentially-implicitly*, as the Thomist school has always maintained. Says St. Thomas: "The article is an indivisible truth with

regard to what is *actually* explicated in the article, but it is *divisible* [unfoldable, explicable, definable] with regard to those things that are POTENTIALLY contained in the article, insofar as he who *says* one thing somehow *says* many things; *and these are* the things that precede the article and *are consequent* to it, and *with respect to this* [to what is *potential* or *consequential*], the article of faith *can be explicated* and divided."[52] "And *with respect to this* the *faith* can be *explicated* day by day, and *was more and more explicated* through the efforts of the Fathers."[53]

Let us add the following passage from Gravina. "Whether any *addition* could and can be made by the Church to the Symbol of the Apostles? .... Catholic conclusion: Additions to the Symbol of the Apostles have been by the Church lawfully made and can be lawfully made ... Growth or addition commonly so-called can be understood in two ways.

"*One* is when one thing is added to another, the former being extrinsic to the thing's substance either because it is a form that is *contrary* to the subject to which it is added, as heat to water, or because it is simply *beside* its essence, as whiteness added to body.

"The *other* is when something is added to another by way of *narrowing* and *determining* that which existed only in the potentiality of that which is determined ... and it is in this way that *conclusions are added to the principles. And it is in this same way that we must think about additions to the symbol* ... for as food which was [flesh] in *potentiality* comes to be alive and flesh in *actuality*, and yet [the living organism] remains *numerically the same* without change, *so it happens in the unfolding of the dogmas*, as the Lyrinensis says: 'Let the religion of the souls imitate the ways of bodies, which remains the same that they were despite the fact that as the years go by they develop and unfold their parts'. And later on: 'The members of suckling infants are small, those of the youth are big, nonetheless they are the same.' For whereas the rule remains intact in its own order, that which lay hidden *in potentiality* is unfolded through the addition and explication of subsequent synods, and what pertained to the faith *potentially with respect to us* is made *actually* of faith by the declaration."[54]

Here our objector can see how dogmatic progress can also extend to what for us is contained in the deposit in a *potential* or *consequential* manner, albeit a potential that is truly *implicit*.

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[52] ST. THOMAS, *In 3 Sent.*, d.25, q.2, a.1, sol.1, ad 4.

[53] *Loc.cit.*, ad 5.

[54] DOMINICUS GRAVINA, O.P., *Catholicae Praescriptiones adversus omnes veteres et nostri temporis haereticos*, 1.4, a.4, Neapoli 1619, pgs. 356-358).

An example from Cajetan follows. It illustrates a case of inclusion which is *actual* "on the part of the thing" but *potential* or *virtual* "on our part".

"To the second we say that the Father does not understand the *essence* and the *paternity* as *two* formal objects *in themselves,* but as *formally one* and *virtually many* . . . This is *not to be understood* as if the *paternity* and the *essence* are *virtually* in that supreme REALITY and formal reason; but it is to be understood that therein they are *formally* and *really, but their distinction* is there *virtually* . . . Thus Augustine and the Doctors speak of the essence and the relation as of two things *formally distinct.* Now on the *part of the thing* this is grounded on the fact that they are formally *distinct virtually, although not* actually. *But on our part* it is grounded on the fact that relative to us they are *actually distinguished* by their objective reason."[55]

As we have already observed elsewhere and shall presently do so again (306, 571), the distinction obtaining between the primitive datum and the dogmas that can be defined by the Church is exactly the same as the distinction obtaining between the divine Essence and the divine Persons, or between the divine Essence and its attributes, or between the divine attributes themselves. It is a distinction "in the manner of the implicit and the explicit", and not "in the manner of the excluding and the excluded". This explains why, *considered in themselves* (*quoad se*), all our dogmas were *actually* contained in the revealed datum; but *considered with respect to us* (*quoad nos*), they were contained therein *potentially, not actually.* "Those things that are contained *potentially* in the article." (ST. THOMAS)

We hope that the foregoing has made it clear to our objector how it is possible for dogmatic progress to encompass also those things that, with respect to *ourselves,* are contained in the deposit in a *potential* or *consequential* manner, provided that it be a potential that is truly *implicit.* (296)

316. FIFTH OBSERVATION. – "A clear distinction must be drawn between the *virtual implicit* and the *virtual connexive.* The former can be defined as of divine faith; the latter, cannot be so defined."

Reply. – If the virtual connexive is not implicit, as the virtual understood in the sense of Suárez is not implicit, then we agree that it must be clearly – very clearly and very radically – distinguished from the virtual implicit. But if the virtual connexive is implicit – and it is implicit in every *truly* theological conclusion – then absolutely no distinction need be drawn at all between the one and the other; the *virtual implicit* is exactly identical to the *theologico-connexive* virtual.

[55] CAJETAN, *In p. I,* q.39, a.1.

Hence, if our objector concedes that the virtual implicit is definable as of faith, as indeed it is, he concedes by the same token that every theological virtual is definable as of faith. All else is mere quibbling about names. We ask our objector to consider just this one thing. No conclusion is a *theological* conclusion if it is capable of falsification absolutely speaking, or by divine power. So much is evident. On the other hand, any conclusion is necessarily *implicit* if it is incapable of falsification even by divine power, since only that which is *of the essence* or *of the understanding* of a thing is incapable of falsification. Therefore, every truly theological conclusion is *of the understanding* of the revealed principles or revealed deposit. There can be no clearer case of *implicitness* unless we wish to play around with names.

On the other hand, since in everybody's judgment the revealed *formal* constitutes the *proper* or *per se* object of divine faith, and the revealed virtual *the proper or per se* object of theology, every theologian must always draw a clear distinction between the *formal* and the *virtual,* and consequently no theologian should ever confuse the *formal* implicit with the virtual implicit. Anyone who fails to make this distinction, as our objector seems to do at times, confuses theology and faith, or confuses their respective specific nomenclatures. The formal-implicit does not, and relative to *our* minds cannot comprise any other conclusions but those involving only *nominal* distinction, as for instance, conclusions that pass from the definition to the thing defined, from one correlative to the other correlative, from the whole the part, from the universal to the singular. But where *conceptual* unfolding intervenes, that is to say, a combination of multiple concepts within the same reality, there, relative to *our* minds, it is no longer a case of formal or immediate, whether explicit or implicit, but a case of *virtual* or mediate. (61, 64) Dogmatic progress is a development of new concepts within the objectivity itself of the revealed datum; it is the *virtual implicit.* It is not only a progress of *formulae,* but a progress of *meaning,* that is, of *implicit* meaning. It is a progress of the *unfolding* of the meaning: *in the same sense.*

317. SIXTH OBSERVATION. – "Hence, the virtual connexive conclusions, as for instance, the conclusion that 'Christ possesses infused knowledge', cannot be defined as of divine faith by the Church, because it is not a revealed truth."

Reply. – We concede that the conclusion concerning Christ's infused knowledge is truly and properly a theological conclusion. Thus, we also concede that it is not *revealed,* that is to say, not revealed *formally* or *in itself,* since whenever the term *revealed* is employed without qualifications it is taken, or should be taken among technical theologians to mean the

formally revealed. The language of the true theologian is always formal, and it is obvious that relative to us the truly and properly theological conclusion is not formally, but *virtually,* revealed. So much is clear. But on what grounds does our objector say that that conclusion cannot be defined by the Church as of divine faith?

If he is led to say it because he regards the conclusion as doubtful or non-demonstrable since it cannot be deduced with absolute certainty from any revealed principle, then *transeat* to the statement that it cannot be defined as of divine faith. We say *transeat* because in that case the example is wholly irrelevant since what cannot be deduced with certainty from any revealed principle is not a truly theological conclusion but a theological opinion or system, and we are not concerned now with the latter.[56]

On the other hand, if our objector believes that it is a truly theological conclusion, then he has no choice but to admit that it is definable as of divine faith. Why? For a very simple reason which we hope will be easily understood by anyone who is familiar with the treatise *On the Incarnation.* The conclusion regarding Christ's infused knowledge is deduced from the *same revealed principle,* and by the *same logical process,* or by the *same minor of reason,* by which the other conclusions are deduced, e.g., that Christ possesses a human intellect, a human will. human knowledge, all the virtues, etc., etc.

Let the reader look up St. Thomas or his commentators, and he will verify that the process employed to deduce all those conclusions is one and the same, to wit:

[56] "I answer that, as has been said above, it was fitting that Christ's soul *should be altogether perfect* by having all its *potentiality* reduced to *act.* Now, it must be borne in mind that in the human soul – as in every creature – there is a twofold passive *potency* . . . Now, both these *potencies* of Christ's soul were reduced to *act* by virtue of this *divinely infused knowledge.* " (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.,* p.3, q.11, a.1)

"And it is proved by the reason given by St. Thomas. For it was befitting that the soul of Christ which was assumed by the Word should not remain *imperfect.* But it would have remained *imperfect* if it did not have a per se infused knowledge distinct from beatific knowledge. Therefore, it did have such a knowledge." (SALMANTICENSES, *In loc.cit.,* ed. Palmé, vol.15, pg.53)

"The *more common* and *more probable* opinion of theologians admits the existence in Christ of a per se infused knowledge distinct from beatific knowledge. Thus St. Thomas and others whom Suárez mentions and follows in the passage above. *He* [Suárez] *correctly observes that the contrary opinion deserves no censure of any kind.* For, although everyone must admit that there existed in Christ some kind of knowledge even during his infancy, nonetheless, the fact that this knowledge is distinct from the beatific knowledge, or even that it is a per se infused knowledge and not *per accidens does not appear to be conclusively gathered* from the Scriptures or the Fathers." (LUGO, *De Mysterio Incarnationis,* d.20, n.3, ed. Vivès, t.2, pg.626)

Major premise of faith: "Christ is not only a man, but a *perfect* man." This major premise or principle of faith, as the Church understands it, means that Christ is *perfect* in all orders, the natural and the supernatural, and in *all* those perfections that involve no imperfection or are not opposed to the purpose of the Incarnation.

Minor premises of reason: Now, the human intellect is a perfection; now, the human will is a perfection; now, infused knowledge is a perfection; now, acquired knowledge is a perfection; now, all the virtues are perfections; etc., etc.

Theological conclusions: Therefore, Christ possesses a human intellect; therefore, he possesses a human will; therefore, he possesses infused knowledge; therefore, he possesses acquired knowledge; therefore, he possesses all the virtues; etc., etc.

There is no escape here. Either any of those minor premises is denied (as it has been denied by some people), in which case its respective conclusion is not truly a conclusion and we are out of bounds; or each and every one of them is admitted as certain, in which case *all* those conclusions are of the *same nature* since their principle and their deductive process are the same.

Now, the conclusion that Christ possesses a human intellect and a human will is not only definable as of divine faith, but has been so defined. Likewise, the conclusion that Christ possesses all the virtues has either been defined by the ordinary magisterium, or is admitted by everybody as a definable truth. Therefore, the conclusion that Christ possesses infused knowledge, or any other *perfection,* is also definable as of divine faith.[57]

We have time and again observed that many are led into confusion in this matter by the stock example: "Christ is man; therefore, he is risible." In this example, they take the term *man* to mean man in his bare essence, whereas it should be taken to mean *perfect* man. If nothing else had been revealed except that Christ is a "man", then not one of the conclusions mentioned above would be a truly theological conclusion, since absolutely or theologically speaking, it is possible to be a man without any of those non-essential

[57] The reader might think that if it is of faith that "Christ is a perfect man", and from the term "perfect" it can be deduced by an inclusive process that he possessed all the properties and all *actual* perfections, then nothing forbids us to deduce that he also had a human personality, since it is an actual perfection, and that he was free from all physical defect, including hunger and thirst.

But then our objector has overlooked the fact that the revealed principle is not simply that "Christ is a perfect man", but that "Christ is a perfect man in everything that is not opposed to the *hypostatic union* or to the *purposes of redemption*" (100). With this qualification, exactly the contrary conclusions are deduced from this principle.

properties or perfections. But if it has been revealed, as indeed it has been revealed, that Christ is a perfect man, then all those conclusions are truly and properly conclusions, since not even God himself can effect that someone be perfect and at the same time not possess perfection. But in this case all those conclusions are also definable as of divine faith because they are deduced by an implicit or inclusive process.

Thus, the conclusion that "Christ possesses infused knowledge" is not only a case of virtual connexive, as our objector holds, but also a case of virtual connexive-implicit. Hence it is a truly and properly theological conclusion, and by the same token definable as of divine faith. The conclusion is implicit not in the term *man* but in the term "*perfect* man". All truly theological conclusions have to be, and always are, similarly implicit.

Consequently, if this teaching about Christ's infused knowledge cannot be defined as of divine faith *as yet,* the reason is not that it is not a matter that is definable as of faith. The reason is that, not having been as yet evidently demonstrated nor accepted by the common and certain consensus of theologians, it has not yet acquired *relative to the Church,* the status of a rigorously theological conclusion.

Hence, either this example is irrelevant since it is not a truly theological conclusion; or if it is admitted as a truly theological conclusion, it must also be admitted as definable as of divine faith. This conclusion is deduced from the revealed deposit by exactly the same inclusive process whereby other theological conclusions concerning the perfections of Christ have been deduced, some of which have already been defined as truths of faith.

318. SEVENTH OBSERVATION. – "Otherwise, one would have to say that the Church can define as of divine faith the whole of the *Summa Theologica.* This is plainly inadmissible."

Reply. – Our objector exaggerates and attempts to carry things to extreme lengths. Given the premise that every rigorously theological conclusion is definable as of divine faith, it does not follow that the whole of the *Summa Theologica* is likewise so definable. From the fact that a house is made of marble it cannot be inferred that everything in the house is of marble, since in a marble house one may find silk curtains, wooden picture frames and many other kinds of furnishings that exist in the house without being an essential part of it. In like manner, not everything in the *Summa Theologica* is *rigorously theological,* albeit everything is of theological *usefulness,* or of theological *ornament.*

Let us, then, in the first place, set aside all the conclusions that have no necessary relationship with the revealed deposit, since they belong exclusively to the physical sciences, as for example: "Whether Light is a Body";

"Whether it is a Quality"; "Whether the Semen is Taken From the Surplus of Nourishment".[58]

In the second place, let us also set aside all those conclusions that, albeit being not physical but metaphysical, nonetheless have similarly no necessary connexion with the revealed deposit, as for instance, "Whether the Reason of the Good consists in Mode, Species, and Order", "Whether Hope is the same as Desire or Cupidity", "Whether Habit is a Determinate Species of Quality".[59]

In the third place, let us set aside all those conclusions that might in themselves be related with certainty to the revealed deposit, and thus, considered in themselves, could be truly and rigorously theological conclusions, but which, relative to human reason in general or, at least, to the majority of men, bear only a doubtful or merely probable relationship to the deposit and have thus been and will continue to be everlastingly debated among the various schools. Such conclusions do not make up the science of theology in the rigorous sense of the term, but only the theological systems or opinions. The *Summa Theologica* abounds in these, as well as in the two preceding kinds of conclusion. *"The Summa of St. Thomas is full of such questions."*[60] Many instances of this kind of conclusions could be adduced, but it is advisable not to do so since what today seems doubtful or only probable might within a century become certain. Nevetheless, as long as they are doubtful or merely probable they cannot be considered conclusions in the rigorous sense of the term, and are, consequently, irrelevant with respect to the question of definability.

Thus, out of the whole of the *Summa Theologica* there remain only those conclusions that are rigorously theological, that is to say, those that even to our minds bear an absolutely certain and evident connexion with the revealed principles. If our objector refers to these conclusions, then we will readily admit that *all* of them are definable as of divine faith, and that, far from being inadmissible and unheard of, such is the common teaching of all traditional theology.

What to our objector and to many others today seems unheard of and inadmissible was regarded as most natural and commonplace by St. Thomas and all his disciples, by St. Bonaventure and Scotus and all their followers. The *only* discordant view was voiced in the 17th century by Molina. But is our objector aware of the reception accorded to Molina's new and strange opinion both within and outside the Society? The Thomists, in the person

[58] *Summa Theol.*, p.1, q.67, aa.2-3. Also q.119, a.2.

[59] *Ibid.*, q.5, a.5. Also *1-2,* q.40, a.1, and q.49, a.2.

[60] MELCHOR CANO, *De Locis,* 12, 4.

of Navarrete, greeted it with this broadside: "This opinion contains *many falsehoods,* which as of now do not wish to *brand with any censure* because it is not sufficiently clear what this author really means."[61] And the great Suárez, who was fully familiar with the tradition of the School, could only bless himself in bewilderment (*It is amazing!*, these are Suárez's own words) and declare it contrary to the common view of the theologians.[62] All of this is authentic history, fairly forgotten by certain modern texbooks, which we have extensively recounted elsewhere. (84)

Let us draw an example from the *Summa Theologica,* an example embodying an extreme case so to speak, to wit, the real distinction between essence and existence. There can hardly be any other example more to the liking of our objector, who would assuredly say that such a conclusion is not definable as of divine faith, and would perhaps even say that it is not a theological but a purely philosophical conclusion. Well then, *every true Thomist* will regard this conclusion *not* as a purely philosophical, but as a truly and properly *theological* conclusion, and precisely because it is truly *theological* it is *objectively* contained in the revealed deposit, which is the *only requisite* necessary for its *definability* as of divine faith. We will quote here a witness above suspicion, the very learned Cardinal Billot. "And thus it is also clear that the *real* distinction between essence and esse in creatures is also established by theological reasoning . . . This, I say, is a very plain *analysis of the revealed principle* . . . Hence it follows that the unity of the act of esse [in Christ] is *objectively contained,* according to the holy Doctor, in the teaching that asserts the union in subsistence, which is a doctrine of faith."[63] All the rigorous conclusions in the *Summa Theologica* are of this kind: an *analysis of a revealed principle.* That is why they are *objectively* contained in revelation. That is why they are *definable as of faith.* By this same process of analysis the Council of Vienne defined that other seemingly purely philosophical truth, viz., that the human soul is the *per se* substantial form of the body. By this same process many, not to say all, of the propositions from the Thomist Syllabus of Pius X could be defined.

The following passage from Báñez deserves to be read and thoughtfully considered in order to obtain an idea of the ample conception held by our great theologians of the scope of dogmatic progress even after the death of the Apostles. "It must be noted, in the fifth place, that just as neither the

[61] NAVARRETE, *Controversiae in D. Thomae et eius Scholae Defensionem,* t.1, q.1.

[62] SUÁREZ, *De Fide,* d.3, s.11, nn.3 and 11.

[63] BILLOT, *De Verbo Incarnato,* q.2, th.7.

Supreme Pontiff nor the whole Church can institute a new sacrament, so also it is not in their power, or rather, much less is it in their power to allow a *substantially new article* or *new dogma,* since faith is the pre-eminent foundation in the Church. Hence, *even Christ the Lord Himself* did not institute or make any *substantially new article of faith,* although He did institute new sacraments. For, just as all the truths of the sciences are contained in this principle, a thing either is or is not, so also no truth of faith exists that is not contained substantially in that principle laid down by the Apostle in Heb. 11: 'He who comes to God must believe that God exists and is a rewarder to those who seek him.' *Whence it follows* that when we raise the question whether it is possible for the Supreme Pontiff to err in *defining* matters of faith, we mean to say in *explicating* by his definition matters of faith. Let us explain this by an *example.* Suppose someone were to seek counsel from a *moral philosopher* concerning some moral doubt and the latter were to reply in accordance with moral *principles,* in such a case indeed the philosopher would be *unfolding* that which lay hidden rather than be himself the author of the truth. *In the same manner* when the Supreme Pontiff defines something as a truth to be held by faith, he is in the position of one who *explicates* a hidden truth, not of one who is the author of the truth. And *it is thus* that St. Thomas is to be understood in the article when he says that a new edition of the Symbol pertains to the authority of the Supreme Pontiff, this is to be understood with respect to a *new explication.* It follows from this that the heretics wrongly object against us that the Supreme Pontiff would be making a *new faith* [which is the same objection leveled by our illustrious friend against our theory]"[64] "For the Church has to date never proposed to the faithful for belief or defined anything that was not *expressed* in the Holy Scriptures or Apostolic traditions or *virtually* contained therein in such a manner that it could be gathered therefrom by evident *consequence.*"[65] "Therefore [the Church] could likewise presently define as of faith *those truths concerning which the whole school of theologians is in agreement.*"[66] That is exactly what we have said and say again. That is exactly what *all* the theologians prior to Molina, and what the great majority of theologians posterior to Molina have said. We will in due time submit the supporting passages. (353-448).

[64] BÁÑEZ, *In 2-2,* q.1, a.10.

[65] BÁÑEZ, *loc.cit.,* a.7.

[66] BÁÑEZ, *In p.1,* q.1, a.8.

319. EIGHTH OBSERVATION. – "But the Church", says our objector, "can define nothing as of divine faith except 'the revealed'."

Reply. – This term "the revealed" always gets our objector confused because of its ambiguity. The Church can propose as of divine faith not only "the revealed", but also *"the explication* of the revealed". That is what traditional theology teaches and what the Vatican has already defined. Now, the truly theological conclusion is nothing else that the intellectual *explication* of the revealed. Says St. Thomas: "There are two ways of *explicating* the articles of faith . . . The other way is with respect to those things that are *implicitly* contained in the articles themselves, and this is done when a man knows *the things that follow from the articles.*"[67]

Thence follows that other fundamental affirmation made by St. Thomas: "Of itself *faith* sufficiently inclines to *all the things* that accompany or *follow* or precede the faith."[68] What does traditional theology understand by *the things that are consequent to the faith?* St. Thomas gives the answer in the same quotation. But it will be good to add St. Bonaventure's authority: "In other to understand the foregoing it should be observed that the *doctrine of faith* has some things as antecedents, some things as consequents, some things as principles or objects . . . *Consequents,* as the *corollary conclusions* . . . or such things as can be *gathered* from those articles and have it in them to be consecutive to those articles."[69] Or as Scotus similarly says: "For the evidence of which it should be known that some things simply pertain to the substance of the *faith* in such a manner that every one, even the simple faithful, are bound to believe them explicitly . . . Other things also similarly pertain to the substance of the *faith,* but are to be explicitly believed only by the elders in the Church . . . Finally some other things belong *to the faith* in such a way that neither the simple faithful nor the elders in the Church are obliged to believe them explicitly; and of this sort are *many conclusions necessarily included* in the articles believed: for no one is bound to hold them explicitly by faith *before* they are declared by the Church and proposed as objects of *faith* . . . and these have a regard to the order of *conclusions* included *virtually* in the articles of faith."[70] As we have already observed, the

[67] *In 3 Sent.,* d.25, q.11, a.1, sol.3.

[68] *Ibid.,* d.24, q.1, a.2, sol.2.

[69] ST. BONAVENTURE, *In 3 Sent.,* d.25, q.1, a.1.

[70] IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Summa Theol.,* per H. de Montefortino, p.1, q.32 a.4.

view that the truly theological conclusion is definable as of divine faith is the position commonly held by all theologians prior to Molina.

320. NINTH OBSERVATION. – "If every theological conclusion were *definable* as of divine faith, the Church would not spend such a long time in order to define a dogma, or in finding out whether a truth is definable or not."

Reply. – It is one thing to say that something is *definable* as of divine faith, and quite another to say that it is *proximately* so definable. For the definability of a truth two conditions are sufficient: (a) that it be explicitly or implicitly contained in the revealed deposit, and we have already said that virtual-implicit containment is a truly implicit containment; (b) that such containment be *capable of being known* with certainty by human reason without any new revelation. However, for the proximate definability of a truth a third condition is required, to wit: (c) that such containment be not only *capable of being known,* but also *known in fact* with certainty.

Now, the Church has available at her disposal not revelation, but only divine assistance, and divine assistance is nothing more than the infallible preservation from error in the use of human means. It follows that no truth is proximately definable as long as the fact of its containment in the deposit is not known with certainty through some human means. As Melchor Cano very aptly remarks, the human means available to the Church in defining are the same means available to the theologian in deducing, that is to say, the *loci theologici.* "In defining these matters [the Supreme Pontiff and the Councils] consult not only the Holy Scriptures, but also the Apostolic institutions, the prior Councils, the decrees of the Supreme Pontiffs, the writings of the early Fathers, the doctrines of the scholars, right philosophical reason. To put it *briefly,* they submit the case at issue to the criteria or loci about which this our book is being written. For there are no other sources from which they can gather arguments for the solution of questions of faith or of theology. To look for new revelations or Sacred Writings is characteristic of the Jews who are even now waiting for new prophets."[71]

Thus the following general rule can be laid down: "Any truth is proximately definable as of divine faith if its explicit or implicit containment in the revealed deposit is established with *theological certainty,* that is to say, through any of the *certain loci theologici.*"

There are many such loci theologici. The Church is not tied down to any one of them in particular. The pope can define without basing himself on

[71] MELCHOR CANO, *De Locis,* 5, 5.

the Bible and basing himself solely on Tradition, he can likewise define without taking account of primitive, but only of later Tradition; he can, finally, define by taking into account the present Tradition, and when looking up the present tradition he is free to take into account either the consensus of the theologians or that of the faithful of the actual Church.[72] Any one of those theological criteria or loci is a theologically certain criterion when it meets the true conditions; and the Holy Father is not merely an organ that *registers* the social consciousness of the Church, as Modernism pretends, nor is he tied down to one or another of the loci theologici, on the contrary, he is the judge and infallible teacher of the doctrinal awareness of the whole Church, and the supreme rule of the explication and the application of each and every one of the loci theologici.

However, notwithstanding the theoretical truth, already defined by the Vatican Council, that the Supreme Pontiff is infallible *of himself, and not in virtue of the consent of the Church,* and that that infallibility and independence are to be understood not only with respect to the *antecedent* consent of the Church, but with respect to all and any consent whether antecedent, concomitant, or consequent, it is no less certain, speaking historically and practically, that the Church does not usually define a truth without the *common agreement* of the theologians of a given period, that is, either such an agreement in which all concur, or, at least, the few who hold the contrary view are considered insignificant, or obviously mistaken, or

[72] Petavius correctly observes that, in defining questions of faith, the majority of the ecumenical councils were satisfied with the testimony of the Fathers who existed much later than the 1st. century. "What were the authorities with which the early Church armed herself in the general councils, or with which she defended a dogma of faith brought into question against the heresies that thereafter rose from time to time? In those cases where the proceedings have been lost altogether, we can form no judgment. But in all the other cases, where we have a fuller record of the things acted and debated upon, one will find that such councils drew their arguments and testimonies *not from the earliest, but rather from the latest and more recent doctors.* We find that this was done in the ecumenical councils of *Ephesus, Chalcedon,* the *Fifth,* and the *Sixth,* not to mention others. In the *first* of these, the truth that it was no mere man but God who was born of the Virgin is proven by the testimonies of Cyprian, Peter of Alexandria, Athanasius, Pope Julius, Pope Felix, Theophilus of Alexandria, Ambrose, Gregory Nazianzen, Gregory of Nyssa, Basil, Atticus, and Amphilochius. The earliest of these, viz. Cyprian, anteceded the Council of Ephesus by not quite two hundred years, the others were of more recent memory . . . Likewise, the Council of *Chalcedon* records writers who lived *hardly one century earlier* . . . Similarly, when the *Fifth Council* enumerates the Fathers which it professes to follow in all things, it names Athanasius, Hilary, Gregory Nazianzen, Gregory of Nyssa, Ambrose, Augustine, Theophilus, John Chrysostom, Leo, Proclus, and *none earlier* . . . The Sixth Council did not behave otherwise. Against the Monothelite heresy it did *not cite any Fathers earlier than those* (PETAVIUS, *De Incarnatione,* lib.14, c.15)

blinded by school or party passions, as in the case of the few theologians who persisted in denying the Immaculate Conception or papal infallibility on the very eve of their definitions.

Thus, as a *practical* rule of *proximate* definability we may lay down the following: "Any truth is proximately definable as of divine faith if its explicit or implicit containment in the revealed deposit is affirmed as certain by the common agreement of the theologians."

Finally, since we maintain, as we believe that every theologian should together with the traditional view, that the implicit-virtual inclusion or the rigorous theological conclusion is a truly implicit inclusion, the aforementioned rule can be reworded as follows: "Every truly theological conclusion is proximately definable as of divine faith it if is held as absolutely certain by the common consent of the theologians." This is the truly Thomist rule which Báñez formulates in these terms: "All those truths could presently be defined as of faith concerning which the whole school of theologians is in agreement."[73]

No one need ask us for a true index of propositions proximately definable as of divine faith. He can easily draw one up if he wants it. Let him pick up the Denzinger and mark all the propositions that have been already defined *infallibly.* Next let him pick up any theological course or treatise and mark all the truly theological propositions held as absolutely certain either by the common agreement of the theologians or by the common agreement of all the faithful. This is the "ultimate previous disposition" to definability. The "sense of the faith" contributes equally or even more than reasoning towards effecting this common agreement of the theologians and of the faithful, that is, of the whole *society* of the Church, especially in the case of dogmas of a practical or affective character. This is the reason why, as we have already observed (220), the sense of the faith, when it spreads and becomes the common sentiment of bishops, theologians, and faithful, is a sufficient criterion of definability for the Church.

This common and social agreement of the Church does not have for its purpose the creation of a heretofore non-existent implicitness in the revealed datum, but to confirm such implicitness where it has already been uncovered through speculative reasoning, or to uncover it by way of the affective process when, despite its being there from the very beginning, it cannot be detected with certainty through reasoning alone.

[73] *In p.1,* q.1, a.8.

We thus see that, although it is *theoretically* certain that the pope does not necessarily depend on the consent of the Church in order to define a truth, it is no less certain that *in practice* the Holy Father always, or almost always, takes such consent into account. In this sense, we believe that Fr. Gardeil was right in affirming that the "social sense of the Church" or "lived theology" is, as it were, the *ultimate previous disposition* to a dogma's definability.[74]

We have time and time again repeated the term "*truly theological* conclusions" in order to stress the fact that not all the conclusions that can be found in theological courses are rigorously theological, but only those conclusions "from the denial of which there follows with absolute necessity the denial of the premise of faith". That the Church bides her time in defining such truths is traceable to two causes: the first is theologians are not always in agreement about such truths, and without it the Church usually does not proceed to a definition. The second is that neither are there always heretics who deny them or pressing requests for their definition from the people. These are the two occasioning causes without the concurrence of which – at least of one of them – the Church is not wont to define a truth.

321. TENTH OBSERVATION. – "But", our objector insists, "how is it possible to define as of divine faith anything that is only *connected* or related to the revealed? For anything to be capable of being defined as of divine faith it is not enough that it be *related* to the deposit, it is necessary that it exist *in* or be *within* the deposit."

The reply to this last insistence provides, we believe, the key to the whole question. Our objector focuses only on the fact that the conclusions are the *relations of other things to the deposit* whereas he ought to focus on the fact that they also and principally are the *relations of the deposit* to other things. This latter viewpoint, and it alone, constitutes the *formal* point of view from which such relations are considered by the Church and by theology, that is, not as relations of other things to the deposit, but as relations of the deposit to other things. Thus, they are the *relations of the deposit*, something pertaining to the deposit itself. Sacred theology does not, and cannot consider things *other* than dogma; it does not, and cannot consider anything but the dogma and *its relations* to other things. And that is precisely what we call conclusions. In other words, relations *of the dogma* itself, *dogmatic* relations. Such relations or conclusions would not be known to *our* human reason without the help of the so-called minors of reason, but these minors

[74] GARDEIL, *Le donée révélé*, pgs.180-181.

do not create or effect those relations, they merely *unfold* or *uncover* them in the majors of faith. (245)

Thus, St. Thomas's *Summa*, insofar as it is rigorously theological, is nothing but the *explication* of the *implicit* virtuality of the revealed deposit, and the same holds for all true theology. If, upon giving us the revealed deposit, God had deigned *to explain himself some more*, we would have, instead of the deposit, the *Summa* of St. Thomas. The Gospel or the revealed deposit is nothing but the *substance of the "Summa Theologica"*. The *Summa Theologica*, i.e. those parts of it that are rigorously *theological*, is simply the *Gospel explicated*.[75]

Of the four degrees or stages that make up the whole complex of Catholic doctrine, to wit: *primitive datum, dogmas of faith, infallible truths*, and *theological* conclusions,[76] the first degree can be compared to a sapling, small in size and development, but prolific and charged with divine substance, sap, virtuality and life. The other three degrees that sprout and issue homogeneously from the first, are the *same* sapling, exactly the same as to *substance*, but now fully grown and turned into a gigantic *tree*, displaying *new* branches, flowers and fruits.

Two gardeners have joined, and will always continue to join hands in order to conserve, cultivate and develop this sacred sapling of the primitive deposit of the faith, One of them is human, the other divine: the theologian and the Church. Both of them – the theologian with his human and fallible reasoning, and the Church with her infallible and divine authority – have an analogous mission, which is not that of adding, subtracting or changing

[75] The painter Louis Edouard Fournier recounts that as he was spending a last winter season in Chatenay doing Sully-Prudhomme's portrait, he found his model one day reading a *compendium* of St. Thomas Aquinas's *Summa*. "As you see", the poet told him, "I am educating myself..." Then, after looking at the book for quite some time, he added, "It is as *extraordinary* as it is complicated... *To think that all of this has come out of the Gospel.*" This remark states in familiar, almost trivial, terms the *problem of dogmatic development*. (LÉONCE DE GRANDMAISON, *"Le développement du dogma chrétien*, in Revue Pratique d'Apologétique, 1908, pg.521)

[76] The order in which the four degrees or levels are enumerated in the text is the order of *perfection*. In the order of *generation*, the enumeration would be as follows: (a) primitive datum; (b) theological conclusions; (c) infallible truths; (d) dogmas of faith. What first comes out of the primitive datum as soon as it is deposited in human minds is the conclusions, whether improper or proper. Out of these two kinds of conclusions come the infallible truths. Out of the conclusions and infallible truths come the dogmas of faith. Out of these dogmatic definitions come new conclusions; out of these new conclusions, new infallible truths and new dogmas. Thus, in the life of dogma we find analogically verified that continuous and *circular* movement, which in biology is termed *cycle*, and which is characteristic of every vital and homogeneous development.

anything in the sapling, but that of preserving and *explicating* it. In the pursuance of this sacred mission the theologian is a pope with neither divine authority nor divine assistance, the pope is a theologian with divine authority, a divinely assisted theologian.

SECTION III

OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE SCOPE OF DOGMATIC EVOLUTION WITH THE SCOPE OF THE CHURCH'S INFALLIBILITY

322. THE FORMAL VIEWPOINT OF THE CHURCH'S INFALLIBILITY. – When we dealt with the six types of reasoning or connexion, we stated that the conclusions or connexions of type 4 are not objects of the Church's infallibility. Subsequently, when we dealt with the scope of dogmatic evolution, we said that its scope was identical to that of the Church's infallibility.

In this section we are going to reply to various observations that have been raised against those two statements which are intimately linked among themselves and with the evolution of dogma. But before we do so, it will be advisable to dwell briefly on the formal viewpoint of the Church's infallibility. This is the only way whereby we will be able to appreciate well its relations to revelation, faith, and theology, and, thus, to the evolution of dogma.

The correct and profound appraisal of any question whatsoever requires that one should get himself from the very beginning on to its *formal* point of view, which is often denominated by St. Thomas the *per se* viewpoint. The *per accidens* or *material* viewpoints often result in a disorientation of thinking unless one takes sedulous care in considering them only and exclusively in relation to the formal viewpoint.[77]

Well then, infallibility was given by God to the Church not for the sake of new revelations or of doctrines unrelated to revelation, but solely and exclusively for the sake of integrally preserving and faithfully expounding the divine *revelation* or the deposit of the *faith* handed down by the Apostles to the Church.

[77] "Nothing that is per accidens constitutes the species, but that which is *per se.*" (ST. THOMAS, *1-2*, q.118, a.5) – "Every single thing is judged rather according to what is found in it *formally and per se*, than according to what is found in it per accidens." (ST. THOMAS, *2-2*, q.110, a.1) – "In every science that which is per accidens is set aside, and that which is *per se* is taken." (ST. THOMAS, *In Boetium, De Trinitate*, q.5, a.4, ad 1) – "As the Philosopher says, *in art no account is to be taken* of that which is per accidens." (ST. THOMAS, *In 4 Sent.*, d.13, q.2, a.2) – *"All knowledge perishes* if it does not settle on things that are *per se."* (CAJETAN, *In 2-2*, q.154, a.2)

Thus the preservation and exposition of divine *revelation* or of the deposit of the *faith* is the *formal* viewpoint or the "ratio sub qua" of the Church's infallibility. Consequently, *nothing* can pertain to the Church's infallibility except divine revelation or by reason of a relation to divine revelation; except the deposit of the faith or by reason of a relation to the deposit of the faith. On the other hand, *any and everything*, insofar as it is the object of divine revelation or of the deposit of the faith, or insofar as it has a necessary relation to the preservation and exposition of divine revelation necessarily is an object of the infallibility of the Church in the same degree and measure as it has to do with revelation and faith.

The Vatican Council has the following to say: "For the Holy Spirit was not promised to Peter's successors in the sense that by his revelation they should disclose new doctrine, but in the sense that by his assistance [infallibility] they should inviolably *safeguard* and faithfully *expound* the *revelation* or deposit of the *faith* handed down by the Apostles."[78] "We teach that the object of infallibility stretches out to the very reaches of the deposit of the faith and as far as required by the office of safekeeping it, and therefore that the infallibility, with which the Church of Christ is endowed, comprises within its ambit both the whole of the *revealed* word of God and everything that, although not revealed *in itself*, is nonetheless such that without it the revealed word cannot be securely preserved, nor certainly and definitively proposed for belief, nor explicated nor validly asserted and defended against the errors of men and of falsely called science."[79]

Schafzler and Franzelin: "And thus the Church's magisterium, whose function it is to apply the light of divine *revelation* to rising questions of *faith*, considers by that same light many things which, taken *in themselves*, fall outside of the object of revelation, but nonetheless fall under its light insofar as they are referred to the question of *faith* to be judged by the Church in the light of divine *revelation*. Now then, it is *solely on this account*, that is, solely insofar as such truths, although belonging to the natural order *of themselves*, are nonetheless illumined by the supernatural light of divine *revelation*, that they are subject to the Church's magisterium."[80] "Consequently, the Church's magisterium teaches these truths and is capable of judging infallibly of these errors, *not* by teaching human sciences *in the light of their own principles, but* by judging them *in the light*

[78] VATICAN COUNCIL, Constitution *De Ecclesia Christi*, ch.4.

[79] Const. Dogm. *De Ecclesia Christi*, c. 9.

[80] SCHAFZLER, O.P., *Introductio in Sacram Theologiam*, pg.185.

of her own principles. Hence, the infallible Church *never judges,* nor can the Holy Spirit ever allow that she should *by her definitions* judge, either truths or errors *except with regard to the deposit* which is to be kept safe, and in virtue of the divinely enjoined office of watching over the deposit."[81]

Let us examine these two propositions. First: Infallibility extends itself not only to the faith and theology but also to philosophy, sociology, etc. Second: Infallibility extends itself solely to the faith and theology. Both propositions are true. However, the first is *materially* true and formally false or inaccurate. The second is *formally* true and accurate. Philosophy, sociology, etc. are not subject to infallibility except *solely* and *insofar* as they are necessarily related to the revealed deposit. But, taken from that point of view, they are no longer formally philosophy, nor sociology, nor politics, nor history, etc., but *theology.*

This is to say that the concept of the Church's infallibility is not an absolute concept, or a concept of indefinite scope, as the concept of God's infallibility. It is an essentially *relative* concept, one that is essentially restricted to the preservation and exposition of *revelation* and of the *faith.* Its fields cannot extend beyond the fields or departments of the faith and revelation. Hence, inasmuch as the Church's infallibility is a concept that is relative to divine faith and divine revelation, one has to appraise accurately the scope or the departments of divine faith and divine revelation if one wishes duly and formally to appraise the scope and the departments of the object of the Church's infallibility. This is the only scientific and safe procedure to employ in the examination of any *relative* concept.

323. TWO GREAT DEPARTMENTS OF DIVINE FAITH. – The Angelic Doctor, whose treatise *On Faith* ranks among the most excellent and accomplished that have ever been written[82], divides the whole field of truth into *two* great departments, essentially and radically distinct one from the other. The first contains the truths that *in one way or another* belong to divine faith. The second includes the truths that *in no way* belong to divine faith. Since there are *two* different *ways* of belonging to divine faith, viz. directly or principally, and indirectly or secondarily, the holy Doctor subdivides the first department into two parts corresponding to these two ways of belonging to the faith. Thus, the whole field of truth is divided by St. Thomas into *three* departments, which we list separately to do justice to the importance of the subjects:

[81] FRANZELIN, *De Divina Traditione,* th.12, schol.1, pg.126, Romae 1882, ed.3.

[82] "In the treatment and development of this virtue of faith St. Thomas proceeded *in a most excellent and scientific order.*" (JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *De Fide,* prol.) – "St. Thomas, whose treatise on faith is a *most accomplished one* . . ." (MAZELLA, *De Virtutibus infusis,* n.799, Romae 1894, ed.3, pg.423)

First department: Truths that *directly* or *principally* belong to divine faith.

Second department: Truths that *indirectly* or *secondarily* belong to divine faith.

Third department: Truths that *in no way* belong to divine faith.

In Thomist teaching these are the three *formal* departments of: (a) divine faith; (b) sacred theology; (c) mere human reason.

Whoever wishes to understand St. Thomas and his commentators when they speak of the faith, infallibility, or theology, should never overlook this division into three departments and the remarks we are going to make on them. But let us first quote a brief passage from St. Thomas. "I answer that it must be said that we now speak of heresy insofar as it involves the *corruption* of the Christian faith. But that someone should entertain a false opinion *in matters that are not of faith,* for instance, in matters of geometry or in other like matters that are *altogether incapable of pertaining to the faith* [here we have the third department which contains those things that in no way are or can be of the faith], this has nothing to do with the corruption of the Christian faith, which takes place only when a man entertains a false opinion concerning those things *that pertain to the faith.* [Here begins the division of the first and second departments of divine faith.] As has been said above, a thing pertains to the faith in two ways: one, *directly* and *principally,* as in the case of the articles of faith [this is the first department *of faith*]; the other way is *indirectly* and *secondarily,* as in the case of those things from the denial of which there *follows* the corruption of some article [this is the second department *of faith*]. And *heresy can* exist with respect to both [that is, the truths of both the first and second departments] in the same way as *faith.*"[83]

In this same article, in the solution to the third objection, the holy Doctor explains how the truths of the second department, that *can* be objects of faith and of heresy, begin *actually* to pertain directly to the faith and that their denial becomes a *heresy.* "And thus some teachers [the Fathers of the Church] appear to have disagreed, either about things with respect to which to hold one opinion or another has *nothing* to do with the faith [the third department], or even about certain things *pertaining to the faith* which had not yet been determined by the Church [the second department]; but *after* they have been determined by the authority of the universal Church [whereby they pass on to the first department], he who should pertinaciously resist such a determination, would be adjudged a heretic."[84]

[83] ST. THOMAS, *2-2,* q.11, a.2.

[84] *Loc.cit.,* ad 3.

This is the classical and most accomplished article from the pen of the holy Doctor on the subject, for it is taken from the *Summa Theologica,* and from the treatise *On Faith.* As parallel passages the first part of the same *Summa*[85] together with Cajetan's commentaries, and the Commentaries on the *Sentences*[86] where the saint deals with the same subject, can be looked up. As examples of the second department the holy Doctor often cites the secondary matters of the Bible, e.g., that "Abraham had two sons", however, it is plain that he also includes in the second department all truly *theological conclusions.* This is clear on several counts: it is obviously gathered from the context; the holy Doctor applies this teaching to the treatise *On the Divine Notions;* theology cannot fit into the third department which is altogether profane, nor can it fit into the first department which is of itself and formally of faith; and lastly because the saint himself says so expressly in the last of the parallel passages earlier quoted. (467-468)

The holy Doctor's mind on the *indirectly* revealed has been accurately expressed by Báñez in these terms: "The question is raised, what does St. Thomas undertand by pertaining *directly* and *indirectly* to the faith? For either it is understood . . . or understood . . . or, *finally,* by the term *directly* is understood something that *immediately* falls under the habit of faith, that is, without benefit of any inferential processes of reason, and, on the other hand, that is said to pertain *indirectly* to the faith which is by a *necessary consequence* gathered from some proposition that is immediately of faith. To this doubt we reply that St. Thomas is to be understood *in this last manner.* And although he cited as examples the articles of faith, which directly pertain to the faith, he nonetheless did not exclude some other things from pertaining directly to the faith. For everything that is found in the Holy Scriptures pertains directly to the faith. The traditions of the Apostles and the definitions of the Councils also pertain directly to the faith. But those things are *indirectly* of the faith from whose denial it follows *by a valid consequence* that what is asserted by faith is false. For instance, he who denies that "Christ is risible" is guilty of error in the Catholic faith *consequently* and *indirectly.* For it validly follows by a consequence known by natural light that "Christ is not a PERFECT *man.*"[87]

324. OBSERVATIONS ON THE TWO DEPARTMENTS OF DIVINE FAITH. – The third department, being as it is altogether profane or bereft of any necessary relationship with the faith, must by the same token be utterly alien to infallibility and theology. Hence, we will set it completely aside, and

[85] Q.32, a.4.

[86] Lib.1, d.33, q.1, a.5; lib.4, d.13, q.2, a.1, ad 6.

[87] BÁÑEZ, *In 2-2,* q.11, a.2.

limit ourselves to making, with St. Thomas, the following observations concerning the other two departments.

1. In the first department are included all the truths *revealed* by God and *defined* as such by the ordinary or solemn magisterium of the Church, and nothing else. In other words, the first department is exclusively limited to all the *dogmas of faith.*

2. To the second department belong all the truths that necessarily *follow* from the former, or are *necessarily* connected with the former, or from whose denial there follows the *denial* of the former, or from whose corruption there follows the *corruption* of the former. All these phrases mean the same thing, and St. Thomas employs them indifferently.

3. *Divine faith* has for its *primary* (or *per se,* or direct, or immediate, or formal – all these terms mean the same thing –) object the truths of the first department; and for its *secondary* (or per accidens, or mediate, or indirect, or virtual – all these terms mean the same thing –) object the truths of the second department.

4. The Church's infallibility, inasmuch as it exists only with respect to divine faith, must have and does have the same object as the faith itself, viz. the truths of the first department as its *primary* object, and the truths of the second department as its *secondary* object.

5. It is well known that the starting point of *sacred theology* is dogma, and its conclusions or proper object is everything that is necessarily connected with dogma. Consequently, sacred theology has as its starting point or *principles* the truths of the first department, and as its *conclusions* or proper object the truths of the second department. Thus, the second is the proper, or specific, or *per se* department of theology, just as the first is the proper, or *per se,* or specific department of divine faith.[88]

[88] St. Thomas usually cites the *articles of faith* as true instances of the first department, since the articles were, and had to be, in the revealed deposit in a *definite* manner since the beginning. It was Jesus Christ himself who *determined* or defined them, and they were found from the beginning in the daily preaching or ordinary magisterium of the Church. "The faith is explicated in *determinate* articles, and this explication was completed by Christ; hence, with regard to the essentials of the faith, it is not lawful either to add to, or subtract from, his teaching." (ST. THOMAS, *In 3 Sent.,* d.25, q.2, a.2, sol.1, ad 5) Nonetheless, any other truth (even if it is not an article) whose *meaning* has been defined from the beginning, or afterwards, belongs to the first department. On the other hand, every truth whose meaning *has not been defined* by either the solemn or the ordinary magisterium of the Church, is assigned by St. Thomas to the second department, since according to St. Thomas, without the Church's definition, nothing can formally be of faith *for us,* who have not received revelation *immediately* from God (156). The definition or the understanding of the dogma by the Church is not the *formal object* of our faith, but it is the *integral* condition, or the *sine qua non* condition, of its *formal* object. "Pertaining to the *integrity* of the formal object of *our* faith."

6. If there be truths that simultaneously satisfy the requirements of both the first and the second departments, viz., truths that on the one hand are revealed and have been defined (the *medium of knowing* of the first department or of divine faith), and on the other hand are a necessary consequence (the *medium of knowing* of the second department or of theology) of other revealed and defined truths, then such truths will at once pertain directly both to faith and to theology. (126)

7. The truths of the second department, considered *per se* or *apart* from the Church's definition, that is to say, when they are known solely through reasoning or through the necessary connexion they bear to the truths of the first department, have properly, rigorously, and exclusively the nature of theological conclusions, and deserve solely and exclusively theological assent. However, since theological assent is neither an assent of mere natural reason, nor an assent of mere divine faith, but an assent *of reason-faith*, its object is, in this sense, said to pertain *mediately* to divine faith. In St. Thomas's teaching to be mediately of divine faith means exactly the same as to be immediately and formally of theology and of mere theology. It is in this seventh observation that *Vázquez* and *Vega* differ from St. Thomas on account of their failure to draw a good and formal distinction between theology and faith. (85)

8. Those same truths of the second department pass on to the first department *once they are defined* by the Church as of divine faith ("after they have been determined by the authority of the universal Church"), that is, they become true *dogmas* of divine faith, and their denial comes to have

(CAJETAN, *In 2-2*, q.5, a.3) Consequently, St. Thomas places in the second department *two* kinds of truths. First, whatever is *secondary* in the Holy Scriptures, so long as the Church does not define it – and she rarely does so. With respect to this *secondary* object, the Church has only defined that it is *inspired* by God just as much as the primary object; hence, everything in the Holy Scriptures belongs to the first department insofar as its *inspiration* and *inerrancy* is at stake, but not insofar as its *meaning* is concerned. Secondly, all theological *conclusions* prior to their definition, since after the Church defines them as of faith they pass on to the first department. These two kinds of truths that make up the contents of the second department – viz., the secondary object of the Holy Scriptures, and theological conclusions – have one thing in common, which is that they do not belong to the faith of themselves or *per se*, but only because of their *relation* to what is *per se* revealed. This relation or connexion with what is *per se* revealed, when known exclusively through human reasoning, is called theology, which is simply the science that defines – i.e., *humanly* defines – things divine. That relation is of divine faith when it is known through the definition of the Church. The Church is, likewise, a defining agency, but a *divine* defining agency, of things divine. Neither theology nor the Church invent, or add to, or modify what is divine or revealed; they only explicate, or unfold, or define what is undefined or virtual in the revealed datum; further, they also conserve whatever is already unfolded, or formal, or defined.

the nature of true *heresy*. From conclusions of theology they come to be *principles* of theology and of the faith, inasmuch as now they are known through a new medium, that is to say, not solely through their connexion with the revealed, which is the formal medium of theology, but through their revelation explicated by the Church, which is the formal medium of divine faith. On this point Vázquez, Vega, and Cano followed faithfully the teaching of St. Thomas and of the whole Thomist school, whereas Molina deviated from it, and Kilber and some others who followed Molina.

These eight observations, which we recommend to the meditation of every Thomist theologian, contain, to our way of thinking, the true key to the whole teaching of St. Thomas on the subject of divine faith, and consequently, on infallibility and theology, two subjects which are essentially relative to divine faith.

325. TWO GREAT DEPARTMENTS OF DIVINE REVELATION. – Since divine revelation is the formal object of divine faith, the departments of the former have to be exactly identical to those of the latter. Or, to speak with greater logical precision, the departments of divine faith, which we have described, must have been derived from the departments of divine revelation, which we are going to describe briefly.

Thomist theology divides the whole field of truth into two great departments altogether and radically distinct one from the other: (a) truths that have been revealed by God *in one way or another;* and (b) truths that *in no way* have been revealed by God.

Since there are *two ways* of true divine revelation: one whereby God reveals a thing *in itself,* the other whereby God reveals something *in another thing,* in which it is necessarily infolded and from which it can be unfolded or extracted or taken or deduced, it follows that the first department is subdivided into two parts: one, containing the truths that have been revealed *in themselves;* the other, containing the truths that have been revealed *in another* truth or truths.

The Thomist school regards the term *in itself* as identical to "formally" or "immediately", and the term *in another* as identical to "virtually" or "mediately". Thus, the whole field of truth is divided by Thomists into three great departments, which we will list down separately.

First department: Truths revealed *in themselves,* or *formally* revealed, or *immediately* revealed.

Second department: Truths revealed *in another,* or *virtually* revealed, or *mediately* revealed.

Third department: Truths *not revealed* in any way, either in themselves or in another, either formally or virtually, either immediately or mediately.

No one who wishes to obtain a good understanding of St. Thomas and his school should overlook this division into three departments, to which correspond the other three earlier mentioned when we spoke of the faith.

The third department is entirely alien to divine revelation, and consequently to divine faith, infallibility, and theology. Only the first two have to do with theology, infallibility, and faith, since they are the two departments into which divine revelation is divided. The same eight observations made earlier about the two departments of divine faith must be proportionally applied to these two departments of divine revelation. We refrain from so doing since it would mean repeating them again almost word for word. We will only recall the eighth observation, which is the most important, viz. that the truths of the second department are definable by the Church, not only as of ecclesiastical, but also as of divine faith, and that this is the teaching not only of Vázquez, Vega, Cano, and Bellarmine, but of the entire Thomist school. This is not the peculiar doctrine of Vázquez and Vega, as commonly affirmed by the majority of modern theologians. Their peculiar opinion is stated in the seventh observation, to wit, that the truths of the second department are formally of divine faith, even prescinding from the Church's definition, provided they are known through evident human reasoning.

326. REVEALED "IN ITSELF" AND REVEALED "IN ANOTHER". We have seen that, according to the Thomist school, the first and the second departments of divine revelation, which are respectively the proper or specific departments of divine faith and of theology, are constituted and distinguished the former by the revealed *in itself*, and the latter by the revealed *in another*.

However, it must be carefully borne in mind that for Thomists the revealed *in itself* and the revealed *in another* are two members of the revealed or *divine revelation*. Consequently, the revealed *in itself* and the revealed *in another* are not respectively equivalent to revealed and *not revealed*, since in this case we would not have a division of revelation, but are to be regarded as equivalent to *two* different *modes* of *true revelation*.

Something similar happens in the commonly known divisions of the known and being, viz., known *in itself* (principles) and known *in another* (conclusions), or of existing *in itself* (substance) and existing *in another* (accidents). To be known *in itself* and known *in another* is not to say known and *not known*, but to say *two* different *modes* of *true knowing*. Likewise to exist itself and to exist *in another* is not say to exist and *not to exist* but to say *two* different *modes* of *truly existing*.

Hence, to deny that a thing is revealed in itself (or formally, or immediately) does not mean for Thomists to deny its revelation. It only

means to deny *one* of the modes of revelation, which does not in the least eliminate *the other* mode of revelation, that is, that the thing can have been revealed *in another*.

Likewise, to affirm that a thing is revealed "in another" (or virtually, or mediately) is not to affirm its improper or metaphorical revelation, but to affirm *another mode* of true and proper revelation.

There are *two modes* of true revelation, as well as of true evidence: the immediate, or *in itself*, or formal mode, and the mediate, or *in another*, or virtual mode. "He who *says* one thing, *somehow says* many things." (ST. THOMAS) (304).

327. THE CONNEXIVE IMPLICIT AND THE CONNEXIVE NON-IMPLICIT. – To say "revealed in another" is the same as saying "necessarily connected with the revealed in itself".

However, it must be remembered that connected and implicit are not two opposed concepts, or two concepts that are mutually exclusive. On the contrary, the connected is divided into implicit and non-implicit. To understand this one need only consider that all true reasoning involves a connexion of the conclusion to the major premise by means of the minor premise. Thus, every conclusion is connexive. However, some minor premises, and consequently their respective conclusions, are implicit or inclusive in the major premises, whereas other minor premises are not implicit or not inclusive but merely connexive. Thus there are connexions that are implicit or inclusive, and there are connexions that are neither implicit nor inclusive. The former constitute the *virtual implicit*, the latter constitute the merely connexive virtual, or the *merely* virtual. (40-41) These latter correspond to the type 4 virtual or connexive; the former to the other five types of virtual or connexive. (46) To maintain that the *virtual* cannot be *implicit*, or that the truly implicit cannot be truly virtual, means that one has lost the concept of *implicit virtuality*, the concept of true theology, one of the keys to dogmatic progress.

328. REPLY TO SOME OBSERVATIONS RAISED AGAINST US. – The foregoing makes it easier to reply to some observations that have been addressed to us. We said that the type 4 connexive or conclusion cannot be the object of infallibility (89-99). A learned theologian believed that this was equivalent to restricting the Church's infallibility and addressed to us the following observations.

FIRST OBSERVATION. – All theologians, without exception, teach that the Church's infallibility extends itself to *everything that is necessarily connected* with the revealed. Likewise, Church praxis in the infallible con-

demnation of errors teaches the same doctrine. Now, according to Fr. Marín, the Church's infallibility does not extend itself to everything that is *connected* with the revealed. Therefore, Fr. Marín excessively restricts the Church's infallibility against the unanimous opinion of theologians and against the praxis of the Church herself.

Reply. – The alert reader will have noticed at once the fundamental defect in this argument. The major premise says *necessarily connected,* while the minor premise merely says *connected,* as if everything "connected" were also "necessarily connected". This is the covert flaw in our objector's argument. He takes for granted that we deny that the Church's infallibility extends to everything that is *necessarily* connected, which is simply not true. To make it plain, let us examine separately the major and the minor premises of the argument.

The major premise is flawless. All theologians maintain, and the Church's praxis teaches, that the Church's infallibility extends not only to whatsoever is formally revealed but also to *everything that is necessarily connected* with it. But so do we. Thus, let it be stated once and for all that the major premise is fully accepted by all and sundry. Let us hear no more about it. That is not the point at issue, for that is elementary in theology.

Consequently, the whole force of the argument, if there be any, must be found in the minor premise, which states that, according to us, the Church's infallibility does not extend to everything that is "connected". But what does our objector mean by the "connected"? If he refers to any of the five earlier mentioned connexives, then it is not true that we exclude them from the secondary object of infallibility. Not only do we hold them to be the secondary object of infallibility, but we also maintain that they are definable, not merely as of the modernly termed *ecclesiastical,* but as of *divine* faith. Consequently, relative to those five connexives, which comprise all rigorously theological conclusions deduced by means of inclusive minors, far from restricting the Church's infallible authority, we actually give it a broader extension than that which certain authors, among them our objector, seem to give to it.

Does he refer exclusively to the type 4 connexive? In that case he ought to know that we have said that this type of connexive *is not* NECESSARILY *connected with the revealed deposit,* which is, according to all theologians, the indispensable requisite for any truly theological conclusion. (89-102) Consequently, our objector has the burden of proving that, "according to all theologians and to the praxis of the Church", a connexive of this type is *necessarily* connected. On this point he says absolutely nothing, nor will he ever produce a proof.

329. SECOND OBSERVATION. – The same argument is submitted by our objector in another form, which can be resumed in these terms. All theologians extend infallibility not only to whatsoever is really revealed, but also to everything that is necessarily connected with it. But Fr. Marín restricts infallibility only to what is really revealed. Therefore . . .

Reply. – The argument again confuses two essentially different questions. One: whether infallibility extends to everything necessarily connected with whatsoever is revealed. Two: whether whatsoever is necessarily connected, by way of conclusion, with anything revealed is really revealed. The first question is the only one that has to do with the scope of infallibility, and to it all theologians give an affirmative answer, and so do we. The second question has absolutely nothing to do with the present question of infallibility, but with the question of definability as of *divine faith.* To this second question there is no unanimous answer given by theologians, as our objector seems to believe. On the contrary, there are two opinions. The first opinion answers affirmatively, and we are of this opinion. The second opinion answers negatively, and our objector seems to be of this opinion.

The first opinion, to which we subscribe, far from restricting the Church's authority, as our objector believes, extends it. Any one who maintains that whatsoever is necessarily connected is not really revealed and at the same time maintains that the Church's infallibility extends only to what is really revealed, would restrict the Church's infallibility since he would exclude from it whatever is necessarily connected. But any one who maintains that whatsoever is necessarily connected is really revealed, and at the same time maintains that "the Church's infallibility extends only to what is really revealed", would extend the Church's infallibility as far as it should, that is, as far as including all the necessarily connected, and *besides* he also extends to the same boundaries the Church's authority to define as of divine faith. Let us not mix altogether different questions and formulae. Infallibility comprises two things: (a) whatsoever is formally revealed, and this is its primary object; (b) whatsoever is necessarily connected with anything formally revealed, and this is its secondary object. We are all agreed on this. The question whether that secondary object is really revealed or not is irrelevant to the question about the scope of infallibility.

330. THIRD OBSERVATION. – A passage from the bishop of Brescia who, in one of the Vatican's preparatory sessions, stated that *absolutely all theologians* admit that it would be an utterly grievous error to restrict the Church's infallibility to what is revealed *in itself,* and not extend it to everything *necessarily connected with the revealed.*

Reply. – That is exactly what we say. But that is not the question at issue. Our objector seems unable to distinguish these three propositions: (a) *All* theologians extend infallibility to everything that is necessarily connected

with the revealed deposit; (b) *All* theologians admit that the type 4 connexive is necessarily connected with the revealed deposit; (c) *All* theologians admit that what is necessarily connected with the revealed deposit is not really revealed. Our objector devotes all his energies to proving the first proposition, which nobody denies, and forgets to prove the second and third propositions which are the only ones that require proof. The bishop of Brescia affirms – and so do we – the first proposition, but he says nothing – nor could he say anything – about the second and the third.

The question whether the virtually revealed or the necessarily connected as a conclusion with the revealed is really revealed or not, and therefore definable as of divine faith, remains as free and debatable after the Vatican Council as it was before. On this point there were – and there are – two opinions. Commenting on the Vatican Council, Vacant says: "We hold as true the things that God has revealed, *ab eo revelata*. Behold the matter, or to use scholastic language, the material object of the act of faith. The faith, of which we are speaking now, is, in effect, the divine faith, that is, the faith grounded on the authority of the revealing God. Hence, only the assent to the truths *revealed* by God constitutes an act of faith, and, reciprocally, every truth *revealed* by God can become the matter of an act of faith. But are we to count among *revealed* truths only those that are *formally* revealed, or can we also include therein the *virtually* revealed truths? *This is a question that our Council allows theologians freely to debate.*"[89] And futher on: "We have already said that *one school* requires that the newly defined dogmas be formally contained in the primitive dogmas of Catholic faith and that they be deduced therefrom by a reasoning whose universal principle is a revealed principle. *Another school* maintains that it suffices that they be virtually contained therein and that they be deduced by a reasoning whose universal principle is furnished by reason."[90] However, one of the Council Fathers submitted an amendment requesting the Council to determine that only the *immediately* (or formally, or *in itself*) revealed could be defined as of divine faith, but the Council took no account of the request. "An amendment submitted to the Council demanded that in our text be inserted 'quae in verbo Dei scripto vel tradito *immediate* continentur . . .' But this amendment was not taken into consideration."[91] Thus, on the question whether "infallibility extends not only to the formally revealed but also to whatsoever is necessarily connected with it", there is unanimous agreement among theologians,

[89] VACANT, *Constitutions du Conc. du Vatican*, vol.2, n.559, pg.28.

[90] *Ibid.*, n.848, pg.293.

[91] *Ibid.*, n.618, pg.87, footnote.

and that is exactly what we have said and say. But on the question "whether the virtually revealed or the necessarily connected as a conclusion with the revealed is really revealed or not, and therefore definable as of divine faith", there is no unanimity, as some people believe there is. On the contrary, there are *two opinions*. This is an entirely debatable question before and after the Council. These two altogether different questions should not be confused.

331. FOURTH OBSERVATION. – The Supreme Pontiffs have defined *ex cathedra* necessarily connected propositions, as can be seen in various propositions cited in particular, e.g., proposition 37 from the Bull *Auctorem Fidei*, in which it is defined that jurisdiction is necessary for the power of absolving.[92]

Reply. – Always the same confusion. The Supreme Pontiffs have defined propositions belonging to the five connexive inclusive types, which are irrelevant to the present discussion, but they have never defined any proposition belonging exclusively to type 4, or physico-connexive, which is the only one relevant here. To make this plain, one need only open the Denzinger. No better proof can be given than this same proposition 37, which our objector cites as an example or model. Does our objector believe that the necessity of jurisdiction is deduced from the power of absolving (which is a revealed truth) by a connexion of type 4, or as a physico-distinct property? No. It is deduced by the other types of connexion, by an *essential* or *inclusive* process, by an *analysis* of the concept of judicial power, from the *reason* or *nature* of judicial judgment.

The argument or reasoning through which the Church has deduced that truth or condemned its contradictory, is the following, as every theologian knows:

"The Sacrament of Penance was instituted *in the manner of a judgment* (revealed major or premise of faith); but, the nature or *essence* of judgment (*natura et ratio iudicii*) includes the jurisdiction or authority of the judge over the culprit (*inclusive*, not physico-distinct, minor of reason); therefore, every

[92] "The teaching of the Synod [of Pistoia] concerning the authority to absolve received through ordination, that declares that, *after the establishment of dioceses and parishes, it is fitting that one should exercise this judgment over persons that are subject to oneself, whether by reason of territory or by reason of some personal right*, because *otherwise confusion and disorder would be introduced;* insofar as it only declares that, once dioceses and parishes have been established, it is befitting that the power to absolve be exercised over subjects in order to preclude confusion, if understood to mean that for the valid use of this power there is no *need* of the ordinary or subdelegated jurisdiction, without which the Tridentine declares that the absolution given by a priest is of no worth whatsoever, is false, temerarious, pernicious, contrary and insulting to the Tridentine, erroneous." (Constitution *Auctorem Fidei*, prop. 37; Denz.-Schön. 2637)

absolution without ordinary or delegated jurisdiction is invalid or non-sacramental" (theological conclusion, object of infallibility, in the opinion of all, because it is necessarily connected, and, in the view of the Thomist school, definable as of faith because it is inclusive).

In our opinion, one would need to have a complete confusion of ideas concerning the "connexive" in order not to see that the argument and its minor premise are not of type 4 but of the other types, since it is plain that the conclusion is deduced from the *reason* or the *essence* of the judicial or imperative act. If anyone should still entertain any doubts, let him look up the *Summa Theologica*[93] where St. Thomas analyzes and deduces that same conclusion by analyzing the essence of the act of command which includes authority or jurisdiction. Or let him look up the Tridentine (reference to which is made in the very condemnation of the proposition), and there he will find the following: "Hence, since the *nature* and *reason* of judgment demand that sentence be pronounced only on subjects, it has always been the persuasion in the Church of God, which this Synod confirms as absolutely true, that the absolution which a priest pronounces upon him over whom he has neither ordinary nor subdelegated jurisdiction, is of no worth whatsoever."[94-95]

What has happened to our objector with respect to this proposition cited by him as a model of non-inclusive connexive on account of the reliance he places on textbooks, will similarly happen with respect to any other proposition culled from Denzinger.

332. FIFTH OBSERVATION. – The traditional opinion maintains that *every virtual* is the object of infallibility.

[93] *Summa Theologica*, Suppl., q.8, a.4.

[94] TRIDENTINE COUNCIL, sess.14, ch.7.

[95] By the way, notice the phrase "it has *always* been the persuasion in the Church of God" that the Council employs, despite the fact that here we have a theological conclusion in the proper sense of the term. That a truth is properly a theological conclusion is not inconsistent with its being known since the Church's very beginning; the inference of such a conclusion can be so evident and obvious as to require neither effort nor time. Ease and evidence are not inconsistent with the character of being a conclusion; on the contrary, the conclusion is all the more perfect and pure the greater the ease and evidence with which it is known. "Hence, the evidence and certainty of the consequence does not eliminate theology but makes it, does not take it away, but brings it in." (CANO, *De Locis*, 12, 2, at the end) We say this even in the supposition that the Council's "always" is to be taken strictly, which is not always the case as we have elsewhere observed (173, footnote). Among some theologians there is today a manifest tendency not to consider as pure theology or pure conclusions except those that are difficult or being debated. This is a wrong notion of theology.

Reply. – The traditional opinion does not maintain that every *virtual* is the object of infallibility, but that every *revealed* virtual or every *theological* virtual is the object of infallibility. Now, the physico-connexive virtual is neither revealed nor theological, since it has no absolutely necessary connexion with the revealed deposit. It is impossible for anything rigorously theological to be false; but the physico-connexive virtual can be, and is false whenever it so pleases God. There is no difficulty to calling it "theological" in the same sense that uncertain or probable conclusions are called theological. However, such conclusions are not *rigorously* theological inasmuch as theology is a science of absolute certainty. (89)

333. SIXTH OBSERVATION. – On the other hand, no truly virtual thing can be of divine faith. The virtual cannot be deduced except from one premise of faith and another of reason, and the rule of every syllogism states that "the conclusion always follows the weaker part".

Reply. – We admit the maxim that the conclusion always follows the weaker premise. Thus, if the premise of reason is physico-connexive, and consequently an *objective addition* to the premise of faith, then the conclusion is also an objective addition. If the minor is *metaphysico-inclusive,* and therefore an *objective explication* of the premise of faith, then the conclusion is also an objective explication of the premise of faith and nothing else. If the objective explication or metaphysico-inclusive minor is employed by human reason alone, then the conclusion is not of faith inasmuch as *reason,* explicating the revealed, is the "weaker part" compared to the premise of faith. The conclusion will only be the human explication of the premise of faith, that is, theology. But, if in lieu of the minor we place the Church's definition, then there is no *weaker part* inasmuch as the explication made by the Church is not *weaker,* but *equal* to revelation itself or the premise of faith. With regard to the *explication* of the revealed the authority of the Church is neither weaker nor less, but equal to that of God and of the Apostles. (176)

The syllogistic rule that "the conclusion always follows the weaker part" validly proves that no theological conclusion can be *formally* of divine faith before it is defined by the Church, but it is not a similarly valid proof with regard to a conclusion that has been defined by the Church. With respect to our *human* minds the minor of reason is part and parcel of the theological reasoning, and essentially determines the nature of the "habit" and of the certainty of the assent to the conclusion; but with respect to the Church's definition it is nothing more than a *preliminary condition* and does not in any way determine the nature of the "habit", the certainty, and the assent to the definition. Consequently, whereas in the case of theology the assent given to the conclusion depends *on ourselves,* depends necessarily on the nature and value of the minor premise of reason, in the case of the Church's definition, the assent is altogether independent. (132-133)

334. SEVENTH OBSERVATION. – That which is virtually revealed is not revealed *simpliciter*, but only revealed *secundum quid*.

Reply. – If the virtually revealed is an implicit or inclusive virtual, then it has been revealed as to its *substance*, and lacks only *explication*. It is not, therefore, "simpliciter" revealed if by "simpliciter" is meant the *explicit*, but it is "simpliciter" revealed if by "simpliciter" is meant the *implicit*. It is properly called the *revealable*, that is, the *explicable* by the revelation already made by God, in which it is truly implicit. The image is really impressed on the photographic film, if imperceptibly, and only needs developing. (214)

335. EIGHTH OBSERVATION. – Reality is one thing, truth is another. From the fact that two proposition express the same reality it does not follow that they express the same truth.

Reply. – Reality and truth differ logically or subjectively, but not really or objectively. Hence, two propositions that have really identical subjects and predicates, have identical objective meaning. They differ only subjectively, although the difference is founded upon the object's fecundity. This is the nature of all identico-real conclusions. It is also the nature of all the successive formulae of dogmatic progress. (515)

It is true that the *real identity* of two propositions does not suffice to make them belong to the same "habit", if they are not known through the *same medium*. We have extensively explained elsewhere (123), in accordance with St. Thomas and Capreolus, that the specific distinction of habits is not taken from the reality that is known (res cognita), but from the *medium* of knowing (medium cognitionis), or, as aptly put by Cajetan, it is not derived from the object *insofar as it is a thing*, but from the object *insofar as it is knowable*.[96]

Thus, relative to one and the same reality, God, there is room for various specifically different habits: faith, theology, theodicy. The theological conclusion, which is really identical to the revealed datum, pertains not to the faith but to theology as long as it has not been defined, because in such a case it is known only through human reasoning, which is the instrument of theology with the exclusion of faith. But it follows that this same conclusion, once it has been defined or explicated by the Church's divine authority, is then known through another medium, to wit, "revelation explicated by the Church", which is the formal medium of faith. After it has been defined, the theological conclusion is of faith, without ceasing to belong to theology, because it is known in two different ways. We must, then, draw a careful distinction between these three mediums of knowing:

[96] *In 2-2*, q.1, a.3, n.4.

(a) *Explicit* revelation. This is revelation explicated by God himself.

(b) *Implicit* revelation prior to its definition, known solely through reasoning. This is revelation explicated by human reason, the theological conclusion before its definition.

(c) *Implicit* revelation defined by the Church. This is revelation explicated by God through the Church, the theological conclusion after its definition.

Of these three mediums of knowing, the first and the third have the same value; the value of divine authority, of faith. Since the Church has truly divine power to explicate everything that is truly implicit in the revealed datum, the value of implicit revelation explicated by the Church (third medium) is the same as that of explicit revelation (first medium), that is, revelation explicated by God. The authority of the Church is certainly less than the authority of God or of the Apostles relative to new revelations and even relative to truths not contained implicitly in the primitive datum, but it is equal to the divine and the apostolic authority relative to everything that is truly implicit provided that its explication does not require any new revelation. (175-176)

On the contrary, the second medium – implicit revelation explicated by the theologian's individual reason – possesses no other than a *human* theological value, specifically different from the value of the other two mediums. Thus, the theological conclusion is of faith in the third case, but not in the second case.

In these matters every true Thomist ought carefully to avoid two extreme theories: Molina's and Vázquez's. (87, 119)

To believe, with Molina, that the properly theological conclusion possesses an *altogether new content*, renders it undefinable as of faith. There is an error here. It is true that the theological conclusion, provided that it be *inclusive*, contains something new on account of the fact that it truly is a conclusion; but since it is implicit, the newness refers to the *explication* of the *same doctrine*. Consequently, by her definition the Church does nothing but *explicate* the revealed datum; and hence the conclusion is of faith after its definition. (306)

But one would fall into the opposite extreme if one were to believe, with Vázquez that, since it is truly inclusive, the theological conclusion must contain *nothing new*, and consequently that it is of faith not only after, but even before its definition for any theologian who deduces it evidently.

This latter notion, unlike that of Molina, is not contrary to dogmatic evolution but rather favours it to excess. However, we believe it to be no less mistaken inasmuch as it takes no account of the specific difference between theology and faith and overlooks the totally divine character of the latter habit. (156)

As a matter of fact, every truly theological conclusion, howsoever *implicit* it may be, contains *something new.* Not a new *doctrine*, but a new explication; otherwise it would not truly be a conclusion. A glance at the following equations will make it plain:

Theological conclusion = revealed datum

Theological conclusion = revealed datum + explication.

The first equation is formally false because it makes conclusions identical to principles, and science to simple understanding. Furthermore, it confuses theology with the faith.

The second equation is accurate, but it also shows that the conclusion contains a *new element,* something *more* than was found in the principle or revealed datum. When I make an act of faith with respect to this conclusion, I take in not only the revealed datum, but also *something new.* Now, this requires that this "something new" be *formally divine* inasmuch as nothing formally human should enter into the *object* of the act of faith. Hence, prior to the Church's definition, this new element constitutive of the conclusion is *formally human,* as is the case with theology. (309) Consequently, the act of faith requires the intervention of the Church, who alone possesses the requisite *divine* authority for the explication of the revealed datum. The explication made by a theologian is formally human; the explication made by the Church is formally divine, and consequently of faith. Therefore, the Church's definition is not only necessary so that the definition will not be erroneous; it is, in the first place, necessary so that the deduction will be formally *divine.*

Now, the fact that the conclusion is *really identical* to its principle, the revealed datum, is the cause why the conclusion is *implicit,* which in turn makes it *definable* by the Church. But neither its real identity nor its implicit definable character suffice to render it formally of faith so long as it is not defined, that is, known through "revelation explicated by the Church", which is the medium of our faith.

Before the definition there obtained between the conclusion and the datum the "identity of the *thing*" (identitas *rei*), but not the "identity of the *knowable*" (identitas *scibilis*). After the definition there obtains not only the "identitas *rei*" but also the identitas *scibilis*", or better, the "identitas *credibilis*" because the conclusion is not known now through rational demonstration – the medium of science – but through the Church's explication – the medium of knowing proper of faith. Before the definition it is merely theological; after the definition it is, besides, credible with divine faith. "Every cognitive habit *formally* has regard to the *medium* whereby something is known; but *materially* it regards *that which* is known by the medium . . . But the *formal* reason of the object in the case of *faith* is the First Truth *manifested by the teaching of the Church,* just as the formal reason of *science* is the medium of *demonstration.*"[97]

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CAUSE OF DOGMATIC PROGRESS. – As we have earlier said (160-161), the psychological cause of human intellectual progress – whether in the natural order, or in the order of faith – must be sought for in *our* connatural mode of knowing "by way of enunciables". Not being entirely intellectual or intuitive, as God and the angels, but rational, discursive, it is impossible for us to know at once everything that is implicit in our starting point, and we are compelled to employ partial and successive enuntiata, deducing the ones from the others by means of inclusive reasoning.

As long as these enuntiata or statements are limited to the unfolding of what was from the beginning truly implicit in our starting point, the *objective unity* of science or faith is preserved notwithstanding the *plurality* of statements.

The reason for this – as St. Thomas profoundly observes – is the fact that the act of faith, as well as that of science, does not terminate in the statement but in the objective *reality.* "But the act of the believer does not terminate in the *enunciable,* but in the *thing;* for we do not form enunciables except for the purpose of achieving knowledge *about things* by means of them. And this is true in *science* as in *faith.*"[98]

From this viewpoint, the holy Doctor gives us at the beginning of the quoted article the reason for this assimilation of science and faith. Faith is a knowledge. All knowledge is achieved according to the knower's connatural mode. The *human* mode of knowing proceeds by statements. Consequently such will also be the human *mode* of knowing and developing the supernatural datum. "Things known are in the knower according to the *knower's mode.* Now it is the *proper mode of the human intellect* to know the truth by *joining and dividing,* as has been said."[98a] "And thus things that *in themselves* are simple are known by the human intellect in accordance with *a kind of complexity.*"[99] "The fact that *our* intellect understands by *discourse,* and

[97] *Summa Theol.,* 2-2, q.9, a.2; *QQ.DD. De Charitate,* a.13, ad 6.

[98] *Summa Theol.,* 2-2, q.1, a.2, ad 2.

[98a] *Op.cit.,* p.1, q.85, a.3.

[99] *Op.cit.,* 2-2, q.1, a.2, at the beginning of the article.

by *joining* and *dividing*, proceeds from the same source, that is, from the fact that upon the first apprehension of *something that is first apprehended* (the natural datum or the revealed datum) it cannot *at once* see whatsoever is *virtually* contained *therein*, and this happens on account of the weakness of the intellectual light in us."[100] "And accordingly it [our intellect] needs to *join* one apprehended object to another and to *divide* one from another, and to proceed *from one* composition and division to *another*, which is *to reason*."[101]

These successive "compositions and divisions", these multiple statements are in some instances implicitly contained in the primitive datum but cannot be seen by *our* reason except through reasoning. Such instances have always been described by the Thomist school as *immediate* or "per se notum *quoad se*" and *mediate* or "non per se notum *quoad nos*". They are said to be immediate or "per se nota *quoad se*" because they are objectively and truly *implicit*, and they are said to be mediate or non per se nota *quoad nos*" because they demand *from our* reason a true demonstration. (165)

This is why St. Thomas – who always displays astonishing depth and logic in his writings – begins his treatise *On God* with the question "Whether it is *per se notum* that God Exists",[102] since on it hinges the nature of all *our* knowledge of God. Similarly, at the beginning of his treatise *On Faith* he raises the question "Whether the Object of Faith is something *Complex as an Enunciable*",[103] a question to which scant attention has been given by so many authors, including Thomists, notwithstanding the fact that on it depends the whole nature of the genesis and development of *our faith*.

It gives us great pleasure to notice that some modern Thomists have at last become aware of the fundamental importance of these questions. We allude to the beautiful articles by Fr. Chenu, O.P., *Contribution a l'histoire du traité de la foi: commentaire historique de la 2-2, q.1, a.2,* and *La raison psychologique du developpement du dogme d'après Saint Thomas*.[104]

Nine years ago we wrote in *La Ciencia Tomista* the following: "It is impossible to delve deeply into and provide a correct solution to the

[100] *Op.cit.*, p.1, q.58, a.4.

[101] *Ibid.*, q.85, a.5.

[102] *Ibid.*, q. 2, a. 1.

[103] *Op.cit.*, 2-2, q.1, a.2.

[104] The first article is found in *Mélanges Thomistes*, Le Saulchoir (Kain, 1923), pg.123. The second, in *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques*, Jan. 1924, pg.44.

questions so fiercely debated today concerning the modernist and the Catholic versions of the evolution of dogma without delving deeply into those *per se notum* and *per modum enuntiabilis*, which many consider as next to, if not actually, museum pieces; but which provide the key to the understanding of all those extremely momentous questions in which the nature and distinction of faith and science, the Church and the individual reason, modernist dogmatic evolution and Catholic dogmatic progress are implicated. There must be a good reason, we repeat, for the fact that the holy Doctor, who always proceeds with admirable logic from the principles to the conclusions, from the essential to the accidental, has seen fit to place those concepts at the head of his immortal treatises *On God* and *On Faith*. It is for this reason that we insist so much on these things, even at the risk of being accused of digressing or of repeating things of which many of our readers perhaps need not be reminded."[105]

336. SIXTH OBSERVATION. – If, for instance, St. Thomas laid down a principle and the Thomists draw out its consequences, no one will say that we do not have here *two* teachings.

Reply. – Obviously no one will attribute to an author the conclusions implicit in his writings if he has not foreseen them and hinted at them. But if we assume that he has plainly seen such implicit conclusions and that he has entrusted to his followers the task of bringing them to light, then it is plain that they are attributable to him.

Now then, although God plainly saw all the consequences implicit in the Holy Scriptures and Tradition revealed by Himself, He nonetheless went on to institute the Church's magisterium for the purpose of explicitating them. Therefore, such consequences, upon their explication by the Church, are *divine*, i.e., *dogmatic* conclusions.

This distinction between the authors of human books and God, the author of Holy Scripture, is one of the principal arguments anticipated by St. Thomas in order to prove the existence of a multiplicity of meanings in Holy Scripture as contrasted to purely human works. Besides those already quoted, the following passages from St. Thomas merit consideration.

"Whether several senses lie hidden in the same words of Holy Scripture.

"*Fifth objection.* Besides, no meaning *gathered* from certain words of the Holy Scripture, is its proper meaning if it was *not intended* by the author, inasmuch as the author could not by any *one* writing intend but *one thing*, since according to the Philosopher many things do not happen to be un-

[105] *La Ciencia Tomista*, March 1915, pg.23, footnote.

derstood simultaneously. Consequently, it is impossible that there be several proper meanings of the Holy Scripture.

"To the fifth it must be said that the principal author of Holy Scripture is the Holy Spirit, who in *one* word of the Holy Scripture *has understood many more things* than those expounded or detected by the expositors of Holy Scripture."[106]

'Whether the aforementioned senses should also be distinguished in *other writings.*

"Third objection. Further, the Philosopher says that he who says *one thing somehow says* many things. Thus it seems that also in the case of other sciences *several meanings* can be indicated *in one* meaning.

"To the third it should be said that he who says one thing somehow says many things, that is, *potentially* insofar as the *conclusions* exist potentially *in the principles,* since many conclusions follow from one principle. But this is not to say that in the case of *other sciences* what is said of one thing *by way of signification,* is also taken as *signified* of other things as well, although *it can be gathered* therefrom through argumentation."[107]

"Whether the *faith has grown* with the passage of time.

"Fourth objection. Further, the article is an *indivisible* truth. But what is indivisible cannot be further distinguished. Hence, inasmuch as the faith has always been comprised under certain articles, it appears that it cannot be subjected to *further distinction* so as to make the articles *explicitly* known.

"To the fourth it should be said that the article is said to be an *indivisible* truth relative to what is *actually* explicated in the article, but it is *divisible* with respect to the things that are *potentially* contained in the article, insofar as he who says *one thing* somehow says *many things;* and *these* are the things that precede the article and the things that are *consequent* to it; and *in this regard* the article of faith can be *explicated* and divided."[108] *"And in this regard the faith can be explicated day by day, and has been more and more explicated through the efforts of the Fathers."*[109]

A careful comparison of these passages from St. Thomas will make two things obvious: (a) that by *potential* or *consequential* containment ("The things that are *potentially* contained in the article . . . the things that *are consequent* to it") he understands the conclusions in the proper sense of the term; (b) that whereas men do not always foresee and give a hint of these conclusions in what they have written, God, on the other hand, always does so in the Holy Scripture.

[106] ST. THOMAS, *Quodlibetum 7,* q.6, a.14, ed. Vivès, vol.15, pgs. 512-513.

[107] *Ibid.,* a.16, pgs.515-516.

[108] ST. THOMAS, *In 3 Sent.,* d.25, q.2, a.2, sol.1, ad 4, ed. Vivès, vol.9, pgs.394-395.

[109] *Loc.cit.,* ad 5.

Assume that St. Thomas laid down a principle; assume that we are speaking of consequences *implicated* in that principle: assume, further, that St. Thomas saw those consequences and saw that his school would deduce them; assume, finally, that St. Thomas appointed his school to deduce those consequences. In such a case, everyone will say that when such consequences are eventually drawn out by his school, it does nothing but unfold or explicate St. Thomas's own teaching. Such is truly the case with God and his Church.[110]

[110] Together with the text quoted from the *Commentary on the Sentences,* whose authenticity is beyond doubt, we felt we had to quote also texts from the 6th question of Quodlibetum 7, so as not to omit anything of St. Thomas's teaching. On the authenticity of this 6th question, cf. the very interesting observations made by Fr. Beltrán de Heredia in *La Ciencia Tomista,* May 1924, pg.374, and by Fr. Synave in *Bulletin Thomiste,* May 1924, pg.41.

On the *consequences* of St. Thomas's teaching, Nuño says the following: "Fr. Suárez contradicts His Grace Cajetan without any reasonable cause and basis. And in the first place he says that the negative proposition *is not found in St. Thomas* — which Cajetan concedes – viz., that contrition is not essentially a part of the sacrament of Penance . . . But, indeed, Master Suárez either did not understand His Grace Cajetan, or, under the latter's name, wanted secretly to impugn St. Thomas. And thus we will prove, in the first place, that that proposition is *plainly gathered* from St. Thomas's very words, and *to that extent* is *implicitly and virtually contained in him.*" (DIDACUS NUÑO, *In 3 partem,* q.90, a.2, pgs.251-252) Thus, everything that is evidently deduced from the teaching of St. Thomas is *implicitly contained* in it; and to deduce such evident consequences is not to teach *another* doctrine, but to *explicate,* or unfold, or develop, or evolve homogeneously the *same doctrine.* When the Molinists or the Scotists disagree with what we, Thomists, consider evident consequences of the principles of St. Thomas, we do not merely say that they disagree with *us,* but that they disagree with the *teaching of St. Thomas.* And if they disown such charges, it is because they deny that the propositions at issue are evident consequences of the holy Doctor's teaching; but they would certainly not deny the charges if they held them to be evident consequences of the Saint's teaching. Cf. the quotations from Berthier and Pesch on the consequent sense of the Holy Scripture in nos. 444 and 447.

In this regard, we will quote a brief passage from Cardinal Cajetan, one of a thousand that could be quoted. Commenting on those words of St. Thomas: "The remission of guilt *cannot be* UNDERSTOOD if there were no infusion of grace", Cajetan writes: "For it is certain that if it were possible by [God's] *absolute power,* it could be UNDERSTOOD." (*In 1-2,* q.113, a.2) Thus, anything that is possible by God's absolute power is *intelligible,* and everything that is impossible by his absolute power is *unintelligible.* Since any *metaphysico-connexive* consequence is the same as an *absolutely necessary* consequence, it follows that every theological metaphysico-connexive consequence is *of the understanding* of the revealed deposit, and that by defining it the Church gives us nothing more than the *understanding* of the revealed deposit. Such is the nature of the inclusive or *intellectual* character of the true theology (103-109)

337. TENTH OBSERVATION. – "The certainty of divine faith has to be infinitely superior not only to physical, but also to metaphysical certainty. Consequently, the metaphysico-inclusive conclusion is as far removed from divine faith as the physico-connexive conclusion."

Reply. – A conclusion necessarily has to be metaphysico-inclusive if it is to be definable as of divine faith, not because metaphysical *certainty* has anything to do with the certainty of faith, which is infinitely superior to it, but because where metaphysical connexion is present the conclusion is identical with, or objectively *included* in the revealed major, which is of faith. The conclusion is definable, not on account of its metaphysical connexion, but on account of its *inclusion.* Thus, metaphysical certainty has nothing to do with the certainty of faith, but the *inclusion* or implicitness of the conclusion in the premise of faith, not only has something to do with its definability as of faith, but it is the only thing that is required and suffices to render it definable, if its inclusion can be evidently known without new revelation.

338. ELEVENTH OBSERVATION. – What is really identical with the revealed is contained therein *quoad se,* but it is not contained therein *quoad nos.*

Reply. – If our reason cannot evidently deduce it without the aid of a new revelation, then it is contained therein *quoad se,* but not *quoad nos* as, e.g., the Trinity of Persons in the Unity of God. But if our reason is capable of deducing it evidently by its own resources, then it is contained therein also with respect to our reason.

339. TWO LAST OBJECTIONS. TWELFTH OBSERVATION. – "Nothing exists but pure connexion between what is said by God and its theological conclusions."

Reply. – In theology, as well as in metaphysics, taking these sciences in the rigorous sense, there can never be *pure connexion,* but connexion together with inclusion. Theological and metaphysical conclusions, considered *objectively,* are not connected but identical to their principles. They are connexive only when they are considered *subjectively.* The *virtual* distinction, upon which they are based, is not in the object, but in the *subject.*

THIRTEENTH OBSERVATION. – No fact can be defined as of divine faith, and consequently as *revealed,* if it has taken place after the Apostles and, thus, after the closure of the deposit of revelation.

Reply. – It is false to say that contingent facts that took place after the Apostles cannot be truly revealed facts and definable as of divine faith. The celebration of the Council of Trent, the drafting of the present Canon of the mass, the Vulgate translation, the election of such a pope, the begetting of this man . . . are contingent facts that have taken place after the Apostles.

Nonetheless, it has been defined, or it is definable as of divine faith and, hence, it is *revealed,* that the Tridentine Council is ecumenical or a rule of faith, that the Canon of the mass is free from error, that the Vulgate is authentic with respect to fundamental matters of faith and morals, that our Holy Father Pius XI is a true pope, that this man has been redeemed by Christ.

It is true that it was possible for the Tridentine not to have been celebrated, and in this sense it is a contingent fact; but having been celebrated *as it was celebrated,* it is not contingent but necessary that it should be ecumenical or a rule of faith. Similarly, it was possible for Jansen's *Augustinus* not to have been written, and it is only in this sense that it is a contingent fact; but once it was written *as it was written,* its formal opposition to the revealed deposit, i.e., its heretical nature, is not contingent but absolutely necessary.

Now then, upon the death of the last of the Apostles the Church remained in possession not only of a doctrinal deposit, but also of a dogmatic authority to determine, by means of that deposit, the orthodoxy or heterodoxy of every doctrinal formula. We call attention to the term "every". It means that the Church has authority to pass judgment not only on doctrinal formulae stated orally, but also on those set down in writing; not only on those that are brief, but also on those that are extensive, even if they be so extensive as to make up a whole book; not only on those that had been spoken or written before the closure of the revealed deposit, but also on those that might be spoken or written in the future.

Thus, even before Jansen wrote his book, the Church already possessed the criterion, i.e., the revealed deposit, and the dogmatic authority wherewith to judge it. But she could apply neither the criterion nor the authority to any particular book before such a book existed. But as soon as such a book came to exist, the Church needed only to *apply* to it the criterion of the revealed deposit in order to verify whether the book was in accordance with or in contradiction to it, that is to say, whether the book contained heresy or not. By virtue of such application the revealed deposit itself neither increases nor diminishes nor undergoes any change just as an old meter or thermometer neither changes nor increases nor diminishes when I apply it to measure the length or the temperature of a new object. Consequently, whenever the Church declares a new dogmatic fact as pertaining to the faith, there is no novelty introduced in the ancient teaching, there is simply a *novelty of application* or a new application of the ancient and always identical teaching to a new doctrine in order to judge it.

When the deposit of Catholic revelation was closed upon the death of the last of the Apostles, it was not yet of divine faith that Jansen's book contained heresy, but it was already of divine faith that *if* a book were written *as Jansen's book was written,* such a book contained heresy. Thus,

when Jansen wrote his book in just the way that he wrote it, and when the Church declared that such a book contained heresy, nothing took place but a simple verification of a condition that was already contained in the revealed deposit. That dogmatic fact, once defined by the Church, is of *divine* faith not precisely because the *Church* said so in the 17th century, but precisely because *God* had already said so in the revealed deposit. Only God had said so in general, or conditionally, whereas the Church says so in particular, verifying the condition.

The misgivings that prevent many theologians from accepting this doctrine proceed, we believe, from the fact that they have formed such a narrow idea of the Church's dogmatic authority, as if it were restricted solely to the *immutable preservation* of the revealed deposit. The truth is that it does not extend solely to the deposit's immutable preservation but also to its faithful explication and application. The definition of the revealed virtuality or theological conclusions, that is to say, inclusive or implicit conclusions, since these alone are definable, is nothing but the *explication* of the revealed deposit. The definition of facts, viz., *dogmatic* facts, which are the only ones definable, is nothing but the *application* of the revealed deposit.

As a matter of fact these three things – preservation, explication, application – are only three degrees or phases of the same thing. The revealed deposit is a doctrinal deposit, and every doctrine is preserved when it is faithfully explicated, and it is explicated when it is faithfully applied. Dogmatic facts, which embody that application are to the doctrine revealed by God as an author's moral casebook to the same author's moral doctrinal treatise. If in his moral casebook the author does nothing except apply to the solution of the case studies, the same teaching expounded in his doctrinal treatise, then no one will say that he is expounding a new moral doctrine but merely applying the same moral doctrine. In like manner, when the Church faithfully and infallibly applies the revealed deposit to dogmatic facts, she does not offer a teaching other than the divine deposit but an application of the *same teaching;* and all theologians admit, or should admit, that anything which is not a new teaching, but the same teaching revealed by God, is definable not merely as of ecclesiastical but as of divine faith. Thus, with the death of the last Apostle the revealed deposit was closed as regards new revelations and new teachings, but not as regards new explications or new applications of the *same teaching.*

Finally, since the Church's infallibility extends to these three things (preservation, explication, and application), and to them alone, it becomes plain that the scope of the Church's dogmatic or divine faith authority is exactly the same as the scope of her infallibility or of the so-called ecclesiastical faith. Such also is the exact extent of the homogeneous evolution of Catholic dogma.

Section IV

OBJECTIONS RAISED AGAINST ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTS FOR DOGMATIC EVOLUTION

340. -- Among the many arguments we submitted to prove the fact and the extent of dogmatic evolution, the eighth argument was based on the opposition to the revealed deposit that must necessarily exist in any theological error. Since no objective opposition is possible without entailing a true contradiction, and since contradiction is impossible without a basis of true identity, we deduce that any truly theological conclusion necessarily has to be objectively identical to the revealed deposit, and hence definable as of divine faith or, in other words, an object of dogmatic evolution. (247)

In an article published in *La Ciencia Tomista*[111] we wrote the following: "When the Church infallibly defines a theological conclusion, or infallibly condemns the opposite error, her formal viewpoint is not precisely the conformity or the opposition of such a conclusion or such an error to the principles of natural reason but to the revealed deposit. Errors that are not really opposed to the revealed deposit do not fall under the jurisdiction either of infallibility or of theology no matter how great or how plain their opposition to the principles of natural reason. The real opposition to the revealed deposit, is, so to speak, the *ratio sub qua* both infallibility and theology regard error." In that same article we went on to say: "Now, then, there can be no true opposition between two doctrines or assertions, if one of them is not the *denial* of *something* really contained in the other; if one does not *imply* even if it does not express it, a real *contradiction* to the other; if there does not exist in both *one* common and really identical meaning, asserted in the one and denied in the other. This," we concluded, "is what St. Thomas teaches, and what can be found in any textbook of logic where the nature of opposition is dealt with."

This statement of ours, viz., that all opposition implicitly entails a contradiction, and the reference we made to logic, earned us the following observations.

341. FIRST OBSERVATION. – That is not required by what logicians teach on the opposition of propositions. As Fr. Urráburu observes, that teaching has no bearing upon the *material* opposition of propositions, i.e., *by reason of the matter dealt with* [in the proportions], inasmuch as the subject-matter is no concern of logicians, e.g., "Peter is running", "Peter is standing still", but upon the *formal* opposition, or the opposition by reason of the form or structure of the propositions... To judge of the *real opposition, or opposition by reason of the subject-matter* is not the province of logicians, but of theologians.

[111] July, 1911.

Reply. – We agree with our distinguished objector on the fact that logic deals directly with formal opposition or the opposition of terms, and not with real opposition or the opposition of meaning. But one thing is the things that *logic deals with*, and quite another the things that are *dealt with* in logic. For instance, in the treatise on faith sacred theology deals directly not with human, but with divine faith. And yet, there is no theology textbook and no theologian who, in order to explain divine faith, is not constrained to explain what is faith in general, and what is human faith, since this is the only way to get a good understanding of what divine faith is. Likewise, there is no logician and no textbook of logic, if it is complete, that, in order to explain correctly logical or formal opposition, is not constrained to deal with, and does not actually deal with the nature of *opposition in general* and the nature of *real opposition*, since there is no other way of explaining and achieving a thorough understanding of formal opposition, inasmuch as, if the object of logic is formal opposition, formal opposition in its turn has real opposition for its object and end. The classic logician, John of St. Thomas, has this to say: "One kind of opposition is *real*, the other is logical, that is, opposition is either an opposition of *things* or of propositions. And these two are related in such a way that the real or physical opposition is, as it were, the *object* of logical opposition, since the to-be and the not-to-be that is encountered on the part of reality and in the objects themselves is signified by opposed propositions. Hence, although it belongs to the metaphysician to treat of real opposition, nonetheless, inasmuch as it belongs to the logician to treat of the opposition of propositions, *he must also somehow touch on what concerns the opposition of things* insofar as things are the *object* of the opposition of propositions."[112]

We mentioned logic so that anyone could see for himself in any logic textbook, and above all in St. Thomas, that every opposition entails a contradiction and, consequently a really identical meaning affirmed in one of two opposed propositions and denied in the other. This was the only point we wanted to establish and which our objector denies.

[112] JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *Logic*, part 1, q.7, a.1. – See also GOUDIN who, after dealing with opposition in general and with formal opposition, devotes almost an entire article to *real* opposition with these words: "There is an opposition of propositions, of which we have already spoken at length; and there is an opposition of *things*, which is our sole concern here." And all of this in *logic*. (GOUDIN, *Logica Maior*, p.1, d.2, q.7, a.unicus). Likewise Fr. Zigliara, who prefaces his treatment of formal opposition with this observation: "We have spoken elsewhere of what the opposition of *ideas* consists in." This opposition of ideas, also known as the incompatibility of ideas, is precisely none other than *real* opposition, and the "elsewhere" to which Zigliara remits the reader is found in *logic* itself. (ZIGLIARA, *Logica*, 8, 7, and 28, 1). Similarly Fr. De Maria, S.J., who observes that it also belongs to logic indirectly to deal with the postpredicaments, and then goes on to treat in detail of the postpredicament of opposition in general, and of its four species of *real* opposition, and even expressly employs St. Thomas's principle that "a contradiction is included in every opposition." And Fr. De Maria treats of all these things in *logic*. (P.MICHAEL DE MARIA, S.J., *Logica Minor*, p.1, c.2, a.7) We could thus go on citing other authors of *logic*. Let us agree, then, that not only formal, but also *real* opposition is dealt with in *logic*.

Since quotations from logical sources concerning real opposition do not seem to satisfy him, let us set logic aside and turn to metaphysics, for it belongs to this science, as John of St. Thomas points out, to treat of real opposition. And let us keep in mind that sacred theology is the metaphysics of God in the supernatural order or the order of revelation, just as theodicy is the metaphysics of God in the natural order or the order of reason.

If we look up St. Thomas's immortal Commentaries on Aristotle's Metaphysics, book 10, lesson 6, we will find the following: "*Contradiction is included in all the other species of opposition*, as something that is prior and more simple. For it is impossible that things that are opposed according to *any species* of opposition should exist simultaneously. And this, indeed, happens on account of the fact that one of the opposites *of its own reason* contains the denial of the other."[113] Nothing could be more plainly said. Every opposition includes a contradiction.

If, notwithstanding the fact that metaphysics is a transcendent science, our objector should still be reluctant in accepting guidance from metaphysical sources in matters of sacred theology, let him look up the First Part of the Second Part of St. Thomas's *Summa Theologica*, question 67, article 3. The holy Doctor discusses there a question related to nothing short of divine faith, and there he writes: "I answer that it must be said that opposition is the proper and per se cause of the exclusion of one of the opposites from the other insofar, that is, that *in all opposites is included the opposition of affirmation and negation*."[114]

Consequently, every opposition, even that which is not a *formal* contradiction, that is, consisting of terms and structure that are expressly contradictory, involves or entails a *real contradiction* or a contradiction in meaning. Since no teaching is erroneous in the theological order or in the order of infallibility, unless it is opposed to the revealed principles or revealed deposit, if follows that a real contradiction or contradiction in meaning is involved or implicitly exists between every theologically or infallibly erroneous proposition and the revealed deposit. Since there cannot be a real contradiction or contradiction in meaning between two teachings or assertions unless there is one same and identical meaning affirmed in the one and denied in the other, it follows that there is in the revealed deposit or prin-

[113] ST. THOMAS, *loc.cit.*, ed.Coll.Angelicum, Rome, no.2041.

[114] ST. THOMAS, *loc.cit.*

ciples of faith a meaning that is identical to the meaning denied in the theologically or infallibly erroneous proposition. Which is to say that in the revealed datum or dogma (the first and second levels of Catholic doctrine), on the one hand, and in the infallible and the theological truth (third and fourth levels), on the other hand, there is an identity of meaning, which is designated by the term *real* or *objective homogeneity* of all the four levels of Catholic doctrine. It follows, finally, that whenever the Church defines a doctrine as infallliibly true or erroneous, or whenever sacred theology deduces a conclusion as demonstratively true or false, the Church does not define and theology does not deduce a conclusion that is *alien* to the revealed deposit or even objectively *distinct* from the meaning of the revealed deposit, but a meaning that is *really identical* to the meaning of the revealed deposit, a meaning which, although not formally expressed, is nonetheless really included or *implicit* in the revealed deposit.

These consequences will infallibly be reached by any one who seriously ponders on and penetrates these two principles: first, in both the order of infallibility and the order of theology, truth and error are relations of conformity with or opposition not precisely to the principles of reason, but to the principles of faith or of the revealed deposit; second, every true opposition does not always express, but it always entails or implies a contradiction. The first is a fundamental principle in theology; the second is likewise an elementary principle in philosophy. Both are expressly taught by St. Thomas. Both are plainly evident.

If notwithstanding the plain evidence of the foregoing, and influenced perhaps by the familiar notion of theology given by most modern textbooks, our objector still hesitates to admit a true contradiction between the revealed deposit and theological error – and, hence, a true identity between the same deposit and theological truth – let him consider that other elementary and indubitable principle according to which "God can do any thing that does not *entail a contradiction*". Well then, is it at all possible for God ever to falsify a true theological conclusion? Can He ever make it false? Or can He ever verify a theological error? No, and a thousand times no! "For *whatsoever* is found in the other sciences to be *contrary* to the truth of this science [sacred theology], is all of it considered as *false*."[115] Sacred theology – the Wisdom of wisdoms, the Queen of the sciences – possesses an objective *certainty* superior to that of all natural sciences whether physical, mathematical or metaphysical. "I answer that it must be said that this science, being as it is speculative in some respects and practical in other respects, transcends *all other* sciences both the speculative and the practical. Among speculative sciences one is held to be worthier than another on account of *certainty* as

[115] ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.1, q.1, a.6, ad 2.

well as of the *dignity of its subject matter*. And on *both counts* this science excels other speculative sciences."[116]

Consequently, if it is impossible for God ever to falsify any true mathematical or metaphysical conclusion, much less will it be possible for him to falsify a true theological conclusion. And if it is impossible for God to do so, it is because a *contradiction* is therein entailed. And if a contradiction is entailed, there also is entailed a *real identity of meaning*. The principles of contradiction and identity are correlative.

342. SECOND OBSERVATION. – The argument earlier taken from Fr. Marín-Sola lacks force. Is it the case that the Church, in the act of pronouncing infallible definitions, looks to the revealed deposit which she has been commissioned to safeguard, and that she regards the same defined truths from the viewpoint of their conformity with or *opposition* to the revealed deposit? Fine! Such indeed is the case. But it does not follow that conformity is *identity*. That which conforms to something is not the thing itself, although it bears a *similarity, proportion,* or *correspondence* to it. That which is identical to something is indeed the thing itself.

Reply. – To begin with, our objector admits, as every theologian must admit, that the infallible and the theological truth, as well as the infallibly condemned and the theological error, are truths or errors respectively on account of their conformity with or opposition to the revealed deposit. Now, we have just seen that according to logicians, as well as metaphysicians and theologians, and according to the prince of them all, St. Thomas, every opposition between two statements implies or entails a contradiction between them. It is obvious that contradiction presupposes identity, and not merely extrinsic proportion, similarity or correspondence. Therefore, it is plain that if theological or infallibly condemned error is truly opposed to the revealed deposit, there has to be an implicit contradiction between those two extremes, and that if a contradiction exists between those two extremes, then there has to be real identity, and not merely similarity or proportion, between the revealed deposit and the infallible or the theological truth. There are no two ways about it, given what our objector concedes and what every theologian must concede. The concept of *identity* is apodictically deduced from the concept of *opposition* through the concept of *contradiction*.

There are, in our opinion, two reasons why our objector, who admits the concept of opposition, should, however, refuse to admit the concept of contradiction and consequently the concept of identity. The first is that upon mentioning theological conclusions, his mind instinctively hies to the stock

[116] ST. THOMAS, *loc.cit.*, a.5.

example: "Christ is man, therefore risible". But this example is understood a la Suárez taking "man" in a purely *essential* or abstract sense, and "risible" in the *actual* sense. And, of course, if the example is thus understood, no identity exists, nor can any exist, between "man" and "risible", just as no contradiction exists between "man" and "not risible". But this is simply due to the fact that between "man" (essential) and "risible" (actual) there is no true opposition, and consequently, there is neither true *theology* nor a true object of *infallibility*. We have dwelt at length on this matter elsewhere (89-102), and we shall again return to it at the end of this section.

The second reason why our objector does not perceive true identity or contradiction respectively, in spite of perceiving true opposition, is his seeming failure to draw a distinction between formal identity, which is not our concern here, and *real* identity, which is our only concern now. Furthermore, he also seems not to distinguish between total identity, which is not in the least required, and *partial* identity, which is what we seek and suffices for our purposes. By partial identity we do not mean a *part of identity*, which would not make sense, but *identity with a part* of the revealed deposit, albeit not with the whole of the deposit.

When two statements or assertions have the same subject and the same verb their identical or contradictory meaning depends wholly on the predicate or predicates. If one affirms or denies the predicate of the other, and affirms or denies it in the *same form*, and consequently in the *same concept* and the *same reality*, the identity or the contradiction is formal. If the affirmation or the denial is made under *another concept*, but within the same reality, the identity or the contradiction is merely real. The propositions "God is eternal" and "God is not eternal" (which is the same as saying "God is not-eternal") are formally contradictory, since the predicate affirmed in one and denied in the other is the same in *all* aspects. But between the propositions "God is eternal" and "God is not immutable" there is only a real contradiction. There is real contradiction because the predicates "eternal" and "immutable" respectively affirmed in one and denied in the other, are the *self-same divine reality;* however the contradiction is not formal because the aforesaid concepts, although signifying the same reality, are nonetheless distinct formalities or *distinct concepts*.

On the other hand, there is a formal contradiction between the propositions "God is merciful and eternal" and "God is merciful but not eternal" since one of the predicates is formally denied, but the contradiction is partial since the other predicate is not denied, which is to say, that the whole predicate of the first proposition is not denied. Likewise, there is a real and partial contradiction between the propositions "God is merciful and eternal" and "God is merciful but not immutable". The contradiction is real and not formal, because the predicates "eternal" and "immutable" are distinct formalities or concepts; partial and not total, because only one of the two

predicates is denied, that is to say, only a part of the whole predicate is denied.

But when all these affirmations and denials refer to *one and the same reality*, that is to say, in every case where one of the predicates is inclusive or implicit in the subject, it is plain that they all always include the affirmation or the denial of *identity*, and not merely of extrinsic similarity, proportion or correspondence.

343. APPLICATION TO THE REVEALED DEPOSIT. – Let us now apply all the foregoing to the revealed deposit. The revealed deposit does not consist of only one revealed proposition or assertion. It is a whole made up of many revealed assertions, and therefore of many revealed meanings. In order that an error be truly contradictory to the meaning of the revealed deposit, or a truth identical to the same deposit, it is not necessary that it be respectively contradictory or identical to each and every one of the deposit's assertions; it suffices that it be either contradictory or identical to just one of its assertions.

Thus, e.g., the first verse of Genesis asserts the creation of the world, and the first verse of St. John's Gospel asserts the Divinity of the Word. Any one who asserts the Divinity of the Word asserts a meaning identical to the revealed deposit, because it is identical to one of the truths contained in it, that is, the first verse of St. John's Gospel, even if this particular assertion is neither identical nor relevant to other truths of the revealed deposit, e.g., the first verse of Genesis concerning the creation of the world.

Similarly, should any one deny one of the truths of the revealed deposit, e.g., the creation of the world, such denial is contradictory to the revealed deposit because it contradicts one of the truths or meanings contained in it, even if that denial has nothing to do, or should have nothing to do with the other truths of the revealed deposit. Hence a true identity with, or a true contradiction to the revealed deposit does not require identity with, or contradiction to, the whole deposit, that is, to *each and every one* of the meanings contained in it; identity with, or contradiction to, *one* of its truths or meanings suffices for the purpose.

This is common knowledge, which many would even qualify as a theological platitude. But it serves to explain another thing, which everybody knows, yet is often overlooked by some people.

Each of the assertions or propositions of the revealed deposit, even if it expresses only *one* predicate or meaning, implies or can imply *several* predicates or concepts. This is a property of any assertion, whether divine or human.

All those predicates or concepts which are not expressed, but are nonetheless implicit in each of the revealed statements, are not known, nor

can be known by us at one single stroke. Time and study are needed to uncover them. They come to light successively. Profound and complicated reasonings might at times be required, delicate processes of analysis and synthesis, contact with different sciences and cultures, a long chain of internal and external experiences . . .: in one word, all the complicated and laborious series of factors that bear upon any instance of human progress, including the progress or development of what was already implicit in the primitive datum or starting point. This is both characteristic and exclusive of our weak and at the same time powerful *human reason.* Weak, because it requires time and effort in order to know, because it advances in knowledge through reasoning, that is, by passing from one to an other, which neither God nor the angels require. Powerful, because in making the transition *from one to an other,* it is capable not only of passing from one reality to another reality, as the senses, but also of passing from one concept to another concept within the same reality or within the one and self-same primitive datum; thereby participating not only in the rational process, but also in the *intellectual* process or process of identity, which is characteristic of the angels and God.

Such a process of absolute identity, of unconditional truth, is available to human reason, not in the domain of the contingent physical sciences, but in that of the eternal mathematical and metaphysical sciences, and even more in that of the eternal and divine science of theology, since the theological process is among all sciences the most intellectual, the closest to the mode of knowing proper of pure intellects, the knowledge of simple understanding. "Theological consideration is in the highest degree intellectual."[117] But let us not digress.

344. AN EXAMPLE OF PLAINEST EVIDENCE: JESUS CHRIST IS GOD. – We were just saying that each assertion of the revealed deposit, even if it should express only one predicate, nonetheless implies or includes many others that are really identical.

Let us, e.g., take this revealed proposition, "Jesus Christ is God." For the sake of greater clarity, let us now prescind from all other revealed truths, or let us suppose that there is no other revealed truth. In order to investigate a sensible phenomenon, science endeavours to isolate it from all other alien factors or conditions. In like manner, in order to analyze a question it is best to isolate or abstract it from others. As the scholastic adage has it: "Abstraction is not untruth". Let us, then prescind from all other revealed truths and suppose that only this proposition has been revealed: "Jesus Christ is God".

[117] ST. THOMAS, *In Boetium, De Trinitate,* q.6, a.1.

The proposition contains only one explicit predicate: *God.* But its implicit predicates are numberless.

Indeed, what *is* God? Observe that the question does not ask what things *distinct* from God are *connected* with God, nor does it ask what things are *similar* or *proportionate* to God. What is being asked is what *is God?* To this question Fr. Astete's Catechism replies: "God *is* the most excellent and admirable thing that can be spoken (ineffability) or thought of (incomprehensibility); He *is* an infinitely good, powerful, wise and just Lord, the beginning and the end of all things."

As if nothing had been said at all, that one single explicit concept of God has been broken up into eight concepts implicit in it, viz: ineffability, incomprehensibility, infinite goodness, omnipotence, infinite wisdom, infinite justice, first principle and ultimate end of all things. If instead of asking the Catechism, which could be accused of replying through faith and not through demonstration or theology, we had asked the same question of St. Thomas's *Summa Theologica,* which in the matter of divine attributes submits apodictic proof of every one it names, it would give us not only the eight mentioned in Astete's Catechism, but many other divine attributes deduced, in the magnificent treatise *On the One God,* through a rigorous process of real identity from the concept or idea of God. In its definition of God, Astete's Catechism does not even mention the divine simplicity, immensity, immutability, eternity, providence, etc . . .

Thus, the revealed statement, "Jesus Christ is God", expresses only one predicate; nonetheless, in that one single predicate it contains implicitly, really, and *identically* many other predicates. *Formally* it expresses only one meaning, but *really* it implies several meanings or truths.

Thus, after the revelation of this truth, any one who affirms this same proposition, "Jesus Christ is God", would not merely affirm *a meaning* identical to the revealed proposition, but the *whole explicit* meaning of the revealed truth, since he affirms it in the same form in which it is revealed. His affirmation is identical to the revealed truth, not only partially but *wholly,* not only really but *formally.*

Likewise, any one who denies that revealed proposition by saying, "Jesus Christ is not God", would not be denying only *one meaning* of the revealed truth, but the whole explicit meaning of the revealed truth, since he denies it in the same form or concept in which it is revealed. There would be here a contradiction in meaning to the revealed truth, a contradiction that is not only implicit but *explicit,* not only partial but *total,* not only real but

formal. It is characteristic of formal opposition or *explicit* contradiction to deny the whole meaning of its contradictory. Which is why logicians say it possesses a *malignant nature,* which sets it apart from the other kinds of opposition which contain only an *implicit* contradiction, and do not deny everything but only a *part,* a real and implicit part, of its opposite, as we shall presently see.[118]

Continuing with the same hypothesis, viz., that only the proposition, "Jesus Christ is God", has been revealed, there comes now a man who expressly neither affirms nor denies that proposition, but affirms that Jesus Christ is one of the many concepts that are virtually distinct but really identical to the concept of God. He says, for instance, "Jesus Christ is ineffable", or "incomprehensible", or "infinitely good", or "wise", etc. When he affirms any of those predicates, which as we have seen are contained implicitly in the term "God" – but which cannot become known to, or developed, or explicitated by human reason, except by true *reasoning,* by means of *minors of reason* – when he affirms those predicates, those truly theological conclusions, he would not be affirming something extrinsic to the predicate "God", nor something merely similar or externally in conformity to what God is, but he would be affirming something *intrinsic* to God, something *really* identical to the revealed predicate "God", something really identical to the revealed proposition. The identity is not a formal identity since the predicates are distinct formalities, distinct concepts, that is, virtually distinct; neither is it a total identity since none of those predicates is commensurate to the

[118] "In contradictory propositions, the denial of one is so unmitigated and absolute that it removes all agreement with its opposite extreme. Thus it allows neither being, nor aptitude, nor universality, nor particularity to remain, but *destroys everything* as if it possessed a *malignant nature.* Hence, speaking absolutely and unqualifiedly (simpliciter), it is intensively the greatest opposition, and from it, as from the chief source, opposition is derived *to all other oppositions,* which *contain so much of opposition insofar as they contain something of contradiction,* as St. Thomas teaches, and is said in logic in the chapter on The Opposites." (JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *Cursus Philosophicus,* p.1, q.7, a.1) "Contradictory opposition is opposition pure and simple (simpliciter), since it purely and simply (simpliciter) takes away what the other posits; but *all other* oppositions *contain so much of opposition insofar as they participate something of contradiction,* i.e., of the denial of the other, although not as absolutely as the contradictory: for if they did not deny *something,* they would not be opposed." (*Op. cit.,* p. 2, q.20, a.1) "This is made plain by going through each of the species of opposition, whether on the part of *things* or of propositions." (*Loc.cit.,* a.1) "For the consequent is a *part* and *something of the antecedent.*" (*Loc.cit.,* q.7, a.2) If the consequent were not a *part* or *something* of the antecedent, no reasoning could be grounded on the principle of identity or on its correlative principle of contradiction. These two principles constitute the everlasting and indispensable basis of every absolute and rigorous demonstration.

predicate "God", just as no property howsoever metaphysical is commensurate to the essence, nor any conclusion howsoever implicit is commensurate to its principle. But it is a *real* identity since those predicates are really identical to the revealed predicate "God". Such is the constitution of theological truth, of theology. Consequently, there is not only a correspondence, a proportion, a similarity between theological truth and the revealed deposit; there is a *real identity* of meaning.

If instead of affirming, we deny any of those predicates by saying, e.g., "Jesus Christ is not ineffable", "is not incomprehensible", "is not omnipotent" . . ., such denials would involve not only a disconformity, a disproportion, a dissimilarity, but a true contradiction to the revealed truth, "Jesus Christ is God". The contradiction is not explicit but *implicit,* it is not formal but *real.* To be God and not to be ineffable, or not to be incomprehensible, or not to be omnipotent, are really contradictory predicates, a contradiction is entailed. And the plain proof of it is that not even God can join them together, and God can always do whatsoever does not entail a contradiction. Consequently, theological error entails, even if it does not express, a real contradiction to the revealed deposit. And consequently, theological truth entails a real identity to it.

This analysis of the treatise *On God* ought to suffice for anyone who understands what *theology* is. Theology's proper and primary object is God, and nothing can come into the domain of theology unless by reference to God. Hence, if in the treatise *On God* every theological truth is a truth of real identity, it follows that the process of identity constitutes, and must constitute, the proper and primary characteristic of every theological conclusion and of every truly theological reasoning. But let us practically show that the same thing happens in the case of any other revealed proposition from any other theological treatise.

Second example: Jesus Christ is man. – Let us consider the revealed proposition, "Jesus Christ is man". It contains explicitly only one predicate, "man"; or, if you prefer, there is one explicit predicate, the predicate "man". But in this predicate there are many others involved or implicit, not only as similar or proportionate, but as really identical.

In effect, just as we earlier asked what is God? , we now ask what *is* man? To this question we get the truthful reply that man *is* a rational animal. Hereto we are still within the formal since rational animal is the very *definition* of man. But if we continue asking what the rational is, we will obtain the truthful reply that what is rational is really *immaterial, spiritual, immortal, free;* capable of *morality, merit, happiness;* capable of *powers, wonder,*

"risibility", etc. All of it follows by true *reasoning*, by true *minors* of reason, by a truly *theological conclusion*. And yet, all these conclusions preserve real identity. And the proof of it is that not even God can create a rational being that is not immaterial, spiritual, immortal, or without any capacity (radical properties) for merit, morality, powers, wonder, risibility.

Third example: Jesus Christ is a perfect man. – If instead of analyzing the predicate "man", we analyze the predicate "*perfect* man", or man in the *connatural state*, or man *like us in everything*, we will find that a man in the connatural or the perfect state is a man possessing all the *actual* properties, viz.: actual intellect, actual will, actual sense of wonder, actual risibility, etc., etc. A man without any one of the actual properties is not a man in the connatural state, but a man in a non-connatural state, which is precisely the denial of the revealed predicate. Consequently, the theological conclusions that affirm any of the radical properties of Our Saviour's human nature, affirm a meaning really *included* in the revealed predicate "man"; and those that affirm any of the actual properties also affirm a meaning really, *included* in the revealed predicate: not in the predicate "man" since they differ really from it, but in the revealed predicate "*perfect* man", or man in a *connatural* state, or man *like us*.

Just as we have analyzed the predicate "rational" we could have analyzed the predicate "animal", or the predicates "body" and "soul", or any predicate of any other revealed proposition. Provided that if only the essence of the predicate has been revealed, only the radical or essential predicates are deduced therefrom; and if the perfection or the connatural state of the essence are also revealed, also its actual properties are deduced. Such a deduction is rigorously scientific and rigorously theological, and yet nonetheless – or better still, precisely on account of it – the deduction is also really identical and rigorously homogeneous.

345. A COMPARISON OF THESE THREE EXAMPLES. – We have just considered three examples, viz., "Christ is God", "Christ is man", "Christ is a perfect man, or man in the connatural state". The first of these is a model of divine predicate; the second, a model of created-essential predicate; the third, a model of created-accidental predicate. These are the three fundamental kinds of theological predicates, and consequently, of the theological processes. There can be no theological predicate or process that is not reducible to one of these three. We have seen that in each and every one of these three there exists a real identity or an identity of meaning, and not merely proportion, similarity, or extrinsic correspondence. Therefore, the theological truth (4th level of Catholic doctrine), out of which comes the infallible truth (3rd level), is really homogeneous with dogma and the revealed datum (2nd and 1st level). And, thus, there is homogeneity or real identity of meaning in all the four levels of Catholic doctrine.

346. THIRD OBSERVATION. – In the Vatican Council, the Bishop of Brescia asserted that the truths belonging to faith or morals are not each and every one necessary *in the same degree* for the preservation of the deposit. Thus, he clearly indicated that they might not be identical, that it is possible for revealed truths and connected truths not to have one identical meaning, that conformity is not identity.

Reply. – We admit that there are various *degrees* in the truths of faith and morals, that is, relative to their necessity for the safeguarding of the revealed deposit. In support of something so obvious and which no one denies, a greater authority than that of the Bishop of Brescia can be adduced, viz. that of the Vatican Council itself. At the end of its dogmatic constitution *On the Catholic Faith*, no less, we find the following: "It is not enough to avoid the corruption of heresy, unless those errors are also avoided that *more or less* approach it."[119]

But we fail to see the bearing that the existence of *degrees* might have on the presence or absence of *identity*. Our objector again seems to forget that we are dealing not with formal but real identity, not with total but with partial identity, that is, identity with a part of the revealed deposit. In the case of formal or total identity no degrees are possible. But degrees are possible in the case of real and partial identity insofar as a bigger or smaller part of the revealed predicate is affirmed or denied. And degrees are not only possible, but required precisely because the identity in this case is a *real* identity.

In effect, since it is a case of identity, and not merely of similarity or proportion, it has to be *within* and not outside the deposit. Since it is real, not formal, it has to be *implicit* and not *explicit*, inasmuch as whatever is explicit is always formal. Now, a truth can be more or less implicit, more or less latent, existing at a greater or lesser depth in another truth. The possibility of various degrees is, therefore, obvious.

The greater or lesser *implicitness* or depth, of a truth relative to the formal content of the deposit or to a defined truth of faith, determines the greater or lesser necessity of the former for the preservation of the latter, since on it depends the greater or lesser *certainty* or evidence wherewith human reason – for the benefit of which the deposit was given, and with regard to which the necessity of safeguarding and explicating it exists – sees the more or less remote or proximate relationship of such a truth to the formal or the defined content of the deposit. The necessity or non-necessity of a truth depends on whether it is related or not to the deposit. The greater or lesser degree of necessity depends on the greater or lesser implicitness of that relationship.

[119] Denz-Schön., 3045.

To illustrate, any teaching or assertion dealing with the Divinity or the Trinity (revealed predicates) has to be true or false by way of real identity, since in the case of God no other way is possible. This notwithstanding, every theologian knows that, with respect to either the Trinity or the Divinity, there are doctrines of faith, or proximate to faith, or simply certain, or more probable, or merely probable, or improbable, or erroneous, or close to error, or simply temerarious, or completely doubtful, or free. A whole gamut of degrees of implicitness in the deposit and of degrees of necessity for its preservation. Nonetheless, all those truths or all those errors agree with or are opposed to the deposit by way of identity, since in the case of either the Divinity or the Trinity no other way is possible.

What is true of the revealed predicate "God", is true of any other revealed predicate provided that the process employed be truly theological, that is to say, provided metaphysical or radical properties be deduced from the revelation of the mere essence, and actual properties be deduced from the revelation of the connatural or perfect essence. Such a deductive process is a process of identity with the revealed datum; however, the identity is not formal but *real*, and thus it is *implicit*, not explicit; and consequently, capable of various degrees of *implicitness*, and various degrees of *relationship*, and various degrees of *necessity*. All homogeneous development carries these two characteristics; since it is homogeneous it is characterized by real identity; since it is a development it is characterized by various degrees or levels of implicitness or development. [120]

347. FOURTH OBSERVATION. — Now we come to the root of the confusion that plagues our objector. He goes on to say:

"An example will make it clear. Let us assume that it has not been revealed that Christ is a physically *perfect* man, but only that he is a *true* man, a rational animal. Subsequently the Church defines as an infallible truth,

[120] The opposition of heresy to dogma is immediate, direct, in a straight line, so to speak; and the straightness of a line excludes more or less, admits no degrees. The opposition of theological error to dogma is mediate, indirect, oblique; and the *obliqueness* or slant of a line admits more or less, admits *degrees*. The opposition between heresy and dogma is direct and *immediate* because it is achieved by means of a simple denial, without any middle term, bypassing the circuitous route of *reasoning*. The opposition between theological error and dogma is oblique, *mediate*, because it requires the circuitous path of the middle term, the minor of reason, of reasoning; but if the line is oblique, it is not a broken but a *continuous* line, since it keeps in real touch or within the objective identity with the dogma inasmuch as the middle term and the reasoning possess *implicit* virtuality, are *inclusive*. On the other hand, the non-implicit or Suarezian virtual is a *broken* line, one in which there is a gap of objectivity or of contact with the dogma; since such a virtual is not in touch with dogma, there is no point at which either theology or infallibility can come in touch with it.

with a mark inferior to that of faith, that Christ possesses *actual* risibility. Will such a definition teach us that this proposition, "Christ possesses actual risibility", is identical in meaning to this other one, "Christ is true man"? Of course not. Actual risibility, inasmuch as it is physical power, is a reality that differs really from the *essence* of man. Thus the two propositions are not identical, albeit they are in conformity."

Reply. — Our reply is quite simple and quite obvious: WE DENY THE SUPPOSITION. That is to say, we categorically deny that the Church could define as *infallibly true* the proposition "Christ possesses *actual* risibility", or that she could condemn as *infallibly erroneous* the contrary proposition "Christ does not possess actual risibility", *in the supposition* made by our objector, to wit, that it has not been revealed that Christ is a perfect or connatural man, but *only* that he is truly or *essentially man*.

Our objector, firmly believes — as do many post-Suarezian textbooks, and even imagines that it is the opinion of *all* theologians — that in the stock example of theological conclusion, "Christ is man, therefore he is risible", it is possible to understand the predicate "risible" in an actual sense when the term "man" is taken in a merely *essential* sense.

We think that they are plainly mistaken in their belief, and that this mistake has transcendental consequences with regard to the nature of true theology and of infallibility. We trust we have made this plain elsewhere. (99-102)

We do not deny that the Church can define as infallibly true, and even as of divine faith, the proposition that "Christ possesses radical risibility", since it has been revealed that Christ is truly or essentially man. Neither do we deny that the Church can define as infallibly true, and even as of divine faith, the proposition that "Christ possesses actual risibility", or any of the other properties that really differ from the essence, since it has been truly revealed that "Christ is a *perfect* man". There is in either case a truly theological conclusion; there is in either case true definability. But, likewise, there is in either case true real identity between the principle and the conclusion, not mere similarity, proportion, or correspondence.

What we have denied, and continue to deny, is that the Church could define as infallibly true, and much less as of divine faith, the proposition that "Christ has *actual* risibility", *in the supposition* that it has been revealed *only* that "Christ is *essentially* a man". The reasoning, "Christ is *essentially* a man, therefore he has such or such *actual* property", can hardly be an object of divine faith or of infallibility when it is not even *theologically* certain. It has exactly the same certainty as these other reasonings: "Christ is essentially a man, therefore he has a human personality", or "The Most Holy Virgin Mary is truly a mother, therefore she is not a virgin". Fine examples of theological certainty, indeed!

348. BY THE LIGHT OF OPPOSITION. – To avoid repeating things that have been argued and documented at length elsewhere as cited above, suffice it to examine these reasonings by the light of the concept of *opposition,* which is the object under study in this section.

In the domain of theology, as in the domain of infallibility, nothing can be condemned as erroneous unless, it is truly opposed to the revealed deposit. This is admitted by our objector. Now, it is plain that there is no true opposition between these two propositions, "Christ is *essentially* a man", and "Christ is not *actually* risible". It is possible to be essentially a man and not to be actually risible, just as it is possible to be essentially a man and not to be actually, or in fact, a human person, or to be essentially a mother without ceasing to be a virgin. In each of these cases, the extremes are, absolutely speaking, *consistent.* Such propositions, which pretend to pass as opposites, can absolutely be *both simultaneously true.* Two propositions which absolutely can be *both simultaneously true,* or two extremes that absolutely are consistent, are not truly opposed, says St. Thomas. "For it is *impossible* that whatsoever things are *opposed* by *any kind* of opposition should *simultaneously exist.*"

And to preclude anyone from being misled by thinking of merely physical impossibility, the holy Doctor immediately adds that the impossibility required for opposition is absolute or *essential* impossibility. "And this, indeed, happens on account of the fact that one of the opposites *of its own reason* contains the *denial of the other.*" This is precisely the basis from which the holy Doctor deduces the fundamental principle that *"contradiction is included in all opposites."*[121]

Now, then, the propositions, "Christ is *essentially* a man", and "Christ is not *actually* risible", can, absolutely speaking, be both simultaneously true, it is possible for both of them, absolutely speaking, to coexist in the same subject. They are not essentially inconsistent, they do not involve a contradiction. Therefore they do not involve a true opposition. Consequently, in the supposition made by our objector that *it has* been revealed only that "Christ is *essentially* a man", the proposition that "Christ is not *actually* risible" would not be truly opposed to the revealed deposit. Inasmuch as it is not opposed to the revealed deposit, it would not be possible to condemn it either as *infallibly,* or as *theologically,* erroneous.

[121] "Since there are four ways according to which some things are opposed to another, viz.: first in the manner of *contradiction,* as being seated to not being seated; secondly, in the manner of *privation,* as blind to seeing; thirdly, in the manner of *contrariety,* as black to whiteness; fourthly, in the manner of *relation,* as son to father; the first among these kinds of opposition is contradiction. The reason is that *contradiction is included in all the others* [oppositions] as that which is prior and more simple. For *it is impossible* that those things that are *opposed* according to *whatsoever* kind of opposition should *exist simultaneously.* And this happens on account of the fact that one of the opposites contains *of its own reason* the denial of the other. As it is *of the reason* of the blind to be not seeing. And it is *of the reason* of the black not to be white. And it is likewise *of the reason* of the son not to be the father to him whose son he is." (ST. THOMAS, *In Metaphysicos,* lib. 10 Lect. 6, Nos. 2040-2041, *ed. cit.* In ed. Vivès it is lect. 3, vol. 25, pg. 116).

349. LET IT NOT BE ARGUED that it could, at least, be infallibly condemned as *temerarious.* No doubt it could. But we are not concerned now with temerity which is contrary to *prudence,* but with *error,* which is opposed to *truth.* The Church could condemn as infallibly temerarious the proposition that "The final judgment will take place the following year", and yet from such a condemnation it cannot be deduced that its contradictory "The final judgment will not take place the following year" is theologically certain, or that it is an object of infallibility either as erroneous or as true. It is an object of infallibility or of theology only as imprudent.[122]

[122] A friend sent us by letter an observation which is very similar to the preceding one. He writes as follows:

"I agree with you in saying that homogeneity exists between the whole of the department of dogma and the department of infallibility with respect to the defined truths or the condemned errors contained in the latter. I believe that you have demonstrated this very plainly in . . . your articles in *La Ciencia Tomista.* But are you going to extend this homogeneity so as to include also the propositions that have been condemned with a censure inferior to that of error, as for example, with the censure of *temerarious?* You know that there are theologians, e.g. the Salmantícenses, who admit that such propositions might be true, absolutely speaking, even after they have been condemned."

Reply – Our objector fails to draw a clear distinction between the truth of a proposition, and the truth of its censure. When the Church condemns a proposition with the censure of "temerarious", what she defines infallibly by such a condemnation is not the truth or the falsity of the condemned proposition, but the truth of the censure with which it has been condemned. Thus when the Church condemns as temerarious the proposition that "The Final Judgment will take place on such a date", that condemnation can be broken up into these two propositions: (a) The Final Judgment will take place (or it will not take place) on such a date; (b) It is temerarious to affirm that the Final Judgment will take place on such a date. It is not the first, but the second proposition that is infallibly defined by the Church's condemnation. To see plainly that this second proposition is perfectly homogeneous to the revealed truth, we need only to formulate the following simple reasoning: "To affirm that the Final Judgment will take place on such a date is to affirm what no man can know. But, it is temerarious to affirm what no man can know. Therefore, it is temerarious to affirm that the Final Judgment will take place on such a date." The major of this reasoning is an expressly revealed proposition. The minor is an *inclusive* proposition, since it is the very *definition* of temerity. Consequently, the conclusion – which is precisely what the Church infallibly defines – is deduced from the revealed datum by way of inclusion, by way of perfect identity and homogeneity. Such is the case with *any and every* proposition that is infallibly censured, even with a censure inferior to that of error.

350. FINAL OBSERVATION. – A final observation from our objector brings to a close this rather lengthy chapter.

"In our view, the Catholic doctrine is the doctrine which the Church, through her solemn or through her ordinary magisterium, whether directly or indirectly, teaches to all the faithful as a *dogma* of faith revealed by God, or as an *infallible truth* in conformity with revelation. *To all of it is applicable* the well-known dictum of the Lirinensis, quoted by the Vatican Council: 'Let, then, the understanding, knowledge, and wisdom of both each one and all, of one man as well as of the whole Church, grow . . . and advance abundantly and forcefully in the course of the ages and the centuries: but only within its own kind, that is to say, within the same dogma, *the same meaning,* the *same teaching*'."

Reply. – Very well spoken! We make ours this whole paragraph from our objector. But either he has suffered a slight distraction, or he there admits all that we have said about the real identity of meaning that pervades all the levels of Catholic doctrine, and throws overboard everything he has sought to establish in his earlier observations.

In the foregoing passage our objector effectively says that the Catholic doctrine comprises not only what is defined as a *dogma* of faith (first and second levels), but also what is defined as an *infallible truth* (third level).

In the same passage he also says that the well-known dictum of the Lirinensis, which the Vatican Council made its own, can be applied to *the whole body of Catholic doctrine.*

Now, as every theologian knows, Lirinensis's dictum, "only within its own kind, that is to say, within the same dogma, the *same meaning,* the same teaching", signifies not only similarity, proportion, correspondence, but also true *implicitness,* true *real identity* of meaning.

Therefore, if the dictum of the Lirinensis and the Vatican Council is applicable to the whole body of Catholic doctrine, which comprises the first three levels, it follows that our objector acknowledges that there is an *identity of meaning* in those three levels of Catholic doctrine. We claim nothing more in this book. That alone suffices to establish the homogeneous evolution of Catholic dogma.

It is true that our objector says nothing explicitly about the *theological truth* (fourth level); but everybody knows – and our objector certainly will not deny it – that the fourth level is of the same nature as the third, since there is no truly theological conclusion that cannot be an object of infallibility.[123]

[123]Hurter exhibits in the following quotation the same misunderstanding that afflicts our objector: "Hence the revealed truths are not *like stones,* but *like seeds,* and

351. IN A NUTSHELL. – The two principles on which this whole section is based are the following: first, any *theological* error, no less than any infallibily condemned error, necessarily has to be really *opposed to the revealed deposit,* and not only to the natural reason. Second, there can be no true opposition between two statements unless there is *implicit* a true *contradiction* between them. We know of no theologian or philosopher who has denied or doubted either of these principles, and, what to us is more important, they are both taken from St. Thomas.

No man – unless he is misled by a false understanding of the stock "Christ is man, therefore risible" – who serenely meditates on the range of these two principles, will fail to achieve clear evidence, not only of the fact that there exists a real identity or objective homogeneity between all the four levels of Catholic doctrine, but also of the fact that the *virtual implicit* is the constitutive reason of the theological truth or theological conclusion. The latter fact is the basis of the former. Its implicitness in the revealed deposit confers on theology its character of real identity or objective homogeneity to the faith. Its virtuality – i.e., the *distinction of concepts* within the same reality, and consequently the need for *true reasoning* – gives theology its character of conclusion and its formal distinction from faith.

Thus, the essence of theological truth consists in the *implicit virtuality of the revealed deposit.* Its *implicitness* in the sacred deposit is admirably condensed in the laconic phrase of the "Prince of Thomists", the great Capreolus, to wit: "ALL SUCH [theological matters] ARE CONTAINED IMPLICITLY IN THE BIBLE." This pithy formula deserves to be graven in the mind of every Thomist and inscribed on the first page of every theological textbook.[124] Its *virtuality* has been described by St. Thomas's foremost

the higher they are, the *more fecund and productive of conclusions.* Thence, too, the human intellect does not behave in a merely *passive way* in the perception of these truths, but is *like a* more or less fertile *field* with regard to the cultivation and development of the seeds that are received therein, especially if there be added industriousness and the light and warmth of the supernatural sun, that is, the grace of illumination by the Holy Spirit. Vincent of Lérins most admirably treats *of these things* [we ask the reader to notice the phrase *of these things*] in ch. 23 of the *Commonitorium,* where among other things he says thus: Are we, then, to say that no progress of religion will ever be had in the Church of Christ? Yes, let there clearly be the greatest progress, etc." (*Theologiae Dogmaticae Compendium,* t.1, n.223, ed.3a., Oeniponte 1880) Very beautifully spoken! But if the quotation from Vincent of Lérins is applicable to such *conclusions,* then such conclusions or *developed seeds* are definable as dogmas, since Vincent of Lérins is speaking not of theological but of *dogmatic* progress.

[124]"In the fourth place, Scotus argues: The knowledge that one has of the things that are delivered in the Canon of the Bible is not given in the manner of demonstrative science. Consequently, one who has the habit of these things thus delivered *in the literal sense,* does not have the habit of *science in the proper sense,* but a habit whereby, concerning the *things delivered in the Holy Scripture,* he does not assent to one thing

commentator, Cajetan, in this no less succinct formula: *"Theological science is contained virtually in the principles of faith."*[125] Both these two characteristics, virtuality and implicitness, are found together in this passage from St. Thomas: "When many things are *virtually* contained in another, they are said to be *implicitly* in it, as conclusions in the principles."[126] Or better still in this other passage: "There are two ways of explicating the articles of faith. The one is with regard to the substance of the articles themselves, insofar as one knows the articles distinctly. The other is with respect to *those things that are contained implicitly in the articles,* and this takes place when one knows *the things that follow from the articles.*"[127]

Every theologian should take notice of the perfect parallel between these two phrases which St. Thomas takes as identical, viz.: (a) "those things that are *contained implicitly* in the articles"; (b) "the things that *follow from* the articles." These are, according to St. Thomas, the two essential characteristics of the theological truth, the theological conclusion, sacred theology. The virtual implicitness is the root of the homogeneity of the Catholic doctrine throughout all its four levels of development. That same *implicitness* plus the *divine authority* which the Church possesses in order to *explicate* it, provide us with the two keys to the homogeneous evolution of Catholic dogma.

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because of another, but assents *immediately* to *each* and *every one* of them all. What is more, if certain things are proven therein, he would thus assent to any of the sayings in it, not because it is proven by another saying, but because of God's authority, on account of which he assents *immediately* to *everything contained* in Holy Scripture, and not to one because of another by way of syllogistic discourse.

"*To the fourth* objection we say that although the Bible does not proceed in the manner of demonstrative science, nonetheless, from the things contained in the Bible, which are like the *principles* of science, the Fathers have demonstratively inferred *conclusions,* with which theology deals, by arguing against heretics from the principles of theology. Hence, although in the sacred Canon theology is not delivered explicitly in syllogistic style, nonetheless, in the books of subsequent theologians it is explicitly delivered in a scientific manner and scholarly method. HOWEVER, ALL SUCH THINGS ARE IMPLICITLY CONTAINED IN THE BIBLE." (CAPREOLUS, *Prol. In 1 Sent.,* q.1, a.2, ed. Paban-Pègues, pg. 17) Beautiful! And thoroughly Thomist. Scotus's objection to St. Thomas is equivalent to the following: If the meaning of the theological conclusion is a meaning truly *implicit* in the Bible ("in the literal sense"), then it is not a conclusion in the proper sense ("science in the proper sense"), therefore, if it is a conclusion in the proper sense, then it cannot be implicit in the Bible. To which Capreolus replies: To be a conclusion in the proper sense, and to be, notwithstanding, truly implicit are not inconsistent in the case of theology. In theology, every truly theological conclusion is truly implicit in the principles of the Bible, and yet it is truly and properly a theological conclusion. This is the true teaching of St. Thomas. It is likewise our teaching.

[125] *In 2-2,* q.4, a.3.

[126] *QQ.DD. De Veritate,* q.14; *De Fide,* a.11.

[127] *In 3 Sent.,* d.25, q.2, a.1, sol. 3.

Chapter VII

THE EVOLUTION OF DOGMA AND THE TRADITIONAL OPINION

352. THE VOICE OF TRADITION. – Anyone who is acquainted with theology only by what modern textbooks say, or seem to say, will be persuaded that the revealed virtuality's definability as of faith, which is the basis of dogmatic evolution, is the private opinion of a few theologians, and that the contrary opinion is the common, or more general, view.

Having established with intrinsic arguments in previous chapters of this book the possibility and the factual existence of dogmatic evolution, we will undertake in this final chapter the burden of making it plain that such was the traditional opinion unanimously held until Molina, and also the more common opinion since Molina up to the present.

We had at first intended to begin this historical study with the great masters of the 13th century, since this problem did not begin to be thoroughly threshed out until then. However, even if this question had not been treated ex professo during the Patristic period, we have thought it convenient to begin by adducing some passages from the Fathers of the Church in order to make it plain that the doctrine concerning the evolution of dogma taught by later theologians is already found in germ in the Fathers and ecclesiastical writers of the first centuries.

Beginning with the 13th century there is a great wealth of testimonies in favour of the evolution of dogma. We will classify them by chronological order. For the sake of brevity, we will try to limit ourselves to one or two brief passages from each theologian, with the exception of St. Thomas and Melchor Cano, who deserve each a separate section.

Finally, since there are some who have utilized history as a weapon against the evolution of dogma, it will be convenient to reply to their observations. Thus this chapter will be divided into seven sections:

1. The traditional opinion up to St. Thomas.
2. The opinion of St. Thomas.
3. From St. Thomas to Molina.
4. From Molina to the present.
5. The mind of Melchor Cano.
6. Reply to historical objections.
7. Examination of a very recent Introduction to the History of Dogmas.

Section I

THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH FATHERS ON THE EVOLUTION OF DOGMA

353. THE PRIMITIVE CHURCH. – The first centuries of Christianity were centuries of struggle. The Church preferably had to concentrate her energies in defending her teaching both against those who attacked it from the outside, as the heathens and the Jews, and those who corrupted it from the inside, as the heretics.

Hence the writings of the Fathers of the Church are mostly devoted to the task of vindicating the divine origin of dogma against the former, and its immutability against the latter.

However, there have been Church Fathers who, on the one hand, tenaciously defended against heretics the substantial immutability of dogma, which is the first element of all homogeneous evolution; and, on the other hand, also pointed out its unfolding by way of inference, which is the second element required by homogeneous evolution.

Among these Church Fathers or ecclesiastical writers we find St. Irenaeus, Origen, St. Basil, St. Gregory Nazianzen, St. Jerome, Vincent of Lérins, and St. Anselm. We will briefly quote from them.

354. ST. IRENAEUS. – "The Church's preaching everywhere constant and equally persevering, having its witness from the Prophets, and the Apostles, and all the disciples... and the wonted way of behaving in accordance with the salvation of men, which is *in our faith:* which we keep as perceived *by the Church,* and which *by God's Spirit,* like an excellent *deposit* in a good vessel, *ever grows young and rejuvenates the very vessel in which it exists.*"[1]

[1] *Contra Haereses,* lib.3, c.24, n.1; MIGNE, PL 7, 966.

It is plain that, according to St. Irenaeus, the revealed deposit possesses two characteristics. First, it develops or rejuvenates the vessel in which it is deposited, which is the minds of the faithful or of the whole Church: "deposit... *rejuvenates* the very vessel in which it exists." Second, it not only rejuvenates the minds of the faithful, but the deposit itself rejuvenates itself: *"deposit... ever grows young."* The *subjective-objective* character of dogmatic evolution can hardly be expressed more plainly and more beautifully in such concise terms.

In this passage the Saint very clearly points out at the same time the two factors that intervene in this evolution or rejuvenation: the instrumental factor, viz. the Church, and the principal factor, which is the action of the Holy Spirit: *"by the Church... by God's Spirit."*

355. ORIGEN. – In his brilliant treatise *De Principiis,* outlining what the rule of faith for the Christian is, Origen clearly draws a distinction between two kinds of teachings or truths. One comprises those truths that are *plain* in the preaching of the Apostles or of the Church: "of such that are manifestly delivered by the Apostolic preaching", "*defined* in the preaching of the Church". The other comprises those truths that are not plain or manifest; that is to say, any and every thing that "is *not* set apart by a *sufficiently manifest* preaching", which "the preaching of the Church has not laid open to view *with sufficient clarity.*" The Christian, says Origen who tries to know his faith in a perfect and scientific manner, as commanded by the Prophet Hosea, must ground himself on the first kind of truths and gather from them the *consequences* that are contained in them, since principles and consequences form *but one body* of doctrine. But let us hear from Origen himself:

"It is therefore necessary that these truths [i.e., those of the first kind, those that are plain or defined in the preaching of either the Apostles or the Church] be utilized, as elements and foundations, in accordance with the command that says: *Enkindle for yourselves the light of knowledge* (Hosea 10:12), by anyone who wishes to *accomplish a certain chain and body of all these things,* so that from manifest and necessary assertions one may probe for what is true concerning each of such things soever, and build up, as we have said, *one body* out of such instances and affirmations, *either those which one comes upon in the Holy Scriptures or* those which one discovers *by an investigation of the consequence itself* and the tenor of right."[2]

It is thus plain that the idea that, in the case of revealed or Christian doctrine, principles and consequences form *only one body,* begins to be outlined from the earliest times. That is the substance of dogmatic evolution.

[2] *De Principiis,* 1, proem., 10; MIGNE, PL 11, 121

356. ST. BASIL. – Leaving aside an interesting passage from Tertullian,[3] which was written when he had already lapsed into heresy and was by him applied in a heretical sense, we pass on to St. Basil:

"Just as the *growing* seed from something tiny turns into something big, yet remains *the same* in itself, does not change in species but is perfected through increments; so, too, I believe that the *same* doctrine has *grown* through progress, but that it has never been the case that the doctrine that now exists has replaced that which had existed from the beginning."[4]

St. Basil speaks here of the homogeneous increase of dogma in his own soul, from the time he learned it as a child up to the time when he developed it as a bishop; nevertheless, there can hardly be another more appropriate description of the growth of dogma in all the faithful or in the whole Church.

357. ST. GREGORY NAZIANZEN. – Next to St. Basil's we quote the testimony of his illustrious fellow student St. Gregory Nazianzen, who is antonomastically known as *the Theologian.* The Macedonian heretics denied the divinity of the Holy Spirit on the basis that nowhere in the Sacred Scripture is the Holy Spirit called God. The holy Doctor replies that one must believe not only what is expressed in the Holy Scripture, but also what is *gathered* from it. This is what he says:

"Since such a great difference exists in things and in words, what is it that makes you such a slave to the *letter* and a follower of Jewish wisdom as to *pursue syllables* while *disregarding things?* If from your saying twice five, or twice seven, I should *gather* ten or fourteen; or from your saying an animal that is endowed with reason and is mortal I should *conclude* that it is a man, would I seem to you to be talking nonsense? But how could this be since *I am saying what you are saying?* For words are not more ascribable to him who speaks than to him who is the *cause of the necessity of speaking thus.* Consequently, just as in this case I should not pay more heed to what is *said* than to what is *understood,* so too, if there be something that *is not said at all,* or *certainly not said clearly enough,* but which I find is *understood and gathered* from the Scriptures, should I be so fearful of *your sycophantic servility to words* as to turn away from the enuntiated meaning itself? "[5]

[3] "*There is nothing without a time,* and everything bides its time. Finally, Ecclesiastes says, 'There is a time to everything.' (Eccles. 3:17) Observe how created things are gradually led to bear fruit. First it is a *grain,* and from the grain *shoots* sprout, and from the shoots a *sapling* grows; then *branches* and *leaves* multiply and the whole tree expands; next comes the *swelling of the bud,* the bud blossoms into a *flower,* and the flower discloses a *fruit;* the latter is for some time shapeless and rough, advancing *by degrees* in age it ripens into a mellow *flavour.* So, also, holiness (for the God of holiness and the God of creatures are one) in its first *rough beginnings* was nature fearing God; thence by the *Law* and the Prophets it passed into *childhood;* thence by the Gospel it surged into *youth;* now by the Paraclete it settles into maturity." (TERTULLIAN, *De Velandis Virginibus,* c.1; MIGNE, PL 2, 938)

[4] *Epistola 223 adversus Eustathium,* MIGNE, PG 32, 827-828.

Granados, Molina's staunch defender, clearly perceived that this passage speaks of conclusions in the proper sense, and evaded its thrust by saying that St. Gregory here takes divine faith in a broad or improper sense (233). Other later theologians, clearly saw that St. Gregory speaks of divine faith in the proper sense of the term since he is talking about the divinity of the Holy Spirit, but they, too, attempt to evade his thrust by saying that the holy Doctor speaks only of conclusions improperly so called. There is never any want of resources to evade an isolated passage, no matter how clear it is, when it goes against the grain of preconceived opinions.

358. ST. JEROME. – Christ himself gave us the parable of the mustard seed, and established a comparison between its growth and the growth of the Kingdom of Heaven which is the preaching of the Gospel. In the preaching of the Gospel the fundamental thing is the doctrine or dogma ("Going, therefore, *teach* . . ."). Hence the Doctor Maximus of scriptural exegesis did not hesitate to admit doctrinal or dogmatic growth, and even went on to compare it with the growth of the Gospel's mustard seed in these terms:

"Now, this preaching of the Gospel, which seemed small in the beginning, when *sown* either in the soul of the believer or in the whole world, does not grow into a shrub, but *becomes a tree* such that the birds of the sky (by which we ought to understand either the souls of the believers, or the powers subject to God's service) come and make their home *in its branches.* By the *branches of the Gospel tree* which grew from the mustard seed, *I understand the different dogmas in which* each of the abovementioned birds rests."[6]

Obviously, the comparison between dogmatic growth and the growth of the mustard seed is only an analogy, which should be understood subject to the limitations we have indicated elsewhere. But it sufficiently shows that the idea of dogmatic development was no less familiar to the Fathers of the Church than the idea of the substantial immutability of dogma.

359. VINCENT OF LÉRINS. – We will not repeat here the passages already quoted from this famous ecclesiastical writer. His formulae concerning the evolution of dogma have become classics. One of them has earned the unique privilege of being literally adopted by the Vatican Council.

When we spoke of the images of the evolution of dogma, we saw how Lérins compared it with the true, but homogeneous, vital development of a seed, and of the human body as well (222-223). When we dealt with the

[5] *Oratio 31,* Theol. 5, n.24; MIGNE, PG 36, 159.

[6] *Comment. in Matthaeum,* lib.2, c.13; Mt. v. 32; MIGNE, PL 26, 93.

problem of whether the Church perfects revelation, we also quoted texts in which Lérins admits that some dogmas were contained in the primitive deposit only in an inchoate and unformed manner ("inchoate and unformed"), and thus need to be cultivated so that they may flower, mature, grow, and become perfect: "let it be cultivated, let it flower, mature, grow, and come to perfection." (187)

No one has given us, as Lérins, the key to explain those passages in which some Fathers of the Church at times assert the immutability of dogma with such rigidity as to seem to leave no room for its evolution.

In effect, no matter how many texts from the Fathers are compiled to prove that dogma is completely immutable, not one will be found that expresses the immutability of dogma in such seemingly absolute and rigid terms as that memorable phrase of Lérins: *"Quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus"*. And yet, the same hand that wrote those words, also wrote in the same book the words *inchoate and unformed,* and *let it mature, grow, and come to perfection.*

As a matter of fact, immutability and development are not two opposed things, but two harmonious aspects and two complementary facets of the same thing, that is, of homogeneous evolution. Given immutability alone, that is, with no development, there would be no evolution, but no life either. Given development, but without substantial immutability, there would not be homogeneous evolution, but corruption or transformism. The union of both these characteristics makes for the true life of dogma. This is why both are present together in the Catholic Church, and both are found wanting in the heretical, and even in the schismatic sects.

This explains why two Catholic apologists, as eminent as Bossuet and Newman, could have employed in defense of the Catholic Church arguments that seem contradictory. Bossuet said to Protestantism: "You change; therefore, the truth is not in you." To Anglicanism Newman said: "You admit no evolution; therefore, you have no life." Truth to say, far from contradicting each other, these two aspects represent the two properties that characterize the truth when it is deposited in human minds and hearts to give life both to the individual and the society.

It explains why all those sects that have separated themselves from the vital principle, which is the divine magisterium of the Catholic Church, are wanting in either one or the other of these two essential properties of life. Either they lack the characteristic of substantial immutability because they have abandoned dogmas that are truly primitive, or they lack the characteristic of vital progress because they have restricted their belief to the dogmas defined up to such a century or such a council and have rejected any development that such dogmas have had or might have had in subsequent times or councils.

These two fundamental properties of every living being find their parallels in two properties or states in every dead organism or corpse: either the unchangeable or rigid state of the mummy, or the dissolving state of corruption. The first is the state of immutability without progress; the second, the state of progress without immutability. The former is the state of the heretical or schismatic sects of the East; the latter is the state of the Protestant sects of the West.

Hence, the formula of true dogmatic life, which Lérins gave us and the Vatican Council made its own, includes neither immutability alone nor progress alone, but includes substantial immutability together with vital or homogeneous progress: "Let it, then, *grow* . . . but *in the same sense.*"[7]

360. ST. ANSELM. – We have seen that St. Gregory Nazianzen employed the way of conclusion or consequence to prove the divinity of the Holy Spirit, and at the same time pointed out that this process led to the knowledge of a dogmatic truth or truth of divine faith, even if it is not expressly contained in the Scriptures.

St. Anselm employs the same procedure to prove that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, and teaches the same doctrine concerning the value of the way of reasoning or conclusion in the following terms:

"We have seen how truthfully and *necessarily it follows* that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son. But if it were not true, then either some of the premises *from which we said that it followed* is false, which is against the faith which we hold in common with the Greeks; or we have *concluded inconsequently,* which cannot be shown. And if this is not true, the *Christian faith is destroyed* . . . Now, if to deny the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son induces such a great falsity as to destroy, against the Christian belief, the premises *from which* we have shown that *it follows* . . . let any rational heart consider for what *reason* it should be excluded from the Christian faith. Lastly, if it be erroneous to believe this procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son, then divine authority itself leads us into error, since it teaches the truths *from which it follows* and the truths *that follow it,* and nowhere does it deny it or give any indication that it opposes it. Thus, if it be objected that no such thing must be said since *divine authority* never says it, let it also be said that it must not be denied since divine authority never denies it nor says anything opposed to it. We also say that divine authority *sufficiently affirms it when it asserts those truths whereby it is established and say nothing at all whereby it is denied.*"[8]

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[7] LIRINENSIS, *Commonitorium,* n.18, and VATICAN COUNCIL, *De Fide Catholica,* c.4; Denz.-Schön. 3020.

[8] *De Processione Spiritus Sancti contra Graecos,* c.26; MIGNE, PL 158, 321.

The reader here has a reply to the objection commonly raised by those who deny dogmatic evolution by way of conclusion. They argue that when God affirms the formally revealed or the principles, he does not thereby affirm the virtual or the consequences; and since nothing can be of divine faith or a dogmatic truth except what is affirmed by God, no conclusion in the proper sense of the term can become a dogmatic truth. St. Anselm provides us with a clear reply: *"Divine authority sufficiently affirms it when it asserts those truths whereby it is established."* Since such an affirmation is implicit and requires explication, nothing else is needed for it to become a dogma but that the explication be made by divine authority, that is, by the Church's definition, and not merely by the theologian's human reasoning.

We now leave the patristic era and pass on to the age of scholastic theology. The foregoing passages are not too many; nonetheless, we believe that they are sufficient to enable the reader to realize that even in the patristic era the idea of dogmatic development by way of theological conclusions had already surfaced quite clearly. This idea subsequently gained both precision and completion in the works of the vast majority of the great theologians from St. Thomas up to the present.

Section II

ST. THOMAS'S DOCTRINE ON THE EVOLUTION OF DOGMA

361. THE THOMIST SYNTHESIS. – St. Thomas's teaching has been cited in almost every page of this book, and we shall be citing it again further on (134, 238-243, 296, 302, 304, 466-468). To avoid useless repetitions, we will limit ourselves here to a brief synthesis of the Angelic Doctor's doctrine.

St. Thomas and the great masters of Scholasticism deal with the evolution of dogma in connection with two problems: (a) the problem of the *unity of the faith;* (b) the problem of the *constitutive element of heresy.* As a matter of fact, these two problems are simply the two aspects or opposite facets of one and the same problem, since heresy is nothing but the denial or the breaking of the unity of the faith as schism is the breaking of the unity of government.

The first of these two problems or difficulties concerning the unity of the faith had already presented itself to the consideration of the Fathers of the Church, notably St. Augustine and Pope St. Leo the Great, on account of the obvious fact that the doctrine of the faith had developed and grown throughout the Old Testament up to Christ and the Apostles. When the great schoolmen of the Middle Ages examined this problem they broadened it to include also another obvious fact, viz., the continuing development and growth of the doctrine of faith after the Apostles. The problem centers on elucidating how it is possible to preserve the unity of something which, as the

doctrine of faith, grows and develops successively, so that the early faithful explicitly knew and believed only a part, whereas the later faithful know and believe other parts or developments which were unknown to the former. St. Thomas and all the other great schoolmen dealt with this problem under such questions as: "Whether the faith of the moderns is the same as the faith of the ancients", "Whether the faith has progressed in the course of time", "Whether the articles of faith have grown with the passage of time", and others similar to these.[9]

St. Thomas's solution to this first problem, whatever the phase or guise under which it is proposed, is always formulated in the same terms, viz., that there was a growth of *explication* of the implicit, but no growth of the *substance.* The argument he offers is always the same, viz., that all subsequent developments were already *implicitly contained* in the former teachings, and since the difference between the implicit and the explicit is not sufficient to destroy the objective or substantial unity of the faith, it follows that the divine faith of the angels in heaven, of our First Parents in Paradise, of the Patriarchs and Prophets in the Old Testament, of the Apostles and ours in the New Testament, is objectively and substantially *one and the same,* notwithstanding the great doctrinal developments that occurred later, because all such developments are simply transitions from the implicit to the explicit, and hence the ancients implicitly believed exactly the same things that we explicitly believe. Says St. Thomas: "The act of the believer does not terminate in the *enunciable* but in the *thing:* for we do not form enunciables except for the purpose of obtaining by their means a knowledge of the things: as in *knowledge* so also in *faith.*"[10]

"And thus it must be said that the object of faith can be considered in two ways: either *in itself,* as it exists *outside the soul,* and it is thus that it *properly* has the *reason of object* and that the habit derives from it *multiplicity* or *unity;* or insofar as it is participated *in the knower.* Consequently, it must be said that if the object of faith, that is, the *thing* believed, is taken as it exists *outside the soul,* then it is *one thing* which is delivered *to us* and *to the ancients:* and thus from the unity of the *thing* faith acquires *unity.* But if it is taken insofar as it exists *in our reception* of it, then it is multiplied *by different enunciables:* but the *faith is not diversified by this diversity.* Hence, it is plain that on all accounts the faith is *one.*"[11]

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[9] ST. THOMAS, *In 3 Sent.*, d.25, q.2, a.2; *Summa Theologica* 2-2, q.1, a.7; De Veritate, q.14, a.12. See also the parallel places.

[10] ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, 2-2, q.1, a.2 ad 2.

[11] ST. THOMAS, *De Veritate,* q.19, a.12 "Whether the faith of present day believers is one with the faith of the ancients."

"Thus, consequently, it must be said that *with respect to the substance* of the articles of faith *there has been no increase of them* with the passage of time, because whatever things are believed by the faithful who came later, *were contained* in the faith of the early Fathers, albeit *implicitly*. But the number of articles *has increased with respect to explication*, because some things are *explicitly* known by those who came later, which those who preceded did not know explicitly."[12]

362. DIFFERENT DEVELOPMENTS. – However, there is an accidental difference between the developments that take place after the Apostles and those that took place before them, though both of them are an explication of the implicit. This is because there are two different kinds of implicitness. There is an implicitness that is objective and true, but so profound that relative to our minds it is as if it were non-existent, since its explicitation and development cannot be effected by our minds alone, but requires a *new revelation*. Such is the implicitness wherewith certain *articles* are contained in other *articles*, and all of them in the two universal articles of faith. Such truths are truly implicit if considered *in themselves*, but not if considered with respect to us. Thus, there was an explication or development of *new articles* in all the time that new revelations were possible; but it ended with Christ and the Apostles, with whom the deposit of revelation was closed: "*This* explication was completed by Christ." Such was the character of dogmatic evolution prior to the Apostles. (313)

363. There is another kind of objective and true implicitness. For its explicitation and development no new revelations are needed, but the reasoning of our minds suffices. Such truths are implicitly contained not only insofar as they are considered *in themselves*, but also insofar as they are considered *with respect to us*. They are not dogmas-articles but dogmas-consequences or derived dogmas. This is the kind of explication or dogmatic evolution that is possible, that has taken place, and will continue to take place after the Apostles: "And *with regard to this* the faith can be explicated *day by day* . . . and has been more and more explicated through the efforts of *the Fathers*."

364. THE TRUE MIND OF ST. THOMAS. – Such is the clear, plain, express mind of the holy Doctor. If many do not see it that way it is because they have had it drilled into their heads by modern textbooks that in those articles St. Thomas was not dealing with the evolution of dogma after the Apostles, but only with its evolution in the Old Testament. To convince them of the contrary we will quote only one passage. Having demonstrated that the

[12] ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, 2-2, q.1, a.7 "Whether the articles of faith increased with the passing of time."

evolution in the Old Testament is homogeneous and that the faith is *one* and the same, since its evolution is simply the unfolding of the implicit, the holy Doctor raises the following objection against himself:

"Fifth objection. Further, this would seem to show that even *now* the articles could be multiplied, for the same reason, with the passage of time: which appears to be false."

The reader will please take note of that "now", which means *now, after the Apostles*. Here is the reply:

"To the fifth it must be said that a thing which is contained *in* an article can be *explicated* in two ways: *one way*, insofar as *one article* is contained *in another*, or two in one common to both, as the resurrection of the dead is somehow contained in Christ's resurrection, and the Passion and the Incarnation in the common one which is the mystery of the Redemption [this is the implicitness of the articles considered *in themselves*, but not *with respect to us*]; and it is in this manner that *implicit* faith is explicated in *determinate* articles, and *this* explication was *completed* by *Christ;* hence, with respect to the *essentials of the faith* [the *articles*] it is not lawful to add or to subtract from his teaching."

Hereto we have the dogmatic explication or evolution of some articles into other articles by means of new revelations. Comes now the explication or evolution after the Apostles, by means of consequences:

"In the *other way*, that which is *contained in* an article is not an article, but something *concomitant* to the article, and *in this regard* the faith can be explicated *day by day*, and has been *more and more explicated* through the efforts of the Fathers [of the councils]."[13]

In the reply *to the fourth* objection the holy Doctor had already told us what he meant by *concomitant to the article:*

"To the fourth it should be said that the article is *an indivisible* truth with respect to what is actually explicated in the article, but *divisible* [explicable or evolvable] with respect to the things that are *potentially* contained in the article, insofar as he who *says* one thing somehow *says* many things: and *these* are the things that *precede the article or are consequent to it:* and *in this regard* the article of faith can be explicated and divided."[13a] "For faith, of itself, sufficiently inclines to *all the things* that *accompany*, or *precede*, or *follow* the faith."[14]

[13] ST. THOMAS, *3 Sent.*, d.25, q.11, a.2, ad 5.

[13a] *Loc. cit.*, ad 4.

[14] *Ibid.*, d.24, q.1, a.2.

Consequently, our faith is *the same* as that of the primitive Church because everything we believe either was explicitly believed by her or is the *implicit consequence* of what she explicitly believed. Such is the solution given by St. Thomas to the first problem concerning the *unity of the faith.*

365. THE SECOND PROBLEM concerning the *constitutive element of heresy* is given the same solution. St. Thomas deals with this problem when he deals with the vices opposed to faith, but he had examined it particularly in the treatise on the Trinity, when dealing with the *divine notions.*[15] This problem was raised by what had happened to Gilbertus Porretanus, a theologian who had maintained certain personal opinions on the divine notions, and had been compelled by the Church to retract himself under pain of *heresy.* Now then, how is *heresy* — and, therefore, *dogma* — possible in matters, such as the question of the divine notions, that are not expressly contained in either the Holy Scripture or Tradition, and concerning which the Fathers of the Church have entertained different opinions?

To this question St. Thomas and all the great schoolmen give the following reply: heresy is nothing but the *corruption* of the faith. Thus, anything that corrupts the faith can become a heresy; and its opposite, can become a *dogma.* Since the faith can be corrupted not only by the denial of what is formally revealed, but also by the denial of the absolutely *necessary consequences* of what is formally revealed, it follows that the Church can condemn as heresy, or define as dogma, anything that is truly *consequential.* Here are some passages from St. Thomas:

"I answer that it should be said that a thing can pertain to the *faith* in two ways. One, directly, as those things that have been principally delivered to us by God . . . But *indirectly* all those things pertain to the faith *from the denial of which there follows something contrary to the faith.*"[16]

"I answer that it should be said that we now speak of *heresy* insofar as it introduces the *corruption of the Christian faith* . . . To which a thing belongs in *two ways:* first, *directly* and principally, as the articles of faith; second, *indirectly* and secondarily, as *those things from which there follows the corruption of an article;* and *heresy,* as well as *faith,* can take place with respect to *both.*[17]

[15] ST. THOMAS, *In 1 Sent.*, d.32, q.1, a.5; *In 4 Sent.*, d.13, q.2, a.1; *Summa Theol.*, p.1, q.32, a.4, and 2-2, q.11, a.2.

[16] ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.1, q.32, a.4.

[17] *Op.cit.*, 2-2, q.11, a.2.

"The *same* judgment applies to the *latter* [the *indirectly* revealed] as well as to the *former* [*the directly* revealed] *since* the one is *followed* by the other."[18]

"For *certain things* are contained in the *faith* of the Church as *conclusions* in the principles."[19]

"*And on this account* many things are now considered heretical that were not previously thus considered, because it is now more evident *what follows from them.*"[20]

"Thus, a man is made a *heretic* through the pertinaciousness wherewith he disdains to submit himself to the Church's judgment *in the things that pertain to the faith* DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY."[21]

Hence, for St. Thomas these two things are equal in dogmatic value: a) the directly or formally revealed; b) the indirectly or virtually revealed, *if the Church defines it.* That is, clearly, our teaching on dogmatic evolution by way of implicit virtuality defined by the Church. (466-469)

Section III
THE TEACHING OF THEOLOGIANS ON THE EVOLUTION OF DOGMA FROM ST. THOMAS TO MOLINA

366. IN THE THREE LONG CENTURIES from St. Thomas to the end of the 16th century, there has been not one theologian who has denied the evolution of dogma by way of rigorous and proper theological conclusion. At least, we have not come upon one notwithstanding the fact that during these last twelve years we have eagerly read all the theologians of that period that we could lay our hands on.

It would be an endless task to quote passages from all the theologians who maintain such a view. In order to avoid prolixity, we will limit ourselves to quoting those theologians who can provide us with a passage that is brief but sufficiently revelatory of its author's mind. For the sake of order we will proceed by centuries.

A. 13th Century

367. ST. BONAVENTURE. — "Whether it be lawful to have a contrary opinion about the notions? I answer that it should be said that one can have

[18] ST THOMAS, *In 1 Sent.*, d.33, q.1, a.5.

[19] ST. THOMAS, *In 4 Sent.*, d.13, q.2, a.1, ad 6.

[20] ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.1, q.33, a.1.

[21] ST. THOMAS, *In 1 ad Cor.*, c.11, lect.4.

a contrary opinion either about things that concern the *doctrine of the Christian religion,* or about things that concern the *doctrine of human investigation.*

"It is lawful to hold a contrary opinion about the things that concern the *doctrine of human investigation,* since these *have no bearing on salvation.*

"But a *distinction must be drawn* relative to asserting the contrary in things that concern the *doctrine of religion.* For some things pertain to the *necessity of the faith,* others to the *necessity of the Scriptures,* and others are *annexed to these two,* as those things that contribute to the *explication of the faith* and the *exposition of the Scriptures.*

"With respect to the things that pertain to the *necessity of the faith,* to hold a contrary opinion is simply speaking (simpliciter) a sin, that is, in the one who opines falsely. And if it be a simple opinion, it is a sin of error; but if it be an assertion and defense, it is to be considered not only an *error,* but a *heresy.*

"Now, with respect to the things that pertain to the *necessity of the Scriptures,* those who are ignorant of the Scriptures may, without sinning, opine the contrary, as, for instance, if a simple man believes that Jacob was the father of Isaac, and another does not, but believes the converse. Now, the former, notwithstanding that he imagines or opines something false, does not sin because he is ignorant of the Scriptures. But this is not lawful in the case of one who knows the Scriptures, on the contrary, he sins, if he should hold it as a simple opinion. And if he should defend it, he is to be considered a *heretic* because he contradicts the Holy Scripture."

Now comes the important thing, that is, the passage concerning theological conclusions. The Saint goes on to say:

"But with regard to those things that are *annexed to the faith or to the Scriptures,* either one opinion is *consequent* to the faith or to the Scriptures whereas the *opposite* is consequent to the other opinion, and in such a case it should be said that, *before a thorough examination* of the matter, it is allowable to opine the contrary, but not *after its thorough examination;* on the contrary, *it is a sin* [that is, a sin of *heresy*], *as in the case of matters* that are *determined by faith or by the Scriptures.* As for instance the opinion of Porretanus about the properties . . . Hence after he had been shown its inconsistency, the Church would have judged him a *heretic* if he had not retracted his error. But he did retract it in the Council of Rheims, as St. Bernard says."[22]

[22] ST. BONAVENTURE, *In 1 Sent.*, d.27, q.6.

368. Although we did say that we would quote only a brief passage from each theologian – and we will do so with respect to almost all the theologians that follow – we found it hard to resist quoting almost in its entirety the foregoing article from St. Bonaventure in order to make it plain that by *the indirectly* revealed or the consequential the Saint meant not only the secondary items of the Holy Scriptures, as many think, but also everything that is truly consequential, and that such a consequential truth is of divine faith, and its denial a heresy, once it is defined by the Church: *after a thorough examination in the council.* This becomes even plainer in the following passages from the same holy Doctor.

"In order to understand the foregoing, it should be noted that the *doctrine of faith* has some things as antecedent, others as consequent, and others as principles or objects. As, for instance, in the case of the other *sciences,* we find that there are some common principles which are presupposed, as the dignities; whereas some are intrinsic principles of *demonstrations;* but some things are as *consequents,* as the *corollary conclusions. So, too, in the doctrine of faith* the antecedents are those things which are dictated by the natural law. Now, the principles are those things to which the illumination of faith *directly* leads, and these are called the articles. But the *consequents* are *those things that can be gathered from the articles and have it in them to follow in the wake of such articles.*"[23]

He speaks no less plainly in the same place in reply to an objection, in these terms:

"To the objection raised that there are many things which are *to be believed,* and which are not contained in the articles, it should be said that this is true of the antecedents, as that God exists. And also of the *consequents,* as the many things that Holy Scripture and *theological teaching draw out from the articles themselves,* as that Christ had the fulness of grace *from the moment of his conception,* and *others similar to these.*"[24] We believe that nothing could be clearer for anyone conversant with the language of the ancient theologians.

369. A LUMINOUS COMMENTARY. – Finally, it will not be redundant to adduce in confirmation the commentary appended by the learned editors of the great modern edition of the works of St. Bonaventure. Commenting on the article in which St. Bonaventure deals with the question: "Whether the faith has grown with respect to the multitude of things to be believed", they say as follows:

[23] ST. BONAVENTURE, In 3 Sent., d.25, q.1, a.1.

[24] *Loc. cit.*

"In this question and those that follow, St. Bonaventure insinuates a *twofold way* in which something is contained in an article, viz., *either* that in which *other articles,* which are subsequently to be believed determinately, are virtually contained in one article, as the Passion and the Death of Christ in the mystery of the Redemption; *or* that in which, not indeed another article is contained in one article, but something is contained in it *as a conclusion.* Cf. St. Thomas this same place, q.2, a.2, questiuncula 1, ad 5. Thus, the substance of faith remaining the same the number of *articles* to be believed also grew by explication: but this explication, that is, as understood in the first way, was completed in the Gospel. But taken in the *other sense* [that is, as that which is contained in the article *as a conclusion*], the explication of the faith can grow both in individual men and in the whole Church. This is taught by the Vatican Council:[25] *Let it, then, grow,* etc. Cf. also this same place, q.2, 3, and dub. 1."[26]

370. COROLLARY. – Consequently, those who say that the doctrine of dogmatic evolution by way of theological conclusion began with Scotus either have read neither St. Thomas nor St. Bonaventure, or have glanced through them in a hurry. But it seems to us more probable that they have read them having in mind the notion that the term conclusion stands for the *non implicit* conclusion (the type 4 virtual, or Suárez's *merely virtual*), and since St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure clearly take the term in the sense of implicit conclusions – and thus describe such conclusions as growth *of explication*, – some modern theologians take it that they were not speaking of proper but of improper conclusions, whereas, as a matter of fact, only the implicit conclusions are properly theological conclusions.

371. AEGIDIUS ROMANUS. – The great Augustinian theologian and disciple of the Angelic Doctor, Aegidius Romanus, expresses himself in exactly the same vein as St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure, as follows:

"Whether it is allowable to opine the contrary about the notions? ... Objection 2: Further, from an error about the notions *there follows* an error about the divine persons; but an error against the divine persons is not without sin. Consequently, since it is necessary that one of two contrary positions be false, to opine the contrary about the notions cannot be without sin.

"To the second, it should be said that one can err about divine things, provided that he does not contradict the articles of faith or the truths that have been determined by the Church, even granting that from what he says a *conclusion* can be drawn contrary to the articles of faith or to the truths held

[25] *De Fide et Ratione,* c.4.

[26] Ed. *Operum Sti. Bonaventurae* (Quaracchi 1887); *In 3 Sent.*, d.3, a.1, q.2.

by Church, but on condition that he himself be ignorant of *such a deduction.* However, if the deduction is made to him, and he is shown that what he says contradicts what the Church holds, then, if he does not relinquish his position, he sins by thus erring, and were he *pertinaciously* to assert his error, he *would be a heretic.*"[27]

372. DUNS SCOTUS. – Let us come now to the great theologian, St. Thomas's worthy rival, who shares with St. Bonaventure the leadership of the illustrious Franciscan school. On this subject we find in him exactly the same doctrine we have just seen in St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, and Aegidius Romanus.

"Whether it is allowable to opine the contrary about the notions? I answer that it should be said that it is allowable to opine in different ways about the notions, but this must be done soberly in such a manner that one should be ready to relinquish one's opinion if the Church should declare otherwise.

"To make this plain, it should be borne in mind that *certain things* pertain to the *substance of the faith* in so absolute a manner (ita simpliciter) that everyone, including the simple faithful, provided that they have the use of reason, is bound to believe them explicitly ...

"Certain *other things* likewise pertain to the *substance of the faith,* but are to be believed explicitly only by the elders in the Church ...

"Finally, there are *other things* that regard *the faith* in such a manner that neither the simple faithful nor the elders in the Church are bound to believe them explicitly; and of such kind are *many conclusions necessarily included in the articles held by faith,* for no one is bound to believe them explicitly *before they are declared and proposed by the Church as an object of faith* ...

"Now, the question about the number of the notions belongs and has regard to the order of *conclusions virtually included in the articles of faith,* and therefore, anyone may licitly hold a contrary opinion thereof; this is plain from the fact that even among the principal Doctors of the Church there have been various opinions about the notions without any mark or suspicion of error."[28]

"Nothing is to be asserted as pertaining to the truth of faith, except what is delivered in the Scriptures, or avowed by the universal Church, or

[27] AEGIDIUS ROMANUS, *In 1 Sent.*, d.33, q.6.

[28] VEN. IOAN. DUNS SCOTI, *Summa Theologica per Ioannem Montefortinum,* p. 1, q. 32, a.4.

necessarily and evidently follows from either of these two thus delivered or avowed."[29]

"To the other [objection] taken from Cyprian I say that *some things* are of the substance of the faith, which everyone, including the simple faithful, are bound explicitly to believe . . . *Other things* are explicitly required as of the substance of the faith, to be observed by the elders of the Church . . . There are *other things* that are not necessarily to be believed explicitly either by the latter or by the former, because their truth has not yet been declared and determined by the Church; of this kind are many *conclusions necessarily included* in the articles held by faith, but before they are declared and explicated by the Church it is not necessary for anyone to believe them, but it is necessary to opine about them with sobriety, that is to say, in such a manner that one should be ready to hold them as soon as the truth is declared."[30]

"Nothing is to be maintained as of the substance of the faith, except what can be expressly had from the Scriptures, or is expressly declared by the Church, or *evidently follows* from something plainly contained in the Scriptures or plainly determined by the Church."[31]

We could quote various other theologians of the 13th century, but we believe that the four already quoted – the founders of the three great schools of theology: the Dominican, the Franciscan, and the Augustinian – are sufficient to show that the doctrine of dogmatic evolution by way of theological conclusion was already an accepted and common teaching among the masters of scholastic theology in the 13th century.

B. 14th and 15th Centuries

373. TWO CENTURIES TOGETHER. – We group these two centuries together because there are not many theologians of true merit to be found in them, especially in the 14th century. Ockham's nominalism on the one hand, and on the other the regrettable and prolonged schism of the West produced a decline in theological studies or plunged them into useless dialectical subtleties. We will quote eight theologians, among whom we find some men of great renown and indisputable worth such as Gerson, Dionisius Carthusianus, Cardinal Torquemada, and especially Capreolus. Without exception, all the theologians of these two centuries that we have been able to peruse, teach, as their 13th century colleagues, the evolution of dogma by way of theological conclusion in the proper sense. Some of them, however, being more or less tainted by nominalism, do not distinguish sufficiently between the habits of theology and faith, and consequently between the theological conclusion before and after its definition by the Church. Although Ockham precedes Aureolus by some years, we will begin by the latter because he deals with the problem ex professo and at greater length.

[29] IOANNIS DUNS SCOTI, *Opera Omnia; In 1 Sent.*, d.26, n.26; ed. Vivès, t.10, p.316.

[30] IOANNIS DUNS SCOTI, *In 4 Sent.*, d.5, q.1, n.6 ad 5; *ed. cit.*, t.16 pp. 404-405.

[31] *Ibid.*, d.11, q.3, n.5.

374. PETER AUREOLUS. – "Whenever we proceed from one proposition of faith and another necessary proposition, or from two propositions that are both of faith, in order to find out what is to be held with regard to something that is doubtful in the faith, no other habit is acquired but *faith*. Now, that habit truly is faith, the opposite of which is *heresy*. But the opposite of the conclusion deduced from an article and a necessary proposition is *heretical*, as, e.g., to say that in Christ there are not two wills, which indeed follows from the article that says that 'in Christ there are two wills'*, viz., the divine and the human, and from this necessary proposition, 'Every intellectual nature has its own will'. Therefore such a *conclusion* is also held by *faith*, and such a deduction does not generate another habit distinct from faith.

"Besides, the *implicit* and *explicit* do not diversify the habit of faith; otherwise, the faith of the Fathers of the Old and of the New Testament would not be the same. Still more, to believe a *bigger* or a *lesser* number of things does not diversify the faith; otherwise, the priest who is bound to believe explicitly more would not have the same faith as the old woman who is bound to less. But the *conclusion* deduced in the aforesaid manner is merely *explicitated* from a previous article in which it was *implicit;* and further, the man who has the deduction of this conclusion does not on such account believe more things than another. Therefore, this does not preclude the fact that such a conclusion is known by faith."[32]

375. WILLIAM OCKHAM. – "Only such truths are to be considered Catholic truths and such that their belief is necessary for salvation, that are *explicitly* or *implicitly* asserted in the canon of the Bible, in such a manner that if some truths are not contained in the Bible under their own proper terms, they can be inferred from the sole contents of the Bible by a *necessary and formal consequence*."[33]

376. COMMENTARY TO THESE TWO PASSAGES. – It is plain that these two theologians of the 14th century – both nominalists, as various others of the 15th century whom we will meet later – are so far from deny-

*Sic. Clearly, what is meant is not "wills" but *natures*. – Transl.

[32] PETRUS AUREOLUS, *In 1 Sent.*, prol., p.11 (Romae 1596).

[33] *Dialogus inter Magistrum et Discipulum*, p.1, lib.2, c.1 (Lugduni 1494)

ing the evolution of dogma by way of conclusion, that they defend it to excess. They see that the theological conclusion is truly *implicit* in the revealed deposit, which suffices for their *definability* as of faith or for the possibility of dogmatic evolution and this leads them to think that the mere explication of such implicitness by human reasoning makes it a dogmatic truth or truth of faith. They overlook the fact that the explication by reason is a human explication, and thus belongs to a human or theological habit, so long as the divine explication made through the Church's definition does not intervene.

377. JOHN GERSON. – "The first degree of truths to be believed is the canon of the whole Holy Scripture and of every single thing literally asserted in it. The second degree is the truths determined by the Church... The third degree is the truths specially revealed to some people, which must without the least hesitation be believed by those to whom their revelation was made... The fourth degree contains each and all the truths *that are concluded from the preceding truths by a certain consequence* through the light of faith [from two revealed premises] or through evident natural light [from one revealed premise and another of reason], even if they are not contained therein under their own proper terms. For instance, this truth is to be believed as necessary for salvation, viz., that Christ had sinews and veins, even if it is not contained in the Holy Scripture under these proper terms. And thus of *countless other similar propositions.* For this is an evident consequence, not just in the light of faith, but in the light of reason among philosophers: 'Christ is true man; therefore, Christ had sinews and veins.'"[34]

378. JOHN CAPREOLUS. – Called "the Prince of Thomists", because chronologically he was the first of the great commentators of St. Thomas in print, it was impossible for him not to defend both the characteristic *implicitness* of every truly theological conclusion in the revealed deposit, which is the foundation of dogmatic evolution, and the specific distinction between the habits of faith and theology, without which one can only end in the confusion between reason and faith, and between the human value of reasoning and the divine value of the Church's dogmatic definitions.

Taking his stand precisely on the implicitness of such conclusions, Scotus had denied, or had not distinguished sufficiently between the habit of theology and the habit of faith. Capreolus replies in the following terms:

"To the fourth we say that although the Bible does not proceed in the manner of a demonstrative science, nonetheless, from the things contained in the Bible, which are as the *principles of science,* the Fathers have demonstratively inferred *conclusions with which theology is concerned,* by arguing against the *heretics* from the principles of theology. And thus, even if in the sacred canon *theology* is not delivered in explicitly syllogistic style, nonetheless, in the books of subsequent theologians it is delivered explicitly in a scientific and scholarly manner. However, *all such things* are IMPLICITLY contained in the Bible."[35]

[34] *Opera Ioannis Gersonii,* p.1, tit.14 "Quae veritates sint credendae de necessitate salutis." [What truths are necessarily to be believed for salvation]. (Basileae 1517)

Elsewhere (351) we have observed that every thologian ought to engrave in his mind this truly memorable phrase of the Prince of Thomists: "However, *all such things* [that is, every truly theological conclusion] *are implicitly contained in the Bible."* Since every truly theological conclusion is truly *implicit* in the revealed deposit or premise of faith, its definition by the Church is merely the *explication* of the faith, as St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, and Scotus repeatedly observe.

379. CARDINAL TORQUEMADA. – After the Prince of Thomists comes the renowned Cardinal Torquemada who was the founder or the first organizer of the modern treatise *On the Church* [Ecclesiology]. Let us quote at least two passages:

"*Catholic truth* is that which is had *immediately* or *mediately* by the supernatural light of divine revelation, either explicitly under its own proper terms, *or implicitly through a good and necessary consequence*... For these are the two ways in which something is said to be contained in the Holy Scripture: either under its own proper terms, as 'Christ was a man'; or else something is therein *implicitly, viz.,* that which follows by a good and *necessary consequence* from the things formally placed in the Holy Scripture. For instance, from the proposition 'Christ was a man' [a *perfect* man] it follows that he had a rational soul, an agent and a possible intellect and all the powers of the soul. Likewise, that in his body they were sinews and veins and such other things. And yet none of these things is found under such proper terms in the Holy Scripture."[36]

The reader will please observe that both Torquemada and Capreolus not only employ the term *implicit* but also categorically explain what is meant by implicit when it is used in connection with being contained in the revealed deposit. "*Implicitly, namely,* that which follows by a good and *necessary consequence* from the things formally placed in the Holy Scripture." It is exactly the same formula employed later by Cardinal Cajetan and Báñez. (383, 396).

380. DIONISIUS CARTHUSIANUS. – The celebrated Ecstatic Doctor, Dionisius Carthusianus, well deserves to be cited together with

[35] IOANNES CAPREOLUS, *In 1 Sent.,* prol. q.1, a.2, solutiones ad argumenta contra quintam conclusionem; ed. Paban-Pègues, t.1, p.17.

[36] *Summa de Ecclesia,* p.2, lib.4, c.8.

Cardinal Torquemada. Although very well known on account of his scriptural and ascetic works, he is not so well known, or at least not quoted as much as he deserves, for his works on dogmatic theology. His commentaries on the four books of the *Sentences*, and his *Summa Fidei Orthodoxae* which he subtitled "Medulla Operum D. Thomae" (The Marrow of the Works of St. Thomas) are most noteworthy on account of the clarity and faithfulness with which he expresses the pure doctrine of St. Thomas. Let us quote some passages on the matter with which we are now dealing:

"Whether it is allowable to opine otherwise about the notions in God? A thing belongs to the faith in two ways, viz., *directly*, as the articles of faith . . . Secondly, a thing belongs to the faith *indirectly*, that is to say, those things *from which there follows* something contrary to the faith . . . Now with respect to such [the indirect] it is allowable to opine otherwise with no danger of heresy *before it is determined* that there follows from it something against the faith: for, if *after such determination*, particularly that which is made by the Church, one opines otherwise, heresy is incurrred. Hence, many things are now considered heretical, which were not heretical before, because of a new determination of the Church, or because now it is more plain *what does follow from them*."[37]

In book 3, article 4, of the same work he deals with "How the faith is said to have grown with the passage of time", and solves the issue by resuming St. Thomas in almost his own words. What deserves to be pointed out is the use of the term *virtually* as synonymous to *implicitly*, which goes to show that when the ancients spoke of virtuality they always meant implicit virtuality. As for instance, in the following text: "Thus, some articles of faith are *virtually* contained in others: for in the belief of the Redemption of men are *implicitly* included the Incarnation, the Passion, the Resurrection, and others such."[38]

Let us conclude with another similar text: "Objection: it seems unlawful to add anything to the Scriptures of either Testament . . . To these St. Thomas replies: to add to the Scriptures happens in two ways: first, by adding something that is contrary or diverse, and this is erroneous or presumptuous. Secondly, by explicating more clearly that which is contained in the Scriptures implicitly, and this is praiseworthy. Hence, Richard: Nothing is to be added that is dissimilar or inconsistent, but that which is true can be added for its explanation. And perhaps this is not properly to add, but to explicate and make plain what is implicit: for that which is true and valid for the exposition of Holy Scripture is implicitly and virtually contained in it."[39]

[37] DYONISII CARTHUSIANI *Summa Fidei Orthodoxae*, lib. 1, a.43. *Opera Omnia* (Monstrolii 1899) t.17, p.48.

[38] *Op. cit.*, pg. 339.

381. GABRIEL BIEL. – Let us close the 14th and 15th centuries, so deficient in great theologians, with the nominalist Gabriel Biel, who died in 1495. "*Implicit* faith", he writes, "is habitual faith or the actual assent to a general proposition that *includes* in itself many particular propositions. A universal or general proposition is said to *include* all those particular propositions *that can be inferred from it, immediately or mediately* through an assumed truth."[40]

It is thus plain that all the theologians of the 14th and 15th centuries persist in considering – with St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, and Scotus – all conclusions in the proper sense as *definable* as of divine faith, and hence, as capable of dogmatic evolution. The only difference is that the theologians of Scotist or nominalist affiliation confuse, or do not draw a sufficient distinction between the habit of theology and the habit of faith, or between the conclusions prior to the Church's definition, and the conclusions after the definition, considering such conclusions as pertaining to faith of themselves (per se) or without any definition.

C. 16th Century

382. LET US NOW COME TO THE 16th CENTURY, the golden century of the restoration of Catholic theology. In this century the great geniuses of the 13th century find at last worthy commentators and continuators of their achievements.

Among the theologians of this period that we have examined there are thirteen who deal with the question of the evolution of dogma or the definability of the revealed virtuality. They include such glorious names as Cardinal Cajetan, Melchor Cano, Domingo Soto, Ambrose Catarinus, Bartolomé de Medina, Domingo Báñez and Paolo Crisaldi, of the Dominican school; Alfonso de Castro, Andrés de Vega and Antonio de Córdoba of the Franciscan school; Luis de León, of the Augustinian school; Cardinal Toledo, of the recently founded Society of Jesus, and bishops Santiago Simancas and Bartolomé de Torres, of the secular clergy. Together they worthily represent all the schools or trends of Catholic theology in the 16th century. Let us begin with the Prince of the commentators of St. Thomas.[41]

[39] *In 1 Sent.*, prol.,; *ed. cit.*, t.18, pg.52

[40] *Collectorium in 4 Libros Sententiarum*, lib.3, d.24, dub.3.

[41] "*Cajetan*, who I dare say is the *most outstanding of our family* in acumen and erudition." (CANO, *De Locis*, 12, 5)

"Indeed, *so great* is Cajetan's *authority* in explaining the doctrine of Aquinas, so great his dexterity and keenness of mind that the Supreme Pontiff Leo XIII did not

383. CARDINAL CAJETAN. – Every theologian knows that Cardinal Cajetan wrote an opusculum on the Immaculate Conception addressed to Pope Leo X, when the Pope was endeavouring to examine in the ecumenical Council of Lateran the definability of the Immaculate Conception as a truth of faith.

In this little work Cajetan had the opportunity to investigate ex professo what things are, and what things are not, definable as of divine faith. He devotes chapter 1 to this problem, with this title: "On Two Ways of Discerning What Things are of the Faith, or What Things are Opposed to it". Cajetan writes:

"There are two ways whereby *what is to be believed* may be determined for the Christian religion. One is the ordinary; the other, the extraordinary way. The ordinary way is divine revelation delivered in the first place to the authors of the Holy Scripture, contained in the canonical books of the Bible, the traditions of the Apostles, in the Symbol and in other things which it is clear that the Church has received through the Apostles, as the sacraments . . . [Here comes the important part] And it *makes no difference whether a thing has been revealed explicitly,* in the Holy Scripture and other sources, (as the creation of the world, the Incarnation of the Word of God, and others similar to these), or *implicitly,* as *all those things the opposite of which cannot be maintained together with the truth of the Holy Scripture and of other things which we hold by faith,* except that talent, effort, reason and understanding are required in order to make it plain that these things *that are said to be* IMPLICITLY *contained* are NECESSARILY CONNECTED with those things in which they are said to be contained."[42]

We would ask every reader, and especially every Thomist reader, to read and reread dispassionately the aforegoing passage from Cajetan. It will be obvious that it clearly teaches that which constitutes the basis and the backbone of dogmatic evolution, to wit, that every and any thing truly *implicit* in the revealed deposit can be defined as a dogma of faith, and that everything that is necessarily connected with the revealed deposit is truly implicit in it. *Implicitly, as all those things the opposite of which cannot be maintained together with the truth of the Holy Scripture and of the other things which*

hesitate to proclaim him the most illustrious interpreter of St. Thomas, through whose lucubrations the teaching of so great a man flows as through copious streams." (Lit. Apost. year 1880) "Prior to Leo XIII, Cajetan's teaching and admirable acumen were extolled by Cardinal Pallavicini (*Vird. Soc. Iesu,* c.26), himself a man outstanding in every sort of erudition, who wrote as follows: 'Cajetan, the Lyceum's *first glory* in the past century and, so to speak, the only *one among au* who amplified with most accomplished commentaries that divine *Summa* of human wisdom'." (MICHAEL DE MARIA, S.J., prol. in ed. opusculi *De Ente et Essentia,* pg. 4; Romae 1907).

[42] CAJETAN, *De Conceptione Virginis,* c.1 (Venetiis 1594), fol. 71 over.

we hold by faith . . .; those things are said to be implicitly contained that are necessarily connected with the things in which they are said to be contained. No clearer definition can be given of implicit containment.

384. THE HUMAN LABOUR OF THE CHURCH. – The reader will also find in this passage a clear exposition of what constitutes the human labour of the Church previous to the definition. Intellectual labour is required, one that is exacting and that at times spans whole centuries. *Talent, effort, reason, and understanding are required.* For what? There are many who are satisfied with this reply: to find out if the truth proposed for definition is *implicit* or not in the revealed deposit. That is true, and Cardinal Cajetan admits it. But these theologians overlook the fact that the medium employed by the Church in order to find out if a truth is *implicit* in the deposit is to see if it is *necessarily connected* with it: "Talent, effort, reason, and understanding are required *in order to make it plain* that these things that are said to be implicitly contained *are necessarily connected* with those things in which they are said to be contained." Such is the purpose of the labour of the Church. This labour is accomplished in the council or has been previously accomplished by the Fathers whose texts are adduced by the Council. It suffices to make the definition of faith possible. The instrument employed is the *connexion,* but the thing found and defined is the *implicit containment* or inclusion. Hence, *absolutely necessary connexion* with the revealed, *implicitness* in the revealed, and *definability* as of divine faith, all amount to the same thing. This is the Thomist doctrine that Cajetan inherited from his predecessors, and which is found in almost all Thomists who succeeded him until the Salmanticenses got themselves entangled in the confusion spawned by Suárez and Lugo and passed on this same confusion to some later Thomists.

385. ALFONSO DE CASTRO. – After the Dominican Cajetan, let us hear the Franciscan Castro. The following is taken from his famous work *Adversus Haereses:*

"Thus the proposition that contradicts the Holy Scripture, understood in the sense accepted by the Catholic Church, is to be considered *heretical* beyond all dispute. *Nor should any account be taken* of whether it contradicts openly or *hiddenly;* for howsoever the contradiction takes place, it deserves to be marked as heretical. For there are some heresies the contraries or contradictories of which are *expressed* in the Holy Scripture . . . There are also other heresies the contraries or contradictories of which, although not expressed in the Holy Writings in such a manner as to be found there under such tenor of words, nonetheless, are *inferred from them by the plainest consequence,* and such assertions are in *hidden* opposition to the Holy Scripture because the Holy Scripture is opposed to the things that are *necessarily derived* from them. And such propositions are also to be considered heretical, just as the former: for those things that are inferred *by a necessary*

consequence from what is contained in the Holy Scripture, have as much certainty of truth and necessity of faith as the things *from which they are inferred* . . . This opinion is taught by Gregory Nazianzen, 5th book of theology, in these terms: 'The things that are gathered from the Holy Scriptures are to be considered as if they were written therein.' Thus Gregory. In accordance with this rule, the holy Doctors assert and *most firmly proclaim* many things as necessary objects of belief, because they are *gathered* from what the Holy Scriptures say, although they are not found in them."[43]

This text not only clearly defends the evolution of dogma by way of a truly theological conclusion, but also interprets in this sense the passage from Gregory Nazianzen we have already quoted (357).

386. DOMINGO SOTO. – Leaving Melchor Cano aside for the moment, since we will be speaking of him in a separate section (449), we come to his confrere in religion and fellow professor at Salamanca, the renowned Domingo Soto.

It is well known that Domingo Soto not only defended the view that the properly theological conclusion is definable as of faith, but went so far as to regard it as being of itself (per se), that is to say, independently of the Church's definition, an object of faith. If the evident conclusions pertained *per se* to the faith, then theology was left with only the probable or doubtful conclusions. This view of Domingo Soto was impugned by Melchor Cano, Báñez and all the Thomists.[44]

However, Soto corrected or explained himself in his classic work *De Natura et Gratia* where, while admitting that theological conclusions or

[43] *De Punitione Haereticorum,* lib.1, c.4; *Opera Omnia* (Parisiis 1578) pg.27.

[44] "Theological assent is gathered from the articles of faith, and furthermore not through an *evident consequence;* for those that are deduced by such a consequence, the same are assents of faith . . . [Theological assent] cannot be said to be faith, since faith is an assent had immediately on authority alone, or *which is thence evidently deduced,* as e.g., Christ is man and, therefore, risible." (DOMINICUS SOTO, *In Dialecticam Aristotelis Commentarii,* p.1, q.2, ad 7; Salmanticae 1574, pg.91) "To the third argument the very learned Master Friar Domingo de Soto (lib.1 *Poster.,* q.2) says that when a conclusion is deduced from principles of faith by an evident consequence, then the conclusion itself is likewise *certain according to faith* . . . However, this opinion is *false* . . . Similarly, what he says is *false,* to wit, 'likewise it is of faith that Christ is man and that Christ is risible.' For if there be anyone who confesses that Christ is a perfect man, but denies that he is risible because he thinks that risibility does not belong to the perfection of man, such a one would be a bad philosopher but *not yet a heretic,* since *up to now* the Church has not defined that Christ is risible. But if it were defined by the Church that risibility belongs to the perfection of human nature, *then he who denies it would be a heretic."* (BAÑEZ, *In 1 partem D. Thomae,* q.1, a.2, ad 3um argumentum; Salmanticae 1585, pg.53). Melchor Cano, too, refutes Soto but without naming him, since both were teaching together at Salamanca. Cano's rebuttal will be quoted further on when we come to deal with Cano's mind (455).

deductions are definable as of faith, he observes that they are of faith *only* when they are defined *by the Church's authority.* He writes:

"The third is that which we have already worked out previously in several places. For a habit does not generate assent except about its own proper object (this is a most celebrated axiom among all philosophers as well as theologians); now the *object* or intention of *faith* is nothing else but God and those things pertaining to our hope that are *revealed* in the Holy Scripture, or therefrom *by the authority of the Church deduced* and expressed. Therefore, *only* of such is the assent of faith."[45]

Thus, if Domingo Soto sinned by excess anywhere in this matter, it was certainly not by curtailing dogmatic evolution but by broadening its scope excessively, an excess which he subsequently corrected, explaining himself in the same manner as all Thomists.

387. AMBROSE CATARINUS. – Along with Domingo Soto let us quote the famous Ambrose Catarinus, his irreconcilable and choleric opponent on several quetions. Famous, we say, not only for being original and peculiar in many questions, but also because, being a Dominican, he seemed to take pleasure in assailing preferably the opinions of his religious confreres. Nonetheless, in the matter of the definability of conclusions as of divine faith he follows the traditional doctrine.

"I, therefore, conclude that just as he is a heretic, not only who denies what is *expressed* in the Scriptures, but also who denies that which is contained in what is expressed and is *therefrom deduced by a necessary and evident consequence;* so, too, he is a prevaricator of *divine* law, not only who transgresses what is therein expressly enjoined, but also who neglects what is *therefrom evidently deduced."*[46]

388. ANDRES DE VEGA. – It was not necessary to quote this Franciscan theologian since all textbooks cite his name along with Vázquez as a defender of the view that conclusions in the proper sense of the term are definable as of faith. However, we believe that it will please the reader to see for himself the rarely quoted passage in which he defends his opinions as follows:

"There are many propositions of faith that cannot be shown to be of faith by any other means except the fact that *they evidently follow from what is held by faith, at least when coupled with some other proposition that*

[45] DOMINICUS SOTO, *De Natura et Gratia,* lib. 3, c.11, (Venetiae 1547) pg.210.

[46] *Tractatus quaestionis quo iure episcoporum residentia debeatur,* an opuscule by Catarinus published in the opus entitled *De Summi Pontificis Auctoritate, gravissimorum Auctorum Opuscula* (Venetiis 1562) vol.1, pg.15 over.

is evident according to the natural light. And this can be plainly shown in the case of many propositions about God and Christ, which are for this reason accepted by all the faithful as certain, and their opposites as heretical, as in the case of the following propositions: God is incorporeal, God is immaterial, God is a being of infinite power; Christ has a heart; Christ has phlegm, Christ is in both species of the Sacrament of the Eucharist with his body and with his soul and everything that is contained in them, Christ is under both species of bread and wine without the substance of the bread and the wine; and such others as are similar. For these propositions are not expressed in the Holy Scriptures, but *are evidently deduced from those contained therein, at least when coupled with a proposition that is evident according to the natural light.*"[47]

The reader will have noticed in this passage from Vega the same defect we have already pointed out in almost every theologian of Scotist or nominalist affiliation. They are all for dogmatic evolution, but excessively so, for they all regard it as dogmatic or of divine faith without drawing any distinction between before and after the Church's definition.

389. ANTONIO DE CÓRDOBA. – Together with Andrés de Vega we will quote his fellow religious Antonio de Córdoba who defends the evolution of dogma by way of conclusion with no less lucidity and with the same defect.

"A proposition of Catholic faith or a Catholic truth is a proposition or truth that is revealed *immediately* or *mediately*. What is called here an immediately or a mediately revealed truth is called by others a truth that is revealed *in itself*, or *in its antecedent*... Now a truth revealed *mediately*, or in its antecedent, is one that is inferred from the aforesaid Catholic truths, that are revealed in themselves or immediately, by a good, certain and necessary consequence, in the light of faith [from two revealed premises] or in the natural light [coupled with a premise of reason], although such a truth is not contained in the Holy Scriptures under its own proper form, as, e.g., that Christ had sinews, and blood, and other humours, bones and veins, and the like. And to this kind belong *almost all the determinations and definitions of the Councils* and of the Supreme Pontiffs, in matters, that is, of faith and morals, which are *deduced from the Holy Scriptures in the aforesaid manner*, and are proposed to all as truths of necessary belief."[48]

This learned Franciscan does not stop short of qualifying as mediately revealed *almost all the definitions of the Councils*. St. Thomas did not say

[47] *Tridentini Decreti de Iustificatione Expositio et Defensio* (Compluti 1564).

[48] *Opera Antonii Cordubensis, Ord. Minorum*, lib.1, q.15, (Venetiis 1569) pgs. 146-149.

almost all, but contented himself with saying *many:* "And on this account *many* things are now considered heretical, that were not so considered before, because it is now more manifest *what does follow from them.*"[49]

390. BARTOLOMÉ DE TORRES. – Keeping to the chronological sequence, let us now quote a commentator of St. Thomas from the ranks of the secular clergy, first-rank professor (catedrático primario) of the University of Siguenza in Spain, and bishop of the Canaries. Commenting on the hitherto frequently cited article of St. Thomas, "Whether it is Allowable to Hold a Contrary Opinion about the Notions", he says:

"Now, then, St. Thomas, after premitting a division of the credibles, establishes two conclusions. The division, clearly, is as follows: The credibles are of two kinds: there are some that belong *directly*, and some that belong *indirectly* to the faith. Now, they belong directly to the faith that are principally delivered to us by God ... And they attain *indirectly* to the faith that are not chiefly proposed to us for belief, however *from their opposites there follows something contrary to the faith.* Having premitted this division, St. Thomas's first conclusion is: To assert *pertinaciously* something false which is contrary to that which *directly* pertains to the faith, is heretical. The second conclusion: To assert, but *not pertinaciously*, something false which is inconsistent with that which *indirectly* pertains to the faith, is not a heresy ...

"Let the fourth assertion be: *Pertinaciousness* consists in this, that a man having both knowledge and prudence deliberately dissents from a proposition of faith, or assents to its opposite, understanding that it is contained in the Holy Scripture, or in the definition of the Church, or that *it is evidently deduced from them*, even if he should dissent for only the briefest of moments. St. Thomas openly holds this view here."[50]

391. SANTIAGO SIMANCAS. – Let us turn to the testimony of another bishop from the secular clergy, who wrote his book *De Catholicis Institutionibus* at the behest of Pope Gregory XIII, to whom it is dedicated.

"At the most we are bound to believe not only the divine Scriptures, the traditions of the Church, the legitimate councils, the Constitutions of the Supreme Pontiffs, the decrees of the Fathers, the accepted teachings of the holy doctors, but also *those truths that are deduced from these by a certain consequence* in the light of faith, or by evident natural reason: provided that such truths are inferred in such a manner as to persuade everyone, especially the learned; for such truths exist in the former, and are therein comprised and

[49] *Summa Theol.*, p.1, q.32, a.4.

[50] *Commentaria in decem et septem quaestiones primae partis Sti. Thomae de Ineffabili Trinitatis mysterio*, q.32, a.4 (Compluti 1567).

contained wherefrom they are by such a consequence deduced. And this is the *true, accepted and Catholic teaching.*"[51]

The reader will observe that by conclusions Simancas means the *inclusive* conclusions. "For such truths *exist in the former*, and are therein comprised and contained wherefrom such consequences are drawn." The definability as of faith comes from such inclusion or containment; the connexion is only the medium employed by the Church to see it.

392. PAOLO GRISALDI. – The Dominican Grisaldi expresses himself no less plainly: "To put the whole matter in a nutshell: a proposition of faith is to believe and hold all the things taught by the Holy Bible, Apostolic Tradition, the Roman See, the general councils, the concordant exposition of the Holy Scriptures by all the Fathers, and *the things that are deduced from these by a necessary consquence* . . . To the Catholic doctrine belongs not only what has been expressly revealed to the Apostles, but also that which is *gathered by an evident syllogism and deduction from a revealed proposition and one of natural evidence.*"[52]

393. BARTOLOMÉ DE MEDINA. – The famous theologian Bartolomé de Medina was Grisaldi's contemporary and fellow Dominican, one of the immortal first-rank professors of the University of Salamanca, and a classical commentator of St. Thomas's *Prima Secundae.*[53]

"The second question is whether we can certainly and infallibly know that we have divine and supernatural faith. For the negative side the argument runs thus: Infallible certainty only renders us certain with respect to the divine revelations proposed by the Church . . . Reply: the virtue of *faith* is [i.e., attains] not only that which is *immediately* revealed, but *also that which is deduced by an evident consequence from the divine revelations.* Now, this truth, viz., that the believer has true faith is deduced from revealed truths by an evident consequence in this manner: It is of faith that no one can assent to all the things that the Church proposes unless he has true and divine faith.

[51] IACOBI SIMANCAS, Pacensis episcopi, *De Catholicis Institutionibus liber*, tit. 28 *de Fide Catholica*, n.16 (Romae 1575) pg. 198.

[52] *Decisiones Fidei Catholicae* . . . , (Venetiis 1582) Introd. and pg. 316, n. 13.

[53] "Bartolomé, surnamed de *Medina*, from his birthplace in the region of León, was Báñez's classmate. For some time he held the chair of Durandus in the university of Salamanca, and won the primary chair in a competition († 1581). He is regarded as one of the *chief* cultivators of scholastic and moral *theology* . . . He worked on his predecessors' traditional exposition, so to speak, of the *Summa* of St. Thomas, diligently begun by the very renowned Francisco de Vitoria with the writings of the students of the college, and thus with a *clear and elegant* style produced *excellent commentaries* on the First of the Second, and the Third Part." (HURTER, *Nomenclator*, 3, n. 68, pg.144)

But I experience that I do assent to all the things that the Church proposes. Therefore, I have true faith."[54]

394. LUIS DE LEÓN. – The famous Augustinian, Luis de León, well deserves a place beside Medina, his fellow professor at Salamanca. Eminent in literature, no less eminent in scriptural knowledge, and equally eminent in speculative sacred theology as in Scripture and belles-lettres, his not being quoted as often as he deserves can be accounted for only by the fact that in almost three hundred years there has not been a good edition of his theological works. Let us quote what he has to say with respect to the issue at hand:

"We can speak in two ways about things and propositions of faith: first, absolutely as they are in themselves; secondly, with respect to us. If we speak in the first way, those things alone are of faith that have been *revealed* by God, either *immediately*, because they have been explicitly delivered by him; or *mediately*, because they are *plainly gathered* from what he has himself delivered. But if we speak in the second way, then those things are of faith that are both revealed by God and we are assured for some reason that they are revealed by God. But there are four reasons that can give us such assurance in this regard: first, the Holy Scripture; second, the tradition of the Apostles; third, the definitions of the councils and pontiffs; fourth, *the evidence of reason leading by inference from one to another* . . . But someone might take exception to what we have said in the last place, viz. that those propositions pertain to the faith that are gathered by *evident consequence* from propositions of faith, as 'Christ is risible'; for this seems to be false . . . To this exception, let our first conclusion be: *such propositions as are evidently gathered from propositions of faith* are to be considered *also as of faith.* This is plain because *they are revealed by God,* at least mediately. Likewise, in the third Council of Constantinople; they were judged to be heretics who denied that there was a human will in Christ, because the proposition 'Christ has a human will' follows from this one, 'Christ is a [perfect] man'."[55]

The reader will please observe once more that the reason given by theologians for saying that the conclusions are definable as of faith, is not precisely *because* there is a *connexion* with what is revealed, but because, there being a truly theological connexion, there is an implicit containment, and hence *true revelation,* although mediate with respect to us. *"This is plain because they are* REVEALED *by God, at least mediately."*

[54] *Expositio in Primam-Secundae Angelici Doctoris*, q.112, a.5, (Venetiis 1580) pg.627.

[55] MAGISTRI LUYSII LEGIONENSIS *Opera, De Fide*, q.9, (Salmanticae 1893) t.5, pgs. 407-409.

395. CARDINAL TOLEDO. – Next comes Cardinal Toledo, the first cardinal from the Society of Jesus, a theologian of equal piety and eminence. Commenting on the second article of the eleventh question of the *Secunda-Secundae,* he writes:

"Conclusion: Heresy is a pertinaciously asserted error concerning the things that are of faith directly or *indirectly,* for instance, concerning the articles of faith, or *concerning the truths inferred from them* . . . You will say: what proposition is that which is called a Catholic proposition? I say, an assertion or proposition is called Catholic in two ways: first, *immediately,* as that which is had at once from the rule of faith. Now, as we have said earlier, the rule to discern the faith is manifold, viz., the Holy Scripture, the general councils, the Pontiff as Pontiff, the Apostolic Tradition, the Universal Church. These assertions, then, that are had from any of these rules are called Catholic in the first sense. Secondly, an assertion is called Catholic *mediately,* viz., *that which is derived by an excellent and clear consequence* from the prior propositions. Hence, he who contradicts either of them falls into *heresy.*"[56]

396. DOMINGO BÁÑEZ. – We conclude this examination of the theologians of the 16th century[57] with the illustrious name of one of the most penetrating and exact commentators of S. Thomas's *Summa Theologica,* one who, in our opinion, surpasses them all, with the exception, of course of Cardinal Cajetan.

Báñez's teaching on the evolution of dogma can be resumed in these four propositions: (1) the theological conclusion, in the proper sense of the term, is not of faith prior to to its definition by the Church. (2) However, it is of divine faith, if the Church defines it. (3) The Church can define, and has in fact defined, rigorous and proper theological conclusions. (4) Such definitions do not constitute a new faith, but they do constitute a new or a greater explication, although not greater than that which the Apostles had. These

[56] *In Summam Theologiae S. Thomae Aquinatis Enarratio,* 2-2, q.11, a.2, (Romae 1869) pgs. 119-120.

[57] We might add the Dominican Javelli, of the 16th century, who writes as follows: "On those words of St. Thomas that it was necessary for salvation that certain things should be disclosed to man *through divine* revelation, as the articles of faith; other things virtually, i.e., corollarily or deductively. For if God *revealed* that He is one and triune, the production of persons by immanent actions and their distinction by relations alone is said to be *revealed ex consequenti.* Thus St. Thomas's demonstration is understood in both ways. . . Hence it follows necessarily that all [faithful, including the] uneducated are *theologians virtually: for they are obligated* to believe not only the *principles* of faith but also *everything necessarily deduced from them,* I mean, to believe not expressly, but *implicitly.*" (CHRYSOSTOMI JAVELLI, O.P., *Expositio in primum tractatum Primae Partis Angelici Doctoris* (Antuerpiae 1612), q.1, a.1.

four propositions, that sum up, as it were, St. Thomas's teaching on dogmatic evolution, can be established with abundant passages from Báñez. We will select only four texts that are both brief and clear.

(a) "To the third argument the very learned Master de Soto[58] says that when a conclusion is deduced *by an evident consequence* from a principle of faith, then the conclusion itself is *certain by faith* . . . However, *this opinion is false* . . . likewise, *it is false* what he says that *it is* similarly *of faith* that Christ is a man as that *Christ is risible.* For if one should confess that Christ is a perfect man, but deny that he is risible, because he thinks that risibility does not pertain to the perfection of man, he would be a *bad philosopher,* but *not yet a heretic, because up to now* it has not yet been defined by the Church that Christ is risible . . . Therefore, to the argument we reply that the conclusions that are deduced by a good consequence from the principles of faith, or from a principle of faith and another naturally evident principle, are PROPERLY conclusions of theological science. This notwithstanding, *they are said to be* conclusions *of faith,* not *immediately,* but *mediately;* and their opposites are called *error* concerning the faith mediately; and he who thinks the contrary, falls under *suspicion* of heresy."[59]

(b) "Because *up to now* it has not yet been defined by the Church that Christ is risible; but *if it were defined by the Church* that risibility pertains to the perfection of human nature, as having two wills, human and divine, has been defined, then whoever denies that Christ is risible would in that case *be a heretic.*"[60]

(c) "The holy Church has many times defined *as of faith* propositions that were not expressly found in the Sacred Writings, but which were commonly affirmed constantly by all the theologians and doctors of the Church, and were *theological propositions* . . . Therefore she could likewise define now as of faith all those truths concerning which the whole body of theologians is in accord; therefore to contradict such truths is erroneous; e.g., all theologians firmly teach that Christ the Lord saw the divine Essence from the first instant of his Incarnation. This is not found expressly in the divine Scriptures, nor has the Church of God defined it as something to be held as of faith; but the theologians *draw it by a good consequence* from other passages of the Holy Scripture and other foundations of faith, and it is commonly accepted to such a degree that it can be denied by no one without the mark of error, *and it could be defined by the Church as of faith.*"[61]

[58] *In 1 Poster.,* q.2, ad confirmationem argumenti septimi.

[59] *Scholastica Commentaria in p.1,* q.1, a.2, (Salmanticae 1585) pg.33.

[60] *Loc. cit.*

[61] *Ibid.,* a.8, pgs.127-128.

(d) "It is an error in the faith to assert that, after the time of the Apostles, the Doctors of the Church or even the Church herself believes a *greater number of things* about matters pertaining to the faith, or believes them in a *more explicated manner* than they were in the faith of the *Apostles* and the Sacred Writers of the evangelical doctrine . . . This is proven, in the second place, by the fact that up to now the Church has never proposed for belief to the faithful or defined anything that is not expressly contained in the Sacred Scriptures or in the Apostolic traditions *or virtually contained in such a manner that it might be drawn therefrom by an evident consequence.*"[62] "Neither the Supreme Pontiff nor the whole Church can establish a *new article* or a *new dogma,* new, that is, *with respect to the substance.* We will illustrate this with an example.If one should consult a moral philosopher concerning some moral doubt, and he answers in accordance with moral *principles,* the philosopher would in that case be *explicating what lay hidden rather* than be the *author of the truth.* In like manner, when the Supreme Pontiff defines that something is to be held *by faith,* he is as *one who explicates* the hidden truth, not as the *author* of the truth . . . And *this is how St. Thomas is to be understood* in the article when he says that a new edition of the Symbol belongs to the authority of the Supreme Pontiff, that is, with respect to a *new explication.* Whence it follows that heretics wrongly charge us with the objection that the Supreme Pontiff makes a *new faith.*"[63]

397. IMPORTANT CONCLUSION. – Anyone who succeeds in penetrating well these four assertions of Báñez, which are nothing but a faithful commentary of St. Thomas's doctrine, will clearly perceive the possibility and the factual existence of dogmatic evolution after the Apostles by way of rigorous and proper theological conclusions, without thereby eliminating the specific difference between the habits of theology and of faith; or calling for new revelations or for a change of the non-revealed to revealed, but only for a change of the immediately revealed *quoad se* to immediately revealed *quoad nos;* or introducing an evolution with respect to the substance or heterogeneous, but an evolution with respect to new explication or homogeneous.

That certain Thomists, coming after the golden age of Theology, have been unable to harmonize these things and have even considered them inconsistent, can be explained by the fact that, having been obfuscated by the purely connexive virtual (virtuale *tantum*), they have lost the true Thomist notion of *implicit virtuality,* which is at once the specific element

[62] *In 2-2,* q.1, a.7, pgs. 85-86.

[63] *Ibid.,* a.10, pgs. 130-131.

of theology in the true and proper sense, and the basis of dogmatic evolution. Being an evolution of true *virtuality,* it is a true evolution; being an evolution of truly *implicit* virtuality, it is an evolution of *explication* or homogeneous

Section 4

THE TEACHING OF THEOLOGIANS ON THE EVOLUTION OF DOGMA FROM MOLINA UP TO THE PRESENT

398. MOLINA'S INFLUENCE. We have just seen in the preceding section that there is not a single theologian prior to Molina, at least among those we are acquainted with, who has denied the possibility and the fact of dogmatic evolution by way of truly theological virtuality or conclusion.

Elsewhere in this book (84 and 233) we have also explained that Molina radically denied the fact and even the possibility of such evolution by denying that the Church can ever define as a true dogma of divine faith anything that is virtually or mediately revealed.

No one, then, will be surprised to find that from Molina onwards the opinion of theologians on this question is no longer completely unanimous. Given the indisputable prestige and merited renown immediately achieved by the original and independent author of the "scientia media", if the array of eminent theologians produced by the Society of Jesus in the 17th century had supported Molina on this issue as they had on many other points, the traditional doctrine on dogmatic evolution would have run the risk of disappearing from theology, since in the 17th and 18th centuries the other theological schools were not able to muster many theologians comparable in depth and scope to those of the 16th century. The 17th century represented the golden age of the theologians of the Society of Jesus, as the 13th and the 16th saw the heyday of the Thomist school.

Fortunately for Catholic theology, the leading theologians of the Society, such as Vázquez, Suárez, Bellarmine, Lugo, Tannero . . . stood against Molina on this point, and this accounts for the fact that the great majority of subsequent theologians, independently of school affiliations, have continued maintaining in substance the evolution of dogma despite the enormous variety and confusion of a new nomenclature.

This is what we intend to establish in this section. For the sake of order and clarity we will classify the theologians by centuries, as in the preceding section. To avoid prolixity we will indulge in commentaries as little as possible. On the other hand, we have selected only passages from authors whose mind is so plain as to require no commentary.

17th Century

399. GABRIEL VÁZQUEZ, S.J. – There is hardly any need to cite this eminent theologian, since he is well-known and quoted not simply as a defender, but even as an exaggerator of dogmatic evolution on account of his failure to draw a good distinction between the evolution of dogma and theology. We have already quoted him elsewhere (85). Here we wish only to advert to the fact that Thomists have always assailed him not for having maintained the view that theological conclusions are definable as of faith, but for having considered them as of faith even without the Church's definition, and even more for having equated the value of the Church's definition to the value of the theologian's private reasoning.

400. FRANCISCO SUÁREZ, S.J., AND CARDINAL LUGO, S.J. – Suárez is the most famous and eminent theologian of his century. We have already quoted him earlier and explained his views on this subject (65-78). Suárez not only maintained that the implicit virtuality, which he calls confused formal, is definable as of faith, but went as far as asserting the definability of the non-implicit virtuality, in the belief that it was the properly termed virtuality whose definability as of faith had always been upheld by traditional theology. The immense authority wielded by Suárez over contemporary and later theologians, and the sharp comment (mirandum est) levelled by him against Molina's position on this question, have placed him in the ranks of those theologians who were mainly responsible for the general acceptance in substance of the traditional idea of dogmatic evolution. At the same time, his novel non-implicit virtual and its corollary theory of new revelations led to formulae that denied that same traditional view. On this matter of dogmatic evolution, as in most others, Suárez's fertile genius has left a deeper imprint than any of his contemporaries or successors.

In the opinion of St. Liguori, Cardinal de Lugo is, after St. Thomas, the prince of moral theologians. His reputation as a dogmatic theologian is not inferior to his renown as a moralist. We have earlier seen (79) that he upholds the metaphysico-connexive theological conclusion's definability as of faith, which is the point that concerns us here; and, like Suárez, even goes as far as admitting the physico-connexive conclusion's definability. Together with Suárez, Lugo is one of those mainly responsible for the acceptance by almost all subsequent theologians, in substance, of the traditional teaching on dogmatic evolution by way of theologico-metaphysical conclusion, although under the designation of formal-confused or identico-real virtual.

401. CARDINAL BELLARMINE. – This distinguished theologian, deservedly acclaimed as the prince of Catholic polemicists against Protestantism, and now already beatified* on account of his heroic virtues, could not have done less than uphold the evolution of dogma, thoroughly acquainted as he was with the patristic and theological tradition. Here are some brief excerpts:

"The *dogmas of faith* can be established in four ways. First, by the express testimony of the Holy Scripture . . . Secondly, *by the evident deduction* from that which is expressly had in the Scriptures . . . Thirdly, by the word of God, not written, but handed down in Tradition . . . Fourthly, *by the evident deduction* from the word of God in Tradition . . . The sufficiency of these four ways is *plain* from the fact that that alone is of faith which is *revealed* by God *mediately or immediately*, and divine revelations are in part set down in writing, and in part not set down in writing. Thus, the decrees of the Councils and Pontiffs, and the general agreement of Doctors, and all the rest, reduce to these four ways: for then they establish a thing as *of faith* when they unfold the Word of God, *or deduce something from it.*"[64]

"The Councils do not receive nor do they write down immediate revelations from God, or God's words; they only make clear what is the word of God which is delivered in writing or in Tradition, and how it should be understood, and *besides they deduce conclusions from it by means of reasoning.*"[65]

402. BALTASAR NAVARRETE, O.P. – Next comes the Dominican Navarrete, a most faithful interpreter of St. Thomas who has always wielded a very great authority on all later theologians, particularly on John of St. Thomas.

"Whether the propositions defined by the Church, which are gathered from the articles of faith, are principles of theology?

"On this point, Molina, in the first disputation, holds the negative part. . , This opinion *contains many false things,* which as of now we do not wish to *mark with a censure* because the mind of this author is not sufficiently clear. . .

"Whence it is also gathered that this proposition, Christ has two wills, can be understood in two ways. First, *insofar as it is deduced by theological discourse and evident consequence* from the principles of faith, viz., that Christ is true God and true man; and thus we assent to it *by the habit of theology.* Secondly, *insofar as that very same proposition is defined by*

*Canonized in 1930 by H.H. Pope Pius XI. – *Transl.*

[64] *Disputationes de Controversiis fidei, De Purgatorio,* lib.1, c.15.

[65] *Op. cit., De Conciliorum Auctoritate,* lib.2, c.12.

the Church, and thus we assent to it not by the habit of theology, but *by the habit of faith* . . . Wherefore, *the said author* [Molina] *greatly errs* in asserting that the theologian assents to that truth by the habit of theology in the same manner that the Church deduces it. For, although the Fathers who were present at those Councils *deduced that proposition by the habit of theology,* nonetheless, *in the supposition that it is defined,* they assented to it by the habit of faith."[66]

403. JUAN GONZÁLEZ DE ALBEDA, O.P. – Next to Navarrete let us cite the name of his fellow Dominican and, like him, a professor at the University of Alcalá, Master González de Albeda, who had previously held a chair at the College of St. Thomas of the Minerva in Rome. Albeda is held in equal regard and quoted no less frequently than Navarette by later Thomists.

"Second conclusion: The theologian does not assent by the habit of faith to propositions demonstrated in theology *before they are defined by the Church,* but by another inferior and subordinate light, viz., *by a theological habit and assent.* For instance, the theologian does not assent immediately by the habit of faith to this truth, Christ is risible, but *by the acquired light of theology.* This conclusion is against Fr. Gabriel Vázquez. . .

"Third conclusion: All the faithful *immediately* assent *by the habit of faith* to the propositions immediately *defined by the Church.* This conclusion is evidently gathered from what has been said in the first conclusion, and it is proved first *by the common agreement of the Doctors* who teach it with St. Thomas. . . And consequently, every *proposition immediately defined by the Church pertains immediately to the habit of faith.* On this point see the doctors aforequoted and Master Báñez.

Secondly, it is confirmed and explained by the fact that the *proposition demonstrated* by the theologian is not immediately, but only mediately, of faith *for the precise reason* that although the principles are supernatural, viz., the articles of faith, they are nonetheless applied to the demonstrated truth *by means of a natural discourse* which is stated in form through the syllogistic art. Hence it immediately depends on something *human* and natural. But the *defined proposition,* with respect to everything on which it depends, *rests upon the testimony of God:* for the principles are supernatural, and the discourse is regulated by the motion and assistance of the Holy Spirit who infallibly directs the Pontiff. And if the latter assumes a *natural premise,* the Holy Spirit specially directs him also with regard to it. . .

[66] *Controversiae in D. Thomae eiusque Scholae Defensionem,* cont.7, c.1, (Vallisoleti 1605) pgs. 30-31.

"Hence *there can be no doubt* that by his definition the Pontiff *makes a proposition be immediately of faith,* it being in his power to make an article of faith, not because he makes a *new faith,* but because he *newly determines explicitly* what was contained *implicitly* in the old definitions.

"Molina is moved by these grounds. . . that there is no power or authority in the Church *to turn into an object of faith anything that was not such before. . .*

"We reply that there is in the Church the power to issue a Symbol of faith, *not by bringing forth a new faith through a new revelation,* as we have remarked in the second observation at the beginning; but by *explicating* the credibles, *deducing them from the revealed truths. . .* And since it is immediately certain by faith that the Church cannot err insofar as she is ruled by the Holy Spirit, *it is also certain by faith* that she does not err in what she proposes here and now. For we have already demonstrated above that whenever a universal proposition is immediately of faith, its singular instances are also immediately of faith, and to this extent *every proposition defined* by the Church is of faith. However, it is not *another faith,* whether totally or partially, but the *same faith more explicated,* as St. Thomas teaches."[67]

All the paragraphs we have just quoted from Navarrete and González belong to the purest Thomist tradition. There is in them not the slightest trace of the confusion introduced by the Suarezian nomenclature. We commend them to the sober consideration of all Thomists, particularly those who are shocked by whatever they cannot find in the Salmanticenses or Billuart.

404. ADAM TANNERO, S.J. – After the two famous Spanish theologians just mentioned, let us cite the no less famous German theologian and polemicist, Adam Tannero, of whom Miguel de San José has justifiably written: "Among the first rate controversialist theologians produced by Germany during his time, Tannero rightly should be given the first place."[68] Tannero writes:

"The question is about conclusions that have *not been immediately revealed. . .* First assertion: The assent to a conclusion of theology, as such, that is, as formally deduced from the revealed principles, is not an assent of faith, but of theology. *This is common teaching against Scotus and Aureolus. . . Second assertion:* If the theological discourse and assent is presupposed [if the Church's definition is presupposed, as a Thomist would

[67] *Commentariorum et disputationum in Primam Partem Angelici Doctoris D. Thomae,* p.1, q.1, d.2, nn.33-50 (Compluti 1621).

[68] HURTER, *Nomenclator litterarius, bibl.* a.1, 99; t.3, pg.639.

say] — one, viz., in which either both premises are revealed, or one is revealed and the other is naturally evident — as the condition that applies the formal reason of faith, *every theological conclusion can also be immediately held by faith...* This is proven... because *anyone who reveals something, also reveals,* as far as he is concerned, *that which is necessarily and evidently connected with it; and therefore, every truth that is necessarily and evidently connected with a revealed truth, is also revealed.*"[69]

And in the treatise on faith, he repeats the same teaching. "IXth Assertion: *It makes no difference* to divine revelation, insofar as it is the formal object of faith, whether the truth to be believed is itself *immediately*, or only *mediately* revealed by God... I have taught this same view in the first volume, even if *certain others* think otherwise... But the reason for the assertion is a general one: for any thing to be of faith so that I may and ought to hold it by faith, it is enough that it be really revealed by God. But the propositions of which we are speaking are such, because speaking per se, *he who reveals something, also reveals whatever things are necessarily connected with it....* It is by this argument that in the aforecited place we have proven in general that *every conclusion evidently deduced* either from two revealed premises, or from one revealed and another evident premise, *is objectively of faith.*"[70]

405. FRANCIS SYLVIO. — We listen now to the faithful Belgian commentator of St. Thomas, from the ranks of the secular clergy, Francis Sylvio, who has this to say:

"When the Church defines or proposes for belief a dogma of faith, she does not establish an *altogether new* article, but in part makes clear what is contained in the Scripture or in the Apostolic traditions, in part defines and enjoins that it must be believed in such a manner as was not generally done previously, i.e., explicitly, owing to the fact that the dogma *had not yet been drawn out from the principles.*"[71]

"One should therefore take note of what propositions belong to the faith. Those propositions belong to the faith which are certainly contained in the Scriptures or in the Apostolic traditions, *or have been defined by the Apostolic See,* whether within or outside a council . . . Now, concerning those propositions that *by a necessary and evident consequence* follow from some proposition of faith — an instance of this sort is the *theological conclusions* — it must be said that they do not belong *per se* and *immediately* to the faith, and that he who pertinaciously denies them is not be considered a heretic, *unless* he should so pertinaciously persevere as not to recede from error even after seeing what follows from it, as St. Thomas says."[72]

"The second article [Whether heresy properly is about matters of faith] teaches that *heresy properly* is only about *matters that are of faith.* But he adds that *such matters are of two kinds.* For there are matters that are of faith *directly* and *principally, i.e., prescinding from any consequence of reason;* and to this kind belong both the articles of faith and other truths that are plainly held by the Church as *dogmas* of faith. But other matters are of faith *indirectly* and *secondarily* or *mediately;* to this kind belong those truths that are *gathered by a necessary consequence* from some proposition that belongs immediately to the faith. What he goes on to say: 'And *heresy* can take place with regard to *both' is true,* but in the sense in which he explains himself in lesson 4, ch.2, of the First to the Corinthians. A thing pertains to the teaching of the faith, says he, in two ways... But certain other things *indirectly*... But on account of these things no man is considered as heretic, unless he should *pertinaciously* persevere to such an extent that he will not recede from error even after seeing what follows."[73]

406. DOMENICO GRAVINA, O.P. — Next comes Domenico Gravina, an Italian Dominican, "no less renowed for his learning as for his holy life."[74] In his controversies against heretics he raises the question "Whether a conclusion of faith follows from a proposition of faith and another natural, necessary proposition" and answers it as follows:

"As St. Thomas teaches, that pertains to the faith, *at least indirectly,* upon the denial of which *there follows something contrary to the faith.* But, *it is plain* that such a thing happens *upon the denial of such a conclusion.* Therefore...

"To deny these conclusions *before the Church's definition* is, indeed, *erroneous*... To deny them *after the Church's definition is heretical:* for they are proposed for belief immediately and without benefit of reasoning, hence they are rightly numbered among the principles."[75]

We have chosen these two passages out of many others from Gravina to make two things plain once more: one, that St. Thomas includes the

[69] ADAM TANNERO, S.J., *Universa Theologia Scholastica* (Ingolstadii 1626), t.1, *De Sacra Theologia,* d.1, q.5, dub.3, pgs. 137-138.

[70] *Op.cit.,* t.2, *De Fide,* d.1, q.1, dub.3, nn.68-70, pg.93.

[71] *Commentaria in Summam Sti. Thomae,* 2-2, q.1, a.8.

[72] *Ibid.,* q.11, a.1.

[73] *Ibid.,* q.11, a.2.

[74] HURTER, *Nomenclator,* 3, pg.998.

[75] DOMINICUS GRAVINA, O.P., *Catholicae praescriptiones adversus omnes veteres et nostri temporis haereticos* (Neapoli 1619), lib.1, praesc.6, pgs. 186-187.

theological conclusions in the *indirectly* revealed; two, that Thomists prior to the Salmanticenses, when dealing with the question whether the theological conclusions are of faith, always distinguish between *before* and *after* the Church's definition, unless the distinction is presupposed.

407. GIOVANNI PAOLO NAZARIO, O.P. – Together with Gravina let us cite another Italian Dominican, a widely known and frequently quoted commentator of St. Thomas, "a man of quick and sharp wits, renowned Master of Sacred Theology."[76] We quote two brief texts:

"Furthermore, keep in mind that the *conclusions, which* the Fathers gathered in the Councils *deduce from the principles of faith and define. belong immediately to the faith*... and from these considerations *Molina's error* becomes plain."[77]

"Now, I call a *theological conclusion* that which is *not found expressly in formal, or altogether equivalent, terms* in the Holy Scriptures or divine traditions, although it is determined by the Supreme Pontiff or the sacred Councils and is to be held by faith."[78]

408. FRANCISCO DEL CASTILLO, O.S.F. – Next in chronological order comes the Franciscan Francisco del Castillo, a native of Madrid. Being a good Scotist, he could do no less than part from Molina on the question of dogmatic evolution by way of revealed virtuality. One quotation will suffice:

"From what has been said you should infer what is to be said to the question raised by Molina, as mentioned above, and Suárez, to wit, whether propositions *virtually contained* in revealed truths are of faith, if they are defined by the Church. *For I answer that they are:* in the first place, because it was already revealed through a conclusion deduced from the premises; hence the Church *does not define a thing that is not revealed,* which is the inconveniency that forces Molina to maintain the contrary; and although such a conclusion is elicitively theological, nonetheless, *objectively it is of faith.*"[79]

409. FRANCISCO DE OVIEDO, S.J. – We next quote another native of Madrid, but a Jesuit this time. We will quote him at greater length not precisely because he was a theologian "endowed with a sharp

[76] HURTER, *Nomenclator,* 111, 939.

[77] *Disputationes et Commentaria Scholastica in Summam D. Thomae Aquinatis* (Coloniae Agrippinae 1621), t.1, q.1, a.2, pg.18.

[78] *Ibid.,* a.3, pg.30.

[79] *Subtilissimi Scoti doctorum super tertium Sententiarum librum, de tribus virtutibus theologicis* (Antuerpiae 1641), d.2, q.111, n.25.

mind and solid judgment in the understanding, treatment and untangling of questions, especially moral questions"[80], but because he is one of the many who have uncovered, without intending to, the contraband hidden under the new term *formal confused* introduced by Suárez.

"A distinction is also drawn between universal or *confused* revelation and *mediate* or remote revelation, the basis of which is that the universal or *confused* revelation immediately attains the *selfsame object* attained by the singular and distinct, and differs from the latter only *in the manner of conceiving.*

"On the other hand, the *mediate* does not attain *the very same object* attained by the immediate. For the *immediate* attains the *object in itself;* the *mediate* does not attain it in itself, but in something that is inferred from it, as for instance, when it is revealed that Christ is a man, the revelation terminates in those things that substantially constitute a man, and because it terminates therein, it is said to be the mediate revelation of all those things that are inferred *by true causality* from the former. Thus it is said that since it is revealed that Christ is a man, it is mediately revealed that he is risible. Now, to explain the point, say that risibility is a property physically distinct from human nature, or, in lieu of risibility, substitute any other accident that is distinct and *naturally* inseparable from human nature; and, on the other hand, say that that which is mediately revealed is not revealed in reality, but is inferred necessarily from that which is revealed . . .

"I have explained in the preceding point, no. 78, what is *virtual and mediate* revelation. Now I am discussing whether it suffices for the act of faith; e.g., whether precisely on account of it being revealed that Christ is a man it can be believed by an act of faith that there exists in him the *superadded power* of laughing, and for the sake of the argument, I assume that it is evident that such a power exists in every man. I raise the question in this manner, and I do not inquire whether on account of it being revealed that Christ is a man it can be believed that he is *risible* although the question can be, and is, *commonly raised* in these terms, *there are people who misuse them,* and change the question to mean the risible that is *identified* with the predicate rational. The question is not to be understood in this manner; for the risible *taken in this sense* is identical to the rational, and therefore by the same token that the latter is revealed, the former *will also be revealed* IN REALITY.

"It is not superfluously that I say IN REALITY. For there are some predicates that are identified with other predicates, but of whose identity

[80] HURTER, *Nomenclator,* 111, pg.921.

we are not certain. Let us give an example in God. There are many who maintain that justice, taken as a virtue in a special sense, exists in God. Let us assume that this opinion is true, in which case, it will be the same in God to be almighty and to be God and to have the attribute of justice; and thus the *revelation which discloses that God exists, discloses that he is just* with respect to anyone who adequately penetrates what is *in reality* imported by what the name God signifies.

"Nevertheless, no matter how truly this describes the real state of things, with respect to us it is not revealed that there exists in God the attribute of justice taken as a virtue in a special sense, because in *our case* we can have only *probability* concerning the existence of this attribute, which we can also deny with probability. And therefore, *in reality*, by the same token that God is affirmed to exist, it is also affirmed that the special virtue of justice exists in him, since factually it is *really* identical with the divine nature; however, such a revelation is not applied *to us*, who affirm the existence of this attribute only with probability, in such wise as to be able to elicit, in virtue of it, an act of faith whereby we judge that God has the aforementioned attribute of omnipotence, or that he is almighty. But in the case of one who *evidently* knows that omnipotence and the special attribute of justice *are really identified*, by the same token that he can make an act of faith concerning one attribute, *he can also make an act of faith concerning the other*, even in terms of the express concept whereby one attribute differs formally from the other. . .

"These things I say against Puente Hurtado and others who *confuse the question* concerning *really distinct* predicates with the question concerning predicates that differ *only formally*, and *wish to extend* to the latter, *which differ only formally*, the opinion which asserts that the conclusions deduced from one revealed premise and another known evidently *is not* of faith, on the ground that one of them is conceived priorly and in the manner of an essence, and the other is conceived posteriorly and in the manner of a property.

"*With the question defined in this manner*, the *affirmative* is upheld by Cano, Vega. . . For the negative stand the same Cano, Suárez. . . I make mine this *negative* opinion. . . The reason is: An object that is *connected* with a revealed truth, precisely on the score that it is connected with it, can be believed only in virtue of the connexion between it and another revealed object; but this connexion is not the motive of faith; therefore, it cannot be believed in virtue of the motive of faith: for we suppose that the object is not revealed in itself, but in another *with which it is connected and not identified*. Therefore, the connexion must be the whole reason for the assent. The minor is self-evident, for the formal object of faith is revelation or divine authority, and not the connexion of one predicate with other predicates."[81]

We are certain that every professional theologian, and even every one interested in the momentous problem on the evolution of dogma, will forgive us this lengthy quotation for the light it sheds on the true meaning of the new nomenclature introduced by Suárez with the terms *formal confused* and *mere virtual*, and the new meaning thereby imposed on the traditional terms *immediate* and *mediate*. By the term formal confused, or immediate implicit, or virtual implicit, or revealed IN REALITY, they mean that which is *really identical* with the revealed deposit, and reserve the term *mediate*, or *virtual*, or *connexive*, for that which *differs really* from the revealed, and is therefore *not revealed*. Thereby they uphold in substance the same view maintained by the ancients and by ourselves, although the formulae they employ appear to say the contrary.

In the aforequoted passages from Oviedo, who was John of St. Thomas's contemporary and countryman, the reader will have perceived the meaning given in the 17th century to the term revealed IN REALITY. It is employed to mean any and every virtuality or conclusion that is *really identical* to the revealed datum. Among Thomists the term makes its first appearance with John of St. Thomas, and it appears precisely in the final and most interesting paragraph wherewith John of St. Thomas ends and resumes the whole of his famous *fourth article* on the theological conclusion's definability as of faith. "Whence it can be gathered that there are two ways in which something can be *virtually* contained in the truths of faith. One in a SOLELY *virtual inferential* manner, and this belongs to theology, which has for its object that which is inferred from the truths of faith. Two, *virtually implicitly*, THAT IS, those things that are 'IN REALITY' *revealed* and intended by the Holy Spirit, but are hidden to us, and thus reached by discourse. *And these* [viz., everything that is revealed *in reality, or really identical* to the *revealed in itself*] *the Church can define and declare.*"[82]

It is plain that by the term *virtual implicit* John of St. Thomas means exactly the same thing that we mean, that is, everything that is *really identical* to the revealed statements. Whether we, modern Thomists, like it or not, we must confess that John of St. Thomas, as so many other later theologians, suffered the overpowering influence of Suárez's prestige, and that the terms *virtually, only inferentially*, and *revealed in reality*, employed by John of St. Thomas and accepted later by other Thomists. bear the stamp of Suarezian origin.

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[81] *Tractatus Theologici, De Fide* (Lugduni 1651), contr.4, nn.76-78 and 107-110.

[82] IOANNES A STO. THOMA, *De Sacra Theologia*, d.11, a.4, n.16.

410. MARCOS SERRA, O.P. – We omit Lugo and John of St. Thomas, who were Oviedo's contemporaries since we have quoted them elsewhere (79 and 307), and come to the Dominican Serra, a native of Valencia, and a distinguished commentator of St. Thomas's *Summa*, who well deserves a hearing.

"Not everybody admits that certain *theological conclusions* have been defined by the Church *solely because they are mediately revealed on account of their being evidently deduced* from immediately revealed propositions. For there are *some* who assert that the proposition 'Christ has a human will' has not been defined in the Sripture, and *they say the same thing of other similar propositions.*

"But even if we grant, as I think we should, that such conclusions are defined by the Church, nonetheless, it does not thence follow that they have the certainty *of faith prior to such definition,* or that its contrary is *heretical,* but only *erroneous.* For just as by the Church's definition something can belong *manifestly* to the faith, so also by her definition something can belong *immediately* to the faith and thus have the certainty of faith, such that its contrary is *heretical,* which previously was only *erroneous. Nor is it necessary that something that is immediately of faith should be immediately revealed by God; but it is enough that it be immediately proposed by the Church, even if it is mediately revealed by God."*[83]

All of it is pure Thomist stock. Serra has succeeded in expounding traditional Thomism not only in its substance but also in its terminology.

411. HONORATO FABRI, S.J. – The Jesuit Fabri expresses himself no less plainly, although his terminology is not as precise.

"You will ask: What is to be said of those conclusions that are deduced from the principles of faith? I will divide the answer to this questions by numbers... In the second place, when the consequent's predicate is identical to the predicate of the antecedent, if the antecedent is of faith, then the consequent also *is of faith* [is definable as of faith, Serra would have said]; for instance, it is of faith that the Word was made man: therefore, it is of faith that Christ has a body and soul, that he is a *rational animal,* that he is *risible,* that he has *an intellect, a will,* etc. The reason for both answers is that everything that is believed *implicitly* is of faith; but in the act whereby I believe that Christ is a man, I certainly believe *implicitly* everything that man of its own nature signifies, that is, to have a body and a soul, to have intellect, will, risibility, etc. Therefore, I believe all this *confusedly* and *implicitly;* therefore, all of it is of faith. *Otherwise, I know not what it is to believe something implicitly and confusedly."*[84]

[83] *Summae commentariorum in Secundam-Secundae D. Thomae* (Valentiae 1654), q.1, a.2, t.1, pgs. 268-269.

412. PETER ANNATO, S.J. – Together with Fabri let us quote his fellow Jesuit Peter Annato, of whom our own Contenson says: "Undisputedly second to no one of the Society in writing clearly and sharply on theological matters."[85] Annato writes:

"Any proposition is said to be *erroneous* which is opposed . . . to a teaching which, although not defined by the Church nor formally and expressly revealed, is, nonetheless, commonly inferred by theologians through reasoning from revealed truths, whence it is also called a *theological conclusion;* thus it is *virtually* revealed, and closely approaches the faith because it is close to being defined by the Church, and *nothing else is wanting for it to be of faith but the definition of the Church* . . .

"You will insist: a thing must be *immediately revealed* or disclosed by a *formal* and immediate revelation for it to be believed with divine faith. Therefore, *virtual* and *mediate* revelation is not sufficient.

"I answer: *I deny the antecedent.* In the first place, as the Doctors of the famous Academy of Dŏuay [Duacensis] correctly observe in their declaration, it is *nowhere written that immediate* revelation is required for livine faith, and that *mediate* revelation is not sufficient therefor."[86]

413. PHILIP OF THE MOST HOLY TRINITY. – Comes now the famous Carmelite Philip of the Most Holy Trinity. Gonet says of him that "he published works worthy of imperishable memory", and of his *Summa Theologiae Thomisticae* Hurter writes: "It is greatly esteemed by the followers of St. Thomas, for it excels in remarkable transparency and clarity." From this distinguished Thomist we quote the following texts:

"That which is believed with divine faith must *either* be *immediately revealed* by God *or* be *deduced from immediately revealed truths* with the Holy Spirit's assistance."[87]

"The common agreement of the Church concerning a proposition that *can be deduced* from two premises, one of which is of faith and the other *naturally evident,* makes it a matter of faith. For if the agreement of

[84] *Summa. Theol.,* (Lugduni 1669), tr.5, *De Fide,* c.2, n.15, pgs.339-340.

[85] CONTENSON, *Theologia mentis et cordis* (Coloniae Agrippinae 1687), lib. 5, dissert. praeambula, c.2, t.1, pg.813.

[86] PETRUS ANNATO, S.J., *Apparatus ad Sacram Theologiam* (Venetiis 1778) t.1, lib.1, a.5, pg.13; and lib.2, a.3, pg.142.

[87] *Disputationes theologiae* (Lugduni 1653), d.1, dub.11, t.1, pg.27.

a general Council concerning a similar proposition makes it be of faith, as is the case whenever the general Council *deduces a theological conclusion* from a proposition of faith and another that is naturally certain, much more will the common agreement of the Church concerning a similar proposition make it of faith."[88]

Also worthy of perusal is this author's commentary to those words of St. Thomas, "But after it has become manifest, and especially if it be determined by the Church".[89] Likewise his commentary to the question "How is the total object of faith contained in the Symbol".[90] They are some of the best writings that we have read after the classical commentators of the 16th century.

414. DOMENICO DE MARINIS, O.P. – After the Carmelite Thomist comes one of the foremost Dominican Thomists, the Italian Domenico de Marinis, whose commentaries on St. Thomas are, in the opinion of Margott, "to be counted among the best theological works of the second half of the 17th century." Commenting on the classical article, "Whether heresy properly is about matters of faith", this great theologian writes as follows:

"St. Thomas here assigns as the *object and proper matter of heresy* that which *directly* and plainly is opposed to some truth of faith; and as its *less principal* object, *but still within the scope of the object,* he assigns that from which *by an evident consequence* is gathered or inferred something plainly contrary to the faith. . .

Thus that proposition *directly* pertains to infidelity which imports something manifestly contrary to the faith. But *indirectly* that proposition which imports an error from which something manifestly contrary to the faith is *mediately* and indirectly inferred, as, e.g., *propositions contrary to the truths demonstrated in theology from one or two propositions of faith:* for in this case something opposed to the faith is inferred *by means of reasoning. . .* For he who is obstinate in holding to a proposition from which something is inferred which is manifestly against the faith, errs in the faith and *is a heretic.*"[91]

And previously he had said: "For the Church has so far defined or proposed to the faithful for belief nothing that is not expressly contained in the Sacred Writings or Apostolic traditions, or *virtually included therein.*"[92]

[88] *Op. cit.,* d.1, dub.4, t.3, pg.20.

[89] *Summa Theologica,* p.1, q.32, a.4.

[90] *Disputationes Theologiae,* t.1, pgs.28-29; t.3, pgs. 32-33.

[91] *Expositio commentaria in 2-2 Sti. Thomae* (Lugduni 1663), q.11, a.2, c.3.

[92] *Op. cit.,* q.1, a.9, c.3.

415. JUAN MARTÍNEZ DE RIPALDA, S.J. – The illustrious Society of Jesus comes again to the fore in the person of one of its many great theologians of the 17th century, Martínez de Ripalda, a son of Navarre, of whom the oft-quoted Hurter writes with obvious family fondness, "[he was] together with Cardinal de Lugo the best scholastic theologian in Spain, and perhaps in all of Europe, during this period."[93] Anyone familiar with these matters will have observed that Ripalda is quoted by some as contrary to, and by others as in favour of dogmatic evolution. Both the former and the latter are partly right. Ripalda admits dogmatic evolution but not with the same amplitude as the majority of the other theologians. Of the five types of conclusion or implicit virtuality we have described elsewhere (45), Ripalda denies the definability of the first three types, or those whereby the metaphysical or radical properties are deduced; but he admits the definability of types 5 and 6 whereby actual or physical properties are deduced from the connatural or perfect essence. Let us quote his own words:

"In the second place, I say: An object that comes to be known from a revealed truth and another that is evident, can be credible by faith. . . For it is held by faith and revealed that Christ is a man not only in a metaphysical sense, but in a natural and physical sense, that is, in the sense of a revelation that discloses that Christ is a man [not only] in terms of the precise and metaphysical concept of the essence or of animality and rationality, but also in terms of the natural and physical concept of man which comprises the properties of man in keeping with the natural and physical laws in such things as are not derogatory to the dignity of the divine supposit and of the Redeemer of the world. But human nature revealed in a natural and physical sense comprises *formally* [the Thomist *implicitly virtual*], and not *only virtually* [Suárez's *extrinsic virtual*] the natural properties that are connected with it, setting miracles aside, one of which is the *power of laughing.* Therefore, by the sole revelation of Christ's human nature, conceived as commonly understood by the faithful, it is of faith [a Thomist would say, *it is definable as of faith*] that he has an intellect distinct from the soul, as well as a formal will, and *quantity* distinct from the substance of the body, without there being need for other singular revelations of these properties; for the sense of that revelation as understood commonly by all the faithful, comprises universally, aside from the essence and substance of man, *also the properties physically and naturally annexed to it,* and under these are included as particular species the *intellect* and the *will, quantity,* and *imagination,* as well as the *power of laughing.*"[94]

[93] *Nomenclator,* t.3, pg. 928.

[94] *De Ente Supernaturali,* t. 7, *De virtutibus infusis, De Fide,* d. 8, s.3, n.45, ed. Vivès (Parisiis 1873), pg.146.

By admitting the definability of the physical or actual properties and denying the definability of the essential or radical properties, Ripalda has given us one instance, among many others, of his tendency towards singular opinions. At the moment we are unable to recall any other theologian of rank guilty of such inconsistency. At any rate, Ripalda is worthy of praise for his defense of dogmatic evolution by way of theological conclusion, even if he falls short of the extension given to it by Suárez and Lugo; for the deduction of properties – whether radical or actual – from the essence deserves to be called, and is, a properly theological conclusion. It is by this procedure that almost all the conclusions of the treatise on the Incarnation have been developed. Some of them, as for instance, the two intellects and two wills of Christ, have already been defined. All the others could be equally defined, assuming that they are truly evident or demonstrated conclusions (100 and 317).

416. JACOB PLATELIO, S.J. – Next to Ripalda, we will quote the remaining Jesuit theologians of this same century. The first among them is the distinguished Platelio, whose *Synopsis Cursus Theologici* has been reedited a great number of times "on account of its elegance, clarity, solidity and utility."[95] He upholds the definability as of divine faith of every theological conclusion, and even of every dogmatic fact.

"Every conclusion deduced from a revealed proposition and another naturally certain proposition is of faith. For when a given predicate is affirmed of a subject, everything that is certainly evidently known to be *identified* or necessarily connected with such a predicate, is simultaneously *mediately* and *virtually* and to that extent *really* affirmed... Therefore, this conclusion, Christ is risible... is sufficiently *revealed*... so that it is credible with divine faith."[96]

Next we see him defending, and with very good reason, the extension of dogmatic evolution to *facts* that are justifiably called *dogmatic:*

"In the fifth place it is proved by the fact that the propositions containing these *facts* can be deduced from a revealed major and a morally certain minor. But such propositions are *definable* by the Pontiff as propositions to be believed with divine faith. Therefore..."[96a]

417. TIRSO GONZALEZ AND DOMINGO VIVA, S.J. – The former not only admits as of divine faith the conclusions and the facts, but also extends divine faith to the canonization of saints. Instead of quoting

[95] HURTER, *Nomenclator,* t.4, pg.328.

[96] *Synopsis totius cursus theologici* (Coloniae Agrippinae 1733), p.3, n.143, pg. 98

[96a] *Loc. cit.*

lengthy passages, suffice it to say that the title of the sixth section of his work reads thus: *It is of Faith that canonized Persons are truly Saints.*[97]

We find the same teaching in Domingo Viva, the classic commentator of the *Damnatae Theses:*

"The Pontiff can define *as of faith* a *theological conclusion* that is gathered from a premise of faith and another that is morally evident. For instance, it can be defined *as of faith* that the Tridentine Council had the assistance of the Holy Spirit, which is a theological conclusion that is gathered from the premise of faith that any general council that is legitimately gathered has the Holy Spirit's assistance, and from this other morally evident proposition that the Tridentine was legitimately gathered.

"Consequently the Pontiff can equally define *as of faith* a fact connected with a principle, or a theological conclusion issuing from a premise of faith which concerns the principle, and another morally certain premise which concerns the fact, as for instance, the condemned conclusion that Jansen's propositions contained in his book are heretical in the obvious sense exhibited by the words. For it issues from this premise of faith which concerns a principle, viz., that such propositions are heretical, as for instance, 'freedom from coercion is sufficient for merit', and this other that is morally certain, to wit, that they are contained in the obvious sense in Jansen's book, as is plain from the experience of all who read Jansen.

"And as *a matter of fact, many of these theological conclusions have* been defined by the Church *as of faith,* e.g., that Christ had a human will, which is gathered from the revealed proposition that Christ is a man, and this other naturally certain proposition that every man has a will. Likewise, in the Tridentine it was defined as of faith that the substance of the bread does not remain under the eucharistic species, which is inferred from the revealed premise that Christ is present under the eucharistic species, and this other naturally certain proposition that two complete substances cannot be under the same accidents."

"And for the same reason the Church can define, for instance that Ignatius is a saint and to be worshipped with the cult of dulia; for it is gathered from the premise of faith that he is to be worshipped who after a life of heroic virtues dies in the embrace of the Lord, and from this other proposition that is morally certain after so many preceding diligent investi-

[97] TIRSUS GONZÁLEZ, S.J., *Tractatus theologicus de certitudinis gradu quem, infra fidem, nunc habet sententia pia de Immaculata Conceptione* (Dillingae 1690), d.1, s.6, pg.17.

gations by the Church, viz., that Ignatius died in the embrace of the Lord after a life of heroic virtues."[98]

418. GERVASE BIJONIO. – This discerning enlarger of Becano's *Summa* writes no less plainly.

"Every theological conclusion is, by the same token, credible with divine faith.

"You will object in the first place: The act of divine faith *immediately* rests on divine revelation; therefore it has for its object a proposition that is *immediately* revealed, which is not verified in the theological conclusion, which is only *mediately* revealed. Therefore. . .

"I answer by denying the consequence. For it is one thing to say that the act of divine faith *immediately rests* on divine revelation, and another thing to say that it rests on *immediate revelation* . . .

"*You will insist:* A proposition must be *revealed in itself* if it is to be credible with divine faith. . . I *distinguish the major:* if its meaning is that it must be *immediately revealed,* I deny. If its meaning is that it must be *truly revealed,* I grant."[99]

The two objections are admirably solved. Bijonio, as almost every non-Thomist theologian, is deficient in only one thing: he fails to observe that the intellectual deduction or explication of the implicit conclusion is not formally of faith until it is defined by the Church. The Church alone is commissioned to explicate divinely or dogmatically the deposit's implicit virtuality. The theologian's explication or deduction is a human one.

419. VINCENT CONTENSON, O.P. – We come now to a theologian of true Thomist pedigree, the no less learned than pious author of the famous *Theologia Mentis et Cordis.*

"Although everything pertaining to the faith is *virtually contained in the Scriptures, nonetheless, not everything is formally* explicated, but *many things are deduced* from them *under the influence of the Holy Spirit,* as various *conclusions are derived from the principles.*"[100]

"The second condition of the object of faith is the *formal or* VIRTUAL *revelation declared by the Church.* The object of faith must be not only *virtually* but *formally* revealed, *or at least* declared by the Church.

[98] DOMINICUS VIVA, S.J., *Damnatae Theses* (Patavii 1724), quaestio prodromia, n.9, pgs. 5-6.

[99] *Tractatus de natura theologiae,* q.8, placed before Martin Becano's *Summa Theologiae* (Parisiis 1658).

[100] *Theologia Mentis et Cordis* (Coloniae Agrippinae 1687), *De Fide,* lib.7, d.2, c.1, spec.1.

The reason is that the *virtually* revealed is deduced by reasoning, and is a *theological conclusion,* concerning which there is a controversy among the learned and even among the Church Fathers themselves. Consequently, it does not pertain to the object of faith *until* with the advent of the Church's determination it is made plain that there is a necessary *connexion* between the *formally* revealed and the *virtually revealed* proposition. . . and it is then that the proposition begins to pertain to the [formal or immediate] object of faith, not precisely *because it is virtually revealed; but because, being virtually revealed, it is formally declared by the Church and educed from the article in which it lay hidden.*"[101]

The doctrine and the terminology in these two passages from Contenson come from the purest Thomist quarry. One seems to be reading St. Thomas, or Cajetan, or Báñez.

420. CARDINAL GOTTI, O.P. – It was our intention – one which we have kept up to now – not to quote on this subject of dogmatic evolution any theologian whose mind was not clear, not only in itself, but even upon the simple perusal of the quoted texts. But before leaving the 17th century theologians, we are going to make an exception in favour of an illustrious Thomist theologian, whose mind on this point is clear, but whose terminology is not equally so. Since John of St. Thomas made use of Suárez's nomenclature and designated the *virtual implicit* with the name of *immediate implicit,* some later Thomists can be found who say time and time again that the Church cannot define as of divine faith except what is *immediately* or *formally* revealed, however it is plain that by immediate or formal they mean the same thing that the Thomist tradition prior to Suárez always designated by the term virtual or consequential. One of such Thomists is Cardinal Gotti, who expressed himself as follows:

"Therefore when the Church defines that something which is newly to be believed is of faith, which was not held by faith before, she does not turn that which was *only mediately* revealed [the implicit virtual is never "only mediately", but it is mediately revealed *quoad nos* and immediately revealed *quoad se*] into something *immediately* revealed; but those truths which, even if previously had been immediately revealed to the *Apostles* [the point here is not how they were revealed to the Apostles, but how they were delivered by the Apostles to the Church; cf. n. 58], yet it was not clear that they were immediately revealed. . . . Hence it is necessary to distinguish two things: one, that the thing *is* of faith; two, that the faithful are under obligation to believe it as a truth of faith. Regarding the former, no change is made by the Church's definition; for this truth, 'Christ has two wills', has always been *immediately of faith* [immediately in itself,

[101] *Loc.cit.,* spec.2.

mediately relative to us]. But there is a change regarding the latter, in the sense that whereas there was no obligation to believe that which was of faith and immediately revealed [in itself], there is now an obligation to believe once the Church has defined that it is of faith."

Anyone who reads the preceding passage from Gotti, especially without the clarifications we have placed in brackets, would be persuaded that Gotti denies the definability of the mediate or virtual, and consequently denies the evolution of dogma. However, the following passage makes plain the sense in which Gotti takes the term *immediate:*

"I say: The articles of faith did not grow *as regards their substance,* but only *as regards their explication*,... Proof of the first part. *Science* is not said to grow as regards its substance because some of its *conclusions,* which were previously not known, come to be known now. Therefore, neither should faith or the articles be said to grow as regards their substance because some things are now held by faith, which were not held by faith before. Proof of the consequence. In the case of the former, those *conclusions,* although unknown, were nonetheless *implicitly* contained in the *principles* of the science. Now then all the things that we now believe are *implicitly* contained *either* in those two principles delivered by the Apostle . . . *or* in the truths that were revealed to the ancient Patriarchs and Prophets, *or* finally and more plainly in the truths taught by Christ and delivered by the Apostles under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. Therefore:

"The second part [that there was growth only as regards their explication] follows from what has been said. For, if all the credibles are *revealed* at least *implicitly,* and in the course of time there has been only an *explication* of the things that were already contained *implicitly* in the revealed truths, then when the Church proposes something as an object of faith, this is not done in virtue of a *new revelation* made to her, but in virtue of a *new explication* of the revelation already made, or of the thing already revealed. Hence the Church has never proposed to the faithful for belief, or defined anything that was not *at least virtually contained* in the Sacred Scriptures or in the divine or apostolic traditions."[102]

421. IT IS THUS PLAIN that when Gotti says that only the *immediate* is definable, he thereby means the *virtual implicit,* since he explicitly admits the latter's definability. This is much plainer in the following quotations from the treatise *De Sacra theologia:*

"I say: A proposition or doctrine is *heretical* when it is immediately contrary *either* to the express word of God, *or* to the express definition

[102] *Theologia Scholastico-dogmatica, De Fide,* q.1, dub.9, nn.4-13.

of the Church. *'Or to the express* definition of the Church' has been added because a proposition that is only *implicitly* contained in the word of God, after it has been declared by the Church to be truly contained in the word of God, nust be expressly believed with divine faith by those who have sufficient knowledge of the judgment pronounced by the Church.

"I call a proposition *erroneous* in matters of faith which is contrary... *not indeed* to a doctrine defined by the Church, or which is *formally* or *expressly* revealed, but which is, however, commonly *deduced* by the Doctors from revealed truths *by means of reasoning.* Hence, a theological conclusion is commonly said to be *virtually revealed,* for *it so closely approaches the faith that nothing else is needed for it to be of faith but the express definition of the Church. Thus, the erroneous proposition coincides with the proposition that is proximate to heresy."*[103]

The mind of the illustrious Cardinal Gotti on the subject of the definability as of faith of conclusions in the proper sense of the term, is thus plain. But how much more lucid would his – and John of St. Thomas's – nomenclature have been if the terms *immediate* and *virtual,* on which the nature of faith and theology hinges, had never been by them employed as synonyms, thereby sowing confusion among so many modern Thomists!

422. GABRIEL BOYVIN, O.S.F. - Leaving aside many other theologians so as not to make ourselves interminable, and since we have been quoting so many Jesuits and Dominicans, let us close the 17th century with the Franciscan Boyvin.

"It is asked: Whether such propositions [i.e., theological conclusions] are of faith when they are defined by the Church? To this question Molina, taking into account that the Church has no power to make of faith something which was not of faith before, since no new revelations are made to her, answers saying that the definitions of the Church *are not of faith,* but, within the bounds of the certainty of *theology,* only more certain than the private definitions of theologians; so certain, indeed, on account of the Holy Spirit's special assistance, that they are not liable to error. *However, the contrary must be asserted, viz., that any conclusion defined by the Church is of faith...* Thus from all the foregoing it must be concluded that no theological conclusion *as such* is of faith, but *insofar as defined* by the Church it is of faith and numbered among the *principles* of theology, and to it is due an assent by the habit of *faith,* and not only by the habit of theology, as Molina pretends."[104]

[103] *Op.cit., De Sacra Theologia,* dub.5, nn.6-7.

[104] *Theologia quadripartita Scoti,* prol., q.5, (ed.4, Parisiis 1678), pg.14.

It is thus clear that, despite Molina's innovation, all throughout the 17th century the majority of theologians continue to maintain the evolution of dogma by way of theological conclusions in the proper sense of the term.

18th Century

423. BY CHRONOLOGICAL SEQUENCE. – We have just seen that throughout the 17th century the great majority of theologians from all schools and countries defended, in spite of Molina's contrary opinion, the traditional doctrine on the evolution of dogma by way of theological conclusions. The same is true, as we will presently see, of the 18th century. We will continue quoting theologians in a more or less chronological order, rather than by school affiliation.

424. JOHN LAWRENCE BERTI, O.S.A. – Let us begin with the distinguished theologian Berti, worthy representative of the Augustinian school.

"Since a proposition *of faith* is that which is contained expressly in the Sacred Scriptures, the traditions received by the Church, the decrees and definitions of the Church, *or is deduced therefrom by a connexion that is certain, manifest, and of utmost firmness,* the proposition that is found to be diametrically opposed to any one of these must be considered *heretical.*"[105]

425. FRANCIS HENNO, O.S.F. – Next comes the Franciscan Henno, who is the most distinguished representative of the Scotist school in this century.

"There is no need that revelation be always *immediate,* so that it is possible for a proposition to be of faith even if it is not revealed *immediately* and in itself, but only *virtually and implicitly* contained in revealed propositions. But if it is inferred from one revealed and another natural proposition, it will not be of faith [per se or prior to its definition]... It should be observed that although a proposition is not of faith as inferred from a non-revealed and a revealed proposition, nonetheless, as soon as it is defined by the Church it is of faith, and not only certain... For the Church proposes to us many things as objects of faith, which are not contained explicitly, formally, and immediately in the Scriptures, *but are only deduced from them through consequence.*"[106]

[105] *De Theologicis disciplinis* (Monachii 1750), prol., c.5.

[106] *Theologia dogmatica et scholastica* (Coloniae 1718), *De Fide,* d.1, q.2, a.4, conc.3.

426. GABRIEL ANTOINE, S.J. – Next follows one of the worthiest dogmatic and moral theologians of the Society of Jesus, who is also among the best theologians of the 18th century. His *Theologia Universa Speculativa et Dogmatica* deserves to be consulted on the subject of dogmatic evolution.

"I say fourthly: A proposition legitimately deduced from an altogether certain universal major proposition and a revealed minor is of faith and can be believed with divine faith. First proof: such a proposition is sufficiently revealed... Third proof: the Church proposes as revealed and as objects of faith propositions that are legitimately deduced from a universal proposition that is altogether certain, though not revealed, and a revealed minor...

"You will object, in the first place, that the proposition at issue, e.g., Christ is risible . . . is not *formally revealed,* not even implicitly. Therefore, it cannot be believed with divine faith.

I answer *denying the consequence.* For the *mediate* and *virtual* revelation of a proposition is sufficient for it to be believed with divine faith . . . It can be believed with divine faith; better still, it must be so believed at least upon its *definition* by the Church."[107]

427. EDMUND SIMONET, S.J. – Together with Antoine let us quote another theologian of the Society of Jesus, Edmund Simonet, S.J., who is no less clear.

"Speaking generally, *every conclusion* legitimately deduced from a premise of faith that is absolutely revealed, and another which is altogether certain... is of faith, as to its capability of [divine] belief, and even as to the obligation [of giving it divine faith] at least when the *Church defines* it. Hence divine faith can be given to the conclusion of this syllogism: Every man is risible; Christ is man; therefore, he is risible."[108]

428. JUAN MARÍN, S.J. – Comes now a third theologian also of the Society of Jesus, no less renowned than Antoine, and much more than Simonet, the Spaniard Juan Marín. He not only holds the same view as all those previously quoted on the subject of dogmatic evolution, but also is one more witness to the meaning given by Suárez and Lugo to the terms formal confused or immediate implicit, viz., that which, albeit formally distinct, is nonetheless really identical to the revealed.

[107] *Theologia Universa* (Augustae Vindeliorum et Cracoviae 1760), *De Fide divina,* s.1, § 4, pgs. 27-30.

[108] *Institutiones Theologiae* (Venetiis 1731), t.1, *De Fide,* d.2, a.5, pgs. 164-165.

"There is a greater difficulty concerning the conclusion deduced from a premise of faith and a natural premise... Suárez, Lugo... say that the conclusion is of faith when it is *identified* with the revealed object; but not when it is *not identified*... *This opinion seems good*...

"You will insist: When God reveals omnipotence, he only reveals what this word means to the listeners, since the meaning of the word must be common to both speaker and listener. But this word 'omnipotence' solely means *omnipotence*, as distinct from *immensity and other attributes*. Therefore...

"I reply conceding the major and distinguishing the minor. It solely means omnipotence *formally*, I concede; *really*, I deny. Hence, the listener *formally* only forms a concept about omnipotence, but *really* he also forms a concept about immensity, because that concept *affirms immensity really*, though not formally."[109]

This teaching of Suárez and Lugo, which Marín here makes his own, viz., that anything is definable as of faith provided that it is really identical to – even if it is formally distinct from – the revealed deposit, is upheld by at least ninety per cent of postsuarezian theologians under the name of formal confused or equivalent. The great merit of Suárez and Lugo – one that can never be sufficiently appreciated – consists in having endorsed with their great authority the definability of the identical-objective virtual, which is exactly what the ancient theologians simply designated with the terms "virtual" or "implicit". This is what truly constitutes the theological conclusion in the proper and rigorous sense of the term. Anything else is physics (73).

429. BERTHOLD CRASSOUS, Carmelite. – We next quote a theologian from the Order of Carmel. This will at least serve to make it clear that, despite the confusion created by the Salmanticenses with their celebrated *Nego maiorem* (80), one hundred years later the theologians of their order remained faithful in the defense of the traditional doctrine concerning the definability of truly theological conclusions. He has this to say:

"Every theological conclusion, insofar as it is contained in the premises, is of faith in the same manner as it is contained in the premises; so that is is *formally* of faith if it is formally contained in the premises, but only *virtually* if it is only virtually contained in them...

"Proof of the second part of the conclusion, viz., that a theological conclusion *virtually contained* in premises of faith, is itself *virtually of faith*. That is virtually of faith which is virtually revealed; for *the manner in which something is revealed is the same manner in which it is of faith*, otherwise God would not be worthy of belief with regard to something revealed by himself. Now, a conclusion *contained virtually* in a premise or premises of faith is itself *virtually revealed*, for *it is revealed in the same manner in which it is contained in the revealed premise*. Therefore, it is *of faith virtually*. Hence this conclusion 'Therefore Christ is risible', which is deduced from this antecedent 'Christ is a man', *is of faith only virtually* since it is contained in the antecedent only virtually. However, it should be observed, as Fr. Henry says, that if the *Church should define* that *this proposition* is to be held by faith, then it would *at once belong to the faith formally and directly*. This doctrine is opposed by Molina alone, as Suárez testifies."[110]

[109] *Theologia Speculativa* (Venetiis 1764), t.2, *De Fide divina*, d.9, pgs. 374-375.

We think that the Thomist doctrine can neither be more beautifully expressed nor more clearly argued for.

430. MIGUEL HERCE, O.S.B. – The Benedictine Order, always prolific in learned men, is represented by Herce who was for many years a professor at Salamanca and later became the general of his Order. Herce follows the Salmanticenses in almost everything, employing their arguments and even borrowing their very words; but he steers away from them to follow the traditional teaching on the definability of the conclusions by the Church.

"Whether virtual or mediate revelation is the formal object of faith [i.e. per se or without the Church's definition]. The first opinion defends the *affirmative*... The second opinion at the extreme opposite teaches... that it is not sufficient for the formal object of faith... *Thomists are generally of this opinion*, as are also the Doctor Eximius and many others among the Fathers of the Society of Jesus. Father Molina pushes this theory to such a length as to say that a conclusion deduced from a premise of faith and another that is evident is not of faith *even if it should be defined by the Church*...

"You will argue, in the first place: It is a truth of faith that God is omnipotent, infinite, and has other similar attributes. But these truths are not immediately revealed... Ergo...

"To the proof based on the examples, I concede the major and deny the minor. For that God is incorporeal, infinite and possesses other similar attributes, is found in the Holy Scripture with sufficient immediacy, if not in the same terms, in other terms that are equivalent and have the same meaning, as when the Holy Scripture says that God is a spirit and is omnipotent [hereto everything is taken almost literally from the Salmanticenses whom Herce quotes frequently, but he now goes on to speak on his own], *except that such have been defined by the Church and would by this sole title belong to the*

[110] *Prolusiones Theologiae* (Romae 1710), t.1, d.5, q.2, nn.8, 23-24, pgs.97-100.

faith, even if there had been no express or equivalent revelation concerning them."[111]

431. ANSELM SCHNELL, O.S.B. – Schnell belongs to the same period and Order. Suffice it to quote only the following from this author.

"In the fourth place, observe that those things are said to be *revealed virtually* which, albeit not being revealed immediately and formally in themselves, are nonetheless contained in some other thing that is formally revealed. On this basis, it is to be held that *virtual* revelation is a sufficient motive of *faith* for the reason that such a virtually revealed thing is *immediately* believed on account of divine revelation."[112]

432. JUAN SANTIAGO SIDRO VILLAROYO, O.S.A. – The Augustinian school is represented by the distinguished Villaroyo. As Aegidius Romanus, Luis de León, Berti, and all the theologians of his school, he too maintains the traditional teaching.

"We call *dogmas* of theology all the things that are revealed by God, or, *being deduced from things revealed, are proposed by the universal Church.* There is, to be sure, one difference between the *dogmas* and the *articles of faith,* viz. that explicit belief is required with respect to the latter, which is not case with respect to the former . . . However, since anyone who denies either expressly equally contradicts the faith, it follows that both the dogmas and the articles of faith are *truths of faith* and are deservedly included in the common name of dogmas. Hence some dogmas are *immediately* revealed by God, some others only *mediately,* and the latter are those that are contained in the former and are *derived therefrom by a necessary consequence.*"[113]

433. ST. ALPHONSE MARIA LIGUORI. – Setting aside many theologians of this century, in the same way that we made no mention of many of the previous one – although an opportunity will not be wanting to cite some of them further on (477-478) –, we will close this survey of the 18th century with its greatest theologian, one who has deserved to be raised to the ranks of the Doctors of the Church. Although St. Liguori is often quoted more as a moral than a dogmatic theologian, nonetheless his authority with respect to anything is great, not only because of his sacred character as a Doctor of the Church, but also because of the extraordinary impartiality of his theological outlook. He was so free of partisanship, of school or religious family

[111] *Tractatus theologici* (Matriti 1760), *De Fide,* tr.2, d.1, nn.84, 94-95, t.3, pg.188.

[112] *Opuscula omnia, De virtutibus theologicis* (Augustae Vindeliorum 1744), n.424.

[113] *Institutiones Christianae Theologiae* (Valentiae 1772), lib. 1, p.3, c.1, pgs. 202-203.

biases, that in our opinion he is in this regard without peer among scholastic theologians, if we except St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure.

"Indeed, *all* propositions *condemned by the Popes,* although not all are *heretical* but some temerarious, others erroneous, scandalous, etc., nonetheless, *once they are defined by the Pope, it is to be held as of faith* that such propositions are truly temerarious or tainted by some such other censure as the Pope has declared them to be."[114]

"Indeed, even if our view [concerning the Blessed Virgin's preservation from original sin] has not yet been defined by the Church, still it can well be held as of faith . . . For St. Thomas says that we can believe *as of faith* not only those things that we hold by infused faith, but also those things that we perceive through *theological conclusions.*"[115]

434. RESUME OF THE 18th CENTURY. – It is thus clear that all these 18th century writers keep upholding, as those of the earlier centuries, the definability of the truly theological conclusions as of divine faith. Each one expresses it in his own way. There is a great variety of opinion regarding particular details, but all are agreed on the evolution of dogma by way of virtuality or of consequence in the proper sense of the term.

19th Century

435. NEW THOMIST REVIVAL. – If the 18th century can be described as a century of decadence for theology, this description is even truer of the 19th century, especially during the first two thirds of it that preceded Leo XIII's encyclical *Aeterni Patris.* With the revival of the study of St. Thomas initiated by this immortal Pope, Catholic philosophy and theology began to flourish anew. Still, we are yet a long way from being able to claim philosophers and theologians of the caliber of those of the 16th and 17th centuries, not to speak of the excellence of those of the 13th. From the relatively few theologians who have written in the 19th century and in what has transpired of the 20th, we will quote only a handful in order to show that the traditional doctrine on dogmatic evolution by way of theological conclusions has been and is being taught as in the previous centuries.

436. LEOPOLD LIEBERMANN. – Let us begin with the pious and equally learned Alsatian theologian Liebermann, whose *Institutiones Theologicae* contributed in a very large measure to the promotion of sound theological studies during the first half of the 19th century.

[114] *Theologia Moralis* (ed.6, P. Gaudé Romae 1905), lib.1, n.103, t.1, pg.84.

[115] *Op.cit.,* lib.7, n.262, t.4. pg.407.

"But if the *conclusion* is deduced from the faith *by an evident consequence,* then it must be said to belong to the faith, at least mediately and indirectly; and the theologian who comprehends the strength of the argument must assent *to it as a truth belonging to the faith.* And do not say that in this case reason produces faith, for such a conclusion does not belong to the faith precisely because it is deduced from the premises by a legitimate consequence, *but because through such procedure it becomes clear that it is already contained in the revealed premise.* Reason sees the consequence, faith embraces the consequent as *contained in the sources of revelation.* Hence reason is only the means and the instrument whereby it becomes certain for me that the conclusion is contained in a directly revealed dogma, and once this fact becomes clear to me, I then assent to it with firm belief *on the authority of the revealing God.*"[116]

This is exactly what Vázquez taught. Dogmatic evolution is upheld, but to excess, since it is considered as of faith or dogmatic prior to the Church's definition.

437. HILARY OF PARIS, Capuchin. – This eminent Capuchin theologian expresses himself no less clearly, but with much greater precision and with a rigorously Thomist criterion. The following passage deserves to be transcribed despite being somewhat lengthy.

"Now the conclusions derived from the faith are of three categories accordingly as they carry either *faith,* or *certainty,* or probability.

"*Conclusions of faith* are those which are *deduced* from the revealed word of God *infallibly with respect to the Church* . . . For the Church not only preserves, but also *infallibly explicates* the word revealed by God. However, this explication is not done through a new revelation. Hence it is necessary that the Church bring to this task the use of her reason, but with the Holy Spirit's assistance so that the Church's reasoning shall proceed infallibly. Now, when it is *infallibly* established that a thing is *connected* with the word of God in such a manner that it cannot be denied unless the word itself of God is denied, then it becomes plain that *such a thing is also revealed by God and belongs to the faith.*

"*Conclusions of theological certainty* are those that are taught by the unanimous and constant agreement of theologians. Such conclusions are close to the truth of faith and so have a certainty that neighbours on divine infallibility. *For the Church makes use of these theological conclusions in order to determine the conclusions of faith* . . . But are they to be believed as objects of faith [prior to the Church's definition]? *This is an issue debated by theologians themselves.* Hence, there are those who distinguish, with Veronio, two kinds of faith, viz., *divine* and *Catholic* . . . Thus, something could be of divine faith, and not of Catholic faith, e.g., in the case of a learned man who evidently perceives that something is contained in revelation, which is not proposed by the Church. And this seems to be the opinion of Fr. Perrone . . . Nevertheless, this distinction [which is as old as Vázquez], even if *recently* it has been well regarded by many, *is to be rejected upon maturer consideration* because it is based on a false assumption, viz. that the *medium or organ whereby divine faith is proposed* can be of two kinds: one universal, which is the Church, and the other particular, which is the *science* whereby the learned are constrained to believe that which the Church has not promulgated. But there is *only one medium or organ whereby the faith is promulgated, Holy Mother Church.* Science, indeed, is the medium whereby theological conclusions are unearthed, but it is not a medium endowed with divine *infallibility* which Christ bestowed on the Church alone. Now, without divine infallibility, the word of God is not *divinely* proposed as the word of God, but as the word of men, as the *word of science* . . . Hence the conclusions of theologians [without the Church's definition] are capable of engendering *certainty,* but are not sufficient for the *faith.*

"Nor does such a conclusion belong more to the faith because it issues *out of two revealed premises,* if it is not one of those that are usually *taught* universally *by the Church* . . . Hence, for the theologian himself the *conclusion of science,* albeit certain, will never be a *conclusion of faith* as long as it is not transmitted by an infallible organ, for *the theologian and the simple faithful stand on equal footing in matters of faith.*"[117]

438. TRULY PRICELESS are all the preceding paragraphs. In our opinion, they constitute the most faithful possible expression of the genuine Thomist position – the mean between the positions of Vázquez and Molina – which is reflected in the preceding work. One seems to be reading one of the classic expositors of Thomist teaching in the 16th century.

439. CARDINAL MAZZELLA, S.J. – We come now to one of the many illustrious theologians that have brought honour to the Society of Jesus and its famous Gregorian University in the 19th century. Cardinal Mazzella has this to say:

"Having completed these explanations, it should be observed that everybody concedes that truths *formally* contained in explicitly revealed truths [the *implicit-formal*] are themselves *revealed* truths, and, consequently, the material object of *faith* . . .

[116] *Institutiones Theologiae* (Lovanii 1832), prol., t.1, pg.34.

[117] *Theologia Universalis* (Parisiis 1868), introd., t.1, pgs.126-128.

"Theologians dispute whether the same is true of those truths that are contained only *virtually* in explicitly revealed truths . . . In the case of a truth *implicitly* [the implicit virtual or identico-real] contained in another that is explicitly revealed, with which it is nonetheless only *really* and *not formally the same*, Ripalda, the Wirceburgenses and others hold that such a truth is not revealed; however, De Lugo, Suárez [and *all* theologians prior to Molina] hold the contrary. *I am of the view that one should subscribe to this opinion.* For an object that is thus implicit in another that is explicitly revealed, *is truly said by God.* For God intends to manifest that which can be signified to those to whom the speech is directed by the sign which he employs. But the sign manifesting one object is capable of signifying to men also another object that is *only formally different*, if the *real identity* of both one and the other can be known by us *without a new revelation.* Therefore . . .

"Thus it is correctly said that the non-revealed premise is employed in this case to understand the *signification* of the divine speech, and not properly to infer some other thing *connected* with it. [The reader will please observe the meaning given by post-Suarezian authors to "by reason of *signification*" and "by reason of *connexion*".] Thus, on this basis, it is said that the *metaphysical* property of any nature whatsoever is credible by faith on account of the revelation of the nature itself, but it is otherwise in the case of a *physical* property which is supposed to be *really different* and *separable* from the nature at least by God's absolute power.

"But in the case of an object that is said to be contained in another that is explicitly revealed inasmuch as it is ***only connected*** to or follows from it (they call this a ***properly virtual*** comprehension), the same Suárez, De Lugo, etc., *deny that such an object* is per se said by God and credible by divine faith. Hence they say that a conclusion deduced from a premise of faith and another naturally evident is not per se revealed, if the latter premise does not explicate the *signification* of the former premise, but shows the *connexion* of an object with that which is explicitly revealed in the premise. I would here employ the distinction which seems to be *in accordance with the mind of these doctors*[118]: for either the implicit object *follows the explicitly revealed truth in such a manner that it can under no hypothesis be separated from it* [neither Suárez, nor Lugo, nor Mazzella, nor so many others, have observed that this is exactly the case in every rigorously theological, metaphysical, or mathematical conclusion . . .], and then *I would say that such a conclusion is revealed,* since otherwise the truth of the explicitly revealed object cannot stand at all; or *it can be separated from it, at least by God's absolute power*

[118] Suárez expressly indicates this distinction, *De Fide*, d.3, s.11, n.12.

[this is the case only in *physics,* on in conclusions of type 4], and then the opinion of Suárez, Lugo, etc., comes up once again."[119]

We have allowed the transcription of this long passage for two reasons. One, to make it plain that this very learned theologian extends as we do, the scope of dogmatic evolution to include everything that, although formally different, is nonetheless really identical to the revealed deposit, i.e to all the deposit's implicit virtuality. Two, to make it clear once more that Suárez, Lugo, and all their later disciples, include under the name of formal confused or equivalent the whole of implicit virtuality, and employ the term proper virtual to mean the non-implicit or type 4 virtual.

440. CARDINAL FRANZELIN, S.J. -- Next to Cardinal Mazzella's we cite the even more illustrious name of Cardinal Franzelin, of the same Society of Jesus, and his successor in the professorship at the Gregorian University. Anyone who has read nothing by Franzelin but his classic *De Divina Traditione et Scriptura* will form the impression that he is opposed to all dogmatic evolution: so forcibly and well does he stress dogma's first characteristic, viz., its objective immutability, that there seems to be no room left for its second characteristic, to wit, its development or evolution within that same objective immutability. But anyone who has read his treatise *De Deo Uno* and the excellent introduction on the nature of theology which prefaces it, will have been convinced that Cardinal Franzelin admits, although with a different phraseology, an evolution of the same amplitude as that described by Cardinal Mazzella. Witness the following passage:

"Whenever it is certain that both premises are revealed truths, or whenever *one premise already contains implicitly that which is enunciated in the conclusion, while the other,* which might not be revealed, *evidently manifests the conclusion's comprehension in the revealed premise* [this happens in the case of every reasoning the minor of which is *metaphysically* certain, as Franzelin himself says at the end], *there is no doubt that the truth enunciated in such a conclusion is itself revealed* . . . An example of a conclusion under the latter form [i.e., a conclusion inferred from a revealed and a non-revealed premise] can be brought against the Monothelists. The revealed proposition that Christ has, aside from a divine nature, a *perfect* human nature in virtue of which he is a *true* man [meaning to say *perfect* man, otherwise there would be no implicitness], already contains the other truths that Christ has, aside from a divine will, also a rational will and human volitions. Hence, when another proposition is assumed in order to complete the argument: Christ is true man; but it is essential to man to have the power of a rational will; therefore Christ has a human will: the assumed proposition only

[119] *De virtutibus infusis* (ed.6, Romae 1909), d.2, a.7, nn.413-414, pgs. 210-212.

makes manifest the comprehension of this conclusion in the revealed proposition. On this basis, the truth of the consequent can be considered in two ways: either formally as revealed by God, and then in such a case to the proposition corresponds the *assent of faith* . . .

"But if one of the premises is revealed and the other is certain only by the light of reason, and if what is enunciated in the conclusion *is not contained except in both premises taken together* [this can never be the case where the minor is a proposition of metaphysical certainty, as he later on confesses], that which is enunciated in the conclusion, indeed, is *certain* [with moral certainty, but not with metaphysical, let alone *theological* certainty], but it will not be contained simpliciter in revelation, and thus it is not an object of divine faith, but only of theological assent that is grounded partly on the revealed, and partly on the naturally certain truth of the premises. It is, e.g., revealed that the sacrament of Baptism confers grace on those who put up no hindrances to it. If I see an infant being baptized by such a minister and in such a manner that no suspicion can be had concerning the value of the sacrament, the fact that this infant is validly baptized is certain, but not withal revealed. Hence the conclusion that this infant is justified is theologically certain, but not of faith. [It is obvious that in his efforts to find an instance of theological conclusion that is not definable as of faith, Franzelin has had to pounce on something that is not a rigorously theological conclusion, not by a long shot. But this is quite accidental. The essential point we wish to underscore with this quotation from Franzelin is embodied in the statements that follow next, to which we invite the reader's attention]. What, on the other hand, Cano and Vega [why does he leave Vázquez out?] maintain, viz., that a proposition deduced from a premise of faith and one that is naturally evident is itself an object of faith, *is not really contrary;* for they speak of a conclusion that is totally contained in the revealed premise in such a way that the naturally evident proposition only serves to make manifest the comprehension of the conclusion in the other revealed premise; and that this is what they mean can be easily shown from the examples that they use to make their position plain. [Here now is the juiciest part.] *Indeed, in these theological syllogisms the naturally certain proposition serves* FOR THE MOST PART *only to make manifest the comprehension of the conclusion in the revealed premise, and this is particularly true where the certainty is* METAPHYSICAL; *and, consequently, these conclusions are implicitly contained in the objective revelation and, hence, they can be explicitly proposed and defined by the Church as propositions to be held by faith."*[120]

[120] *De Deo Uno* (ed. altera Romae 1876), prol. *de Theologiae obiecto,* pgs. 21-23.

Three things are worthy of note in this passage from the illustrious cardinal. First, he admits that for the most part (plerumque) theological conclusions are inclusive and definable as of divine faith. Second, he admits that this is especially true in the case of conclusions where the minor is metaphysically certain, or what is exactly the same, in the case of every rigorously metaphysical, since for us and for every Thomist who knows whereof he is speaking, no rigorously theological conclusion can be anything but a metaphysical conclusion. Third, when Cano and Vega and Vázquez spoke of conclusions of faith, they had in mind such metaphysical-inclusive conclusions. This is clear, since prior to Suárez no one had ever conceived the idea of calling the physico-connexive conclusion a rigorous conclusion.

Franzelin is quite right in saying that Cano and Vázquez understood by conclusions the *implicit* conclusions, since to the best of our knowledge no theologian prior to Suárez has taken the non-implicit or physico-connexive as theological conclusion. "For the theologian gathers *his conclusions* from the principles of faith revealed by God, and *explicates* such conclusions *implicit* in the principles themselves by a natural argumentation."[121] "As we have often said elsewhere, neither the councils nor the Pontiff of the Apostolic See nor the Fathers who interpret the Scriptures give new revelations to the faithful, but such revelations as the Church received from the apostles they either *articulate, or interpret,* or *gather the things that* certainly *follow from* or are *connected with* them, make plain the things that are contrary and inconsistent."[122] Plainly, Cano takes as identical the theological connected and the implicit, since the non-implicit is not theological, nor metaphysical, nor mathematical, but physical.

441. SANTOS SCHIFFINI and WILLIAM WILMERS, S.J. – To the preceding two let us add another distinguished theologian from the same Society of Jesus. Having correctly denied that the revealed virtual is of divine faith *per se* or without the Church's definition – and on this point every true Thomist should align himself with Ripalda and the Wirceburgenes, and not with Vásquez and so many others – he clearly admits that it is of divine faith after the Church's definition. The following text should suffice:

"You will insist: The Church defines not only things that are found *formally* implicitly in the divine-apostolic teaching, but also many things that, albeit not *formally* implicit in this teaching, are nonetheless *connected* with it with a *necessary* bond. But, as earlier pointed out, this necessary bond is not

[121] CANO, *De Locis,* 8, 2.

[122] *Op. cit.,* 12, 3.

sufficient to make us say that these conclusions are implicitly revealed or implicitly of faith. Therefore.

"I answer conceding the major and distinguishing the minor: if the bond alone is taken into account, and *apart from the Church's definition that might have been added, I concede; with the added definition of the Church*, I deny."[123]

Wilmers has the following interesting paragraphs:

"Whatever has been revealed by God can be held with divine faith. But it has been revealed by God that each and every act of the supreme magisterium is infallible in deciding and determining matters that pertain to religion, or infallibly declaring that a certain teaching is revealed, that some other teaching is opposed to the revealed doctrine either *immediately* or *mediately*, that the teaching of this or that book is in conformity with or in opposition to the revealed truth. Consequently, on the strength of divine revelation, and thus *with divine faith, it can be believed that each and every defining act of the supreme magisterium is infallible*, i.e., that the Church infallibly declares that a certain teaching is revealed, that some other teaching is opposed to a revealed doctrine either immediately or mediately. Now, in believing that the Church infallibly declares that a certain teaching is revealed, that some other teaching is either immediately or mediately opposed to a revealed doctrine, we at the same time *implicitly* believe that the teaching is really as the Church declares it to be; for the *act* cannot be conceived without its object.

"The second proof is taken from the simultaneous concurrence of two motives. When two motives concur or equally offer themselves as grounds for asserting something, it is left to our discretion to assent to a thing on the strength of either one or the other. Now, then, whenever the Church by her supreme judgment defines that a thing is so, two motives for asserting the truth of the definition offer themselves equally to us: one is the created authority of the Church; the other is the *authority of God who reveals* that the Church is infallible in all her supreme judgments, and thus also in this or that particular one. Consequently, we can accept what the Church defines as infallibly defined either on account of the Church's authority, or *on account of the authority of the revealing God.* If we hold it to be infallibly defined on account of the latter, we make an act of *divine faith* . . .

"First corollary: In the supposition that the Church is infallible in the solemn canonization of the Saints, it can by all be held with *divine faith* that deceased canonized person is one of the blessed . . .

[123] S. SCHIFFINI, *Tractatus de Virtutibus infusis* (Friburgi Brisgoviae 1904), d.3, s.4, solvuntur obiectiones, n.130, pg.225.

"Second corollary: After the condemnation of the five propositions taken from Jansen's book, anyone can believe *with divine faith* that those five propositions, as contained in Jansen's book, are alien to the faith."[124]

442. PARTHENSIUS MINGUES, O.F.M. – As a representative of the Franciscan school in this century we cite the learned professor of theology in Munich, the Very Rev. Fr. Parthenius Mingues, whose *Compendium Theologiae Dogmaticae* is greatly esteemed by all as a guide to the minds of St. Bonaventure and Scotus.

"In all these cases [where something is contained as a particular in the universal, or as a part in the whole] the conclusions can be said to be *formally* revealed, since it becomes manifest immediately *by the mere explanation of terms,* hence there is need only for an *explanatory syllogism.*

"But there is no *dogma* if the theological conclusion is included in another truth only *virtually, mediately,* more or less obscurely, such that there is need for *proper argumentation* in order to know the truth that is included in another. For instance, assume that this proposition is revealed: The soul is *spiritual.* From the soul's spirituality it can be deduced that *it cannot be generated* and that it is immediately produced by God himself. However, this conclusion requires *true ratiocination;* it does not follow at once from considering the term 'spirit'. Hence this truth *is not a dogma.*

"However, this conclusion can become a dogma of faith through the Church's proposition, or at least a Catholic truth. Thus, although it is only *virtually* revealed, the proposition that Mary was immaculately conceived is now become a dogma. It is of such conclusions that Scotus says (*4 Sent.*, d.5, q.1, n.7): 'There are other truths that need not be necessarily believed explicitly either by the latter [the learned] or by the former [the simple Christians] because their truth has not yet been *declared* and *determined* by the Church; and of this kind there are *many conclusions necessarily included in the articles of faith,* but before they are *declared* and *explicated* by the Church it is not necessary for anyone to believe them; however, it is necessary to opine soberly about them, so that one is ready to accept them at such a time when their truth shall have been *declared.*"[125]

In these paragraphs Fr. Mingues correctly expresses the traditional teaching that we already know. The revealed virtual is not of divine faith of itself or without the definition, but it can become of divine faith with the definition. By the way, the reader will do well to pay closer attention to the

[124] *De Fide divina* (Ratisbonae 1902), nn.262-263, 271.
[125] *Compendium Theologiae dogmaticae generalis* (Monachii 1902), pg.241.

passage from Scotus quoted by Fr. Mingues, which we have quoted earlier (372). As everybody admits, Scotus speaks there of theological conclusions in the *proper sense*. This notwithstanding, he calls the Church's definition of such conclusions by the names of *declaration, determination,* or *explication,* exactly as St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure. Let this be a reminder to certain modern theologians who seem to have lost the key to the nomenclature employed by the great masters of the 13th and 14th centuries of this subject (506).

443. HONORATO DEL VAL and AURELIUS PALMIERI, O.S.A. – We come next to a theologian no less distinguished than the preceding ones, who has maintained in the 19th century the glorious theological traditions of the Augustinian school. His excellent textbook of dogmatic theology can stand comparison with the best written in the previous century.

"If in the explicitly revealed there be *virtually* contained some other thing which is *altogether inseparable from it* [only such cases are regarded by Thomists as rigorously theological conclusions], then this other thing is more probably to be considered as a per se *object of divine faith* [a Thomist would call it *definable* as of divine faith], although to us, on account of a defect of knowledge, it is not always an object necessarily to be believed.

"Particularly with respect to these things that are *virtually* revealed theologians debate whether they are per se objects of *divine faith*. In the present inquiry, there is nothing else to add to what we have said in the preliminary treatise to dogmatic theology, namely:

"Melchor Cano, Bellarmine and other theologians of great renown maintain the *affirmative* . . . However, many theologians, with Veronius and the Salmanticenses, defend the *negative* . . . The *affirmative answer* pleases me in the case of conclusions that are *logically necessary* [*metaphysical connexion*] in such a way that the denial of the *consequent proposition* cannot be sustained without *implying the denial of the divinely revealed premise.*"[126]

Let us add the testimony of another well known Augustinian theologian, Fr. Palmieri, whose *Theologia Dogmatica Orthodoxa* is highly regarded by all.

"Catholic theology teaches that an *increase* which is declarative of the ***faith,* viz., *dogmatic progress* in a sense (secundum quid), or, in the words of** St. Anselm, 'the progress of the faithful in the faith rather than of the faith in the faithful', effected through the Church endowed with the divine prerogative of an infallible magisterium, is possible, necessary, real.

[126] HONORATUS DEL VAL, O.S.A., *Sacra Theologia Dogmatica* (Matriti 1906), *De Virtutibus infusis,* c.2, nn.44-45, t.2, pgs.660-661.

"Before proceeding to the proof of the thesis, the distinction between things that are held by *divine faith explicitly* or *implicitly* must be made clear . . . Anyone who believes, e.g., that the soul is a ***spiritual* nature, by the** same token *implicitly* believes that the soul is *simple, incorruptible, rational,* etc., all of which are requirements of any spiritual nature . . . To deny this is to say that God has commanded man to bury in the ground the treasures he has given, that he has revealed the principles of a more exalted science from which man has no right whatsoever to deduce conclusions."[127]

444. JOACHIM BERTHIER, O.P. – Let us now mention the name of a distinguished Dominican who is equally a theologian, a historian, and an artist. His *De Locis Theologicis* is, in our opinion, one of the best modern supplements to Melchor Cano's thrice secular, yet ever perennial, work. Fr. Berthier writes:

"Among men no truth is found that is *wholly and at once* comprehended and expressed both *in itself and in its consequences*. Inasmuch as he is composed of body and soul by a substantial unity, man has nothing in the intellect that was not earlier in the senses, and consequently he requires *discourse* and must investigate truths with slow and measured steps. He, thus, attains truth dispersed, as it were, in pieces and does not, as the angel, see all the *consequences and connexions* in the grasped principle. Now, innumerable other truths are connected with every and each truth, especially the higher ones or those of the supernatural order, *which it was neither easy nor useful to express at the same time.* These truths are said to be expressed *implicity,* because they are not asserted in themselves but in *other truths.* Thus, when the Holy Spirit revealed the *principles*, he also revealed the *consequences* . . . For if one cannot be denied without the *ruin* of the other, this shows that there is the *greatest connexion* between the two, and that *the revelation of the one is contained in the revelation of the other* . . . Now, since the Holy Spirit, who is the author of divine traditions, sees in all truths all the *connected truths,* it follows that he also willed to reveal the latter . . . Thus, it is easy to discern the truths on which the Church exercises her magisterium. First . . . Secondly . . .Thirdly, all the truths that are inferred *by a necessary conclusion* from some revealed truth. For everyone knows that that which is said explicitly, and that which is said implicitly, come from the same author . . . This can also be gathered from innumerable instances of the Church Fathers and Doctors who defended the truth and rejected error, even *dogmatically, by means of conclusions deduced* from the Scriptures."[128]

[127] AURELIUS PALMIERI, O.S.A., *Theologia dogmatica orthodoxa* (Florentiae 1911), t.1, pgs.45-47.

[128] *De Locis Theologicis* (Augustae Taurinorum 1888), nn.71-72, 80, 171, 274.

445. ALEXIS LEPICIER, O.S.M. – This famous theologian, professor of the College of the Propaganda in Rome, and General of the Servite Order, is well-known to everybody. His clarity, conciseness, faithfulness to St. Thomas, and his profoundly conservative criterion in all questions are recognized by all. His opinion on this subject follows:

"Hence *divine-Catholic faith* comprises all those things that the Church through her infallible magisterium proposes to us for belief as *formally* or *virtually* contained in written revelation or in Tradition. *Formally*, insofar as the truth is expressed and signified in God's written word or in Tradition in so many words, or their *equivalents*. *Virtually*, insofar as it is *by a logical process* deduced from a formally revealed truth . . . And, indeed, if the Church's authority be brought into play, such a conclusion [the *virtually* revealed] is itself to be held *by divine Catholic faith;* otherwise, it will remain a *merely theological conclusion*."[129]

The author could have hardly expressed more plainly in so few lines how dogmatic evolution by way of true virtuality or conclusion is possible, how such evolution is merely theological prior to the definition, and how it becomes dogmatic after the Church's definition. This is the true Thomist position which is the mean between Molina's and Vázquez's.

446. M. M. TUYAERTS, O.P. – Next we quote an illustrious Belgian Dominican, Fr. Tuyaerts.

"It is enough to review the definitions promulgated by the Church in order to find, from the first centuries up to the present, an astonishingly large number of theological conclusions defined as revealed by God, as truths to be believed with divine faith. To cite but a few examples: the Church has defined that the intellectual soul is *per se and essentially* the substantial form of the human body; that in administering the sacraments the minister must have the intention of doing what the Church does, that the baptism conferred by heretics is valid; that this sacrament is not to be reiterated in the case of those who fall into apostasy; that the Blessed Virgin Mary has been conceived without original sin; that when the Pope proclaims ex cathedra revealed doctrines on faith or morals, he is infallible, etc. It is certain, on the one hand, that the doctrinal points just cited, taken at random from hundreds of others, are not immediately revealed truths; it would be rewardless to look for them in the deposit of faith under the given tenor or under an equivalent form. On the other hand, it is no less certain that the Church proposes these doctrines as divine and Catholic dogmas, as truths to be believed with divine and Catholic faith . . . We can boldly conclude that *the Church, through the constant exercise of her infallible magisterium, teaches that theological conclusions can become dogmas of faith.*"[130]

[129] *De stabilitate et progressu dogmatis* (Romae 1910), pgs.22-23.

447. OTHER AUTHORS. – The list of authors we have just cited could be broadened to include the names of many other distinguished theologians, particularly from the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries, some of whom we will have the opportunity to quote later on (477-478).

Even limiting ourselves to contemporary theologians, we could have mentioned many very famous names who deny dogmatic evolution only to reaffirm it subsequently without being aware of their inconsistency.

For instance, we could have quoted the Jesuit Christian Pesch, who writes: "But a question arises here: Is this *consequent meaning* a true meaning of the Scriptures? I answer that a distinction must be drawn between those things that *logically follow*, and those things that by human consideration are linked to the literal sense on account of some sort of similitude. Where a *necessary logical connexion* exists, the *consequent* meaning is not undeservedly said to be a *meaning of the Scriptures*. For, even if not every man can be said to want to express by his words all the things that can be correctly deduced from them *to the last conclusions*, since perhaps he might not have the slightest suspicion of these conclusions, nonetheless, the *Holy Spirit*, who knows very well what is contained in his words, and what men will legitimately deduce from them, *is correctly said to have wanted to express all these things.*"[131] What is all this but the evolution of dogma by way of theological conclusion in the proper sense of the term?

We could also have quoted the classical commentator of the Vatican Council, Vacant, who says: "But this controversy [viz., whether the revealed virtual is truly revealed and definable as of divine faith, or not] is of little importance from the point of view with which we are concerned, if one observes with Cardinal Mazella[132] that one must *certainly regard as revealed* every truth which, although not expressed in any of the formulae of Scripture or Tradition, is nonetheless *attached* to these formulae in such a way that one may well think that, in revealing the dogmas affirmed in the formulae, God also intended to manifest such truths. In communicating his revelations to us God has, in effect, accommodated himself to our human way of manifesting our thoughts. Now, when a man speaks, he intends to make known not only what he affirms, but also all that he *implies* and particularly *all the thoughts that must be attributed to him in order to reconcile his affirmations*. . . Since God possesses infinite knowledge and knows perfectly *all the dogmas without*

[130] *L'évolution du dogme* (Louvain 1919), pgs. 88-89.

[131] *De inspiratione Sacrae Scripturae* (Friburgi Brisgoviae 1906), n.563.

[132] *De Virtutibus infusis*, n.478.

which men would not be able to reconcile the truths formulated in his revelation in proper terms, there is all the more reason to think that *he has willed to manifest these dogmas in revealing those truths.* Consequently, it is possible to consider *as revealed* and as contained in the deposit of Catholic tradition *all those doctrinal points, which are as yet undefined by the Church, but which it will be necessary to admit in order to reconcile among themselves the truths of the Catholic faith* . . . Hence the Church can define as belonging to the faith *all the truths without which the dogmas heretofore believed cannot be harmonized.* It is possible that these truths should have been *completely unknown* in themselves. It is even possible that some authors should have impugned them before their definition, for it might be that these authors could not see that the truths which they rejected had a *necessary connexion* with the dogmas they admitted."[133] What is all this but an admission of the evolution of dogma by way of proper theological conclusion?

We could have in this manner cited many other modern theologians. We have refrained from so doing in order to cite only those who defined it clearly and consistently, without denying in some place the same thing that they affirm in some other place.

The reader will have noticed that the writers we have quoted admit dogmatic evolution by way of proper theological conclusion in a variety of ways, but all agree in admitting it. Some give it a wider scope than others. There are those who regard it as dogmatic or of divine faith in the manner of Vázquez and Vega, i.e., even *prior* to the Church's definition. Others, in true Thomist fashion, do not regard it as formally of divine faith except *after* the Church's definition. However, they are all one in admitting true evolution of dogma by way of properly theological conclusions.

448. COROLLARY. — This small historical study should make it possible for any unprejudiced reader to draw as a bare minimum the following conclusion: anyone who affirms that the view defending the evolution of dogma by way of proper theological conclusions is of recent origin, or accepted by a handful of theologians, or contrary to the common opinion of the Thomist school, or a dangerous doctrine, simply shows himself uninformed of the history of this problem.

[133] *Constitutions du Concile du Vatican,* vol.2, n.849, pgs.293-294.

SECTION V

THE TRUE MIND OF MELCHOR CANO CONCERNING THE DEFINABILITY OF THEOLOGICAL CONCLUSIONS AS TRUTHS OF FAITH

449. STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION. — In the course of this work we have frequently promised to investigate the mind of Melchor Cano on the nature and definability of the theological conclusion as a truth of faith. We shall now keep our promise. The theological conclusion is, as it were, the focal point of the very serious problem of dogmatic development, and it will be worthwhile to find what is on this subject the *genuine* mind of the illustrious founder of the discipline of *De Locis Theologicis,* the great genius that is undoubtedly one of the greatest glories of Catholic theology and, in the opinion of Natalis Alexander, the first among Dominican theologians after the Angelic Doctor.[134]

[134] "Melchor Cano left behind in the twelve books of *De Locis Theologicis* an *everlasting monument* of his genius, teaching and industriousness . . . Whose genius *I regard most highly above all other writers* of the Dominican Order second to St. Thomas's angelical mind." (NATALIS ALEXANDER, *Historia Ecclesiastica,* saec. XVI, c.5, a.2, n.18) — "He acquired *immortal fame* by that work whose volume can hardly be called large, of which *there are as many praisers and admirers as there are readers,* viz., the twelve books of De Locis Theologicis." (NICOLÁS ANTONIO) — "Outstanding as much in doctrine as in genius; *great in fame, greater in reality.* I mean Melchor Cano, who was the *first and the foremost* to accomplish in a *truly golden book* this same study of *De Locis Theologicis.*" (CARDINAL PALLAVICINI, S.J.) — "I can most truthfully affirm that . . . in the academy of doctors of the Dominican Order, Melchor Cano can single-handed *take the place of a whole army.*" (FRANCISCO GARCÍA, S.J.) — "He was a man of *greatest and brightest fame. No one* since his time *has better explained* the mysteries of the Holy Scriptures." (BENITO PEREIRA, S.J.) — "He wrote that most erudite book entitled *De Locis Theologicis* which is today *widely and deservedly found in everybody's hands.* Which are the chief loci that serve the theologian to establish his conclusions, and are as the foundations on which the whole structure of theology is to be built, are in this book by him *so remarkably, accurately and eloquently* settled that *nothing could be more accurate and accomplished.*" (SIXTUS SENENSIS) — "The treatise on *De Locis Theologicis* is indeed *a thoroughly golden book, perfectly accomplished in all its parts,* and put together with the greatest elegance." (ELIAS DUPIN) — "That eminent author wrote a complete and *golden book* on the twelve Loci, which I would describe as a *real treasure* extracted from various mines, in which nothing is included that is not *precious,* not *tested by fire,* not *roundly finished* . . . Any attentive and serious reader will readily confess that (with the sole exception of the Fathers of the Church) there *hardly is any book within the memory of men* that is richer in content, or more suitable in method, or more plentiful in variety, or more polished in phrasing, or more remarkable in the disposition of everything: in it, indeed, *exceptionally brilliant elegance, lofty wisdom, and profound erudition vie for honours.*" (VINCENT CONTENSON).

In this section we intend to show that there has been a confusion concerning the mind of Melchor Cano on this question, and that this confusion has been uncritically handed down from one to another to the point that it is common tender today.

In effect, it is commonplace to find in theological writers the assertion that Melchor Cano maintained, with Vázquez and Vega, that the *theological conclusions are of divine faith.* Let the reader look up in any theological treatise the question whether theological conclusions or the revealed mediate or virtual are of divine faith or not. He will invariably find some such statement as the following: "The first opinion maintains that these theological conclusions are of faith and, consequently, that it suffices for the faith that they be virtually revealed or virtually contained in revelation. Thus says Cano in *book 6* of De Locis, last chapter *ad decimum;* more at length *Vega* in book 9 on the Tridentine, ch.39; and *Vázquez,* part 1, disp.5, ch.3."

Those are Suárez's words.[135] The majority of authors express themselves in similar terms, invariably quoting the same place mentioned by Suárez, which Vázquez had earlier quoted for his own purposes, viz. the *Ad decimum* of the last chapter of Book 6 of Cano's immortal work.

450. MELCHOR CANO'S TEXT. – Let us begin by quoting literally the passage that has given rise to this question, Melchor Cano's famous *Ad decimum.* "Finally, this should also be observed (for it is an important thing and worthy of diligent consideration) that to the *Catholic doctrine* pertains not only what has been expressly revealed to the Apostles, but also that which is *produced by an evident syllogism and inference from a revealed proposition and one that is certain in the light of nature."*

Many other encomiums by distinguished writers can be found in SERRY's introduction to his edition of Cano's works. Today the fundamental course De Locis is often studied in modern *compendiums* and as a consequence Cano is neither read nor quoted nor extolled as often and as enthusiastically as he was by our elders. However, we believe that no one who studies or reads the classic and imperishable work of the founder of De Locis with the leisure that it deserves and compares it with what has been in modern times written on the subject, can fail to subscribe to the judgment of the distinguished and competent Fr. Berthier who says of Cano: *He absolutely was* and HAS REMAINED *the foremost.* "Thus the very same man who was the *first* discoverer of the science of the Loci Theologici was not just the author of the same discipline, but *absolutely was and* HAS REMAINED *its foremost exponent,* even if some things are to be added to his work or changed therefrom on account of the greater development of some sciences.' (BERTHIER, *De Locis Theologicis* [Augustae Taurinorum 1888], prol., pg.8). In turn Cano regards Cajetan as the greatest of St. Thomas's students: "Cajetan, who, I dare say, *is the most outstanding of our family* in acumen and erudition." (*De Locis,* lib.12, c.5) It is well known that by the phrase *our own* or *our family* Cano usually means the *Thomist school. "To us,* that is, *St. Thomas's family."* (*Op. cit.,* lib.9, c.9).

[135] *De Fide,* d.1, s.1 i, a.2.

This is all that Melchor Cano wrote in his often quoted *Ad decimum,* adding in support three examples which we place in a footnote because of their great length.[136] This text is the basis of the widespread persuasion that Melchor Cano defended, as Vega and Vázquez seem to have defended, the view that the theological conclusion *is of divine faith* in the sense that it is *immediately* of divine faith, as the phrase is commonly understood today,

[136] After the quoted words Cano continues: "As, e.g., that Christ the Lord has two wills and two intellects, and that likewise each of these has a created and an uncreated action, or that Christ is of his own nature capable of laughter as all other men, these things perhaps are not expressed in the Sacred Scriptures. However, since it is therein delivered that the Son of God is a man, and it is by natural reason certain that every man is endowed with a created will and intellect, and with the created operations of each of those two powers, and similarly that even as every man is capable of tears so is he capable of laughter; anyone who denies any of these things *will be regarded as a heretic.* For this reason: that by denying the consequent, viz. that the Son of God is endowed with a created intellect and intellection, he therefore denies the antecedent from which it was gathered, viz. that the Son of God is a man. Here is another example. That the Council of Nicaea, or of Chalcedon, or of Ephesus, did not err in the faith is not expressed either in the Sacred Books or in the Traditions of the Apostles except only for the assertion that Councils legitimately gathered in the Holy Spirit cannot err. But that the Councils of Nicaea, Chalcedon, Ephesus, were legitimately gathered is not believed on the basis of revelation. It is however so believed on the basis of human faith and the account of trustworthy history by which we know that these Synods convened from all the parts of the world by proclamation of the true pastors of the Church, who also confirmed them. Thus, although the certainty and truth of the things defined in these Councils seem to depend on two principles, so to speak, of which the one is revealed by God, viz. that Councils legitimately gathered are endowed with truth of utmost certainty, whereas the other is held only by natural certainty on the basis of what serious and upright authors committed to writing; yet, all this notwithstanding, whoever denies the findings and *decrees* of these Synods *will be a heretic* just as if he had denied the Gospel. Here is another very clear example. It is not disclosed in the Sacred Scriptures that the priests of our own times have been duly consecrated by true bishops, but this is rather a matter of fact that depends on the words and intention of the consecrators. From this principle which we hold by human faith, viz. that these priests have been duly ordained, that other thing necessarily depends, to wit, whether the Sacrament of the Eucharist truly exists today in the Church. Whoever denies it would be *regarded as a heretic* by the Church. Only the universal statement has been received through revelation to the effect that all true priests truly consecrate the Sacrament of the Eucharist provided that they have the right intention of consecrating. But that the priests now living are such is not certified by the Gospel alone, but by weighty and constant natural reason together with the Gospel. In much the same manner, too, whoever denies that the Roman Pontiff has the same authority that Peter received from Christ, *is to be regarded as an enemy of the faith,* even if nothing else is proximately gathered from the Gospel than that Peter's successors have the same power as Peter. For, if to this evangelical conclusion it is further added that the Roman Bishop is Peter's successor, which is a fact that we have received from the histories delivered by very sober men, it is plainly gathered that the Roman Pontiff is both superior to the rest of the bishops and possesses in the Church the same power and authority Peter had. Hence the Supreme Pontiffs have fittingly and

since the view that the theological conclusion is *mediately* of divine faith is commonly admitted by theologians.

Now, then, is it true that Melchor Cano defended the view commonly attributed to him, viz. that the theological conclusion is *immediately* of divine faith? Is this the meaning of the text quoted from the famous *Ad decimum*? Let us look into it. But let us begin by making two simple observations.

451. FIRST OBSERVATION. – All the great scholastic theologians divide *divine revelation* into *immediate* and *mediate*. According to all theologians, there are *immediately* revealed truths, and *mediately* revealed truths. Consequently, a thing can belong to the *divine faith* or to *Catholic doctrine* in two different ways: *immediately* or *mediately*. Therefore -- and this should never be overlooked – when in the old theologians we read the phrase *it is of divine faith* or *it belongs to divine faith*, we must find out whether they mean to say *immediately* of divine faith, or only *mediately*.

452. SECOND OBSERVATION. – Although Vázquez confused, or seemed to have confused, the value of the *Church's authority* with that of *theological reasoning*, nonetheless, theologians generally, and Thomists very particularly, have drawn an essential distinction between the two. Thus, when a theologian, and especially a Thomist theologian, says that something is of divine faith or not, one must pay attention to whether he says or means that it is of faith *after* the Church's definition, or *before* or even *without* such a definition.

453. CONFIRMATION. – Indeed, the old theologians frequently employ the terms *revealed truth, to be of faith, to belong to the Catholic doctrine*, not only in today's strict sense of being *immediately* so, but also in the much broader sense of being so whether *immediately* or *mediately*. Although this is obvious, we will quote a few brief passages from various old theological sources.

"*Revealed doctrine, immediately* such as faith, or *mediately* such as theology."[137]

prudently referred those evangelical testimonies to the Roman Pontiffs and the Apostolic See." (CANO, *De Locis Theologicis*, lib.6, c.ultimo, *ad decimum)*

This is all – neither more nor less – that Cano left written in his frequently quoted *ad decimum* on the question at hand. Cano's three examples mentioned in this footnote pose no special difficulty and are generally admitted by theologians. The obscurity lies in the general rule established by Cano in the passage quoted in the text, which asserts that conclusions deduced from a premise of faith and a premise of reason *are f faith*, or *belong to the Catholic doctrine*. What does Cano mean by *are of faith*, or *belong to the Catholic doctrine?* That is what we propose to examine in this section.

[137]BÁÑEZ, *In 1 partem*, q.1,a.1.

"You will ask: What is it that is called a *Catholic proposition?* I say that something is called a *Catholic* proposition in two ways. One, *immediately*, as the proposition that is at once had from the rule of faith . . . Secondly, something is called a Catholic assertion *mediately*, as that which is derived through a good and clear *consequence* from the former kind of proposition."[138]

"*Catholic faith* can, thus, be understood in two ways, *precisely*, to mean the habit and assent to such things as are revealed *immediately*, i.e. *formally* and in themselves. Second, broadly, to mean the habit and assent to *the things just mentioned as well as to such things as are revealed* MEDIATELY, i.e. virtually and in another, as e.g., the conclusions deduced from the articles. For it is *common usage* to describe as *being of faith* those things that are plainly deduced from the articles."[139]

"It is *usual* to say that something *is of faith* immediately and formally, and *mediately* or virtually. That is said to be of faith *immediately* and per se primarily which is attained immediately by God's light and the assent of belief as immediately revealed. And that is said to be of faith *mediately* and per se secondarily which is attained through inference from a proposition of faith, and thus pertains to *theological light*, proper of which is to deduce from the things that are faith."[140]

"I *take for granted* in the first place, that something can be said to be *of divine faith in two ways:* either *immediately* or *only mediately*, i.e., virtually. That is said to be *immediately* of divine faith which is immediately revealed; *mediately*, on the other hand, that which is evidently deduced from a proposition immediately revealed by God and another known by natural light."[141]

"Something can be called a *dogma of faith* either *immediately*, because it is contained in the written word of God or in Tradition; or *mediately*, because it is necessarily inferred or gathered from the word of God. For this kind of conclusions, that are necessarily connected with matters of faith, *are to be said to belong to the faith* at least mediately."[142]

All these passages taken from such distinguished and different théologians are simply the development of the principle expressly formulated earlier by St. Thomas: "A thing belongs to the *faith* in *two ways:* one, *directly*, as

[138]TOLEDO, *In Secundam-Secundae*, q.5, a.3.

[139]MOLINA, *In Primam partem D. Thomae*, q.1, a.2, d.1.

[140]JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *De Fide*, d.9, a.3, solvuntur obiectiones, n.5.

[141]GONET, *De Fide*, d.4, n.99.

[142]GOTTI, *Theologia Scholastico-dogmatica*, tr.1, a.1, dub.4, §1, n.10.

the articles of faith. . . Two, *indirectly,* as the *things* from which there follows something contrary to the faith."[142a] (323, 469)

The point here is not whether the old nomenclature is better or worse than the modern. The point is that in all our classical theologians the phrases *is of divine faith, belongs to the Catholic doctrine,* have *two* meanings: to be of faith *immediately,* or to be of faith *mediately.*

Today the phrase *it is of faith* is getting to be understood in only one sense, in the sense of being *immediately* of faith. Even more, it is almost understood exclusively in the sense of being immediately not only of divine but also of *Catholic faith.* "When something is said to be *of faith, it has become a rather widespread practice* commonly to understand it as being *of Catholic faith.*[143] As we have seen, in earlier times theologians commonly understood it in quite a different sense. "For it is *common usage* to describe as being *of faith* those things that are plainly deduced from the articles."[144] "It is *usual* to say that something is *of faith* immediately and formally, and *mediately* or virtually."[145] Consequently, anyone who reads the old theologians, and particularly Melchor Cano, overlooking these two meanings whereby something is *of faith* or *belongs to the Catholic doctrine,* will debar himself from the understanding of traditional theology and, with the best of good faith, ascribe to an author exactly the opposite of what the author means.

With regard to the second distinction, that of *before* or *after* the Church's definition, suffice it to quote John of St. Thomas: "Concerning the certainty of the conclusions deduced by theology, a *distinction must be drawn:* either such conclusions are reached through theological *reasoning alone,* or *in addition* to reasoning the *Church's definition* is also brought to bear on them."[146]

Putting these two observations together we obtain the following result: in order to read correctly the mind of an old theologian when he asserts that something is of divine faith, one needs to find out two things: a) whether he says or suggests that it is of faith *immediately* or *only mediately;* b) whether he says or suggests that it is of faith even *before,* or *only after* its definition by the Church.

[142a] *Summa Theologica,* 2-2, q.11, a.2.

[143] VALENTÍN DE LA ASUNCIÓN, *Theologia Dogmatico-scholastica* (Burgis 1910), vol.1, prol., a.8, n.51.

[144] MOLINA, *loc.cit.*

[145] JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *loc.cit.*

[146] JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *Cursus Theologicus,* q.1, d.2, a.4.

454. MELCHOR CANO'S TRUE MIND. – When a writer has explained himself, and has explained himself not once but repeatedly and has couched his explanation in express and categorical terms, nobody is entitled to ascribe to him any other different meaning. Now, then, Melchor Cano has given us a categorical explanation of what he meant in the famous *Ad decimum* in saying that *theological conclusions* belong *to the faith* or *to the Catholic doctrine.* In the first place, let us find out whether he meant or intended to say that they are of faith *immediately* or *only mediately.*

In Book 5, chapter 5, he discusses what things are matters of faith and can be defined as of faith by the ecumenical councils as follows:

"There are *two kinds* of conclusions that can be defined in the council. *First,* those that are *proper of theological science* because they are gathered either from two principles held by faith, or from one of faith and another known by the light of nature. *Secondly,* those that the Holy Spirit has in effect himself *revealed* to the Apostles, Evangelists, or Prophets, but since this was not so manifest, the Synod *declares* it. Conclusions of the *first kind* pertain to the faith *secondarily* and, so to speak, *mediately.* For this reason, as we will explain *at length in its proper place,* he who denies them is a heretic inasmuch as he denies *ex consequenti* the principle from which they are deduced. But conclusions of the *second kind* pertain to the faith *properly and of themselves,* nor should we expect new conclusions of this kind from the popes or the councils."[147]

Nothing could be plainer. Theological conclusions, whether deduced from two premises of faith or from one of faith and another of reason, belong to the faith only *mediately,* secondarily, *ex consequenti.* This is the categorical explanation given by Melchor Cano himself of the sense in which theological conclusions can be said, and are by him said, to be *of faith.* This teaching, as explained by Cano himself, is so far from being identical to the view of Vázquez and Vega, that it is the position maintained by the whole Thomist school, and the opinion commonly followed by all modern theologians. Between the latter and Cano there exists only one difference, which is to Cano's credit. The difference is this: when they say that theological conclusions are of faith only *mediately,* modern theologians make an exception of conclusions deduced from two premises of faith, and even of conclusions deduced from a premise of faith and a premise of reason if this latter premise is *inclusive* or explicative: in both cases, according to modern theologians, the conclusions are of faith not only mediately but also *immediately.* On the other hand, in the view of Cano and all Thomists, *no conclusions,* including those

[147] *De Locis,* lib.5, c.5, ad postremum argumentum. "Since we will be discussing the subject *at length* in the *twelfth book* there is no need to dwell on it now." (CANO, *loc. cit.,* § *Illud autem domus*).

deduced from two premises of faith, are of faith *immediately:* they are properly and immediately *theological* and belong to the faith *only mediately.*

Hence, Melchor Cano's teaching is not only opposed to that of Vázquez and Vega but it is even more radically opposed than the teaching commonly followed today by non-Thomist theologians.

455. MORE PASSAGES FROM MELCHOR CANO. – The preceding quotation would be sufficient by itself, on account of its explicit and positive tenor, to establish the mind of Melchor Cano. However, there are many others that place the matter beyond all doubt.

It will have been observed that in the preceding quotation Melchor Cano himself says that he intends to speak at length on the subject in its proper place. As everyone well acquainted with Cano's work knows, and as Cano himself further on expressly says, that place is *Book 12.* Here the author deals extensively with the nature of faith and theology, and more particularly with theological principles and conclusions.[148] It would seem natural that any writer who wished to know Melchor Cano's mind on this issue would preferably look up the book where Cano discusses it ex professo, instead of merely glancing at the *Ad decimum* of another book where he touches on it only incidentally in order to solve an objection related to quite another matter. Following Cano's indication, let us look up Book 12. We will set aside the prologue, which in the edition we have at hand is counted as chapter one, and see what, from chapter 2 onwards, the author has to say on whether theological conclusions are *of faith* or not. Cano says textually:

"To call *faith* what is grounded *proximately* not on *authority* but on *reason* and *syllogism* is *absurd*... The argument given for this view is certainly *not trenchant* but even *dull,* viz. that where the connexion is certain and clear, the conclusion *would not in that case belong to theology but to faith.* But this is a *ridiculous* argument and thus it is deservedly censured by many. For the *difference between faith and theology is easy and plain to see: faith* is proximately and *immediately,* so to say, grounded on *authority;* but *theology* is proximately and *immediately* grounded on *reason.* For, as I have earlier said, *faith and theology are related not otherwise than as the* HABIT OF THE PRINCIPLES *and the* SCIENCE OF THE CONCLUSIONS... But to come to the point. When the connexion is *uncertain,* or when the other proposition that is taken together with the principle of faith is not certain, the conclusion will be held as an *opinion,* but *theology properly will not exist.* But, *whether* the two principles of the syllogism are taken from faith, *or* one is certain by faith while the other is naturally *evident,* the conclusion will *belong to theology,* provided that the consequence be clear in the light of nature or known by the illumination of faith. For, as I have said *many times, and will say many more times,* the *science* of such a conclusion is related to *faith not otherwise* than *natural disciplines* are related to the *habit of principles.* And since these things are so plain as to require no proof, let us turn from them to other matters."[149]

We believe that few theologians have more plainly, more exactly, and more vigorously described the distinction between theology and faith, and the nature of the truly theological conclusion. In Melchor Cano's view, the formal *medium* of faith is exclusively the *authority* of God; but the formal *medium* of theology includes besides human *reasoning.* Although both faith and theology are grounded on *divine* revelation, nonetheless, faith has as its *medium* of knowing *divine revelation as declared by the Church's divine* ***authority,*** whereas theology has as its ***medium divine revelation reasoned,*** i.e., *declared by the human reason of the theologian.* What is known through the first medium is grounded solely and *immediately* on divine *authority;* what is known solely through the second medium is grounded immediately on the theologian's human reasoning, and only *mediately* on revelation or divine authority.

This distinction between the formal *mediums* of *knowing* – it must be kept in mind that *faith* and *theology* are not merely *affective* habits or will-habits that can be given the kind of assent that one pleases; they are *cognitive* or intellectual habits that admit no other kinds of assent than those demanded by the kinds of *mediums of knowing* at their disposal – makes the distinction between faith and theology *easy* and *plain to see.* "The *difference* between faith and theology is *easy* and *plain* to see: *faith* is proximately and *immediately,* so to say, grounded on *authority;* but *theology* is proximately and *immediately* grounded on *reason.* For as I have earlier said, faith and

[148] We give here the table of contents of Book 12. Chap. 1: Introduction. – Chap. 2: What theology, is its object, its purpose. – Chap. 3: Which are theology's principles. – Chap. 4: The arguments of the preceding chapter are refuted. – Chap. 5: Which are the questions or conclusions of theology. – Chap.6: The signs whereby questions of faith can be discerned. – Chap.7: Of the various degrees of error, and first of heresy and the heretical proposition. – Chap.8: Some arguments against the definition of heresy. – Chap.9: Three rules in accordance with which external judgments of faith are to be conducted. – Chap.10: Of propositions that are erroneous, savouring of heresy, offensive to pious ears, temerarious, scandalous. – Chap.11: How to find theological arguments and to draw them out of their loci. – Chap.12: First example, in which a principle of theology is called into question. – Chap.13: Second example, in which a conclusion of theology is called into question. – Chap.14: In which a question that is both natural and of faith is called into doubt. – This 12th Book is a complete treatise on Sacred Theology and Faith, one of the best that have been written. It is the book to be looked up by anyone desirous of knowing Melchor Cano's true mind on these matters.

[149] *De Locis,* lib.12, circa finem. This passage, as almost everything said by Cano in his admirable Book 12, comes from the purest Thomist quarry.

theology are related *not otherwise* than as the *habit of principles* and the *science of conclusions.*"[150] Melchor Cano would find it unbelievable that anyone should impute to him such a confusion between faith and theology as is entailed in making *immediately* of faith conclusions known solely through *reasoning.*

But let us continue quoting from *Book 12,* in which according to Cano his mind on these matters should be studied, and where clear and explicit passages are found in abundance. In chapter 5 he writes: "Questions of faith are of *two kinds.* The *first* belongs *immediately* to the faith, as truly belong all those things that God delivered to his Church whether by word of mouth or by writing. The *second* is of faith *mediately,* and of this kind are *all the conclusions* that are evidently gathered from the first kind. Since these are *revealed by God not in themselves but in others,* as in *principles,* they are said to be of faith *mediately,* and he who denies them is said to deny the faith *in this manner.*"[151]

Further on, in chapter 6, he writes in similar vein: "There being *two kinds* of *truths of faith,* as we have just said, one that is of faith *mediately,* and another *immediately,* we must from the beginning establish two levels of propositions of faith. The first comprises those that are the legitimate *principles* of theology, whatsoever they might be, whether primary or secondary, i.e. all those things that God has revealed to the Church *in themselves.* The second level comprises those that are necessarily gathered from the former."[152]

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[151] *De Locis,* lib.12, c.5, circa finem. By the way, observe that Cano always employs the Latin adverbs *immediate* and *mediate* (to mean something that is of faith immediately or mediately) instead of the diphthonged adjectives *immediate* and *mediate* which would agree with the noun *faith.* Thomists do not distinguish between immediate divine faith and mediate divine faith as if there were *two* different *habits* of faith. They distinguish between *two objects:* one that is *immediately* revealed in itself, and another that is revealed *mediately* or *in another.* The former is faith's immediate and proper object; the latter is theology's immediate and proper object, and of itself belongs to faith only *mediately.*

[152] *De Locis,* lib.12, c.6. Cano immediately goes on to say: "Conclusions of this sort are also related to the faith inasmuch as they are connected with matters of faith, since by reason of being connected, one who concedes the former is obliged to concede also the latter and one who denies the latter is similarly obliged to deny the former... And thus, although *not on the same plane and degree, all can be called questions of faith* simply and without further qualifications, inasmuch as the truths of faith depend on both and are joined and linked with both." *(Ibid.)* "For we have said that faith, although not *immediately,* is nonetheless also about those conclusions that are gathered from the articles of faith by means of an evident and necessary consequence. Hence it is necessary that infidelity should also be MEDIATELY about conclusions that are opposed to theology." *(Loc.cit.)*

We think that these explicit and positive quotations are more than enough to place in clear light Melchor Cano's mind on the question whether theological conclusions are of faith or not. In Cano's view, as in that of St. Thomas and the Thomists, theological conclusions – whether deduced from two premises of faith, or from a premise of faith and a premise of reason – of themselves are *immediately* theological, not of faith; they belong to and are said to be of faith *mediately.* We believe that this conviction is or ought to be beyond doubt to anyone who examines without prejudices, not an isolated *Ad decimum,* but the whole work of Melchor Cano, especially his excellent Book 12, in which he examines the question ex professo and to which he refers every time he alludes to it.

456. THE THEOLOGICAL CONCLUSION AFTER THE CHURCH'S DEFINITION. – At the beginning of this section we remarked that, in order to know the mind of any theologian, particularly of one who is a Thomist, when he says that something belongs to the *faith* or not, one should pay attention to two things: a) whether he says or means that it belongs to the faith *immediately* or only *mediately,* for these are essentially different things; b) whether he says or means that it is of faith *before* or *after* the Church's dogmatic definition, since these are also two very different things.

We have already found Melchor Cano's mind relative to the former. theological conclusions *of themselves* – or *per se,* in Cano's own words – belong to the faith only *mediately.* There remains the second question. What does Melchor Cano have to say about the manner in which theological conclusions belong to the faith *after* the Church's definition?

If Cano expressed himself categorically with respect to the first question, he is no less categorical with respect to the second. He establishes, with St. Thomas and all his school, that such conclusions, after they have been dogmatically defined by the Church, are of divine faith not only mediately but as properly and as rigorously as the very articles of faith, and that anyone who denies them deliberately after their definition is a heretic in the same proper sense as one who denies the Bible or the divine Tradition. Cano further establishes this proposition not as a more or less probable opinion, but as one of the indubitable canons or *rules* (*praeceptiones*) of the *loci theologici.* He says textually:

"SEVENTH RULE. – *If either the Church, or the Council, or the Apostolic See, or even the Fathers, should with one mind and voice deduce a theological conclusion and also* PRESCRIBE *it to the* FAITHFUL, *it shall be considered a* CATHOLIC TRUTH AS IF *it had been* PER SE REVEALED *by Christ; and anyone who opposes it shall be a* HERETIC IN THE SAME WAY

AS IF *he had opposed the Holy Scriptures and the traditions of the Apostles.*"[153]

[153] *De Locis*, lib. 12, c.6. Melchor Cano continues: "I call a theological conclusion properly that which follows from the principles of this science with a certain and firm consequence. A *great number* of instances can be *readily* cited. The Sixth General Council deduced the existence in Christ of two wills and two operations from the text 'Not as I will, but as you will', as well as from the fact that Christ is God and PERFECT MAN. The Council of Lyons, under Gregory X, demonstrated by a firm *theological reason* that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son not as from two but as from one principle, not by two but by one aspiration. Indeed, in accordance with the *faith*, the Father and the Son are one God, one power, one wisdom; briefly, one in everything in which no relative opposition is found; for the unity of nature could not otherwise be preserved in two persons. Hence, inasmuch as in the act of spiring there is no distinction of the Son from the Father, it follows that the Father and the Son are not two but one principle of the Holy Spirit, just as they are not two but one principle of created beings. Which gives us to understand that both Erasmus and Ambrose Catharinus *greatly erred:* the former in thinking that this conclusion has nothing to do with the faith, the latter in counting it among the first principles, i.e., the articles of faith, when it properly is a theological conclusion. Likewise, the Lateran Council, under Innocent III, established *by a theological reasoning* against Joachim that the divine essence neither generates nor is generated. The thing generated and the thing that generates must needs differ really. Hence if the divine essence generates essence, it would differ from itself not only in thought but also in reality. Similarly, all the Fathers to a man *have argued* from the principle 'This is my body' to the conversion of the bread into the body of Christ, since without such a conversion they could neither conceive the truth of those words nor of all the other things that the Catholic faith confesses about the true containment of Christ's body under the species of bread. Thus, the Lateran Council, taking its stand on the agreement of the old Fathers, determined that the bread is transubstantiated into the body and the wine into the blood of Christ: this is how the Council speaks. The matter having been thus settled, these consequences followed, sanctioned by a decree of the Council of Constance, viz., that the bread does not remain after the consecration, and *therefore* the accidents remain without a subject. For in any change or conversion the term from which the change and conversion take their beginning does not remain. Hence if by the words of consecration the bread becomes the body of Christ, then it itself does not endure, but its accidents endure. Likewise, from John's testimony 'As the Father has sent me, I also send you: whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them; and whose sins you shall retain, they are retained', the Synod of Alcalá, sustained by Sixtus IV in his Extravagant, established by means of certain theological argument not only the institution of the sacrament of Penance, but also the precept of confession. This we have plainly *deduced* in the lecture on Penance; look there for the proof of this example. For we are here only sipping and touching with our fingertips, so to speak, the residues of things we have once upon a time pursued at very great lengths in daily lectures." (CANO, *loc.cit.*)

The reader will please understand that by these quotations from Cano we do not exactly mean to maintain that the examples or arguments adduced by him are conclusive or otherwise. What we mean to make plain is Melchor Cano's mind on the subject of the theological conclusion, or that, according to Cano, the theological conclusion is truly and properly of divine faith, *dogma of faith*, but only *after its definition by the Church*, since for as long as the Church has not defined it and it is known *solely through theological reasoning*, it is not of faith except *mediately*, which is to say that it is immediately theological and deserves only theological assent.

In support of this rule Cano cites numerous instances of true *dogmas* of *divine* faith, and not only of ecclesiastical faith, which in his opinion are found in the revealed deposit not as truths revealed *in themselves* or immediately, but only as revealed *in other truths* out of which reason deduces them by way of conclusion or reasoning, i.e., as revealed only *mediately*, and thus they constitute the proper and immediate object of *theology*, not of divine faith, until they were defined by the Church.

Thus, Cano is of the view that, before the definition, theological conclusions are only *mediately* of faith, and properly and rigorously *theological*. *After* the Church's *dogmatic* definition, they are *properly* of *divine faith* and demand the immediate assent of *divine faith*, and not merely a theological assent or an assent of ecclesiastical faith.

This is Melchor Cano's teaching. It is contrary not only to both Vázquez and Vega, but it also is the teaching commonly followed later by almost all the great theologians, both within and outside the Thomist school, even if the contrary persuasion seems to prevail today.

457. OTHER PROOFS OF MELCHOR CANO'S TRUE MIND. – The transcribed quotations, and others that could be adduced, are clear and positive. In our opinion, they leave no room for doubt concerning Melchor Cano's true mind about this subject. Nonetheless, we will submit other proofs of an indirect character, which we believe will serve to confirm everything we have said. These proofs are like extrinsic *indications* that corroborate what we already know directly from Cano's textual passages. Among many others, we will adduce only three.

458. FIRST INDICATION. – When there are two extreme or radically opposed positions on any debated point, and those who defend both the one and the other cite and quote a famous writer for their side without the least reservation concerning the latter's agreement with their opinion, this provides a strong indication that the quoted author is not in complete agreement with either of the extremes.

Now, it is common knowledge that on the issue of whether theological conclusions are *of faith* or not, two radically opposed positions exist within traditional theology. One is the theory of Vázquez, the other, that of Molina. Vázquez is of the opinion that the theological conclusion is *immediately* of divine faith, even prescinding from the Church's definition. Molina is of the opinion that the theological conclusion is of faith only *mediately*, even with the Church's definition. Vázquez holds that *any evidently deduced theological conclusion* can and ought to be given not only a theological assent, but also an assent of *divine faith*, even before its definition by the Church. Molina holds that the theological conclusion can be given only a *theological* assent, never the immediate assent of divine faith, even after it definition by the Church. The opposition between these two theories cannot be more complete.

Now, here is an interesting fact, which, as far as we know, has not been noticed by anyone, viz. that both Vázquez and Molina quote Cano in support of their opposed theories, and quote him as one whose mind is clear and beyond all doubt. This strongly suggests that Cano is in the middle.

Few will be surprised on being told that Vázquez quotes Cano for his opinion since it is so commonplace today to see Cano cited as of the same view as Vázquez and Vega. But we believe that the reader will be surprised to learn that Cano is cited by Molina to prove not only that theological conclusions of themselves are not of faith, but also that they are not of faith even if the Church should define them dogmatically as she has defined the conclusion of the two wills in Christ. Molina says literally:

"The principles in this doctrine are all those things that God has revealed immediately and in themselves... There have been some who have said that among the principles of theology we must also place the definitions whereby the Church has established certain truths because she sees that they are *evidently deduced from revealed truths,* as, e.g., that in Christ there are two wills, divine and human, which although not expressed in the Scriptures is, nonetheless, *evidently gathered therefrom*... This opinion does not please me. *Cano also rejects it, De Locis,* bk.12, ch.3. For the assistance whereby the Holy Spirit is readily present to the Catholic *Church,* and to the Supreme Pontiff who is her head, *is not given in order to make of faith* what previously was not of faith, but only so that she will not err in declaring the things that belong to the faith *mediately* or *immediately.*"[154]

Here we see Cano, whom we are used to find cited as of Vázquez's opinion, cited by Molina as of the diametrically opposed opinion.

The fact that both Vázquez and Molina should have with perfectly good faith cited Cano in favour of radically opposed theories has a very simple explanation. As the saying goes, extremes touch each other, i.e., radically opposed theories often share a common starting or terminal point. The characteristic common to the theories of Vázquez and Molina is the ignoring of the essential distinction between the *divine* or *dogmatic* value of the *Church's* definition and the *human* or *theological* value of *science* and *reasoning* relative to whether theological conclusions are or can be of faith. Such ignoring of *specifically* different values accounts for the fact that, in dealing with the question whether theological conclusions are *of faith* or not, both Vázquez and Molina dismiss as *accidental* and irrelevant the distinction between *before* and *after* the Church's definition. They both simply say that the theological conclusion *is of faith,* or *is not of faith,* without making any distinction by reference to the Church's definition. Vázquez asserts that for

[154] MOLINA, *In Primam Partem D. Thomae,* q.1, a.2, d.1.

anyone who evidently sees the conclusion, *it is of faith* before as well as after the definition since the before and the after are accidental. Molina says that *it is not of faith* either before or after the definition since the definition is accidental and makes no difference. Since both theologians regard as accidental the distinction between before or after the definition, one should not be surprised to find that, when reading other authors, they should attach no importance and pay scant attention to whether these authors, in affirming or denying that theological conclusions are *of faith,* mean to affirm or deny it *before* or *after* the definition. If an author says that theological conclusions *are of faith,* Vázquez takes it as obvious that the author agrees with himself. On the other hand, if the author says that theological conclusions *are not of faith,* Molina takes it as equally obvious that the author shares his view.

Here we have the explanation of how two theologians as distinguished as Vázquez and Molina could have cited Melchor Cano in favour of two radically opposed theories. In Melchor Cano's theory -- as in that of every true Thomist -- two assertions can be made on this question, both equally true: 1) Theological conclusions *are not of faith;* 2) Theological conclusions *are of faith.* That is to say: *of itself (per se)* or *before* the Church's definition the theological conclusion is not of faith *immediately* but only *mediately,* since properly and immediately it is *theological.* But *by* or *after* the Church's definition it is not only theological, but *of faith* properly and immediately, since the Church's dogmatic definition furnishes another *different formal medium,* viz., *divine revelation as explicated* or defined *by the Church.* Vázquez will read this second assertion by Melchor Cano in the celebrated *Ad decimum,* and will cite him for his side saying that, according to Cano, theological conclusions *are of faith.* Molina will read the first assertion in many other places, especially in Book 12, and will also cite Cano for his side saying that, according to Melchor Cano, theological conclusions *are not of faith.* Both are somehow justified in so saying, since both of Cano's assertions are true in the Thomist doctrine.

We believe that this is the true account of how Vázquez and Molina, both first-rate theologians, but also often not too faithful to the teaching of the St. Thomas, could have cited Melchor Cano in support of their opposed theories. This is an indication that Cano is not totally in agreement with either one, but occupies a middle term, as we have seen from Cano's own clear and categorical texts.

459. CONFIRMATION. — Even at the price of a small digression, it will not be superfluous to adduce here some quotations from John of St. Thomas, Báñez, Gotti, and De Groot. It is well known that John of St. Thomas is rated among the more profound, and almost always more faithful commentators of the true thought of St. Thomas and the Thomist school. Contenson has rightly described him thus: "John of St. Thomas, *second to no*

one in the understanding and penetration of the teaching of the angelic St. Thomas."[155] Describing Vázquez's and Molina's positions relative to the Thomist doctrine on this subject, John of St. Thomas says:

"What certainty does the theological conclusion have without the Church's definition, or together with it? Concerning the certainty of the conclusions deduced by theology, *a distinction must be made:* either they are reached *solely through theological reasoning,* or in addition to reasoning the Church's definition is also brought to bear on them. In the first case, there are two opinions. Some think that conclusions evidently deduced from principles of faith also belong to the faith, as Master Soto *seems* to believe. [We have seen in no. 386 that Soto has explained himself by saying "provided that they are defined by the Church".] Molina attributes the same opinion to Scotus when he [Scotus] says that faith and theology are the same habit. The other opinion, which is the more common, states that the conclusions thus deduced belong to the faith not *immediately* but *mediately,* but belong *per se to theological science.*

"Authors also differs with regard to the certainty of theology in the second case. Father Vázquez *equates the Church's definition,* whom he declares something to be of faith, *to the theological demonstration,* and assigns only a *rather too material* difference, viz., that the *council* proposes what it defines as an object of belief to the whole Church, whereas theological *reasoning* proposes it only to those to whom the consequence is evident. Here he equates the definition of faith to theological reasoning. But, on the other hand, Molina (with some others whom Granados cites and follows) maintains that the propositions *deduced* by the Church, and thus defined in virtue of the deduction, are not *immediately* of faith, but still belong to theological science as *conclusions,* and cannot become *principles* of theology... The *third opinion* states that propositions evidently deduced from the principles of faith, *if defined by the Church,* belong to the faith *immediately* and become *principles* of theology, they no longer are grounded on *reasoning* but derive their certainty from the *divine testimony proposed by the Church* in accordance with the Holy Spirit's infallible assistance in the definition of matters of faith. *This is the opinion commonly followed by Thomists.*"[156] In the treatise *De Fide,* alluding to this same just quoted place, he says: "From what has been said it can be gathered that virtual or *mediate* revelation, or that which is deduced through reasoning, such as is found in theology, differs *specifically* from *immediate* revelation which is had from the testimony of the witness and attains that which is to be believed by

[155] CONTENSON, *Theologia Mentis et Cordis,* lib.7, d.5, c.1.

[156] JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *Cursus Theologicus* q.1, *de scientia theologica,* d.2, a.4.

faith, as we have extensively explained in Part 1, Q.1, Disp. 2, art. 4. where we rejected two *extreme* opinions: one, *Vázquez's,* who thinks that the conclusion deduced from the premises of faith is with respect to the knower's reasoning just as certain as the proposition defined by the Church; the other, Molina's who thinks that even if the Church's definition be brought to bear on a proposition that previously was not of faith, it would not make it of faith, and that the Holy Spirit assists the Church to preclude her from erring, but not to make of faith what previously was not of faith. These opinions can be seen in the aforecited place, where they are *impugned.*"[157]

St. Thomas's great commentator, Domingo Báñez, similarly writes: "Just as divine revelation is *immediately* the formal principle of *faith,* but *mediately* of *theological science,* so also *faith* itself *immediately* and *per se* inclines only to the articles of faith and to those things that are expressly revealed, but *mediately* and *consequently* also regards the *conclusions* gathered by evident consequence from the articles of faith. Hence, it is necessary that dissent regarding the propositions of theology should *mediately* and consequently be opposed to the faith."[158] *"For anyone who confesses that* Christ is a perfect man, and denies that he is risible because he thinks that risibility does not pertain to the perfection of human nature, he would indeed be a bad philosopher, but *not yet a heretic, since up to now the Church has not yet defined* that Christ is risible. *However, if the Church were to define* that risibility pertains to the perfection of human nature, as she has defined that Christ has two wills, human and divine, *then he who denies it would be a heretic,* because he would be opposing the teaching of the Church who is the pillar and support of truth. To the argument, then, we reply that conclusions deduced from principles of faith, or from one of faith and another naturally evident, are *properly* conclusions of *theological* science. Nonetheless, they are said to be conclusions *of faith,* not immediately, but *mediately;* and their contraries are said to be an error about the *faith mediately;* and he who maintains the contrary falls under suspicion of heresy, especially if he is a philosopher, since such a one is not presumed to deny what is evident by natural light, and therefore he is presumed to be denying the principle of faith. *My teacher, Cano, is of this opinion* in *De Locis,* bk.12, ch.2."[159]

Gotti, too, writes in similar vein: "Something can be said to be a *dogma of faith* either *immediately* because it is contained in divine Scripture or Tradition, or *mediately* because it is inferred and gathered from the aforecited Word of God . . . Hence, the theological conclusion is commonly said to be

[157] JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *De Fide,* d.1, a.2.

[158] BÁÑEZ, *In Primam Partem,* q.1, a.8.

[159] BÁÑEZ, *ibid.,* a.2, ad. 3.

virtually revealed, because it is so close to the faith that nothing more is required to make it of faith but the *Church's express definition.*"[160]

It is thus plain that Báñez, John of St. Thomas, Gotti (and we could easily cite all the other Thomists) solve the problem in the same way and with the same distinction as Melchor Cano: the distinction between being of faith *immediately* or *mediately,* and the distinction between being of faith *before* or *after* the Church's definition. Vázquez overlooked the first distinction and believed that *Melchor Cano* was of his own opinion. Molina overlooked the second distinction and attributed to *Cano* the opposite view.

460. FR. DE GROOT. – We keep insisting on these things, even at the risk of being considered importunate and diffuse, because they furnish the key to the understanding not only of *Melchor Cano* but of the whole Thomist position on the subject. Their being overlooked explains the fact that *Cano* is being saddled today, even by distinguished Thomists, with views that are a far cry from what he actually did say.

Thus, e.g., quote only a domestic theologian, the learned Fr. De Groot, whose *Summa Apologetica* is universally and deservedly held in high esteem, after saying that theological conclusions are not immediately *of faith,* but *mediately* or *ex consequenti,* and that their denial can thus be called *heresy* only in a *mediate* or inferential sense (which is exactly Cano's own teaching,[161] provided that the theological conclusion is considered *before* the Church defines it as of faith), goes on to say: "However, *Cano, and some others,* seems to depart from this rule when he says: *'It* [the truly theological conclusion] *shall be considered a Catholic truth as if it were per se revealed by Christ; and anyone who opposes it shall be a heretic in the same way as if he had opposed the Holy Scriptures and the traditions of the Apostles'.*"[162]

The complete rule given by *Cano,* here quoted by *De Groot,* but from which *De Groot* has omitted the first part thinking it unnecessary begins thus, as the reader already knows: *"Seventh Rule: If either the Church, or the council, or the Apostolic See, or even the Fathers, should with one mind and voice deduce a theological conclusion and also PRESCRIBE IT TO THE FAITHFUL, it shall be considered a Catholic truth,"* etc.[162a] These underscored words, omitted in all good faith by Fr. De Groot in the belief that they are accidental to this question, plainly show that in this Rule Cano

[160]GOTTI, *op.* and *loc. cit.,* dub. 4, n. 10, and dub. 5, n. 8.

[161]CANO, *De Locis,* lib.12, c.6, praecep.7.

[162]DE GROOT, *Summa Apologetica,* q.10, a.6, n.4, (ed.3, Ratisbonae 1906) pg.387.

[162a]CANO, *loc. cit.*

speaks of the theological conclusion *after* the Church's definition. Now, that the theological conclusion, *after* its definition by the Church, is immediately of divine faith, and that its denial is heresy in the proper and immediate sense, and not only in a mediate or inferential sense, such a view is not the particular opinion of *Cano and some others,* as Fr. De Groot gives to understand, but the constant teaching of the *whole* Thomist school, of the *whole* Scotist school, and of the immense majority of great theologians of all the other schools. In giving an innocently truncated quotation of Melchor Cano's *Seventh Rule,* Fr. De Groot overlooked the distinction between *before* and *after* the Church's definition, just as so many other modern theologians, in their reading or quoting of Melchor Cano's other passages, overlook the distinction between *immediately* or *mediately* pertaining to the faith. For Thomists both distinctions are essential to this problem.

461. SECOND INDICATION. – One of the best indications of a theologian's mind on whether theological conclusions known only by evident reasoning are of faith *immediately* or only *mediately* is to verify whether he admits or not a specific distinction between the habit of the *principles* and the habit of the *conclusions* of the sacred science.

Any theologian who regards as specifically identical the habits of faith and of theology, must logically admit that the theological conclusion is immediately of faith merely through being known by evident *reasoning* or deduction from revealed truths, which is theology's *formal* or immediate *medium.* On the other hand, any theologian who admits a specific distinction between the habits of theology and faith, must consistently admit that the theological conclusion which is known solely through the *theological medium,* i.e., through *reasoning,* is immediately theological and only mediately of faith. Inversely: anyone who admits that theological conclusions known only through reasoning are immediately of faith, must concede that the habits of theology and faith do not differ essentially; whereas anyone who admits that such conclusions belong to theology properly and immediately, and only mediately to faith, must conclude that faith and theology differ specifically.

This rule or criterion is of itself evident to anyone familiar with these questions, and can be inductively substantiated by a review of the various theologians and theological schools. It has been expressly and well formulated by Suárez. Speaking of the opinion that denies that theological conclusions are of themselves immediately of faith, Suárez writes: "And, thus, as favouring this opinion we may cite those *who distinguish* the habit of faith from the habit of theology."[163] Further on, speaking of the opposite opinion, he

[163]SUÁREZ, *De Fide,* d.3, s.11, n.3.

points to the same rule but inversely: "And of the same opinion are Aureolus and some Doctors *who do not distinguish* between the habit of faith, insofar as it assents to the conclusions, and the habit of theology."[164] This same rule is adduced by *Lugo*[165] and many other writers.

Thus, in order to find out whether Melchor Cano is of the belief that theological conclusions are *immediately* of faith, or only *mediately*, no better indication can be given than ascertaining whether or not he distinguishes specifically between faith and theology. If he does not distinguish them specifically, he must logically maintain that theological conclusions, known solely through evident reasoning and without any definition by the Church, are of faith immediately. On the other hand, if he specifically distinguishes faith from theology, or the principles from the conclusions of the sacred science, he must logically say that theological conclusions, known solely through theology's formal medium, viz., *reasoning* or deduction from the revealed truths, are immediately and properly theological, and belong to the faith only *mediately* or indirectly or *ex consequenti*.

Now, then, has Melchor Cano admitted, or not, a specific distinction between the habits of *faith* and *theology*, or between the habits of the *principles* and of the *conclusions* of the sacred science? He has admitted not only a specific but even a *generic* distinction, and in rather strong terms, too. "For the *difference* between faith and theology is easy and *plain* to see: faith is proximately and *immediately*, so to say, grounded on *authority*, but theology is proximately and *immediately* grounded on *reason*. For, as I have earlier said, faith and theology are related *not otherwise* than as the habit of the principles and the science of the conclusions."[166] "As we have said, by this distinction theology and faith are sundered not *in words* and *thinking*, but *in their whole reality and generic constitution (universa re et toto genere)*."[167] According to Cano, the *root* of this distinction is to be found in the fact that *theology* is to *faith* as *reason* or *science* is to *simple understanding*. "If we want to derive this whole matter from the *source* and see *wherefrom everything flows*, we must understand that the habit of *faith* is to *theological* discipline as the habit of *understanding* is to human *sciences* and faculties."[168] "For, as I have said *many times*, and *will say many more times*, the science of such a conclusion is related to faith *not otherwise* than natural disciplines are related to the habit of principles."[169] All of which is simply a

[164] SUÁREZ, *ibid.*, d.6, s.4, n.3.

[165] *De Fide*, d.1, s.13, n.258.

[166] *De Locis*, lib.12, c.2.

[167] *Ibid.*, c.3.

[168] *Op.cit.*, lib.2, c.8.

[169] *Op.cit. lib.12, c.2.*

faithful commentary to that great principle that St. Thomas reiterates time and again under various guises: "In the *doctrine* of faith the *articles* of faith are as the self-evident *principles* in the *doctrine obtained* through natural *reason*."[170]

Cano, then, has plainly and radically distinguished *theology* from *faith*, and the *principles* from the *conclusions* in the same way that St. Thomas did. This is a good indication that he could not have maintained that *theological* conclusions, of themselves or without the Church's definition, are *of faith immediately*, but only *mediately*, as we have learned from his own express textual testimony.

462. CONFIRMATION. -- Also worthy of perusal in its entirety is the following passage from Cano on the distinction between theology and faith, and on the manner in which anyone who denies an evident theological conclusion is or may be called a heretic. In Book 12, ch.7, Rule 7, he establishes that anyone who denies a theological conclusion *after* the Church has defined it as of faith, is properly and formally a *heretic*. In Rule 8, he says that when all the theologians teach a conclusion with absolute unanimity and impose it on the faithful, such a conclusion is to be regarded as a *Catholic truth*, and its denial as *proximate to heresy*.[171] Cano then goes to say:

"But since almost all theologians are agreed on it, and *I myself have frequently asserted* that these conclusions, derived from the faith by an explicated consequence, BELONG PROPERLY TO THEOLOGY, NOT TO THE FAITH, someone might be surprised that I should now be guilty of confusion, as if faith and theology were the same virtue. For if an error about a theological conclusion is an error about the faith, as it truly is, if to deny it is heresy, it follows that faith and theology belong to the same virtue, inasmuch as the errors opposed to both faculties pertain to the same vice, for both errors are heresies. But anyone who *rereads what has been said earlier* will not find it difficult to crush and destroy this CALUMNY. For we have said that faith also regards, albeit not *immediately*, the conclusions gathered by evident and necessary consequence from the articles of faith. Hence it is necessary that infidelity should also regard *mediately* the conclusions contrary to theology. Now, since from these contrary errors there follows not only a sickness of the faith, but also its corruption, it follows that between them and the faith there exists, indeed, an *indirect* and *consequent*, but nonetheless *true* and natural opposition. Hence, although the Church understands that these conclusions depend not only on faith but also on natural principles, nonetheless, *she judges* anyone who opposes them a *heretic* because she does not presume any rational man to deny that which is plain and manifest to reason. She

[170] *Summa Theologica*, 2-2, q.1, a.7.

[171] In accordance with what he had already settled in Book 8, ch.4, concl.3.

presumes, and for a very good reason, that he does not waver with respect to the natural reasoning, which is evident, but with respect to the faith. But if anyone should be ignorant of the consequence of such things, which is otherwise plain, or even of the natural principle that is taken together with the article of faith in order to deduce the theological conclusion, such a one *would certainly not be a heretic.* For instance, suppose an unlettered man thinks that this proposition is false, *every man is risible.* Even if he believed that Christ is a man, he would not thereby believe Christ to be capable of laughing. But really he would not be properly an infidel but obtuse, since he is not per se opposed to the supernatural but to the natural evidence. However, since this obtuseness, albeit accidentally and indirectly, nonetheless corrupts and perverts *ex consequenti* the judgment of *faith,* it is *deservedly in the eyes of the Church considered* not as obtuseness but as crime."[172]

All Thomists express themselves similarly and in almost identical terms. Suffice it to quote Báñez: "But an argument arises against this conclusion. For if an error contrary to *theological* propositions is also an error contrary to the *faith* it follows that faith and theology are not formally different habits. The consequent is false; therefore, also the antecedent. That the consequent is false has been shown above in art. 2. Proof of the consequence: a contrary cannot be opposed to two formally different contraries, but only to one. White is opposed only to black, and cold only to hot. Therefore, if error contrary to *theology* is contrary to *faith,* then theology and faith do not differ formally. The reply to this argument is that just as divine revelation is *immediately* the formal principle of *faith,* but *mediately* of *theological* science, so also faith itself immediately and per se only inclines to the articles of faith and those things that are expressly revealed, but *mediately* and *consequently* it also regards the conclusions gathered by evident consequence from the articles of faith. Hence it is necessary that dissent about the propositions of theology be *mediately* and *consequently* contrary to the faith, just as a physical agent that destroys the accidents necessary to the conservation of substance consequently destroys the substance itself. For this reason the Church condemns as an *infidel* anyone who opposes such theological propositions. For although she understands that such propositions are deduced not only from faith but also from natural principles, nonetheless, *it is presumed* that any rational man does not deny rationally evident things, but things that are held by faith. For instance, anyone who denies that Christ is risible, which is gathered from these two premises: every man is risible, Christ *is a man,* would be condemned as an infidel. For he is not presumed to deny the proposition that every man is risible, which is naturally evident, or the validity of the consequence, which is also per se obvious, but the truth of the

[172] CANO, *De Locis,* lib.12, c.6.

assumed minor, Christ is a man. But if one is so ignorant or obtuse as not to perceive either the validity of the consequence or the truth of the natural principle, he might deny the theological propositions *without detriment to* Catholic *faith* because he would be excused on account of ignorance."[173] All of which is true *before* the Church's definition. As we have seen, *Báñez* acknowledges, with Cano, that *after* the Church's definition the theological conclusion is properly and rigorously of divine faith, and anyone who deliberately denies it would be a heretic properly and formally, not only *presumably*. "However, *if the Church were to define* that risibility pertains to the perfection of human nature, as she has defined that Christ has two wills, human and divine, he who denies it *would be a heretic.*"[174]

Suárez himself defends this general teaching of Thomists: "Someone might say: anyone who, e.g., denies this proposition *Christ is risible,* is deservedly regarded as a heretic, because he is not believed to deny the evident proposition *every man is risible,* and thus he is convicted of denying the other proposition of faith, Christ is a man. Therefore, by denying the conclusion he falls into heresy; therefore, the proposition contrary to the conclusion is heretical. *Reply:* it is one thing to speak of such a man in accordance with human or external presumption; and it is another thing to judge him in accordance with internal truth. The argument obtains in the first case, because men judge in accordance with exterior appearances and do not see the heart. Thus, if the man in question is pertinacious in his opinion, he will be deservedly punished as a heretic. However, if he internally believes that Christ is a man and does not believe that he is risible, either because he obtusely denies the universal principle, or because he rashly imagines that God has separated in Christ that property from the essence, he would not be *formally* a *heretic,* but mistaken in the faith, until the proposition that Christ is risible *is immediately defined by the Church.*"[175]

Lugo expresses himself as Cano, Báñez and Suárez: "It might be asked whether, in case that the Church defines in a legitimate council a proposition deduced evidently from one revealed premise and another evident non-revealed premise, the man who denies it *is properly a heretic?* Of this case I have also already said in the aforementioned place[176] that such a proposition

[173] BÁÑEZ, *In Primam Partem,* q.1, a.8, *tertia conclusio.*

[174] *Ibid* a.2, ad 3.

[175] SUÁREZ, *De Fide,* d.19, s.2, n.15.

[176] LUGO, *De Fide,* d.1, s.13.

is of faith *after the Church's definition.* Thus it must be said, in consequence, that he who denies it *afterwards is properly a heretic."*[177]

463. THIRD INDICATION. – We come now to the third indication – one must significant and convincing – viz., that Suárez himself recognizes that on this question Cano is not with Vázquez and Vega, as is commonly asserted and as Suárez himself had earlier affirmed, but with St. Thomas and all the Thomist school. To our knowledge, no one to date has noticed this important fact.

It is true that, in the place and passage we quoted at the beginning of this section, Suárez affirmed without reservations that Cano, with Vázquez and Vega, was of the opinion that theological conclusions are immediately of faith, even without the Church's definition, citing in support the aforesaid *Ad decimum* from Cano's Book 6. However, Suárez himself, dealing later on with the opposite opinion which maintains that such conclusions are immediately theological and only mediately of faith, writes as follows: "This opinion, besides the authors cited in the second opinion [viz., *Capreolus, Cajetan,* the *Thomists,* others, and plainly *St. Thomas*] is *held by Cano* in *De Locis*, bk 12, ch.7, Rule 8, thus *explaining* or *correcting* what he had *earlier said."*[178] Further on he repeats almost the same thing: "This is the common opinion of the Doctors with St. Thomas, Cajetan, Capreolus, *and it is also Cano's better judgment* in *De Locis, bk 12,* ch.3, 3rd conclusion."[179]

Suárez here plainly confesses two things: first, that Cano is of the opinion that theological conclusions are not immediately of faith, but immediately theological and only mediately of faith. Secondly, that with this express admission by Cano in Book 12, Cano has *explained* or *corrected* what is commonly attributed to him on the basis of the *Ad decimum* in Book 6. In the face of this categorical confession by Suárez how is it possible that his readers should have so nonchalantly continued citing Cano as being of Vázquez's and Vega's opinion, frequently bolstering such a claim with Suárez's authority, without observing or telling us that Suárez had himself eventually confessed the contrary? Particularly since what Suárez calls *explanation or correction* is only an *explanation,* which Cano did not defer until Book 12, as Suárez seems to suggest, but had already anticipated in Book 5, that is to say, much earlier than the celebrated *Ad decimum* found in Book 6. In Book 5, and alluding beforehand to what he intended to say in Book 12, Cano gives us the key to his mind in the following terms: "There are two kinds of conclusions that can be defined in the council. *First,* those that are

[177] *Ibid.,* d.20, s.2, n.69.

[178] SUÁREZ, *De Fide,* d.3, s.11, n.7.

[179] *Ibid.,* d.6, s.4, n.4.

proper of theological science because they are *gathered* either from two principles held by faith, or from one of faith and another known by natural light. Secondly, those that the Holy Spirit has in effect himself *revealed* to the Apostles, Evangelists, or Prophets, but since this was not so manifest, the Synod *declares* it. Conclusions *of the first kind* pertain to the faith *secondarily* and, so to speak, MEDIATELY."[180] Thus, Melchor Cano's mind, which Suárez correctly recognized in the whole of Book 12, is not a *correction* but a clearer and more ample explanation of what Cano had already said before and after his *Ad decimum* in Book 6.

In any case, it is beyond doubt that Suárez confesses that Cano's definitive mind on the issue of theological conclusions is not the mind of Vázquez and Vega, as is customarily asserted, but the mind "of Capreolus, Cajetan, the Thomists, others, and plainly St. Thomas."[181]

464. RÉSUMÉ. - From all the foregoing we believe that it has been clearly shown that Melchor Cano's mind on this question can be summarized in these two propositions:

1. Of themselves, or without the Church's definition, theological conclusions are not immediately of faith, but immediately and purely theological and only *mediately* of faith.

2. After the Church's dogmatic definition, theological conclusions are *properly* and *immediately* of faith.

The first proposition is diametrically opposed to the teaching of Vázquez and Vega; the second is diametrically opposed to Molina's. Both together reflect the Angelic Doctor's great theory, of which John of St. Thomas says: "This is the opinion commonly followed by Thomists."[182]

SECTION VI

A REPLY TO SOME HISTORICAL OBJECTIONS

465. A HISTORICAL STUDY. – In the preceding sections we have seen the view upheld by traditional theology on the homogeneous evolution of Catholic dogma by way of inclusive theological conclusion.

By way of complement we will deal briefly in this section with certain historical objections submitted to us by a distinguished theologian. Our objector intends to prove that, in maintaining the definability of theological con-

[180] CANO, *De Locis,* lib.5, c.5.

[181] SUÁREZ, *loc. cit.*

[182] *De sacra theologia,* d.2, a.4, n.3.

clusions, traditional theology took the term to mean *improper* theological conclusions. Pursuing his point, he divides his historical study into four periods: a) The great Schoolmen of the 13th century; b) From Scotus to the Council of Trent; c) From the Tridentine to the Vatican; d) From the Vatican Council to the present. We will follow the same division.

466. THE GREAT SCHOOLMEN UP TO SCOTUS. -- As we have just remarked, our objector intends to prove that when St. Thomas and the great Schoolmen of the 13th century taught that the consequences of the articles of faith are definable as of divine faith, they meant the *improper* consequences, i.e., *formally* revealed truths. To this end he explains several display of erudition something which we have ourselves explained several times, viz., that the great Schoolmen consider the whole aggregate of revealed truths as an *organism*, and divide it into articles and not-articles. By articles they mean those fundamental truths that offer "special difficulty". Everything else that offers no special difficulty, even if it is formally revealed, is classified among the "not-articles". This latter group has often been subdivided into antecedents, concomitants, and consequences of the articles. Hence – says our objector – when they speak of "consequences" of the articles, they take this term to mean *formally* revealed truths even if they are not articles, and thus *improper* consequences. A further proof is the fact that they classify the Eucharist among the not-articles, but no one will deny that the Eucharist is a formally revealed truth. This is the whole meat of what our objector has to say relative to this first period.

Our reply is quite simple. In the great Schoolmen, and particularly in St. Thomas, we find *two* divisions of the revealed. Two very different divisions inasmuch as they are made from different points of view. The first is the division into *articles* of the *Creed* and *not-articles*. All the great Schoolmen treat of this division in connection with the *Apostle's Creed* in Book 3 of the *Sentences*. The second is the division into *directly* revealed and *indirectly* revealed, which is sometimes described as a division into things that are "contained in revelation in an *explicit* or *determinate* manner" and things "from whose denial or corruption there would follow the denial or corruption of what is explicitly or determinately revealed". The great Schoolmen of the 13th and following centuries treat of this second division in Book 1 of the *Sentences*, particularly in connection with the question "Whether it is allowable to opine the contrary about the Notions".[183]

Our objector has concentrated almost exclusively on the first division into *articles* and *not articles*, whereas he should have focused his attention

[183] ALBERTUS MAGNUS, d.26, a.14; ST. THOMAS, d.33, q.1, a.5, and other places we will cite further on; ST. BONAVENTURE, d.27, p.1, q.4; SCOTUS, *Oxoniense*, d.28, q.2; AEGIDIUS ROMANUS, d.33, q.6; PETRUS A TARANTASIA, d.33, q.1; DIONYSIUS CARTHUSIANUS, d.26, q.5; etc., etc.

primarily on the second division into the *directly* and the *indirectly* revealed. Having concentrated on the first division, and having observed that St. Thomas places the Eucharist in the second member of this division, viz., among the not-articles, he deduces that the division of the articles and not-articles is a division within the formally revealed. We invite our objector to consider the second division, and he will see for himself that St. Thomas never places the Eucharist or any other sacrament in the second member, i.e., in the category of the *indirectly* revealed."[184]

It is this division of the revealed into *directly* and *indirectly* revealed which is of interest for us at the moment. St. Thomas attaches such a great importance to it that he discusses it in a separate article in four different places, besides other secondary places, viz.: a) in *Sentences*, bk.1, d.33, q.1, a.5 under the title "Whether contrary opinions about the Notions can be held without sin"; b) in *Sentences*, bk.4, d.13, q.2, a.1, under the title "Whether heresy means the perversion of the faith"; c) in the Summa Theologica, p.1, q.32, a.4, under the title "Whether it is allowable to opine the contrary about the Notions"; d) in the same *Summa* p.2-2, q.11, a.2, under the title "Whether heresy is properly about matters of faith". These four articles are perfectly parallel and, together with the parallel articles in St. Bonaventure and Scotus, should be repeatedly perused, analyzed and compared by anyone to ascertain the mind of the great Schoolmen, and particularly St. Thomas's, on the question of dogmatic development by way of theological conclusions.

The difference between the directly and the indirectly revealed does not consist, as in the case of the articles and the not-articles, in offering greater or lesser difficulty. The difference consists in something else which is very important but not sufficiently noted by many people. For St. Thomas, as well as for St. Bonaventure and Scotus, the term indirectly revealed means *all those things from whose denial or corruption there necessarily follows the denial or the corruption of the directly revealed.* Once it is defined by the

[184] "Whether the Eucharist is a *special* article of faith? Various opinions held by theologians are usually cited, but many of them differ *only in words* since they all do not have the same idea of the *article of faith*, nor the same meaning of the term *special*.

"Soto observes that a truth can be regarded as an article of faith on three levels: *First*, because it is *defined* by the sacred Councils. *Second*, because it is *expressed* in the Bible. *Third*, because it is *one of the fourteen articles of faith* proposed to all Christian faithful for belief.

"Thus *everyone admits* what Soto proves, viz., that this truth is a truth to be held with *divine faith*, and that it is an article of faith in the first two ways, since it is *defined* in almost all the councils from the beginning of the Church and... it is *expressly* contained in the Gospel." (IOANNES MARTINEZ DEL PRADO, O.P., *De Eucharistiae Sanctissimo Sacramento, super tertiam partem Summae Doctoris Angelici* [Compluti 1662], q.75, dub.1, nn.14-15, pgs.156-157)

Church, the indirectly revealed becomes a truth of truly *divine* faith and its denial is truly *heresy*. Here are some pertinent passages:

"I answer that it must be said that something pertains to the faith in two ways. One, *directly*, as those things that have been principally delivered to us by God . . . But *indirectly those things* pertain to the faith *from the denial of which there follows something contrary to the faith.*"[185]

"I answer that we now speak of heresy insofar as it imports the *corruption of the Christian faith* . . . to which something pertains in two ways: one, *directly* and principally, as the articles of faith; two, *indirectly* and secondarily, as *those things wherefrom there follows the corruption of some article*. And *heresy* is possible with regard to *both the one and the other* in the same manner as faith."[186]

"I answer that . . . contradiction about matters pertaining to the faith can happen in two ways: for either it is about things that are *expressly* contained in the articles of faith . . .; *or* about *things that are followed by something in disagreement with and opposition to the faith.*"[187]

Now, according to St. Thomas, the denial of each and every true and proper conclusion entails the denial of the principle from which it is deduced, and, consequently, the denial of each and every truly and properly theological conclusion entails the denial of the directly revealed. "This is the relationship of the *conclusion* to the *principle*, that *with the destruction of the conclusion, the principle is destroyed.*"[188] "Demonstrative conclusions are necessarily related to the principles whereby they are demonstrated in such a way that *if the conclusions are not true, it is necessary that the principles be not true.*"[189] "And since there are some things implicitly contained in the faith of the Church as conclusions in principles, on such matters there is a diversity of opinions *until* one of them is *declared by the Church* to be contrary to the Church's faith, *because therefrom there follows something directly* opposed to the faith."[190]

Finally, when the Church defines the indirectly revealed, "the same judgment applies to the *latter* [the indirectly revealed] and to the *former* [the directly revealed], that are determinate in the faith, *because the one is*

[185] ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theologica*, p.1, q.32, a.4.

[186] *Summa Theologica*, 2-2, q.11, a.2.

[187] *In 1 Sent.*, d.33, q.1, a.5.

[188] ST. THOMAS, *In Post. Analyt.*, lect.38.

[189] ST. THOMAS, *De Veritate*, q.24, a.1, ad 18.

[190] *In 3 Sent.*, d.13, q.2, a.1, ad 6.

followed by the other".[191] "In this one may not err without *heresy*."[192] "If anyone should resist such a determination he would be considered a *heretic*."[193] "Thus the pertinaciousness whereby a man refuses to *submit* himself to the Church's judgment in matters that are of faith DIRECTLY or INDIRECTLY, makes a man a heretic."[194]

467. THE INDIRECTLY REVEALED. – Thus, in the second member, i.e., the indirectly revealed, St. Thomas – and similarly St. Bonaventure and Scotus – includes two things: a) all the merely *ornamental* or *secondary* matters in the Holy Scripture, e.g., that Abraham had two sons, or that Tobias's dog wagged its tail, because even if such matters are unimportant *of themselves* (per se), they are important on account of their necessary *relation* to something that is *directly* revealed, since their denial would entail the denial of the dogma of the total inspiration of the Holy Scripture which is something *directly* revealed; b) all truly *theological conclusions*, and for identical reason, i.e., on account of their necessary *relation* to the *directly* revealed, since the denial or corruption of the theological conclusion entails the denial of the *directly* revealed dogma from which the conclusion is deduced: "Because therefrom there follows something *directly* opposed to the faith."[195]

Let every Thomist read and reread without prejudices these four fundamental articles in which the holy Doctor treats of the indirectly revealed, let him analyze and compare them among themselves, and it will be plain that in the definition of the indirectly revealed St. Thomas includes every truly theological conclusion.

Let him not consider exclusively the *example* given by St. Thomas. Examples are always taken from plain and obvious things in order to apply them later to things more difficult and less obvious. Let him consider instead the *definition* given by St. Thomas of the indirectly revealed as well as the *application* he makes of it to the question of the *divine notions* and the *theological conclusions*.

When St. Thomas speaks, e.g., of *life*, he defines it as "anything that moves itself from within" and cites *animals* as an example. If any empirical reader would pay exclusive attention to the example, he would deduce that, according to St. Thomas, neither the angels nor God have life, since they are

[191] *In 1 Sent.*, d.33, q.1, a.5.

[192] *Summa Theologica*, p.1, q.32, a.4.

[193] *Op. cit.*, 2-2, q.11, a.2, ad 3.

[194] ST. THOMAS, *In 1 ad Corinth.*., c.11, lect 4; ed. Vivès, vol. 20, pg. 725.

[195] *In 3 Sent.*, d.13, q.11, a.1, ad 6.

not animals. But this would be a ridiculous way of interpreting St. Thomas because, although the example usually given by him, when he treats of life, applies neither to the angels nor to God, nevertheless the definition applies. Similarly, when he deals with the indirectly revealed, St. Thomas gives as an example the secondary matters in Holy Scripture, but he defines it as "everything from the denial or corruption of which there follows the denial or corruption of the directly revealed". And it is obvious that this definition applies in full to theological conclusions, for as the holy Doctor himself reminds us, "with the destruction of the conclusion, the principle is destroyed."

On the other hand, in the first and the fourth of the aforecited articles St. Thomas expressly and radically draws a distinction between truths that may in one way or another belong to the faith, and truths that can in no way belong to the faith. The former he subdivides into truths that directly belong to the faith, and truths that belong indirectly. Thus, according to St. Thomas, every truth whatsoever has to be classified under one of these three categories: a) truths that belong to the faith *directly;* b) truths that belong to the faith *indirectly;* c) truths that *in no way* belong, or can belong, to the faith.

He describes the first category as truths of divine faith *per se*. Of the second category he says that they are of divine faith because of their necessary *relation* to those of the first category, and that they are to be believed with divine faith *after their definition by the Church*. Of the third category he says that they are absolutely *indifferent* to the faith and may be freely affirmed or denied *without any sin*, except perhaps the subjective sin of vanity or presumption which is always possible in every human act even in the case of matters utterly profane and indifferent to the faith. *"There is no sin*, except perhaps per accidens, viz., a sin of presumption or of vainglory or of many other kinds since causes *per accidens* are infinite."[196]

Now, then, let every Thomist say frankly in which of these three categories or groups is he going to classify the theological conclusions and even the dogmatic facts? If he classifies them in the third category, such truths would be utterly *indifferent* to the conservation of the faith, which is the Jansenist error. If he classifies them in either the second or the first, he is constrained to confess that, according to St. Thomas, such truths, upon being defined by the Church, become objects of truly *divine faith*. There is no evasion possible for anyone who subscribes to those two fundamental articles of St. Thomas.

Furthermore, in the first and third of the four aforecited articles St. Thomas expressly applies the doctrine of the indirectly revealed to the divine *notions*. This is clear proof that St. Thomas takes the indirectly revealed to

[196] *In 1 Sent.*, d.32, q.1, a.5.

mean not merely the secondary scriptural matters since the divine notions are not scriptural.[197] The reason why the divine notions are included in the indirectly revealed, and, therefore, definable as of divine faith, is given expressly by St. Thomas, to wit, that from the denial of the notions there would follow the denial of the persons, and since the persons are directly revealed, it follows that the notions are indirectly revealed and definable as of divine faith. "The same judgment applies to the latter and to the former which are determinate in the faith, *because the one is followed by the other*"... *because "from an error about the notions there follows an error about the persons."* Consequently, the holy Doctor deduces that very fundamental corollary which no theologian or historian of dogmas ought ever to forget: "And *on this account* many things are now considered *heretical* that were not so regarded before." What teachings did St. Thomas mean in saying that they are now considered by the Church as heretical, which were not so regarded before? Certainly he did not mean directly revealed teachings since he was speaking of the indirectly revealed. Neither did he mean the secondary or ornamental details of the Holy Scriptures since none of such matters has been defined as heretical by the Church. Plainly, then, St. Thomas meant the truly theological conclusions, or those truths that have not been directly revealed, but whose denial entails the denial of a directly revealed principle. This suffices to render them also indirectly revealed and definable as of divine faith. The holy Doctor explains himself quite plainly: "And *on this account* many things are now considered *heretical* that were not so regarded before, *because it is now much clearer what follows from* them."

Let Thomists observe the term *because*. Many modern theologians are satisfied with pointing out that if the Church employs reasoning, it is for the *only purpose* of ascertaining whether or not the conclusion was implicitly contained from the beginning in revelation or in the intention of the revealing God. That is very true, and the Church has no other *purpose* but that. However, such theologians overlook the fact that, according to St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure and Scotus, the human instrument or *medium* available to the Church (but always under *divine* assistance or authority), in order to ascertain whether or not a conclusion was contained from the beginning in revelation or in the intention of the revealing God, is verifying whether that conclusion carries an absolutely necessary connexion with a directly revealed principle, and, therefore, that for St. Thomas *absolutely necessary connexion* with a directly revealed principle (it is this that defines the proper theological

[197] "To this *Altisiodorensis* in his Summa, book 1, replies: 'Neither of those opinions is heretical because *we do not have it determined by the Sacred Scripture what must be held about the notions*'." (DIONYSIUS CARTHUSIANUS, *In 1 Sent.*, d.36, q. 5; *ed. cit.*, t. 18, pg. 52.

conclusion) is tantamount to *implicit containment* in the intention of the revealing God or in divine revelation.

468. RÉSUMÉ. – Thus, all our argumentation – one which we have already expounded on other occasions and which we reiterate with the profoundest conviction – is condensed in the following propositions from St. Thomas:

1. Everything that is revealed indirectly can be defined as of divine faith.

2. By indirectly revealed is meant anything from the denial of which there follows necessarily the denial of something directly revealed.

3. From the denial of every truly theological conclusion there follows necessarily the denial of something directly revealed.

4. Therefore, every truly theological conclusion is definable as of divine faith.

469. FINAL CONFIRMATION. – Readers not familiar with these matters can find clear and definitive confirmation in the classical commentators of St. Thomas. The whole issue hangs on what St. Thomas and the great Schoolmen of the 13th century understood by *indirectly* revealed. Let us consult Bánez in his commentary to St. Thomas's classical article.[198]

"First conclusion: Heresy is possible about matters that are of faith *directly* or *indirectly* . . . With respect to the first conclusion of the second article it is asked: What does St. Thomas understand by *pertaining directly* or *indirectly to the faith?* For either it is taken to mean . . . or it is taken to mean . . . or, finally, *directly* is taken to mean something that immediately falls under the habit of faith, i.e. *without benefit of the consequence of reasoning;* but that is said to belong *indirectly* to the faith *which is gathered by a necessary consequence from a proposition that is immediate according to the faith.*

"To this question the answer is that St. Thomas is to be understood *in this last sense* . . . As, e.g., if anyone were to deny that Christ is *risible,* he commits an error in the Catholic faith *consequently* and *indirectly,* because it validly follows *by a naturally evident consequence* that Christ is not a perfect man."[199] Nothing could be plainer. Elsewhere Bánez adds: "If anyone should confess that Christ is a perfect man, but deny that he is risible in the belief that risibility does not pertain to the perfection of man, he would be a bad philosopher, *but not yet a heretic,* since *up to now* the Church has not defined that Christ is risible. But *if the Church were to define* that risibility

[198] *Summa Theologica,* 2-2, q.11, a.2.

[199] BÁÑEZ, *In Secundam-Secundae,* q.11, a.2.

belongs to the perfection of human nature, as she has defined that Christ has two wills, divine and human, then anyone who denies that Christ is risible *would be a heretic."*[200]

We would advise every Thomist to peruse Bañez's whole commentary to the aforementioned article.[201] It is priceless.

However, we believe that one statement is inaccurate: "For *everything* found in the Holy Scripture pertains *directly* to the faith." Báñez seems not to have observed that St. Thomas expressly affirms that the *secondary* matters in the Holy Scripture pertain to the faith only *indirectly.*

But this is of small importance with respect to proper theological conclusions, the only thing with which we are now concerned. On this score all, or almost all, commentators interpret St. Thomas as Báñez did, and affirm that such conclusions are included by St. Thomas in the number of truths that are of faith *indirectly.* As mentioned earlier (263), there is no theologian who does not quote St.Thomas's texts on the *indirectly* revealed in order to prove that the Church's infallibility extends to the properly theological conclusions. We have already quoted Torres, Toledo, Silvio, Gravina, Serra, Philip of the Most Holy Trinity, de Marinis (390, 395, 405, 406, 410, 413, 243, 414). And we will further quote some others.

"A *heretical* proposition is one which *directly* and *immediately* contradicts a truth of faith immediately revealed by the Holy Scripture, or *defined by the Church.* This is the common definition given by St. Thomas, 2-2, q.11, art.2, and by the commentators of the same question . . . On a second level there is the *erroneous* proposition. An erroneous proposition is one which is contrary to a truth *revealed by God mediately or indirectly and secondarily,* AS ST. THOMAS EXPRESSLY TEACHES *in the same q.11, art.2"*[202]

"Because of the ratio sub qua *theological conclusions* are to be held as objects of faith. The ratio sub qua is the *connexion* between the immediately revealed and those things that are required in order to safeguard, propose, explicate, and defend the truths thus revealed . . . 'To which faith', says St. Thomas, 2-2, q.11, a.2, 'a thing belongs in two ways . . . One, *directly* and principally, as the articles of faith; two, *indirectly* and secondarily, as all those things from the denial of which there follows the corruption of some

[200] BÁÑEZ, *In Partem Primam,* q.1, a.2, ad tertium argumentum.

[201] BÁÑEZ, *In Secundam-Secundae,* q.11, a.2.

[202] PETRUS DE TAPIA, O.P., *De Fide* (Hispali 1657), lib.1, q.6, a.4, nn.2-3.

article; and heresy is possible with regard to both the one and the other in the same way as faith.'"[203]

"Nor is there any disagreement among theologians on this matter [i.e. on the extension of the Church's infallibility to theological conclusions in the proper sense], but on the censure which the contrary opinion deserves. A thing belongs to the doctrine of faith, says St. Thomas in I Cor., c. 11, lect. 4, in two ways: one, *directly,* as the articles of faith that are per se proposed for belief; but certain other things *indirectly, inasmuch* as from their denial there follows something contrary to the faith."[204]

We could continue citing many more theologians, ancient and modern, Thomists and non-Thomists, who interpret St. Thomas in the same sense. But we will limit ourselves to one further passage which we believe will please our objector since it is taken from the Salmanticenses.

"An *erroneous* proposition is one which immediately and evidently is opposed to a truth *revealed mediately and secondarily,* or one that immediately and evidently goes against a theological conclusion, as this proposition 'Christ is not risible'. THIS IS GATHERED FROM ST. THOMAS, 2-2, q.11, a.2, and is taught by Suárez, Báñez, Tapia, and modern Doctors generally."[205]

In these passages our objector can see for himself that St. Thomas and the great Schoolmen of the 13th century are interpreted by Báñez and the majority of theologians in exactly the same sense in which we have interpreted them. There it is clearly and explicitly explained what St. Thomas meant by the indirectly revealed or by conclusions or consequences of the directly revealed, viz. *theological conclusions* in the true and *proper* and *rigorous* sense of the term.

Let our objector now read St. Thomas, or any of the great Schoolmen of the 13th century, and he will ascertain that they place the Eucharist and other similar truths in the category of the *not-articles* of the *Creed,* but never in the category of the *indirectly revealed.* Our objector has busied himself with the analysis of the questions in which the Schoolmen deal with "How all the truths of faith are contained in the *Creed*", or "How the *Eucharist* is contained in the *Creed*" where they discuss the *accidental* division into articles and not-articles. He should also have given himself to the analysis of the questions in which they discuss *"Whether it is allowable to hold a contrary opinion about the Notions"*, or *"Whether heresy is about matters of faith"*. It is in these questions that they treat of the *fundamental* division into *directly* revealed and *indirectly* revealed. His confusion or insufficient understanding of these two divisions of the revealed object explains why all the remarks about the great Schoolmen of the 13th century made by our objector with such copious erudition are beside the point.[206]

[203] DE GROOT, O.P., *Summa Apologetica,* (ed.3, Ratisbonae 1906), q.9, a.2, n.3, pgs. 310-311)

[204] AEMILIUS DORSCH, *Institutiones theologiae fundamentalis* (Oeniponte 1914), vol.2, p.2, s.1, a.3, pg. 337.

[205] SALMANTICENSES, *De Fide,* d.9, n.48, (ed. Palmé) vol. 11, pg. 429.

470. FROM SCOTUS TO THE COUNCIL OF TRENT. – In this period our objector cites Scotus, Ockham, Gerson, Aureolus, and, among the Thomists, Cardinal Torquemada. He is constrained to confess that they all, Cardinal Torquemada included, expressly and plainly defend that the properly theological conclusion is definable as of divine faith.

Our objector could have likewise cited many other writers of this period – we have quoted them earlier (372-398) – who say exactly the same thing. Better still, he could have simply said that *all,* without exception, are of the same view. We have found *not one single theologian* prior to Molina – nor, we believe, will one be found – who has defended the contrary. Since our objector frankly admits all this, we could without further ado turn to the following period.

However, Capreolus belongs to this second period, and he is one who wields great authority among Thomists. Our objector could not simply ignore him, and neither should we. Our objector concedes that all the theologians of this period cited by him defend the same view that we do. He finds in Capreolus no clear statement to the contrary. So he contents himself with saying that "Capreolus *seems* to say the contrary." But from what source did our objector pluck that timid *seems?* Capreolus is not in the habit of allowing Scotus, Aureolus, etc. one single slip against the teaching of St. Thomas without the appropriate correction. Has he corrected in the least the teaching of these theologians on the *definability* of the theological conclusion? No, not one word on this subject has our objector been able to find

[206] In the *Summa Theologica* St. Thomas makes a division of the object of faith in four places, among others. (1) Division into directly revealed and indirectly revealed (p.I, q.32, a.4,). (2) Division into articles and not-articles (2-2, q.1, a.6, corp.) (3) Division into revealed "secundum se" and revealed "in ordine ad alia" (*ibid.*, ad 1). (4) Division into directly revealed and indirectly revealed (2-2, q.11, a.2).

In making division (4) the holy Doctor remarks "As was said earlier." Our objector takes the phrase "as was said earlier" to refer to division (2); thus he gathers that division (4) into "direct" and "indirect" is identical to division (2) into "articles" and "not-articles". Since the Eucharist is placed by the holy Doctor among the not-articles, our objector believed that it should also be placed among the indirectly revealed. Since it is plain that the Eucharist is a formally revealed truth, our objector has attempted to conclude therefrom that St. Thomas takes the indirectly revealed solely to mean the formally revealed.

in Capreolus. All he has found is that, on the question whether theology is a science not of the articles of faith but of the conclusions, and whether theology is a *habit distinct* from the habit of faith, Capreolus answers both questions in the affirmative. We fail to understand our objector's reason for quoting these passages from Capreolus since that same answer has been, is, and will be given by all Thomists with St. Thomas. Those two questions are relevant to the issue whether theological conclusions are of faith *per se,* i.e., prior to the Church's definition, which is a view that Thomists have always rejected; but they are altogether irrelevant to the issue whether they are of faith *by their relation* to directly revealed truths when such a relation is defined by the Church, which is the view that Thomists have always maintained.

On the other hand, earlier our objector had asserted that whenever St. Thomas speaks of conclusions, he takes the term to mean improper conclusions, quoting in support of this assertion St. Thomas's passage *In Boetium:* "The things we hold by faith are as principles in this science. and the others are as conclusions." Now he says, and quite correctly, that when Capreolus speaks of conclusions he takes the term to mean proper conclusions. But our

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This confusion arises from thinking that the phrase "as was said earlier" found in division (4) makes reference to division (2) into articles and not-articles. However, it is obvious that it makes reference not to division (2) but to division (1) into directly revealed and indirectly revealed, as the learned editors of the Leonine edition point out, or to division (3) into revealed "secundum se" and revealed "in ordine ad alia", as the reader can find out in any of the other editions of the *Summa.*

Now, it is plain that division (2) into articles and not-articles differs from the other two divisions into "directly and "indirectly" revealed, or into revealed "secundum se" and "in ordine ad alia". Every article is revealed directly and "secundum se"; but not everything revealed directly or revealed "secundum se" (e.g., the Eucharist) is an article. It is therefore a case of two different divisions drawn from different points of view. To be indirectly revealed, and hence definable as of divine faith, it is sufficient, in St. Thomas's view, that its denial be followed by the denial of anything directly revealed; and this happens in the case of every rigorously theological conclusion i.e., one that is truly *inclusive.*

If our objector wishes to insist in taking all those divisions as equal, so much the better for our case. It is obvious that Báñez and the greater part of the Saint's commentators take the indirectly revealed to mean proper theological concusions. It follows that the term "consequences of the articles" in the other divisions is to be taken also in this same meaning.

In a later article our objector eventually comes to admit all of this when he expressly says that St. Thomas takes the term revealed implicitly or secondarily or "per accidens", and the term explications or determinations of the articles to mean "not only nominal explications, but also explications that *differ conceptually* and are deduced as theological conclusion." With this concession there is enough and more than enough, since it is a commonplace that every true Thomist regards as a *proper* theological conclusion every conclusion that *differs conceptually* from the primitive datum.

objector has failed to observe that, in making his point about proper conclusions, Capreolus (in the same place alluded to by our objector) quotes precisely the same passage from St. Thomas which our objector interprets as referring to improper conclusions.[207]

Even more puzzling is the fact that our objector has failed to take account of the one passage from Capreolus which is relevant to the present case. It says: "To the fourth it should be said that although the Bible does not proceed in the manner of demonstrative science, nonetheless, from the things contained in the Bible, which are as the principles of a science, *the Fathers,* arguing against heretics from the principles of theology, have demonstratively inferred *conclusions with which theology is concerned.* Thus, although *theology* is not in the sacred canon delivered *explicitly* in syllogistic style, nonetheless, in the book of subsequent *theologians* it is *explicitly* delivered in a scientific and scholarly manner. HOWEVER, EVERYTHING IS CONTAINED IMPLICITLY IN THE BIBLE."[208] Our objector can see for himself that both Capreolus and St. Thomas hold that true and proper theological conclusions – our objector correctly admits that it is of such conclusions that Capreolus speaks – are *implicit* in the Bible. This is the only requisite necessary for such conclusions to be definable as of divine faith.

Our objector ends the second period with Capreolus, and so will we.

471. A VERY SIGNIFICANT CONFESSION: FROM THE TRIDENTINE TO THE VATICAN. – Our objector begins this third period with this frank and honest confession: "The teaching that regarded the conclusions as truths *of faith* [i.e., *definable as truths of faith*] *remained common* also after the Tridentine on account of the *common agreement of the theologians.* Thus in the 16th century it was held by Pedro Soto, Bellarmine, Cardinal Toledo [and he could have added Cajetan, Cano, Domingo Soto, Báñez, Medina, etc., etc.]. More, John of St. Thomas, with Navarrete and Master González, declares it *the common teaching among Thomists,* at least with respect to the *definability of conclusions."*

Let the reader take good note of this momentous confession. That is what we have time and again pointed out in this book against certain textbooks that describe the definability of the theological conclusion as a particular view of Cano, Vázquez and Vega, when in fact it was the common opi-

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[207] CAPREOLUS, *In 1 Sent.,* prol., q.1, a.1, *Quinta conclusio.* (ed. Paban-Pègues) t.1, pg.4.

[208] *Ibid.,* a.2, *Solutiones ad argumenta contra quintam conclusionem,* (ed.cit.) pg.17.

nion of *all* theologians prior to Molina, and of almost all who came after him. The excess of Vázquez and Vega consisted in asserting that the conclusions were of faith *per se* or without the Church's definition, not in asserting that they were definable as of faith, since that was already the common view, as our objector confesses and as Suárez had already confessed. We are happy that a historian as reputable as our objector should have come to this very important conclusion.

However, despite his frank confession, our objector believes that *later* theologians have restricted that common teaching, and that it is this restriction that should command our acceptance. He says: "Nonetheless during this period this nominalistic formula is *no longer simply admitted* but only with a *restriction* and distinction that bring it back to the path of truth."

In the first place, there is something funny in qualifying as "nominalistic" a formula which our objector confesses has been admitted without any restriction and distinction by *all* theologians, before and after the Tridentine, until Molina. Are we to say that all the classical theologians of the 16th century who admit without distinctions and restrictions the definability of truly theological conclusions are nominalists? That teaching is not in the least an offshoot of the nominalist period. Both the common opinion and the formula which our objector is pleased to describe as nominalistic are derived from the notion of the *indirectly* revealed expounded by the great Schoolmen, and in a very special manner by St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure. (361-370)

In the second place, when a teaching has been the *common doctrine* before and after the Tridentine, and especially among the classical theologians of the 16th century, it is of little consequence that *some* later theologians should have restricted it, even if such theologians should be called John of St. Thomas, the Salmanticenses, and Billuart. These are the three post-Suarezian theologians who have sown confusion *in the Thomist school* on these questions. The former by a confusion of nomenclature with the promiscuous use at times of the terms *immediate* and *virtual*. The latter two by using the new Suarezian terms *formal confused* or equivalent and *pure virtual* (virtuale *tantum*), thus giving grounds for debating whether they take such terms in the same sense or in a sense different from that which they had and that which they have since Suárez who coined them.

But let us set this aside and see who are the theologians that, in our objector's opinion, have made the *restriction* or cooperate in it. He writes: "Apparently it was *Cajetan* who gave the first impetus; *Melchor Cano,* the first to raise the question; *Suárez,* the first to pose the issue of definability; *John of St. Thomas,* the *Salmanticenses,* and Billuart gave the question a *sufficient solution.*" Let us examine one by one, briefly, these six theologians, the only ones cited by our objector on the matter of what he calls the *restriction* of the *common* teaching.

472. CARDINAL CAJETAN. – Of Cajetan our objector says the following: "Following in the wake of Capreolus, Cajetan assigned the conclusions to theology as its proper object. For this purpose, he distinguishes two kinds of revealed truths: 'the formally revealed, i.e., revealed in itself; and the virtually revealed, i.e., revealed in its principles'." This is *all* our objector has found in Cajetan.

We have ourselves quoted this passage from Cajetan several times, and, frankly, we fail to see its bearing on the restriction with which we are now concerned. However, we suspect that, by the phrase "following in the wake of Capreolus" coupled with what he had previously said of Capreolus, our objector wishes to insinuate, without venturing to say it in so many words, that first Capreolus and then Cajetan, in designating proper conclusions as the object of theology, have modified or restricted the teaching of St. Thomas, who, according to our objector, had taken the term conclusions to mean *improper* conclusions. Is this what he means to say?

Well, then, anyone who looks up the *Summa Theologica's* first question, art.3, "Whether the Sacred Doctrine is one science", will find that St. Thomas introduces there the distinction between the "revealed" and the "revealable", and designates the "revealed" as the proper object of divine faith and the "revealable" as the proper object of theology. "Hence, since the sacred doctrine considers certain things insofar as they are divinely *revealed,* all things whatever that are divinely *revealable* share in the one nature of this *science.*"[209]

It is surprising that our objector should have missed this fundamental distinction drawn by St. Thomas between the "revealed" and the "revealable" inasmuch as the "revealable" is exactly the *properly* theological conclusion, and the root and vital force of all dogmatic progress by way of rigorous theological conclusions. The distinction later made by Capreolus into "principles" and "conclusions" as well as the distinction by Cajetan into the "formally revealed" and the "virtually revealed" are neither restrictions nor amplifications, but accurate translations of the holy Doctor's distinction into "revealed" and "revealable". Although this is obvious, we will quote the commentator who seems favoured by our objector on these questions. Commenting on the holy Doctor's just quoted article and text, John of St. Thomas says: "St. Thomas assigns on the part of the Holy Scripture the things that are *immediately revealed* since the things delivered by the Scriptures are credible by faith; but on the part of theological *science* he assigns

[209] St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica,* p.I, q.I, a.3.

the things that are *revealable,* i.e., those that are *revealed virtually or in potency."*[210]

The reader can there find plainly stated not only that the distinctions made by Cajetan and Capreolus are identical to that made by St. Thomas, but, furthermore, that St. Thomas and the great Schoolmen took the term conclusions to mean the *proper* conclusions (revealed virtually or in potency), which is how both Capreolus and Cajetan understood the term, as our objector confesses.

On the other hand, our objector has forgotten to quote a very important passage in which Cajetan deals with and settles ex professo the question whether everything *necessarily connected* with the revealed principles is definable as of faith, which is precisely the point now at issue. "There are two ways whereby what is to be believed can be determined for the Christian religion. . . *Nor does it matter* whether something is revealed *explicitly* in Holy Scripture and elsewhere (as, e.g., the creation of the world, the incarnation of the Word of God, and others of the same sort) or *implicitly,* as are *all those things the opposite of which cannot be maintained together with the truth of the Holy Scripture* and of other things we know by certain faith, except that ingenuity, effort, reason and intellect are required to make it evident that the things that are said to be *implicitly contained* are NECESSARILY CONNECTED with the things in which they are said to be contained."[211]

Cajetan explicitly asserts there what we had already learned from Capreolus and St. Thomas, viz., that everything *necessarily connected* with truly theological connexion is *implicit* and *definable* as of divine faith. Are we to say that Báñez, Capreolus and Cardinal Cajetan are also nominalists?

473. MELCHOR CANO. – Our objector makes three assertions about the illustrious founder of *De Locis.* We regret to say that all three assertions are inaccurate.

In the first place, he says that in *Book 6,* chapter 8, Cano *began* by affirming the common teaching that theological conclusions are of faith, but further on, in *Book 12,* he expressly added that they are of faith only mediately. This is not accurate. The view that they are of faith mediately had already been indicated by Cano in *Book 5,* chapter 5, in the paragraph which begins with the words "Ad postremum argumentum". (463)

In the second place, he says that by affirming that conclusions are of faith mediately Cano modified the common opinion he had himself earlier expressed. This is even more inaccurate. That the theological conclusion is

[210] JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *Cursus Theologicus, In 1 partem,* q.1, d.2, a.7, n.11.

[211] Opusculum *De Conceptione B. V ginis,* ch.1: "On two ways of discerning what is of faith, or what is opposed to it."

not of faith except mediately is asserted by Cano in the case of the theological conclusion *per se* or without the Church's definition. But in the case of conclusions *defined by the Church* Cano expressly and categorically affirms that they are of faith as immediately and as formally as the articles of faith or the Gospels themselves. And Cano asserts this not as a probable opinion but as one of the fundamental rules or "precepts" of the *Loci Theologici.* Says Cano: *"Seventh Rule:* If either the Church, or the Council, or the Apostolic See, or even the Fathers, should with one mind and voice deduce a *theological* conclusion and also prescribe it to the faithful, *it shall be considered a Catholic truth as if it had been per se revealed by Christ;* and anyone who opposes it *shall be a heretic in the same way as if he had opposed the Holy Scriptures and the traditions of the Apostles."*[212] Nothing could be clearer (456).

In the third place, our objector asserts that Cano describes the theological conclusions as "appendages of the faith", and affirms that when a theological conclusion is denied "the faith becomes ill, but does not perish." Obviously, our objector has read Cano in a hurry. The phrases "appendages of the faith" and "the faith becomes ill, but does not perish", written by Cano at the beginning of chapter 5, are referred by Cano not to theological conclusions but to *other* truths that do not attain to the category of conclusions because they do not have a *necessary* but a *strong* connexion. Of such truths Cano had just spoken in the preceding chapter, at the end.[213] We invite our objector to reread those chapters, and he will admit that such is the case. So very far is Cano from thinking that when the conclusions are denied "the faith becomes ill, but does not perish", that he expressly says a bit further on, after the passage quoted by our objector: "Now, since from these contrary errors [viz., the denial of the conclusions] there allows not only the illness of the faith, but also its corruption," etc.[214]

Thus, Melchor Cano's teaching is embodied in these two propositions: a) Truly theological conclusions (and no conclusion is truly and rigorously theological if it does not have an absolute or metaphysically certain connexion with the revealed principle from which it is deduced) are *purely theological,* or mediately of faith, *per se* or *without the Church's definition;* b) but they are formally or immediately of faith *after the definition.* Vázquez disagreed with the first proposition, Molina with the second. Both propositions taken jointly embody accurately, as we have seen, the doctrine taught

[212] CANO, *De Locis,* lib.12, c.6.

[213] *Ibid.,* lib.12, c.4, at the end.

[214] *Ibid.,* c.5, octava praeceptio.

by St. Thomas concerning the indirectly revealed or theological conclusion. This is the same doctrine taught by all classical Thomists prior to the Suarezian confusion or innovation. (464)

474. SUAREZ AND LUGO. – From Cano our objector jumps to Suárez and Lugo. It would have been advisable to explain first the radically opposed theories of Molina and Vázquez, since Suárez's doctrine is hardly intelligible except with reference to those two theories that Suárez attempted to harmonize or combine (71) But let us turn to Suárez and Lugo.

Our objector begins by citing the three famous theses formulated by Suárez and Lugo, which we have repeatedly cited already, and which reduce to the following.

1. The revealed *formal-confused* is of faith *per se* or without definition.

2. The ***purely virtually*** or ***purely mediately*** revealed (virtuale tantum, mediate tantum) is not of faith ***per se*** or without definition.

3. The ***purely virtually*** or ***purely mediately*** revealed becomes of faith by the definition.

In these three propositions Suárez and Lugo employ two *new* terms in the history of theology, viz., *formal-confused* and *purely virtual* or mediate. These two terms were coined by Suárez, and both Suárez and Lugo mean by them something quite different from what the ancients and many moderns mean by the simple and traditional terms *formal* and *virtual.* Being unaware of this, our objector moves in a state of continuous confusion with respect to whatever he thereafter says of theologians posterior to Suárez and Lugo.

By *formal-confused* (subsequently translated by many as *formal*-equivalent) Suárez and Lugo mean all the conclusions that are really identical to, although they might differ conceptually from, the revealed principle from which they are deduced. By *purely virtual* or mediate they mean all the conclusions that *differ really* from the revealed principle. This is the explanation given by Suárez and Lugo themselves, and this is how they are interpreted by Ripalda, Mazzella and all the Suarezian writers we have read, as we have already shown elsewhere (73)

Thus, the three theses formulated by Suárez and Lugo have the following meaning:

1. Any conclusion that is *really identical to,* albeit *conceptually different from,* the revealed premise from which it is deduced, is of faith *per se.*

2. Any conclusion that *differs really* from the revealed premise is not of faith *per se.*

3. This same conclusion, viz., one that *differs really,* can be defined as of faith by the Church.

This is – we repeat and will keep repeating a thousand times – the true meaning of Suárez's and Lugo's three theses. Anyone who adverts only to the terms "formal-confused" and "purely virtual" and does not consider the meaning given them by Suárez and Lugo will grasp neither the mind of these two writers nor the mind of many other later writers who have made use of the same nomenclature. This, we believe, is what has happened to our objector.

Our objector describes Suárez's third thesis as inadmissible. It is exactly what we have said and say. What is *purely virtual* or mediate, or equivalently, what differs *really* and not only conceptually from the revealed premise from which it is deduced, cannot be defined as of faith for the simple reason that it is not truly revealed either directly or indirectly, since absolutely speaking the conclusion can be false without entailing the falsity of the revealed premise. The Salmanticenses were correct in attacking this proposition of Suárez and Lugo, which is the only one they had in mind in impugning these authors.

On the other hand, with respect to the first two theses of Suárez and Lugo our objector makes this important confession: *"Since then almost all theologians, Thomists included,* followed these two theses of Suárez. Our objector is quite accurate in making this assertion. We have gathered quotations from eighty or so theologians posterior to Suárez, and more than seventy of these theologians – or 90% – admit these two Suarezian theses. With one difference: where Suárez, in his first, proposition, says that the conclusions are *of faith,* true Thomists say that they are *definable as of faith.*

It is plain that what our objector here confesses is what we have been saying ourselves. Except that, not having grasped the true *meaning* of the new terms *formal confused* and *merely virtual* employed by Suárez and Lugo and repeated by so many subsequent authors, he has understood neither the doctrine of Suárez and Lugo, nor the teaching of 90% of later writers, nor our own.

Let us then set aside the nomenclature and go straight to the point. Does our objector admit that "any conclusion is *definable as of divine faith* if it is *really identical to,* even it should *differ conceptually from,* the revealed premise from which it is deduced"? If he admits it, he is in complete agreement with what we say, and the rest is only a matter of words. If he does not, he disagrees not only with ourselves but also with 90% of theologians, ancient as well as modern.

It is thus a demonstrated fact that both Suárez and Lugo are so far from having restricted the definability of the theological conclusion as a truth of faith that they have rather exaggerated it. In their first proposition they accepted, and very correctly indeed, the definability of *inclusive theological conclusions as* truths of faith. But in their third proposition they exaggerated that doctrine by extending it to physico connexive conclusions, which are not

rigorously theological conclusions. Hence, with respect to that third proposition they were forced to recur to the celebrated theories of new revelations or of transforming assistance (78-79).

One further remark and we are through with Suárez and Lugo. With the intention of suggesting that Lugo regards as a *modern* opinion the view that asserts the definability of the theological conclusion, our objector writes as follows: "Suárez's opinion obtained quickly such wide acceptance that Lugo already declares it to be common among the *more recent doctors.*"

We cannot account for this suprising statement except by assuming that, as our objector was turning over a page of Lugo, he inadvertently turned over eight pages. Lugo deals with the question of the definability of a theological conclusion deduced from a premise of faith and a premise of reason – the point now at issue – in nos. 258-277 of *De Fide,* Disp. I. On the other hand, the phrase "the *more recent doctors*" appears in no. 326 where Lugo deals with the question "How is it of faith that this man is the true and legitimate pope?" This is an altogether different question, with regard to which John of St. Thomas and the Salmanticenses hold the same opinion as Suárez and Lugo. So far is Lugo from considering as *modern* the doctrine of the theological conclusion's definability that he says expressly: *"Apart* from the arguments brought forward by Suárez, it is confirmed by the praxis and use of *all."*[215]

475. JOHN OF ST. THOMAS. – Next to Suárez and Lugo, our objector cites John of St. Thomas, the Salmanticenses, and Billuart. Of John of St. Thomas he is forced to admit that "John of St. Thomas, with Navarrete and Master González, declares this opinion to be *common among Thomists,* at least insofar as the *definability of conclusions* is concerned." But our objector vainly insists on arguing that John of St. Thomas restricts that doctrine to improper conclusions.

There is one very simple and very objective way of ascertaining whether John of St. Thomas is speaking of proper or improper conclusions. It is common knowledge that John of St. Thomas confesses that he follows Navarrete and González against Molina and Granados. These five theologians deal with this question ex professo. Let anyone, then, look them up and compare them among themselves. If, after doing this, he still persists in saying that the question in which Navarrete impugns Molina, and Granados defends Molina against Navarrete, and John of St. Thomas with Navarrete and Master González impugns Molina and Granados, is not a question about proper but about improper conclusions, then he must be given up as a hopeless case.[216]

[215] LUGO, *De Fide,* d.1, n.270.

The text quoted by our objector is found in Part I, Q.1, Disp.2, art.4. We have already examined it elsewhere (307). Well, then, in his *De Fide* John of St. Thomas has expressly and authentically explained the meaning of what he said *in the aforecited place.*

"From what has been said it follows that *virtual* or *mediate* revelation or that which is *deduced through reasoning,* such as exists in theology, *differs specifically* from *immediate* revelation which is had through the testimony of the witness and attains that which is to be held *by faith,* as we have explained at greater length in Part I, Q.1, Disp.2, art.4 [the place quoted by our objector], where we *rejected* two *extreme* opinions: one was Vázquez's who holds that a conclusion *deduced* from premises of faith is in respect of the knower's reasoning as certain as a proposition defined by the Church; the other was Molina's, who holds that even if the Church's definition should be attached to a proposition *that previously was not of faith,* the definition would not make it of faith, but that *the Holy Spirit assists the Church so that she will not err, but not that she may make of faith what was previously not of faith.* These two opinions may be seen *impugned in the aforecited place."*[217]

Our objector can see there for himself that John of St. Thomas was speaking of a *proper* conclusion when he was arguing against Molina for the theological conclusion's definability. No one will say that the revelation that is *mediate, virtual, deduced through reasoning, specifically different from immediate revelation,* as there described by John of St. Thomas, is an *improper* conclusion. If in the solutions to the objections John of St. Thomas called such a conclusion *immediate,* and even added that nothing can be defined as of faith if it is *merely mediate,* that is because any truly theological conclusion – and only an inclusive *implicit* or *conceptual* conclusion can be

[216] The passage from John of St. Thomas reads as follows: "The third opinion holds that propositions *evidently deduced* from principles of faith, *if defined by the Church,* pertain immediately to the *faith* and become *principles of theology;* they no longer lean on reasoning, but their certainty is based on the divine testimony proposed by the Church in accordance with the Holy Spirit's infallible assistance in the definition of matters of faith. This opinion is *commonly* followed by Thomists, as can be seen in the aforecited *Navarrete,* and Master *González,* and for this same view he cites in the aforementioned place *Granados, Bellarmine, Vega, Cano, Vázquez* and *others."* Passages from Navarrete, González, Granados, Bellarmine, Vega, Cano and Vázquez have been quoted respectively in numbers 402, 403, 232, 401, 388, 456, and 85. The reader can verify with his own eyes whether these writers speak of theological conclusions in the *proper sense,* or not.

[217] JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *De Fide,* d.1, q.2, n.13..

such – is always *immediate in itself* and is only *mediate to us,* as St. Thomas observes repeatedly and we have elsewhere explained. If, in the statement that nothing but the *immediate* can be defined, John of St. Thomas had only qualified the term immediate by the term *in itself,* there would have been nothing to censure in him, which is why we have blamed him only for an imprecision of nomenclature. But John of St. Thomas gave quite a clear account of himself by ending the whole question with the assertion that the Church can and does define the *virtual implicit,* but not the *purely connexive (connexive tantum).* That is exactly what we have said and say. *Connexion* without *inclusion* does not suffice for *definability* just as it does not suffice for true or rigorous *theology.*

476. THE SALMANTICENSES AND BILLUART. – By employing the new Suarezian and Lugonian nomenclature instead of the traditional Thomist nomenclature, the Salmanticenses have sown confusion in the majority of modern Thomists. Billuart does little else than transcribe the Salmanticenses.

According to the Salmanticenses, the *formal confused* or *formal equivalent* is definable as of faith; the *purely virtual* (virtuale tantum) is not definable as of faith.

Our reply is simple enough. Do the Salmanticenses mean what Suárez means by the term *formal confused,* viz., all the conclusions that, albeit *differing conceptually,* are *really identical* to the revealed principles? If they do, then by admitting that such conclusions are definable they are saying exactly what we are saying. If they do not, then by denying their definability they disagree with 90% of ancient and modern theologians, and our objector errs in putting the Salmanticenses together with Suárez and Lugo.

Likewise, do they mean what Suárez and Lugo mean by *purely virtual,* viz.,"only those conclusions that *differ really* from the revealed principles"? If they do, then by denying that they are definable as of faith they are saying exactly what we are saying.

Finally, when the Salmaticenses and Billuart, and with them our objector, define the theological conclusion as "that which is contained in the revealed premises as the effect in its *cause",* do they take cause to mean the *natural* or *physical* cause or cause *in essendo?* If they do, then in denying that such a conclusion is definable as of faith they are saying exactly what we are saying. A conclusion linked to the revealed premise with only a *physical connexion* can hardly be an object of *faith* when it cannot be even an object of *infallibility* or of *rigorous theological science.* Do they, on the contrary, take cause to mean the *virtual* or *metaphysical* cause or cause *in cognoscendo?* This is the sense in which the term must be taken in the case of sciences of absolute certainty. If they do, and deny nonetheless that the conclusions are definable as of faith, then we gladly hand over to our objector in

a silver platter the Salmaticenses and Billuart, and if it pleases him, even John of St. Thomas. Such a view is not only contrary to what we regard as *certain* and *evident,* but also contrary to what the great majority not only of ancient but also of modern theologians teach. Only a meager number of modern theologians do not admit the definability of the *conceptual* or *identico-real* conclusion as a truth of faith (490).

In short, to put an end to the confusion sown among Thomists by the Salmanticenses and Billuart, we invite our objector to choose once and for all the horn of the dilemma which best pleases him. If, in admitting that the formal confused or equivalent is definable as of faith, the Salmanticenses and Billuart take the term in the same sense as Suárez and Lugo, then the Salmanticenses and Billuart are with us, and not with our objector. If they take the term in another different sense, then the fictitious chain with which our objector sought to link the Salmanticenses and Billuart to Suárez and Lugo is completely broken, and those two Thomist theologians remain entirely isolated since, with the exception of Kilber, hardly half-a-dozen postsuarezian theologians will be found who deny the definability of the *formal confused* in the sense meant by Suárez and Lugo, viz., the conceptual or *identico-real* conclusion. Hence, Fr. Gardeil observes with his customary critical sense: "This view of the development of the doctrine of faith by way of a truly theological conclusion – i.e., one that is metaphysically connected with the revealed datum and *really included* in it according to the *distinction of concepts* by which the conclusion expresses the datum – has been *obscured by the Salmanticenses and Billuart, who have been deceived by Suárez* and have carried away with themselves – at the cost of those struggles against the evidence of the definition of theological conclusions by the Church – a number of Thomist theologians themselves."[218]

477. STATE OF THE QUESTION AT THE END OF THE 18th CENTURY. – With adroit courtroom strategy, our objector brings the history of this period to a close with Montaigne, since he is one of the theologians who deny the theological conclusion's definability: *Montaigne represents the state of the question* at the end of 18th century."

We have been highly amused by this clever historical ruse. Why has our objector chosen to close the 18th century with Montaigne, one of the *few* postsuarezian theologians who deny the definability of the conclusion, and not with any of the *great multitude* of theologians who admit its definability, not to mention that many of them admit even the definability of dogmatic facts? Besides the many we have already quoted (399-434), we will now quote only four: two Jesuits and two Dominicans, all posterior to the Salmanticenses and contemporaries of both Billuart and Montaigne.

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[218] *Revue des Sciences philosophiques et théologiques,* Oct. 1920, pg.662.

The Jesuit Gautier says: "A theological conclusion, one that is *strictly such,* becomes *precisely dogmatic* and belongs to the sphere of *faith* if it is gathered by the Church herself or the Apostolic See and by its *definition,* or application of the divine revelation, proposed to all the faithful for belief."[219]

The Jesuit Platelio: "A conclusion deduced from an altogether certain universal, and a subsumed revealed proposition, and hence generally *every* conclusion deduced from a revealed premise and another naturally certain and evident, *is of faith*... Proof of our conclusion: when a predicate is affirmed of a subject, all those things that are certainly and evidently known to be identical or necessarily connected with such a conclusion are simultaneously affirmed *mediately* and *virtually,* and hence *really.* Therefore this conclusion: 'Christ is risible', deduced from the premises: 'Every man is risible' and 'Christ is a man', of which the former is naturally evident and the latter of faith, is *sufficiently revealed.*"[220]

The Dominican Labat: 'Whoever denies a theological conclusion, *even one deduced from two revealed premises,* precisely as such [i.e. in the absence of a definition], would not be a heretic... I said *precisely as* such, because anyone who denies a theological conclusion that is *on another count defined by the Church,* would *truly be a heretic, whatever Molina might say to the contrary.*"[221]

Lastly, the Dominican Preingué: "You will object, in the first place, that it is not of faith that the Church is infallible in defining *what is* the meaning of a certain proposition, *since this is not revealed.* In reply, *the assumption is denied.* For that infallibility is revealed *at least mediately,* inasmuch as it is revealed that the Church is infallible in determining *what* the meaning of propositions is: and *such revelation suffices to make something pertain to the faith.* Thus St. Thomas here [2-2, q.11, a.2, corp.] says: 'A thing pertains to the faith in two ways. One, directly... Two, indirectly... And *heresy* is possible *with regard to both the one and the other* in the same way as *faith.*"[222]

We have chosen this text from Preingué to show once more the meaning of St. Thomas's *indirectly revealed.*

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[219] *Prodromus ad theologicam dogmatico-scholasticam,* d.2, c.l, a.3, "Of purely theological conclusions", pg.99.

[220] *Synopsis totius cursus theologici,* p. 3, n.202.

[221] *Theologia scholastica,* secundum illibatam D. Thomae doctrinam, t.l, pg.30.

[222] IORDANUS PREINGUÉ, O.P., *Theologia Speculativa et Moralis, De Fide,* d.7, q.5, t.4, pg.244.

478. OTHER 17th CENTURY THEOLOGIANS. – Having just quoted four end-of-the-18th century theologians, we will now quote for our objector's benefit other four end-of-the-17th century theologians from the number of those not yet cited – an Augustinian, a Benedictine, a Jesuit, and a Capuchin.

The Augustinian Gabardi: "I say, in the fourth place: *Theological conclusions* however *defined* by the Church (whether as deduced or as not deduced) *pertain to the faith* and are principles of theology; but this is not so in the case of conclusions that are not defined. This second part is against Vázquez who thinks that a *non-defined* conclusion is proposed for belief to those to whom it is evident through theological reasoning."[223]

The Benedictine Mezger writes as follows: "Observe, in the first place, that a thing can be revealed formally or virtually... That is revealed *virtually* which, on account of its being contained as it were radically and virtually (virtute) in something formally revealed, possesses an infallible connexion with it which is deducible through natural reasoning. First conclusion: The sufficient motive of *faith* is not limited only to confused and universal formal revelation, but includes also *virtual* revelation, First proof: Many propositions, not only of those revealed formally confusedly, but also of those revealed *virtually,* have been as a matter of fact proposed for belief to all the faithful and *defined by the Church.*"[224]

The well-known Sorbonne theologian Martin Grandin: "Whether *mediate* revelation suffices for the faith? *Immediate* revelation is that which falls immediately on a certain proposition. Thus revelation immediately falls on this proposition 'Christ is a man'. *Mediate* revelation is that which by means of that proposition falls on another proposition, as, e.g., by means of the aforecited proposition revelation falls on this one 'Christ is risible'. It is asked whether *mediate* revelation suffices.

"*Sole conclusion:* Such conclusions are *of faith* Proof: When two things are necessarily connected with each other, if God says one of them, he also says the other to an extent that suffices for *divine faith*... This can be confirmed at least a posteriori in this manner: when two things are connected, if one of them is to be believed, the Church can also propose the other; therefore when one thing is connected to another, God who says the one, also says the other in a way that suffices for *divine faith.*"[225]

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[223] NICOLAUS GABARDI, *Theologia Scholastica Aegidio-Augustiniana,* t.l, n.66.

[224] *Theologia scholastica secundum viam et doctrinam D. Thomae Aquinatis,* t.3, *De Fide,* pg.130.

[225] *Opera Theologica,* t.3, *De Fide,* d.l, s.2, punctum postremum, pgs.47-48.

The Jesuit Haunoldus: "When *some* theologians usually affirm that there are in the Church no *new dogmas* to be newly believed, they mean to say no more than that nothing begins to be of faith formally and explicitly which was previously not of faith *radically, implicitly,* and *virtually,* inasmuch, that is, as the Church defines as explicitly to be believed only those things that, through the Holy Spirit's assistance, she knows are virtually contained in an object already formally revealed."[226]

Finally, the Capuchin Gervasius Brisaciensis: "In the third place, you will ask whether *virtual* revelation i.e , that which is through a good consequence deduced from another revealed truth, suffices for the object of faith or for theological faith, or is merely a theological conclusion?

"I answer that there are two opinions. Some affirm. . . Some deny. . . However, in the meantime *all Catholics agree that with the Church's definition* it suffices for *divine faith.*"[227]

We could thus keep quoting innumerable theologians from the post-Tridentine period. The reader can now see for himself what is left of our objector's dogmatic assertion: "In this period the nominalistic formula is *no longer* simply admitted, but with a restriction." Thus is history written!

479. THE VATICAN COUNCIL. – Our objector labels the fourth period "The Vatican Council". With respect to this period he makes the following observations.

FIRST OBSERVATION. – "There is thus common agreement among the Scholastics on the substance of the doctrine. Hence the doctrine was sufficiently prepared for a definition in case of urgent necessity. This necessity presented itself to the Vatican Council on account of the error of the Protestants, the rationalists and Gunther, who refused to admit as *divinely revealed* the dogmas defined by the Church."

Reply. – The error of either Protestants, or rationalists, or Gunther, has nothing to do with the question of which we are speaking. All Catholic theologians admit that only that which is *revealed* can be defined as a dogma, and that alone suffices. Is it only the principles that are revealed, or also the truly theological conclusions?: that is a question which remains completely free before and after the Vatican Council. Since Molina there is no unanimous agreement on this point, although *ninety per cent* admit that *"all* conclusions deduced from revealed principles through *conceptual* reasoning" are truly revealed and definable as of faith. That is our opinion. And those are, according to the Thomist school, the conclusions that are truly and rigorously theological.

[226] *Theologia Speculativa,* lib.3, cont.7, n.153.

[227] *Cursus theologicus,* t.4, *De Virtutibus theologicis,* n.25.

480. SECOND OBSERVATION. – "As a matter of fact, the Vatican Council *approved,* at least *in substance,* the teaching of the Scholastics."

Reply. – The Vatican Council has defined only that nothing is definable as dogma except that which is *revealed.* If that is what our objector means by the *substance* of the scholastic teaching, it is undoubtedly a defined truth. But the Council has said not one word on whether it is only the formally revealed that is revealed, or also the virtually revealed. We repeat that this is a free question after as well as before the Council. The Council's classical commentator, commenting precisely on the passages referred to by our objector, says the following: "We believe as true the things that God has *revealed: ab eo revelata.* Behold the matter, or in scholastic language, the material object of the act of faith. But is it not possible to count among the *revealed* truths anything except those that are *formally revealed,* or can one also include therein the *virtually revealed* truths? *This is a question that our Council allows theologians to debate freely.*"[228]

481. THIRD OBSERVATION. – The Vatican Council expressly says that "The Holy Spirit was *not* promised to Peter and his successors so that by his revelation they should disclose *new doctrine."*

Reply. – Nothing can be deduced from this text against those who defend the definability of theological conclusions as truths of faith, since these theologians also defend against Kilber and Ripalda that the theological conclusion is not a *new doctrine* but a *new* conceptual *unfolding* of *the same* revealed doctrine.

On the contrary, this Vatican text works in their favour. Indeed, according to this text, the Holy Spirit, or what amounts to the same thing, *infallibility* was not promised to the Church in view of *new doctrine;* but, according to *all* theologians, the Holy Spirit or infallibility was promised to the Church in view of every truly theological conclusion, and even in view of every truly dogmatic fact. Therefore, neither truly theological conclusions nor truly dogmatic facts constitute *new doctrine.* Thus they are definable as of divine faith. This is what is deduced from the Vatican Council, and it is what we hope will someday be admitted by all theologians without exception (248).

482. FOURTH OBSERVATION. – "Among Scotists, Fr. Parthenius Minges[229] simply holds that theological conclusions are definable as dogmas,

[228] VACANT, *Constitutions du Conc. du Vatican,* t.3, n.559, pg.28.

[229] *Compendium theologiae,* 240-242.

and that the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary was thus defined. *He did not take into account the correction to Scotus made by later Scholastics,* nor did he take into consideration that Pius IX defined *as a revealed truth* the doctrine of the Blessed Virgin Mary's Immaculate Conception."

Reply. – That Scotist theologian, whom we have elsewhere quoted (442), is perfectly entitled to say everything he says in that paragraph, and we congratulate him for it. With respect to the definability of the theological conclusion or of the indirectly revealed, Scotus had no need of being corrected by anyone. On the contrary, 90% of theologians follow St. Thomas and Scotus on this point against Molina, against Kilber, and if our objector so wishes, against the Salmanticenses and Billuart. On the other hand, Pius IX defined that the dogma of the Immaculate Conception is a *revealed* truth, but he did not say that it is a *formally* revealed truth. It could have been revealed indirectly as a conceptual *conclusion* of the principle of Mary's worthy *divine motherhood.* With Fr. Minges, we think that this is how it was revealed. That is the *indirectly revealed* mentioned by St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure and Scotus in the question "Whether it is allowable to opine the contrary about the Notions" (209)

483. FIFTH OBSERVATION. – "The Jesuit School is *divided*, although the greater part holds that only the formally revealed can be defined as dogma, not the merely virtually reveaied, as e.g., Cardinal Billot, Mazzella, Schiffini, Pesch."

Reply. – In the first place, if the Jesuit School is divided on this question, our objector is ill-advised in repeating so frequently that after the Salmanticenses and Billuart – as if there were no theologians in the world except these two – the question "has been settled in substance", and that "there exists a common agreement among the Scholastics", and even that "the doctrine was sufficiently prepared for a definition (!!) in case of urgent necessity". As if the prestigious Society of Jesus counted for nothing at all!

In the second place, of those four Jesuit theologians chosen by our objector, *Schiffini* not only maintains, as we do, the definability of conceptually different conclusions, but extends it also to really different conclusions.[230] Cardinal Mazzella not only maintains, as we do, the definability of conceptual conclusions, but even maintains that they are of faith prior to their definition.[231] Cardinal Billot and Pesch do not distinguish clearly between conclusions that differ conceptually and conclusions that differ really, as neither have Suárez, Lugo and Mazzella. Hence we do not know exactly whether, in

[230] *De virtutibus infusis,* n.127.

[231] *De virtutibus infusis,* n.414.

denying the definability of the theological conclusion as a truth of faith, they deny the definability of every conclusion, or only the definability of conclusions that differ really. Meanwhile, as we have seen, Pesch admits the definability of every truly consequential meaning of the Bible, which is tantamount to admitting the definability of a conclusion in the proper sense (447).

484. SIXTH OBSERVATION. – "Among the Thomists, M. Tuyaerts holds that everything connected with things revealed, including the judgments of the Church concerning dogmatic facts . . . can be defined as dogma, in spite of the fact that these jugdments *obviously are not revealed.*"

Reply. – "Obviously are not revealed" if what we have in mind is *direct* revelation, but "obviously they are revealed" if what we have in mind is *indirect* revelation. Now, according to St. Thomas, the indirectly revealed can be defined as a truth of faith. The definition of the conclusions by the Church is only the infallible *explication* of revelation, just as the definition of dogmatic facts is only the infallible *application* of revelation. The Church has *divine* authority to do both things. The texts of Báñez and Preingué commenting on St. Thomas's *directly* and *indirectly*[232] should here be recalled to mind. We think that Fr. Tuyaerts is deficient in three things: a) in not distinguishing between conceptual conclusions or conclusions of metaphysico-absolute certainty, and really distinct conclusions or conclusions of physico-

[232] Let us quote once more an important passage from Billuart since he is one of our contradictor's theologians.

"You will insist: Faith comes from hearing, but hearing is through the Word of God. Now, Jansen's fact is not contained in the *Word of God. Therefore.*

"Likewise: the Church has no *new revelations,* and the articles of faith do not increase with tne passing of time. But these two things are seemingly to be admitted if Jansen's fact is accepted as *revealed* and of divine faith. Therefore.

"I answer that the solutions to these insistencies flow from what has been said.

"To the first, I distinguish the minor: Jansen's fact is not contained in the Word of God *explicitly* and *immediately,* I concede; *implicitly* and *mediately,* I deny. For it is contained in this *revealed universal* proposition: 'Every text condemned by the Church is *condemnable'.*

"To the second: The revelation of the universal proposition just mentioned is not *new,* but existed since the beginning. Consequently, the condemnation of Jansen's text is not a *new article of faith but an explication and application of the revelation of the universal to a particular object."* (BILLUART, *De Regulis fidei,* d.3, a.7, solvuntur objectiones)

Our learned contradictor is at complete liberty to follow the opinion he prefers in these matters that have not yet been defined by the Church. But it seems to us more prudent to be more considerate of those who follow a contrary opinion, and not to call *evident* without further ado what is a subject of debate among the greatest theologians.

contingent certainty. Only the former are rigorously theological conclusions and definable as of faith. b) In not distinguishing between before and after the definition. Before the definition, no conclusion can be given an assent of divine faith, not even one that is deduced from two revealed premises, no matter what the Salmanticenses may say. c) In having credited everything to the speculative reasoning and little or nothing to the practical sense of faith. The latter, as Fr. Gardeil correctly pointed out, is as important as reasoning, if not more.

485. SEVENTH OBSERVATION. – "Not even the Nestor among French Thomists, Fr. A. Gardeil, seems satisfied with the *teaching of Thomists* [i.e., the teaching of the Salmanticenses and Billuart] *even if he does hold it in fact.*"

Reply. – We fail to understand why, for the purpose of classifying Fr. Gardeil's opinion, our objector has not quoted what Fr. Gardeil has most recently written on the subject: "The Salmanticenses and Billuart, deceived by Suárez , have obscured this idea, carrying away with themselves a number of Thomist theologians themselves. Fr. Marín-Sola has done us the service of retrieving our tradition and bringing it to full light. *I align myself unhesitatingly with this conception of the direct definition of truly theological conclusions.*"[233] Fr. Gardeil was the first among the modern Thomists to call attention to the famous "revelabile" which, according to St. Thomas, constitutes the specific object of sacred theology, and is the true bridge and the true vital force of dogmatic progress. In our opinion, Fr. Gardeil's two inestimable monographs *Le donné révélé* and *La credibilité* have been the true sources of whatever has been subsequently well said on the two questions of dogmatic development and the nature of apologetics.

486. FINAL OBSERVATION. – "Lastly, Fr. Marín-Sola has indeed touched a *sore spot* in Suárez's teaching, but *has not healed it.*"

Reply. – Our objector has not understood the true meaning of the *formal confused,* which is the central point of the first of the aforecited three theses of Suárez and Lugo, and neither has he understood what we have censured and what we have approved in Suárez and Lugo.

As we have pointed out – and this will be admitted by all Suárez's disciples – Suárez and Lugo include in the term formal confused "all conclusions that are *really identical* to or absolutely inseparable from the revealed premise from which they are deduced".

[233] *Revue des Sciences philosophiques et théologiques,* Oct. 1920, pg. 662.

The *definability* of these conclusions is admitted by Suárez and Lugo. On this point, far from censuring Suárez and Lugo, we agree with them. Do the Salmanticenses, Billuart and our objector agree *on this point* with us, or not? If they do, then the dispute is at an end, since these are the true and proper conclusions of which we have been speaking all throughout this book. If they do not, then they obviously disagree not only with us, but also with Suárez and Lugo (in the *first, and not only in the third,* of their theses), and with 90% of ancient and modern theologians. We are quite certain that on this point all the true disciples of Suárez are with us.

We have censured Suárez on four points: a) for denying, in the first of his three theses under the new term "formal confused", that conceptual conclusions are proper conclusions; b) for affirming that such conclusions are of faith *per se* or without the Church's definition; c) for asserting, in the second and third of his theses under the likewise new term *merely virtual,* that the conclusion in the proper sense is the really distinct conclusion or physically certain conclusion; d) for regarding these conclusions as definable as of divine faith, thereby being forced to appeal to new revelations. We believe that these four criticisms of Suárez will merit the approval of anyone who has studied these questions, not in the Salmanticenses and Billuart who were misled by the Suarezian nomenclature, but in St. Thomas himself or in his commentators prior to the confusion created by Suárez's new nomenclature.

487. QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANCE AND QUESTIONS OF NAMES. – Speaking in another context the Salmanticenses make this very judicious remark: "From the liberty to attach *new meanings to terms or to play loose at will with their ancient significations* there arise *long and interminable questions on the ways of speaking* together with false and dangerous opinions which *by playing with words,* find shelter in their *ambiguity* so that it becomes impossible to convict them of falsity."[234]

This is what is happening to many modern theologians in connexion with the *new* terms formal *confused,* formal *equivalent, pure* virtual, *pure* mediate, and others such. Since Suárez coined those terms, theologians have found themselves trapped in a confusion comparable to that created at the druggist's by a practical joker who had furtively changed all the labels on the bottles. The salesclerks would swear that they had dispensed quinine as per prescription, whereas the customers or the physician would swear that they had been given arsenic instead of quinine. The only way out of the mess would be to ignore the labels altogether and examine the real content of the bottles.

Let us then ignore for the moment all these new terms or labels and go straight to the substance or content. We cannot of course speak of the sub-

[234] *Cursus theologicus, De vitiis et peccatis,* d. 15, dub. 3, n. 70.

stance without employing words. But instead of employing ambiguous or elastic words, let us employ only words whose meaning is exact, precise and admitted by *all*.

Now, then, everybody knows with perfect accuracy what is meant by *explicitly revealed*. Likewise, every theologian knows the exact meaning of the *distinction of reasoning reason* (distinctio rationis ratiocinantis), *distinction of reasoned reason* (distinctio rationis ratiocinatae), and *real distinction*. These four terms are sufficient to lay bare before any man, however unfamiliar with these matters, the exact *substance* of the problem labeled "the theological conclusion's definability as a truth of faith", and to classify with absolute precision the different opinions held by postsuarezian theologians.

As a matter of fact, God revealed to the Apostles, and they in turn delivered to the Church, a determinate set of *explicit* propositions called the *revealed datum* or the starting point of all development, both the theological and the dogmatic. From these explicit propositions there can emerge through reasoning no other kinds of conclusions but three: a) conclusions differing from the propositions delivered by the Apostles only with a distinction of reasoning reason; b) conclusions differing with a distinction of reasoned reason; c) conclusions differing with a real distinction. These are the only kinds of conclusions possible – there are neither more nor less.

488. FOUR SETS OF TRUTHS. – We have thus *four sets* of truths, viz.:

Set 1: *Explicitly revealed* truths.

Set 2: Conclusions that do not differ from those just mentioned except with a distinction of *reasoning reason*.

Set 3: Conclusions differing with a distinction of *reasoned reason*, i.e., with a conceptual or virtual distinction.

Set 4: Conclusions differing with a *real distinction*.

To these four sets so perfectly delineated there correspond in postsuarezian theology four opinions perfectly characterized and essentially different from each other, to wit:

1st opinion: that which holds that only truths of set 1 are definable as of faith. The best representative of this rigid opinion is, in a sense, *Arriaga*, who is followed by *Maistrio* and some other rare theologian. This opinion is today completely discredited.

2nd opinion: that which asserts that propositions of sets 1 and 2 are definable, but not propositions of set 3. This opinion is best represented by *Kilber* or the so-called Wirceburgenses, who in this question follow *Ripalda* in part, and *Molina* and *Granados* in toto. This opinion has had few followers after Kilber.

3rd opinion: that which affirms that propositions of the first three sets are definable. In other words, definability is not restricted to what is explicitly revealed (set 1) and the conclusions of reasoning reason (set 2), but embraces also the conclusions of reasoned reason, i.e., conceptual or identico-real conclusions (set 3). The most distinguished representatives of this opinion, apart from all the theologians prior to Molina, are Suárez and *Lugo* (in the *first* of their theses under the term *formal confused*). The immense majority of later theologians up to the present concurs with Suárez and Lugo on this point. This is also our opinion.

4th opinion: that which maintains that not only propositions of the first three sets but also propositions of set 4 are definable. This opinion holds as definable not only propositions that differ *conceptually* but also propositions that *differ really* or propositions of *purely physical necessity*. This is the opinion uniquely held by Suárez and Lugo (in the *third* of their theses under the term *merely virtual*), which logically led these two illustrious theologians to the inadmissible theories of new revelations or of indefinite and transforming assistance.

The theologian or historian of dogmas who fails to draw a clear distinction between these four perfectly characterized and completely irreducible opinions, or believes, as our objector seems to believe, that the four are equal *in substance*, either is uninformed on the postsuarezian history of this question or confuses the substance or content with the nomenclature.

We have said, and say it again, that on the issue of the *definability* of the theological conclusions, our opinion is the third. Will our objector, then, be kind enough to distinguish clearly on this point between the question of *substance* and the question of *nomenclature*.

The question of *substance* is the following: "When a proposition is *explicitly* revealed are all other propositions *really identical* to, albeit *conceptually different* from, it also revealed implicitly and thus definable as of faith? " No one can fail to see the profound significance of this question for the problem of the scope of dogmatic development and of the nature of sacred theology.

On the other hand, the question of *nomenclature* is the following: Are we to *call* formally revealed, or virtually revealed, those truths that are really identical to explicitly revealed propositions, albeit differing from them conceptually?

Anyone will understand that the problem of the *definability* of such conceptual truths, which is the problem with which we are concerned, depends,on the answer to the question of substance, not on the answer to the

question of nomenclature. If the answer is that such truths *are truly* revealed, then everyone will concede that they *are* definable, *no matter how they are called.* If the answer is that they *are not* revealed, then everyone will say that they *are not* definable whatever the *name* they are given.

How, then, does our objector answer the question of substance? If his answer is affirmative, he is in complete agreement with us, and all else is a secondary question. If he answers in the negative, then he should not doubt for a moment that he disagrees not only with us but also with 90% of both ancient and modern theologians.

It would be unprofitable to attempt to evade a categorical reply by toying with words, e.g., saying that such conclusions are definable *if* they do not express any *new doctrine,* but not otherwise. For that is precisely the point. We want to know whether such conclusions, which *differ only conceptually* from the revealed premise from which they are deduced, express *any new doctrine,* or not. If our objector concedes that *they do not express any new doctrine* – which is tantamount to conceding that they are *definable as of faith* – then he is totally in agteement with us. If he answers that *they express a completely new doctrine* – which is tantamount to denying that they are definable – he disagrees not only with ourselves but also with the immense majority of ancient and modern theologians.

490. AN IMPARTIAL TESTIMONY. – To show our objector that this is indeed the opinion of the immense majority of theologians, ancient as well as modern, we close this section with a passage from a very modern and impartial author, who could have had nothing furthest from his mind than the thought of being quoted to corroborate our teaching. He is the Jesuit Fr. Daniel Sola, the most recent theologian that we have read on these matters, and a distinguished professor at the Pontifical Seminary of Comillas in Spain."

"Something can be contained in an explicitly revealed truth either formally or virtually. It is contained *formally implicitly* when it is formally, i.e. *according to the concept itself,* identical to the explicitly revealed truth, so that there is no other distinction than a distinction of *reasoning reason* . . . A thing is said to be contained in another *materially* and *identically* [this is what concerns us, and we beg our objector to take note] when there is *no real distinction* between them, but there is an *adequate metaphysical distinction* or a distinction of *reasoned reason.* It is thus that God's omnipotence is contained in his immensity, and vice versa; and so of all the other divine attributes."

Our objector can plainly see that what Fr. Daniel calls *material* or *identical* containment is the conceptual conclusions of which we are speaking. Here now is Fr. Daniel Sola's thesis, which is truly noteworthy:

"Thesis 76: Any truth that is *formally implicitly* contained in another which is explicitly revealed belongs in itself (quoad se) to the material object of faith. *The same should more probably be said of those truths that are contained in another explicitly revealed truth materially and identically or essentially connexively, but not formally.*

"Assesment. The *first part,* i.e.,that any truth that is *formally* contained in another which is explicitly revealed is in itself the material object of faith, or truly and really revealed, is *certain* and *common* against Arriaga. . .

"The *second part* [let our objector please take note] is in reality THE MOST COMMON and *very much more probable,* at least if the real identity of both truths can be known by us with certainty without any new revelation. Among the *more ancient* this view is held by Suárez, Lugo [in the first, not in the third thesis], Oviedo, Marín, and *many others,* and COMMONLY BY THE MORE RECENT against Ripalda, the Wirceburgenses and others."[235]

Our objector can there verify that the opinion we hold, and which our objector seems to regard as something peculiar, is not only *very much more probable* and taught by the ancient theologians, but also followed *commonly by the more recent.* Our objector's whole thesis is flawed by the fact that, having been ensnared in the new and ambiguous terms "formale *confusum*" and virtuale *tantum*" coined by Suárez and Lugo, which the Salmanticenses were unable to assess correctly, he has not been able to grasp the true *substance* of the *conceptual* or *identico-real* conclusion which Suárez and Lugo called formal confused, and whose definability as a truth of divine faith has always been defended, as it is also today defended, by the great majority of theologians against Ripalda and the Wirceburgenses. Provided that our objector admits this *substance,* the *nomenclature* would not matter much. We do not believe, though, that any Thomist worth his salt would dare maintain that the conceptual conclusion is not a *proper* conclusion, not a revealed or theological virtual in the proper and rigorous sense.

SECTION VII

EXAMINATION OF A VERY RECENT BOOK ON THE HISTORY OF DOGMAS

491. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF DOGMAS. – An interesting introduction to the history of dogmas has just been published. It is written by the learned professor at the Angelicum in Rome, Fr. Schultes, with the title *Introductio in Historiam Dogmatum. . . Auctore P. Reginaldo Maria Schultes, O.P., S. Theol. Mag. (Parisiis 1922).*

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[235] *De Gratia Christi et virtutibus infusis* (Vallisoleti 1919), nn.619-620.

This distinguished historian of dogmas admits in substance, as we do, the evolution of dogma by way of theological conclusions. However, since on the subject of the theological conclusion or the revealed virtuality in the proper sense he entertains a notion, or at least a nomenclature, somewhat different from ours, the author frequently refers, even by name, to our teaching and makes us certain observations. We think that such observations have been more than sufficiently answered by all that has been already said. However, we shall here reply to them as briefly as possible, indicating in parentheses the numbers in this book where the reader can find the teaching explained at greater length. Fr. Schultes's observations follow.

492. FIRST OBSERVATION. – "As the very term revelation itself makes plain, dogmas have to be truly and *properly* revealed. Hence it is not enough that a doctrine be revealed only *improperly or in an analogical sense,* as further on when dealing with virtual revelation . . . we will ex professo explain."[236]

Reply. – Our objector serenely identifies there, as well as further on, the analogical and the improper. "Improperly *or* in an analogical sense."

The division of *revelation* into immediate or formal *(in se)* and mediate or virtual *(in alio)* is an analogical division, as is often the case with divisions in metaphysics or in theology. However, it is neither improper nor metaphorical, but proper and real and intrinsic exactly as the division of evidence into immediate evidence (in se) and mediate evidence (in alio).

Implicit-virtual revelation is, thus, true and *proper* revelation, but *in its own manner.* That manner is the *implicit* manner or "in alio", which is why it needs to be *explicated.* When the explication is made through the theologian's private reasoning the result is theology. When it is done by the divine authority of the Church, who employs reasoning or theology as an instrument, the result is dogma (304, 326).

493. SECOND OBSERVATION. – "Although all dogmas express a *revealed* doctrine, nonetheless not everything revealed has the aptitude to become a dogma, but *only* such things as *per se* or *by reason of themselves* order us to God or to salvation."[237]

Reply. – According to St. Thomas, both that which is revealed directly or *by reason of itself* (ratione sui), as well as that which is revealed indirectly or *by reason of another* (ratione alterius), can become dogmas through the Church's definition.

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[236] *Op.cit.*, pg.12, footnote 2.

[237] *Op.cit.*, pg.13.

"A thing belongs to the faith in two ways: one, *directly* . . Another, *indirectly*. . . And heresy is possible with regard to *both the one and the other* in the same way as *faith.*"[238] "The *same judgment* applies to the latter [the indirect] as to the former [the direct] which are determinate in the faith, *since the one is followed by the other.*"[239]

The only difference is that the *scriptural* indirect is never or rarely defined by the Church. On the other hand, the *theological* indirect is frequently defined by the Church. (323, 466)

494. THIRD OBSERVATION. – "Hence the Vatican Council expressly insinuates that *nothing* new has been established by the definition of the Roman Pontiff's infallibility."[240]

Reply. – Nothing new *in substance* or *no new revelation.* But something, and even a great deal, that is new as to *new explication.* Therein precisely lies the evolution of dogma: in a new or greater explication of everything that is truly *implicit,* as the implicit-virtual truly is (170, 173).

495. FOURTH OBSERVATION. – "Thus dogmatic progress or the evolution of dogmas is possible inasmuch as the revealed truths are successively *proposed by the Church* for belief, and are in the course of time more perfectly *known by us.*"[241]

Reply. – There is not only a *proposition* and a *knowledge* of the explication that already existed, but also a *greater explication* than that already in existence – greater, that is, than that which already existed in the faithful, and greater also than that which already existed in the whole Church, although not greater than that which existed in the mind of the Apostles. Hence, although it is not a progress of the faith in itself or in its substance, nonetheless it is not just a progress of the faithful in the faith, but also a progress of the faith in the faithful, not merely in the individual faithful but in the Church herself. (177, 182)

It is one thing to catalogue, order, classify, divide, formulate . . . concepts already *known,* and even to deduce *known* concepts from others similarly *known.* It is another radically different thing to pass from *known* concepts to other concepts still *unknown.*

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[238] *Summa Theologica,* 2-2, q.11, a.2.

[239] ST. THOMAS, *In 3 Sent.*, d.33, q.1, a.5.

[240] *Op.cit.*, pg.19.

[241] *Op.cit.*, pg.44.

In the former case the intellect remains within the *formal,* within the *same concepts.* In the latter case there is a transition from the formal to the virtual-implicit, a transition to a *new concept.*

In the first case there is nothing but a greater distinction, or greater clarity, or greater order of the same concepts. In the second case there is not only a newness of order, classification, or formulation, but also a newness of *consequence* or of concept. "The explication of the articles of faith happens in two ways: one, when a man knows *distinctly* the articles themselves; another, when. . . a man knows *the things that follow from the articles.*"[242]

It is evident that, by her dogmatic definitions, the Church does not merely order, or classify, or distinguish concepts already *known* but determines, or defines, or gives us *new concepts,* concepts *not known* previously, although already implicitly contained in the concepts primitively known. As Lirinensis puts it: "By thee posterity thankfully rejoices in something known, which antiquity heretofore venerated *unknown.*"[243]

Let no one believe, as many seem to believe, that these are concepts unknown to the faithful in particular but known to the Church, as if the Church did nothing but define something unknown to the faithful but already known to herself. These are concepts previously not known to the faithful and to the Church herself, although known to the Apostles. "Thus, in the course of ages and centuries, let there be growth in the understanding, *knowledge* [scientia], and wisdom of each as well as of every one, of one man as well as of the *whole Church.*"[244]

Dogmatic progress thus moves between concepts that are neither contrary nor diverse, but explicative or mutually implicit. Hence it is homogeneous and not transformist. But this does not mean that the concepts are not *new concepts.* Not entirely new since they are not new as to their objectivity or substance, but nonetheless partially new since they are new as to their development or explication (20, 306).

496. FIFTH OBSERVATION. – "It should be observed that, in the Schoolmen's view, the 'consequences or corollaries' are not contained in the articles in a way such that they are deducible from them *by reasoning alone,* but in a way similar to the way in which particular articles are contained in certain general articles, as, e.g., the Passion of Christ in the Redemption."[245]

[242] ST. THOMAS, *In 3 Sent.,* d.25, q.11, a.1, sol.3.
[243] *Commonitorium,* 23
[244] VATICAN COUNCIL, Denz.-Schön. 3020; LIRINENSIS, *Commonitorium,* 28
[245] *Op.cit.,* pgs.73-74.

Reply. St. Thomas and all the great Schoolmen expressly and clearly distinguish between the containment of one *article* in another, or the containment of all the articles in the two most general articles of the faith, and the containment of the *consequences* or corollaries in the articles.

Of the first mode of containment they assert that it cannot be done through human reason alone, but that it requires revelation, and hence the deduction or explication *from one article to another article* was completed in Christ and his Apostles. "This explication was completed by Christ."

Of the second mode of containment, i.e., the containment of the "consequences or corollaries" in the articles, they assert that such consequences can be known and deduced, and have as a matter of fact been known and deduced, without revelation, by human reason, as in the case of theology, or by reason with divine assistance, as in the case of Church definitions. "And in this regard the faith can be explicated day by day, *and has been more and more explicated through efforts of the Fathers.*" (134, 314)

497. SIXTH OBSERVATION. – "Thus, according to St. Thomas, 'the articles' *do not contain that which is revealed per accidens,* but everything that is *revealed per se* whether explicitly or implicitly."[246]

Reply. – St. Thomas expressly says that in the articles two kinds of things are contained and can be deduced or explicated: a) things contained *actually* in the article; b) things contained *potentially* in the article.

Now, every Thomist knows, and St. Thomas says it expressly, that by *potentially* contained or revealed is not meant the formally revealed, but the *indirectly* revealed or the consequential: *the things that follow from the articles.* That is the *potentially* or *virtually* revealed; that is the truly and properly theological conclusion.

Let us quote a Thomist who will no doubt please Fr. Schultes. In his commentary to a parallel passage, John of St. Thomas writes: "St. Thomas assigns on the part of the Holy Scripture the *immediately revealed,* but on the part of theological science he assigns the *revealable,* or that which is revealed *virtually* or *in potency.*"[247]

Thus the *potential* content of the articles, of which St. Thomas expressly speaks and of which he says that it is *divisible* and *explicable,* is identical to what Cajetan and later Thomists called *virtual* in the proper sense. All of it, according to St. Thomas, is *truly contained* in the article. "That which is potentially *contained in the article.*" (134, 296. 365)

[246] *Op.cit.,* pg.75.
[247] *Cursus Theologicus,* p.1, q.1, d.2, a.7, n.11.

498. SEVENTH OBSERVATION. – "However, it must be observed that only certain determinate conclusions have been accepted as Catholic truths, viz. those that are inferred with a *good and necessary consequence*, i.e., which follow from any truth of the Holy Scripture or any other dogma with *logical certitude* through a mediating *immediately evident* proposition. Finally, these conclusions will be nothing but explications or determinations of the meaning of Holy Scripture or Tradition."[248]

Reply. – This passage is taken from a context in which our objector speaks of theologians of the 14th and 15th centuries, among them Scotus.

In the first place, it is not accurate to say that all these theologians require that the premise of reason be "*immediately* evident". The majority of them are satisfied with requiring that it be "necessary and evident". The reader can verify this by looking up the passages we have quoted (372-381).

In the second place, it is enough that our objector admits, as he does, that a conclusion from a premise of faith and a premise of natural reason is definable when the premise of reason is "immediately evident". That is enough for saying that theological conclusions in the *proper* sense are definable as of faith, unless there be some Thomist theologian capable of saying that no conclusion derived from an immediately evident premise of reason is a conclusion in the proper sense. That would be the limit!

In the third place, the reader is given to understand how our objector is to be understood when he says time and again in his book that nothing can be defined as a dogma if it is not "formally" revealed or if it is not an "explication or determination" of the revealed. By these terms he apparently means any theological conclusion, even one that is deduced through a premise of natural reason, provided that this premise is immediately evident. This alone is sufficient to warrant the acceptance of the definability of conclusions in the proper sense.

What happens in such theological conclusions is this: when the minor of reason is *immediately evident*, or both premises are explicitly revealed, the conclusion is quickly and without any difficulty accepted by all theologians, and even by all the faithful; it is quickly taught by the ordinary preaching of the pastors; it quickly gains admission into the teaching and belief of the universal Church, and thereby it is speedily defined by the ordinary magisterium with no need of any solemn definition.

But this does not mean that such conclusions are not truly and properly conclusions, or that they need no definition of the Church, at least the definition of her ordinary magisterium, in order to be believed as truths of divine faith.

[248] *Op.cit.*, pg.85.

The more evident a conclusion, the more it is properly a conclusion, and the more properly and rigorously theological it is. "Thus the evidence and necessity of the consequences *does not eliminate but makes theology; it does not take theology away, but brings theology in.*"[249]

Today, on the contrary, there seems to exist in many theologians the manifest tendency to regard a theological conclusion as all the more *theological* or all the more *scholastic* the more difficult, or doubtful, or obscure, or debatable it is. They have lost the true Thomist notion of theological science and of the theological conclusion in the proper sense of these terms.

499. EIGHTH OBSERVATION. – "Consequently, according to Báñez, the definitions issued later by the Church represent a *pure explication* of the knowledge had *by the Apostles* and delivered *to the Church.*"[250]

Reply. – The reader who has read, or reread, Báñez's texts (396) will plainly see that Báñez clearly distinguished between the *explication* that the *Apostles* had of the revealed datum, and the explication that the posterior *Church* has.

If we compare the explication that the Church has and is given by her to us with the explication that the Apostles had, the former is not more but less than the latter. The Apostles possessed an explication greater than the explication given to us by the Church, and equal to any explication that might be given to us by the Church till the end of time (57, 58).

But if we compare the explication possessed and given by the Church of later centuries, not with the explication possessed by the Apostles, but with the explication given by the Apostles to the Church, which is what we call the revealed datum, then the explication is successively *greater.* According to Báñez, this explication embraces every truly and rigorously theological conclusion, and it is, he says, what St. Thomas meant by the indirectly revealed.

On this matter, as on many others, Báñez is superior to certain commentators of the 17th and 18th centuries.

Our objector will not be able to quote a single passage in which Báñez denies the definability of the truly theological conclusion as a truth of faith. On the other hand, we have quoted numerous passages, and we could quote many more, in which Báñez expressly asserts it.

[249] CANO, *De Locis*, 12, 2.

[250] *Op.cit.*, pg.90.

500. NINTH OBSERVATION. – "The formula given by St. Thomas and other Schoolmen was sufficient to explain the development of the faith through new revelations, but not to explain the unfolding of the faith through the magisterium of the Church or in the course of dogmatic development."[251]

Reply. – St. Thomas has given us not only a clear formula to explain the progress of the Old Testament or the progress of new revelations, but also very clear formulae to explain the dogmatic progress that takes place after the Apostles by means of the Church.

These formulae are: a)*"The things that are contained potentially* in the article... and these things are *those that precede* the article and *those that are consequent to it"*[252]; b) "The things that are contained implicitly in the articles, which is the case when a man knows *the things that follow from the articles"*[253]; c) "The things that are contained *implicitly* in the faith of the Church *as conclusions in the principles"*[254]; d) *"The things from the denial of which there follows something contrary to the faith"*[255], e)*"The things from which there follows the corruption of an article."*[256]

The reader has there five literal formulae taken from St. Thomas that express the scope of dogmatic progress after the Apostles with much more clarity and accuracy, and with much less confusion and empiricism than any formulae invented thereafter.

St. Thomas's five formulae are equivalent to one, viz., to the truly *theological conclusion* or truly *implicit virtually*, which is the formula whereby they are translated by Capreolus, Cajetan, Báñez, and almost all the Saint's classical commentators prior to the Salmanticenses (467,469)

501. TENTH OBSERVATION. – "But the general reason for the confusion has been the failure to distinguish between the division of *revelation* itself (i.e. on the part of revelation itself) and the division of the various modes of *knowing* the revealed objects, i.e. on the part of the mode of our knowledge."[257] Our objector repeats this at every turn and believes that it is the principal distinction that has to be made.

[251] *Op.cit.*, pg.99.

[252] *In 3 Sent.*, d.25, q.2, a,2, ad 4.

[253] *Ibid.*, a.1, sol.3.

[254] *In 4 Sent.*, d.13, q.2, a.2, ad 6.

[255] *Summa Theologica*, p.I, q.32, a.4.

[256] *Op.cit.*, 2-2, q.11, a.2.

[257] *Op.cit.*, pg.110.

Reply. – We concede that this distinction needs to be made since without it it becomes impossible to know what is revealed immediately *in itself* or on the part of *revelation,* and what is revealed immediately *for us* or on the part of our knowledge.

But there is a third member, more important than these two and which our objector never mentions, viz., that which is *at the same time* revealed immediately *in itself* and revealed mediately *to us.* This is precisely the revealed implicit-virtual. Inasmuch as it is mediate to us it is virtual, and hence rigorously theological. Inasmuch as it is immediate *in itself* it is implicit, and hence definable by the Church.

Thus, the Church defines nothing that is not truly revealed, since she defines only that which was already *implicit* in the revealed object. Thus, too, the Church does nothing but turn the immediate *quoad se* into immediate *quoad nos,* since whatever is implicit or inclusive is already immediate *quoad se,* as St. Thomas repeatedly observes (168).

502. ELEVENTH OBSERVATION. – "H. Kilber, one of Suárez's brothers in the Society, does an excellent refutation of him [Suárez] based principally on this reason: that any doctrine which is *only virtually* revealed cannot be held *exclusively on God's authority."*[258] Kilber's objection is repeated subsequently by our objector on his own in pg. 196.

Reply. – In the first place, if Kilber and our objector are speaking of the virtual-implicit or inclusive, as they truly do, they are wrong in describing it as *only virtual.* Anything truly implicit or inclusive, albeit virtual or mediate to us, is formal or immediate in itself. They should describe it as *formal-confused,* as Suárez and Lugo call it; or *virtual-implicit*, as John of St. Thomas calls it; or *implicit* or *virtual* without further qualifications, as it was termed by all theologians prior to Suárez; or *identico-real* virtual or *connexive-essential* virtual, as it is called by the majority of modern theologians.

In the second place, setting aside useless questions of nomenclature, Kilber, as so many non-Thomists, has not distinguished sufficiently between *the faith* and *our faith.* That assent is to be given *exclusively on God's authority* is true speaking of faith in itself, i.e., of the faith of those who have received the revelation immediately from God. But it is not true speaking of *our* faith, i.e., of the faith of those who have received the revelation through the proposition and explication of the Church. In *our* faith there are two elements: a) the *object* which is revealed by God alone; b) its *explication* by the Church assisted by God. With respect to the revealed object, the formal mo-

[258] *Op.cit.*, pg.119.

tive is God alone. But with respect to its explication, the Church's definition comes into play, not as the formal motive, but as an integral and indispensable *condition* of the formal motive. And since the definition is not done in virtue of new revelation but in virtue of assistance, *reasoning* comes into play as an instrument of the Church, just as history, critique and all the other necessary human means come into play in order to find the meaning of the explicitly revealed, or to explicate the implicit.

The argument submitted by Kilber and our objector proves apodictically that no conclusion, not even a conclusion deduced from two revealed premises, can be a truth of divine faith *before* its definition by the Church, since it is *human* reasoning that explicates and proposes the conclusion, and we would therefore assent with *divine* faith to a *human explication*. But it proves nothing at all with respect to *implicit* conclusions defined by the Church, even if the Church had to employ reasoning to unfold or *explicate* them. In this case reasoning plays no part at all either in our knowledge or in our assent to the conclusion, which is known by us through simple and immediate definition. If it plays a part at all, reasoning has no part in *our act* [of faith] but in the *explicative labour of the Church*, and even there its part is not that of the formal motive but of a simple instrument or condition previous to the definition (129-134 and 135-156).

503. TWELFTH OBSERVATION. – "God does not disclose or reveal everything he knows about the thing, but only what is *signified* by the terms."[259]

Reply. – This second argument from Kilber is no more efficacious than the preceding one. God reveals not only what the terms *explicitly* say, but also what they say *implicitly*, i.e., what is *implicated* or *included* in the predicate of the revealed proposition. That is the virtual *inclusive* or *implicit*.

Explicative or analytic or conceptual reasoning, which is what we mean by inclusive reasoning, does not have for its purpose the addition of any meaning or signification that was not implicit. Its purpose is to explicate or unfold what was already implicit in the revealed premise, and in it alone, just as a tree develops the vitality it already possessed within itself into branches, flowers and fruits.

The only difference lies in that the tree cannot do it without assuming material from without, whereas our intellect, being in possession of a so-called *analytic* or *intellectual* process which is purely and exclusively intrinsic, can do it without any mixture, addition or change, by a simple *explication* or unfolding of what was already objectively and truly *implicit* in the starting point (224).

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[259] *Op.cit.*, pg.119.

Elsewhere (96, 246) we have quoted texts from John of St. Thomas and Gonet in which they assert that the truly theological conclusion is completely contained in the premise of faith alone, and not at all in the premise of reason. This is obvious to any true Thomist. However, we shall further submit the testimony of two modern Thomists.

"The conclusion, in effect, is *solely contained in the principle of faith*, and not at all in the principle of natural reason."[260]

"At any rate, and this observation is of *capital* importance, the theological conclusion is not contained virtually in the philosophical minor – the latter is absolutely extrinsic to the former – but *in the revealed major alone.*"[261]

Such being the case, it is plain that the Church, in defining such conclusions as truths of divine faith, does not *objectively* increase the revealed deposit.

504. THIRTEENTH OBSERVATION. – "But if a thing is *in no way immediately revealed*, neither implicitly nor explicitly, the Church can never propose it as a truth of faith."[262]

Reply. – These words from John of St. Thomas, which our objector stresses as if they were a forceful argument, are effective against the definability of the *non-inclusive* or *physico-connexive* mediate. It is only such a mediate that is "in no way immediate", since it is mediate both *quoad se* and *quoad nos*. But they are of no force against the mediate *inclusive*, which neither John of St. Thomas nor any true Thomist would dare describe as being *in no way immediate*, since even if it is not immediate *quoad nos*, it is *immediate quoad se* (168). "Any proposition whose predicate is *included* in the reason of the subject, is *immediate* and per se evident *of itself.*"[263]

Our objector likewise repeatedly observes that if a truth is to be a "conclusion properly speaking", it needs to be deduced from the revealed deposit "as the effect from its cause", and if it is contained and deduced only in this manner then it is not definable as of divine faith. But our objector seems not to have adverted, as neither the Salmanticenses seem to have, to the fact that to be deduced "as the effect from its cause" can have two essentially different senses.

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[260] R.P.MARTIN, O.P., *Revue Thomiste*, Jul.-Aug. 1912. pg.505.

[261] A. DE POULPIQUET, O.P., *L'objet intégral de l'Apologétique*, pgs. 523-524.

[262] *Op.cit.*, pg.121.

[263] ST. THOMAS, *In Post. Analyst.*, lib.1, lect.3.

First sense: deduced as the effect from its "cause in the proper sense", viz. the *natural* or *real* or *physical* cause. In this case, it is obvious, and we readily concede, that the conclusion is not definable as of divine faith, nor even as of ecclesiastical faith, for the simple reason that it is not an *inclusive* or implicit conclusion, but merely connexive. It is not a rigorously theologico-metaphysical or absolutely necessary conclusion, but a physical conclusion, which absolutely speaking is contingent or fallible. It is a conclusion of *type 4.*

Second sense: contained in the revealed deposit and deduced from it as the effect from its "cause in the improper sense",viz., the *virtual* or *metaphysical* cause with respect to its effects, or the *integral* or *perfect* essence with respect to its properties. It is thus that every rigorously theological conclusion is contained in and deduced from the revealed deposit. But in this case the conclusion is not purely connexive but also implicit or inclusive. It is mediate *quoad nos* but immediate *quoad se.* Hence it is definable as of divine faith. Such are the conclusions of the other five types.

Hence, these two things should never be confused: a) to be a *conclusion in the proper sense;* b) to be deduced as effect from its *cause in the proper sense.* The latter is not necessarily required for the former. The majority of those who deny the theological conclusion's definability as of faith do so because they understand it in terms of a conclusion deduced as an effect from its cause in the proper sense. But this is a wrong notion of the theological conclusion (46, 53, 98, 300).

505. FOURTEENTH OBSERVATION. – "For any thing to belong indirectly to the faith, it is indeed necessary that from its denial there should follow the denial of the principle of faith, but it is also *further* necessary that it be *revealed in itself.*"[264]

Reply. – It is necessary that it be *revealed,* but not that it be revealed *in itself.* It is sufficient that it be revealed *in another.* This is what is known as the virtual *implicit,* and it is verified in every *inclusive* theological conclusion.

Such implicitness is not created by our reasoning; but it is discovered, or explicated, or deduced by reasoning. Since this implicitness exists *objectively,* and thus independently of our reasoning, it is by the same token a true and *objective* implicitness, and suffices for definability. But our reason cannot discover or explicate it except *by means of* reasoning, and for this reason it is called virtual or *mediate,* i.e., mediate for *our* intellect.

The passages we have quoted from Cajetan (383) and many other Thomists will make obvious that for *definability* they require nothing but

[264] *Op.cit.,* pg.142.

implicitness, and for implicitness they require nothing but *necessary connexion,* since when we speak of theological, not physical connexion, we are speaking of a connexion of *objective analysis,* and hence of connexion with implicitness. For St. Thomas and the Thomists and for 90% of the other theologians, *objective identity* (provided that it can be known evidently without new revelation) is the same as *implicitness* and as *definability* as a truth of faith.

If Molina, and Kilber and certain other theologians think otherwise, they and those who wish to follow them are entitled to their views, since in the absence of a definition by the Church these are matters of free opinion. But we find it hard to comprehend that there should be Thomists who think that what is *really identical* is not likewise *objectively identical,* and what is objectively identical not *objectively implicit,* and what is objectively implicit in the revealed deposit not *implicitly revealed.*

We believe that such theologians, much like the ancient conceptualists, pay more attention to the statements and the subjective concepts than to the *objective reality* involved in the statements and concepts. They forget that the goal and terminal point of the statement and the concept, in science as well as in revelation or faith, is not the statement or concept, but the *reality.* "The act of the believer does not terminate in the *enunciable* but in the *thing.* For we do not form *enunciables* except for the sake of obtaining by their means knowledge of the *things, as in science so too in faith.*"[265]

506. FIFTEENTH OBSERVATION. – "Third corollary: The question, what conclusions are definable as dogmas, cannot be properly settled by the fact that they are *connected* with something that is revealed in itself... (but also by taking into account that they are *expositions* or *expressions* of a determinate revealed doctrine): for *connexion* with something revealed alone does not make a teaching definable as an object of faith."[266]

Reply. – We concede that *connexion* alone does not suffice for definability. What is needed is connexion with *inclusion* or *implicitness.* Such is the case with conceptual or analytic reasoning. Such is also the case with implicit virtuality.

We likewise concede that the definitions of the Church, whether they are definitions of faith or simply infallible definitions (Thomists have never distinguished between the two in the case of teachings, although there has been some difference of opinion in the case of dogmatic facts), are nothing

[265] *Summa Theologica,* 2-2, q.1, a.2, ad 2.

[266] *Op.cit.,* pg. 143.

but the *explication* of what is revealed. For this reason we do not admit as definable the non-implicit virtuality, but require that the virtuality be *implicit,* since only what is implicit can be *explicated.*

Lastly, we concede that every definition of the Church is nothing but a *determination* of what was already revealed. But that, and only that, is what a true conclusion does, if it is inclusive, viz.: *determine,* unfold, develop, or lay open (all these terms are equivalent) the revealed principle.

We believe that a lot of time is wasted beating around the bush without delving into the substance by all those theologians who pile texts upon texts from the Church Fathers and St. Thomas in which it is asserted that the definitions of the Church do nothing except *explicate* and *determine* the revealed deposit. That is undoubtedly true; but in the Fathers of the Church and in St. Thomas these terms do not have the superficial and empirical meaning frequently given them by the common people and the casuists, but the philosophical, organic, ontological and vital meaning they have in philosophy and theology. In the vocabulary of Lérins and St. Thomas the terms *to explicate* or *to determine* mean *to unfold* or *to develop* what was already implicit, but with the sort of *virtual* implicitness in which the branches find themselves before breaking out of the trunk, the members of the body before acquiring their full development, implicit but true and proper conclusions before they are deduced from the principles. Let us quote an example from Lérins and a couple from St. Thomas.

St. Vincent of Lérins: "Let the religion of the souls imitate the condition of bodies, which, with the passing of years, *evolve* and *explicate* their parts, but withal remain the same that they were."[267] The reader can here see the term *explication* taken in the sense of development or *evolution* of the virtual implicit: "*evolve and explicate.*"

St. Thomas: "Of this natural knowledge a beginning and an end may be pointed out. Its beginning lies in a certain *confused* knowledge of all things, insofar, that is, that there naturally exists in man the knowledge of universal *principles,* in which, as it were in *seeds,* all the *knowable things* that can be attained by natural reason pre-exist *virtually.* But the end of this knowledge is reached when the things that exist *virtually* in the principles themselves are EXPLICATED in act: as e.g., when from the *seed* of an animal, in which all the animal's members pre-exist *virtually,* the animal is produced having all its members differentiated and perfect, the end of the animal's generation is said to be reached . . . And just as nothing pertaining to the perfection of his [Adam's] body was found in it not EXPLICIT in act, so whatever existed

[267] *Commonitorium,* n.22.

seminally or *virtually* in the *first principles* of reason was all of it EXPLICIT in accordance with perfect knowledge."[268] The reader can here see clearly explained by St. Thomas himself the meaning of the term *to explicate,* viz., *to develop* the *inclusive virtuality.* Nothing could be plainer.

Another text from St. Thomas: "Therefore, since the principal intention of this Sacred Teaching is to deliver a knowledge of God . . .; applying ourselves to the *exposition of this teaching,* we will treat: first, of God"[269], etc. Here we see the term *exposition of teaching* taken as synonymous to deducing proper conclusions. Finally, another text from St. Thomas on the meaning of the term *to determine.* From the many texts available we will choose one in which St. Thomas plainly speaks of determining the *virtual.* In the *Summa Theologica,* p.I, q.1, art.7, St. Thomas deals with the question "Whether God is the subject of this *science",* i.e., of theology insofar as it is a *science,* and says: "To the second objection it is to be said that *all the things* that are DETERMINED in the Sacred Teaching are comprehended under God, not as parts, or species, or accidents, but insofar as they are ordered to him in one way or another."[269a] The term *to determine* is here applied not only to improper but also to proper conclusions. *"All the things that are determined."*

In short, those who accumulate texts from the Fathers of the Church, St. Thomas, and the great Schoolmen, containing the assertion that the definitions of the Church are only *explications* or *determinations* of the revealed deposit, and then proceed to deduce from such texts that the Church's definitions are not definitions of the implicit *virtuality,* simply do not understand the language of traditional theology.

To the Thomist *novice,* as Cajetan would say, who wishes to achieve a good understanding of St. Thomas's mind, we will, with his indulgence, offer two pieces of advice. First, with regard to the terms *explication* or *determination* of the faith, he should observe that St. Thomas employs them to mean *all* infallible *definitions* of the Church, both the definitions of divine faith and those that are known today as definitions of ecclesiastical faith. In the case of doctrinal definitions St. Thomas never drew a distinction between those two kinds of definition. Second, St. Thomas ordinarily employs the

[268] *De Veritate,* q.18, a.4.

[269] *Summa Theologica,* p.I, q.2, prol. quaestionis.

[269a] *Summa Theologica,* p.1, q.1, a.7, ad 2.

terms *explication* and *determination* in the sense of *developing* or *unfolding* the implicit virtuality, and hence conclusions properly so called.[270]

All the *articles* of the Creed are only explications or determinations of the two most general articles of faith, but explications or determinations of such great profundity that they are beyond any human power and demand new revelations. These revelations ceased with Christ and his Apostles. "And this *explication* was *completed* by Christ . . . in *determinate* articles". (St. Thomas)

On the other hand, dogmas *not-articles* or dogmas *conclusions* are also explications or determinations, but of a kind that is relatively easy, so that human reason aided by simple divine assistance suffices to make them. "And *in this regard* the faith can be *explicated* day by day, and has been more and more explicated through the efforts of *the Fathers* [the ecumenical councils]." (St. Thomas)

Each stroke of the sculptor's chisel effects an explication or determination in the marble or in the features of the statue; each stroke of the painter's brush effects an explication or determination of the lines or details of the painting; each new branch is an explication or determination of the tree; each *inclusive* conclusion is an explication or determination of the principles of the science.

[270] "In the teaching of faith the *articles of faith* play the *same* role that the *per se evident principles* play in the teaching achieved *by natural reason.*" (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theologica,* 2-2, q.1, a.7) "Being *collative,* the intellectual power passes from certain things *to others;* hence it does not regard equally all the intelligibles that are to be known. *Certain things* it sees at once, as those that are *per se evident,* in which *certain other* things are contained IMPLICITLY, which it cannot understand except *by means of reason,* EXPLICATING what is IMPLICITLY contained in the principles." (*De Veritate,* q.11, a.1, ad 12) "When many things are VIRTUALLY contained in one thing they are said to be IMPLICITLY in it. *as conclusions in the principles.*" (*Ibid.,* q.14, a.11) "And this was the cause why it was necessary to put forth *many Creeds,* which differ in nothing except that in one there is a *fuller explication* of the things that are contained IMPLICITLY in the other." (*Summa Theologica,* 2-2, q.1, a.9) "When we ask whether it is possible for the Supreme Pontiff to err in the *definition* of matters of faith, we mean the EXPLICATION of matters of faith through his definition. We will explain this with an example. If a moral philosopher is asked for advice on some doubtful matter and he answers in accordance with moral *principles,* then certainly the philosopher is not in this case the author of truth, but rather EXPLICATES what lay concealed. IN THIS SAME MANNER, when the Supreme Pontiff defines something as a truth to be held by faith, his role is that of one who EXPLICATES the hidden truth, not of one who is the author of the truth. AND IT IS IN THIS MANNER THAT ST. THOMAS IS TO BE UNDERSTOOD when he says in the article that a *new* issue of the Creed belongs to the authority of the Supreme Pontiff, i.e., as to a NEW EXPLICATION" (BAÑEZ, *In 2-2,* q.1, a.10) "For up to now the Church has never proposed to the faithful for belief or defined what is not expressly contained in the Sacred Scriptures or the Apostolic Traditions, or contained therein VIRTUALLY in such a manner that it can be deduced therefrom through an evident CONSEQUENCE." (BAÑEZ, *loc. cit.*) Etc., etc.

Let any Thomist read without biases these and thousands of other texts that could be quoted, and he will plainly perceive what St. Thomas and the whole ancient Thomist tradition understood by *explicating* what is *implicit* in the deposit of the faith.

Analogously, each definition of the Church – provided that it truly is a *definition* and not a mere *redefinition* (171) – is also a new explication or determination, a new development or evolution, a new facet or new aspect of the divine deposit, the living and fecund deposit entrusted by God to his Spouse, the Church, for safeguarding and *explication.*

The only difference is that the first three instances just mentioned are instances of material things in which there is no explication or determination except by adding something from outside or by subtracting something from within; whereas reason, when inclusive or analytic, develops its principles, and the Church develops her deposit, without any objective change (224).

Thus the Church is not only the divine *guardian* whose mission it is faithfully to preserve the deposit as to what is already explicit and determinate in it, but also the divine *artificer* whose mission it is to *explicate* or determine, to polish and chisel, to develop and mature, to perfect and complete what in the divine deposit is virtual or unformed, implicit or inchoate. "Let it be cultivated, let it flower, mature, develop and come to perfection. . . Whatever things are of old *unformed* and *inchoate,* let her carefully foster and polish; whatever things are already firmly established and defined, let her keep safe."[271]

Such is, in our judgment, the ample, fecund, vital, philosophical sense of the terms *explication* and *determination* in Lérins, St. Thomas, and all the great Schoolmen, as applied to the deposit of the faith.[272]

[271] LIRINENSIS, *Commonitorium,* 23.

[272] "In matters of faith there are some things that are not perfectly *made clear* by the Church: e.g., in the primitive Church it was not perfectly *made clear* that persons converted from Judaism were not obligated to keep the legal observances, and during the time of St. Augustine the Church had not yet *made clear* that the soul does not originate from the seed . . . But there are other things pertaining to the faith that have already been *determined* by the Church." (ST. THOMAS, *In Epistolam ad Romanos,* c.14, lect.3) Thus it appears that some doctors have disagreed . . . in certain matters of faith that had not yet been *determined* by the Church. But after they have been determined by the authority of the universal Church, anyone who should resist such a decision would be regarded as a heretic." (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theologica,* 2-2, q.11, a.2, ad 3) "And since some things are *implicitly* contained in the faith of the Church as *conclusions* in principles, there are different opinions maintained concerning such matters until the Church *determines* that one of them is against the faith of the Church because from it *there follows* something directly contrary to the faith." (ST. THOMAS, *In 4 Sent.,* d.13, q.2, a.1, ad 6) "There are two ways of *explicating* the articles of faith . . . The other

These two functions – that of *guardian* and that of *artificer* – entrusted to the Church with respect to the revealed deposit, and which the Vatican Council describes as *conserving* and *explaining*, have been recognized and admirably expounded by Lérins.

The role of guardian is described by him as follows: "*Keep*, says the Apostle, *the deposit*. What is a deposit? That which is *entrusted* to you, not *discovered* by you; what you have *received*, not what you have *devised*; a thing not from *ingenuity*, but from *teaching*; not from private *usurpation*, but from public *delivery*; a thing *brought to* you, not *brought forth* by you; in respect of which you should not regard yourself as the *author* but as the *custodian*; not the *instructor*, but a *sectary*; not the *leader*, but a *follower*. Keep, says he, *the deposit: conserve* the talent of the Catholic faith inviolate and unimpaired. What has been entrusted to you, let it remain with you, let it be the same thing that you deliver. You received gold, deliver gold. I do not want you to substitute *one thing for another*. I do not want you either impudently to substitute lead or fraudulently to deliver bronze instead of gold. I do not want the appearances of gold, but *certainly its substance*." Hereto the office of *guardian* or custodian, the function of conserving.

Lérins follows with the description of the office of *artificer* or the function of *explicating* or developing the deposit. He compares the Catholic teacher, i.e., the Church, with Beseleel, the artificer mentioned by the Holy Scripture,[273] in these terms: "O Timothy, O priest, O handler, O teacher! If

way refers to those things that are *implicitly* contained in the articles themselves, and this takes place when a man knows the things that *follow* from the articles." (ST. THOMAS, *In 3 Sent.*, d.25, q.2, a.1, sol.3) "Hence, just as the article of the resurrection was contained in the text *'I am the God of Abraham and Isaac'*, which Christ the Lord afterwards *explained* to men of lesser understanding, so too, certain things that are obscure in the Sacred Scriptures he *unfolded* to the Church by the Spirit of truth." (CANO, *De Locis*, book 3, 3) "For the theologian *gathers his conclusions* from the principles of faith, and *explicates* such conclusions *implicit* in the principles themselves by a process of natural argumentation." (CANO, *op.cit.*, book 8, 2) "As we have elsewhere repeatedly said neither the Church, nor the Pontiff of the Apostolic See, nor the interpreters of the Sacred Scriptures issue new revelations to the faithful, but they either express or interpret the revelations received by the Church from the Apostles, or certainly *gather what is consequent or connected*, or *make clear* what is contrary and inconsistent." (CANO, *op.cit.*, book 12, 3) "And in this respect the article of faith can be *explicated* and divided." (ST. THOMAS, *In 3 Sent.*, d.25, q.2, a.2, ad 4) "And in this respect the faith can be explicated day by day, and has been more and more explicated through the efforts of the Fathers." (ST. THOMAS, *loc.cit.*) "I answer that it is to be said that with respect to *explication* the articles of faith are as *general principles* no differently than the general rules of behaviour with respect to human laws. Hence, both such explication and human enactments are as *conclusions deduced from their general principles.*" (GRAVINA, O.P., *Catholicae Praescriptiones* [Neapoli 1619]. lib. 4, a.5, pg.361)

[273] *Exod.* 31:2.

the office divinely given thee has made thee fit, *be the Beseleel of the spiritual tabernacle* by thy intelligence and the exercise of teaching, *carve* the precious jewels of divine dogma, *coapt* them faithfully, *embellish* them wisely, *add* splendour, charm, beauty . . . By thee let posterity thankfully rejoice in possessing *understood* what antiquity venerated *not understood* . . . Accordingly, whatever has been *sown* by the faith of the fathers in this tillage of the field that is God's Church, it behooves that the same be *cultivated* and *tended* by the industriousness of the sons; let the same *flower* and *grow to maturity*, let the same *advance* and *come to perfection*. For it is right that the old dogmas of heavenly philosophy should in the course of time be *carefully fostered, refined, polished*. But it is unlawful to exchange them; it is unlawful to detruncate, to mutilate them . . . Whatever things are of old *unformed* and *inchoate* let her *carefully foster* and *finish*; whatever things are already firmly established and defined let her keep safe."[274]

There are historians of dogmas who give us a magnificent idea of the Church's function as *custodian* of the revealed deposit ; however, they seem to deny, or at least dissemble, her other function as *artificer* or *gardener*. The role of artificer, far from being opposed to dogmatic immutability, complements it, provided that the artifice or cultivation is restricted only to effecting a transition "from one to *an other according to reason which is not an other in reality*", i.e., to conceptual conclusions or conclusions that differ with only a distinction of reason. As St. Thomas very correctly observes: *"The distinction of reason alters nothing on the part of the things."*[275]

507. SIXTEENTH OBSERVATION. – "Thus, finally, St. Thomas teaches the same thing that the Vatican Council teaches when it says: 'The Holy Spirit was promised to Peter's successors . . . so that, with his assistance, they would inviolably *safeguard* and faithfully *expound* the *revelation* delivered through the Apostles or the deposit of faith."[276]

Reply. – This text of the Vatican refers not only to the definitions of faith, but also to the Church's every infallible definition. Since, according to all theologians, infallible definitions embrace also the virtual or the conclusions properly so called, it follows from this text that the exposition or explication of the deposit includes the development or definition of its implicit virtuality (248). All the more so since any development of implicit virtuality is nothing more than the exposition or explication of what is revealed (240).

[274] *Commonitorium*, nn.22-23.

[275] *Summa Theologica*. p.3, q.75, a.7.

[276] *Op.cit.*, pg.146.

508. SEVENTEENTH OBSERVATION. – "It is *firmly to be held* that any doctrine subsequently defined as a dogma of faith is revealed *properly* and *in itself* [formally]."[277]

Reply. – Our objector again joins together and takes as identical *proper* revelation and *formal* revelation or revelation *in itself*, as if revelation *in another* or virtual revelation were not proper revelation. Now, it is true and "firmly to be held" that only *proper* revelation can become a dogma of faith. However, it is neither true nor "firmly to be held", but on the contrary, "it is freely debated" whether revelation *in another* or virtual revelation can become a dogma or not.

Both ancient and modern theologians are so far from considering the non definability of the virtual as "firmly to be held" that, when it is a case of inclusive virtuality or of conclusions that are identico-real or metaphysico-connexive to the revealed deposit, the majority of them maintain the contrary. Whether only the formally revealed is definable, or also the virtually revealed, is an entirely free question after as well as before the Vatican Council. Fortunately, the author eventually admits it expressly on pg. 195, at the bottom of which is found this brief and expressive footnote: "The conclusion is being debated." Well!

509. EIGHTEENTH OBSERVATION. – "Thus, by a proposition revealed explicitly and implicitly, one and the same thing, or better still, the same *formally known object* is known through different concepts under different aspects."[278]

Reply. – We understand very well that one thing, remaining *materially* the same, can be known through formally different concepts.

What we cannot understand – and this is precisely what dogmatic progress is all about – is that a thing, remaining *formally* the same, can be expressed by means of concepts *differing formally from it* without going out of bounds of the formal. With the intervention of a formally different concept between the conclusion and the principle, there exists a virtual distinction and a conclusion in the proper sense. This is exactly what happens in many of the Church's dogmatic definitions, i.e., they are conceptually different from, albeit really identical to, the revealed premise as this premise exists in the primitive datum.

For instance, suppose that nothing existed in the revealed datum with regard to the transubstantiation except the statement "This is my body", and

[277] *Op.cit.*, pg.161.

[278] *Op.cit.*, pg.167.

that from it the primitive Church deduced the transubstantiation, as did St. Thomas and the Tridentine. In that case, there would have been a transition from the formal to the virtual, that is, to to an implicit virtual (210).

Likewise, suppose that nothing existed in the primitive datum relative to the sacrament of Penance except the statement "Receive the Holy Spirit: whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them; and whose sins you shall retain, they are retained", and that from it the Church gathered the necessity of confessing the circumstances that change the species; there would have been a transition from the formal to the implicit virtual (211).

Similarly, suppose that in the primitive datum nothing existed with respect to the Immaculate Conception but the phrases "I will put enmities. . .", "Hail, full of grace", "Mother of God", and that from these the Church deduced Pius IX's definition; it would have been a transition from the formal to the implicit virtual (209, 312). And so of many other instances.

To pass from the knowledge of a known thing to the knowledge of other concepts formally identical to what is already known, is one thing. It is quite another thing to pass to the knowledge of other concepts *differing virtually* from, although *really identical* to, *the concept primitively known.*

Our objector seems to believe that no distinction exists between the propositions of the primitive datum and the propositions later defined dogmatically by the Church except a distinction of *formulae* or of reasoning reason, but in no case a distinction of concepts or of reasoned reason or *virtual* distinction.

On the other hand, we believe – and on this point we have on our side the whole theological tradition and the plain facts of the history of dogmas – that there can be, and there frequently is, a *virtual* distinction, a distinction of proper conclusion, i.e., an analytic or inclusive conclusion. "For up to now the Church has never proposed to the faithful for belief or defined anything that is not contained expressly in the Sacred Scriptures or Apostolic traditions, or *contained virtually in such a way that it can be deduced therefrom by an evident consequence.*"[279]

510. NINETEENTH OBSERVATION. – To show that *mediate* or *virtual* revelation is not enough for *implicit* revelation our objector argues as follows:

"Truth is revealed either *immediately* or *mediately.* Something is said to be revealed immediately or formally, if it is revealed or disclosed *in itself*, i.e., if the truth is as such disclosed by the proposition or the terms of the proposition, e.g., *if I actually say to someone: The treasure you are looking*

[279] BÁÑEZ, *In 2.2*, q.1, a.10.

for is in such a place. Something is said to be revealed *mediately* or *virtually*, if it is revealed *in its principles or causes*, i.e., if a principle is disclosed by means of which or from which the truth or teaching at issue is made manifest to me through my own intellectual operation, e.g., if a thing is revealed from the knowledge of which I can come to know another teaching, either by knowing the effect from the cause, or the cause from the effect, or the property from the essence, *or the essence from the property*, or in some such other way: as, e.g., *if I should show someone a divining rod by means of which he is able to find a hidden treasure.*"[280]

Reply. – In the first place, even if a man did not tell me expressly where his treasure is hidden, were he to give me a divining rod that infallibly shows the place where it is hidden, he has by the same token revealed it to me implicitly, since to know where it is I need do nothing but *apply* the rod. God has not revealed *explicitly* the treasure of the theological conclusions or the revealed mediate and virtual, but he has given us in the definition of the Church an infallible rod to find that treasure. We *only need to apply* the rod to find it. The treasure is thus *implicitly* revealed. As a matter of fact, simple common sense tells us that the treasure's hiding place is disclosed not only by one who says "The treasure you are looking for is in *such* a place, but also by one who says "The treasure you want is in the place indicated by this infallible rod I give you." That is exactly what God has said to us when he gave us in the Church's infallible authority the infallible rod to determine or define the revealed mediate or virtual. It is, therefore, of divine faith once it is defined, not because it is indicated by the rod, but because *God said* that it is there where the rod shows its presence.

In the second place, by denying the implicit revelation of conclusions in which the *essence* is deduced from a revealed *property*, our objector unwittingly disagrees with the teaching of the Salmanticenses whom he holds in such high esteem "There is this difference between the revelation of the subject and the revelation of the property: the express revelation of the former is not necessarily the implicit revelation of the latter; but, on the contrary, the *explicit revelation of the property is a formal implicit revelation of its subject* because the express revelation of the defined is an implicit revelation of the definition. But every property is essentially defined by its subject which takes the place of the genus or the difference, as it is said logic."[281] How is it possible that Thomists of such caliber as the Salmanticenses should have fallen into such an obvious inconsistency as to deny, on the one hand, that theological conclusions *in the proper sense* are *implicitly*

[280] *Op.cit.*, pg.167

[281] SALMANTICENSES, *De Fide*, d.1, n.149.

revealed, and to affirm, on the other hand, that when a *property* is revealed, the essence is *implicitly revealed?* It is possible that any Thomist should not see that the deduction of the essence from the property is a conclusion *in the proper sense?* Our objector there has a new proof of the confusion suffered by the Salmanticenses on the question of the definability of the revealed virtual. It is one of the effects of Suárez's formal confused and pure virtual.

In the third place, St. Thomas expressly teaches that the revealed mediate or virtual is *implicitly* revealed: "That is *properly* called implicit *in which* many things are *contained* as if it were in one. . . *Hence* whenever many things are *virtually* contained in some one thing they are said to be in it *implicitly, as conclusions in the principle.*"[282] To evade the force of such a clear text our objector finds nothing better than to say "St. Thomas takes the terms 'explicitly' and 'implicitly' *in a broader sense.*"[283] Our objector has overlooked the fact that that is precisely Molina's solution: "St. Thomas spoke *less properly.*" (169) He has also overlooked the fact that St. Thomas himself took the precaution of observing that he was speaking of the implicit in the proper and rigorous sense: "That is *properly* called implicit. . ." Lastly, he has overlooked the fact that if we are to interpret in a broad sense the term "implicit" when St. Thomas affirms that the virtual or mediate is implicit, then we must likewise interpret it in a broad sense when the Saint affirms that the Church can define as of divine faith nothing but the implicitly revealed, in which case we equally arrive at the conclusion that, according to St. Thomas, the virtual is definable as of divine faith. Whatever the interpretation given to the terms "implicit" and "virtual" employed by the holy Doctor, we eventually arrive at that same conclusion if those terms are uniformly interpreted. The one way of escaping the dilemma is uncritically and arbitrarily to give those terms one meaning in certain passages, and another meaning in certain other passages, when it is the case that the passages are parallel passages from the same author, on the same subject, in the same question, and at times even in the same article, as is the case with the texts of St. Thomas on the *implicitly* revealed.

In short – to return to the example of the treasure and the divining rod –: to find the treasure of the revealed virtual or mediate in the revealed deposit or premitive datum, there are two divining rods available to us. One is human reasoning alone. This divining rod is not infallible; above all, *God has not told us* that the treasure would be in the place indicated by it. Thus, whatever we find by its means is not and cannot be of divine faith, but of theological assent. The other is the Church's definition. This divining rod is not only infallible, but in its case *God has told us* that it is infallible and that

[282] ST. THOMAS, *De Veritate*, q.14, a.11.

[283] *Op.cit.*, pg.167, footnote 2.

the treasure would be in the place indicated by it. Hence, whatever we find by its means is of divine faith, not precisely because we have found it, or because it was pointed out by the Church's divining rod, but because *God had said so* implicitly.

It is for this reason that we have said time and time again throughout this book that the revealed virtual or theological conclusion, no matter how inclusive, is not of divine faith before it is defined by the Church, but it is of divine faith after its definition.

511. TWENTIETH OBSERVATION. – "Fr. Marín-Sola . . . if I am not mistaken, confuses two different things, viz., the objective distinction of the *mode of revelation,* and the distinction of the *mode of knowing* on our part."[284]

Reply. – We do distinguish those two modes, viz.: a) immediate or mediate on the part of the *revelation,* or *quoad se;* b) immediate or mediate on the part of *our knowing,* or *quoad nos.* But far from confusing the two, we add a third: c) immediate on the part of *revelation* and mediate on the part of *our knowing.*

St. Thomas and the Thomist school have always insisted on drawing a clear distinction between this *third mode* and the other two modes. It is this *third mode* which Scotus confused and which gave rise to the extreme opinions of Vázquez and Molina (169). It is this *third mode* which, we think, our objector has failed to understand. And it is exactly in this *third mode* that dogmatic development consists, since this mode is the revealed inclusive virtual: immediately revealed *quoad se*, but mediately revealed *quoad nos.*

Of the two elements – viz.: a) *revelation;* b) *explication* and proposition of the revelation – the revealed virtual possesses the first element without the second. Thus there is no need of revelation since the revealed virtual-inclusive already has it; but there is need of a new explication and proposition. And that is precisely what dogmatic progress consists in: in the explication and proposition of the implicit revealed virtual.

Our objector also repeats under various guises in his new book the following words which he had already written in *La Ciencia Tomista:* "The things that theology demonstrates, explains, makes manifest, are not only the theological conclusions properly so called, but *primarily* and *principally*, or even, in St. Thomas's view, *regularly* the revealed truths themselves, which are viz. unfolded, explained, made manifest. . . It is for this reason that St. Thomas identifies, as it were, the Sacred Teaching with the Holy Scripture."

[284] *Op.cit.*, pg.170.

Our objector correctly says that theology is concerned with explaining the immediate or formal meaning of its principles; but we believe that he is far from correct in saying that that is its primary or principal concern. Our "elders" in the Thomist school have always taught something else quite different on the notion and nature of sacred theology.

"The proper office of scholastic theology, *insofar as we have gathered from our elders and experience in almost daily encounters as students of this faculty,* is, in the *first* place, *to bring as it were out of the darkness* into the light what is contained concealed in the Sacred Scriptures and the Traditions of the Apostles. For the theologian gathers *his conclusions from the principles of faith,* and *explicates* through a suitable *natural argumentation* the conclusions *implicit* in the principles themselves. For *just as* the faculty of Music *connects through reasoning,* from the things established in Arithmetic, *the things existing is measured sounds, whether consonant or dissonant,* so also the School's theology through natural reason gathers from the things established by faith *consequences* about God and things divine . . . This faculty of researching in the School has *yet another* proposed aim, viz., to *defend* our faith against heretics . . . Finally, it pertains to the Schoolmen's function to *illustrate,* insofar as this is possible, this teaching, and even to confirm it by means of human disciplines . . . Hence *three* ends should be acknowledged as the ends of *true theology.* For I am not speaking only of Scholastic Theology, but of any theology whatsoever."[285]

"For, *in the first place,* it deduces *conclusions* from indemonstrable principles, and this is common to it and other sciences; *then* it busies itself in various ways with the first *principles.*"[286] All the great Thomists express themselves in similar vein.

Thus sacred theology, like metaphysics, has various purposes, but its primary, fundamental, regular and ordinary purpose is to deduce *conclusions* properly so called.[287]

[285] CANO, *De Locis,* lib.8, c.2.

[286] GONET, *De Summ. Theol,* n.74.

[287] When in the *Summa Theologica,* q.1, a.2, St. Thomas asks "Whether the Sacred Teaching is a *science*", he takes this term to mean science in the *proper sense,* and therefore by Sacred Theology he does not understand the Bible or the formally revealed principles, but sacred theology insofar as it is knowledge of *conclusions in the proper sense.* Cajetan says to the point:

"Note to words in the title of this second article: one, *science;* the other *Sacred Teaching.* Science is here *taken properly* as an intellectual virtue [6 *Ethic.*, c.6, n.1] and the *habit of conclusions* acquired through demonstration from the principles. And since subjects are such as are allowed by the predicates, it follows that the term *Sacred Teach-*

The other two purposes, viz., the defense and the explanation of the *formal* meaning of its first principles, do not belong to theology as *science*, but as *wisdom*, i.e., not *per se* but *per accidens*, inasmuch as there are people who deny or who do not understand those principles, and there being no other superior science to undertake their defense and explanation, such functions have to be undertaken by theology itself through its auxiliaries, Apologetics and Exegesis. "Hence the Sacred Teaching, *inasmuch as it has no superior*, argues against anyone who denies it *principles*."[288] But from saying this to saying that principles are theology's primary or principal business, or that St. Thomas *ordinarily identifies theology with the Bible*, there is a vast distance – the distance that exists between conclusions and principles.

Every true science consists in effect, of two integrant parts, viz., *first principles* and *conclusions*, but the principal or specific part of science as such is not the principles but the conclusions. Now, the Bible and divine Tradition are the first principles of theology, not its conclusions. Hence, theology includes two integrant parts: first, the Bible and divine Tradition as first principles; second, everything necessarily and evidently connected with those two sources, as conclusions. Both things or parts integrate theology, but the principal or primary or specific part of theological science is neither the Bible nor divine Tradition but their conclusions properly so called. However, being *theological* conclusions and not physical, these conclusions are inclusive or implicit conclusions, not merely connexive.

ing is here taken to mean the revealed doctrine *insofar as it is about conclusions." (Comment. in loc.cit.)*

But there was no need for it to be pointed out by Cajetan, since St. Thomas had himself pointed it out expressly in the treatise on faith where he alludes explicitly to the second article just quoted. "From these *principles* [viz., the principles of faith or authorities from the Sacred Scripture] something is established among the faithful *in the same manner* as something is established among all men *from naturally evident principles*. Hence, too, *theology is a science*, as it was said at the beginning of this work in part 1, q-1, a.2." (2-2, q.1, a.5, ad 2)

In a parallel place of the *Commentaries to the Sentences*, in which he raises the same question ("It is further asked whether it is a *science*"), he writes: "Just as the *habit of first principles* is not acquired through other sciences, but is had from nature, but what is acquired is the *habit of conclusions* deduced from the first principles, *so also* the *habit of faith*, which is as the habit of principles, is not acquired in this teaching, but what is acquired is the *habit of whatever is deduced from them*." *(In 1 Sent.*, prol., q.1, a.3, sol.2, ad 2)

Thus to say that St. Thomas takes the term science to mean science in the improper sense, or conclusions to mean improper conclusions, or that he almost identifies theology with the Bible – to say any of these things seems to us improper of a true Thomist.

[288] *Summa Theologica*, p.1, q.1, a.8.

In the 17th and 18th centuries, all these questions began to be considered from a more or less empirical or material viewpoint as a result of the predominance of positive over speculative theology. Since then, certain theologians have almost forgotten the distinction between "principles" and "first principles" of theology, despite the existence of a formal distinction between the two.

To be a principle of theology it is sufficient that a truth be defined by the Church infallibly, or at least as of divine faith. Hence it is enough that it belong to any of the first three levels of Catholic doctrine (3), or at least to any of the first two levels. But to be a "first principle" of theology it is not enough that a truth be defined as a truth of divine faith, let alone as an infallible truth. It is necessary that it be an immediately revealed truth or a truth revealed in itself, such that the Church and theology have found it in the revealed deposit without the help of deduction or reasoning properly speaking. Hence it is not enough that it belong to the third or the second level of Catholic doctrine; it must necessarily belong to the first level.

Theology's "first principles" are principles and not conclusions properly speaking. Those that are principles, but not "first principles", are not only principles but also and at the same time conclusions properly speaking.

The first principles are principles *per se* and from the very beginning they were defined or determinate in the ordinary magisterium or universal preaching of the *Apostles* themselves. Those that are not "first", but secondary or derived principles, are not principles per se, but by the Church's definition or determination, and existed as true and mere theological conclusions before they were defined and became principles.

Instances of first principles are the so-called articles of faith in respect of their fundamental or primary concepts, e.g., that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, or that there are two natures in Christ. Instances of principles that are not first principles, but principles-conclusions are the dogmas posteriorly defined that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as from *one* principle,[289] or that there are in Christ two intellects and two wills, or any of the many examples we have given elsewhere (202-212).

Almost all, or the greater part of, theological conclusions that are evident and admitted by all theologians have graduated to the second or the

[289] "Which gives us to understand that both Erasmus and Ambrose Catharinus *greatly erred:* the former in thinking that this conclusion [viz., that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as from *one* principle] has *nothing* to do with the faith; the latter in counting it among the *first principles*, i.e., the articles of faith, whereas it is *properly a theological conclusion.*" (CANO, *De Locis*, lib.12, c.6, septima praeceptio) The reader will do well to take note of the phrases "properly a theological conclusion", "first principles", and "greatly erred".

third level of Catholic doctrine through solemn or ordinary magisterium. Hence, the fourth level contains only conclusions that either are not plain and evident, or are not yet admitted by all. This understandably natural fact has given rise to two false conceptions of theology.

The first is that of certain theologians who overlook the fact that many true and proper theological conclusions have passed on to the third and even to the second level of Catholic doctrine, without prejudice to their being truly and properly conclusions. Thus they regard as conclusions only those remaining on the fourth level. Since those remaining on this level are mostly either not evident or not yet admitted by all, such theologians easily beget the notion that the truly and properly theological conclusion is solely the non-evident or the debatable conclusion. Hence the confusion in many theologians between theology itself and theological systems, and the discredit in which "Scholastic Theology" is held by many, as if the whole of the third level of Catholic doctrine and a great part of the second level were not genuine "Scholastic Theology"!

The second is that of those who look with contempt, or near contempt, at the fourth level of Catholic doctrine since there is so much in it that is obscure and debatable. Accordingly, they restrict theology to the first three levels. Now, all the truths on these first three levels are "principles" of theology. They thus form the notion that true theology is concerned principally and almost exclusively with principles in order to defend or to explain them, and secondarily or even scarcely, if at all, with conclusions properly speaking. They fail to appreciate the fact that, although all of the third level and a very large part of the second level is made up of principles, such principles, nonetheless, are not "first principles" but principles-conclusions. Hence, when theology busies itself with these principles and shows how these secondary or derived principles are gathered by reasoning from the first principles, it is busying itself with conclusions properly so called.

These secondary or derived principles are now truths of divine faith, or of infallible faith, because they have been defined by the Church. But they also are, and in the beginning were, truly and properly theological conclusions, since they are not found in the primitive deposit or revealed datum except by means of proper reasoning, i.e. as conclusions differing virtually from the revealed principles in which they were contained and from which they were deduced. Such derived dogmas or dogmas-conclusions are not only objects of divine faith but also objects of theology, and it is the theologian's office to *demonstrate* them. For this task it is not enough to pile up texts from the Fathers and Councils *posterior* to the revealed datum, showing that the Fathers have *thus* understood them, and the Church has *thus* defined them. It is further necessary to show *why* the Fathers and the Church have *thus* understood and taught them. "*Why* the Church has thus understood it."

(212) That is to say, it is necessary to demonstrate *how* such secondary and derived principles are contained in and were gathered from the first principles. These *why's* and *how's* constitute the true and proper theological conclusions, and it is with them that theology is concerned, whether they are conclusions yet undefined (4th level), or conclusions already defined as infallible (3rd level), or conclusions or principles-conclusions already defined as dogmas of faith (2nd level). Ninety percent of the truly demonstrative articles in St. Thomas's *Summa Theologica* and of any other true course of theology has to do with either of those three levels of proper theological conclusions. Consequently, the ordinary, normal and proper function of theology *as science* is not concerned with the first principles, but with their proper conclusions.[290]

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[290] There are three essentially different kinds of demonstrations: (a) *natural* or philosophical; (b) apologetical; (c) theological.

The first employs as a medium of demonstration the *principles of natural reason;* the second, the principles or *motives of credibility;* the third, the *revealed principles* or revealed deposit. When it is said that absolutely supernatural truths or mysteries are indemonstrable, this is to be understood of natural, not of apologetical or theological, demonstration.

A truth can be contained in the revealed principles or revealed deposit in three ways: (a) explicitly; (b) implicitly, but with a superficial or nominal implicitness; (c) implicitly, but with a conceptual or virtual implicitness. In the first case, the truth requires no reasoning at all in order to be known; in the second case, an improper reasoning is needed; in the third case, proper reasoning is needed, and this is what is properly called *theological demonstration.*

Theological demonstration can be effected by the theologian in two ways. One is the external or purely positive way, which consists in merely adducing *authorities* whether of popes, councils, or Church Fathers, etc., who assert that something is so. The other is the intrinsic and scientific or magistral way, in which *theological reasons* are submitted, i.e. the internal links or vital sinews that bind a given truth with any of the organic centers of the revealed deposit or the so-called articles of faith, or, at least, with any of the *per se* and explicitly revealed truths – all of which is tantamount to showing *how* such a truth is contained in the primitive datum and *how* it follows therefrom. The latter is the true *scholastic theology.*

Of these two demonstrations, the positive and the scholastic, the former demonstrates *that* such or such is the truth, but not *why* it is the truth. The latter demonstrates not merely *that* such or such is the truth but also *why* it is the truth. The former shows that the Church has understood it *so;* the latter shows *why* the Church has understood it so. "*Quare sic* intellexit Ecclesia."

These two kinds of theological demonstrations or "disputations" have been admirably described by St. Thomas in an article from which we transcribe the following: "One kind of disputation is aimed at removing the doubt *whether a thing is so,* and in this theological disputation *authorities* accepted by the adverse parties in the disputation are to be employed above all else . . . Another kind of disputation is the *magistral* used in the schools, which is not aimed at removing error, but at the instruction of the listeners so that they are led to the *understanding of the truth,* which it intends. In this case one

Those who think otherwise do so, in our opinion, because they do not understand, or, with Molina, they unduly restrict the Church's true dogmatic function. They regard the Church as a simple registering machine. Not one that registers the social awareness, as claimed by Modernism, but one that registers the revealed datum. They think that if any thing is formally of divine faith after the definition, it likewise had to be such before the definition. Since nothing can be a principle of theology if it is not of divine faith, they consequently think that if any thing is capable of becoming a principle of theology through the Church's definition, it already had to be such before the definition. In short, they believe that the Church's authority or definition reduces simply to *make of the record* as a truth of faith or a principle of theology that which already was of faith and a principle, but not *to make* of

should lean on the *reasons that inquire into the root of the truth* and which give us to know *how it is* that what is said is true. Otherwise, if the master should determine the question by means of *authorities alone*, the intellect will indeed be certified *that it is so;* however, it will have acquired nothing of science or understanding, but *will depart empty."* (Quodlibetum 4, a.18, "Whether theological determinations should be done through authority or through reason", ed.Vivès, t.15, pgs.444-445)

Certain modern theological courses devote so great a part to positive theology and so little to scholastic or rational theology, that they do not seem to be courses of true theological science at all, but courses of apologetics or of external history of dogmas. And we say "external" history, because the true "internal" history of dogmas does not consist precisely in pinpointing the *dates* and *places* in which each dogma developed, or the *persons* who contributed to its unfolding. It consists principally in pointing out the internal or organic links that bind one dogma to another, and all of them with the articles of faith or primitive datum. These internal bonds have been and are the true formal or vital causes of the evolution of certain dogmas into other dogmas.

Truth to say, any theology that is truly scholastic or rational is a true *internal* history of the dogmas. And thus there is no better internal history of the dogmas nor a better course of theology than the ever perennial *Summa* of St. Thomas. This immortal work is, for anyone knowledgeable enough to plumb its depths, a true anatomical and physiological chart of the fevealed truth's organism, whose four levels of development constitute the luxuriant tree of Catholic doctrine.

The requirements demanded by the defense of the revealed deposit against Protestantism in the first place, and later on against rationalism and naturalism, increasingly turned Catholic theologians towards positive theology and apologetics. By the same token they began to regard sacred theology from the external view-point of *defense* of the revealed deposit, rather than from the intrinsic viewpoint of the *development* or explication of the deposit. This gave rise to the *extrinsicist* notion of sacred theology. a notion that has been gaining ground day by day, which looks at its conclusions as something *external* to the revealed deposit, not as something *internal* contained within and issuing out of its very innards (117, 245). Thence flows the natural and logical idea that, as something *external* to dogma, the theological conclusion constitutes a true objctive or substantial addition to the revealed deposit, and hence not definable. Thence, too, the discredit in which the idea of rational or scholastic theology – and even the idea itself of theology – is held by many today. We believe that such people have lost the Thomist notion of true theology or theogical conclusion.

faith or a principle of theology that which for us was but a proper theological conclusion.

Such theologians seem to forget that, on account of the Church's divine authority, sacred theology possesses a characteristic or peculiarity not possessed by any other science, to wit, that its conclusions can *become* principles because that which was previously known only through theological reasoning can come to be known subsequently through divine authority (308): "And thus this is *peculiar* in theology, that what at one time was a conclusion can *become* a principle."[291] "And this makes plain the *error of Molina,* who asserts the contrary."[292] We will not go so far as to qualify as erroneous Molina's opinion or innovation, but we will certainly subscribe to the "It is amazing! " levelled at it by the illustrious Suárez with as much justification as thorough familiarity with theological tradition (84).

Thus, when our objector asserts time and again that the *principal* and quasi ordinary function of theology has to do with the principles and not with the conclusions in the proper sense, that assertion can have two meanings.

If by principles he means the "first" principles, then that would be tantamount to eliminating theology by destroying its character as science in the proper sense.[293] That would not be the Thomist teaching, but the teaching of Aureolus and the Nominalists.

[291] JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *loc.cit.*

[292] NAZARIO, *loc.cit.*

[293] With regard to theological demonstrations concerning the first revealed principles or articles of faith, Báñez writes as follows:

"Briefly, I say that there is no incongruity in saying that even an article of faith is capable of *theological demonstration,* at least a posteriori. Thus, e.g., 'Any man who rises from the dead was dead; therefore Christ was dead.' However, such demonstrations seem to be *pointless* for they contribute neither certainty nor clarity to the conclusion." (BÁÑEZ, *In 1 Partem,* q.1, a.3)

"Such consequences, in which one article can be gathered from another, are *useless* argumentations, unless employed against people who deny one principle while conceding another [this is theology's role as apologetic or as wisdom]. Hence *speaking simpliciter* theology [insofar as it is *science*] does not reason *to prove its principles."* (BÁÑEZ, *ibid.,* a.8, ad 4)

As a matter of fact, to deduce a first principle from another first principle, or even a formally revealed truth from another formally revealed truth, might be useful for purposes of organizing or defending the revealed datum, but it is useless for the purpose of developing it. Science as such is not about the formal but about the virtual. Hence, the *principal* function of theology is not, and cannot be, to concern itself with the formally, but with the virtually revealed.

If by the term he means the secondary or derived principles, then the assertion has no force against us or against the question at issue, since the secondary and derived principles are theological conclusions in the proper and rigorous sense, and did not come to be known and defined by the Church except by way of proper and rigorous theological conclusion.

512. TWENTY-FIRST OBSERVATION. – "Fr. Marín-Sola likewise holds that the concept of virtual revelation was *vitiated* by Suárez. However, unless I am mistaken, there is here an equivocation which is cleared away by an easy distinction. Fr. Marín-Sola considers the *real distinction of properties from their essences,* whereas Suárez considers whether *in two given propositions something formally distinct is being said.*"[294]

Reply. – Of Suárez and Lugo we have asserted two things, which bear repetition here: 1) that they affirm that *everything* really identical to the revealed deposit, albeit differing conceptually from it, is the revealed formal confused, which is not only definable as of divine faith but can also be given the assent of divine faith even without the Church's definition. 2) That they affirm that *only* that which differs really from the revealed deposit is virtual in the proper sense.

The reader can look up elsewhere (73) the proofs of our two assertions. That *that* is Suárez's true mind is admitted by all true disciples of Lugo and Suárez. That *that* is to vitiate the concept of virtual revelation or theological conclusion should be admitted by every true disciple of St. Thomas.

It is true that Suárez did not express that teaching as clearly and categorically as Lugo. If, on that account, our objector prefers to impute to Lugo everything that, with Lugo, Ripalda and all the Suarezians, we have imputed to Suárez, he is welcome to it with no objection from us. Whether it was Suárez or Lugo who authored the teaching or innovation whereby the traditional and true concept of virtual revelation is vitiated, is of little consequence for the question with which we are dealing. But it is of the greatest importance, indeed, to make it of record that Suárez and Lugo, together with all theologians before Molina and the majority of theologians after him, affirm against our objector, as we also affirm, that wherever *real identity* exists between the theological conclusion and the revealed principle from which it is deduced because their predicates differ only conceptually, there too *identity of doctrine* likewise exists, and therefore definability *as of divine faith.* That is enough, and more than enough, to assert the existence of true dogmatic evolution by way of proper theological conclusion. If our objector prefers to call *that* an improper conclusion, it is only a matter of names. Thomists have always called it a proper and rigorous conclusion (27), which it is.

[294] *Op.cit.*, pg.172.

In support of our interpretation of Suárez we will quote three distinguished Suarezians.

"There is a greater difficulty regarding the object of a conclusion known form a revealed premise and a premise certified by natural reason. The *first opinion* holds that an object of this sort is believable by faith . . The *second opinion* denies . . . the *third opinion* lies in the *middle,* i.e., it holds that the object of such a conclusion is believable by faith if it is REALLY *identical* to the revealed object, but not if it *differs* REALLY and is separable from it . . . *Thus* Lugo and *Suárez.*"[295]

"Let us now come to those conclusions that can be deduced from a revealed premise and one that is evident. The *first opinion* universally affirms that such conclusions are of divine faith. . . The *second opinion* universally denies. . . The *third opinion* draws a distinction: for if the deduced property is *metaphysically,* i.e. *only formally different* from the revealed object, then it says that it can be believed with divine faith. But if it [the deduced property] *differs* REALLY, then it denies. *Thus Suárez* and Cardinal De Lugo,"[296]

"If it is a question of a truth that is implicitly contained in another explicitly revealed truth, with which, however, it is *only* REALLY *but not formally identified,* Ripalda, the Wirceburgenses and others hold that such a truth is not revealed. But De Lugo and *Suárez* teach the opposite. And this seems to be the opinion to which one should subscribe."[297]

It should be plain to our objector that we have attributed to Suárez nothing but the teaching attributed to him by his most distinguished and fervent disciples. Even more, our objector eventually confesses indirectly that Suárez *did vitiate* the concept of virtual revelation. Speaking of Suárez's theory that the Church's definition of the virtual is tantamount to a new revelation, our objector remarks:

"However, this teaching [Suárez's] *lacks solid foundation*. . . It also *perverts* the teaching of the old Schoolmen; but, particularly after the Vatican Council, *it can scarcely be admitted.* Certainly a theory of the evolution of dogmas *can hardly be built* on the foundation of this teaching."[298]

If that is true, as it is, our objector is well aware that Suárez's theory equating the Church's definition of the virtual to a new revelation arose precisely out of his other theory designating as virtual that which differs really from the formal, as we have shown elsewhere (78).

[295] RIPALDA, *De Fide,* d.8, s.3, n.37.

[296] HAUNOLDUS, S.J., *De Fide,* lib.3, n.145.

[297] MAZZELA, *De virtutibus infusis,* n.414.

[298] *Op.cit.*, pg.97.

Finally, although this is not really necessary, it will not be superfluous to add that Montaigne himself, who is so highly praised by our objector on this subject, interprets Suárez as we have done.

"That is contained *identically* in another, says Suárez (d.19 *De Fide*, s.2, n.10), which is contained in it as in A THING that is altogether the same: thus in God the intellect and the will, justice and mercy, paternity and nature, are one and the same REALLY *and identifically.*"[299]

By looking up the place quoted by Montaigne, the reader will verify that the *real* and *identical* mentioned by Montaigne is exactly what Suárez calls *formal confused*, and what we call, virtual *implicit* or *inclusive*, since although it is formal or immediate *in itself*, it is nonetheless mediate or virtual *to us*, as Suárez confesses in the same place quoted by Montaigne.[300] They have not grasped, as neither have the Salmanticenses, the true meaning of Suárez's and Lugo's formal confused.

513. TWENTY-SECOND OBSERVATION. – Fr. Marín-Sola assails the teaching on proper or improper reasoning... but he fails to attain the *historical* distinction between the proper and the improper syllogism. For the improper syllogism is not said to be explicative as if it only explained the meaning of the terms of revelation with other words, but also inasmuch as it at the same time *explicates* the revealed doctrine by *different concepts.*"[301]

Reply. – In the first place, to determine what is proper and what is improper reasoning is not a matter of *history*, but of logic.

In the second place, as we have earlier said (509), it is not a question of concepts that differ among themselves but are identical to the revealed premise, but of concepts that *differ from the revealed premise* or primitive datum. If the new concepts differ virtually from the concepts of the revealed premise or revealed datum, the reasoning is a proper reasoning and the progress is a progress of proper virtuality. This is elementary in Thomist teaching against Scotus and Aureolus. And this is exactly the point at issue in the question of dogmatic progress.

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[299] MONTAIGNE, *De censuris*, a.2, §1; MIGNE, *Theologiae cursus completus*, t.1, pg. 1132.

[300] "Let me point out that, from what has been earlier said, there are two ways in which it can happen that a proposition is contained in another that is revealed. *One*, as *in a* THING altogether identical to it . . . Well, then, taking the *mediately revealed* proposition in the *first way*, it is true that any proposition opposed to it is *heretical*, since a proposition that is thus revealed is simpliciter *of faith*, as I have earlier said d.3, s.11, n.5. . . The reason is that, although QUOAD NOS and according to our manner of conceiving *confusedly*, such a proposition is said to be *mediately revealed*, nonetheless IN SE revelation falls on, or reaches it *immediately.*" (SUÁREZ, *De Fide*, d.19, s.2, n.10)

[301] *Op.cit.*, pg.185.

Speaking historically, the first and most fundamental division of revelation is its division into explicit and implicit revelation. All the great masters of the 13th century carry this division. Furthermore, they admit that not only what is explicitly revealed is definable as of divine faith, but also *everything* that is *implicitly* revealed.

Implicit revelation can be subdivided, as subsequently it was, into immediate or formal, and mediate or virtual, insofar as the explication of the implicitness requires either an improper reasoning leading to a nominal conclusion, or a proper reasoning leading to a conceptual conclusion. Observe that the reasoning based on real distinction is a proper reasoning, however it is not *explicative* of implicitness but merely connexive. Thus arose the first of the three divisions of divine revelation which we submit in the outline below. This is the division made by almost all theologians until the 17th century.

Later on, the division into immediate or formal and mediate or virtual was taken as the basis in lieu of the division into explicit and implicit. However, with Suárez and Lugo, a new member was added to the mediate or virtual, viz., the virtual non-implicit, as can be seen in the second division.

Lastly, Kilber and certain others, with Molina, denied that anything mediate or virtual could be implicit, and limited the term implicit exclusively to the immediate or formal. Thus came about the third of the three divisions given in the following outline:

The first of these three divisions is perfect and, in our opinion, expresses the genuine Thomist teaching both in substance and in nomenclature.

The second division is good to a large extent, but it is very seriously flawed by the fact that it introduces as a member of the division of *revelation* a member which *everybody* concedes is *not revealed*. That member is the fourth member, the mediate or virtual *non-implicit*, introduced by Suárez as proper virtual or *merely virtual* (73). If this fourth member were eliminated, the first three coincide perfectly with the members of the first division.

An attentive observation of any of those two first divisions makes it easy to understand why the ancient theologians, including John of St. Thomas, correctly speak of a truly revealed *virtual implicit* since in both divisions it is a fundamental member of the division of revelation.

On the other hand, the third division, Kilber's, is, in our view, antithomist in substance and nomenclature. It is based in its entirety on a complete divorce between implicitness and virtuality. The virtual implicit has been eliminated altogether from this third division which begins by identifying *a priori* the mediate or virtual with the non-implicit.

According to this third division, no virtual or mediate can be implicit or inclusive, and nothing implicit or inclusive can be mediate or virtual. This division overlooks the fact that in any datum or piece of knowledge, whether natural or revealed, there can be concepts truly inclusive or implicit in themselves, but nonetheless mediate or virtual to *our* human reason. This third division of Kilber's is the radical denial of the concept of *implicit virtuality*, the denial of the well-known division of objective propositions into *per se evident quoad se* and *not per se evident quoad nos*, which constituted the line dividing Thomism and Scotism in many fundamental philosophical and theological questions. Our objector's observation is based on this third division of Kilber's[302]

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[302] Our objector also lays down the following canon:

"In the second place: One and the same implicitly revealed doctrine can be known by us from the same explicitly revealed revelation either by way of the implicitly revealed, or by way of the *virtually revealed*. E.g., this is a formally revealed proposition: God was made man. In it is implicitly contained that Christ had a body and a rational soul . . . However, I can also deduce the same knowledge *in the manner of the virtually revealed*, as follows: It is revealed that God was made man; but from my philosophical knowledge I know that man is constituted of a body and a rational soul; therefore Christ had a rational soul. Thus I refute Apollinarism *by way of the virtually revealed.*" (*Op.cit.*, pgs.186-187)

Reply. – Our objector fails to distinguish clearly between the *formal* and the *virtual*. The reasoning he submits does not proceed "by way of the *implicitly* revealed", but "by way of the *formally* revealed." For this reason – and this reason alone – it is an improper reasoning or a reasoning solely in form. The concepts "to be a man" and

514. TWENTY-THIRD OBSERVATION. – "Fr. Marín-Sola elsewhere draws a distinction between the *proper* syllogism in which the *medium* of deduction is a new and different reality, and the *proper* syllogism whose medium is only a different concept. However, the concept of *another thing* can intervene as a *medium* even in the *improper* or explicatory syllogism, as is obvious in *exegetical demonstration*. It is not necessarily the case that the conclusion is about a really different thing if the *medium of deduction* is a different thing."[303]

Reply. – Any proposition of the primitive datum, e.g., any biblical proposition, can be submitted to reasoning for two essentially different purposes: a) for the purpose of finding the immediate or formal *meaning* of the terms or of the formula, if the meaning is as yet unknown. This is often the case when the terms are rare, ambiguous, obscure; or when the phrasing is complicated, etc., etc. Examples could be given by the hundreds. This is the business of hermeneutics and exegesis with all their auxiliaries. Here the purpose is not to deduce a new formula, but simply to establish the meaning of the primitive formula. b) When the immediate or formal meaning of the scriptural terms or formula is already known, reasoning can be employed in order to deduce *new formulae*. This is no longer the business of hermeneutics or exegesis, but the business of theology as science (27, footnote).

In the first case – the purpose of which is not the deduction of any new formula but the finding of the immediate or formal meaning of the terms of the primitive proposition – one can, following the example set by St. Jerome and Cajetan, employ anything as a medium: a dictionary, a grammar, some other verse or book of the Bible, a bearded rabbi. Whether we employ any of these things, or some other things, or all of them together, we will remain within the bounds of *improper* reasoning because our business is with the *formal meaning of the terms*, despite the fact that the dictionary or the rabbi are things that differ really from the biblical proposition. Nor did we ever think or mean to say the contrary. This first case is the case to which the learned Cardinal Billot alludes in a passage quoted by our objector on pg. 180, as follows:

"Observe here that one should not confuse what is signified by the *express* words of a proposition with what is at once perceived by the mere reading or hearing of the proposition. For it might happen that the *meaning*

"to be constituted of a body and a rational soul" are *formally* identical concepts. The minor premise is a *formal* identity, nor merely a *real* identity. Hence the conclusion is *formally* included in the revealed major. Thus the instance is irrelevant to the issue under discussion, which is about conclusions that differ *virtually*. Many of the conclusions defined as of faith by the Church are of the latter kind.

[303] *Op.cit.*, pgs.187-188.

of the words does not become clear except by means of a very studious inquiry, and thus there are many *explicitly* revealed truths that are not seen to be such except after much argument: I mean arguments of the kind that *only* show what, in a given context and according to the rules of *hermeneutics*, is the supposition, power, and connexion of the terms."[304] Plainly, the learned Cardinal has in mind only the demonstration or argumentation that is solely aimed as establishing the true *formal meaning of the terms*.

Not a few theologians fail to distinguish clearly between exegetical argumentation, or apologetic argumentation, or theological argumentation insofar as it is *wisdom*, on the one hand, and *theological* argumentation insofar as it is *science*, on the other hand. The former never gives rise to *new formulae* or propositions, the latter consists in deducing new propositions. And this is exactly the point of the problem of dogmatic progress. Hence neither hermeneutics, nor exegesis, nor apologetics are of any relevance here, but *theological science* alone.

The second case alone is our concern at present. The formal or immediate meaning of the terms of the primitive proposition or formula is known, and what is desired is the deduction of *another proposition* or formula through reasoning. The Church has acted, and does act in this second manner: she has not only defined as dogmas the primitive formulae, but has also defined with the aid of reasoning other formulae which are not primitive formulae. It is in the context of this second case, and in it alone, that the question is raised, When is the reasoning improper, and when proper?

The primitive proposition or formula has *two* terms. A *third* term is indispensable if we are to deduce a new formula. Well then: we have said, and we repeat it once more, that if the third term, which is indispensable for the deduction of a new formula, is *formally identical* to the two primitive terms, the reasoning is *improper*. If it *differs formally* but is really identical – and this is the distinction called *virtual* distinction – the reasoning is *proper* but characteristic of the superior sciences. If it *differs really*, the reasoning is also *proper*, but in this case it is characteristic of the poor and inferior physical sciences. *Proper of natural science.* (St. Thomas) In our opinion, this is the ABC of Thomism (27, 106).

On the other hand, arguing against our position, for rigorously theological conclusions in spite of a *real distinction* between the conclusions and the revealed principles from which they are deduced, our objector cites as instances the conclusions that "human personality differs really from the

[304] CARD. BILLOT, *De virtutibus infusis*, pg.258.

nature", "accidents differ really from the substance", which are respectively deduced from the dogmas of the hypostatic union and the transubstantiation. The conclusions, says our objector, *differ really from the dogmas*.[305]

Our objector could not have chosen less appropriate instances. The first of these two conclusions is deduced as follows: "In the hypostatic union there exists a human nature really separated from a human personality (premise of faith). But two really separable things are really different things (minor of reason). Therefore human nature and human personality are really different things (theological conclusion)." Now, either human personality is something purely negative, as Scotus holds, in which case the conclusion is not a truly theological conclusion since *it does not follow*, and the example is irrelevant; or, on the contrary, human personality is something positive, as Thomists hold, in which case the conclusion is a truly theological conclusion. But in this case it is really identical to the revealed principle because "real separation" and "real distinction", said of positive entities, are really identical. The latter is *included* in the former. Hence the minor in this reasoning is a premise of real identity.

Similarly, the second of the aforementioned conclusions is deduced as follows: "In the Eucharist there are accidents really separated from the substance (principle of faith). But, two things that are really separable are really different (minor of reason). Therefore, accidents differ really from substance (theological conclusion). Now, either the eucharistic accidents are mere appearances, as the Cartesians and many others say, in which case the conclusion is not a truly theological conclusion and is irrelevant; or, on the contrary, the eucharistic accidents are objective-real entities, in which case the argument concludes validly. But, then, the conclusion is *really identical* to the revealed principle from which it is deduced, since relative to objective-real entities "real separation" and "real distinction" are really identical. The second is included in the first. Let the reader observe the minor premises or mediums of both reasonings, and it will be plain that they are inclusive minors or minors of real identity.

Our objector has misread the two given examples, and will very lik misread any others he might give, provided that they are cases of rigorou theologico-metaphysical conclusions. Like many other modern theologians, he is handicapped by the fact that he takes *debatable* conclusions as models of conclusions, scarcely noticing that they are debatable because there is a question whether they truly are conclusions since many take the minor of reason in such a sense that the conclusion *does not follow*. But, then, it is clear that the example is irrelevant because we are speaking of conclusions

[305] *Op.cit.*, pgs.200-201.

that do follow. To hold that a mathematical, metaphysical, or theological conclusion *follows*, but is nonetheless not *really included* in the principle from which it is deduced, is plain nonsense to any Thomist (103-109).

515. TWENTY-FOURTH OBSERVATION. – "That which is only included in or identified with a revealed *reality*, is not properly revealed except in its principle or cause... For the *real* identity of the object of two doctrines does not make any man know the one when he knows the other, nor does it disclose the other when the one is disclosed or revealed."[306]

Reply. – Propositions are not said to be really identical precisely because they are about the same reality, i.e., the same *real* subject, as our objector seems at times to think. Really different, and even completely disparate propositions can bear upon the same real subject, e.g., "Peter is a Spaniard" and "Peter is a priest".

Propositions are said to be really identical when, besides having the same subject, they have really identical predicates, e.g., "The human soul is spiritual" and "The human soul is immortal". The subject is the same, "the human soul"; the predicates "spiritual" and "immortal" are really identical. It is of these propositions, which are called conceptual, that we have repeatedly asserted that when one is explicitly revealed, the other is implicitly revealed and definable as of faith, provided that their real identity is evidently detectable by us without new revelation.

Indeed, if we are to avoid Ockham's and Aureolus's subjective nominalism or conceptualism, it should be conceded that the value of a proposition does not depend precisely on the words, but on their *objective meaning*. The words are what is material in propositions, the meaning is what is formal. Thus, if two propositions have really identical predicates, they also have a really identical *meaning*. Now, *implicit* revelation suffices to make anything definable as of faith. Having the *same meaning – in eodem sensu* – suffices for implicitness. It follows, therefore, that to have really identical predicates is to have a really identical meaning, to be the one implicit in the other, to be definable as of faith.

Our objector, in fact, repeatedly asserts that if a conclusion is to be definable as of faith it is necessary that "it *express* the same doctrine". In the first place, it is not necessary that it "express", it is enough that it "imply" the same doctrine. It is not only the "explicit" that is definable, but also the "implicit". In the second and principal place, we take it that our objector does not take "the same doctrine" to mean "the same words", but "the same meaning", *in eodem sensu*. Now, when two propositions have the same

[306] *Op.cit.*, pg.206.

subject, the whole difference or identity in meaning depends on the distinction or identity of their predicates. Thus, if the predicates are really identical, the meaning will also be identical, and the doctrine also really identical. To say otherwise is, in our view, nominalism or conceptualism in disguise. We think that Kilber's opinion is a derivation of Roscelin's conceptualism which focuses on the statement rather than on the reality meant by it. On this question, as on all others, St. Thomas is a *realist:* "The believer's assent does not terminate in the *enunciable,* but in the *thing*. . ., in *science* as well as in faith."[307]

We do not, therefore, contend that such conclusions are definable because there is an *inclusive* connexion, nor because there is an identical *reality,* but because, there being an inclusive connexion or identical reality, there is "ipso facto" *identity of meaning.* The reason why anything is definable is solely and purely its *implicit revelation;* the reason why it is implicitly revealed is the identity of meaning. Real identity or analytic reasoning are not the formal reason of its definability, but the medium or instrument whereby we detect the presence or absence of identity of meaning, and thus of implicit revelation and by the same token of definability as of faith.

We believe that Kilber and the few who follow him on this question have fallen into a deplorable subjectivism or conceptualism. They have taken the *intention* of the speaker as a criterion to determine what is implicitly *revealed.* Whether a thing is implicitly revealed by my words or not, does not depend precisely on my having or not having the intention of revealing it, but on the *objective reach* or the real content of what I am saying.

Suppose that I have no intention of revealing that such an event took place in Madrid. Nonetheless, if I say that it took place at such and such geographical longitude and latitude that coincide exactly with those of Madrid, the location is thereby objectively disclosed, provided that among my listeners there be someone knowledgeable in geography and capable of "adding two and two together" to get at what is implicitly contained in my words.

Suppose that I have no intention of disclosing that the Apostles were twelve. Nonetheless, if I say they were $4 + x = 10 + \frac{x}{2}$,* their number has been objectively disclosed, provided that among my listeners there be someone capable of solving for x.

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[307] *Summa Theologica,* 2-2, q.1, a.2, ad 2;

Sic. There is probably a typographical error here. The equation should read $4 + x = 10 + \frac{x}{4}$. – *Transl.*

Suppose that I do not want to reveal that Christ possessed knowledge and virtue. If I say that he was the *most perfect* man, his knowledge and virtue are implicitly revealed, on condition that among my listeners there be someone capable of penetrating well the concept "most perfect man".

Suppose that I do not intend to disclose whether or not the human soul is immortal. If I say that it is spiritual, its immortality is implicitly revealed and disclosed if there be among my listeners one capable of delving into the whole implicit content of the concept "spiritual".

If no one among my listeners is knowledgeable in geography, mathematics, physics, or metaphysics; none capable of "adding two and two together", i.e., none capable of solving for x, or unfolding what is objectively contained in what I have said, then the thing will be revealed or contained or implicit *in itself,* but not *to my listeners.*[308]

Now, the listeners to whom God has addressed *Catholic* revelation are the listeners of all times, the whole human race, *human reason.*[309] Hence, whatever is objectively contained in the Catholic revelation, but whose unfolding or development is impossible to human reason so that a new revelation is necessary, all of it is revealed implicitly "quoad se", but not "quoad nos". Whatever is not only implicit but also capable of being unfolded by human reason, is not only implicit in itself, but also implicit to us.

Thus, what we call *deducing* with respect to theology, or *defining* with respect to the Church, is simply "adding two and two together" in what God has said, "solving for x" in the revealed deposit, "unfolding", "developing" the objective or implicit content of God's words; in short, *explicating* revelation. If the job is done by human reason alone, there is a human explication of divine revelation – theology, not divine faith. If it is done by the Church's divine authority – the Church has divine authority for anything having to do with "explicating the deposit" – it is divine faith, a dogma of faith.

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[308] Let us suppose that a confessor does not reveal expressly or directly the name of a penitent who has confessed a grievous sin; however, if he discloses something from which it can be certainly gathered or "be given to understand" who the penitent was, such a confessor has revealed *implicitly,* but nonetheless *really* and truly, the secret or seal of confession. That is what common sense says, and moralists unanimously maintain. Consequently, a thing is revealed not only by disclosing it directly and *in itself* (formally revealed = revealed *in se*), but also by disclosing *some other thing* (virtually revealed = revealed *in alio*) in which it is included and from which the listeners can deduce it with certitude. This is what common sense says, and the contrary seems to us nothing but nominalistic or conceptualistic subtleties.

[309] "Men receive revelation [i.e., public or Catholic revelation] from God not only for the present time, but also for the instruction of *men of all future times.*" (ST. THOMAS, *Contra Gentes,* lib.3, c.154)

If, in order to determine whether a thing has been revealed or not, we take as sole criterion the speaker's *intention* without taking account of the real or objective content of the revealed datum, then it would be impossible unwittingly to reveal a secret. But this is contradicted both by common sense as well as the speech of all peoples, according to which it is possible for a man to reveal something without intending to do so.

Through ignorance or inadvertence a man fails to see the reach of what he says. Thus he often discloses more or less than he intends to, either because his intention falls short of the content of his words, or because the objective content of his words falls short of what he intends to convey.

But in God there is neither ignorance nor inadvertence. Thus, the content or reach of his words cannot go farther than his intention, but neither can his intention fall short of the reach or the real and objective content of his words. God not only reveals all that he *intends* to reveal, but also intends to reveal *all that he does reveal*, i.e., *all the objective content* of what he says. "For he who says *one* thing", we repeat once more with St. Thomas, "somehow says *many things;* and *these things* are those that *precede* the article and are *consequent* to it, and *in this regard* the article of faith can be *explicated* and divided... And for this reason *many things* are now reputed *heretical*, which were not thus reputed before, viz. that it is now more obvious *what* follows from them . . . And *in this regard* the faith can be explicated day by day, and *has been more and more explicated* through the efforts of the Fathers [the ecumenical council Fathers]."

Let us add to St. Thomas four other interesting passages from John of St. Thomas, Martínez del Prado, Nazarius, and Valencia.

"However, St. Thomas, *considering at much greater depth* the per se evident proposition, spoke of it not only according to the formal reason of a proposition by *taking account of the concept or the meaningful word*, but also by taking account of the foundation which exists in the signified *reality* itself. For that a proposition should be demonstrable through a *medium*, or that it should lack a *medium* of demonstration and thus be *immediate* and per se evident, *does not proceed from the very meaning of the terms, but from the very* CONNEXION OF THE THINGS *signified.*"[310]

"That a proposition is *mediate* or *immediate* does not proceed *either from the words or from the formal concepts, but from the* OBJECTIVE CONNEXION *of the predicate with the subject.*"[311]

[310]JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *Cursus Philosophicus, Logica*, p.2, q.24, a.4, ed. Vivès, vol. 2, pg. 676.

[311]MARTÍNEZ DEL PRADO, O.P., *Quaestiones Logicae* (Compluti 1665), lib.3, q.6, n.12, pg.530.

"In the third place, I say that to speak of a proposition by taking account of that which is *principal* in it, viz., the *thing* signified, is not to speak of it *less properly* [which is what Molina and Kilber say, and what our objector often says], especially since the whole *information* given by the proposition is to be referred altogether to the *thing* signified by the proposition. For, neither as regards the *terms* nor as regards the *concepts* is any proposition said to be evident, whether in itself or to us, except by reason of the *thing* signified by the concepts. For *concepts* and *words* are not formed unless for the sake of achieving knowledge of the *thing*. Hence the *thing* is that which is *primarily per se* said to be *known* whether in itself or to us, in the way explained above."[312]

Valencia: "It is a fact that *the conclusion does not always signify something really different from what the premises signify*, as is clear in the case of *metaphysical demonstrations*, in which the subject and the property do not differ *really, nor consequently the meaning of the premises and the conclusion.*"[313]

In these texts our objector can see for himself that the principal thing to be taken into account is the *objective reality*, and that in any case where the reality is the same, as it is in every theologico-metaphysical conclusion, there the *meaning* is also *the same: idem significatum.* Anything else is, in our opinion, conceptualism rank and simple, with apologies to Molina and Kilber.

516. TWENTY-FIFTH OBSERVATION. – "Thus, by the revelation of *God's* unity the *Trinity* of Persons is not revealed, despite the *real identity.*"[314]

Reply. – It would not surprise us to see this objection raised by Ripalda and Kilber, but it does surprise us to see a Thomist raise it without perceiving at once its weak point. We are speaking of conclusions that are really conclusions, i.e., objectively contained not only *quoad se* but also *quoad nos;* in other words, conclusions whose objective inclusion or real identity is capable of being perceived *evidently* by human reason; were it not so, it would not truly be a conclusion for us. The Trinity is really identified with God's unity and objectively contained in it *quoad se*, but not *quoad nos*, since it is impossible for us evidently to detect its identity or inclusion without new revelation. The example is thus irrelevant since for us it is not

[312]NAZARIUS, O.P., *In Summam D. Thomae*, t.1, q.2, a.1.

[313]GREGORIUS DE VALENTIA, S.J., *De Fide*, d.1, q.1, punct.2, (Ingolstadii 1595) t.3, pg.44.

[314]*Op. cit.*, pg.206.

a true theological conclusion. A distinguished commentator of St. Thomas writes in this regard:

"I answer that it should be said that the total object *of faith* is contained *virtually* and *implicitly* in the Apostle's Creed or in the articles that compose it, as in *proximate* and adequate principles. Hence, the object of faith has never grown in its *substance,* but in its *explication.* This is the *common opinion* of theologians on this subject . . .

"To the third it should be said that the total object of faith is contained in the Apostles's Creed in a *different way* than it is contained in the *Apostle's* statement: For he who comes to God, etc. For in the articles of the Creed it is contained as in its *proximate* and *adequate* principles; but in the truths mentioned in the Apostle's statement (that God *exists* and is a *rewarder)* it is contained as in the *most universal* principles. . . Now, there is this difference in the mode of containment: The Creed proximately and adequately contains all the mysteries of faith *not only quoad se but also quoad nos. . .* But the Apostle's statement contains indeed *virtually and implicitly* all the mysteries of faith *quoad se, but not quoad nos,* in the sense that from that statement we could come to know the mysteries of faith through an *evident consequence.* Hence, it does not follow evidently *quoad nos:* 'God exists, therefore he is three Persons', although this follows necessarily *quoad se.*"[315]

By the way, the reader should observe that the Trinity and every other revealed mystery was already contained in the two most general principles of faith *objectively quoad se,* even if it required new revelation to be known. For this reason St. Thomas repeatedly says that not even in all of the Old Testament was there any progress of *substance* or real objectivity, but only of *explication* although by means of *revelation.*[316]

On the other hand, there scarcely is one author today who does not say, distorting all of the traditional nomenclature, that in the Old Testament there was not only a progress of explication, but also a *substantial* or *objective* progress. It will be retorted that it is only a question of nomenclature True. But one begins by giving the terms a *meaning different* from that given them by St. Thomas and the great theologians of the 13th and 16th centuries, and – naturally enough! – one ends by not understanding the language spoken by those great theologians, or by understanding them in a *different sense.*

[315] PHILIPPUS A SMA. TRINITATE, *Disp. Theol., De Fide* (Lugduni 1653), t.3, pgs. 32-33.

[316] *"For this reason* not even Christ Our Lord instituted or made a *new article of faith quoad substantiam,* even if he did institute new sacraments." (BÁÑEZ, *In 2-2,* q.1, a.10)

517. TWENTY-SIXTH OBSERVATION. – "Similarly, God's free will is not revealed with the revelation of God's unity, although God's freedom can be deduced from the notion of God and is really identical to it."[317]

Reply. – It should be interesting to know why, out of so many other attributes in God, our objector should have chosen as an example precisely the attribute of divine freedom. No doubt he has chosen it (as another theologian, who also raised the same objection, expressly wrote us) because of the great difficulty or obscurity encountered by human reason in the demonstration of this divine attribute on account of its apparent inconsistency with the attribute of immutability. These theologians are unmindful of the fact that any conclusion falls short of being rigorously a conclusion in the same degree that it is obscure to us, inasmuch as the conclusion is defined as that which is deduced with *evident* certainty.

Thus, our reply is a very simple one. Either such a conclusion can be deduced by human reason with evidence and absolute certainty, or not. If it cannot be so deduced, it is not a rigorous conclusion to us, and the example is irrelevant. If it can be so deduced, then we concede that in the revelation of God's existence divine freedom is *implicitly* revealed, i.e., with virtual implicitness.

Will our objector be kind enough to answer this question: Can the Church, on the sole basis of the revelation of God's existence, infallibly define his freedom, or not? If she cannot, then that conclusion is not truly a theological conclusion, and once again the example is irrelevant. If she can, we ask our objector to set aside that and other similar obscure instances and cite one single instance of a theological conclusion *already defined infallibly* by the Church, which cannot be defined as a truth of faith. He will certainly not produce even one. If, then, our objector cannot produce, out of all the conclusions already defined infallibly, one single instance that is not definable as of divine faith, it follows that every true conclusion is definable as of divine faith, since every true conclusion can be defined infallibly.

When it is a question of verifying whether every truly theological conclusion possesses the characteristic of being "definable as of divine faith", it is rather unscientific to put forward obscure examples that are meant more to strike the imagination than to enlighten the mind. In the sciences, when it is a question of determining the essential characteristics of a certain type, e.g., the characteristics of a living thing, one does not take as a specimen a doubtful case concerning which questions are raised as to its being alive or lifeless, but a case of which there can be no doubt that it is a living thing. It is in the latter and in all specimens that are *clearly* and *indubitably* alive that the

[317] *Op. cit.,* pg. 206.

essential characteristics of living organisms are investigated. Once they are determined, such characteristics are unconditionally applied to every living organism, and *conditionally* to any specimen of which we are not sure whether it is an organism or a mineral. If it is an organism it will have such characteristics; it will not have them, if it is not.

Now then: doubtful or debatable conclusions are not clearly conclusions since to question or dispute their truth is tantamount to questioning or disputing whether they are conclusions. Hence, only conclusions admitted as certain by all theologians are to be taken as specimens of rigorously theological conclusions, not those that are obscure, doubtful or debatable.

Furthermore: all the theologians of any determinate period can be deceived. Therefore, in the question of verifying whether the truly theological conclusion is or is not definable as of faith, the scientific procedure consists in taking account of the conclusions that the Church has already defined as *infallible,* for in such conclusions no deception is possible. If every conclusion defined as infallible can be defined as of faith, then every truly theological conclusion can be defined as of faith. Hence we ask our objector to set aside obscure or doubtful instances and to cite one single conclusion defined as infallible that cannot be defined as of faith. This is the truly scientific and certain method.

The foregoing would be sufficient, and more than sufficient, to rebut the example brought forward against us. But, for greater abundance, we will now examine it on its merits. Suppose a philosopher were to say "God is not a free agent", or "God is not omnipotent", or "in God there is no providence regarding this world". We now ask in turn, "On the basis of such statements alone, has the philosopher said, or not, 'God does not exist'? " We are not asking whether he *intended* to say it, but whether he has *said* it.

To be consistent our objector would have to say that he has not. He would have to say that *it follows* from what has been said, but that *it has not been said.* On the other hand, we affirm, with St. Thomas, that whether or not he *intended* to say it, *he has said it, implicitly* of course, but nonetheless truly. St. Thomas says: "Then does a man *say* that *God does not exist,* when he thinks that *God is not omnipotent,* and that *he has not any care of human affairs.*"[318] Thus, if anyone who denies God's freedom or his omnipotence thereby *says* that God does not exist, then anyone who affirms or reveals God's existence reveals or *affirms* implicitly his freedom, omnipotence, or

[318] ST. THOMAS, *In Psalmum 13,* ed. Vivès, t.18, pg.290.

any other divine attribute that can be evidently known by human reason without new revelation.

Compare now the just quoted text of St. Thomas with that other text of the Saint which we have repeatedly quoted: "For he who *says* one thing somehow *says* many things: and *these things* are those that precede the article and are *consequent* to it. And *in this regard* the article of faith can be *explicated* and divided." The comparison of these texts will make it clear once more that St. Thomas takes *consequences* to mean true and proper consequences, since the attributes of omnipotence, providence, or divine freedom, are conclusions in the proper sense from the divine essence.

Therefore, everything that truly is a consequence of the revealed deposit – provided it is a consequence without which it is absolutely impossible to maintain the truth of the revealed deposit, and provided it is evidently deducible by us without new revelation – is *implicitly* revealed or *said* by God. But precisely on account of its being *implicit,* it has not yet been *explicated* or *proposed* by God, and hence it is not yet formally of faith. If its *explication* and *proposition* are done by *human reason,* then it is human science; theology. But if done by the Church's *divine authority,* then it is of divine faith.

Hence we have said, and say again, that there are two, not one, keys to dogmatic development: a) the truly *implicit virtuality* of the revealed deposit; b) the *divine authority* or definition of the Church. Without the former the development would not be homogeneous or an evolution *quoad explicationem,* but transformistic or an evolution *quoad substantiam.* Without the latter the development would be theological, not dogmatic development (119, 156).

As a new, if unnecessary confirmation of the amplitude with which St. Thomas conceived the truly implicit containment of the Holy Scripture, suffice it to say that, according to St. Thomas, in the assertion "The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father" is implicit and truly contained this other assertion "The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son". Even more, according to St. Thomas, in the assertion "The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father *alone"* is truly contained the assertion "The Holy Spirit proceeds also from the Son". The reason for it is the real identity required by the mystery of the Holy Trinity in *any and every* thing where no relative opposition exists, as none exists between the Father and the Son in being the principle of the Holy Spirit.

St. Thomas says: "Inasmuch as the error of those who assert that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son had not yet arisen at the time of the early councils, it was not necessary that it should have been *explicitly* stated . . . However, *it was implicitly contained in the saying that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father.*"[319] "Consequently, when it is said that the

[319] *Summa Theologica,* p.1, q.36, a.2, ad 2.

Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, even if it were added that he proceeds from *the Father alone,* the Son would not thence be excluded, *because* the Father and the Son are *not opposed* in respect of being the principle of the Holy Spirit."[320] "It is impossible that everything should be explicitly contained in that Symbol, in which there is no mention made of the descent to hell. But the procession of the Holy Spirit [from the Son] is contained implicitly therein, INSOFAR *as therein is contained the distinction of persons, which would not be possible otherwise,* as has been said. But the Greeks ask how did the Latins presume to add this [viz., *and the Son*]. To which it is to be replied that there was a need, as their error shows, that the *authority of the Roman Church* should gather a council in which something that was *implicitly* contained in the articles of faith would be *expressed.*"[321]

The dogmatic truth that "The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son was already *formally* revealed in the words ('because he will receive of what is mine') and others similar."[322] But even if it were not formally contained in those words, it would be *virtually,* but implicitly and truly, contained in just these words, "The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father", and, according to St. Thomas, this alone would suffice to enable the Church to define as a truth of faith that the Holy Spirit proceeds also from the Son.

Thus, if the statement "The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father" contains implicitly the statement "The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son", then for the same, if not greater, reason the statement "God is the being by essence", or some such other statement, contains implicitly the statement "God is free". Let any Thomist ponder on it, and it will become clear that the reason is the same, viz., the *objective* containment of the one in the other not only in itself but also *for us,* that the one cannot be denied or affirmed without the other, that the one is *of the understanding* of the other. Such is the true implicit-virtual theology. Therein lies the root of the *definability* as of divine faith of every truly theological conclusion.

Confirmation. – We have elsewhere (249) quoted an interesting passage from the learned Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange, in which he admits that in the concept of God or of any of his attributes the concepts of all the other attributes are *implicitly* contained. Let us quote another passage from another equally distinguished theologian, the profound and lucid Fr. De La Taille, of the Society of Jesus. After explaining that the concepts of animality and rationality are *extrinsic* to each other, and the former does not include the

[320] *Loc. cit.*, ad 1.

[321] ST. THOMAS, *In 1 Sent.*, d.11, expositio textus.

[322] *Ibid.*

latter so that the latter is a true objective *addition* to the former, Fr. De La Taille goes on to say: "In God there is nothing of the sort; there is nothing of the sort *in any divine attribute:* no attribute is extrinsic to the other. I can, it is true, *conceive* a divine perfection without *adverting* to the fact that it *includes* the others, but the others *are there, and I have but to explore that which I have in mind to find all the others there.* HENCE NOTHING IS ADDED THERE."[323] If that is true, as it is, every theologian who does not allow himself to be blinded by preconceived ideas should confess that in the revelation of God's existence or of any of his attributes, all the other attributes are by the same token *implicitly* revealed and definable as of divine faith, on condition that it be possible for us to know them evidently without new revelation.

Let us add other interesting passages from Billuart, Oviedo, and Marín.

"Foreknowledge, goodness, justice and the other attributes are not God's substance in a *virtual and explicit sense,* according to the meaning of the *terms,* but in a REAL *formal sense.* For it is *altogether one and the same* REALITY that is signified by different names and grasped by different *inadequate* concepts, of which one *does not explicitly* signify the other, *albeit it does so implicitly.*"[324]

"In God it is the same thing to be God and to have the attribute of justice; hence the *revelation that* AFFIRMS *that God exists,* AFFIRMS *that he is just* for anyone who adequately penetrates what that which is signified by the name God imports IN REALITY."[325]

"You will insist: God who reveals omnipotence solely reveals what this *word* signifies to the hearers, since the meaning of a word must be common to both speaker and hearer. But this word 'omnipotence' only signifies 'omnipotence' as distinct from immensity and the other attributes. Therefore.

"I answer conceding the major and distinguishing the minor. Only signifies omnipotence *formally,* I concede the minor; REALLY, I deny the minor. Hence the hearer forms only a concept about omnipotence *formally; but* REALLY *he forms a concept about immensity,* since that concept REALLY AFFIRMS *immensity,* albeit not formally."[326]

[323] M. DE LA TAILLE, "Recherches des Sciences Religieuses" (Jan.-Feb. 1923), pg. 11.

[324] BILLUART, *De Deo Uno,* d.2, a.3, 4, solvuntur obiectiones.

[325] FRANCISCUS DE OVIEDO, *De Fide* (Lugduni 1651), controv.4, n.107.

[326] IOANNES MARÍN, S.J., *Theologia speculativa* (Venetiis 1764), *De Fide divina,* d.9, pgs.374-375.

All this had already been said *in a real manner* by St. Thomas in the following terms: "The act of the believer does not terminate in the *enunciable* but in the THING. . . as in science, so also *in faith.*"[327]

In short, the distinction between the primitive dogmatic concepts explicated by the Apostles and the new consequential dogmatic concepts defined by the Church is exactly the same distinction that exists between the divine essence and its attributes or among the divine attributes themselves. It is not a real distinction. And neither is it a *major* virtual distinction as that which exists between concepts *extrinsic* to each other, and which the Schoolmen designated by the term *per modum excludentis et exclusi* (i.e. in the manner of the excluding and the excluded), as, e.g., the distinction between animality and rationality. It is solely and exclusively a *minor* virtual distinction which exists between mutually *implicit* or intrinsic concepts, which the Schoolmen designated by the term *per modum includentis et inclusi* (i.e., in the manner of the including and the included), as, e.g., the concepts of absolute immutability and eternity.[328]

For this reason we have repeatedly said, and say again, that the development or evolution of dogma through the definitions of the Church gives us concepts that are *new* or *different* from the primitive concepts; not, however, completely or adequately new, but only partially or inadequately; not new *simpliciter* but only *secundum quid;* not new in substance but in explication.

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[327] *Summa Theologica,* 2-2, q.1, a.2, ad 2.

[328] "The distinction of reasoned reason is of two kinds: *major* and *minor.*

The *major* is that which distinguishes in the object formalities or concepts which *do not include each other,* e.g., animality and rationality in man.

The *minor* exists between concepts of which one formally and explicitly is not the other, however by reason of the subject in which they are found, the *one includes the other,* and thus they differ not in the manner of the excluding and the excluded, but *in the manner of the including and the included,* e.g., the concepts of justice and mercy in God." (MARCELLUS A PUERO IESU, *Cursus Philosophiae Scholasticae ad mentem Angelici Doctoris* [Burgis 1922], vol. 3, pg. 24)

"From this last conclusion it is gathered that in God the attributes, relations, and essence do not differ in exactly the same way as the metaphysical degrees, e.g. animality and rationality. The latter differs with a *major* distinction or by an *exclusive* precision; the former differs with a *minor* distinction or by an *inclusive* precision." (BILLUART, *De Deo,* d.2, a.3, §3, at the end)

"The *common opinion among Thomists* holds that the divine attributes differ from the essence, or from one another, only in the manner of the *explicit* and the *implicit,* as being differs from its properties in which it is transcendentally *included.*" (GONET, *De Deo,* d.3, a.3, n.30) Hence, if the divine attributes do not differ from the essence, or from each other, except as *explicit* and *implicit,* it is beyond us to conceive that there can be Thomists who maintain that the revelation of one of them is not the implicit revelation of the other, or that the latter is nonetheless not definable as of divine faith.

Inasmuch as they are new concepts, they are *proper* conclusions. Inasmuch as they are not new in substance but in explication, their definition by the Church is only an *explication* of the primitive faith, and therefore, dogmas of divine faith (306).

518. FINAL OBSERVATION. – "Lastly, Fr. Marín-Sola's opinion leads to *incongruous* consequences. For it would follow that *all theological conclusions* about God would be definable. The same would have to be said of *other mysteries of the faith.* Fr. Marín-Sola himself concedes and asserts that *all of* St. Thomas' *Summa Theologica* is definable . . . e.g., the real distinction between essence and existence in created things. Thus, finally, *all of metaphysics,* and even *all of philosophy and mathematics* would be definable as truths revealed by God! "[329]

Reply. – This is the last page of the book in which our objector cites us. In it, so to speak, he lays everything on the line in hopes of impressing the reader with an oratorical coup, which a metaphysician would describe as a *quantitative* argument. It would mean, he says, the definability of *all* conclusions of theology, *all* the mysteries of the faith, the *whole of the Summa Theologica,* the *whole of metaphysics,* the *whole of mathematics.* Fortunately, in metaphysics and theology arguments based on *numbers* and *quantity* usually carry little weight. This argument is very much like the argument submitted by royalists against the authority of the Church. When they hear it said that the Church has authority over the state in *everything related* to spiritual matters, they believe that therewith it is asserted that the Church has authority over *everything,* period, and that civil authority is eliminated.

To make our objector see the weak point of the argument it would be enough to ask: Can the Church define as infallible truth everything that our objector has enumerated there? Plainly not. Now, then, nothing can be defined as a truth of divine *faith* that cannot be defined as an infallible truth. That, we say, should suffice since the matter is plain enough. However, since the point is an interesting one, let us take it up by parts, even if we have previously touched on it elsewhere (318).

In the first place, let us eliminate mathematics. We fail to understand why our objector has mentioned it. Mathematics rarely or never has any necessary relation to the revealed deposit, and without necessary relation there is no definability. "As in *geometrical matters* and *others of the sort,* which can *never at all* belong to the faith."[330]

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[329] *Op. cit.,* pgs. 206-207.

[330] *Summa Theologica,* 2-2, q.11, a.2.

In the second place, speaking of philosophy, and even of its principal part, metaphysics, let us eliminate all conclusions that *for us* are unrelated to the revealed deposit. Whether or not they are in themselves related to the revealed deposit is immaterial. If, for us, no relation is discernible, they cannot be defined as of divine faith, not even as infallible truths. Of such conclusions there is a great number.

In the third place, even in the case of conclusions in philosophy and theology that, for us, are related in some way to the revealed deposit, let us eliminate all conclusions whose relationship to it is for us only probable, uncertain, not evidently certain. Such conclusions abound in theology and philosophy, as well as in all other sciences. They are not science, but scientific theories or systems.

In the fourth place, even in the case of certain and evident conclusions, let us eliminate all conclusions whose certainty and connexion are only physically certain, e.g., the connexion between being a mother and not being a virgin, or between being a man and being a human person, or in other words, all conclusions of what we have called type 4. Our objector knows very well that we do not regard such conclusions as objects of infallibility, let alone as definable as of divine faith.

With these four cuts or eliminations which every theologian is bound to make, the pile of definable conclusions – the great mass of which so alarmed our objector – has been reduced to a much smaller quatity. It has shrunk to include only the theologico-inclusive conclusions or those that are gathered from the revealed deposit through objective analysis, only the conclusions without which it is impossible to maintain the truth of the revealed deposit, only the conclusions whose denial entails with absolute necessity the denial of the revealed deposit, provided that our reason is able to know these conclusions evidently without new revelation. It is of such conclusions that St. Thomas writes: "Those from whose denial *there follows* something contrary to the faith... Those from which *there follows* the corruption of some article... And with respect to both the one and the other *heresy* is possible in the same way as *faith.*" (467)

Will the author be kind enough to answer this question: Are these conclusions – whether many or few is immaterial since *quantity* has no bearing on metaphysical or theological questions – are these conclusions definable by the Church as *infallible,* or not? Every Catholic theologian is bound to answer, as in fact he does, that these conclusions, whatever their number, are objects of infallibility. This being so, as it truly is, we ask our objector to reflect on three things:

First, St. Thomas devotes a whole article of his *Quaestiones Disputatae De Fide* to prove that no infallible faith is possible other than divine faith. We have analyzed that article at great length elsewhere in this book (239), and earlier in *La Ciencia Tomista.* Our objector knew of this article of St. Thomas's and our analysis of it. And yet, in a book in which he quotes so many other articles and passages from St. Thomas, he makes not the slightest allusion either to this fundamental article of the holy Doctor or of our demonstration based on it.

Secondly, even setting aside the question whether an infallible faith is possible other than divine faith, *all* theologians prior to Molina expressly affirm that such conclusions are definable as of *divine faith.* The author has been unable to cite one single theologian for the opposite view.

The uninitiated reader who peruses our objector's book without being clear in his mind as to the point at issue, might be impressed by the many writers quoted by our objector seemingly in his favour. We ask the reader to observe that two different points can be at issue on this subject: a) whether the Church's definitions are an *explication* of the revealed deposit; b) whether truly *theological conclusions* can be defined by the Church as truths of divine faith. Our objector has fruitlessly amassed a multitude of texts asserting the first point apparently unaware that they are all pointless since we all are agreed on it and no one disputes it. But he has not quoted one single text or cited a writer prior to Molina who denies the second point, which is precisely the point at issue. On the other hand, we have quoted numerous writers, before and after Molina, who not only assert the first point, but likewise expressly assert the second point, viz., that every rigorously theological conclusion is definable as of divine faith. Inasmuch as every rigorously theological conclusion is *implicitly* contained in the revealed premise alone, its definition is nothing but an *explication* of the revealed datum.

Thirdly, *even after Molina,* and despite his great and well-deserved prestige, the vast majority of theologians, irrespective of religious or school affiliation, have asserted that inclusive conclusions are definable as of divine faith. Among these theologians we find names as illustrious as those of Vázquez, Suárez, Bellarmine, Lugo, Tannero, Oviedo, Fabri, Annato, Platelius, Tirso González, Gautier, Antoine, Simonet, Marín, Haunoldus... of the Society of Jesus; Navarrete, González, Gravina, Nazarius, Serra, Labat, Contenson, Preingué... of the Order of the Preachers; Gabarti, Berti, Villarroyo, Honorato del Val..., of the Order of St. Augustine; Castillo, Boyvin, Gervase of Brescia, Hilary of Paris... of the Order of St. Francis; Mezguer, Herce, Schnell... of the Order of St. Benedict; Philip of the Most Holy Trinity, Crassous . . . , of the Order of Carmel; Grandin, Silvius, Bijonius, Liebermann . . . , of the secular clergy. Earlier in this book (398-448) we have submitted passages from these writers, passages that are clear and resistant to tergiversation.

Fourthly, a distinguished Jesuit theologian has only just now, as it were, written that our opinion "is in reality the *most common* and *very much more probable*... Among the ancients this opinion is held by.... and *commonly by the more recent* against Ripalda, the Wirceburgenses [or Kilber] and others." (490)

It is regrettable that a historian and theologian of the caliber of Fr. Schultes should have chosen to side with Kilber against the other opinion ("most common and very much more probable") which is also our own. But this is the condition as well as the right of the human mind relative to all matters left by God to the free debate of men.

519. IMMUTABILITY AND EVOLUTION. – We do not want to close this section without mentioning that the work of our distinguished fellow religious Fr. Schultes is, in our opinion, an excellent textbook on the history of dogmas as to the *immutability* of dogma; but as to the *evolution* of dogma we find it somewhat deficient, perhaps in nomenclature rather than in substance.

We believe that Fr. Schultes's position and our own are somewhat analogous to the positions of Bossuet and Newman respectively described earlier (359). The former stressed the immutability of dogma, the latter its vitality and homogeneous evolution. Far from being opposed the two positions complement each other.

EPILOGUE TO THE WHOLE BOOK

520. SUMMARY OF THE SEVEN CHAPTERS. – It is now time to summarize and bring to a conclusion this rather lengthy and dry study on the homogeneous evolution of Catholic dogma.

In *chapter 1* we saw that a doctrinal system evolves homogeneously when the evolution is restricted to developing what was already truly implicit in the primitive datum or starting point.

In *chapter 2* we saw that the revealed datum or whatever is explicitly revealed provides the starting point of all Catholic doctrine. There existed and exists in it a truly *implicit* virtuality, viz., the metaphysico-inclusive virtuality known to traditional theology before Suárez by the names of revealed virtual or virtual implicit.

In *chapter 3* we saw that the Church possesses truly *divine* assistance and authority not only to safeguard, but also to *explicate* or unfold everything that is truly implicit in the revealed datum.

In *chapter 4* we saw that, provided it is truly inclusive or analytic, theological reasoning keeps within the bounds of truly *implicit* virtuality. Likewise, the sense of faith keeps within the same bounds, provided that it includes the whole body of Christian believers. These are the Church's two human instruments. By employing them under *divine* assistance, the Church can define, and has in fact defined, many new dogmas. New, that is, not *quoad substantiam*, but *quoad explicationem*.

In *Chapter 5* we saw that both the revealed datum's *implicit* virtuality and the Church's *divine* authority to *explicate* it dogmatically reach as far as the lowest level of Catholic doctrine, including even the dogmatic facts.

In *Chapter 6* we saw that all the objections raised against the evolution of dogma are valid only against substantial or transformistic evolution, as, e.g., the evolution of the physico-connexive or non-implicit kind. They have no force against the evolution by way of *implicit* or metaphysico-inclusive virtuality. This kind of evolution is *explicatory* and hence homogeneous.

Finally, in *chapter 7* we saw that dogmatic evolution by way of *implicit* virtuality or conclusion is admitted by all theologians before Molina, and by the vast majority of theologians after him.

521. THE DIFFERENT FACTORS OF DOGMATIC EVOLUTION. – We believe that the foregoing has thrown sufficient light on the material, the process, the principal cause, the instrumental agencies, and the scope of the homogeneous evolution of Catholic dogma.

The *material* is the implicit virtuality. *"That which is implicitly contained in the articles."* (St. Thomas)

The *process* is always and exclusively the development of the *implicit*, a process of explication. *"The explication of the faith."* (St. Thomas)

The *principal cause* is the Holy Spirit's assistance, which is to say the divine authority of the Church, she who is "the *minister of the object of faith* through whom the First Truth *explicates itself and other objects of belief.*" (Cajetan)

The *instrumental agencies*, great in number and variety as all human agencies are, reduce to two, viz. inclusive reasoning and the sense of faith, or the Christian mind and the Christian heart, or the effort of the learned and the labour of the saint. *"Through rational inquisition and through connaturality to things divine."* (St. Thomas)

The *scope* is equal to the scope of divine assistance or the Church's infallibility, equal to scope of sacred theology, viz., all the levels of truly Christian doctrine. *"Everything* [i.e., all things theological] *is implicitly contained in the Bible."* (Capreolus) "For this reason many things are now

reputed *heretical* that were not thus reputed previously, viz., that it is now much clearer *what follows* from them." (St. Thomas) "nor is it necessary that what is *immediately of faith* should be *immediately revealed by God;* but it suffices that, even if it is *mediately revealed by God,* it be *immediately proposed by the Church.*" (Serra) "For the Church has up to now never proposed to the faithful for belief or defined anything that is not contained expressly in the Sacred Scriptures or in the Traditions of the Apostles, or *contained in them virtually in such a manner that it is gathered therefrom through evident consequence* . . . And it is *in this sense that St. Thomas is to be understood* in the article when he says that a *new* issue of the Creed belongs to the authority of the Supreme Pontiff, i.e., as to a *new explication.* Whence it follows that heretics wrongly charge against us that the Supreme Pontiff makes a *new faith*." (Báñez)

Such is our concept of the homogenerous evolution of Catholic dogma after the Apostles. In our opinion, it is also the true concept of St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, Scotus, and traditional theology.

522. TWO DIFFERENT QUESTIONS. – In the course of this book's exposition of that concept, two questions should be distinguished: one principal, the other secondary. The principal question refers to the definability of metaphysico-inclusive *theological conclusions* as truths of divine faith. The secondary question refers to the definability of dogmatic facts as truths of divine faith.

Anyone who admits the definability of the metaphysico-inclusive theological conclusion, as it is in fact admitted by all traditional theology before Molina and by the vast majority of later theologians, admits by that sole token true and proper evolution in dogma by way of theological conclusions in the proper sense. The implicit virtuality of such conclusions is no obstacle to their being theological conclusions truly and properly.

On the other hand, the other question relative to the definability of dogmatic facts as truths of faith, and to the canonization of saints, is a relatively secondary problem since it has no bearing upon the existence or non-existence of truly dogmatic evolution, but on its greater or lesser extension.

Thus, although we have defended and defend the affirmative view on both questions, we regard the first as the principal and fundamental question. Provided that this first question is accepted, it is of no great significance for the question of the evolution of dogma whether the second question is accepted or not.

The central purpose of this book has been the investigation of the first and fundamental question. It was our aim to show that, even after the Apostles, there has been and will be a true homogeneous evolution of

Catholic dogma by way of rigorous metaphysico-inclusive conclusions, whether such conclusions be apodictically detectable through the speculative channel of reasoning, or solely detectable through the intuitive channel of the sence of faith (218). We are intimately persuaded not only that such is the view of traditional teaching, but also that it is the only view capable of explaining honestly and without forced tergiversations the plain facts of the history of dogmas, and of successfully rebutting the objections based on those facts which Modernism raises against the homogeneity of Catholic dogma.

Our teaching is identical to that described by bishop Simancas in the 16th century as follows: "This is the true, accepted and Catholic teaching." (391)

It is the same as the teaching of which the Capuchin Gervase of Brescia said in the 17th century: "All Catholics are agreed" on it (478).

Lastly, it is the same teaching of which the Jesuit Daniel Sola has recently written: "In reality it is the *most common* and *much more probable*... This view is held...*commonly by the more recent*" authors (490).

523. THE TRUE FORMULA OF HOMOGENEOUS EVOLUTION. – We close our book as we began it: with the two golden formulae of the homogeneous evolution of Catholic dogma bequeathed to us by St. Vincent de Lérins and St. Thomas Aquinas.

The formula of St. Vincent de Lérins, already consecrated by the Vatican Council, is embodied in these brief words: "Let it, then, GROW... but IN THE SAME SENSE."

Even more concise is St. Thomas's formula, which is also the formula of St. Bonaventure and Scotus. It is made up of only two words, than which there can be, and there is no better summary, no better epilogue, no better ending to our book:

EXPLICATIO FIDEI

THE EXPLICATION OF THE FAITH

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